Algeria – Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 23 July 2014

Information on GIA, MIA terrorists and their terrorist activities in

The Appendix to a report published by the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, in a section titled “Islamist groups, contains brief descriptions of the principal terrorist groups currently active in Algeria. In a paragraph headed “Those Who Signed in Blood (Al-Mouwakoune Bi-Dima)/ The Masked Men Brigade (Al Mulathameen )/ Khaled Abu Al Abbas Brigade)” this report states:

“This is a splinter group of AQIM led by , which separated in 2012. The group claimed responsibility for the attack on the In Amenas gas facility in January 2013. In August 2013 it was reported that the group has merged with MUJAO to form Al Murabitoun. This has not been confirmed by the experts commenting on the groups.” (Strachan, A.L. (January 2014). Conflict analysis of Algeria, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), University of Birmingham, p.23)

A paragraph headed Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb/ Al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM/AQLIM) states:

“This group was known as GSPC (Groupe Salafite pour la prédication et le combat/ Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) and it was a splinter group of the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé/ Armed Islamic Group), which had been fighting the Government since 1993.33 AQIM in Algeria was founded by Hassan Hattab, a former member of the GIA. The group stated that only the state is a legitimate target, disassociating itself from the GIA’s policy of considering civilians to be legitimate targets. However AQIM has also used one-sided violence. Its affiliation with al-Qaeda was viewed as negative by some members, as in Algeria dates back to the 1980s and therefore Bin Laden, was seen to be copying the Algerians. Affiliation was therefore deemed to be unnecessary (Expert comment). The group’s aim is to replace Algeria’s secular state with an Islamic one. The group has split into northern and southern cells, with the northern cell retaining its ideological goals, while the southern cells have been increasingly involved in criminal activity. AQIM’s northern cell is led by . The organisation is active across the Sahara-Sahel region.” (ibid, p.23)

A paragraph headed “Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest, MUJAO)” states:

“MUJAO is a splinter group of AQIM. The group emerged in 2011, and its first attack was the kidnapping of three humanitarian workers in Tindouf. They have also claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of seven Algerian diplomats in Gao, Mali, and for attacks on the Gendarmeries in Tamanrasset and Ouargla. The group is allied with AQIM and Ansar Eddine (a Malian

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group). In August 2013 Mokhtar Belmokhtar announced a merger between the Masked Men Brigade and MUJAO.” (ibid, p.23)

A report on a joint Swedish-Swiss fact finding mission to Algeria, in a section titled 3.3 “The security situation” (section 3.3), refers to information supplied by representatives from Centre Africain d'Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme (CAERT) as follows:

“According to CAERT, armed Islamist opposition is now almost exclusively an occurrence in north-eastern Algeria, and in the Sahel region (i.e. southern Algeria, northern Mali and Niger). CAERT stated that the armed Islamist forces in northern Algeria now are limited to approximately 200 individuals belonging to the organisation Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The group was called Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) before swearing allegiance to Al Qaeda. The AQIM fighters move about in the mountains in the provinces of Jijel and Tizi Ouzo, and to some extent in the mountain range that leads south in the province of Oued Soufa. The members of AQIM are sought after in mountainous areas by the Algerian security forces.” (Swedish Migration Board (20 January 2012) The Development in Algeria in the Shade of the Arabic Spring, and its Consequences on Migration (Public version), pp.11-12)

This section of the report briefly refers to the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) as follows:

“According to the CAERT there exists another terrorist organisation in northern Algeria as well, Dham Houmet Daawa Salafi (DHDS). DHDS is a splinter group from the Groupe Islamique Army (GIA). The latter group is no longer active.” (ibid, p.12)

A country advice document published by the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal states:

“Following a ceasefire in October 1997 the GIA fell apart and is now largely defunct. One offshoot of the GIA was the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which became the al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Remnants of the GIA membership are with the AQIM, other groups or have surrendered.” (Australian Government: Refugee Review Tribunal (3 December 2009) Algeria – DZA35742 – GIA – State protection – Internal relocation, p.1)

See also International Crisis Group report which, in a section titled “The Disintegration of the GIA and the End of the AIS”, states:

