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WSI China Security Vol.4 No.3 Summer 2008: Debating China's Future

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WSI China Security Vol.4 No.3 Summer 2008: Debating China's Future World Security Institute 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington, D.C. 20036 ChinaSecurity 05 Vol. 4, No. 3 Summer 2008 05/08 Chen Shi China Research Group China Security 中国安全 CHINA*DESIGN*ART*ARCHITECTURE*LIFESTYLE*TRAVEL Suite 2480 Sunfl ower Tower urbane 37 Maizidian St., Chaoyang District Beijing, 100125 Debating China's Future Li Mingjiang • David M. Lampton • Suisheng Zhao • Albert Keidel • Wu We're the [purple] cow country, the chocolate and watches country. That doesn't really correspond to reality to correspond really doesn't That country. watches and chocolate the country, cow [purple] the We're Jianmin • Evan S. Medeiros • Yuan Peng • Shen Dingli • Da Wei • Peter Van Ness • Hu Xijin • William Tow • Sidney Rittenberg The Rise of an Image-Conscious China Simon Rabinovitch Olympics and Chinese Nationalism www.chinasecurity.us Suisheng Zhao Energy Security and UN Diplomacy Trevor Houser & Roy Levy Emerging Trends in Violent Riots WHAT is Yu Jianrong CHINA Untangling Energy Policy Libin Zhang & Jason Lee DESIGN? p24 Vol. 4 No. 3 Summer 2008 3 Summer 4 No. Vol. may 200 ISSN 1935-5564 8 国内统一刊号 CN 11-3909/J Bruce G. Blair Publisher Eric Hagt Chief Editor Chen Yali, Liu Yong, Matthew Durnin Associate Editors Emily Roblin Communications Director Assistant Editors CC Huang, Ryan Martinson, Jared Mondschein and Diego Montero Editorial Board Jeffrey A. Bader Brookings Institution Richard K. Betts Columbia University Thomas J. Christensen Princeton University Philip Coyle World Security Institute Lowell Dittmer University of California, Berkeley Bates Gill Center for Strategic and International Studies Theresa Hitchens World Security Institute Joan Johnson-Freese Naval War College Albert Keidel Carnegie Endowement for International Peace Nicholas R. Lardy Institute for International Economics Li Bin Tsinghua University John J. Mearsheimer University of Chicago Mike M. Mochizuki George Washington University Michael E. O’Hanlon Brookings Institution Jonathan D. Pollack Naval War College Shen Dingli Fudan University Shi Yinhong Renmin University of China Teng Jianqun China Arms Control & Disarmament Association Frank von Hippel Princeton University Xue Lan Tsinghua University Yuan Peng China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations Zha Daojiong Pekin University Manuscript Reviewers Kong Bo, David Chen, Dean Cheng, Andrew Erickson, Eric Hundman, Yuan Jingdong, Gregory Kulacki, Jeffrey Lewis, James Clay Moltz, Victoria Samson & David Wright This issue was made possible through the generous support of the Ford Foundation, Secure World Foundation and the Robert and Ardis James Foundation Contents Debating China’s Future 3 Li Mingjiang, David M. Lampton, Suisheng Zhao, Albert Keidel, Wu Jianmin, Evan Medeiros, Yuan Peng, Shen Dingli, Da Wei, Peter Van Ness, Hu Xijin, William Tow and Sidney Rittenberg Th e Rise of an Image-Conscious China 33 Simon Rabinovitch Th e Olympics and Chinese Nationalism 48 Suisheng Zhao Situation Report: Energy Policy 58 Libin Zhang & Jason Lee Energy Security and China’s UN Diplomacy 63 Trevor Houser & Roy Levy Emerging Trends in Violent Riots 75 Yu Jianrong ProjectsProjects ofof thethe WorldWorld SecuritySecurity InstituteInstitute ChinaChina ProgramProgram In addition to China Security, thethe WorldWorld SecuritySecurity InstituteInstitute ChinaChina Program,Program, inin partnershippartnership withwith ChenChen Shi China Research Group, has a variety of on-going projects in our Beijing and Washington offices. The World Security Institute is a non-profit organization committed to independent research and journalism on global affairs. All of our projects attempt to increase the understanding of China in the United States and internationally and to deepen an international dialogue. hina-U.S. Dialogue on Space – is dedicated to strengthening security in space by fostering dialogue between Cthe two potential economic, political and military competitors in outer space. We enhance transparency and discussion on space between the two countries by educating the public and policymakers on each other's space programs and long-term policies. www.wsichina.org/space/ orning China news digest - is a twice-weekly news Mdigest that combines the most important and up-to-date, domestic Chinese news via email. The project aims to improve the understanding of China amongst international policy practitioners and the public by increasing the accessibility of Chinese news. www.wsichina.org/morningchina edia and Policy Conferences – We organize a Mnumber of key events for Chinese and American policy-makers, journalists and scholars to meet, discuss and exchange ideas in about the influence of media and policy in the area of culture, society, politics and international relations. The next conference is planned for April 2008, to be held in Beijing. nergy and the Environment – An online resource and dialogue on China’s energy and environmental security in Epartnership with the UK-based ChinaDialogue, with our