Comparing Modi's Media Strategy to Nehru and Indira
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ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 Charisma Through Communication: Comparing Modi's Media Strategy to Nehru and Indira RONOJOY SEN Ronojoy Sen ([email protected]) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies and South Asian Studies Programme, National University of Singapore. Vol. 56, Issue No. 10, 06 Mar, 2021 This paper looks at how Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi used traditional media–radio and print–and their communication styles. It then goes on to examine Narendra Modi’s use of media and his ways of communication, drawing comparisons with the Congress when it was dominant. The paper concludes by arguing that though there are certain continuities in the use of mass media in the two eras, the changes are equally significant. It is well known that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have used the media, particularly social media, to good effect both during elections as well in normal times (Sen 2019; Sen et al 2019). The 2019 Indian general election saw the widespread and innovative use of digital media and technology and was dubbed by many as the “WhatsApp” election (Bengani 2019). The BJP reportedly had three WhatsApp groups for each of India’s over 90,000 polling booths and 1.2 million social media volunteers, besides using Twitter, Facebook and an array of other digital media tools. The increased use of digital media by the BJP and other political parties was matched by a corresponding increase in the number of Internet users in India, a steady growth of cellphone subscribers and the cheap cost of mobile data. ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 Rajni Kothari in his seminal essay on the “Congress system” or its re-evaluation makes no mention of the media (Kothari 1964, 1974). What do we know of the use of media in the heydays of the Congress system—under Jawaharlal Nehru and the first two terms of Indira Gandhi? This paper looks at how Nehru and Indira Gandhi used traditional media—radio and print—and their communication styles. It then goes on to examine Modi’s use of media and his ways of communication, drawing comparisons with the Congress when it was dominant. The paper concludes by arguing that though there are certain continuities in the use of mass media in the two eras, the changes are equally significant. Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s Use of Media Nehru was a great believer in using the radio as a means of communicating with the people. His speech after M K Gandhi’s assassination is well known. But it was not just on momentous occasions that Nehru used the radio. Even as the Constituent Assembly deliberations were winding down, in June 1949, Nehru in a radio broadcast on the food situation declared “I feel that I have been very remiss during the past many months, absorbed as I was in my normal work. I have not been able to give much time to speaking to you either through the radio or in public meetings. I feel that I ought to make good this omission in so far as I can… I hope… to speak to you much more often than I have done in the past” (Times of India 1949a). While Nehru was not entirely able to make “good his omission,” he did again address the nation in a radio broadcast on 3 December 1949, a few weeks before India would formally be proclaimed a republic. He once again reiterated that he wanted to “keep in touch with the people, if not in person at least through the radio” (Times of India 1949b). Indeed, political scientist W H Morris-Jones had noted that Nehru “rules a country of continental size and bewildering diversities with a microphone” (Malhotra 2014). Nehru would periodically keep addressing the nation on radio, especially during moments of national crisis. For instance, within days of the Chinese invasion in 1962, Nehru said in a radio broadcast “I am speaking to you on the radio after a long interval. I feel, however, that I must speak to you about the grave situation that has arisen on our frontiers…” (National Herald 2020). Lal Bahadur Shastri too did the same during his brief tenure as prime minister. Ramachandra Guha recounts how during the language agitation in Tamil Nadu in 1965, Shastri acknowledged his mistake in imposing Hindi in a radio broadcast on 11 February 1965 (Guha 2020). It might be noted that in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the penetration of daily newspapers was low, and in 1981 stood at 22 per 1,000 people (Jeffrey 2015: 31). Another less remembered and less appreciated medium to transmit the government’s views ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 were the documentaries and news reels made by the Films Division of India, a unit under the Information and Broadcasting (I&B) Ministry. Many