I-C With major reliance being placed upon armor and Intelligence indicated that the main supplies for motorized troops to achieve success of the operation, a the Eifel came from the north via Cologne while the program of conservation of vehicle fuel and a build-up troops came via Giessen and Fulda to Frankfurt and of available vehicles was instituted. All the tanks, from there to the Rhine to Coblenz. To interfere with armored force vehicles and motorized transport pos­ the rail movement of troops through Frankfurt, centers sible were made available for the offensive. All of these such as Giessen, Fulda, Frankfurt, Hanau, Mainz, items were immediately committed to battle, and losses Bingen, and Coblenz were attacked. In the north, to could be made up only from the shipments of new interrupt the flow of supplies, marshaling yards at items from the sources of manufacture. Cologne were the main targets, with others at Rheydt Tanks were shipped directly from the manufac­ and Neuss. Attacks on yards at Cologne-Nippes, turer with no breaking-in period. In many instances Giessen, Hanau, Homburg, Trier, and Ehrang were the disruption of rail traffic west of the Rhine required particularly effective. that they be driven great distances to the battlefield. The total effect of the Allied attack was to paralyze Because of these conditions plus the use of inexper­ all rail traffic west of the Rhine as far north as Cologne ienced personnel many tanks and AFV's were burned and as far south and west as Trier and Frankfurt. out before they saw combat. Each tank was issued approximately 2-1/2 units c. MOTORIZED TRANSPORT. of fuel, sufficient to travel 250 km. After travelling that The effectiveness of the Allied air power against distance a tank commander might have to wait 10 the motorized transport of the enemy is attested to by hours, as in one known case, before he could refuel his the claims for the period of 17-27 December 1944. units. In many cases additional fuel never came, as During that period, which may be considered the dura­ attested to by the fact that hundreds of serviceable tion of the German offensive drive, the Allied claims enemy vehicles were found without gasoline as the were 3525 vehicles destroyed and 1650 damaged. enemy retreated. A PW from 1 SS Panzer Division Fighter-bombers attacked enemy columns continually, related one instance of where the lack of fuel meant weather permitting, and took a very heavy toll of the difference between possible success and surrender. enemy material, thus disrupting enemy movement and The mission of 1 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was causing a general lowering of efficiency by constant to tie up with Einheit Peiper (the tank component of harassing. the 1 SS) and then to push forward to Liege. It did not d. ROAD BLOCKS. succeed. Einheit Peiper (what remained of it) was To appreciate the part played by "road blocks" in cornered in La Gleize. It had remained there expecting halting the mighty German offensive, within eleven munitions and gasoline which never arrived. days after it started, one must have a knowledge of the The German plan also envisaged the capture of type of road-net behind and within the battle area. The Allies stocks of fuel, but with very few exceptions Ardennes is a plateau, both hilly and heavily wooded. these stocks were destroyed or evacuated. The road network contains few good main roads. A factor which probably had much to do with The system consists mainly of long, straight, tree-lined lowering the morale of the enemy was the lack of food. avenues with surfaces of water-bound macadam which Evidence in the form of PW reports indicates that do not stand up to very heavy wheeled or tracked soldiers frequently went days without food. traffic. Bastogne, the key town in the center of this The enemy, through the element of surprise, and plateau, is a concentration point for these routes. The on supplies issued at the start of the offensive, enjoyed roads are generally on high ground, and those that run early sweeping successes. Failure to get additional north and northwest from Bastogne and those running supplies to his spearheading forces resulted in a slow north through Malmedy traverse wooded and boggy down, eliminated the advantage he had gained, and areas, as opposed to following the river valleys where left him vulnerable to the counter thrust by the rede­ the towns are situated. ployed Allied forces. A factor which placed