DOCSLIB.ORG

Critical Review: the Emotional Construction of Morals

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Critical Review: the Emotional Construction of Morals Philosophical Psychology, 2013 Vol. 26, No. 3, 461–475, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.673767 Critical review: The Emotional Construction of Morals Erick Ramirez Jesse Prinz’s The Emotional Construction of Morals is an ambitious and intriguing contribution to the debate about the nature and role of emotion within moral psychology. I review Prinz’s recent claims surrounding the nature of emotional concepts as ‘‘embodied representations of concern’’ and survey his later arguments meant to establish a form of cultural relativism. Although I suggest that other theories of emotional representation (i.e. prototype views) would better serve Prinz’s aims, the underlying meta-ethical relativism that results is well defended and represents a significant advance for constructivist Sentimentalists. Keywords: Emotion; Meta-Ethics; Moral Psychology; Sentimentalism 1. Introduction The late Robert Solomon is quoted on the back cover of Jesse Prinz’s last book on emotions, Gut reactions (2004), saying that it was ‘‘an exciting book, I couldn’t put it down, but I fought with it every inch of the way.’’ One might very well say the same about Prinz’s companion book, The emotional construction of morals. Prinz’s arguments are sophisticated, empirically informed, and his conclusions enticing. Still, I fought with it every inch of the way. Prinz’s latest project is at its heart an attempt to accommodate empirical data on the emotions with our intuitions about morality. Prinz tries to explain our folk notions, not just of emotion but also of our moral practices and, in giving us those explanations, draws intriguing conclusions about the nature of both. His project is audacious in that he wants to give an account of emotion and ethics that preserves many seemingly incompatible aspects of these folk Erick Ramirez is an Instructor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego Correspondence to: Erick Ramirez, Department of Philosophy—0119, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0119, USA. Email: [email protected] © 2013 Taylor & Francis 462 E. Ramirez concepts by showing that emotions, understood as perceptions of somatic states calibrated to ‘‘concerns,’’ are necessary and sufficient to account for moral judgments and moral values as we (the folk) understand them. In doing this, Prinz thinks that the resulting meta-ethical position, speaker relative Sentimentalism, is not only true but can accommodate intuitions about what moral judgments are, why we make them, and why they are justified. In what follows I address specific questions at only one critical juncture of Prinz’s arguments: his theory of emotion. I will also briefly touch upon his account of moral disagreement, and the meta-ethical relativism he ultimately endorses. Prinz argues that although relativism is thought to imply moral nihilism, his view has the resources to retain most of our moral beliefs. I question the strength of these arguments, especially his claims about relativism and tolerance. 2. What is an Emotion? One aspect of Prinz’s work that ought to be praised is his making his theory of emotion central to his normative theory. In other words, Prinz wants to make clear that if we’re going to be committed Sentimentalists—committed, that is, to the belief that our emotional responses are what separate the domain of the moral from the non-moral—it matters what our theory of the sentiments actually is. The content of morality, its scope, and its normative authority should crucially depend on the underlying theory of what sentiments are. Prinz focuses much of the early parts of his book on getting straight just what he thinks emotions are, their origins, and how they impact us. This turns us toward questions in the philosophy of mind, theories of concepts, and questions about motivational internalism. Prinz draws quite heavily on the Neo-Jamesian theory of emotion he developed in Gut reactions (2004), though not without important differences. Before addressing those differences, however, I want to pause to address Prinz’s arguments against cognitive theories of emotion, and raise questions not only about those arguments but about his own positive arguments in favor of non- cognitivism. Much as in Gut reactions, Prinz divides the wide-ranging theories of emotion along one dimension: whether propositional attitudes are a necessary feature of an emotional experience. The division then amounts to a debate between emotional cognitivists who argue that emotions necessarily involve propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.), and non-cognitivists who deny this. Prinz is a non-cognitivist and amasses impressive support for thinking that any theory of emotion that requires propositional attitudes is false.1 For example, propositional attitudes are clearly not sufficient for having an emotional experience (e.g., I can judge that I’ve been wronged without feeling angry either at the moment of judgment or afterward), but Prinz’s arguments go farther than this. He argues that propositional attitudes of any kind are not necessary in order to have an emotional experience. If propositional attitudes are Philosophical Psychology 463 neither necessary nor sufficient to account for genuine emotional experiences, then cognitivism is false. One criticism that Prinz makes early on is that cognitive theories seem too demanding to be a realistic account of emotional experience (p. 51). Cognitivists, Prinz argues, require us to make judgments/appraisals of our feelings, when in fact we often find ourselves in an emotional state without any mediation through prior judgments. In other words, although appraisals do at times seem to play a role