An Analysis of the Decision Granting the Mormon Priesthood to Blacks Author(S): O

Abandoning an Unpopular Policy: An Analysis of the Decision Granting the Mormon Priesthood to Blacks Author(s): O. Kendall White, Jr. and Daryl White Source: Sociological Analysis, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 231-245 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3710400 Accessed: 13-11-2017 21:15 UTC

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Abandoning an Unpopular Policy: An Analysis of the Decision Granting the Mormon Priesthood to Blacks*

0. Kendall White, Jr. Washington & Lee University Daryl White Georgia State University

The decision admitting blacks into the Mormon priesthood is explained as an adaptation to environmental pressures, the logical outcome of organizational practices, and the resolution of internal contradictions. Adverse publicity from the media, pressures from the black community, and threats of successful litigation reflected environmental hostility; an organizational imperative of growth, the quest for respectability, and the internationalization of Mormonism predisposed the church toward adaptation; and challenges from Mormon intellectuals and activists, pressures from black Mormons, and the leadership of the president reinforced adaptive strategies. Revelation, as a technique of internal control, ensured the consensus of officials and strengthened Mormon hegemony.

For the past ninety years, Mormonism has provided a history of major adaptations to its environment. From the abandonment of the Kingdom of God as a concrete society and acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the nation-state (Hansen, 1974; White, 1978), the repudiation of communitarian socialism and embracing of corporate capitalism (Ar- rington, 1966; White, 1980), to the discontinuation of polygamy and acceptance of mo- nogamy (Young, 1954); Ivins, 1972), the Saints have adopted beliefs and altered social structures in response to environmental pressures. Indeed, organizational strategies em- phasizing adaptation may be said to constitute the dominant orientation of twentieth century Mormonism. To some non-Mormon scholars-e.g., O'Dea (1957), Dolgin (1976), Leone (1976; 1979), and Michaelson (1977, 1978)-the church's vitality is equated with its remarkable ability to adapt to environmental vicissitudes. The decision admitting blacks into the priesthood is the most recent of the church's major accommodations. While it might be explained in terms of various accommodation theories, our analysis is not dependent upon any specific model but demonstrates how environmental and organizational forces coalesced during the summer of 1978 to produce the most significant change in Mormon policy for decades. This decision was the culmination of environmental pressures, the logical conclusion of established organizational practices, and the resolution of internal contradictions. Adverse publicity

*An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, April 4-7, 1979. We wish to thank Harlan Beckley, Earl Caruthers, Wayland Hand, Roger Jeans, Patrick McNamara, David Novack, Brent White, Glenn White, and especially Kenneth Westhues for comments on earlier versions. This research could not have been accomplished without the cooperation of many respond- ents whom we will not identify in order to ensure their anonymity.

231

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from the media, pressures from the black community, and threats of successful litigation reflected growing environmental hostility; an organizational imperative of growth, the quest for respectability, and the internationalization of Mormonism predisposed the church toward adaptation; and challenges from Mormon intellectuals and activists, pressures from black Mormons, and the leadership of the Mormon president reinforced adaptive organizational strategies.

Factors Affecting the Policy Change

Adverse Publicity from the Media

Following accommodation in the realms of politics, economics, and the family, twentieth century Mormonism found itself in an increasingly sympathetic environment. The image of the Saints as secret, authoritarian, and morally depraved (see Davis, 1972) gave way to an image of model citizens disproportionately active in the political and economic life of the nation. Celebrating the Mormon welfare system, the news media empha- sized this new image from the Great Depression through the early post World War II years. Responding to the challenge of the civil rights movement, the media soon discovered that blacks were denied the Mormon priesthood. This resulted in characterizations of Mormonism as politically reactionary and morally bankrupt. Lythgoe's extensive analysis (1968) of the changing image of Mormonism through the late fifties and sixties documents the "disenchantment" with the church of previously sympathetic writers over the race issue. In a subsequent analysis of the seventies, but before announcement of the revelation, Stathis and Lythgoe (1977) found the non-Mormon media more sophisticated and less preoccupied with blacks and the priesthood. Nevertheless, it headed the list of controversial items as a major source of embarrassment to a people profoundly preoccupied "with their public image." Even semi-popular books, written by established journalists, reflected this same am- bivalence. Wallace Turner (1966) and William Whalen's (1967) descriptions of modern Mormonism generally praised the Saints but condemned the church's racial policy, and Clark Mollenhoff (1968) and T. George Harris' (1967) accounts of George Romney's political career underscored the Mormon dilemma. Any added success for Romney meant wider publicity for Mormon racism. The writings of Jerald and Sandra Tanner (1970; 1972) may have reached fewer people, but their more thorough analyses clearly dis- turbed church officials and made many aware of contradictions in the official policy. But some of the most significant work came from non-Mormon academics. If Thomas O'Dea's major book (1957) failed to identify Mormon racism as a serious problem, an in- vitation to reexamine his chapter on "strains and conflicts" rectified the situation. This essay (1972) treated the race issue as symbolic of the Mormon response to modernity- an issue revealing all of the strains identified in his earlier analysis. Since it involved the dialectics of literal versus critical interpretations of scripture, unquestioning obe- dience and acceptance of authority versus democracy and individualism, and political conservatism versus social idealism, the Mormon church faced a profound challenge instead of a simple matter of policy. It is interesting to note that this is the one essay in which O'Dea doubts the probability of Mormonism meaningfully adapting to its environment. While O'Dea's work may or may not have been significant to church of-

