I-C

With major reliance being placed upon armor and Intelligence indicated that the main supplies for motorized troops to achieve success of the operation, a the Eifel came from the north via Cologne while the program of conservation of vehicle fuel and a build-up troops came via Giessen and Fulda to Frankfurt and of available vehicles was instituted. All the tanks, from there to the Rhine to Coblenz. To interfere with armored force vehicles and motorized transport pos­ the rail movement of troops through Frankfurt, centers sible were made available for the offensive. All of these such as Giessen, Fulda, Frankfurt, Hanau, Mainz, items were immediately committed to battle, and losses Bingen, and Coblenz were attacked. In the north, to could be made up only from the shipments of new interrupt the flow of supplies, marshaling yards at items from the sources of manufacture. Cologne were the main targets, with others at Rheydt Tanks were shipped directly from the manufac­ and Neuss. Attacks on yards at Cologne-Nippes, turer with no breaking-in period. In many instances Giessen, Hanau, Homburg, Trier, and Ehrang were the disruption of rail traffic west of the Rhine required particularly effective. that they be driven great distances to the battlefield. The total effect of the Allied attack was to paralyze Because of these conditions plus the use of inexper­ all rail traffic west of the Rhine as far north as Cologne ienced personnel many tanks and AFV's were burned and as far south and west as Trier and Frankfurt. out before they saw combat. Each tank was issued approximately 2-1/2 units c. MOTORIZED TRANSPORT. of fuel, sufficient to travel 250 km. After travelling that The effectiveness of the Allied air power against distance a tank commander might have to wait 10 the motorized transport of the enemy is attested to by hours, as in one known case, before he could refuel his the claims for the period of 17-27 December 1944. units. In many cases additional fuel never came, as During that period, which may be considered the dura­ attested to by the fact that hundreds of serviceable tion of the German offensive drive, the Allied claims enemy vehicles were found without gasoline as the were 3525 vehicles destroyed and 1650 damaged. enemy retreated. A PW from 1 SS Panzer Division Fighter-bombers attacked enemy columns continually, related one instance of where the lack of fuel meant weather permitting, and took a very heavy toll of the difference between possible success and surrender. enemy material, thus disrupting enemy movement and The mission of 1 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was causing a general lowering of efficiency by constant to tie up with Einheit Peiper (the tank component of harassing. the 1 SS) and then to push forward to Liege. It did not d. ROAD BLOCKS. succeed. Einheit Peiper (what remained of it) was To appreciate the part played by "road blocks" in cornered in La Gleize. It had remained there expecting halting the mighty German offensive, within eleven munitions and gasoline which never arrived. days after it started, one must have a knowledge of the The German plan also envisaged the capture of type of road-net behind and within the battle area. The Allies stocks of fuel, but with very few exceptions Ardennes is a plateau, both hilly and heavily wooded. these stocks were destroyed or evacuated. The road network contains few good main roads. A factor which probably had much to do with The system consists mainly of long, straight, tree-lined lowering the morale of the enemy was the lack of food. avenues with surfaces of water-bound macadam which Evidence in the form of PW reports indicates that do not stand up to very heavy wheeled or tracked soldiers frequently went days without food. traffic. Bastogne, the key town in the center of this The enemy, through the element of surprise, and plateau, is a concentration point for these routes. The on supplies issued at the start of the offensive, enjoyed roads are generally on high ground, and those that run early sweeping successes. Failure to get additional north and northwest from Bastogne and those running supplies to his spearheading forces resulted in a slow north through Malmedy traverse wooded and boggy down, eliminated the advantage he had gained, and areas, as opposed to following the river valleys where left him vulnerable to the counter thrust by the rede­ the towns are situated. ployed Allied forces. A factor which placed even a heavier burden on the already congested road-net was the heavy and b. RAIL FACILITIES. constant Allied air attacks of rail facilities behind the From the beginning of the offensive, Allied heavy "bulge". Deprived of rail facilities the enemy was bombardment aircraft concentrated on the paralyzing forced to rely on long hauls by road. of rail traffic toward the Eifel. The enemy used his railways as far forward as possible and had established Most enemy movements behind the salient, fun rail-heads and unloading points along the line Eus­ nelled through five major communications centers: kirchen-Trier. Reconnaissance showed that over this Bitburg, Kail, Prum, Gemund, and Stadkyll. The key rail line and all lines leading to it military traffic poured position of Bitburg was outstanding. Units detraining continuously. For this reason places such as Euskir­ along the Rhine as far north as Remagen swung south chen, Stadkyll, Gerolstein, Prum, Bitburg, and Ehrang through Bitburg. After passing the five choke points were subjected to bombing attacks, and these raids the units fanned out and came together only for the contributed materially to the early breakdown of crossing of the Our River. enemy's forward supply system. The main communication centers within the sal­ 186 Part I-C "Greif"