own research as well as that of top scholars and experts. www.chinasecurity.us For more information, contact: Emily Roblin Communications Director [email protected] Debating China’s Future (cont.) In this current issue we continue our foot forward for the Games, spending lavish- discussion about prospects for China’s fu- ly and making significant compromises to its ture. Previously, we tackled this huge can- critics. But behind the façade of new build- vass with equally ings and a phenomenal large strokes of Liu Zhi display of social mobili- the brush: China’s Dust I zation, China continues grand strategy, the its struggle to harmonize build up of its com- perception with reality. prehensive nation- Beneath the surface of al power, China’s China’s growing confi- engagement with dence lies the potential the world and what excesses of nationalism; ‘idea’ or value sys- with an increase in Chi- tem China might na’s influence and power offer the world as comes apprehension by it grows into great its neighbors; and along- power status. side China’s growing We now shift global interests arises our focus from the need to be more ac- the grand sweep tive in its foreign policy. of China’s condi- In this issue, our tion to the nuts authors address both and bolts of what the successes and fail- makes the country ures in China’s attempt tick: the evolution to achieve these goals. of China’s soft power, its economic prospects, These essays are not the definitive analyses the country’s nationalist tendencies, foreign of China’s future direction. Rather, they suc- policy and perhaps most importantly, how ceed in deepening the discussion, widening all of this is viewed by the world. our perspective and perhaps most impor- With the light of the Olympic flame illu- tantly, pose even more questions for us to minating China, what does the world see? contemplate in this complex task of under- China has certainly tried hard to put its best standing China and its destiny. - Eric Hagt, Editor China Security, Vol. 4 No. 3 Summer 2008, pp. 3-31 World Security Institute China Security Vol. 4 No. 3 Summer 2008 3 Debating China’s Future (cont.) and consequent misunderstanding of the Ya Ri Chinese approach to soft power. Th is article Empty attempts to shed some light on these issues. What is soft power? Th e concept was introduced by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and is notoriously under-theorized, which leads to a nebulous conceptual framework that numerous analysts have nonetheless employed. Few people would dispute the basic criteria or benchmark to defi ne soft power: that is, the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. What remains unclear and much disputed is this - what produces attraction? Infl uenced by this approach, analysts tend to focus on certain sources of power - culture, values and foreign policy - as the starting point in analyzing a country’s soft power. However, the shortcomings of this approach are evident. It is unclear why culture and values are juxtaposed to foreign policy as if the fi rst two are not part of a state’s foreign policy. Also, it is taken for granted that these sources of power are non-coercive in nature. In reality this assumption is not supported by facts. Moreover, people who follow this approach tend to separate ideational factors from material factors, which is practically impossible in the real world. Lastly, without Li Mingjiang considering social context it becomes Soft Power and the Chinese Approach literally meaningless to discuss soft power. he term soft power hhasas bbecomeecome a wworldwideorldwide In reality, as many critics have pointed out, Tcurrency in the exchange of ideas there is no source of power that is soft in among scholars and pundits in the fi eld of nature. In certain circumstances, culture international politics. Th e focus is particularly and values can be easily used for coercion. on China, simply because of its phenomenal Conversely, economic and military power rise and expanding infl uence. Views on the can be used to produce attraction as well. subject are variegated. Assessments range from Culture is not always attractive. One has to Beijing’s soft power as weak and hopeless to acknowledge that any culture contains elements China evolving into the primary challenger to completely unacceptable to others. Culture US soft power throughout the world. Proposals becomes attractive only when a society displays for a response also span a wide spectrum, with the good parts of its culture while downplaying some analysts cautiously welcoming Beijing’s those aspects that might be repulsive to diplomacy while others staunchly advocating outsiders. Moreover, culture becomes hard countermeasures against the growth of power if a state intends to impose its cultural China’s infl uence. Such sharp contrast of norms and values on other societies. Examples views partly stems from the loopholes in of such “cultural imperialism” or aggressive the existing conceptualization of soft power cultural foreign policy in history are numerous. 4 China Security Vol. 4 No. 3 Summer 2008 Debating China’s Future (cont.) On the other hand, economic and eration, has become Westernized.
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