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ficials, it profoundly influenced Mormon intellectuals. The latter, as we will soon see, did influence the new policy. Whether the characterization of Mormonism in the media caused or reflected greater environmental hostility is irrelevant to our analysis. The point is that the past two decades found the church again in conflict with its environment, and the shifting focus of the media serves at the very least as a barometer of the conflict.

Pressures from the Black Community

The impact of the civil rights movement should not be underestimated. Becoming increasingly conscious of the Mormon policy and connecting it directly with discrimination in Utah, black civil rights organizations insisted that Mormon leaders prove their good faith with endorsements of pending legislation during the early Kennedy-Johnson years. When Mormon officials refused, civil rights organizations entertained the possi- bility of demonstrating at the semi-annual general conferences of the Mormon church. Apostle Hugh B. Brown, the most sympathetic to the movement, expressed support for the civil rights of blacks at a general conference in 1963, but he failed to endorse specific legislation. The Utah chapters of the NAACP responded in 1965 with a resolution in- troduced at the national meeting urging foreign governments to deny visas to Mormon missionaries for promulgating a doctrine of black inferiority (see White 1972b; Brewer, 1966; 1968). If massive protests failed to materialize during the mid-sixties, this was merely the lull before the storm. The late sixties found the Brigham Young University the focal point of militant protests. Sports events provided the context for protests, boycotts, disrupted games, mass demonstrations, and "riots." At one point the conflicts among schools within the West- ern Athletic Conference became so intense that the conference almost disbanded. Ad- ministrators, already embroiled in student demonstrations over Vietnam, began to separate themselves from the Mormon school. Stanford University, for instance, severed all relations with Brigham Young University until a recent announcement, following the revelation, of an interest in reestablishing intercollegiate ties (see White, 1972b). Mormon reactions to both the threat of demonstrations during the mid-sixties and the militancy of the late sixties bordered on collective paranoia. Rumors of an organized conspiracy, typically directed by established civil rights organizations intent upon destroying the city, permeated the region. The NAACP's disclaimers of a planned demonstration for the October 1965 Mormon conference failed to dispel rumors of blacks con- verging on Salt Lake City to foment racial conflict (White, 1972b:54-57). The rumors during the late sixties found Black Panthers and hippies awaiting to descend on the city to destroy the temple. An apocryphal prophecy, which church authorities subsequently repudiated, legitimated rumors of a racial war (Wilson, 1976), and vigilante groups, os- tensibly to assist the police, emerged throughout the community. While the press reported that they numbered over fifty groups, vigilante leaders claimed to have the support of 10,000 "sincere citizens" (White, 1972b; Wilson, 1976). The important point of course is the social and psychological consequences. The rumors helped to perpetuate the status quo and prevent the Mormon community from coming to terms with its racial policy. Previously identified as a factor inhibiting change

