Prime Minister Abe's Resignation, 28 Aug 2020
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Nishimura | Chasing the Conservative Dream Research Chasing the Conservative Dream: Why Shinzo Abe Failed to Revise the Constitution of Japan Rintaro Nishimura This paper examines the role of domestic actors in shaping Japan’s constitutional debate during Shinzo Abe’s time as prime minister. Based on a holistic analysis of the prevailing literature and the role of the public, leadership, and other political actors, this study finds that Abe was unable to garner enough support from the public or fellow lawmakers to push his version of proposed revisions to the Constitution of Japan. The paper identifies the wide spectrum of views that exist on the issue and how revising the constitution is viewed as a challenge against prevailing norms. Public opinion remains opposed to revision and the inability of lawmakers to build consensus on what to amend stymies the process further. Abe seems to have had a grasp on the political climate, opting to pursue constitutional revision largely for electoral purposes. Introduction Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced his decision to step down in August 2020.1 Japan’s longest-serving prime minister left behind a mixed legacy defined by electoral and foreign policy achievements, as well as a period of economic stagnation and string of political scandals.2 But what best defines Abe’s political career will undoubtedly be his desire, and ultimate failure, to revise the seventy-four-year-old Constitution of Japan (COJ). Although Abe’s failure to amend the COJ is often attributed to institutional hurdles, this paper argues that varying interests among domestic actors—from public resistance to militarism, to the prime minister’s agenda, and lawmakers’ scattered inter- ests regarding what exactly to amend—ultimately determined the fate of his political 1 Eric Johnston and Satoshi Sugiyama, “Abe to resign over health, ending era of political stability,” Japan Times, August 28, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/08/28/national/politics-di- plomacy/shinzo-abe-resign/. -
JAPAN: the Silence Defeated Suga, As Eyes Turn Now to Kono
Asia | September 3, 2021 JAPAN: The silence defeated Suga, as eyes turn now to Kono ● Strategic silence from Abe and Aso undermined Yoshihide Suga, but the prime minister’s own gambits hastened his departure. ● Taro Kono is set to enter the race as the favorite, and Kishida may now be joined by Ishiba and other candidates. ● The LDP’s prospects for the general election will now improve, as will the likelihood of another stimulus package The dominos all fell quickly at the end. Perhaps the chief factor in Yoshihide Suga’s decision to step down from his positions as party president and prime minister was the ongoing silence of two of the kingmakers, his boss of eight years and former PM Shinzo Abe, and his current deputy PM and Finance Minister Taro Aso. Their lack of public support created the space for doubts to fester in Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) circles about whether the factionally-unaligned premier would secure the votes to repeat his unlikely victory of 12 months ago. Suga also hastened his own departure with two consequential gambits this week – first floating the idea of a snap September election that resulted in blowback from jittery party colleagues, then presenting several prominent names with a back-me-or-I’ll-sack-myself ultimatum with his plan to reshuffle top posts only weeks before the party vote. Environment Minister Junichiro Koizumi and others ultimately seem to have concluded that Suga’s offers of promotion were akin to being given front-row deck chairs on the Titanic. The leadership race opens The incumbent’s withdrawal leaves the field open in the party leadership race. -
Nationalism in Japan's Contemporary Foreign Policy
The London School of Economics and Political Science Nationalism in Japan’s Contemporary Foreign Policy: A Consideration of the Cases of China, North Korea, and India Maiko Kuroki A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, February 2013 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of <88,7630> words. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Josh Collins and Greg Demmons. 2 of 3 Abstract Under the Koizumi and Abe administrations, the deterioration of the Japan-China relationship and growing tension between Japan and North Korea were often interpreted as being caused by the rise of nationalism. This thesis aims to explore this question by looking at Japan’s foreign policy in the region and uncovering how political actors manipulated the concept of nationalism in foreign policy discourse. -
Park Statue Politics World War II Comfort Women Memorials in the United States
