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Home , Afzal Guru, Mokhtar Belmokhtar

VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION

Evading Scrutiny, The Elusive Spreading Mohammad Fazl: Settling Scores Uyghur Insurgent Mayhem: How Military —The Death of Haunting China in Jaish-e Muhammad Commander- USS Cole Attack BRIEF —Haji Chief Maulana turned-- Furqan Accomplice is Negotiator Crafting Chaos in Jamal al-Badawi

ANDREW SUDHA FRANZ J. MARTY MICHAEL HORTON MCGREGOR ANIMESH ROUL RAMACHANDRAN

VOLUME X, ISSUE 2 | FEBRUARY 2019

Yahya Abu al-Hammam: security source, Abu al-Hammam had been Eliminates Leading Saharan Jihadist tracked for three months through his telephone (AFP, February 22). Al-Hammam was the third Andrew McGregor JNIM leader to be killed within a year as French

forces work to decapitate the JNIM leadership in French commandos tore through the desert the hopes of destroying the Salafi-Jihadist north of Timbuktu on February 21, in hot movement in the /Sahel region. pursuit of a leading jihadist who had been detected as part of a three-car convoy by a The announcement of al-Hammam’s death Reaper surveillance drone. As the commandos came only hours before French Prime Minister caught up, the militants opened fire. Five French Edouard Phillipe arrived in , where French helicopters moved in and quickly destroyed the troops have been fighting militants and terrorists convoy, killing 11, including the main target, since 2013. An upbeat Phillipe told a gathering Algerian Yahya Abu al-Hammam (a.k.a. Djamel of French, Malian, British, and Estonian troops Okacha), a top al-Qaeda financier and strategist that they had “managed to destroy [the (Jeune Afrique/AFP, February 22; Defense.gouv.fr, jihadists’] means of combat, to intercept their February 22). logistical flows, to dry up their resources… every day our enemies suffer significant Al-Hammam was the second-in-command of losses…” (Ouest-France, February 24). Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s Sahel/Sahara affiliate. There are Born on May 9, 1978, in the Reghaïa commune reports that al-Hammam may have been ill and of Algiers province, al-Hammam began his decided to seek medical treatment elsewhere career in 1998 as a militant with the Algerian (Malijet, February 23). According to a Malian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA – Armed Islamic

!1 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Group) and later, after 18 months of oversaw a rigidly strict Shari’a regime that imprisonment, the Groupe salafiste pour la prédication destroyed much of the city’s Islamic heritage and et le combat (GSPC – Salafist Group for Preaching applied corporal and capital punishments to its and Combat). people for offenses against their interpretation of Islam. He was rewarded in October 2012 when Al-Hammam arrived in northern Mali in 2004 AQIM leader ‘Abd al-Malik Droukdel (a.k.a. with the controversial GSPC commander ‘Abd Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd al-Wadud) appointed al- al-Razzak al-Para (Malijet, February 23). From Hammam the new amir of AQIM’s Saharan bases there, al-Hammam left an explosive trail affiliate in October 2012. (Agence Nouakchott through , where, under the direction d’Information, October 4, 2012; Le Monde, of Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abu Hamid ‘Abd February 22). Unlike many of his fellow al-Zaïd, he and his fellow militants exploited militants, al-Hammam survived the 2013 Mauritanian military weakness in a series of French-led that dispersed the deadly attacks that killed dozens of Mauritanian Islamists and assumed ‘Abd al-Hamid Abu Zaïd’s troops between 2005 and 2008 (Malijet, command when the latter was killed by a Franco- February 23). In 2009 he was a suspect in Chadian patrol in February 2013. organizing both the murder of American missionary Christopher Leggett and a suicide Remaining aloof from the rival attack on the French embassy in Nouakchott, the group, al-Hammam appeared in the March 2017 Mauritanian capital. video that announced the establishment of the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM alliance of four In 2009, as commander of the Katiba al-Furqan, Sahara/Sahel jihadist groups under veteran al-Hammam ordered the assassination of Mali’s Tuareg militant Iyad ag Ghali (al-Akhbar intelligence chief in northern Mali, the [Nouakchott], January 10, 2016, MaliActu, Timbuktu-based Colonel Lamana Ould Bou, a March 2, 2017). Bérabiche Arab. Though the killing was a setback for security forces, it reportedly provoked Al-Hammam last appeared in a November 8, a disagreement between al-Hammam and his 2018 video, in which he sat alongside ag Ghali as former sponsor, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who had Amadou Kufa, the Fulani leader of the Force de spent years cultivating relationships with the libération du Macina (FLM – Macina Liberation Bérabiche of northern Mali (Malijet, August 13, Front), and called on his fellow Fulani to “make 2014). ” wherever they are (Le Monde/AFP, November 9, 2018). Two weeks later Koufa died From 2009, al-Hammam became heavily in the Wagadou Forest after being mortally involved with kidnappings, particularly those of wounded by a French attack. With al-Hammam Western tourists or workers. now gone as well, the priority of French forces Al-Hammam led AQIM gunmen into Timbuktu will be the elimination of JNIM leader Iyad ag- in April 2012 as part of the Islamist uprising and Ghali. Al-Hammam could be succeeded by Abd occupation of northern Mali. As governor, he al-Rahman Talha al-Libi, the current !2 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION commander of the Katiba al-Furqan, though The Elusive Uyghur Insurgent there are rumors that Talha may have been one Commander Haunting China of those killed in the attack on al-Hammam’s in Afghanistan— Haji Furqan convoy (Malijet, February 23).