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The important point of course is the social and psychological consequences. The rumors helped to perpetuate the status quo and prevent the Mormon community from coming to terms with its racial policy. Previously identified as a factor inhibiting change (White, 1972b), the rumors enabled the Mormon community to project its own fears and hostility onto external forces while avoiding any realistic appraisal of Mormon racism. Indeed, in the most extreme form, W. Cleon Skowsen attributes the problem to a Communist conspiracy intent on destroying the Mormon church (see O'Dea, 1972: 164-165). With these responses to the challenges of Mormon racism, little hope for change appeared on the horizon. (White, 1972b), the rumors enabled the Mormon community to project its own fears and hostility onto external forces while avoiding any realistic appaisal of Mormon racism. Indeed, in the most extreme form, W. Cleon Skowsen attributes the problem to a Communist conspiracy intent on destroying the Mormon church (see O'Dea, 1972: 164-165). With these responses to the challenges of Mormon racism, little hope for change appeared on the horizon. It is not surprising, however, that Mormon officials would be unlikely to change their racial policy during periods of intense environmental conflict. To do so would appear expedient. Nor could they assume that the apparent reprieve during the mid-sixties from the highly publicized confrontation politics would last. Moreover, a period in which relevant publics perceived environmental hostility to be declining provided an excellent opportunity for announcing a new policy. It would take the world, including analysts of the Mormon situation, by surprise; ensure good press coverage; seem more sincere; and appear to be less a function of immediate pressures.

Fears of Successful Litigation Any perception of tranquility was merely an apparition. The conflict simply assumed new forms. Flamboyant confrontation tactics generally gave way to more sophisticated use of politically powerful environmental actors, including the judiciary. Several cases, some of which were solved out of court, charged Mormon leaders with racial discrimination. Potential litigation, of which church leaders were clearly aware, could involve the church in complicity to deprive people of their civil rights, collusion of church and state, and misrepresentation in the acquisition of federal lands. The impact of litigation may be illustrated by the most famous case involving the Mormon church, Boy Scouts of America, and the NAACP. When the church required senior patrol leaders to be deacon's quorum presidents-i.e. priesthood bearers, Byron Marchant, a Mormon scout master, appealed to church leaders, scout officials, officers of United Way, and the state ombudsman in behalf of two black scouts. Unable to ob- tain support, he brought the issue before the NAACP. The latter entered federal court charging the church with a violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Avoiding a court appearance in which they were to produce all documents relevant to Mormon racial policy, church and scout officials agreed with the NAACP to settle out of court. The defen- dants promised that the benefits of scouting would remain available to "all boys of all races"; not to deprive any scout of "full" enjoyment of the "offices, services, facilities, privileges, etc." by reason of race or color; and to establish a program for monitoring the participation of black scouts (Stipulation and Order, C-74-239, pp. 3-4).

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If church officials succeeded in averting a trial which would have inevitably generated wide publicity, they certainly knew that the future held little hope. Even victorious cases would bring adverse publicity, and the probability of losing litigation appearing on the horizon was increasing. Some potential cases would be highly embarrassing. Should they come to trial, any change in Mormon racial policy would appear expedient, and this would force the church into a sufficiently intransigent posture to preclude change for many years. On the other hand, a new racial policy would render such litigation moot.

The Organizational Imperative of Growth

Mormonism originated on assumptions of aggressive proselyting with the explicit goal of becoming a world-wide empire, but the rationalization of growth technologies is largely a phenomenon of the past three decades. Today missionaries resemble salesmen more than preachers. They present the same memorized "lessons" throughout the world. A successful mission is now largely measured in ternis of the number of conversions-a fact that became apparent even to the popular media during the sixties. The shift from qualitative to quantitative criteria of success and the implementation of more efficient means of ensuring growth have become very obvious to observers of the missionary program. Whatever the other consequences, standardization has paid off in substantial growth. Kelley's analysis (1972) of the declining membership of mainline Protestant and Catholic churches and the growth of the more conservative sects and denominations also docu- mented Mormon expansion. In fact, he found the Mormon's annual growth rate of 5.6 per cent to be the largest for religious organizations with more than one million members. Arrington and Bitton (1979:285) observe that Mormon growth has continued to exceed an annual rate of five per cent through the seventies. Even a cursory examina- tion of Mormon publications reveals this obsession with growth. A typical issue of the Church News (January 6, 1979), for instance, celebrates President Kimball's five year leadership in terms of numerical increases in missions, stakes (dioceses), wards (parishes), temples, missionaries, and converts. It concludes with the characteristic call for more and a plea from Kimball to double the numbers of missionaries and converts in the coming decade. The inherent logic of the organizational imperative of growth suggested change in Mormon racial policy. Surely church leaders perceived the frequent inquiries about the priesthood policy and the difficulties it created for missionaries as reducing the number of potential converts. Not only would a new policy encourage growth in areas where Mormon missionaries are currently active, but it would enable the church to extend its domain to areas previously closed because of racial conflict or predominantly black populations. That Mormon officials so defined the situation may be inferred from ex- ploratory missions to black Africans (Church News, November 4, 1979) and a recent report of over 800 black converts in Nigeria and Ghana (The Denver Post, June 16, 1979).

