Copyright by Ian Bradley Lyles 2016 The Dissertation Committee for Ian Bradley Lyles Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Demystifying Counterinsurgency: U.S. Army Internal Security Training and South American Responses in the 1960s Committee: Jonathan C. Brown, Supervisor Ann Twinam Seth W. Garfield Raul L. Madrid Susan Deans-Smith Demystifying Counterinsurgency: U.S. Army Internal Security Training and South American Responses in the 1960s by Ian Bradley Lyles, B.B.A., M.A., M.M.A.S., M.S.S. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin December 2016 Dedication I dedicate this dissertation to Cheryl, Audrey and Ashley. Acknowledgements I begin by thanking the Latin Americanists on the faculty of the History and Government Departments at the University of Texas at Austin. Jonathan Brown, Raúl Madrid, Henry Dietz and Zoltan Barany gave me my first introduction as a graduate student to the richness and complexity of Latin America and enabled much of my subsequent professional success. It was my singular good fortune to have the opportunity to return to the University of Texas at Austin many years later to build on that earlier work and pursue a doctoral degree. During my second tenure as a student I renewed old acquaintances and forged new ones. Ann Twinam and Susan Deans-Smith expanded my knowledge into the realm of colonial Latin America. They also sharpened my perceptions related to understanding and interpreting archival documents and enhanced my ability to recognize the broader context of the purpose, place and time in which those documents were created. Seth Garfield opened my eyes to a deeper understanding of Brazilian history. He also challenged me to improve the coherence of my arguments and the conciseness of my writing. The skills and knowledge mentioned above aided me immensely in writing this dissertation. I owe the greatest debt of gratitude to my advisor, mentor and friend Jonathan Brown. Although many people contributed to my success in preparing me to undertake a research and writing project of this magnitude, his contribution was paramount. Like all the best historians, Jonathan is committed to teaching the craft of history to his students. However, he is equally dedicated to coaching his protégés the art of writing and for that I am doubly thankful. v I also thank Ward Ferguson. He has been font of good advice throughout this process. He also provided levity and motivation when my stamina and enthusiasm were flagging - which occurred more often than I am now willing to admit. vi Demystifying Counterinsurgency: U.S. Army Internal Security Training and South American Responses in the 1960s Ian Bradley Lyles, PhD The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 Supervisor: Jonathan C. Brown United States’ counterinsurgency activities in the Western Hemisphere provide a new lens with which to investigate Latin America’s Cold War experience. This dissertation contributes to the debate over the impact of American foreign policy in the region by reconstructing a key component of Washington’s strategy: the U. S. Army’s counterinsurgency training of South American military forces during the 1960s and 1970s. Counterinsurgency casts a long shadow over U. S. foreign relations with Latin America but few authors explain what that doctrine entailed and how Washington sought to disseminate it among its regional allies. This dissertation contributes to the new Cold War literature on Latin America by using previously unpublished and declassified materials to demystify the term “counterinsurgency.” It examines American training of South American militaries and explains the doctrine and tactics the U.S. Army sought to transmit to its counterparts under the rubric of counterinsurgency. After reconstructing the U.S. Army’s institutional apparatus for teaching internal security, this dissertation investigates the impact of American counterinsurgency efforts. In doing so it seeks to solve an enduring enigma. If the regional hegemon, the United States, exported one consistent counterinsurgency vii doctrine throughout the Western Hemisphere, why did South American countries experience such widely divergent internal security outcomes during the Cold War? A comparative analysis of six South American nations’ responses to American counterinsurgency yields new insights into Latin America’s Cold War experience. This dissertation argues that U.S. Army counterinsurgency training was more complex, nuanced and perishable than previously understood. Numerous obstacles impeded the U.S. Army’s ability to disseminate its training. Moreover, South American political and military leaders chose whether to accept or reject U.S. counterinsurgency. Washington did not dictate or decree its internal security training. Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia embraced American counterinsurgency and sought U.S. Army assistance in confronting internal insecurity. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile shunned the American “model.” Military regimes in those nations developed their own internal security doctrine and tactics and conducted “dirty wars” against their populations a result of their own choices, not because of their slight exposure to American counterinsurgency concepts. viii Table of Contents List of Tables ................................................................................................... xii List of Figures ................................................................................................. xiv Chapter One: Introduction ................................................................................... 1 PART I: THE INSTITUTIONS OF U. S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY 22 Chapter Two: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Schools in the United States ........ 22 The Origins of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Instruction ......................... 24 Student Attendance at the Special Warfare School .................................... 36 Challenges Related to Foreign Military Education .................................... 41 Barriers to Implementing U.S. Counterinsurgency Training ...................... 44 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 58 Chapter Three: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Schools in Panama .................... 61 The U.S. Army Caribbean School ............................................................. 64 Student Attendance at the School of the Americas .................................... 74 Obstacles to U.S. Schools Attendance ....................................................... 76 Conventional Training Versus Counterinsurgency .................................... 78 Resistance to Change ................................................................................ 79 Political Challenges .................................................................................. 80 Language, Conscription, and Illiteracy ...................................................... 81 Acceptance of U.S. Counterinsurgency ..................................................... 84 Rejection of U.S. Counterinsurgency ........................................................ 87 Other Canal Zone Schools ........................................................................ 90 The School of the Americas’ Contested Later History ............................... 94 Conclusion ..............................................................................................100 Chapter Four: U.S. Army Mobile Training Teams in South America ................103 The Origin of the Special Forces ..............................................................105 The Special Action Force for Latin America ............................................116 Counterinsurgency or Civic Action? ........................................................124 ix The Management of Mobile Training Team Missions ..............................132 Challenges Faced by Mobile Training Teams ..........................................137 Conclusion ..............................................................................................157 PART II: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE ANDEAN RIDGE 161 Chapter Five: Counterinsurgency in Venezuela ................................................165 Castro Versus Betancourt ........................................................................166 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Venezuela .....................................169 Conclusion ..............................................................................................196 Chapter Six: Counterinsurgency in Colombia ...................................................199 Colombia’s Lingering Civil War ..............................................................202 U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Colombia .........................................209 Plan Lazo.................................................................................................216 U.S. Counterinsurgency Training in Colombia .........................................219 Applying Counterinsurgency ...................................................................229 Conclusion ..............................................................................................236 Chapter Seven: Counterinsurgency in Bolivia ...................................................240 Bolivia’s Incomplete Revolution ..............................................................242