Andrew McGregor is Director of Aberfoyle International Franz J. Marty Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic world. He received a Ph.D. Uyghur Islamist extremists propagating a from the University of Toronto’s Dept. of Near and separatist jihad against the Chinese state have Middle Eastern Civilizations in 2000 and is a former concerned the Chinese government since long Research Associate of the Canadian Institute of before recent reports of mass internment of International Affairs. Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the far west of China (South China Morning Post, February 26; Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, November 29, 2001). [1] And although sober assessments reveal that the few Uyghur fighters who have taken refuge in parts of Afghanistan’s remote northeastern province of Badakhshan do not pose a significant threat to China, sources indicate that China is actively looking for information on their elusive commander, Haji Furqan (Afghanistan Analyst Network, March 19, 2018).

Haji Furqan – Commander of Foreign Fighters

Local Badakhshi, Chinese, and UN sources agree that Uyghur extremists as well as other foreign fighters in Afghan Badakhshan (estimates range from 160 to 400 fighters, among them 50 to 100 Uyghurs) are led by a man called Haji Furqan, likely a nom de guerre. [2]

Furqan is a very elusive figure, as he—like other foreign fighters in Badakhshan—reportedly seldom interacts with local residents, except for the local Afghan Taliban commanders with whom he allegedly coordinates closely on

!3 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION insurgent operations. These include in particular never stated his origin and that he would, when the Taliban’s shadow governor for Badakhshan, asked, incorrectly assert that he is from the Qari Fasehuddin, and Mawlawi Amanuddin, Khostak valley in Badakhshan’s district of Jurm who is described as Fasehuddin’s deputy and is (the Khostak valley has long been under allegedly responsible for the Taliban’s military complete insurgent control and is—aside from affairs as well as coordination with foreign the neighboring district of Warduj—reportedly fighters in Badakhshan. [3] the main nest for foreign fighters in Afghan Badakhshan). [8] Another UN source stated Haji Furqan and his foreign fighters are locals sometimes claim that Furqan is a Tajik; apparently embedded with the local Afghan however, this is apparently a misidentification, as Taliban; there is no indication of a separate the source explained that locals would assert this Uyghur group. [4] While U.S. Central simply based on the fact that Furqan reportedly Command has asserted its forces bombed speaks fluent Persian (the native language of training facilities in Afghan Badakhshan in Tajiks). Furqan also speaks fluent Pashto and February 2018 that were allegedly used by the , according to the same source. [9] Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, a purported Uyghur terrorist organization, such Since his arrival in Afghan Badakhshan, Furqan claims are contradicted by detailed information reportedly resides in the district of Warduj, from various sources on the ground in which has been under full Taliban control since Badakhshan (U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, October 2015. Local sources, including the February 8, 2018; Afghanistan Analyst Network, defector that saw Furqan himself, assert that March 19, 2018). Furqan is often moving inside Warduj. [10] A UN source also indicated that he is always Haji Furqan – Personal Background accompanied by 10 to 15 foreign fighters acting Several sources indicated that Furqan arrived in as bodyguards. [11] Furqan sometimes Afghan Badakhshan in 2014 or 2015, allegedly reportedly visits the Khostak valley and possibly from Pakistani Chitral. [5] It is unclear where he other areas in the immediate vicinity of Warduj, was before—or where he originally hails from. such as the Taliban-held district of Yamgon. Local sources claimed that Furqan had never left Almost all sources state that Furqan is a Uyghur Badakhshan since his arrival; given that their from Xinjiang. [6] However, a UN source noted information on Furqan is limited, this cannot be that their reports suggest Furqan hails from stated with certainty. [12] Kazakhstan, but may have a Uyghur background (Kazakhstan, which borders This author managed to obtain exclusively the Xinjiang, also has a minority Uyghur clear photograph below, purportedly of Furqan. population). [7] A local man, who had spent The photograph was confirmed by a Badakhshi time among the Taliban in Badakhshan and has who briefly saw Furqan himself in Warduj met Furqan himself before he defected to the during a ceasefire in mid-June 2018, as well as by Afghan Local Police, recounted that Furqan had other local sources who allegedly have seen other !4 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION photos of Furqan that are not available but were 2015), the threat posed by them and Furqan has shown to them by other locals, including the to be qualified. [19] Taliban. [13] It also roughly corresponds to a While the fall and subsequent holding of Warduj low-quality photograph that, according to the and Yamgon were huge successes for the Taliban defector who has seen Furqan, depicts the latter, in Badakhshan, they were not a tidal change, as well as to stills from a propaganda video that with the Taliban not having expanded their allegedly show Furqan, but in which his face is territory from those districts since then. For blurred. [14] [15] It also matches the description example, the front between Warduj and the of Furqan given by the defector and a UN neighboring district of Bahorak has been—with source. According to those descriptions, Furqan a very few exceptions—more or less static and has a light complexion and rather Caucasian rather quiet since the fall of Warduj. And a few features, and reportedly always wears a pakool (a Taliban attacks on Zebak, another district round, rolled-up felt hat). [16] [17] Hence, there neighboring Warduj, were always swiftly is a high confidence that the photograph below is repelled. [20] With respect to the Uyghur indeed a photograph of Furqan. [18] fighters in Afghan Badakhshan (including Furqan), an independent assessment concluded that “Uyghur combat power is not a decisive factor on the battlefield” and that they do not pose any cross-border threat—in particular not for the utterly remote Afghan–Chinese border. In fact, as far as could be determined, there has not been a single confirmed attack conducted or planned by a Uyghur group in or from Afghanistan, or any sign that the Uyghurs in Badakhshan are able to change that. This corroborates assessments according to which Haji Furqan – A Threat? Uyghur fighters are arguably hiding out in Badakhshan and not using it as a platform to Local Badakhshi sources agreed that Furqan has launch attacks in China or elsewhere not undertaken any significant activities since his (Afghanistan Analyst Network, March 19, 2018). arrival in Badakhshan. He and his foreign fighters are reportedly taking part in local This also holds true in spite of the fact that local Taliban operations. But while those foreign sources attribute exceptional skills and battlefield fighters purportedly played a crucial role in the prowess to foreign fighters, including Furqan, Taliban’s takeover of Badakhshan’s districts of who—in the opinion of a well-informed source Warduj (October 2015) and Yamgon (November from Badakhshan—must have participated in some conflict somewhere(unconfirmed rumors mentioned Iraq and/or Syria), as he is allegedly !5 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION well-versed in insurgent warfare. [21] Such [1] Speaking a Turkic language and being allegations are not supported by tangible predominantly Sunni Muslims, Uyghurs are indications and could, therefore, neither be ethnically, linguistically and culturally different confirmed nor disproved. In general, there is from other Chinese. ample evidence that Afghan sources exaggerate [2] Author’s interviews, several dates during the capabilities of foreign fighters. Such 2018. The presence of some Uyghur extremists allegations also appear to provide a welcome in Badakhshan was further confirmed by a excuse for Afghan government officials to brush propaganda video dated December 2017 that over the shortcomings of government forces. was partly shot in Badakhshan’s districts of Jurm This said, Furqan has, according to credible and Warduj (a copy of the video is in the sources, brought some other Uyghur extremists author’s possession). to Afghan Badakhshan; the same sources also [3] Author’s interviews, several dates during stated that Uyghur fighters are training Afghan 2018. insurgents there. [22] However, in view of the above, neither their number nor the effect of [4] Author’s interviews, several dates during their training seem to have had a significant 2018. impact. [23] [5] Author’s interviews, several dates during Despite this, China is—according to a local 2018. source on the ground in Badakhshan and [6] Author’s interviews, several dates during another well-placed source—actively seeking 2018. photographs and exact up-to-date locations of Furqan, as well as information on his intentions [7] E-mail to author, February 17, 2018. and affiliates. [24] [8] Author’s interview, Qalotak, Bahorak district, Hence, it seems that China’s paranoia about Badakhshan province, August 25, 2018. Uyghur extremists in Afghan Badakhshan in [9] E-mail to author, November 8, 2018. general and Furqan in particular will persist. [10] Author’s interviews, several dates during Franz J. Marty is a freelance journalist based in 2018. Afghanistan; his work includes interviews with active insurgents. He has visited Afghan Badakhshan several [11] E-mail to author, November 8, 2018. times and has previously written on Chinese and Uyghur involvement in said province. He can be followed [12] Author’s interviews, several dates during @franzjmarty on twitter. 2018. [13] Author’s interview, October 30, 2018. Notes [14] Author’s interview, Qalotak, Bahorak district, Badakhshan province, August 25, 2018.