Quest for Respectability

Related to this obsession with growth is a quest for respectability. When organizational energies focused on strategies of accommodation, the Saints discovered that they

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liked acceptance. However, the rationalization of this quest-embodied in the elaborate public relations apparatus of the contemporary church-is a recent phenomenon. The most complex problems confronting Mormonism today are explained by the logic of public relations. In a recent article, Robert Bennett, public relations director for Summa Corporation, characterizes several of these. Claiming that Joseph Smith and Brigham Young were masters of public relations, he suggests that their successors until the 1930s were "somewhat confused" in their "PR focus." Without the slightest hint of embarrassment, he describes the Mormon Tabernacle Choir's recording with the Philadelphia Or- chestra, media coverage of the Palmyra Pageant, and books about the church as prod- ucts of a professional, non-Mormon public relations firm (Bennett, 1977:121). President Kimball is characterized as "possessing good PR sense" because he is "usually able to avoid quibling and to project Christian love" (Bennett, 1977:121). Wendell Ashton (1977), Managing Director of Public Communications for the church, attributes the more positive images of the Mormons during the 1970s to an aggressive public relations program which assumed the initiative instead of reacting to events. Established in 1972 to deal with a deteriorating image, the Public Communica- tions Department has 1,000 coordinators and directors throughout the world to create the image of the Mormon people desired by church officials. Their purpose is to redefine the issues and reorient the focus of the non-Mormon media. There are indications of considerable success. Television stations across the country run innocuous public service ads about family responsibility, which constituted $31,000,000 of free publicity for the Mormon church by 1977. The church has spon- sored a nation-wide prime-time TV show on family life, initiated several articles in popular magazines, presented Mormon celebrities endorsing good health habits, and broad- cast music of the Tabernacle Choir with the "soft sell" emanating from Temple Square. Ashton virtually acknowledges that much of this was designed to shift attention from the race and women's issues. Reflecting on the Mormon President's appearance on the Today Show during the Bicentennial, in which the race issue was raised, Ashton (1977, pp. 18-19), observes:

(Incidently, that program was arranged by our Public Communications people.) I thought they were, shall I say, rougher, on the President of the Church than they could have been or should have been, but I didn't feel too badly about the interview, because I felt that overall the results were more positive than negative so far as the Church is concerned. I think the fact that our world leader would appear and answer difficult questions is generally positive ..... A news article about the Church which is fair and generally positive, which may criticize us in one or two places, is more helpful to us than something that's all sweetness and light. Such a news article is actually more believable and those of us with experience in marketing know the importance of believability.

This marketing of Mormonism is highly elaborated. Survey research techniques are employed to determine the most effective means of manipulating the church's image. In- dependent consulting firms assess public attitudes before temples are constructed and are employed to ascertain how Mormonism should be sold to the public. In an era when the techniques and language of the PR men have transformed Mormonism from a way of life into a commodity and where the most compelling criterion of success has become

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the number of converts entering the church, it is hardly surprising to find leaders talking about conducting an "in-depth survey in six major markets," abandoning the "Hard Sell" for a more "subtle" approach, getting a "good" rather than bad press, or beginning with the people's desires before offering them "the recipe for happiness" (Ashton, 1977). Nor is it surprising that the primary source of that bad press - an unpopular racial policy inhibiting growth -would be reconsidered in light of its consequences for the Mormon image.