Park Statue Politics World War II Comfort Women Memorials in the United States THOMAS J. WARD & WILLIAM D. LAY i Park Statue Politics World War II Comfort Women Memorials in the United States THOMAS J. WARD AND WILLIAM D. LAY ii E-International Relations www.E-IR.info Bristol, England 2019 ISBN 978-1-910814-50-5 This book is published under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license. You are free to: • Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format • Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material Under the following terms: • Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. • NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission. Please contact [email protected] for any such enquiries, including for licensing and translation requests. Other than the terms noted above, there are no restrictions placed on the use and dissemination of this book for student learning materials/scholarly use. Production: Michael Tang Cover Image: Ki Young via Shutterstock A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. iii E-IR Open Access Series Editor: Stephen McGlinchey Books Editor: Cameran Clayton Editorial Assistants: Xolisile Ntuli and Shelly Mahajan E-IR Open Access is a series of scholarly books presented in a format that preferences brevity and accessibility while retaining academic conventions. -
Use of Insolvency Proceedings for Systemically Important Financial Institutions
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE Twelfth Annual International Insolvency Conference Supreme Court of France Paris, France SHOWCASE PRESENTATION: PLANNING FOR FAILURE: USE OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS Overview Of The Japanese Legal Framework To Resolve A Systemically Important Financial Institution In Insolvency Proceedings In Japan By Hideyuki Sakai Bingham McCutchen Murase Sakai Mimura Tokyo June 21-22, 2012 ©International Insolvency Institute 2012. All rights reserved. Admin*1656557.1 OVERVIEW OF THE JAPANESE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO RESOLVE A SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTION IN INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN JAPAN May 28, 2012 Hideyuki Sakai [email protected] Tokyo Tel: +81-3-6721-3131 (Direct) Introduction This article is intended to provide an overview of the Japanese legal framework within which the resolution of a systemically important financial institution would occur in Japan. While Japan has a well-established scheme of insolvency laws, there have been few insolvencies of Japanese regulated financial institutions in the past decade. In addition, Japanese courts have considerable latitude in administering insolvency proceedings and rendering decisions. The combination of these factors makes it difficult to predict with certainty the mechanisms for implementing a proposed resolution. International Context Japan is a member of the Group of Twenty (“G20”) and the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”). As such, Japan’s leaders have committed to pursue financial stability, implement international financial standards and undergo periodic peer reviews.1 On November 4, 2011, three Japanese financial institutions were named in the initial group of twenty-nine globally systemically important financial institutions (“G-SIFIs”) identified by the FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”). -
Administration of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 2021 the President's News
Administration of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 2021 The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan April 16, 2021 President Biden. Well, good afternoon. The Prime Minister has brought the sun out, so he can do about anything. Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for being here. It's been my pleasure to welcome Prime Minister Suga to the White House. This is our first in-person meeting here, the first head of state that I've asked in my administration to come to the White House. Yoshi, thank you for making the long trip to Washington. We've already met several times virtually on—at a G–7 meeting and a Quad leader summit, but I greatly appreciate the chance to spend time with you in person and to make our—exchange our ideas face to face. There's no substitute for face-to-face discussions. We are still talking—taking COVID precautions, being careful. But our commitment to meet in person is indicative of the importance and the value we both place on this relationship between Japan and the United States, this partnership. We had a very productive discussion today. When nations as close as ours get together, we always look for operations and opportunities to do more, and today was no exception. So, Yoshi, you'll probably be seeing a lot more of me in the future. And today Prime Minister Suga and I affirmed our ironclad support for U.S.-Japanese alliance and for our shared security. We committed to working together to take on the challenges from China and on issues like the East China Sea, the South China Sea, as well as North Korea, to ensure a future of a free and open Indo-Pacific. -
Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression for More Information on This Publication, Visit
C O R P O R A T I O N MICHAEL J. MAZARR, JOE CHERAVITCH, JEFFREY W. HORNUNG, STEPHANIE PEZARD What Deters and Why Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3142 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0397-1 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: REUTERS/Kyodo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled What Deters and Why: North Korea and Russia, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. -
Medical Innovation As a National Strategy
Medical Innovation as a National Strategy March 18, 2013 Hideaki Nakagaki Deputy Director‐General, Office of Healthcare Policy Cabinet Secretariat Provisional Translation 1 Establishment of Office of Healthcare Policy On February 22, 2013, the government established an Office of Healthcare Policy within the Cabinet Secretariat as part of concerted Government efforts to implement a growth strategy for Japan. The office aims to establish Japan as a nation that boasts of the most advanced medical technologies and healthcare services in the world, which is expected to result in Japan being the country with the longest healthy life expectancy. Given these achievements, the Office also aims to develop the medical sector, pharmaceutical products and medical devices and equipment as strategic industries that will form a key pillar for Japan's economic revitalization. 2 Structure of the Office for Healthcare Policy As of March 18, 2013 Chief Cabinet Secretary (Yoshihide SUGA ) Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (Katsunobu Kato and Hiroshige Seko) Director-General:Special Advisor to the Prime Minister (Hiroto Izumi) Deputy Director General: Councilor, Cabinet Secretariat (Nakagaki, MHLW) Councilor, Cabinet Secretariat (Morimoto, MEXT) Councilor, Cabinet Secretariat (Miyamoto, METI) Counselor, Cabinet Secretariat (Akuzawa, MoF) Counselor, Cabinet Secretariat(Fujimoto, METI) Counselor, Cabinet Secretariat (Saruta, MHLW) Director Director (Private sector: Director Director Director Director (Private sector: (Private sector: (MEXT) FIRM*) (MHLW) (Private -
Mizuho Economic Outlook & Analysis
Mizuho Economic Outlook & Analysis Policy Issues facing the Abe Administration in the final stage of Abenomics - Looking beyond to “post-Abenomics” - October 10, 2018 Copyright Mizuho Research Institute Ltd. All Rights Reserved. Contents 1. Policy Issues of the Abe Administration [ Overview ] P 3 2. Key Policy Issues of the Abe Administration [ Details ] P 4 3. Future Points of Focus P 12 4. Shift in Priorities of Abenomics P 13 Conclusion P 14 1 Summary The Liberal Democratic Party leadership election held in September 2018 saw LDP President (Prime Minister) Shinzo Abe capture his third consecutive victory and party leadership for the next three years. During his last three-year term under the LDP constitution, the Abe administration needs to complete the final stage of Abenomics and draw up a roadmap for the post-Abenomics era. Over the past nearly six years, the Abe administration has promoted its economic policy featuring “three arrows” and “three new arrows,” and the policy has demonstrated certain achievements, for example, substantial progress made in overcoming deflation. But Japan’s full-fledged economic recovery is only halfway down the road. In the coming years, the government needs to advance its policy agenda below and address important medium- and long-term issues. This report examines (1) consumption tax increase, (2) fiscal consolidation, (3) monetary policy, (4) growth strategy, (5) social security, (6) employment, and (7) regional revitalization as the government’s key policy issues. Japan is facing numerous domestic and foreign affairs challenges, including changing the current Japanese era name, the Upper House election, chairing the G20 summit in 2019, and hosting the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. -
Japan's Way Forward: the Prospects for Political Leadership and The