!6 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION [15] E-mail to author, September 23, 2018. Evading Scrutiny, Spreading [16] Author’s interview, Qalotak, Bahorak Mayhem: How Jaish-e- district, Badakhshan province, August 25, 2018. Muhammad Chief Maulana Masood Azhar is Crafting [17] E-mail to author, November 8, 2018. Chaos in Kashmir [18] This author has also obtained photographs of other men that were said to be Furqan; Animesh Roul however, the sources that allegedly saw Furqan themselves explicitly denied that these were Maulana Masood Azhar, the founding leader of photographs of Furqan (author’s interviews, Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad— August 25 and October 30, 2018). JeM), a -based terrorist group blamed for violence against India over the past two [19] Author’s interviews, several dates during decades—including the latest vehicle-borne 2018. improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack in [20] Author’s interviews, several dates during Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) targeting a security 2018. convoy. On February 14, 42 paramilitary force personnel were killed on the -Jammu [21] Author’s interviews, several dates during highway near the town of Awantipora, Pulwama 2018. district when a Jaish-e-Muhammad fidayeen [22] Author’s interviews, several dates during (suicide attacker) Adil Ahmed Dar (a.k.a Waqas 2018. Commando) ambushed the security convoy with an explosives-laden vehicle (The Tribune, [23] Author’s interviews, several dates in 2018. February 15). The latest event led India to carry [24] Author’s interviews, several dates during out air strikes targeting JeM’s terror training 2018. camps in Balakot (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province), Chakothi, and (Pakistan-Administered Kashmir) on February 26 (Times of India, February 26).

