Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
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Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Inside What Comes Next? The Consequences of Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Presumed Death - Gregoire Patte, Nathan Cohen and Andrew Mitzcavitch Implications of Umar Patek’s Conviction - V. Arianti Indonesian Prisons: A Think Tank for Terrorists - Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin Special Feature: Community Engagement in Schools: The Singapore Story - Salim Mohamed Nasir Volume 4: Issue 8, August 2012 2 What Comes Next? The Consequences of Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Presumed Death By Gregoire Patte, Nathan Cohen and Andrew Mitzcavitch As the cornerstone of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mokhtar Belmokhtar was intimately in- volved in all aspects of AQIM’s operations, its tribal relationships, its smuggling operations, and its liai- soning with other terrorist groups. This paper provides details of Mokhtar Belmokhtar's role in AQIM and the effects stemming from his possible demise. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, whose nicknames include erations for the GIA during Algeria’s Civil War “The Uncatchable”, “One-Eyed”, and “Mr. Marl- and then expanded its area of operations into boro”, is a ubiquitous figure in the Sahel and the southern Algeria and the Sahara. Sahara. He has been a key operator, facilitator and emir of the Sahel and Sahara regions for Facing increasing dis- Algerian fighting groups such as the Groupe agreements with the GIA Islamique Armee (GIA), the Groupe Salafiste leadership, in 2002 Mok- pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC), and Al htar Belmokhtar supported Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Following the creation of the GSPC his own particular vision of jihad, Belmokhtar has alongside with Hassan become one of Africa’s most wanted terrorists. Hattab. Belmokhtar re- mained the leader of the Belmokhtar was born southern region of the on 1 June 1972 in GSPC, and started to build Ghardaia, a city in Figure 2: Hassan Hattab, his reputation as a valu- central-northern Alge- Source: Public Domain able supplier of weapons ria. In an interview and materials to militant posted online in late Islamic groups in the region. Belmokhtar and his 2005, he revealed followers financed these supplies by engaging in that his commitment criminal activities such as smuggling, drug traf- to jihad started after ficking and kidnapping, and taxing the traffickers the assassination of in the Sahara and the Sahel regions for protec- Figure 1: Mokhtar Belmokhtar Jordanian-Palestinian tion. His smuggling acumen earned him the nick- at a young age. Photo Credit: ideologue Abdullah name “Mr. Marlboro” and some of his detractors Maghreb Politics Review Azzam in 1989. At the consider Belmokhtar “motivated more by money age of 19, after a than ideology.” short period in the Algerian military, he flew to Afghanistan to support the Taliban. He trained at When Hassan Hattab was removed from the Khalden, Jihad Wal, and Al Qaeda’s Jalalabad GSPC leadership in 2003, the group chose Nabil camp and claimed to have networked with other Sharaoui as a successor, despite Belmokhtar’s Al Qaeda affiliated jihadists such as Abu Qatada, credentials. When the Algerian security services Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abu Talal al- killed Sahraoui, leadership passed to the unpopu- Masri. Belmokthar returned to Ghardaia in 1993 lar and inexperienced Abdelmalek Droukdel, who soon after fighting between the Algerian govern- remains the current leader of the GSPC, now ment and Islamist fighters began. In Ghardaia, he labeled Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). founded the Shahada Katibat (Martyrs’ Battalion), Profoundly disappointed by Droukdel’s nomina- which eventually became the ninth zone of op- tion and opposed to his vision of jihad, Belmok- Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 8, 2012 The Consequences of Belmokhtar's Presumed Death 3 htar distanced himself from the organization. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, presumed dead While focusing on his activities in southern Alge- ria, Belmokhtar came to counterbalance Drouk- On 28 June 2012, the National Movement for del’s leadership. However, despite his detach- the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) announced ment from AQIM, that Mokhtar Belmokhtar was killed while fight- Belmokhtar re- ing alongside other AQIM fighters and MUJWA mained a critical in Gao, a northern Mali town, on the previous supplier for the day. However, his death has been falsely re- group, and his ported before. For example in 1999, the Algerian influence among forces incorrectly reported his death and in the Sahel and 2008, he was falsely reported to have surren- Saharan Islamic dered to Algerian authorities. Both AQIM and groups contin- the anti-MNLA online forum kidal.info denied Figure 3: Abdelmalek Droukdel, Photo ued to expand. Credit: L’expression Belmokhtar’s death. Indeed, on 30 June 2012, the jihadist web forum Ansar al-Mujahideen pub- lished a communiqué covering the events in Gao that was penned by Belmokhtar’s alias, Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s prominence in the Sahel “Khalid Abu al-Abbas.” However, the commu- and the Sahara made him a natural point of con- niqué does not give any details post 28 June tact for local and international jihadist groups. 