Answer of the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation tabled by Members of the Bundestag Marieluise Beck, Volker Beck, Cornelia Behm, Alexander Bonde, Dr. Uschi Eid, Hans-Josef Fell, Bärbel Höhn, Thilo Hoppe, Ute Koczy, Kerstin Müller, Winfried Nachtwei, Omid Nouripour, Claudia Roth, Manuel Sarrazin, Jürgen Trittin and the Alliance 90/The Greens parliamentary group German-Russian cooperation in climate protection - Printed paper number 16/131 62 - Preliminary remarks of the questioners A few months ahead of the UN Climate Conference COP 15 in Copenhagen (7-18 December 2009), which is central to worldwide climate protection, Russia must be regarded as one of the most difficult but at the same time most important negotiating partners in the struggle to agree a post-2012 climate convention. In the final document negotiated at the G8 meeting in Heiligendamm in June 2007, the sole commitment made by Russia, together with the United States, was to “seriously consider” at least halving global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Nevertheless, Russia, together with its G8 partners, accepted the findings of the Fourth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which states that human activity is the main cause of climate change. During the COP 14 UN Climate Conference in December 2008 the Russian Government declared it was striving to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions in Russia which had been growing since 1999 up to the time of the current economic crisis. As at the beginning of May 2009, however, the Russian Government, in the course of the current UNFCCCC negotiations and in contrast to other countries, has not yet published emission targets for the periods to 2020 and to 2050. It is true that because of the collapse of the highly energy-intensive Soviet heavy industry, Russian greenhouse gas emissions (excluding emissions from forests and through soil use) in 2007 were 34 per cent lower than they were in 1990. Independent Russian experts are currently forecasting a level of emissions for 2020 that will be 25 per cent below the 1990 level. Yet Russian industry continues to be one of the most energy-intensive and CO2-intensive industries in the world. According to figures from Gazprom (20 April 2009), up to 100 billion cubic metres of natural gas could be saved each year in the country with simple energy efficiency measures. This would be equivalent to three times the volume of Russian gas supplied to Germany. According to figures produced by the World Bank, the energy intensity of the Russian economy has fallen by 3.4 per cent per year since 1990, but most of the other former Soviet Republics achieved annual reductions of between 6 and 7 per cent in the same period. In order even to maintain 3.4 per cent in the future, the World Bank believes that more pro-active policymaking is required. Global warming continues to be largely ignored by the Russian public. Reporting on the issue in the media is being stepped up only very slowly. Starting from a very low level, the subjects of energy efficiency, renewable energies and climate protection have, however, been enjoying heightened political attention in recent months. The Government’s target now is to cut the energy intensity of industry by at least 40 per cent by 2020. To this effect, the Government and the Duma are currently drafting a bill on “Energy saving and increasing energy efficiency”. A first Renewable Energies Decree of January 2009 is intended to increase the share of renewable energies on the energy market from the current level of under one per cent to 4.5 per cent by 2020 (with the exception of large- scale hydropower). According to Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, however, expanding renewable energies is only a secondary priority for the Russian Government. With the announcement of a climate doctrine on 23 April 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin underlined for the first time the need and the government’s will to pursue an active Russian climate policy. Under certain circumstances this could open up additional possibilities for German-Russian and for European-Russian cooperation in the area of climate protection which could create new impetus for a sufficiently ambitious post-2012 climate convention ahead of the crucial UN climate negotiations in December 2009. We ask the Federal Government: 1 International climate negotiations 1. How does the Federal Government assess the role of Russia in the current climate negotiations in the framework of the UNFCCC, G8, G20 and the Major Economies Forum? Answer: Russia is a key partner for climate protection both as one of the biggest producers of greenhouse gas emissions and as a consumer and exporter of fossil fuels. 2. In the opinion of the Federal Government, what should be the scale of the cap on Russian greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (base year 1990)? Answer: Russia is an industrialised country and has a quantified commitment to limit emissions under the Kyoto Protocol (as an Annex I country). The Federal Government and the EU are of the view that all industrialised countries should accept binding quantified commitments to limit or reduce emissions under a Copenhagen Convention. Based on information contained in the Fourth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the industrialised countries should collectively cut their greenhouse gas emissions by between 25 and 40 per cent of 1990 levels by 2020 in order to meet the target set by the Federal Government and the EU to limit the rise in average global surface temperature to below 2°C compared to pre-industrial times. The Federal Government and the EU believe that industrialised countries should cut their emissions on a scale which is compatible with the EU’s target of a cut of 30 per cent by 2020 against the base year of 1990. 3. What is the Federal Government’s attitude to the crediting of unused Russian and Ukrainian emission entitlements from the current accounting period to the period starting in 2012? Answer: The combined surplus emission entitlements (Assigned Amount Units, AAUs) from Russia and Ukraine in the Kyoto commitment period 2008 to 2012 are likely to amount to more than 1.6 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent (UNFCCC data). The European Commission calculates that after other countries (e.g. Japan and Canada) have bought up surplus AAUs, a surplus of 7.4 billion tonnes will still remain after 2012, 5.5 billion tonnes of which will be from Russia alone. If these amounts and also AAUs from transition countries were to be credited to a future climate convention to cap greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2012 to 2020, the emission cuts of Annex I countries would be reduced by around 4 per cent. Germany and the EU are arguing with vigour that a Copenhagen Convention should include the goal of limiting the rise in the average global temperature to under 2°C. The IPCC has shown that industrialised countries would have to reduce their total emissions by 25-40% by 2020 against the 1990 level in order to meet this target. The IPCC has not so far included surplus AAUs in its calculations. It follows that a cut in emissions by the industrialised countries totalling 25-40% would not be sufficient to achieve the 2°C target. The Federal Government believes that it is imperative to frame a future global convention on emission caps in such a way that unused surplus AAUs do not jeopardise the climate protection targets. For the EU countries which are at the same time transition economies, surplus AAUs had already been taken into account in the setting of the EU climate protection target. A comparable arrangement should be sought for Russia and Ukraine too. 4. In the view of the Federal Government, should Russia provide a share of the resources needed internationally to fund adaptation and technology transfer in non-Annex I countries and if so, how much? Answer: Funding adaptation and reduction measures in developing countries is a central topic in international climate negotiations. The Federal Government takes the view that all – except the poorest – countries should bear their share of emission reduction measures according to their means. For this reason, the Federal Government 2 advocates that Russia, too, should make an appropriate contribution to climate protection measures. Russian climate policy 5. To what extent does the Russian decree promoting renewable energies adopted in January 2009 provide an adequate framework to encourage a sufficient scale of additional investment in renewable energies? Answer: The Federal Government has not yet examined whether or not the current legal conditions in Russia offer an adequate incentive to encourage a sufficient scale of additional investment in renewable energies. In order to answer this question it would be necessary to conduct a scientific study. This cannot be done in the context of answering a minor interpellation. a) To what extent has the Russian legislature taken a lead from the German Renewable Energies Act initiated by the Red-Green Federal Government? Answer: The Federal Government has no information as to whether or to what extent the Russian legislature took a lead from the Renewable Energies Act. b) What new opportunities for investment can the Federal Government see for German firms in the area of renewables after the Russian Renewable Energies Decree enters into force? Answer: On the intervention of the German side, the question of the increased use of renewable energies has already been discussed many times in the German-Russian Working Group on Strategic Economic and Financial Cooperation (SAG), most recently at its 25th meeting in Berlin on 20/21 April 2009, in order to bring about closer cooperation between German and Russian firms, particularly in relation to the supply of plant and knowhow transfer, culminating in investment.