Internationalization of the Church

The logical conclusion to the imperative of growth and quest for respectability is an international Mormonism. Today, when becoming a Mormon no longer requires gath- ering to Zion, converts remain in their native lands to expand the church. Recent growth outside of the United States attests to their success. In 1950 only 7.7 percent of the Saints lived outside of North America. This increased to 10.4 percent in 1960 (Allen and Leonard, 1976:564) and became 20 percent by 1975 (Allen and Leonard, 1976: 634-635). In fact, the most significant gains during the sixties occurred in the tradition- ally weak areas of Asia and Latin America. While the former grew by 408 percent, the latter increased 622 percent (Allen and Leonard, 1976:610-611). So spectacular is this growth in Latin America that two recent analyses suggest continuation at the present rate will result in more Spanish than English speaking Mormons within a few decades (Craig, 1968; Tullis, 1972). Some consequences of the Church's efforts to extend its domain into nonwestern societies may be seen in Mormon-African relations during the sixties. A black Nigerian's interest in the Joseph Smith story, which subsequently resulted in the conversion of 7,000 black Nigerians, led Mormon officials to announce formation of a special mission in 1963. After a Nigerian publication urged restrictions on Mormon missionary activities and called on President Kennedy to invoke sanctions against this "anti-Negro organization," the Nigerian government denied visas to the missionaries. Consequently, the first Mormon mission to blacks never left the Salt Lake Valley (see White, 1972b; Brewer, 1968). The differences in racial composition and racial attitudes of other societies, where Mormon proselyting succeeded, influenced church officials. The fact that Brazil, for example, never exhibited the sort of racial consciousness of the United States-the cruci- ble of Mormon racism- made it impossible to determine who could or could not receive the priesthood or enjoy the blessings of the temple. The acceptance and frequency of miscegenation, which often shocked Mormon missionaries, rendered meaningless the traditional methods of ascertaining race. If the same criteria were applied to Brazil as are used in the United States, then this rapidly growing population of faithful Mormons could not produce enough priesthood bearers to govern themselves. However, the use of different criteria for different societies would call into question Mormon racial cate- gories, making the church even more vulnerable to the challenge of critics. Whether construction of a Mormon temple in Brazil anticipated change in the priesthood policy or simply exacerbated these contradictions may be difficult to ascertain, but the fact that its presence would signify second class citizenship to thousands of Brazilian Mormons to

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whom its doors would remain closed cannot be denied. That the Brazilian temple became an immediate impetus for extending the priesthood to blacks is indicated in the following interview with a ranking Mormon apostle.

I'll tell you what provoked it in a way. Down in Brazil, there is so much Negro blood in the population there, that it is hard to get leaders who don't have Negro blood in them; and we just built a temple down there, and it's going to be dedicated in October. Now all those people with Negro blood in them have been raising money to build the temple, and they won't even be able to use it if we don't change. Now Brother Kimball worried about it, and he prayed about it, and asked each one of us-of the twelve-to pray about it.

A final aspect of this internationalization which may be significant, but for which we have no data, is the foreign business interests of the Mormon church. That the church owns business enterprises in several countries is well known, but the extent of Mormon holdings and their relationship to this issue is impossible to determine. On the other hand, it is not difficult to imagine Mormon leaders, like the directors of other multinational corporations, adopting a less offensive racial policy in order to reduce the probability of restrictions or perhaps nationalization of their enterprises. Whatever the impact of Mormon interests as a multinational corporation, the phenomenal growth of the church outside of North America, the potential threat of foreign governments denying visas to missionaries or otherwise inhibiting Mormon activities, and the different orien- tations toward race in third world countries all encouraged the Mormons to change their racial policy.

Challenges from Mormon Intellectuals and Activists

Internal challenges from intellectuals to Mormon racial policy date back to the 1930s. However, the impetus for more systematic and broader based critiques came with World War II. Though several highly respected Mormon intellectuals stated their objections to church leaders, the most significant incident involved the Mormon presidency and soci- ologist Lowry Nelson. Having conducted research in Cuba, Nelson was asked about the feasibility of a Cuban mission. His reply, a copy of which he sent to the church presidency, repudiated Mormon racial policy.

Because I think our system of religious organization could serve the rural Cuban people as perhaps no other system could, I am sad to have to write to you and say, for what my opinion may be worth, that it would be better for the Cubans if we did not enter their island -unless we are willing to revise our racial theory. To teach them the pernicious doctrine of segregation and inequalities among races where it does not exist, or to lend religious sanction to it where it has raised its ugly head would, it seems to me, be tragic ... we just fought a war over such ideas (Quoted in White, 1972b:40-41).

