Party Adaptation, Elite Training, and Political Selection in Reform-Era China
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PARTY ADAPTATION, ELITE TRAINING, AND POLITICAL SELECTION IN REFORM-ERA CHINA A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Charlotte P. Lee June 2010 © 2010 by Charlotte Ping Lee. All Rights Reserved. Re-distributed by Stanford University under license with the author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/ This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/jn431dw0841 ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Jean Oi, Primary Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Beatriz Magaloni-Kerpel I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Michael McFaul Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost Graduate Education This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives. iii Abstract How and why have seemingly outdated political organizations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) persisted through China’s past three decades of economic liberalization and social transition? In answering this question, I focus on the CCP’s nationwide system of political training academies, or party schools, to piece together the story of these schools’ role within the party apparatus and subsequent adaptation to changed incentives and circumstances. By investigating the logic of party organization and examining sub-party actors, this dissertation seeks to address broader questions regarding how ruling parties in authoritarian regimes are able to generate incentives for both institutional continuity and adaptation. During market reforms, CCP leadership has invested in reviving and updating party organizations of bureaucratic management. In the case of the party school system, party authorities have sought to adapt these core political organizations to a market context not by insulating them from market forces, but by linking organizational survival to market savvy. Central party authorities have induced adaptation by opening party schools to local and national market forces. This study thus uncovers a market-based path by which organizations within a Leninist party persist through – and even thrive on – economic transformation. I draw on organizational theories of competition and redundancy to explain the logic of these developments – and resultant “party entrepreneurialism”. Two sets of findings emerge from my research. First, the party school system in China continues to be an important site of political control over individual bureaucrats. My analysis of survey and career history data reveals that party school enrollment iv increases the likelihood of attaining a higher administrative rank and more rapid promotion up the career ladder. In the principal-agent relationships which suffuse China’s hierarchically organized political system, the party must solve the problem of how to select bureaucratic agents at all levels of the system. This selection problem comes prior to the monitoring of agents and is particularly salient in the highly competitive bureaucracy of the Chinese party-state. By employing a matching method on large-N survey data and analyzing an original dataset of the career histories of central- level officials, I find that party school training constitutes a pipeline to high office. Second, party schools have fulfilled this selection function while responding to the demands of multiple markets. These include the local and national markets for goods and services opened under the reforms of the past thirty years and a training market created by central party authorities. Party authorities have harnessed market forces in order to generate incentives for traditionally closed party schools to turn outward for income, innovative training content, and new partners. Content analysis of an original dataset of Central Party School training syllabi from 1985 to 2007 reveals the extent of change in party school training content. Findings from field visits to the party schools of two provinces, one Special Economic Zone, and the Central Party School in Beijing uncovers the means by which these organizational actors have leveraged the limited local autonomy granted to them and become highly entrepreneurial. One result has been an expansion in the diversity of educational and profit-making activities on party school campuses, developments that both complement and conflict with the core function of these schools as elite training grounds. v These findings illustrate the balance that China’s ruling party has sought to strike between encouraging organizational reform while maintaining preexisting institutional arrangements for managing political elites. The “party entrepreneurialism” that has developed in the party school system has implications for central-local relations in China as well as strategies of organizational adaptation within the CCP. Market opportunities embed party schools more deeply in local economies, and this has the potential to strengthen the ties between schools and local constituents – at the risk of compromising school responsiveness to central dictates. At the same time, the marketization of cadre training has generated strong incentives for party schools to search actively for innovative solutions to challenges from party and non-party competitors. Over the past three decades of reform, party schools have proven to be nimble political and economic actors: school leaders have developed an entrepreneurial spirit, in the process retaining the relevance of their organizations within the party and profiting from the market-based turn that internal party reforms have taken. vi Acknowledgements When I began my graduate studies six years ago, I had little idea that the road to producing a dissertation would be so delightfully peopled with teachers and friends, both old and new, who would inject much wisdom and encouragement into what is otherwise a long, wearying process. Along the way, I have become indebted to so many individuals – at Stanford, in China, and from my alma mater, UC Berkeley – and each has contributed to my research and thinking in ways that are difficult to measure. I am grateful for the generosity of ideas and spirit that many mentors, friends, and family have bestowed on me these years. Heartfelt thanks goes to my advisor, Jean Oi, whose energy, unflagging curiosity, and deep knowledge of Chinese politics have been an inspiration to me. I still remember feeling exhausted just watching Jean conduct one interview after another in the townships and villages where rural China has taken off, far from the glamour and resources of the big cities. Her formidable skills in the field and in the classroom will continue to shape my approach to research and teaching. I also could not have completed this project without the encouragement of my two other dissertation readers, Beatriz Magaloni and Mike McFaul. Beatriz challenged me always with her questioning and thinking about how the China case fits into our understanding of authoritarian systems, and she did so while achieving an admirable work-life balance. I am grateful for Mike’s big questions and his amazing ability to support my work while handling calls from the “situation room.” Special thanks go to Andy Walder for pushing my research in new directions and chairing my dissertation defense with humor and care. Alice Miller has also taught me a vii great deal about how to put together a terrific class while teaching me volumes about the intricacies of elite politics in China. I also thank her for bringing her expertise to the table during my dissertation defense. Although he was not on my dissertation committee, I am also indebted to Larry Diamond for his mentorship over the years and admire his ability to bridge the policy and scholarly worlds. The process of writing this dissertation was also due in no small part to the support of my colleagues at Stanford and beyond. I thank the members of my dissertation writing group, Bethany Lacina, Jed Stiglitz, Luke Condra, and Roy Elis for their gentle comments in the face of glaring flaws. Thanks also go to my interdisciplinary writing group, including Daniel Kreiss, Johanne Eliacin, Rekha Balu, and Zhanara Nauruzbayeva, for their fresh perspectives. I thank Leslie Wang for her critical spirit and introduction to the Berkeley graduate student community. In the social sciences at Stanford, I am fortunate to be surrounded by a collegial circle of China researchers, and the brilliance of my colleagues continually inspires me. Thanks go to Yuen Yuen Ang, David Barmore, Chris Chan, Joo-Youn Jung, Jen Haskell, Xiaobin He, Xiaojun Li, Chao-Chi Lin, Paul Ling, Sung-Min Rho, Kay Shimizu, Mee Smuthkalin, Jeremy Wallace, and Rachel Wu for their support and help throughout. My deep thanks and appreciation go to each of my many friends and acquaintances in China. They must remain anonymous