Evidently, India blames JeM’s founding leader Masood Azhar and his core commanders based in Pakistan, including Abdul Rauf Asghar and Yusuf Azhar (a.k.a Ustad Ghauri), for masterminding the Pulwama . Both Yusuf Azhar and Abdul Rauf are relatives of Azhar and played active roles in the December 1999 Indian Airlines hijacking crisis that ended with the safe passage of the imprisoned JeM

!7 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION chief. [1] India has submitted a dossier to Azhar—who along with Abdul Jabber was Pakistan on February 27 with specific details of accused of plotting assassination attempts on JeM’s involvement in the Pulwama attack and Pakistani President in the presence of the group’s leadership and December 2003 and in January 2004— flourishing terror-training camps in Pakistan maintained a low profile for several years in (India Today, February 27). Amid the rising Pakistan. Since the group was banned in 2002 in tension between the two neighboring countries, Pakistan, Masood Azhar and his jihadist coterie the Punjab provincial government in Pakistan attempted to reinvigorate their militant has taken control of the Jaish-e-Mohammad run campaigns (recruitment, fund raisings, etc) by mosque, Jama-e-Masjid Subhanallah and a renaming the group Khuddam-ul-Islam (KuI), seminary, Madressatul Sabir in Bahawalpur Tehrik ul-Furqaan (TuF), al-Rahmat Trust (ART) (Dawn [Karachi] February 22). However, —to name a few—as educational and religious Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood charity centers ( Monitor, November Qureshi asked India for credible evidence of 11, 2011). The latest offshoot of JeM is “al- Azhar’s involvement in the Pulwama suicide Murabitoon” which is engaged in organizing attack while admitting to his presence in Pakistan Islamic discourse and debate competitions in (The Indian Express, March 1). schools and colleges in Pakistan. JeM leaders distributed prizes for the winners, including Born and raised in Bahawalpur in Punjab swords bearing the name of Masood Azhar as province, Pakistan, Masood Azhar founded JeM the “Ameer of ” (Zee News, January in late January 2000 in Karachi with the broad 4, 2018). The many incarnations of JeM were objectives of overthrowing Indian “occupation” obviously aimed at evading national and of Kashmir; merging Kashmir with Pakistan; international scrutiny in order to raise funds and and the expulsion of U.S. troops from recruits for jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Afghanistan. After years of being mostly confined to his After splitting from the parent terrorist groups of hometown of Bahawalpur where the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) and Harkat-ul- headquarters of JeM is located, Azhar’s voice (HuM), Azhar and JeM unleashed a again reverberated with the call for jihad in wave of terror attacks in J&K and beyond. The Kashmir in February 2014. In an address to a group became infamous for introducing foreign Kashmir rally in Muzzafarabad (Pakistan- fighters and fidayeen attacks into the Kashmir Administered Kashmir) Azhar reportedly said conflict. They were responsible for the April that “there are 313 fidayeen in this gathering and 2000 suicide attack in the Badamibag Army if a call is given the number will go up to 3,000.” Cantonment; the October 2001 attack on the (India Today, February 19, 2014). Days before J&K Assembly in Srinagar; and the December this public address in early 2014, Azhar and 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in the JeM’s core commanders formed a suicide squad, national capital of New . the “Afzal Guru Squad,” named after the

!8 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Parliament attacker Muhammad Afzal Guru forces that made international headlines and (The Tribune, October 7, 2017). Several attacks almost brought two nuclear powered neighbors in Kashmir thereafter were blamed on the to the brink of war—the January 2 Pathankot, squad, which was led by a close confidante of Punjab, air base attack that resulted in the deaths Masood Azhar, Mufti Waqas, who recruited local of seven security force personnel and the youths for jihad in Kashmir. Masood Azhar also September 18, Uri, Kashmir, attack in which sent his nephews to Kashmir to work with these nearly 18 security personnel were killed local recruits. Talha Rasheed, one of his (News18.com, January 2, 2016; WION News, nephews, died in an armed encounter at the September 18, 2016). In the aftermaths of these Kandi Aglar village of Pulwama district in attacks, Pakistan authorities briefly detained November 2017. A U.S.-made gun was Masood Azhar, his brother Mufti Abdul Rauf recovered following the shootout, and is along with other close aides. However, these suspected to have been procured from detentions in the guise of interrogations remain Afghanistan (Kashmir Dispatch, November 7, largely symbolic. 2017). Since 2007, it appeared that JeM’s direct Azhar’s JeM is also credited with introducing operational rein has been resting on Azhar’s sniper attacks in J&K. Another nephew of relatives such as Abdul Rauf Asghar and Yusuf Azhar, identified as Usman Haider, was the Azhar, whereas Azhar remains JeM’s spiritual deputy chief of this sniper squad, and was killed head and mostly relegated to propaganda, on October 30, 2018 (Indian Express, October fundraising, and indoctrination of recruits 31, 2018). It is evident now that the latest (Times of India, April 22, 2007). Apparently, Pulwama suicide attack was carried out to Azhar, while keeping a low profile, actively avenge the deaths of Masood Azhar’s nephews engages in revitalizing JeM and encouraging the (Mumbai Mirror, February 17). rise of a new generation of militants. Due to his intellectual sympathies, especially in matters of While each and every militant formation in jihad and Islam, he has long been closely Kashmir, including Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) and associated with the Afghanistan Taliban and al- (HM), continue their efforts Qaeda. Though not physically fit for any to remain relevant in the crowded insurgent field battlefield actions, Azhar spreads and maintains of Kashmir, JeM has carved out a niche for itself immense clout through his speeches and sermons by introducing daring tactics to stay ahead of the at mosques and at Kashmiri fundraising rallies. curve. With intermittent violence to keep the flag He remains strong and effective as a firebrand of jihad high in Kashmir, Azhar, along with his speaker and eloquent writer on Islam and jihad close family members and field commanders, has through publications such as al-Qalam (in Urdu) directed JeM militants to carry out a series of and Rangnoor (English). violent and audacious terror attacks. Similar to the recent Pulwama suicide bombing, JeM in Through his outreach, Azhar makes it clear that 2016 carried two violent strikes targeting security he has sacrificed his own relatives for the cause in !9 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Kashmir. This narrative has been used to incite India to get custody of Azhar or to designate youths to take up arms against India. His him as a global terrorist in the past were writings are full of anti-Hindu and anti-Semitic thwarted by Pakistan and China, respectively. hatred as he attempts to justify violence against The government of Pakistan often tags India’s the enemies of the Muslims, “the Jews and the attempt to ban Masood Azhar at the UN as a Polytheists,” by citing the Quran. Masood Azhar, “politically motivated proposal aimed at covering who has been writing under the pseudonym its (India’s) own subversive activities in Sa’adi, blames Indian Prime Minster Narendra Pakistan” (Daily Times, January 2, 2017). Modi and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Intriguingly, amid heightened tensions between Adityanath for the increasing atrocities against India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the Muslims in India (Rangnoor, July 20, 2017). He February 14 Pulwama suicide event, there has threatened both the right-wing leaders of India been a renewed clamor again around the world with consequence while criticizing present to designate Azhar as a global terrorist under the Pakistan governments. “O Modi, O Yogi the United Nation Security Council. Muslim blood is very precious. Extirpation of the Animesh Roul is the executive director of the New Delhi- Muslims is impossible. If only one real Muslim based policy research group Society for the Study of Peace ruler comes in Pakistan, you can be taught a and Conflict. He specializes in counterterrorism, radical lesson in three to four days” (Rangnoor, July 20, Islam, terror financing, and armed conflict and violence in 2017). In one his writings he urged Indian South Asia. Mr. Roul has written extensively on these Muslims to avenge all atrocities by sacrificing subject areas, being published in edited books, journals, their life and to increase their passion for jihad. and policy magazines. He co-authored a book on India’s He also advises not to depend upon traditional indigenous terror group Indian Mujahideen (Springer, weaponry for waging jihad. He wrote, “there is 2013). He is regularly cited in the Washington no need of any bomb, bullet shot, gunpowder, Post, Reuters, Wall Street Journal and Hindustan gun, rocket launcher or training; People launch Times among others. He regularly contributes to The big operations with the help of cars, electricity, Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor. petrol, fertilizers, grains of sand and pesticides” (Rangnoor, September 2017). Notes