In the exchange that followed, Nelson, having developed the moral issues and identified their implications for social relations, expressed his hope that this practice had not become so "crystallized" as to be considered doctrine. The first presidency insisted that the priesthood denial was a doctrine originating with Joseph Smith and never questioned by a subsequent president. They called off the correspondence with a warning not to be "too impressed with the reasonings of men, however well founded they may seem to be" (see White, 1972b:40-41 for a brief discussion of the Nelson correspondence).

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Growing criticism led to an official statement in 1951 in which the church presidency declared the priesthood denial to be a doctrine and not a matter of policy. Since policy could be altered by administrative decision while doctrinal matters required divine revelation, Mormon leaders-probably convinced they had resolved the matter-actually defined the lines along which intellectual challenges would proceed. They also placed themselves in a defensive, intransigent position from which extrication became very difficult. It may surprise Mormons and non-Mormons alike to learn that the fifties were characterized by intense internal conflict. Convinced that some Mormon educators were destroying the faith of students, church officials initiated a series of purges. Appointment of a political reactionary and religious fundamentalist as president of Brigham Young University signaled a more conservative era. He invited Apostle Mark Peterson to settle the race issue. In a speech reminding one of the Klan, Peterson identified the gospel with segregation. Several intellectuals, who spoke in protest, were removed from their positions, transferred to locations where they would exert less influence, or severely reprimanded. Some of the most talented and morally committed left the church, in spirit if not in fact. While some became apologists for Mormon racism, others remained silent out of fear of losing their jobs. A few who remained in the church educational system commiserated with those students unable to reconcile this practice with other Mor- mon values. This decade was one in which the Saints, according to a leading Apostle, were finding their church "guilty of a great injustice" in the "flood of correspondence from all parts of the church" (Smith, 1958:184). But it was the next generation of scholars who debunked the official interpretations of origin. Rejecting doctrinal claims and acknowledging that a few blacks held the priesthood during the nineteenth century, Taggart (1970), Bush (1969; 1973), White (1972c; 1980), and Bringhurst (1978) account for the origin of the policy in the milieu of nineteenth century Mormonism. While Taggart attributes the origin to Joseph Smith's legitimation of slavery and attempts to separate Mormon from black interests, Bush and White suggest that the policy may have originated with Brigham Young in Utah. Bring- hurst, in a brilliant analysis of the origin of Mormon racial attitudes, links the policy to the early Utah experience and documents its institutionalization. Brewer (1968; 1970) and White (1972b) examine the subsequent legitimation of the practice and its implications for Mormon-black relations. We infer from Mauss's survey research (1966; 1967), which typically finds Mormons no more prejudiced than members of other denominations, that the primary resistance to change was not attitudinal but structural. Though church officials typically ignored this scholarship, missionaries sometimes received a handout, for which authorities deny responsibility, that acknowledged blacks having held the priesthood and responded to objections of the preceding scholarship. However, the impetus for change came less from scholars than from activists who employed this scholarship in their confrontations with the church. John Fitzgerald and C. D. McBride's frequent letters to the editor, public speeches, popular articles, and extensive correspondence with Mormon authorities calling upon the church to repudiate its racism resulted in their excommunications. Douglas Wallace's ordination of a black to the priesthood, which the church officially rejected, led to his highly publicized excom-

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munication. Byron Marchant's involvement in the NAACP-Boy Scout suit, "picketing" of the church offices in order to remind authorities of their discriminatory practice, and challenge to President Tanner's endorsement of the priesthood policy culminated in his excommunication. However, excommunication failed to inhibit their efforts to change the policy. In fact, it made them a more serious threat to Mormon officials. Symbolizing the repressive potential of the church, the activists became highly visible to non- Mormons and the media. Additional efforts to silence them by court injunctions, police surveillance, and a trespassing suit only focused more attention on Mormon racial policy. When Mormon leaders announced the revelation admitting blacks to the priesthood, they knew of potential litigation, a possible scandal surrounding their surveillance of activists, and a demonstration called for the October conference. Whatever else they may have thought it had become painfully obvious that there was no effective means of silencing the activists nor of controlling scholarship.