in getting us to enter an emotional state (‘‘Is that man insulting me? Yes, he is. That makes me furious!’’), they don’t seem to accurately account for emotional experiences in which we first find ourselves feeling a certain way and only afterward determine the causal antecedents that put us in that state. As a first pass this doesn’t seem to attack cognitive theories that posit non-conscious judgemental states as essential to emotions. Solomon, in Thinking about feeling, for example, allows that: An emotion is rather a complex of judgments and, sometimes, quite sophisticated judgments, such as judgments of responsibility (in shame, anger, and embarrass- ment) or judgments of comparative status (as in contempt and resentment). Emotions as judgments are not necessarily (or usually) conscious or deliberative or even articulate, but we certainly can articulate, attend to, and deliberate regarding our emotions and emotion-judgments, and we do so whenever we think our way into an emotion, ‘‘work ourselves up’’ to anger, or jealousy, or love. (2004, p. 11) So, if the criticism here is simply that we don’t necessarily have a conscious judgment that is an essential component of emotion, then this criticism, by itself, misses its mark. Whatever states Solomon is referring to here as ‘‘not necessarily (or usually) conscious or deliberative or even articulate’’ seem compatible with Prinz’s argument that we don’t often find ourselves making judgments when we experience an emotion. However, Prinz isn’t yet done with his assault on cognitivism. Prinz’s argument against the necessity of propositional attitudes is a bit more complex than I have initially framed it. Prinz contends that how one conceives of thoughts is crucial to determining whether they are necessarily a part of an emotional experience. Thoughts, at a minimum, are defined by Prinz as ‘‘mental representations that contain concepts;’’ accordingly, he claims that ‘‘to say that emotions are necessarily cognitive is to say that one cannot have an emotion without possessing and tokening certain concepts’’ (pp. 56–57). This definition thus makes clearer why a theory like Solomon’s would still count as cognitive on Prinz’s account. However, having added this much, what reasons are we given to think that cognitivism, understood now as a theory of emotion that necessarily requires the tokening of concepts, is false? Prinz’s appeal is again to emotional immediacy. Emotions don’t seem, phenom- enally, to require judgments. Cognitivism, he claims, places emotions ‘‘too high up on the phylogenetic and ontogenetic scales’’ (p. 57), i.e., it denies emotions to nonhumans and very young children, which Prinz argues is a mistake. Appeals to emotional immediacy, again, leave untouched versions of cognitivism that posit non-conscious appraisals as essential to emotion; neither is the appeal, by 464 E. Ramirez itself, a very powerful argument against cognitivism in general. There needs to be some reason for thinking that emotional experience actually lacks cognition (not just that it seems so to us) and that our phenomenal experience with emotion is not only essentially non-cognitive but also that it should serve as arbiter in the debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.2 Solomon, to use a familiar foil, is all too happy to include animal emotions within his taxonomy despite his commitment to a form of cognitivism about emotions. The real meat in Prinz’s arguments against cognitivism comes from his extensive use of psychological data on emotion to support his conclusion that cognitivism is false. He argues that if experimental data can show that emotions can be elicited by bypassing cognition altogether, then we have good reason to conclude that cognitivism—at least a cognitivism that states that all emotions must always include propositional attitudes—is false. At best, if the data point in this direction, cognitivism would find a home in some ‘‘mixed theory’’ of emotion. How does Prinz propose to show this? Prinz appeals to studies that he believes show that emotions can be induced without judgments. Here he refers to studies purporting to support the facial feedback hypothesis, which simply states that moving one’s facial muscles into specific emotional configurations (smiles, frowns, and so on) can induce the emotions corresponding with their facial expressions—smiling tends to make us feel happy, frowning makes us feel sad, etc.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Embodied Emotions
    Emotions Embodied Jesse Prinz University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill [email protected] [Penultimate version of chapter in R. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling,. New York: OUP 2003. Consult published version to quote.] In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a central theme of Descartes’ exquisite opus, The Passions of the Soul. But James and Lange wanted to push things farther than most, suggesting that emotions are exhausted by bodily changes or perceptions thereof. Other kinds of mental episodes might co-occur when we have an emotion state. For James, an emotion follows an exciting perception. But the exciting perception is not a part of the emotion it excited (Ellsworth, 1994, reads James differently, but see Reisenzein et al.’s 1995 convincing response). The majority of contemporary emotion researchers, especially those in philosophy, find this suggestion completely untenable. Surely, emotions involve something more. At their core, emotions are more like judgments or thoughts, than perceptions. They evaluate, assess, or appraise. Emotions are amendable to rational assessment; they report, correctly or incorrectly, on how we are faring in the world. Within this general consensus, there is a further debate about whether the body should figure into a theory of emotions at all.