In the aftermath of the Pathankot terror events [1] Animesh Roul, “The Jihadi Demagogue: A in early 2016, a Pakistani commentator Profile of Maulana Masood Azhar of Pakistan”, compared Azhar with Ratko Mladić, the former Militant Leadership Monitor, Vol 4 (3), Bosnian Serb warlord and convicted war September 2013. criminal, suggesting that the Pakistan [2] Dr Haider Shah, “Can Azhar be Pakistan’s government should stop protecting militant Mladic?”, Daily Times, January 16, 2016, leaders on its own soil and hand them over to https://dailytimes.com.pk/95914/can-azhar-be- India as a friendly gesture in exchange for better -mladic/ bilateral ties. [2]. However, multiple attempts by

!10 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Mohammad Fazl: Military Madrassa in Quetta. Then in 1995, he crossed Commander-turned-Taliban- back into Afghanistan where he joined the Negotiator Taliban in Kandahar as a fighter. [1] Fazl was not among the founding generation of Sudha Ramachandran the Taliban, but he joined the group early. On account of his fighting skills, he rose through the In October 2018, the Taliban announced that ranks to become the Deputy Minister of Defense Mullah Mohammad Fazl, Khairullah in the Taliban government and in 2001, the Khairkhwa, Abdul Haq Wasiq, Norullah Noori, Taliban Chief of Army Staff (Afghanistan and Mohammad Nabi would be among its Analysts Network, March 9, 2012). He was a representatives at upcoming talks with the “close associate” of the Taliban’s founder-chief United States. The five, who were imprisoned at Mullah and helped him set the U.S. military detention facility at up the Taliban government (United Nations Guantanamo, Cuba for over 14 years—they are Security Council). At Guantanamo, Fazl’s often referred to in Western media as the interrogators established that he had ties with ‘Taliban Five’ or the ‘Guantanamo Five’—held several militant Islamist groups, including al- important posts in the Taliban regime. Of them, Qaeda—he reportedly admitted to being at al- Fazl is the most controversial. Among the “most Qaeda’s al-Farouq training camp near Kandahar important and feared commanders” in the —but also others, such as the Islamic Movement Taliban government, he has been accused of of Uzbekistan, and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. serious violations of the laws of armed conflict [2] (Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 9, 2012). War Crimes Allegations Human rights activists and Afghan civilians have been calling for his trial for war crimes. So, what Fazl has been accused of committing war crimes is an alleged war criminal doing at talks aimed at in the 1990s. He had command responsibilities politically settling the decades-old Afghan civil in major incidents in Afghanistan during which war? And importantly, what does he bring to the rules of armed conflict were violated. [3] negotiating table? According to an Afghanistan Justice Project (AJP) Report, Fazl was among the senior field Background commanders in the Taliban offensive on the Born in 1967, Fazl is Pashtun by ethnicity and Shamali plain in 1999, when Taliban forces belongs to the Kakar tribe. He is from Tirinkot carried out summary executions of both civilians in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan province. Following the and surrendered Northern Alliance combatants Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Fazl and his and the “wanton destruction” of entire villages. mother fled the country and lived in refugee Houses were razed to the ground and vineyards camps in Pakistan for several years. He received and irrigation systems were systematically religious training for six years at the Rabinyah destroyed. Some 300,000 people were forced to