Photo 27 —Road-Blocking at St. Vith, 27 December 1944 ient keys to the entire road network, were Bastogne, tion centers and road choke points. Results of these La Roche, St. Vith, and Houffalize. attacks varied greatly but the cumulative effect of these The only instance of the use of heavy bombard­ attacks was to slow down and seriously disrupt enemy ment aircraft in creating a road block within the movements. One prisoner of war stated that it took two salient was the RAF attack of St. Vith on 26 December hours to march through Kyllburg where it was neces­ in which 1140 tons of bombs were dropped. All roads sary to climb over rubble. Horsedrawn vehicles espe­ were blocked for one or more days and two of the cially experienced difficulty in getting through. main east-west roads were not in use as late as 11 Jan­ The road blocking attacks by medium bombard­ uary after engineers had been working on the roads ment aircraft of the IX Bomb Division were partially for a week. successful. The attacks on Houffalize, La Roche, and Eighth Air Force heavies during the offensive St. Vith were effective in achieving at least temporary period of 17-27 December attacked 27 communica­ road blocks on main lines. The attack on Rodt was M a M r ._. Vt i-c "Greif"

TABLE 23: DAILY TOTAL OF CLAIMS—17-27 DECEMBER, 1944

Enemy Aircraft Date Rail Road Gun lanes A.F.V. M. T. Locos RR Cars Bridges Guns Pos. Air Ground Cuts Cuts

17 116-11-44 1-0-0 2-0 23-9 224-218 23-42 231-371 13 3-4 — 16-15 18 50-4-33 — 0-2 74-36 262-91 7-14 61-87 25-13 19 7-0-1 2-0-5 — — 62-70 7-9 131-174 18 — 0-10 0-2 20 — 3-5 21 — — — 2-0 0-5 — — 4-0 22 6-0-1 2-13 73-100 2 23 117-29-58 9-0-0 17-14 233-128 13-12 170-250 12 3 — 0-1 1-35 24 125-5-31 — 7-6 56-74 623-227 10-31 83-508 30 10 2-0 0-3 17-57 25 96-8-14 4-5-8 — 101-41 970-400 18-23 233-372 14 19 50-26 26 75-6-16 0-0-13 6-7 56-72 560-304 14-39 191-288 43 5 1-2 — 23-10 27 94-5-33 1-0-0 — 126-61 586-207 27-54 346-446 38 45 5-0 — 32-29

Totals 746-68-231 17-5-26 32-29 436-293 3525-165O121-237 1519-26O1 176 91 11-6 0-14 168-187

TABLE 24: DAILY TOTAL OF BOMB TONNAGE BY TYPE OF TARGET 17-27 DECEMBER, 1944

Rltvy. Tar- Targets Oil A/C Fac- Air- Close Total Date Cities gets Commu- of Oppor- Tons Targets tories Fields nications Support tunity 17 — — 558 — 558 18 4970 1049 513 35 6573 19 69 — 2097 109 — 2275 20 — 21 495 __ __ 45 540 22 — 12 12 — 1140 113 — 1277 23 — 64 4251 404 16 4735 24 169 4216 2608 486 363 7842 25 1 550 2816 611 235 4213 26 3 — 1010 2014 3 3030 27 3153 652 38 3843

