Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects William James's Undivided Self and the Possibility of Immortality Anthony Karlin Marquette University Recommended Citation Karlin, Anthony, "William James's Undivided Self and the Possibility of Immortality" (2011). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 100. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/100 WILLIAM JAMES’S UNDIVIDED SELF AND THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMORTALITY by Anthony G. Karlin, B.F.A. A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin May 2011 ABSTRACT WILLIAM JAMES’S UNDIVIDED SELF AND THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMORTALITY Anthony G. Karlin, B.F.A. Marquette University, 2011 The dissertation explores William James’s conception of the self and his belief in the possibility of immortality. In The Divided Self of William James, James scholar Richard M. Gale argues that James unwittingly advanced two incompatible types of selves: a self-assertive “Promethean” self who maximizes desire-satisfaction and a passive mystic self who favors conceptless, mystical intuition. I argue that Gale’s dichotomy of James is incorrect and that James’s conception of the self is better understood through his growing belief in the possibility of immortality. I develop this idea by considering relevant aspects of both James’s personal and philosophical development. I discuss the personal crises of James’s youth as well as the dilemmas he encountered as his philosophy evolved. I argue that one of the keys to understanding James’s conception of the self was his long-term involvement with psychic research and his association with the psychic medium Leonora Piper. These interactions compelled James to envision possibilities for the self beyond this life. In the final analysis, I believe my alternative account to Gale results in a more accurate and unified understanding of James, i.e., one in which the possibility of immortality played a central role in James’s evolving vision of the self. i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Anthony G. Karlin, B.F.A. This dissertation is dedicated to my mother and father, whose faith and belief in my abilities have always surpassed my own. I would also like to thank my wife for her enduring patience, love, and support. Finally, I would like to extend my deepest thanks and gratitude to all of my former Philosophy professors at Fort Hays State University, my committee, my director, the Graduate School, and all of the Marquette University administration. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………………….. i CHAPTER INTRODUCTION: THE DIVIDED-SELF AND POSSIBILITY………………. 1 I. WILLIAM JAMES’S NON-MYSTICAL SELF .…………….….....……….. 21 II. DEATH IN THE LIFE OF JAMES ..…………....…...…………………...... 42 III. THE PASSING THOUGHT AND IMMORTALITY IN PRINCIPLES ………...…………………………………………………….………………….. 73 IV. EXPANDING THE SELF: IMMORTALITY AND JAMES’S FIELD MODEL ….…..…………………………………………………………..…… 103 V. RADICAL EMPIRICISM AND IMMORTALITY: JAMES’S QUEST FOR INTIMACY ...………………………………………………..…………. 122 VI. MYSTICISM IN JAMES’S THOUGHT: A FINAL REPLY TO GALE ………………………………………………………………………………… 148 CONCLUSIONS…………………..………………………….……………... 172 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………….……………... 178 1 Introduction: The Divided-Self and Possibility In The Divided Self of William James, Richard M. Gale argues that James “was a highly divided self throughout his life,” and throughout “his career James was of several minds about everything.”1 According to Gale’s analysis, James unwittingly advanced two incompatible types of selves: a bold, creative “Promethean” self who maximizes desire-satisfaction and a mystic self who renounces the self-assertive Promethean quest in favor of a passive state of conceptless, mystical intuition that results in an intimate union with the universe. Gale suggests that these two selves are incompatible because of how they interact with the world and, more importantly, because of how each self conceives the nature of reality, i.e., their ontological commitments. The Promethean self, on this account, has an active will and is committed to ontological relativism, while the mystic self has a passive will and is committed to some form of absolutism. Consequently, so long as one attempts to realize both types of selves (which Gale claims James attempted to do), self-integration will remain impossible. Thus, concludes Gale, James and his philosophy remained perpetually divided. Since Gale’s book came out in 1999, two noteworthy attempts to re-unify James and his philosophy have already appeared. In The Unity of William James’s Thought, published in 2002, Wesley Cooper attempts what Gale would later characterize as a “doctrinal integration” of James’s thought.2 In brief, Cooper’s main idea, what he calls his “Two-Levels View,” is that James’s philosophy is not divided into two incompatible 1 Richard M. Gale, The Divided Self of William James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 258. 