!11 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION flee for safety. According to an eyewitness cited in become more knowledgeable about Islam, the AJP report, Fazl was “in the field” and according to Afghan journalist Sami Yousafzai. “supervising the wanton destruction of civilian [6] infrastructure.” Besides, he was army chief in From 2011 onwards, reports in the media 2001, during the Taliban’s brutal offensives in indicated that the U.S. government was and around Yakaolang in the Bamiyan province considering releasing the Taliban Five. The to crush resistance to Taliban rule. Hundreds of freeing of “hardened terrorists” was strongly civilians were massacred and their villages criticized in the United States as many feared burned down. During these offensives, that they would return to Afghanistan to join the Fazl “visited occasionally, including during major Taliban against the Afghan operations,” and that he “must have been government and U.S. forces (Washington Post, involved in the planning and supervision of the June 1, 2014). They were subsequently released operation.” [4] He has not been put on trial for from Guantanamo and handed over to the his war crimes. Qatari government in exchange for the release On February 23, 2001, Fazl’s name was included of U.S. Army soldier Bowe Bergdahl, who was in on the United Nations Security Council’s the Taliban’s custody. On May 31, 2014, Fazl sanctions list, and remains on it (United Nations and the rest of the Taliban Five landed in Qatar Security Council). and have remained there since. They are reported to be living in luxury in Qatar. [7] Guantanamo and After New Role Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in November 2001, Fazl surrendered to Northern Since arriving in Qatar, the five Taliban leaders Alliance Commander General Abdul Rashid from Guantanamo “have been quietly meeting Dostum in the northern Kunduz province. He people, both Afghans and internationals,” a was handed over to U.S. custody in late Kabul-based political analyst said, adding that December and transferred to the Guantanamo while “these meetings don't seem to be ‘official' facility in January 2002. At Guantanamo, Fazl in that they aren’t formally mandated by the was assessed as a “high-risk” detainee “likely to Taliban leadership or part of the Doha political pose a threat to the U.S., its interests, and allies.” office,” neither “are they ‘rogue’ or independent He was seen to have “high intelligence value.” of the movement.” Those who have met them His conduct while detained at Guantanamo, single out Fazl and Khairkhwa as “the most however, was seen to pose a “low threat from a prominent in the group,” their importance detention perspective” and his “overall behavior” stemming from the fact they are from the was seen to be “compliant and rarely hostile to pre-2001 leadership, were in Guantanamo for a the guard force and staff.” [5] Fazl was at long period of time, and are not in Pakistan and Guantanamo for 14 years and five months. hence have “some independence.” [8] During this period, he is said to have studied and

!12 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION In October 2018, the Taliban Five joined the draw on the wisdom and experience of the older Taliban’s political office in Qatar. The Taliban leaders. Since they also have ties with former announced that they would be among its Afghan warlords and other political leaders, they representatives in the talks with the United States “could act as a bridge” between the Taliban and (Tolo News, October 31, 2018). With this, Fazl, “wider Afghan society.” This will be “useful in who has “never held a civilian post, assumed a creating consensus.” [11] political role for the first time in his life,” an The Taliban’s critics describe the inclusion of the Afghan official said. [9] Several rounds of talks Taliban Five and Fazl in particular in its have taken place in the months since and in negotiating team as “alarming but not January this year, U.S. special envoy to the talks surprising.” If the Quetta Shura sees Fazl as best Zalmay Khalilzad announced that a draft suited to represent the Taliban, “it means that a framework on an agreement had been reached. narrow and brutal interpretation of Islam and Still, these are very early days in a peace process. misogynist barbarism remains the Taliban’s Why Fazl? ideology.” [12]

The inclusion of former Guantanamo detainees At the Table and especially the alleged war criminal Fazl in There is some speculation over the impact that the Taliban delegation has generated much over a decade of incarceration at the debate. Some see it as a tactical move, aimed at Guantanamo facility would have had on the getting the UNSC to lift sanctions on leaders like Taliban Five. Has the long detention and likely Fazl, whose movement is restricted on account of “rewiring” that they may have undergone at sanctions. [10] The Taliban itself says that the Guantanamo softened them to the United States former Guantanamo detainees are among its or hardened them to any sort of compromise? representatives as “their word carries weight with Basit rules out a dilution in their outlook or the Taliban leadership and the beliefs. “A Talib is a Talib,” he says. “He believes mujahideen” (Tolo News, October 31, 2018). in a certain worldview and sticks to it no matter Terrorism analyst Abdul Basit points out that what. Even if his stance is moderated, it is only Fazl “has the trust and blessings of the Quetta for buying time or creating political openings Shura,” which “represents the new generation of and opportunity maximization.” [13] the Taliban.” They look up to Fazl as “a Little is known about what position any of the respected, senior leader” and see him, along with negotiators are taking at the talks. However, it is Mullah Baradar, as “best suited to defend and possible to say with some certainty that at the represent the Taliban’s interests.” Fazl’s stature negotiations, Fazal is a “hardliner when it comes within the Taliban makes it likely that “any to protecting the core Taliban interests and a decision that he, along with other negotiation pragmatist when it comes to having to make team members, make” would win the support of political compromises to pave way for peace and the cadres. Importantly, the Taliban would like to