Total 5707 18 12 4830 18124 5505 690 34886 partially effective. No information is obtainable on the contributed greatly to the dulling of the German of effects of the attacks on Salmchateau and Gouvy while fensive thrust. the attacks on Clervaux and Viaden were unsatis- During the period 17-27 December the claims factory. against tanks and armored force vehicles were 468 Fighter-bombers, in close cooperation with Allied destroyed and 322 damaged. Other vehicles littered ground forces, were frequently called upon during the the roads and enemy concentration points as 3,525 offensive period to form road blocks to slow down the were destroyed and 1,650 damaged. 14 guns were enemy advance, many of which resulted from fighter- damaged by air attack while 168 gun positions were bomber operations against enemy road movements. destroyed and 187 were damaged. Conditions which were found most favorable for successful road blocks were: (1) defiladed terrain, (2) 5. POST ATTACK PHASE. dependence, for through traffic, upon crossing bridges a. GROUND SITUATION. over sizeable streams that could not be forded, and (3) By 28 December 1944, the Germans had reached large built-up areas directly abutting critical roads. the high water level of the Ardennes-Eifel offensive and Natural barriers along the road such as thick woods, from that point on, with the exception of a short time ravines, flooded areas, and swamps or approaches to when conditions remained more or less static, the small bridges were utilized to prevent the possibility operation was a strategic withdrawal by the enemy. of by-passing the craters. At no time did the retreat become a route and had it e. ARMORED FORCE VEHICLES, TANKS, GUNS not been for the terrific losses sustained by the enemy AND GUN POSITIONS. from Allied air attack, the withdrawal would have been Armor, including tanks and other armored force accomplished with a considerable amount of success. vehicles, were smashing the Allied defenses in the By 7 January 1945, the entire northern flank of the initial stages. These immediately became a priority salient had been committed to infantry units as the target of Allied fighter-bombers and the toll taken enemy went on the defensive in that sector. The enemy

188 Part I-C "Greif"

TABLE 25: ALLIED CLAIMS FOR THE PERIOD 28 DECEMBER 1944 THRU 31 JANUARY 1945

Date E/A Tanks AFV M/T Locos RR/F RR/Cuts Rd/Cuts Bridges Guns Gun/Pos.

28 Dec. 17-0-33 — 0-2 — 8-58 120-299 10 — 2-0 — — 29 Dec. 32-1-14 28-6 35-1 159-119 37-46 237-331 17 1 — — 14-1 30 Dec. 18-4-3 20-16 5-1 184-58 35-50 430-944 48 1 — 1-0 7-0 31 Dec. 21-2-4 25-5 3-2 220-73 11-16 229-177 64 18 2-4 0-1 4-0 1 Jan. 117-11-39 22-48 37-13 320-187 37-22 336-504 55 18 0-1 3-8 8-5 2 Jan. 19-1-9 50-67 57-8 259-172 15-21 322-174 43 17 — — 42-8 3 Jan. — — — 1-0 0-30 13 — — — 4 Jan. 16-2-4 — — 9-7 19-28 37-217 9 — — 0-16 — 5 Jan. 3-1-2 15-21 11-3 268-118 35-45 177-257 23 18 1-5 0-3 8-6 6 Jan. 1-0-1 — — 18-15 1-0 — 3 — — — — 7 Jan. — — — 7-3 — — — — — — 8 Jan. — 5-0 0-16 7-44 — 0-45 1 — 1-0 — — 9 Jan. 5-0-0 — — 1-0 — 54-23 1 — 1-0 1-3 — 10 Jan. 2-0-0 10-29 — 82-27 3-3 37-211 10 2 — 0-3 — 11 Jan. — — — 9-3 15-35 — — — — — 12 Jan. — — — — — — — — — — 13 Jan. — 3-14 4-8 138-67 2-0 168-60 34 3 0-3 2-1 1-0 14 Jan. 60-3-11 18-17 7-9 299-368 27-46 178-265 70 15 1-8 0 25-5 15 Jan. — 5-7 5-1 188-114 8-1 119-173 31 5 2-1 — 18-12 16 Jan. 15-1-5 14-33 1-0 448-170 17-12 382-482 68 18 0-2 0-6 17-7 17 Jan. 0-0-1 — — 12-1 2-0 2-0 1 — — — — 18 Jan. 1-0-0 — — 1-7 0-1 — — — — — — 19 Jan. — 1-0 1-0 26-8 0-6 49-38 10 2 1-0 — 6-0 20 Jan. 5-0-0 1-0 2-0 41-32 7-11 127-118 43 6 0-2 7-0 1-4 21 Jan. — 13-18 3-9 285-242 5-6 118-201 19 18 1-1 — 0-8 22 Jan. 11-0-2 30-32 36-24 1611-1216 30-72 778-947 38 21 0-3 13-14 49-19 23 Jan. 35-4-18 9-13 14-25 1088-1214 28-83 324-604 79 44 2-3 — 29-7 24 Jan. 7-0-3 12-27 30-8 365-305 13-51 146-249 28 15 5-0 — 48-2 25 Jan. — 5-25 42-35 687-550 9-3 88-276 13 46 1-0 2-0 21-3 26 Jan. 4-4 8-2 150-337 17-22 21-154 8 3 1-0 0-3 1-17 27 Jan. — 1-2 9-12 185-184 2-2 40-60 16 30 1-2 — 2-2 28 Jan. — — — — 4-6 3-60 1 — — — — 29 Jan. 7-1-16 11-29 31-8 746-680 9-42 196-960 37 29 1-2 1-6 3-2 30 Jan. — — — 39-209 4-11 14-129 5 — 2-0 — — 31 Jan. — — — — 1-1 — — — — — —