2012 and thus until irrefutable evidence sur- Belmokhtar acted as the channel for communi- faces, his death remains unconfirmed. cations between Al Qaeda central team and the Algerian jihadist groups, and as the contact If Belmokhtar’s fatality is confirmed, then the point for all Al Qaeda emissaries to the Algerian structure of AQIM leadership may become less arena. Furthermore, Belmokhtar retains a deep complicated. As previously mentioned, Belmok- connection to regional jihadist groups such as htar mostly worked independently and had a Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and contentious relationship with AQIM central. Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Thus the recent Droukdel, AQIM’s emir, had sent Yahya Djouadi unconfirmed announcement of his death raises to assert control over Belmokhtar. However, many questions on AQIM’s future. Djouadi was removed in late November 2011. According to Mohamed Mahmoud Aboulmaaly, editor of the Nouakchott Info Newspaper, Figure 4: Al Qaeda area of operation and influence in the Sahel region. Photo Credit: Agence France Presse Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 8, 2012 The Consequences of Belmokhtar's Presumed Death 4 "Yahya Djouadi did not succeed, according to hara to Niger. Attracted by the new opportuni- the organization, in activating and developing ties, many young men are now under the AQIM Sahara Emirate strategies." Djouadi was re- criminal-wing umbrella and they will fight to placed by Nabil Makhloufi (aka Nabil Abu maintain this source of benefits. Belmokhtar un- Alqama). derstood the importance of the hostages and the necessity to keep them alive to buy the alle- With Belmokhtar out of the way, Droukdel could giance of the local community and sustain insert another leader which would be in line with AQIM’s financial needs. Other leaders such as AQIM ideology and re-establish cohesion in the Hamidu Abu Zeid and formerly Yahya Djouadi group. Possible successors would be Abou Zeid are known to be more extreme and less strate- and Yahya Abou al-Hammam who were con- gic regarding the hostage issue; they do not firmed seen with Belmokhtar in Timbuktu in April hesitate to kill the hostages. 2012. Abou Zeid is a prominent AQIM com- mander and is reportedly operating in Mali and Niger. Yahya Abou Al-Hammam has lived in the Mali region for several years and reportedly be- came the local governor of Timbuktu in April. How would Belmokhtar’s death affect AQIM modus operandi? Mokhtar Belmokhtar played a key role in the reorganization of the GSPC and AQIM’s activi- ties in the Sahel and the Sahara regions. Figure 5: Hostages seized in Niger by AQIM. Photo Though traditionally active in northern Algerian Credit: Radio France Internationale towns and cities, in recent years militant Islamic groups have fled southwards toward the regions bordering Mauritania, Mali and Niger. The Kidnappings are not the only source for AQIM, sparse governmental presence allowed AQIM to or even its most profitable one. In 2010, Moroc- establish a secure zone of influence and con- can authorities arrested a network of 34 drug nect to other insurgent and terrorist groups of traffickers linked to AQIM and seized 600 kilo- the West Africa, Sahel and Sahara. To increase grams of cocaine for an estimated value of USD its control over these regions, AQIM reached out 60 million. Comparatively, the estimated amount to the local Tuareg communities. Belmokhtar, for collected by AQIM from the ransoms since 2006 example, is reported to have married four wives is about USD 70 million. Mokhtar Belmokhtar from local Arab and Tuareg communities, includ- was the corner stone of the smuggling, traffick- ing daughters of local commanders and tribal ing, and kidnapping system in the region. If Bel- chiefs. mokhtar died, then AQIM’s capacity to raise funds, supply weapons and preserve its integra- AQIM’s illegal activities provided a financial tion into the local society would undoubtedly source for the largely impoverished and unem- suffer. Moreover, one may have doubts regard- ployed local population. Western governments ing the capacity of Hamidu Abu Zeid to take have paid handsome ransom fees to AQIM for charge of the now powerful and independent the release of hostages. In turn, AQIM has rein- Belmokhtar’s el-Moulathamine. His vision, which vested a part of the ransoms in the enrolment of he shares with the demoted but still influential criminal and traffickers group from Western Sa- Yahya Djouadi, of a “purer” Jihad that prohibits Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 8, 2012 The Consequences of Belmokhtar's Presumed Death 5 criminal activities may not satisfy the local crimi- nal groups. If they lose their financial benefits they may then turn against AQIM.