!13 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION end of war.” [14] It does “not bode well for the Notes peace process.” [15] [1] U.S. Department of Defense document Fazl as Peacemaker accessed through Wikileaks on Feb 5 at https:// wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/7.html On the face of it, Fazl is an unlikely peacemaker. He neither has political vision, diplomatic, nor [2] Ibid. negotiating skills. Still, his seniority, image as a [3] Under the laws of armed conflict, command military commander during the Taliban regime, responsibility assigns criminal liability to higher- and his proximity to Mullah Omar evokes much ranking members of armed forces for war crimes respect among Taliban leaders as well as the committed by their subordinates if they ordered rank and file. This could win the support of the latter to commit the crimes, did not prevent Taliban fighters for any agreement that may be them from carrying them out or failed, reached in the talks. subsequently, to discipline them. Fazl’s participation in the negotiations is [4] The Afghanistan Justice Report, “Casting understandably unacceptable to Hazaras and Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against other Afghan ethnic groups who suffered directly Humanity: 1978-2001,” Open Society because of his alleged war crimes. Still, for the Foundations, 2005, accessed on February 13, peace process to get started and a sustained https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/ peace be built, it will be necessary that the default/files/ajpreport_20050718.pdf process and participation in the peace process is inclusive. Fazl’s participation in the talks, after [5] n. 1. all, could win the support of hardliners in the [6] Author’s Interview, Kabul-based Afghan Taliban. journalist, Sami Yousafzai, Fazl’s participation underscores one of the main February 4. contentious issues in peace processes. Should war [7] Ibid. criminals be made to face trial or would that jeopardize the chances of post-war [8] Author’s Interview, Kabul-based analyst, peacebuilding? Should justice be prioritized? February 12. Many, especially Fazl’s victims, would argue that [9] Author’s Interview, Afghan official, Ministry without justice, the peace reached would be a of Foreign Affairs February 16. shallow one. Others would say that it is better to have a flawed peace than no peace at all. [10] Afghan journalist, n. 6.

Dr. Sudha Ramachandran is an independent researcher [11] Author’s Interview, Abdul Basit, associate and journalist based in Bangalore, India. She has written research fellow at the International Centre for extensively on South Asian peace and conflict, political Political Violence and Terrorism Research and security issues for The Diplomat, Asia Times and (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of Geopolitics. !14 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION International Studies, Nanyang Technological Settling Scores - The Death of University, Singapore, February 6. USS Cole Attack Accomplice [12] Afghan official, n. 9. Jamal al-Badawi

[13] Basit, n.11. Michael Horton

[14] Ibid. Long-time al-Qaeda operative Jamal al-Badawi [15] Afghan official, n.9 was killed in what U.S. military officials called a “precision airstrike” on January 1 in the Yemeni governorate of Marib (al-Jazeera, January 6). Al- Badawi was a key accomplice in the October 2000 al-Qaeda led attack on the USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden. On January 6, al-Qaeda- linked jihadists released brief eulogies that seemingly confirmed al-Badawi’s death from a drone strike in Marib city, which is under the control of Saudi Arabia and its proxy forces (Asharq al-Awsat, January 5). [1]

Al-Badawi’s death—which the U.S. military has also confirmed—will have little or no impact on al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) ability to operate in Yemen. Al-Badawi was a legacy member of AQAP who had long since passed on whatever skills he may have had to new generations of operatives. Al-Badawi’s death by a purported drone strike will be more useful to AQAP for recruitment purposes than any services he might have been able to provide the organization.

The Afghanistan Connection

Little is known about Jamal al-Badawi’s early life beyond the fact that he was born sometime in 1960 or 1963 in al-Bayda, one of Yemen’s most restive and strategic governorates. Al-Bayda is on the border between the formerly independent countries of north Yemen (Yemen Arab