TOTALS 392-31-165 302-413 341-187 7853-6530 386-665 4747-8023 798 330 25-37 30-64 304-108

'Excludes strategic missions beyond the Tactical Boundary.

threw 10 divisions against Bastogne, but by the end of Through the week of 14-21 January, the enemy the week, the Allies who were also attacking, actually continued his withdrawal with skill and dogged gained ground in the corridor and around the town. fighting. At no point was a breakthrough achieved On the western end of the salient, severe fighting con- against him nor was any major formation cut off. The tinued to take place but an eventual withdrawal by the line at the end of the week had been pushed to a point enemy to the Ourthe River appeared imminent. just west of St. Vith and Houffalize. Bad weather con­ ditions had been entirely in favor of the enemy during Rundstedt, by 14 January 1945, had made up his the week. decision to withdraw. He was favored by heavy snows but suffered very serious losses; these amounted to 1/4 By the end of January 1945, the Ardennes-Eifel of his men and 1/2 of the armored vehicles he had campaign could be considered terminated. The river staked on the venture. The pressure of the Allied Clerf, the last line before the Siegfried, had been counter-attack on the northern flank became severe crossed by Allied forces, and numerous enemy divi­ enough to compel the withdrawal of armor from sions began to withdraw, some to strengthen the line around Bastogne. The lateral road from La Roche to forward of Cologne. Vielsalm was cut and overrun, and the vital road from Houffalize to St. Vith was threatened and taken under b. GAF EFFORT. Allied fire. Allied pressure from the northwest and The Luftwaffe activity during the withdrawal southwest threatened to cut off three panzer divisions phase of the campaign took somewhat the same form on the western end of the salient and caused them to as that of the German ground forces. Badflying wea­ withdraw as quickly as possible, leaving only rear- ther cut down operations of the GAF, but even on those guard troops in contact. Allied attacks on the southern days when flying was possible the number of sorties flank of the salient made steady gains against frequent were few. The operations of the enemy were defensive, counter-attacks. and the number of daily sorties tapered P&uatil by the B **! ft ": /*'- * pT ' ' ' . '"*'• f\ $fH 189 Part 1-$ : ii iwrnir 'Greif" ••';'• 11 ! ' j

190 Part I-C "Greif" end of the month they were almost nil. Indications by that time were that some of the enemy units were being sent to the Eastern Front. c. ALLIED AIR EFFORT. During the last 30 days of the Ardennes-Eifel campaign, the weather frequently stopped all air oper­ ations or reduced them to a minimum. However, weather permitting, the Allied forces continued to hit the withdrawing enemy forces unmercifully taking a very heavy toll of men and material. Heavy bombard­ ment gradually went back to attacks on strategic targets, with the exception of the one Bomb Division of the Eighth Air Force under operational control of the Ninth Air Force which continued to engage in tactical operations. Medium bombardment and fighter- bomber aircraft of the tactical air forces continued their attacks in cooperation with what now amounted to an Allied offensive. During the period 28 December through 31 January, 302 tanks, 341 A. F. V., 7853 M. T., 17 loco­ P/ioto 28 — Fighter-Bombers Destroy Ammunition Train motives, and 382 railway cars were destroyed. Total Near Euskirchen, 21 January 1945 claims for the period are included in Table 25.