even a heavier burden on the already congested road-net was the heavy and b. RAIL FACILITIES. constant Allied air attacks of rail facilities behind the From the beginning of the offensive, Allied heavy "bulge". Deprived of rail facilities the enemy was bombardment aircraft concentrated on the paralyzing forced to rely on long hauls by road. of rail traffic toward the Eifel. The enemy used his railways as far forward as possible and had established Most enemy movements behind the salient, fun rail-heads and unloading points along the line Eus­ nelled through five major communications centers: kirchen-Trier. Reconnaissance showed that over this Bitburg, Kail, Prum, Gemund, and Stadkyll. The key rail line and all lines leading to it military traffic poured position of Bitburg was outstanding. Units detraining continuously. For this reason places such as Euskir­ along the Rhine as far north as Remagen swung south chen, Stadkyll, Gerolstein, Prum, Bitburg, and Ehrang through Bitburg. After passing the five choke points were subjected to bombing attacks, and these raids the units fanned out and came together only for the contributed materially to the early breakdown of crossing of the Our River. enemy's forward supply system. The main communication centers within the sal­ 186 Part I-C "Greif" Photo 27 —Road-Blocking at St. Vith, 27 December 1944 ient keys to the entire road network, were Bastogne, tion centers and road choke points. Results of these La Roche, St. Vith, and Houffalize. attacks varied greatly but the cumulative effect of these The only instance of the use of heavy bombard­ attacks was to slow down and seriously disrupt enemy ment aircraft in creating a road block within the movements. One prisoner of war stated that it took two salient was the RAF attack of St. Vith on 26 December hours to march through Kyllburg where it was neces­ in which 1140 tons of bombs were dropped. All roads sary to climb over rubble. Horsedrawn vehicles espe­ were blocked for one or more days and two of the cially experienced difficulty in getting through. main east-west roads were not in use as late as 11 Jan­ The road blocking attacks by medium bombard­ uary after engineers had been working on the roads ment aircraft of the IX Bomb Division were partially for a week. successful. The attacks on Houffalize, La Roche, and Eighth Air Force heavies during the offensive St. Vith were effective in achieving at least temporary period of 17-27 December attacked 27 communica­ road blocks on main lines. The attack on Rodt was M a M r ._. Vt i-c "Greif" TABLE 23: DAILY TOTAL OF CLAIMS—17-27 DECEMBER, 1944 Enemy Aircraft Date Rail Road Gun lanes A.F.V. M. T. Locos RR Cars Bridges Guns Pos. Air Ground Cuts Cuts 17 116-11-44 1-0-0 2-0 23-9 224-218 23-42 231-371 13 3-4 — 16-15 18 50-4-33 — 0-2 74-36 262-91 7-14 61-87 25-13 19 7-0-1 2-0-5 — — 62-70 7-9 131-174 18 — 0-10 0-2 20 — 3-5 21 — — — 2-0 0-5 — — 4-0 22 6-0-1 2-13 73-100 2 23 117-29-58 9-0-0 17-14 233-128 13-12 170-250 12 3 — 0-1 1-35 24 125-5-31 — 7-6 56-74 623-227 10-31 83-508 30 10 2-0 0-3 17-57 25 96-8-14 4-5-8 — 101-41 970-400 18-23 233-372 14 19 50-26 26 75-6-16 0-0-13 6-7 56-72 560-304 14-39 191-288 43 5 1-2 — 23-10 27 94-5-33 1-0-0 — 126-61 586-207 27-54 346-446 38 45 5-0 — 32-29 Totals 746-68-231 17-5-26 32-29 436-293 3525-165O121-237 1519-26O1 176 91 11-6 0-14 168-187 TABLE 24: DAILY TOTAL OF BOMB TONNAGE BY TYPE OF TARGET 17-27 DECEMBER, 1944 Rltvy. Tar- Targets Oil A/C Fac- Air- Close Total Date Cities gets Commu- of Oppor- Tons Targets tories Fields nications Support tunity 17 — — 558 — 558 18 4970 1049 513 35 6573 19 69 — 2097 109 — 2275 20 — 21 495 __ __ 45 540 22 — 12 12 — 1140 113 — 1277 23 — 64 4251 404 16 4735 24 169 4216 2608 486 363 7842 25 1 550 2816 611 235 4213 26 3 — 1010 2014 3 3030 27 3153 652 38 3843 Total 5707 18 12 4830 18124 5505 690 34886 partially effective. No information is obtainable on the contributed greatly to the dulling of the German of effects of the attacks on Salmchateau and Gouvy while fensive thrust. the attacks on Clervaux and Viaden were unsatis- During the period 17-27 December the claims factory. against tanks and armored force vehicles were 468 Fighter-bombers, in close cooperation with Allied destroyed and 322 damaged. Other vehicles littered ground forces, were frequently called upon during the the roads and enemy concentration points as 3,525 offensive period to form road blocks to slow down the were destroyed and 1,650 damaged.