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University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School January 2013 Subject of Conscience: On the Relation between Freedom and Discrimination in the Thought of Heidegger, Foucault, and Butler Aret Karademir University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the Philosophy Commons Scholar Commons Citation Karademir, Aret, "Subject of Conscience: On the Relation between Freedom and Discrimination in the Thought of Heidegger, Foucault, and Butler" (2013). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4821 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Subject of Conscience: On the Relation between Freedom and Discrimination in the Thought of Heidegger, Foucault, and Butler by Aret Karademir A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Co-Major Professor: Stephen Turner, Ph.D. Co-Major Professor: Charles Guignon, Ph.D. Ofelia Schutte, Ph.D. Martin Schönfeld, Ph.D. Alex Levine, Ph.D. Date of Approval: September 30, 2013 Keywords: Authenticity, Tradition, National Socialism, Radical Democracy Copyright © 2013, Aret Karademir DEDICATION To her. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I express my deepest gratitude to Stephen Turner, Charles Guignon, and Ofelia Schutte for their support, guidance, and help throughout my doctoral studies. I also thank them for their comments on each and every version of this essay. And I thank them for giving me the opportunity to write my dissertation under their intellectual guidance. I am also grateful to my friends, David Cheely and Muhammad Velji, for their insightful comments and criticisms not only on earlier versions of this essay but also on my philosophical beliefs in general. I thank Martin Schönfeld and Alex Levine for their help in the preparation of the final version of this essay. Last but not least, I thank Agop Karademir, Artür Karademir, Kirkor Döşemeciyan, and Derviş Emre Demirocak for their constant support. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Heidegger and Freedom 11 1.1. Inauthentic Historicity 12 1.2. Authentic Historicity 22 1.3. Subversive Historicity 32 Chapter 2: Heidegger and Modernity 43 2.1. Heidegger’s Conservative World 44 2.2. Heidegger’s Völkisch Philosophy 51 2.3. Völkisch Historicity versus Nazi Revolution 61 Chapter 3: Heidegger and Discrimination 80 3.1. Monolithic Historicity 82 3.2. Marginalizing Historicity 97 Chapter 4: Heidegger and Foucault 110 4.1. Power, Resistance, Genealogy 112 4.2. Subversive Repetition 124 4.3. Constant Subversive Repetition as Being-towards-Freedom 142 4.4. Freedom or Discrimination 156 Chapter 5: Heidegger and Butler 162 5.1. Existential Guilt 164 5.2. Anxiety 173 5.3. Anxiety-Engendering Other 181 5.4. Authentic Solicitude 192 Conclusion 203 List of References 209 Appendix: Copyright Information 229 i ABSTRACT Martin Heidegger was not only one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century but also a supporter of and a contributor to one of the most discriminatory ideologies of the recent past. Thus, “the Heidegger’s case” gives us philosophers an opportunity to work on discrimination from a philosophical perspective. My aim in this essay is to question the relationship between freedom and discrimination via Heidegger’s philosophy. I will show that what bridges the gap between Heidegger’s philosophy and a discriminatory ideology such as the National Socialist ideology is Heidegger’s conceptualization of freedom with the aid of a monolithic understanding of history—one that refuses to acknowledge the plurality and heterogeneity in the socio-historical existence of human beings. Accordingly, I will claim that the Heideggerian freedom depends on the social, if not literal, murder of the marginalized segments of a given society. However, I will refuse to conclude that Heidegger’s philosophy is a Nazi philosophy and that it should never be appropriated as long as we want to purify our thoughts from discriminatory ideas. Rather, I will re-appropriate Heidegger, against Heidegger, to read and interpret Michel Foucault’s and Judith Butler’s philosophies. My aim here is to construct a social ontology that may justify anti-discriminatory policies. More specifically, through my Heideggerian readings of Foucault and Butler, I will argue ii that one’s freedom is dependent on the cultural resuscitation of socially, and sometimes literally, murdered racial, sexual, ethnic, religious, and sectarian/confessional minorities. iii INTRODUCTION Martin Heidegger became the first Nazi rector of the University of Freiburg on April 21, 1933 and joined the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeitepartei (NSDAP) on May 1, 1933. After Germany’s defeat in WWII, he defended himself on many occasions by saying that he had been an apolitical thinker until his assumption of the rectorate; he accepted the