From Looking for Leadership: The Dilemma of Political Leadership in Japan, 2015 Japan’s Way Forward: 8 The Prospects for Political Leadership and the International Implications James GANNON and Ryo SAHASHI he success that Shinzo Abe had after his 2012 election in breaking Japan’s pattern of one-year premierships offered hope to some that a new era of effective political leadership was at hand for Tthe country. However, it appears that any respite from Japan’s “leadership deficit” will be temporary. As the authors of this volume argue, there are bound to be exceptions to the parade of short-lived prime ministers who struggle to advance their agendas—strong premiers such as Yasuhiro Nakasone, Junichiro Koizumi, and Abe are likely to emerge from time to time—but without further changes to the political system, powerful institutional factors will continue to make it difficult for prime ministers to exercise political leadership in a sustained and effective manner. Of course, Japan has never been renowned for having charismatic, strong political leaders. However, the challenges associated with political leadership are particularly worrying now because over the past quarter century, societal shifts, political reform, and voter expectations have elevated the profile of Japan’s prime minister, making the individual holding that post and the performance of that person increasingly conse- quential. Furthermore, in recent decades, the rise of summit diplomacy James Gannon is the executive director of the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE/USA), and Ryo Sahashi is an associate professor at Kanagawa University. 181 182 LOOKING FOR LEADERSHIP and advances in communications technology have expanded the diplo- matic role of heads of government. -
(CUWS) Outreach Journal # 1247
USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal CUWS Outreach Journal 1247 13 January 2017 Feature Item: “The Requirement for a Nuclear Triad: Strategic Stability and the Critical Value of America’s ICBMs.” Authored by Peter Huessy; Published by Real Clear Defense.com; January 11, 2017. http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/01/11/strategic_stability_and_the_critical_value_ of_americas_icbms_110614.html Russia and China are both markedly improving their nuclear forces at a pace not seen even during the height of the Cold War. Russian President Putin has called for continued such modernization, describing Russian nuclear forces as already sixty percent modernized and the strongest in the world. Russia also has a multi-thousand advantage in tactical or theater nuclear weapons (not subject to arms control limits) which further complicates U.S. and allied deterrent policy. What then should be the U.S. response? One former Secretary of Defense has argued that the U.S. should not seek to match the Russian modernization even though both countries are parties to the New Start treaty that caps strategic nuclear weapons at 1550. Other disarmers argue that despite the dramatic drop in casualties from conventional war in the Post World War II era, there is nothing definitive to conclude that nuclear deterrence has kept the nuclear-armed superpowers from major war for the past seventy years, compared to the 1914-1945 period. Still, others have concluded that nuclear deterrence plays a minor role in today’s strategic stability and a fully modernized force is not needed. Are these assertions true? My analysis points to the need for a full modernization of our nuclear enterprise especially going forward with the ground-based strategic deterrent or ICBM modernization effort. -
The United States and Japan in Global Context: 2015
THE EDWIN O. REISCHAUER CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: 2015 THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY Washington, D.C. Edwin O. Reischauer October 15, 1910 – September 1, 1990 Yearbook Class of 2015 From Left to Right: Sung Hui “Sophie” Yang, Jeffrey Bond, Ju Hyung Kim, Luoxi Dao, Ji Won Kwon, Malcolm Whitehead, Michael Wakcher, Professor William Brooks, Evan Sankey, Benjamin Garton, Ian Hamilton, Michael Kotler, Waichiro Katsuda, Yiwei “Jenny” Pan TABLE OF CONTENTS The Year at the Reischauer Center 1 Reischauer Center Events, 2014-2015 7 Introduction 10 William L. Brooks For U.S.-Japan Relations, the JET Program Is a Hidden National Treasure 46 Malcolm Whitehead U.S.-Japan Cultural Exchange in a New Era of Public Diplomacy 73 Michael Wakcher New U.S.-Japan Partnership in Disaster Management and Japan’s Role 95 Waichiro Katsuda India and the US-Japan Alliance 113 Evan Sankey Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Central Asia Strategy: Is it Effective? 129 Ian Hamilton Trilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia 157 Ju Hyong Kim Japan’s Trade Agreement Strategies: Three Case Studies 172 Ji Won Kwon Changing Trade Patterns among the U.S., Japan and China: Does Politics Trump Market Forces? 205 Jenny Iwei Pan Impact of “Abenomics” on Mergers and Acquisition Trends in Japan 222 Luoxi Dao Japan’s Long Road to Corporate Governance Reform 240 Ben Garton Building Japan’s Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 258 Jeff Bond Class Research Trip to Tokyo, March 2014: Photo Album 281 1 THE YEAR AT THE REISCHAUER CENTER The 2014-2015 academic year, during which the Reischauer Center celebrated its thirtieth anniversary, was a historic one--for the Center, SAIS, and for trans-Pacific relations.