    [Show full text]
  • Review of Jesse Prinz's the Emotional Construction of Morals
    Moral relativists gone wild The Emotional Construction of Morals by Jesse J. Prinz (Oxford University Press, 2007) Reviewed by Richard Joyce for Mind 118 (2009) [penultimate draft] Many of us now have a pretty good idea of what to anticipate from a new book by Jesse Prinz. We expect lively philosophy enriched by numerous studies from the empirical sciences, an ambitious and confident engagement with Big Problems, many novel and intriguing arguments, and an author whose joy at immersing himself in the thick of the argumentative fray is obvious. Yet we also expect to see indulged the temptation to pack so much into a limited space that the reader can almost feel Prinz’s thoughts eagerly jostling to win a place on the page, with a sense of hastiness and a degree of superficiality the inevitable consequences. In short, we expect a fun ride with a dose of exasperation. The Emotional Construction of Morals satisfies and further entrenches these expectations. In what follows I will outline the eight chapters of the book in turn—often very briefly—pausing on what strike me as some of the more troubling aspects of Prinz’s case. The critical attitude adopted throughout should not be taken to imply that I do not think it a very stimulating and worthwhile piece of philosophy. Chapter 1 introduces us to emotionism, the thesis that emotions are in some manner essential to morality. Hedonic utilitarianism is a kind of emotionism (since it makes happiness essential to moral status), as is emotivism, as is sensibility theory. Prinz delineates various relations that may hold between emotions and morality and homes in on a strong form of the thesis which he wishes to defend.
    [Show full text]
  • Book Reviews
    Journal of cognition and culture �4 (�0�4) �49–�55 brill.com/jocc Book Reviews Joshua Alexander Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. Polity Press: Cambridge, MA, 2012. US$22.95 Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction is somewhat narrower in scope than Experimental Philosophy by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (2008, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and broader than Experiments in Ethics by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2008, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). The brevity, concise writing style, and focus will make Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction a useful background text for undergraduate teaching and the best introduction to this exciting field for some time to come. Because the field of experimental philosophy is new, customary readers of Journal of Cognition and Culture may not be aware of the purview of such a book. First, Alexander’s book requires background knowledge in analytic phi- losophy; the audience is exclusively analytic philosophy students and profes- sionals. This allows the book its tight focus but gives the impression that, just like in mainstream analytic philosophy, philosophers are still talking amongst themselves. For example, we don’t have an account of the treatment of the cognitive psychology of reasoning and other cognate disciplines in this book. This, and larger discussion of the work of Jesse Prinz, Shaun Nichols and Shaun Gallagher would have been most welcome. Second, Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction appears to dichotomize experimental philosophy and main- stream analytic philosophy in ways that oversimplify how philosophers work. It omits any consideration of the historical tradition of experimental philoso- phy that went under the name ‘natural philosophy’. Overall Experimental Philosophy does not aim to answer fundamental ques- tions about the relationship of philosophy to empirical research, but rather aims to provide helpful, clearly structured summaries of articles, with glosses on them, that have appeared in the recent experimental philosophical litera- ture.
