Incomes and Labor Market Policies in Sweden, 1945-70
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Incomes and Labor Market Policies in Sweden, 1945-70 ERHARD BREHMER and MAXWELL R. BRADFORD * N RECONCILING the policy objectives of price stability, on the one I hand, and full employment and economic growth, on the other, Sweden has employed a governmental incomes policy only in the period immediately after World War II. At that time the authorities attempted to achieve price stability through direct control of prices, maintenance of low and stable interest rates, and exhortation to the trade unions to exercise restraint in their wage demands. Since this strategy was not complemented by a demand management policy that was adequately restrictive, it failed to ensure domestic and external stability. Conse- quently, there was a deliberate shift in the policy mix from direct con- trols to the active use of monetary and fiscal policies during the 1950s. Increased reliance was placed on labor market policies * in the late 1950s and beyond, but these have been combined recently with measures to stimulate industrial development in depressed areas. In the housing, * Mr. Brehmer, Chief of the Northern European Division of the European Department, is a graduate of Kiel University, Germany, and has served as a staff member of the Deutsche Bundesbank. He is the author of Struktur und Funktions- weise des Geldmarktes der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Seit 1948 (Tübingen, 1956 and 1964) and of a number of journal articles. Mr. Bradford, a graduate of the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, was an economist in the Northern European Division on temporary assignment from the New Zealand Treasury when this article was written. He has now returned to the New Zealand Treasury. 1 Labor market policies mainly comprise programs to promote the geographical mobility and retraining of labor and to generate employment. 101 ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution 102 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS agriculture, and public service sectors, the system of price control has been retained. I. Swedish Policy Experiments The adoption and constant modification of this "new" mix of general fiscal-monetary policies and energetic policies for the retraining and re- deployment of labor were promoted by the continuity of a government that has been open-minded to experiments in economic and social policy. The policy mix, particularly the adoption of active labor market policies, has to a large extent been inspired by economists in the trade unions.2 Despite the challenge of some academic economists,3 the Swedish Government in the 1950s and 1960s did not attempt to interfere with wage bargaining because of opposition from the labor market organiza- tions. This standpoint has been defended both by the Government and by the labor market organizations, on the grounds that the bargaining process, on the whole, has managed to preserve peaceful labor relations and that union leaders could not guarantee sufficient support among members for a policy of wage restraint in the event of governmental interference. The Government has thus not intervened directly in the bargaining process. The wage policies of the unions have been guided by the principle of wage solidarity. In particular, this principle has aimed at obtaining uniform average increases in wages throughout industry without regard to low productivity and stagnating sectors, a policy which has been facilitated by highly centralized wage bargaining. Combined with more or less efficient demand management policies and international competi- tion, which limited the rise in international prices during most of the period after World War II, this wage policy of the unions played an important role in closing down inefficient enterprises and production lines and in promoting the desired restructuring of the Swedish economy. The success of the restructuring process has to no small degree been dependent on the adoption of active labor market policies, which have 2 See especially, Rudolf Meidner, "The Dilemma of Wages Policy Under Full Employment," and Gösta Rehn, "The Problem of Stability: An Analysis and Some Policy Proposals," in Wages Policy Under Full Employment by Erik Lund- berg and others, edited and translated by Ralph Turvey (London, 1952). 3 See, for example, Bent Hansen, The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy (Lon- don, 1958), pp. 353 ff. ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution INCOMES AND LABOR MARKET POLICIES IN SWEDEN 103 allowed the skill content and geographic distribution of the labor force to adjust to the requirements of a changing industrial structure. Under these policies, generous grants are made for the training and movement of labor. Originally designed to assist anticyclical monetary and fiscal policy, labor market policies have since become an instrument of struc- tural policy, used independently of cyclical conditions. By aiding the expansion of efficient firms with above-average productivity growth, this instrument has helped to foster economic growth. Considering this and the fact that those in retraining and public relief works are not viewed as unemployed persons in Sweden, labor market policy has become an important instrument in the Government's efforts to reconcile price stability with rapid growth and full employment. On the whole, the mix of stabilization policies in Sweden has been more successful in preventing recessions than in combating inflationary tendencies, except for certain periods (particularly 1955-63) when stabilization policies were quite successful. In assessing the success of the Government's stabilization efforts, it should not be overlooked that economic policy in Sweden has been characterized by a con- tinuous determination to attain full employment and full social welfare. The upward drift of prices following World War II met with little opposition from the public, except in years with notably accelerated price increases. This study examines the debate surrounding the adop- tion of the "new" policy mix in the 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the institutional framework which has permitted some success in recon- ciling the objective of price stability with the aims of sustained full employment and economic growth in the absence of a governmental incomes policy. DIRECT CONTROLS AND VOLUNTARY WAGE RESTRAINT AFTER WORLD WAR II In the five years immediately after World War II (1945-50), there was intensive debate in Sweden about the appropriate set of economic policies to be adopted in the face of an expected world-wide depression, and there was also some experimentation with direct and indirect con- trol over economic activity. Following the recommendations made under several postwar programs for economic policy, the Government in 1945 and 1946 sought to sustain a high level of demand to maintain full employment. It pursued expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, and it abolished or liberalized several wartime controls in 1945 and 1946— rationing, import controls, and building controls. Controls over prices ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution 104 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS and capital movements were retained, and efforts were made to attain "voluntary" wage restraint by the labor unions. Price policies were designed on the assumption that, during a period of direct price control, prices were determined more by cost than by demand factors. The price policies at that time were aimed at stabilizing or reducing prices in reaction to increased productivity of enterprises and by increasing the supply of goods from abroad at cheaper prices. Various measures were introduced to this end, including a reduction in interest rates (February 1945), an appreciation of the krona by 17 per cent (July 1946), the abolition of the general sales tax (July 1947), and liberalization of imports. The Government exhorted the labor unions to show restraint in their wage demands in return for reasonable price stability. Although these policies kept unemployment at a low level (averaging 1.5 to 2 per cent in 1946 and 1947), they did not succeed in holding down prices and wages nor in maintaining external equilibrium. The failure was attributed to substantial excess demand, which developed as a result of the expansive fiscal and monetary policies and the liberaliza- tion of direct controls on investment. Thus, in spite of price control, consumer prices rose by 8 per cent in the three years to mid-1948, and despite government pleas for wage restraint, wages in industry (includ- ing fringe benefits) rose by over 20 per cent in the two years 1946-47.4 The current account balance shifted fom a surplus of SKr 1.3 billion in 1945 to a deficit of SKr 1.5 billion in 1947 under the influence of excess demand, currency revaluation, and import liberalization. The Swedish Government reacted to these developments by reintro- ducing import controls and certain forms of rationing, but monetary and fiscal policy remained rather passive. Building controls were tightened and were applied to discriminate against investment in housing and building in the services sector in favor of the export- and import- competing sectors. In addition, the Government was successful in achiev- ing a wage freeze in 1949 and 1950 by persuading the unions to accept a prolongation of the previous wage agreement in return for a promise to hold down price increases by price control, subsidies, and low interest rates. As shown in Table 1, prices rose very little in 1949 and 1950, and there was only a rather moderate increase in wage rates in industry in these years.