!15 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Republic) and south Yemen (the People’s The October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole Democratic Republic of Yemen). Due to its was a crude but well-planned operation that mountainous topography and proximity to the killed 17 U.S. servicemen and injured 39 more. south, al-Bayda was used as a staging area for The USS Cole entered the harbor at Aden for a north Yemen’s covert operations against its routine refueling stop. The attack on the USS enemies in south Yemen. The president of the Cole was preceded by a failed attack on the USS Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), Ali Abdullah The Sullivans, which had also stopped at Aden for Saleh, and his cousin, General Ali Mohsen al- refueling. This attack on The Sullivans failed Ahmar (currently the vice president of Yemen), because the suicide boat was so heavily laden saw the returning veterans of the wars in with explosives that it sank before it could reach Afghanistan as useful proxies in their low- the ship. Al-Qaeda learned from this failure and intensity war against their political enemies in employed the same strategy in its subsequent the south. attack on the USS Cole. The boat, which al- Badawi helped acquire, was loaded with C4 President Saleh tasked General Mushin and the explosives and driven into the side of the USS Yemeni security service, the Political Security Cole by two suicide bombers who were both Bureau (PSB), with recruiting and running first- killed in the attack. and second-generation veterans of the wars in Afghanistan. The veterans played a key role in Al-Badawi’s role in the attack on the USS Cole the 1994 war between north and south Yemen. came to light during the FBI-led investigation of The veterans that formed irregular units were the attack. Initially, Yemeni officials cooperated some of the most effective and brutal fighters with FBI investigators, but their already minimal and led the assault and subsequent looting of cooperation declined further as FBI investigators Aden, the former of capital of south Yemen. zeroed in on suspects—including al-Badawi, who was detained by Yemeni officials following the While it is not clear what, if any, role al-Badawi attack. Yemeni officials limited FBI access to al- played in the 1994 civil war, it is certain that he Badawi and Fahad al-Quso in the months after spent time in Afghanistan in the 1990s, with his the attack, saying both men had sworn on the last trip thought to be in 1997-98. There, he met Koran that they had nothing to do with the associates of , including bin bombing. However, the lead FBI investigator, Ali Laden’s bodyguard, , who is Soufan, through a series of non-violent imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay (al-Jazeera, interrogations, pointed out the inconsistencies in September 10, 2017). Bin Attash was identified al-Badawi’s testimony that eventually led al- as having played a key role in the 1998 bombings Badawi to confess that he had indeed planned of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es much of the attack (Newsweek, October 27, Salam and in the attack on the USS Cole. 2007). Attacking the USS Cole Al-Badawi’s role in the attack was also cited by Walid bin Attash, who was captured in Karachi !16 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION in April 2003. Attash, who was subjected to Yemeni government (Asharq al-Awsat, October harsh interrogation measures at various black site 17, 2007). After he turned himself into prisons, provided testimony stating that al- authorities, al-Badawi was freed and allowed to Badawi helped secure the boat used in the attack return to his home near Aden after he pledged and also traveled to the Yemeni town of Sa’dah loyalty to then Yemeni president Ali Abdullah —where there was a major arms market—to Saleh. Yemeni authorities refused multiple purchase the explosives used in the attack. requests to extradite al-Badawi before and after he was released. In April 2003, Al-Badawi escaped along with ten other suspects from the military prison where he Jamal al-Badawi’s escapes from prison, his was held ( al-Jazeera, January 6, 2019). After his commuted death sentence, and what was finally recapture in 2004, al-Badawi, who had been a de-facto by the country’s president— sentenced to death by a Yemeni court, had this despite ample evidence of his role in the sentence commuted to a 15-year prison term (al- bombing of the Cole—all point to his having a Jazeera, September 29, 2004). Al-Badawi had close relationship with elements of the Yemeni been indicted on 50 counts in absentia in a New security services. Former Yemeni President Ali York court in 2003. Abdullah Saleh and the current vice president, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (who many Terrorist and Asset? Yemenis refer to as Baba al-Qaeda [the father of In February 2006, al-Badawi and 22 other al-Qaeda]), both saw the usefulness of those men prisoners, including Nasir al-Wuhayshi (who who had trained and fought in Afghanistan. would become the emir of AQAP) and Qasim al- These men, like all good proxies, were deniable Raymi (the current emir of AQAP), escaped a and expendable. Yet, in the case of al-Badawi, it Yemeni jail run by the Political Security Bureau seems that he continued to enjoy some degree of (PSB) in Sana’a. The prisoners purportedly protection by the state despite what must have managed to dig a 460-foot tunnel unbeknownst been immense pressure from the U.S. to either to their jailers (al-Jazeera, February 6, 2006). imprison or extradite him. The tunnel led them directly and conveniently to Quiescence a mosque that was adjacent to the prison. Whatever the nature of the deal made with the Yemen has been the site of frequent prison Yemeni government, al-Badawi was protected breaks, most of which have occurred at prisons from arrest and extradition until his assassination run by the country’s security services. The 2006 by a U.S. drone. Following his de-facto pardon in prison break, in which al-Badawi escaped, was 2007, little is known about what role, if any, al- the most significant because a number of the Badawi played in AQAP. It is likely that he prisoners who were not recaptured went on to maintained contact with both AQAP operatives play significant roles in AQAP. In 2007, al- and members of the Yemeni security services, Badawi turned himself into Yemeni authorities who would have monitored his whereabouts. following protracted negotiations with the !17 VOLUME X, ISSUE 2, FEBRUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION There is little doubt that al-Badawi was nothing [2] See: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ more than a legacy member of al-Qaeda who files/field_document/ had little, if anything, to do with AQAP’s current csrt_transcript_al_nashiri_released_6.13.16_high operations in Yemen. His death will have no lighted_for_csrt_upload.pdf impact on the ability of AQAP to operate in [ 3 ] S e e : https://foreignpolicy.com/ Yemen, but AQAP will—as it always does— 2015/01/21/playing-a-double-game-in-the- capitalize on the death to recruit new low-level fight-against-aqap-yemen-saleh-al-qaeda/ operatives and foot soldiers.

Jamal al-Badawi’s career points to the complex Militant Leadership Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown and shadowy nature of the relationship between Foundation. It is designed to be read by policymakers and other specialists, yet also accessible to the general public. In order to purchase a Yemeni security services and jihadists. Had al- subscription, please visit http://mlm.jamestown.org. Unauthorized Badawi been captured alive and questioned by a reproduction or redistribution of this or any Jamestown publication is strictly prohibited by law. skilled interrogator like Ali Soufan, his testimony would have undoubtedly contributed greatly to the United States’ understanding of how jihadist groups like AQAP may interact with some elements of the state. This information would be of particular interest now, since a disintegrating Yemen is rife with such interactions ( Al-Bawaba, August 26, 2018). Jihadists, including members of AQAP, are active along almost all of Yemen’s frontlines as various factions backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE battle Yemen’s Houthi rebels (al-Jazeera, November 28, 2018). Michael Horton is a Fellow for Arabian affairs at the Jamestown Foundation. He is a frequent contributor to Jane’s Intelligence Review and has written for numerous other publications including: The National Interest, The Economist and West Point’s CTC Sentinel.

Notes

[1]See: https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/ index.php? option=com_acymailing&ctrl=archive&task=vie w&mailid=12993&key=X3D3CLmy&subid=14 72-t9ir9gm3ghmVr7&tmpl=component

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