    [Show full text]
  • “The Self” from Philosophy to Cognitive Neuroscience Winston Chiong, MD Phd, University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine
    This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Neurocase on 2011, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/https://doi.org/10.1080/13554794.2010.532808 . “The self” from philosophy to cognitive neuroscience Winston Chiong, MD PhD, University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine ABSTRACT: Neuroscientists have recently begun to explore topics, such as the nature of the self, that were previously considered problems for philosophy rather than for science. This article aims to provide a starting point for interdisciplinary exchange by reviewing three philosophical debates about the nature of the self in light of contemporary work in cognitive neuroscience. Continental rationalist and British empiricist approaches to the unity of the self are discussed in relation to earlier work on split-brain patients, and to more recent work on “mental time travel” and the default mode network; the phenomenological movement, and the central concept of intentionality, are discussed in relation to interoceptive accounts of emotion and to the mirror neuron system; and ongoing philosophical debates about agency and autonomy are discussed in relation to recent work on action awareness and on insight in clinical populations such as addicts and patients with frontotemporal dementia. KEYWORDS: Philosophy; Self; Autonomy; Personal; Consciousness; Existentialism; Memory; Default mode; Mental time travel; Mirror neuron; Intentionality As the articles in this issue of Neurocase illustrate, cognitive neuroscientists have begun to ​ ​ address topics traditionally regarded as questions for philosophy rather than for science; such topics include not only the nature of the self, but also the relationship between the material brain and conscious mind (Block, 2005), the problem of free will (Roskies, 2010), and the nature of moral motivation (Haidt, 2007).
    [Show full text]
  • The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments
    Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 9, No. 1, March 2006 THE EMOTIONAL BASIS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS Jesse Prinz Recent work in cognitive science provides overwhelming evidence for a link between emotion and moral judgment. I review findings from psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and research on psychopathology and conclude that emotions are not merely correlated with moral judgments but they are also, in some sense, both necessary and sufficient. I then use these findings along with some anthropological observations to support several philosophical theories: first, I argue that sentimentalism is true: to judge that something is wrong is to have a sentiment of disapprobation towards it. Second, I argue that moral facts are response-dependent: the bad just is that which cases disapprobation in a community of moralizers. Third, I argue that a form of motivational internalism is true: ordinary moral judgments are intrinsically motivating, and all non-motivating moral judgments are parasitic on these. Introduction In the early 1970s, social psychologist Stanley Milgram instructed his graduate students to approach strangers on a New York City subway and request their seats. Almost all of Milgram’s students refused to try this, and the one student who was willing to go came back quickly and reported that he had to abort the experiment before collecting enough data. The student had not been physically threatened in any way, and indeed the majority of people he asked willingly gave up their seats. Milgram couldn’t understand why his student came back prematurely, and he decided to descend into the subway and perform the experiment himself. This is how he recalls his experience: The words seemed lodged in my trachea and would simply not emerge.
    [Show full text]
  • MORALITY IS a CULTURALLY CONDITIONED RESPONSE Jesse Prinz
    MORALITY IS A CULTURALLY CONDITIONED RESPONSE Jesse Prinz Jesse Prinz is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at in mortal combat. Killing for pleasure has also been the City University of New York. His books include Gut documented among headhunting cultures, in which de- Reactions (2004), The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007), and Beyond Human Nature (forthcoming). The capitation was sometimes pursued as a recreational activ- following essay first appeared in Philosophy Now ity. Many societies have also practiced extreme forms of (March/April 2011). public torture and execution, as was the case in Europe before the 18th century. And there are cultures that en- Suppose you have a moral disagreement with some- gage in painful forms of body modification, such as scari- one, for example, a disagreement about whether it is okay fication, genital infibulation, or footbinding – a practice to live in a society where the amount of money you are that lasted in China for 1,000 years and involved the de- born with is the primary determinant of how wealthy you liberate and excruciating crippling of young girls. Varia- will end up. In pursuing this debate, you assume that you tion in attitudes towards violence is paralleled by varia- are correct about the issue and that your conversation tion in attitudes towards sex and marriage. When studying partner is mistaken. Your conversation partner assumes culturally independent societies, anthropologists have that you are making the blunder. In other words, you both found that over 80% permit polygamy. Arranged marriage assume that only one of you can be correct. Relativists is also common, and some cultures marry off girls while reject this assumption.
