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Strategy and War Syllabus

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Strategy and War Syllabus TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE FOREWORD 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 COURSE OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT 4 STUDENT OUTCOMES 7 COURSE THEMES 8 MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS—THE PROCESS 9 1. The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations 9 2. Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans 9 3. The Instruments of War 10 4. The Design, Execution, and Effects of Operations 11 5. Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment 11 6. War Termination 12 MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS—THE ENVIRONMENT 12 7. The Multinational Arena 12 8. The Institutional Context 13 9. Cultures and Societies 13 COURSE PROCESS AND STANDARDS 14 1. Methodology 14 2. Seminar Assignments 14 3. Presentations 14 4. Readings 14 5. Course Requirements 14 6. Seminar Essays 15 7. Final Examination 15 8. Grading Standards for Written Work 15 9. Pretutorials and Tutorials 17 10. Seminar Preparation and Contribution 17 11. Grade Appeals 19 12. Academic Honor Code 19 13. Student Survey 20 14. Online Resources 20 STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY 22 2 CASE STUDIES I. Masters of War—Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao 40 II Democracy, Leadership, and Strategy in a Protracted War—The Peloponnesian War 46 III. Sea Power, Joint and Combined Operations, and Irregular Warfare— The War for American Independence 55 IV. Maritime Strategy, Joint Operations, and War Termination in a Limited Regional Conflict—The Russo-Japanese War 62 V. Prewar Planning, Wartime Realities, Reassessment, and Adaptation— The First World War 69 VI. Waging Total War: Interdependence of Sea, Air, and Ground Operations—The Second World War in Europe 78 VII. Victory at Sea: Military Transformation, Theater Command, and Joint Operations in a Major Maritime War—The Second World War in the Pacific 87 VIII. Clash of Ideologies: Fighting and Terminating a Major Regional War— The Korean War, 1950-1953 97 IX. Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Conventional, and Interagency Operations—The Vietnam War, 1965-1975 106 X. Joint and Coalition Operations in a Major Regional War—The Struggle Against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, 1990-1998 114 XI. Counterterrorism, Theater Strategies, and Interagency Operations in a Global Context—The War Against al Qaeda and Associated Movements in Afghanistan and Iraq 122 XII. Retrospect and Prospect: Sea Power and Maritime Strategy—War in the Twenty-First Century 129 COURSE SURVEY 138 COURSE PRESENTATION SCHEDULE 171 3 STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE DESCRIPTION Course Objectives and Content The Strategy and War Course addresses Intermediate-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29 May 2015. Apart from meeting OPMEP objectives, the Strategy and War Course addresses additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy’s guidance on Professional Military Education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. Lastly, the course reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty and assessments offered by the students. In the waning days of the Vietnam War, Admiral Stansfield Turner served as President of the Naval War College. He saw a glaring need to revolutionize the Naval War College curriculum. Rather than training officers, Turner sought to develop a curriculum that would educate leaders. Admiral Turner argued, If you attempt to make this a prep school for your next duty assignment, you will have missed the purpose of being here. If we trained you for a particular assignment or type of duty, the value of this college would be short-lived. We want to educate you to be capable of doing well in a multitude of future duties…. Your objective here should be to improve your reasoning, logic, and analysis.1 The Strategy and War Course embodies Turner’s mission to place education over training by obliging students to grapple with the complex interrelationship among policy, strategy, and operations to lift the students’ perspective above the level of tactics while also sharpening critical thinking concerning joint matters. The Strategy and War Course utilizes a case study approach integrating a diverse array of academic disciplines, including history, economics, political science, and security studies, to assess both historical and contemporary conflicts. This methodology exposes students to a tapestry of historical case studies in which senior policy and military leaders, as well as staff planners, encounter and mitigate persistent undercurrents of tension between policy, military strategy, and operational outcomes. This will enable students to understand more fully the complex relationship among national resources, military objectives, and national security policy. 1 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, “Challenge: A New Approach to Professional Education,” Naval War College Review 25, no. 2 (November-December 1972): 6. 4 The course stresses the crucial importance of multinational cooperation while integrating all elements of national power. Moreover, it instills in students the ability and awareness to perform comprehensive assessments at all stages in a conflict, and to communicate such assessments with clarity and precision. Finally, the course drives students to think critically—beginning in the planning phase of operations—about desired end-states, war termination, and post-conflict transitions. After examining past conflicts in a disciplined way, students are better equipped to grasp the values of the profession of arms as espoused by the U.S. armed forces. Students comprehend more fully the capacity of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of operations in pursuit of national interests. Moreover, students better understand why and how the U.S. military establishment is organized to plan, execute, and sustain joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. In war, of course, the enemy always seeks to stymie the best-laid plans while imposing high risks and costs. The Strategy and War Course emphasizes that a war’s outcome is contingent upon the actions taken by those engaged in the conflict. Skillful adversaries seek to exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. Skillful adversaries also seek to employ surprise, denial, and deception to their advantage. Furthermore, an enemy’s capabilities might prove difficult to overcome. Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can create an operational environment that precludes decisive outcomes. Adept strategists and operational planners understand that the enemy’s determination and actions help decide the war’s outcome. This course amply illustrates the truism: “the enemy has a vote.” Critical strategic thinking serves as the hallmark of the Strategy and War Course. Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and current Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, observes: The armed forces have always needed independent-minded officers who dare to read, think, write, and publish the innovative ideas that can change the course of history. Now, as America enters an era of international flux and budgetary stress reminiscent of the interwar years, the services need skilled, outspoken strategic thinkers more than ever.2 We achieve this goal through graduate-level interdisciplinary seminars employing a unique methodology built upon two core components: the study of foundational theories of war and the close analysis of historical and contemporary case studies. The written works of prominent strategic thinkers—notably Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Thucydides, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett— provide analytical frameworks that students use to understand the interrelationship 2 Admiral James Stavridis, (U.S. Navy, ret.), e-mail communication with Professor James Holmes, June 22, 2016. 5 between strategy and operations. The influence of these classic works on current strategic thought cannot be denied. Reflecting on his education, General Colin Powell wrote, “Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His On War, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries.”3 The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss how strategic planners and military leaders in real world circumstances have successfully—or unsuccessfully— addressed the problems associated with using force to attain national objectives. The historical case studies provide an opportunity to examine three distinct types of war, or “boxes of war.” The first box comprises major, protracted wars fought between coalitions in multiple theaters for high stakes. The second box refers to regional wars fought within single theaters, typically for shorter times and often for lesser stakes. The third box comprises insurgencies fought within single countries, against failing, emerging, or well-established states. We study multiple cases involving each box of war. In several cases, these three types of war overlap, resulting in “wars within wars.” During the Vietnam War, for example, there was an insurgency in South Vietnam, overlaid by a regional war between the United States and North Vietnam, all within the context of a global Cold War. In- depth analysis of wide-ranging case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current strategic and operational problems but also those they might face in
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