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Economic Principals \273 Blog Archive \273 a Normal Professor Economic Principals » Blog Archive » A Normal Professor http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2008.06.01/320.html Home June 1, 2008 David Warsh, Proprietor About Archives previous | contents | next Books A Normal Professor Receive the Bulldog Edition Perhaps, now that Harvard’s Russia scandal is receding into the past, Andrei Shleifer, 47, will take it easy. He has a steady stream of students, presides over a growing literature in comparative economics, and has developed an interesting sideline in the economics of persuasion. His wife, Nancy Zimmerman , runs a hedge fund that has seen explosive growth, today managing more than $3 billion for institutional clients; together the pair, through their start-ups, may have Economic Blogosphere amassed net worth of $40 million or more. (A columnist for Economics Portfolio magazine’s website subsequently estimated that Roundtable the figure may be closer to $1 bullion.) Their children are Economists View growing, his energetic parents live nearby, he superintends a steady stream of visitors to his villa in the south of France, and he keeps a hand in with developments in Russia. Economic Journalists For example, when Anders Aslund , of Washington’s Peterson Allan Sloan institute for International Economics, was in Cambridge, Amity Shlaes Mass. last winter, to celebrate the publication of How Andrew Leonard Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Binyamin Appelbaum Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia and Russia’s Bruce Bartlett Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Carl Bialik Democracy Failed , Shleifer, the author of A Normal Catherine Rampell Country: Russia After Communism , threw a party for him at Charles Duhigg his spacious home on unpaved Bracebridge Road in suburban Christopher Caldwell Newton. Christopher Hayes 1 of 8 12/24/2011 8:33 AM Economic Principals » Blog Archive » A Normal Professor http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2008.06.01/320.html Chrystia Freeland Clive Crook But if Shleifer has slowed down, he hasn’t shown it yet. He Conor Dougherty just returned from giving three seminars in three days in Daniel Altman Chicago. University of Chicago professor Steven Levitt , for Daniel Gross one, marveled at the enthusiasm with which Shleifer David Brooks presented a series of new ideas. Given the uphill battle that David Leonhardt publishing requires, the lags, the referees, the harshness of David Wessel the inevitable criticism: “Usually when people have such rich Dean Baker outside options, they take them. It’s refreshing to see the Douglas Clement passion with which Andrei pursues academic research.” Drake Bennett Ezra Klein EP readers know Shleifer mainly through this weekly’s Felix Salmon extensive coverage of the tumult that broke around him in the Gordon Crovitz spring of 1997, when the US Agency for International Greg Ip Development, after a brief investigation, fired the Harvard Gregg Zachary University for International Development from its contract to Gretchen Morgenson advise the government of Boris Yeltsin, having discovered Harold Meyerson that its team leader, Shleifer, and his wife, were running a Holman Jenkins private investment office out of Harvard’s Moscow office. Ira Stoll Thus they don’t have much of a picture of the man – the sort James Grant of thing a proper profile would provide. It’s no longer my job James Surowiecki to provide that profile. But I can sketch the outlines of what Jeff Madrick fuller picture of Shleifer might look like in the aftermath of Jesse Eisinger the scandal, with a view to turning the page. John Cassidy John Kay First, a reminder of the outlines of the story. A kid, newly John Lanchester emigrated with his family from Russia, turns up at Harvard, John M. Berry still learning English, and is assigned J. Bradford Delong as a John Parker roommate. (Today DeLong is professor of economics at the John Tierney University of California at Berkeley, where, among many Jon Hilsenrath other pursuits, he maintains a popular blog .) A year later, he Jonathan Cohn is adopted as research assistant by MIT assistant professor Justin Fox Lawrence Summers, and begins a meteoric rise. He earns his Justin Lahart PhD at MIT, demonstrating the advantages of an innocent Leon Neyfakh eye with a remarkable thesis titled “The Business Cycle and Mark Whitehouse the Stock Market.” He spends a year teaching at Princeton Martin Wolf (where he acquires a disciple in Edward Glaeser, then an Mary Fricker 2 of 8 12/24/2011 8:33 AM Economic Principals » Blog Archive » A Normal Professor http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2008.06.01/320.html Matt Miller Matt Ridley undergraduate, today a Harvard professor), then goes on to Matt Yglasias Chicago. He meets and marries Zimmerman. Five years out Maureen Tkacik of graduate school, Andrei Shleifer returns to Harvard and Megan McArdle goes to Russia as head of Harvard team advising President Michael Lewis Boris Yeltsin on behalf of the US