    [Show full text]
  • CURRICULUM VITAE John Bickle December 2020
    CURRICULUM VITAE John Bickle December 2020 Mailing Address: Department of Philosophy and Religion P.O. Box JS Mississippi State University Mississippi State, MS 39762 (662) 325-2382 fax: (662) 325-3340 E-mail Addresses: [email protected] URLs: http://www.philosophyandreligion.msstate.edu/faculty/bickle.php https://www.umc.edu/Education/Schools/Medicine/Basic_Science/Neurobiology/John_Bi ckle,_PhD.aspx ___________________________________________________________________________ CURRENT ACADEMIC POSITIONS Professor (Tenured) of Philosophy Mississippi State University Affiliate Faculty Department of Neurobiology and Anatomical Sciences University of Mississippi Medical Center EDUCATION B.A. University of California, Los Angeles, June 1983 M.A., Ph.D. University of California, Irvine, June 1989 Field: Philosophy; Scientific Concentration: Neurobiology. Doctoral Dissertation: Toward a Scientific Reformulation of the Mind-Body Problem AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Philosophy of Neuroscience, Philosophy of Science (especially Scientific Reductionism), Cellular and Molecular Mechanisms of Cognition and Consciousness AREAS OF COMPETENCE Moral Psychology and the Moral Virtues, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). Logical Positivism (especially the Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap), Libertarian Political Philosophy ______________________________________________________________________________ PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS (94) BOOKS (4) 2014 Engineering the Next Revolution in Neuroscience. (Co-authors: Alcino J. Silva and Anthony Landreth).
    [Show full text]
  • Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Maing Moral Judgments?
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2013v12n1p113 ARE EMOTIONS NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR MAKING MORAL JUDGMENTS?1 AS EMOÇÕES SÃO NECESSÁRIAS E SUFICIENTES PARA FAZER JUÍZOS MORAIS? MARCO AURÉLIO SOUSA ALVES (University of Texas at Austin / EUA) RESUMO Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) afirmou que emoções são necessárias e suficientes para julgamentos morais. Primeiramente, explicito qual é de fato a sua tese. A teoria que ele chama de emocionismo é, então, criticamente avaliada. Prinz arregimenta várias descobertas empíricas para defender uma série de teses cada vez mais fortes acerca de como as emoções são essenciais para os julgamentos morais. Argumento aqui que o suporte empírico sobre o qual se assentam seus argumentos é não apenas insuficiente, mas até mesmo sugere o contrário, se devidamente interpretado. Minha crítica é, então, estendida à sua teoria sentimentalista, que se ocupa de como as emoções são integradas em julgamentos morais. O problema central é que a perspectiva de Prinz não consegue apreender o aspecto racional do julgamento moral. Tal incapacidade é explicitada, e por fim reivindico que alguma forma de neossentimentalismo é a via mais promissora. Palavras-chave: Jesse Prinz; emoção; emocionismo; teoria sentimentalista; neossentimentalismo ABSTRACT Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted.
    [Show full text]
  • Extraneous Influences on Morality, Aesthetics, and Perception
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2-2017 Evaluative Mind: Extraneous Influences on Morality, Aesthetics, and Perception Angelika Luiza Seidel The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1918 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] EVALUATIVE MIND: EXTRANEOUS INFLUENCES ON MORALITY, AESTHETICS, AND PERCEPTION by ANGELIKA L. SEIDEL A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The Graduate Center of the City University of New York 2017 ii © 2017 ANGELIKA L. SEIDEL All Rights Reserved iii Evaluate Mind: Extraneous Influences on Morality, Aesthetics, and Perception by Angelika L. Seidel This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date Stefano Ghirlanda Chair of Examining Committee Date Richard J Bodnar Executive Officer Jesse Prinz, Ph.D Glen Hass, Ph.D Curtis Hardin, Ph.D Aaron Kozbelt, Ph.D THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iv Abstract Evaluative mind: Extraneous influences on morality, aesthetics, and perception by Angelika L. Seidel Advisor: Stefano Ghirlanda, Jesse Prinz In a series of experiments I examine extraneous factors that influence evaluative judgments and perception. Specifically, I focus on two kinds of evaluative states: moral evaluation and aesthetic evaluation.