Photo 29— Self-propelled Gun in Crater of Bomb Which Knocked it Out, 3 February 1945 ' 5 $ $ ?* 191 Part l-C "Gre

ADVANCE TO THE RHINE RIVER ("GRENADE") 25 JANUARY — 18 MARCH 1945

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATION. German counteroffensive in the Ardennes began on Preceded by an isolation program of air attack against 16 December, and from then until 2 5 January 1945 this communications, a large scale air-ground offensive was battle absorbed all Allied effort. launched on 23 February to clear the area from the Roer By the end of January the forces thrown into the to the Rhine River. By 6 March, XXIX TAC had dis­ Ardennes battle had neutralized all enemy gains and patched 7022 aircraft against targets in the area with had assumed the offensive with increasing momentum. excellent results. Farther north, after the advance of the Ninth US Medium bombers made 232 attacks in 37 days after 23 Army to the west bank of the Roer River had been February in what was considered the most effective appli­ successfully completed, attention again turned to the cation of medium bombardment in the theater. The pri­ immediate problem of seizing all ground on the west mary objectives were communications and supply facili­ bank of the Rhine River and of preparations for an ties. assault crossing of the Rhine north of Duisburg. Flak was intense during the operation but failed toward Current estimates of the strength of the GAF in the the end; there was little opposition from enemy aircraft. west indicated that some 500 SEF were based in the The advance was rapid and within two weeks the area Frankfurt area or to the North. Of this force, approxi­ had been cleared except for a small portion in the British mately 300 were likely to be in serviceable condition sector. A corresponding advance was made by the First and capable of operating in the sector at any given and Third Armies to the south. Air power had already time. In addition, an estimated 75 jet aircraft were done its work well, and close cooperation as previously based in northwest Germany* There was a force of used was no longer necessary. Armored columns advanced about 75 aircraft available for night bombing opera­ at will in any direction. tions. An estimated 350 aircraft constituted the night By 18 March, the Rhine area was cleared north of the fighter force in Northwest Germany. Moselle River, the Remagen bridgehead had been estab­ Opposed to this the Allied Air Forces on the north­ lished across the Rhine, and the Third Army was moving ern half of the Western Front had available approxi­ rapidly southeast to join forces with the Seventh Army mately: 1900 fighters, 160 night fighters, 850 medium moving north. bombers, and 4000 heavy bombers (based in the UK). It was estimated that a maximum of 60%-70% of this EVALUATION. force could be employed at any one time. The effectiveness of close air cooperation missions be­ Two immediate sources of reinforcements existed came difficult to assess during the operation because the for the GAF: An estimated 250 SEF on Southern por­ need had largely disappeared. German forces were with­ tion of Western Front and some 500 SEF in central drawing rapidly across the Rhine, and air power was Germany. being employed more toward preventing this and in effect­ The GAF did not possess a great number of first ing the isolation of the Ruhr area. Numerous, poorly-de­ class operational airfields; many of their installations fined pockets of enemy resistance left by the rapid advance were of a secondary nature and used primarily for were not profitable targets, and it was better to employ emergency operations or reservicing points. armed reconnaissance missions deep within enemy terri­ tory. The amount and location of German antiaircraft defenses had not changed appreciably, and the heavier 1. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. defenses remained in the Rhine and Roer areas. To Following the rapid advance across France, culmin­ the front of our existing lines the flak was moderately ating in the airborne operation in Holland from 17 heavy, but it was not of sufficient intensity to cause September to 26 September, the Allied armies were prohibitive losses to fighter-bomber activities. held to a static condition, regrouping, consolidating, At the beginning of February the Cologne Plain, the and strengthening positions preparatory to a major zone of the Fifteenth German Army, was well stocked effort to clear the entire area west of the Rhine from with guns, and with the closing of the Eifel Sector to Holland to Switzerland. The hardest part of the ad­ the South, flak units had regrouped and refitted. Some vance lay ahead, the breaching of Germany's main de­ had gone east with their army units to stem the Russian fensive postions along the Siegfried Line. advance, although an estimated 195 heavy guns and Large scale operations, although local, were made 1,000 light guns had taken positions to the north in in November in the north around Aachen and Esch­ the Fifteenth German Army Zone, increasing the total weiler (Operation "Queen") and in the south at Metz to roughly 1,000 heavy and 4,000 light flak weapons (Operation "Madison"). Before plaps for continuing in this area. An increase of 20 heavy guns was noted these qijFefi$iv£;s cpuid beout into actionYTiowever, the in the wooded area around Arsbeck but no other new f 5 ,f* A F\ > • f •'"•I '."