Pressures from Black Mormons

Though few in number, black Mormons have become an important internal consti- tuency. If the communal nature of early Mormonism may have appealed to free blacks and slaves, Joseph Smith's endorsement of slavery, in an effort to appease Missouri set- tlers, destroyed any serious prospects of significant conversion among blacks. The subsequent emergence of the priesthood denial virtually guaranteed that Mormonism would offer little appeal to black people. Even so, some blacks joined the church-a few receiv- ing the priesthood-and migrated to Utah with other pioneers. Others, who were slaves, became Mormons with the conversion of their masters whom they joined in the westward migration (Lythogoe, 1967). These early black pioneers provided the founda- tion of the Mormon black community. With the institutionalization of the priesthood policy, little incentive obtained for blacks to join the church, for Mormons to proselyte actively within the black community, or for black Mormons to participate actively within Mormon religious life. Some blacks who affirmed their loyalty to the church, while adopting gradualist approaches to change, received considerable attention during the crises of the sixties; and the few blacks who converted during this period appeared on album covers with the Mormon Tabernacle Choir, wrote books on the virtues of the black Mormon experience, and became frequent speakers testifying to white Mormon audiences of the truthfulness of the faith. Obviously black Mormons could not be insulated from the conflicts of the period. In- deed, no segment of the Mormon community so clearly revealed the contradictions inherent in the social structure. Fundamental principles of Mormon social organization, in which the lay ministry links the family to the church, assume that males over twelve will bear the priesthood and that the father, especially, will function simultaneously as a family and ecclesiastical authority. It is his responsibility to bless, baptize, and confirm his children as well as to ordain the males to various offices in the priesthood. His role as head of the family is more than analogous to that of Christ as head of the church; for the family, like the church, is an eternal entity in the Mormon world view. The marriage ceremony performed in Mormon temples binds husband and wife, including their chil-

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dren born under this sacred union, to one another for "time and eternity." The ultimate salvation (exaltation) of particular family members is largely dependent on the family as a unit. Thus, not only is the Mormon conception of salvation communal, but the family is the church in microcosm. It is a religious institution. However, this is precisely the contradiction the black Mormon family epitomized. Since both family responsibilities and the integration of the family into the church require the priesthood, black men could neither assume the family nor church responsibilities and prerogatives demanded by their religion. Blacks who accepted the Mormon world view would necessarily experience incomplete family and church lives. The priesthood, temple, and eternal family-all denied to blacks-brutally symbolized their in- ferior status and the precarious nature of their family structure. Responding to this unique status, black Mormons organized the Genesis Group, with the endorsement of church officials. If the latter saw its value in further isolating the black Saints, the Genesis Group nonetheless provided a forum for the articulation of special grievances. Mormon officials confronted questions urging clarification of policy on intermarriage; blacks offering prayers in sacrament meetings; serving as home and visiting teachers, missionaries, Sunday School officers, auxilary advisors, teachers, and scout masters; attending priesthood meetings as potential bearers; participating in the prayer circle as their children are blessed; and administering to sick children. These questions brought the contradictions of the church policy into sharp focus; for they demonstrated the impossibility of black Mormons fulfilling family and church obliga- tions. Moreover, as a social entity, the Genesis Group became a vehicle for the non- Mormon media to gain access to the perspectives of black Mormons. Church authorities knew the discontent of black Mormons to be potentially far more embarrassing than the protests and demonstrations of non-Mormon blacks.

Leadership of the Mormon President

Spencer Kimball's ascension to the church presidency brought one of the most accom- modating apostles into the top position. If he was generally less visible than his col- leagues, he was not so readily identified with controversial theological positions or an explicit political ideology. On the other hand, neither had he been noted for especially aggressive leadership, and a bout with throat cancer and fairly recent open-heart surgery caused concern over his health. It was these factors that gave rise to Mormon expectations that his would be largely a caretaker administration void of bold innovations. The theme of "lengthening our stride," borrowed from one of Kimball's speeches, symbolized Mormon expectations of growth but not particularly significant change (Church News, January 6, 1979). This concealed Kimball's skills as a leader. Mormon officials had typically confronted the priesthood issue with a simple reaffirmation of tradition or repressive exercise of power. With less extreme ideological identifications, Kimball worked more easily with conflicting factions. Given a personal history of some sympathy toward minorities and a tendency to judge institutional practices in terms of their effects on individuals, he was more likely than immediate successors or predecessors to respond to the environmental pressures and internal forces by adopting a less alienating policy.