    [Show full text]
  • Newsletter--Fall 2006
    FALL 2006 KANSAS PhilosophyΦΦΦ NEWSLETTER OF THE KU DEPARTMENT OF P HILOSOPHY VOL. 5 NO. 1 MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIR— TOM T UOZZO Greetings, alumni of the KU Philosophy Department! After a couple of years’ hiatus, we’re starting up our department newsletter again; we’ll try to keep to an annual timetable this time around. As you’ll note from the name above and the picture on this page (I’m the tall one), Tony Genova, after many years of service as Chair, has stepped down to return to full-time teaching, and I became Chair in July 2004. For virtually everyone receiving this letter, Tony has been the only Chair of the KU Philosophy Department they have known. They also know what big shoes those are to fill. Other changes have taken place too: Sarah Sawyer left KU first for the University of Nebraska and then for Suffolk University in her native Britain, while Christian Lotz and Kevin Davies took new positions at Michigan State and the University of Chicago. In their stead we welcomed on board two new assistant professors this year, of whom we expect great things. Kevan Edwards joins us from Rutgers, where he recently defended, in August, the dissertation he wrote under the supervision of Jerry Fodor. He works in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and, with an interest in Kara Tan Bhala, MA, with Tom Tuozzo at the Master’s Hooding cognitive science, he will be helping us build bridges with the Ceremony, May 2006 psychology and linguistics departments. Ingra Schellenberg is a newly minted Ph.D.
    [Show full text]
  • Emotions in Philosophy. a Short Introduction
    Studia Humana Volume 5:3 (2016), pp. 8—20 DOI: 10.1515/sh-2016-0011 Emotions in Philosophy. A Short Introduction Andrzej D ąbrowski University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, Poland e-mail : [email protected] Abstract : In recent decades, there has been a renewed attention to the emotions amongst scientists of different disciplines: psychology, psychiatry, neurobiology, cognitive science, computer science, sociology, economics, and many others. There are many research centers and scientific journals devoted to affective states already existing. However, studies of emotion have a very long history – especially in philosophy (anthropology, ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, and rhetoric). Philosophers first raised many important questions about emotions and their contribution to the discovery of the nature of emotions is very important. The aim of the article is the reconstruction of the views on emotions of particular thinkers in history of philosophy. Keywords : passions, emotions, ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, modern philosophy. 1. Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Directly and straight the problem of emotions was dealt with by Plato [50, 51, 52, 53; see also 14, 79] and Aristotle [2, 3, 4, 5; see also 14, 54]. They studied it within their anthropological theories, especially when the soul was concerned. Plato put forward the opposition of the immortal and rational soul and irrational body. All desires and emotions he localized in the body. He saw nothing positive in greed and passion, ‘because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it’ [50, 66b]. Later he offered a more elaborate division.
    [Show full text]
  • Empathy: What Is It, What Is It Good For? Colleen Dougherty John Carroll University, [email protected]
    John Carroll University Carroll Collected Senior Honors Projects Honor's Program Spring 2019 Empathy: What is it, What is it Good For? Colleen Dougherty John Carroll University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://collected.jcu.edu/honorspapers Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Dougherty, Colleen, "Empathy: What is it, What is it Good For?" (2019). Senior Honors Projects. 119. https://collected.jcu.edu/honorspapers/119 This Honors Paper/Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Honor's Program at Carroll Collected. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of Carroll Collected. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dougherty 1 Colleen Dougherty John Carroll University: Department of Philosophy Senior Honors Project Empathy: What is it, What is it Good For? Abstract: Many people believe that empathy is necessary for being morally “good”, such that ​ empathy is fundamental to our moral sense. Yet, there is much debate about what empathy is and whether or not it is, in fact, a good thing. My goal is to explore and evaluate this debate. In the first part of the paper, I discuss common misconceptions of empathy and provide a taxonomy of different sorts of empathy. I will then address whether empathy is good by evaluating the arguments for and against empathy from David Hume, Michael Slote, Jesse Prinz, Paul Bloom, Peter Goldie, and Denise Cummins. I will argue that empathy is a poor moral guide because it is subject to various biases, easily manipulated, and unreliable.
    [Show full text]