2 Richard M. Gale, “The Still Divided Self of William James: A Response to Pawelski and Cooper,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society XL, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 159. 2 worlds, but, rather, reflects two different perspectives or dimensions of the same world.3 James O. Pawelski followed Cooper’s attempt to unify James in 2007 with his work, The Dynamic Individualism of William James. Unlike Cooper, Pawelski is primarily concerned with what Gale refers to as an “existential integration” of James.4 That is, Pawelski attempts to unify not only James’s philosophy, but also his mind by arguing that his ideas became increasingly more integrated as his thought developed.5 Like Cooper and Pawelski, I do not accept Gale’s divided-self thesis, but my attempt to re-unify James is unlike either of theirs. The thesis that I will argue for and defend in this paper is that James’s understanding of the self was shaped and unified by his desire for and growing belief in the possibility of immortality. Like Pawelski, therefore, my account may be labeled “existential” insofar as I argue against a “several minds” interpretation of James. However, my account will differ from Pawelski’s insofar as the unity I identify in James is not the success of reconciling competing beliefs, but, rather, a unity of vision and ambition, so to speak, for a conception of the self compatible with the possibility of immortality. In order to present this account my task will be two-fold, part critical and part constructive. First, I will begin in Chapter 1 with a critique of Gale’s claim that James was himself a mystic. In particular, I will consider Gale’s claim that James had a number of mystical experiences which licenses him to attribute a mystical self to James. Using the examples Gale provides, I will then evaluate each experience according to the criteria 3 Wesley Cooper, The Unity of William James’s Thought (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), 6. 4 Gale, “Still Divided,” 159. 5 James O. Pawelski, The Dynamic Individualism of William James (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), chap. 5. 3 for mystical experience which James set out in The Varieties of Religious Experience.6 I will argue that only one of these experiences comfortably meets the criteria and, thus, Gale’s portrayal of James as mystic is unwarranted. Following this initial critique, Chapters 2-5 will be used to construct my positive thesis that James rallied his views of the self around his desire for and growing belief in the possibility of immortality. The development of this idea will not only encompass the entire range of James’s philosophical works, but it will additionally take into consideration relevant aspects of his personal life. More specifically, Chapter 2 will consider important aspects of James’s biography such as the personal crises of his mid-20’s and his subsequent interest and involvement in psychical research. It will be shown how James’s interest in immortality was largely borne out of these events. Next, in Chapter 3, I will wholly turn to James’s philosophical writings beginning with his magnum opus, The Principles of Psychology. There I will argue that, despite surface appearances, his novel conception of the self in Principles is compatible with and favors the possibility of immortality. In the fourth chapter I will examine James’s discussion of the self in his Ingersoll Lecture, “Human Immortality,” and The Varieties of Religious Experience. I will contend that in these two works we once again find James concerned with immortality as he defends the doctrine against popular objections and advances a field-theory of consciousness which substantially expands the notion of the self found in Principles. In Chapter 5, I will turn to James’s later, more explicitly metaphysical works, namely, Essays in Radical Empiricism, A Pluralistic Universe, and Some Problems in Philosophy. James’s interest 6 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to works by William James refer to The Works of William James, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis, 19 Vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975-1988); The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1897. 4 in the possibility of an afterlife becomes even more apparent in these works as indicated by his rejection of dualism in favor of a metaphysics approximating panpsychism. With my interpretation of James in place, in the final chapter I will be able to more sharply critique Gale’s claims regarding the clash between selves he believes exists in James’s philosophy. There I will argue that Gale’s characterization of the mystical self runs against the current of James’s thought and, in addition, directly conflicts with James’s claims regarding mystical experience. In the end, with Gale’s supposed clashes diffused and my alternative account in place, the result will be a more accurate and unified understanding of James, i.e., one in which the possibility of immortality played a central role in James’s evolving vision of the self.