post and then became a party member reluctantly just because he thought he could protect the university from political intrusions without turning his back to the “positive” aspects of the National Socialist movement. Even during his rectorship, he was an apolitical professor engaging in no political activity; and due to his lack of political understanding, it took him a year to realize that there was nothing positive in the movement. Moreover, immediately after his resignation from his post on April 23, 1934, but especially in his Nietzsche lectures beginning with 1936, he criticized National Socialism as harshly as possible. This is the story Heidegger has stuck with for more than twenty years. He narrated the same story before the Denazification Committee in 1945— while he was trying not to lose his professorship because of his Nazi past—in his 1966 Der Spiegel interview, and in “The Rectorate 1933/1934: Facts and Thoughts.” In his “Facts and Thoughts,” Heidegger claims that even though he was reluctant to assume the rectorate, his predecessors, Joseph Sauer and Wilhelm von Möllendorf, convinced him to be the new rector of the university; but the real motivation 1 behind his decision was his desire “to save, purify, and to strengthen what was positive” in the new political movement in Germany (Heidegger 1985b, p. 486): Von Möllendorf … wanted me to assume the rectorate. Similarly his predecessor, Sauer, tried to persuade me to assume the office in the interest of university. I hesitated as late as the day of the election and wanted to withdraw my candidacy. I had no contact with the relevant government and party agencies, was myself neither a member of the party, nor had I been active politically in any way (ibid., p. 481). After he reluctantly assumed the office, Heidegger adds, he found himself in a situation where he had to make another reluctant move, namely, party membership. He accepted the membership on the condition that he would not be bothered by any real- political task: During my first weeks in office, it was called to my attention that the Minister thought it important that rectors belong to the party. One day Dr. Kerber, then the County Leader, the Deputy County Leader, and a third member of the County Leadership appeared in my office to invite me to join the party. Only in the interest of the university… did I, who had never belonged to a political party, accept the invitation, but this, too, only on the expressly acknowledged condition that I would never take on a party office or engage in any party activity (ibid., pp. 492-493). Similar to his reluctance to get involved in politics, Heidegger continues, the NSDAP, too, was reluctant to include Heidegger in the movement. The first conflict between Heidegger and the movement took place when Heidegger refused the posting of the “Jew Notice” in his university and told the student leader that “as long as I was rector, this notice would find no place in this university” (ibid., p. 491). This was the first clash of opinions between Heidegger and the fascist movement, which would be followed by Heidegger’s “heroic” confrontation with Nazism in his Nietzsche lectures: “In 1936, I began the Nietzsche lectures. Anyone with ears to hear heard in these lectures a confrontation with National Socialism” (Heidegger 1991d, p. 101). Similarly, in his letter to the editor of Süddeutsche Zeitung in 1950, Heidegger writes, “during the last ten years 2 of my academic teaching career up until the autumn of 1944, I was engaged in an increasingly sharp intellectual conflict with and critique of the anti-intellectual foundations of the ‘National Socialist world-view’” (cited in Ott 1993, p. 29). However, thanks to the archival works of Victor Farias (1989), Hugo Ott (1993), and Rüdiger Safranski (1998), we know today that the Heideggerian version of the story is not entirely true. First of all, even before his assumption of the rectorate, in March, Heidegger became a member of “the Cultural-Political Working Community of German University Teachers”—a National Socialist clique within the official association of university staff, “the German Academics’ Association.” The clique was known for its members’ support for Gleichschaltung—i.e., alignment of public institutions with the totalitarian state ideology—for the introduction of the Führerprinzip into German universities, and for the ideological transformation of teaching (Safranski 1998, p. 235). Secondly, contrary to the Heideggerian version, neither Sauer nor von Möllendorf tried to convince Heidegger to assume the rectorate. As a matter of fact, the rector Sauer thought Heidegger was not ready to preside over the university when he was approached, in April, by a Nazi professor, Wolfgang Schadewalt, and asked to nominate Heidegger for the rectorate instead of von Möllendorf for the sake of a smooth nazification of the university.