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Having not identified himself with the most reactionary, racist authorities (see White, 1972b and Brewer, 1970 for discussions of racism among Mormon authorities), Kimball was in a better position to adopt a new policy. Indeed, he had occasionally addressed the issue of racial discrimination but largely in relation to American Indians. More than any other high official, he was responsible for attempts to integrate Indians into the church. If he refused to apply his own logic to the predicament of black Mormons for so many years, perhaps he transcended that failure in 1978. His most candid statement implies that his own racism presented an obstacle.

I had a great deal to fight ... myself largely, because I had grown up with this thought that Negroes should not have the priesthood and I was prepared to go all the rest of my life until my death and fight for it and defend it as it was (Church News, January 6, 1979:4).

We are suggesting, in other words, that Kimball's personal sensitivity to people and in- clination toward integration rendered change more likely during his administration than either preceding ones or the next two in line of succession. It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether these are personality traits or simply a more sophisticated effort to manage internal conflict and reduce environmental uncertainties. The latter may follow from the contemporary emphasis on public relations. In either event, the consequence for the priesthood controversy is the same -namely a propensity to se- lect an organizational strategy resolving internal conflicts and enhancing environmental adaptation.

The Revelation

Kimball, who acknowledged wrestling with the issue of blacks and the priesthood for at least two years, became preoccupied during the three months preceeding the announcement. After requiring written statements from each apostle arguing both the cases for and against granting the priesthood to blacks, he met privately with all of them so, according to a senior apostle, they would not be influenced by others. Kimball led a special prayer circle, following a meeting in the Salt Lake Temple of the First Presidency and Council of the Twelve, in which the new policy was presented. At least three of the participants recognized Kimball's prayer as the word of God to the church, and Kimball subsequently reported that "the revelation and assurance came to me so clearly that there was no question about it" (Church News, January 6, 1979). Only after all present had consented to the new policy did the prayer circle come to an end. Two apostles who were absent were informed of the revelation, and they consented to the new policy. After obtaining consensus among all remaining general authorities of the church, Mor- mon officials announced their decision to the world on June 9, 1978.

It followed institutionalized procedures. Major policy changes require consensus of the presidency and apostles. The support of the remaining general authorities is obtained before changes are announced or implemented. Since any question of the president's claim to revelation challenges the very legitimacy of the institution, revelation functions as an especially effective technique of internal control. By allowing only the president to speak for the church, it reinforces continuity with the past. At the same time, it permits the institution to embark on a new course-to change-without repudiating earlier poli-

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cies (see White, 1972b:57-58). Consequently, a presidential claim to revelation inhibits opposition while it enhances the probability of realizing consensus. If this necessity for consensus in turn inhibits change, it nonetheless ensures a smooth transition once new policies emerge. For it curtails any institutional base for protest movements. The contrast is striking with the Episcopal church's recent decision admitting women to the priesthood. If protesting factions led by dissenting bishops threaten to tear the Episcopal church asunder, Mormonism's consensus procedure guarantees, at the very least, that no established leader will be in a position to lead dissenting factions. Moreover, the basic principles of Mormon social organization -a hierarchical authority structure, the leadership succession process, and the lay ministry-ensure sufficient control over middle level and local leaders to reduce the likelihood of organized dissent (see White, 1972b; White and White, forthcoming). These decision-making procedures may delay change, but they strengthen the hegemony of general authorities and reinforce institutional stability.

Conclusion

We have explained the Mormon church's decision to admit blacks into the priesthood as an adaptation to environmental pressures, the logical outcome of established organizational practices, and the resolution of internal contradictions. Organizational strategies of accommodation employed by church officials have reduced environmental uncertainty, established more favorable conditions for extending the church's domain as an international organization, increased the probability of growth, and strengthened internal hegemony. The consequences of these strategies-including the further assimilation of the Saints which is reflected in the overwhelming approval from the public media-are likely to reinforce similar choices in the future. This does not mean, however, that all is well in Zion. Some of the issues confronting the church will not be resolved so easily. If, for example, accommodation theories and the church's recent behavior invite the hypothesis that the Mormons will eventually re- solve conflicts surrounding women's issues in a similar manner, we would argue that these changes will be much more difficult. Racism was tangentially linked to Mormon beliefs, but sexism permeates Mormon social order. An elaborate metaphysics and theology wed family structure and ecclesiastical organization. Authentic sexual equality will demand a rather thorough restructuring of Mormon society. It is sexual equality and related issues, in contrast to O'Dea's identification of blacks and the priesthood (1972), that constitute the real tests of Mormonism's ability to cope with modernity.

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