The Séléka Insurgency and Insecurity in the Central African Republic, 2012 - 2014

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The Séléka Insurgency and Insecurity in the Central African Republic, 2012 - 2014 Brazilian Journal of African Studies e-ISSN 2448-3923 | ISSN 2448-3907 | v.1, n.1, Jan./Jun. 2016 | p.40-66 THE SÉLÉKA INSURGENCY AND INSECURITY IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 2012 - 2014 Henry Kam Kah1 Introduction Many African countries have known armed insurgency, civil unrest and instability for many years. Among these countries are Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the CAR (Joseph 2012, 23-25; Cilliers and Schünemann 2013, 9-10). In sub-Saharan Africa, in general, military power between state and insurgency appears to be shifting often in favour of the latter which has forced African states to deploy forces more frequently beyond their borders (Howe 2001, 1). In the case of Ethiopia, for instance, the government has been at running battles with the Oromo for a long time and in Somalia, the brutalities of the Al- Shabaab are well known including also sea piracy which made the Horn of Africa insecure to sea-going vessels. All these have threatened peace and security in the Horn of Africa and beyond. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East of the country bordering Cameroon and Chad and activities of armed militias in the Niger Delta have threatened the peace and unity of this colossus of Africa. In the Central African sub-region, to which is located the CAR, wars and conflicts like in the DRC and Chad have created unfavourable socio-political and economic conditions. There is also a proliferation of internal and inter-state violence in the sub-region, especially in countries like the CAR, Chad and the DRC. In fact, recurrent political crises and military hostilities have kept the central African sub- region continuously in the headlines in the 21st century (Mwanasali 1999, 90-91; Frère 2010, 1). 1 Department of History, University of Buea, Buea, South West Region, Cameroon. E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] 40 Henry Kam Kah The Central African Republic (CAR), which is the focus of this study, is a member of the Economic and Monetary Community of the Central African States, known by its French acronym as CEMAC. It is also a member state of the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS). This country is very rich in natural resources, notably in diamond, gold, copper, uranium and timber. The population of the country is estimated at 4.5 million (Miles 2013). In terms of population configuration, the CAR is an amalgamation of various ethnic groups. The Gbaya people sought refuge from the Fulani of Northern Cameroon by migrating into the CAR in the early 19th century, while the Banda who fled the Muslim Arab slave raids of Sudan followed the Gbaya later in the century. The country generally has over 80 ethnic groups, each with its own language and cultural practices. The largest ethnic groups of the country include the Gbaya 33%, Banda 27%, Mandjia 13%, Sara 10%, Mboum 7%, M’Baka 4% and Yakoma 4%. Other smaller ethnic groups make up the remaining 2% of the population. There are different religious groups in the country. Of these religious groups, 35% of the population is inclined to indigenous beliefs, 25% adhere to Protestantism and another 25% are Catholics while about 15% are profess the Muslim religion (Alusala 2007, 11). In terms of the standards of living in Africa, the CAR has one of the lowest in spite of its rich natural endowments. In the domain of infrastructure, the road network of the country is not regularly maintained and some communities suffer a chronic shortage of drinking water. The country is also politically unstable, corruption and highway robbery are rife and the economic climate is uncertain, attracting little foreign investment. In a general sense, the CAR has insufficient functioning state institutions, an economy in shambles, an impoverished population and a security apparatus in complete disarray (N’Ddiaye 2007, 1; Central African Republic Country Level Information; Country Profile Central African Republic). These problems combined together have made the country vulnerable to armed insurgency and instability in the Central African sub-region, giving rise to intervention and interference of various forms from gullible and self- seeking neighbouring states. In this study we examine the road to the Séléka overthrow of the government of Bozizé in March 2013 and the departure of Michel Djotodia, who was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza in January 2014. This is one out of many insurgencies that have taken place in the country since its independence in August 1960. The historical roots of the instability and disintegration in the country are examined to show that CAR, from its creation, had problems and these have manifested themselves in fratricidal war times and again in the territory. The study also examines the grievances 41 The Séléka insurgency and insecurity in the Central African Republic, 2012 - 2014 of the Séléka insurgents, the challenges of the new Séléka led government and that of the present care-taker government of Catherine Samba-Panza. All of these, if not carefully handled, is still likely to plunge the country further into chaos, as was the case before the armed insurrection of March 2013 and subsequent military and counter military reprisals. This study is significant in several ways. The fact that the CAR has been in the news for its instability, leadership crisis, coups and armed insurrection needs a study to unravel the factors that have been responsible for this. It is a country rich in natural resources, such as timber, gold, copper and diamond, but paradoxically one of the poorest in the world. The saga in the country only confirms the resource curse that has characterised countries with vast natural resources like Nigeria and Angola. A study of this country is a contribution to this theory of resource curse that has characterised many African countries blessed with natural resources. Again, the study is important because the continuous instability of the CAR is an indication of either the failure or inability of ECCAS and CEMAC to establish peace and stability in the country. Rather, the country has been drawn into serious conflicts with two members of these blocs, namely Chad and the DRC. If these regional groupings are unable to tackle this instability it is even more challenging for the African Union (AU) to achieve continental unity, peace and stability in Africa. An understanding of the Séléka insurgency in the CAR could be traced from the historical roots of the country. Historical roots of instability The root of crisis and instability in the Central African sub-region as a whole was a result of the French policy of assimilation which became the guiding principle for colonial administration. Forje (2005, 228) argues that the politics of assimilation pursued by the French in the Central African sub-region was seen as a betrayal of national sovereignty. This betrayal of sovereignty was compounded by the governing elite that emerged because they converted this into a new form of hegemony. This manifested itself in the form of the transfer of state property into personal/private property, the ethnicisation of the state and the creation of a family dynasty as the legitimate source of succession. Forje also argues that the sovereignty of the people of this sub-region was greedily hijacked by this few privileged elite. They instituted the politics of exclusion in place of inclusion. The result of this kind of policy after independence plunged the Central African region into turmoil. The creation of the CAR from the period of colonisation to independence, in 1960, witnessed a manifestation of hegemonic tendencies in different ways and at different times. 42 Henry Kam Kah The numerous crises in the CAR have their roots in the history of the country from the past to its independence on 13 August 1960 from France. French colonial administration and the Arab slave trade in the area contributed negatively to the future stability of the country. The territory was initially organised in 1894 as the colony of Ubangi-Shari and subsequently united administratively with Chad in 1905. In 1910 the territory was incorporated into the French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Française, AEF) which was a federation of three colonies namely Gabon, Middle Congo (Moyen Congo) and Ubangi-Shari-Chad. Four years later, Chad was separated from the Ubangi-Shari colony and made a separate territory. The Ubangi-Shari as the CAR was called at the time, received less attention and resources from France than the other AEF territories namely present day Republic of Congo, Gabon and Chad. Rather, thousands of its population was forced to work on infrastructure projects elsewhere in AEF and this was of little benefit to the territory. Besides, the Arab slave trade raids from present day Chad and the Sudan resulted in the decline in the population of large areas of the CAR. This eventually had an effect on development and the ethnic and religious tensions in the country today (Alusala 2007, 11; Berman and Lombard 2008, 3). French colonial administration and the Arab slave trade raids laid the basis of the present mayhem in the CAR with ramifications on neighbouring countries like Chad and Sudan. The administration of the territory as an integral part of the AEF did not make the French to devote resources towards its own separate development. They channelled resources towards the development of other areas especially the Republic of Congo and Gabon at the expense of the people of the CAR. To make matters worse, the population was carted away to work on the infrastructure of other territories while their own infrastructure was unattended to.
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