••• "' •••-»* E ,*ps Sflfe 192 Part I-C "Grenade" deployments were discovered through photo recon­ (c) Assist the advance of the Ninth US Army by naissance. Pilots continued to encounter intense heavy closely coordinated aerial attacks to the immediate and light flak along the Roer River from Julich to front of the attacking ground troops. Roermond. (2) The total air strength available for the oper­ 2. PLAN OF OPERATIONS ("Grenade"). ation consisted of: a. GROUND PLAN. Eighth Air Force—Heavy Bombers (approx. 1200 a/c) The Ninth US Army had nearly completed the concentration of a powerful striking force on 16 RAF Bomb Comd.—Heavy Bombers (approx. February 1945. This force was assembled for the 1200 a/c) greatest offensive yet launched by Ninth Army—Oper­ 9th Bomb Div.—Medium Bombers (approx. ation "Grenade", the objective of which was the 600 a/c) destruction of all German forces west of the Rhine XXIX TAC—Reinforced to 7 F/B Groups River in the area bounded by the Roer, Erft, Rhine, (approx. 300 a/c) and Maas Rivers. The attack was to be coordinated IX TAC—F/B strength as determined by CG with the First US Army, protecting Ninth Army's right IX TAC. flank, and the First Canadian Army to the north, which had launched its attack earlier, moving south to clear (3) Primary air tasks were: the area between the Maas and the Rhine. The plan of (a) Maintenance of air supremacy and reduc­ attack of Ninth Army called for a swift crossing of the tion of GAF. Roer, followed by a drive toward the north and north­ On D minus 14 the attrition of German oper­ east to the Rhine. ational air bases within 150 miles of zone of opera­ The 21 Army Group consisted of the Ninth Army, tions by means of medium and heavy bomber air occupying in a general line Duren to Roermond; the strikes was to begin. These attacks would continue Second British Army, north of the Ninth Army and until the ground assault phase of the operation began. occupying a general line Roermond to Boxmeer; and Air strikes would be made by heavy bombers of the the First Canadian Army on the north holding the line Eighth AF and medium bombers of the 9th Bomb from Boxmeer north to the sea. Division and 2nd TAF; dive bombing and strafing The scheme of attack as it affected the First Cana­ attacks would be made by fighter-bombers of the IX dian Army called for an advance southeast from the and XXIX TAC's and 2nd TAF. Targets for heavy and vicinity of Nijmegen with the objective of clearing the medium bomber attacks were runways, repair installa­ area between the Rhine and Maas Rivers as far south tions, POL and ammunition dumps. Fighter-bomber as the general line Xanten—Geldern. attacks were to be concentrated on the destruction of enemy aircraft on the ground. Attacks against air­ The Second British Army's task was to hold the dromes capable of operating jet aircraft had highest line along the Maas River from Roermond to Boxmeer priority. and later to cross the Maas River in the Venlo Area. The Ninth US Army was to attack east and north (b) Isolation of the Battlefield, (ftom D minus across the Roer generally from the Julich and Linnich 14). areas and to seize the west bank of the Rhine between All rail and road bridges across the Rhine Neuss and Mors. river between Wesel and Bonn, inclusive, would be Flood conditions prevailing along the river en­ destroyed by heavy bombers of the RAF and Eighth forced postponement of D-Day which had previously AF and medium bombers of the 9th Bomb Div. been set for 10 February. At a conference on 21 Febru­ Interdiction would be accomplished of the ary the Army Engineers stated that the river could be rail system west of the Rhine which affected the move­ crossed and bridged on 23 February, despite the fact ment of enemy troops and supplies into the zone of that it would not be confined within its banks. Accord­ operations. ingly on 21 February the Army Commander announced That portion of the primary road system west 23 February as D-Day and 0330 hours as H-hour. of the Rhine was to be interdicted so as to impede b. AIR PLAN. movement of enemy reinforcement and supplies into (1) The XXIX Tactical Air Command, in its role the zone of operations. as the major close cooperating Air Force with the (c) Air-ground coordination phase. Ninth US Army, planned all operations to: This phase was planned to take nine separate (a) Prevent the enemy air force from interfer­ courses into consideration, four of which were to be ing with the preparation for, and the conduct of, the utilized in conjunction with an operation involving attack of the Ninth US Army. simultaneous attacks by the First and Ninth US (b) Prevent the enemy from moving ground Armies and the remaining five in conjunction with an forces and equipment which would interfere with the operation involving an attack by the First US Army Ninth Army's operation. prior to that of the Ninth US Army. (H T\ i* & •"• ••; :. >' " 6 • • •• - ,..„,._ 193 Part I-C "Grenade" ' " 1 ' 11 tj'.^V,.- J j 'J

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, • 194