Indians of a certain age will recall having watched these films, which were compulsory viewing at cinema halls from the 1950s. Under Nehru, the films attempted to instill belief in the “virtues of Nehruvian developmentalism” and creation of ideal citizens (Sutoris 2016: 210). Indira Gandhi well understood the power of radio and television. Indeed, as minister for information and broadcasting in 1964 she said the press, radio and television in future should be used to “educate” the public rather than “mere propaganda” (Times of India 1964). Indira Gandhi would of course turn this dictum on its head during the emergency. Ironically, it was a committee set up by Indira Gandhi as I&B minister–the Chanda Committee–that concluded that All India Radio (AIR) had become a “purveyor of stale news” and a “psychological transformation” was necessary (Jeffrey 2006: 215-16). Indira Gandhi was also aware of the power of communicating complex ideas through catchy slogans. Her “Garibi Hatao” slogan struck a chord with voters in the 1971 election and was one of the key factors in securing a “landslide victory” for the Congress (Hasan 2019). Indira Gandhi was also fastidious about her speeches. Prithvi Nath Dhar, one of her close advisors, recalls that the “longest and most tedious meetings with Indira Gandhi had to do with the preparation of her speeches” and that she took great pains “regardless of the importance of the occasion or the subject matter she had to deal with” (Dhar 2000: 120). In fact, the famous midnight speech of December 3, 1971 on AIR, when Indira Gandhi declared war on Pakistan, had to be delayed by an hour since she was not happy with it (Dhar 2000: 122). However, Indira Gandhi is today much better remembered for muzzling the press and using it for propaganda during the Emergency from 1975-77. Accounts of Indira Gandhi’s handling of the media during the emergency are well known, but some aspects are worth reiterating. While some newspapers resisted for a while and others ceased publication, eventually most complied with the government, publishing “official press releases, statements, and speeches by Indira Gandhi and her minions” (Prakash 2019: 183). Almost as soon as Emergency was imposed, the government merged four news agencies–UNI, PTI, Hindustan Samachar and Samachar Bharati —into one entity, Samachar, and placed it under the supervision of a police officer (Kapoor 2015: 66). B D Garga notes that AIR, Doordarshan and Films Division became “propaganda instruments of the ruling party and peddlers of a personality cult” (Garga 2007: 186). The mild Inder Kumar Gujral, a future prime minister, was also replaced by the compliant Vidya Charan Shukla as I&B minister. Under Shukla, All India Radio came to be mockingly known as All Indira Radio. According to the Shah Commission Report, between January 1, 1976 and January 18, 1977 the AIR news bulletins carried 192 items on Indira Gandhi’s son, Sanjay Gandhi, alone (Kapoor 2015: 66). A four-hour long documentary, Indus Valley to Indira Gandhi, was also commissioned for the princely sum of Rs 11.9 lakh (Garga 2007: 186). ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 Indira Gandhi was brazen about the censorship stating in a speech in the Rajya Sabha on January 8, 1976: “It is obvious that the opposition movement was not merely getting publicity, but was actually built up by our press; and it is because we denied the opposition the benefit of this, their special type of publicity, that the emergency has succeeded. In a battle the antagonists’ lines of supply have to be cut off, and this is what censorship has done” (Kapoor 2015: 63). In February 1976, the government also enacted the Prevention of Publication of Objectionable Matter Act against the printing of incitement of crime and other objectionable matters (Prakash 2019: 182). In tandem with press censorship, the government plastered the country with slogans to publicise the government’s Twenty Point Programme. Indira Gandhi was also not averse to using Nehru’s name to legitimise the Emergency. One of the memorable Emergency-era posters was that of Nehru in cricketing flannels and a bat with the caption saying: “The Skipper of Modern India.” Ramachandra Guha notes, “The Indian love of cricket and the public admiration of the (always democratic) Nehru were being invoked to help promote loyalty to his non-cricket playing and authoritarian daughter” (Guha 2002). Some of the government’s propaganda measures though fell flat. A triptych by eminent artist M F Husain lauding the Emergency and Indira Gandhi was exhibited in Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta and outside India. However, the National Gallery of Modern Art in Delhi refused to house the paintings permanently and subsequently they went out of circulation due to their association with the Emergency (Prakash 2019: 184).