government. Michael Mandel Mickey Kaus In 1997, he is discovered to be investing in Russia, along with Noam Scheiber his wife, deputy, deputy’s girlfriend, and their in-laws. He and Paul Blustein Harvard are fired by the State Department, the project Paul Krugman collapses, and its failure used to discredit both Yeltsin and US Paul Solman ambitions in Russia. He maintains that he was within his Peter Coy rights. In 1999, Shleifer wins the John Bates Clark Medal, Peter Goodman awarded every two years to the most influential economist Peter Gosselin under forty. And, in 2000, the US Department of Justice Peter Passell abandons its criminal investigation of him and instead files a Phil Izzo & Co huge civil suit. Harvard and Shleifer dig in their heels and Robert Samuelson begin a protracted battle. Summers, soon after president of Robert Wright Harvard University, stands by his protégé throughout. Roger Alcaly Roger Lowenstein In 2005, the government finally wins its case, including the Sebastian Mallaby return of $25.2 million from Harvard. Shleifer capitulates, Sewell Chan paying $2 million in fines. Harvard deprives him of his Steven Pearlstein endowed chair. The Russia case is closed. But not before, in Sudeep Reddy 2006, his handling of it helps cost Shleifer’s old friend Susan Lee Summers the presidency of Harvard. Sylvia Nasar Thomas Friedman So what’s changed? Tim Harford Timothy Taylor First of all, Shleifer’s defenders, at least those who followed Virginia Postrel the case, now acknowledge he shouldn’t have been investing William D. Cohan in Russia while officially advising its government. Moreover, Zanny Minton most recognize the negative effect when a Russian expatriate Beddoes with close links to the US Treasury Department (and, in anti-Semitic Russia, a Jew), is seen to be running a family Various feeds business out of his USAID-financed Harvard office in Moscow. A little more attention has been paid to the role of 3 of 8 12/24/2011 8:33 AM Economic Principals » Blog Archive » A Normal Professor http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2008.06.01/320.html wife may have played in egging him on. Shleifer’s long-promised defense of his actions has not materialized. Meanwhile, healing forces have gone to work within Harvard. The university’s endowment, nearly 2 percent of which was invested in special situations in Russia in the mid-1990s, has become less aggressive. Harvard has given up the Investing in Russia conference it sponsored for many years. Other authors, historians and government scholars, including some at Harvard, have joined in the telling of the story of Russia’s transition. The economics department, eager to be known as the world’s foremost in order to attract the brightest students, remains in bad odor within the university. Then, too, Shleifer is giving up the editorship of the Journal of Economic Perspectives , after serving two three-year terms. (Term limits were adopted after founding editor Joseph Stiglitz served three.) As one of three flagship journals of the American Economic Association, the JEP is intended “to fill a gap between the general interest press and most other academic economics journals,” according to its marching orders. Its editor thus has great power to reward friends and punish enemies, and the appointment of such an embattled figure in 2003 was viewed with alarm by some senior figures in the profession (though none was willing to do so publicly). David Autor, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, takes over in December. You would have thought that ten years of backroom battles with Harvard lawyers and the government attorneys would have cost Shleifer dearly in terms of scholarship. But there is little evidence of the disturbance in his CV. Between 1997 and 2005, he published more than fifty papers dealing with finance, behavioral and organizational economics, including “The Limits of Arbitrage,” a famous paper in 1997 considered to have anticipated the circumstances in which 4 of 8 12/24/2011 8:33 AM Economic Principals » Blog Archive » A Normal Professor http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2008.06.01/320.html Long Term Capital Management foundered the next year. There is, of course, no telling how much greater would have been his influence in such diverse fields had he been able to concentrate single-mindedly on his research, test it more extensively against the evidence, and build bridges to the work of those outside his various networks. But there is no doubt that he has produced a substantial body of work. “Certain people have the inner strength necessary to produce remarkable work in adversity,” says his friend and fellow Harvard professor Claudia Goldin. One arena in which Shleifer works is what is routinely described as the new comparative economics. Traditionally, comparative economics strived to bring capitalist and socialist economies into close comparison, searching out the mechanisms through which markets and central planning achieved their results, gauging the efficiency of each in gaining its ends.
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