“The massacres of 1997-1998 precipitated the AIS's decision to end its campaign and accelerated the break-up of the GIA. On 21 September 1997, after secret negotiations with the army over many months, AIS commander Madani Mezrag announced a nationwide ceasefire effective from 1 October. The fact that families linked to the FIS/AIS had been among the victims of the massacres probably influenced this decision. The ceasefire was a strategic defeat for the FIS, since it meant that the Algerian army had ended the AIS campaign without conceding it a renewed political role.105 The GIA fell apart: Mustapha Kertali's group at Larba and Ali Benhadjar's LIDD soon associated

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themselves with the ceasefire; Kada Benchiha and his followers quit the GIA to found a new group, "The Guardians of the Salafi Call" (HDS);106 and in September 1998, the GIA commander in the Boumerdès region, Hassan Hattab, broke away to found the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).” (International Crisis Group (30 July 2004) , Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page, p.14)

An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to a request for information, in a section titled “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”

“AQIM was known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, GSPC) before joining with Al-Qaeda in September 2006 and changing its name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007. According to the US Congressional Research Service, ‘the practical meaning of AQIM's union with Al Qaeda is uncertain, and links between the two may be nominal but mutually beneficial’. For its part, the CFR states that, according to analysts, the merger and the name change symbolize the organization's efforts ‘to move beyond the Algerian conflict and focus on jihadist aspirations in the broader region’. Sources indicate that AQIM has links with other African terrorist organizations, including al- Shabaab and Boko Haram. AQIM is also reported to have links to drug traffickers or smugglers.” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (15 August 2013) DZA104508.E –Algeria: Information on terrorism and banditry; measures taken by the state to fight terrorism and banditry (November 2011- July 2013))

An article published by the Jamestown Foundation, in a section titled “Assessing New Threats”, states:

“Algerian experience in the field of counter-terrorism dates to its struggle with the jihadist Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) in the 1990s and later with its successor, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM’s tactical retreat toward the Sahel region has confirmed the effectiveness of Algeria’s counter-terrorism’s efforts. However, AQIM has also transformed from a local movement to a regional network developed around Algerian borders—especially between Mali and Mauritania. AQIM’s reorientation has introduced new threats for the Algerian security forces; AQIM’s current reorganization aims at targeting Algeria again in future attacks.” (Jamestown Foundation (17 October 2013) Jihadism and Counterterrorism Policy in Algeria: New Responses to New Challenges, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 11 Issue: 19)

The 2014 US Department of State country report on terrorism in Algeria states:

“Within Algeria, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained the most active terrorist threat. AQIM attacked Algerian security forces, local government targets, and westerners in the Sahel, operating primarily in the mountainous areas east of Algiers and in the expansive desert regions near Algeria's southern border.” (US Department of State (30 April 2014) Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 – Algeria)

This report also states

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“Once part of AQIM, the al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) became a separate organization in late 2012 and its sub-battalion, "Those Who Sign in Blood," led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, claimed responsibility for the January 16, 2013 attack against a gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria.” (ibid)

In a paragraph headed “2013 Terrorist Incidents” this report states:

“AQIM continued attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombings, false roadblocks, kidnappings, and ambushes in areas east and south of Algiers. The press reported at least 196 terrorist acts in 2013. As in years past, Algeria experienced a spike in terrorist incidents during Ramadan. In 2013, however, the Algerian government observed AQIM's yearly Ramadan offensive was significantly reduced relative to the past decade.” (ibid)

The 2014 Overseas Security Advisory Council report on Algeria, in a section titled “Local, Regional, and International Terrorism Threats/Concerns”, states:

“Terrorist threats posed by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continue to dominate security concerns and media reporting. AQIM is the most active terrorist group in Algeria. This group, which had been known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat before affiliating with al-Qa’ida in 2006, is a splinter of the Armed Islamic Group that arose in the early 1990s. The threat posed by AQIM continued to menace the Algerian government and expatriate business operating throughout Algeria. Although AQIM’s primary targets have been the Algerian government and its institutions, it has also targeted foreign interests, particularly in the Sahel states of Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. To increase its financial resources, AQIM has kidnapped Westerners in those countries to obtain ransoms. AQIM operatives in Algeria have stated their intention to overthrow the government and attack Algerian, French, Spanish, and American targets. AQIM continued attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombings, false roadblocks, kidnappings, and ambushes in areas east and south of Algiers.” (Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) (2 February 2014) Algeria 2014 Crime and Safety Report, pp.3-4)

This section of the report also states:

“On January 16, 2013, “Those Who Sign in Blood,” an AQIM-linked organization led by a former AQIM leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, attacked the Tiguentourine gas facility (a joint venture among Algerian, British, and Norwegian companies) near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. Over 800 people were taken hostage for several days, and the attack resulted in the deaths of 39 foreign hostages, including three U.S. citizens. The group’s leader and an Algerian national, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, remains a threat and is at-large. An AQIM affiliate, the Movement for Unity of Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO), emerged in 2011 and has been more visible than AQIM in the past two years. In August 2013, the Mali-based MUJAO and Al-Mulathamun Battalion, another group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, announced that the two organizations merged and adopted the name al-Murabitoun. The group aspires to establish Islamic law in Algeria and in the region and to attack Western interests.” (ibid, p.4)

A Jamestown Foundation article states:

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“The continuing break-up of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) into northern and southern factions under rival commanders Abd al-Malik Droukdel and Mokhtar Belmokhtar has presented Algerian authorities with the necessity of fighting a two-front war against factions interested in establishing their dominance by striking security targets within the country.” (Jamestown Foundation (16 May 2014) Algeria Fighting a Two-Front War With Islamist Militants, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 10)

This article also states:

“The April 30 pledge of allegiance by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas) to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (in which Belmokhtar called al-Zawahiri ‘our Amir’) and his recognition of the legacy of and Abdullah Azzam appears to be yet another demonstration of his rejection of the leadership of AQIM leader Abd al- Malik Droukdel (AFP, May 1). At the moment, Droukdel’s AQIM and Belmokhtar’s Libyan-based al-Murabitun movement seem to be engaged in a bitter rivalry, though so far their contest is being carried out through attacks on Algerian targets rather than group-on- group clashes like those witnessed between the and Syria (ISIS) and the al-Qaeda sponsored al-Nusra Front in Syria. With Droukdel’s faction operating in northern Algeria and Belmokhtar’s faction operating in the remote south, such inter-Islamist clashes appear unlikely in Algeria.” (ibid)

This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research and Information Unit within time constraints. This response is not and does not purport to be conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please read in full all documents referred to.

References:

Australian Government: Refugee Review Tribunal (3 December 2009) Algeria – DZA35742 – GIA – State protection – Internal relocation http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1293038255_dza35742.pdf (Accessed 23 July 2014)

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (15 August 2013) DZA104508.E – Algeria: Information on terrorism and banditry; measures taken by the state to fight terrorism and banditry (November 2011-July 2013) http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/Eng/ResRec/RirRdi/Pages/index.aspx?doc=454740&pls=1 (Accessed 22 July 2014)

International Crisis Group (30 July 2004) Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/ North%20Africa/Algeria/Islamism%20Violence%20and%20Reform%20in%20 Algeria%20Turning%20the%20Page.pdf (Accessed 23 July 2014)

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Jamestown Foundation (16 May 2014) Algeria Fighting a Two-Front War With Islamist Militants, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 10 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42366&tx _ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=5e946831abeb8690c3ae6bcae3674fac#.U85C VdROPK5 (Accessed 22 July 2014)

Jamestown Foundation (17 October 2013) Jihadism and Counterterrorism Policy in Algeria: New Responses to New Challenges, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 11 Issue: 19 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=7&tx_ttnews%5 Btt_news%5D=41501&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=228&cHash=0b1f600fcba 0599365652aeabf030c96#.U85w3dROPK4 (Accessed 22 July 2014)

Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) (2 February 2014) Algeria 2014 Crime and Safety Report https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15067 (Accessed 22 July 2014)

Strachan, A.L. (January 2014). Conflict analysis of Algeria, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), University of Birmingham http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/GSDRC_ConflAnal_Algeria.pdf (Accessed 23 July 2014)

Swedish Migration Board (20 January 2012) The Development in Algeria in the Shade of the Arabic Spring, and its Consequences on Migration (Public version) http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/migration/laenderinformationen/h erkunftslaenderinformationen/afrika/dza/DZA-ber-factfindingmission-e.pdf (Accessed 22 July 2014)

US Department of State (30 April 2014) Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 – Algeria http://www.refworld.org/docid/53622a088.html (Accessed 22 July 2014)

Sources Consulted:

Amnesty International Electronic Immigration Network European Country of Origin Information Network Google Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada International Crisis Group Jamestown Foundation Lexis Nexis Overseas Security Advisory Council Refugee Documentation Centre Query Database Swedish Migration Board

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UK Home Office UNHCR Refworld US Department of State

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