Framing a Crisis: Exploring the Rassemblement National’s Path to Power
A thesis presented by Payal D. Majmundar1
Presented to the Department of International Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree with honors of Bachelor of Arts
University of Florida April 2020
1 Special thanks to Dr. Esther Romeyn for her guidance and expertise in the preparation of this thesis. FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 2 POWER Abstract
The Rassemblement National, France’s right-wing populist movement, recently experienced impressive gains in voter support under Marine Le Pen’s leadership, shaping the electoral landscape in the 2017 presidential election. The movement’s popularity amongst voters continues to grow, thus it is important to analyze the reasons behind the recent success to determine future political implications for France. Academic literature theorizes that Marine’s rebranding of the movement helped increase its number of votes in the 2017 presidential election. This thesis uses a content analysis to further analyze this theory of the movement’s rebranding as a reason for its electoral success. The content analysis examines the changes in the
Rassemblement National’s communication with the French public between the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections to identify which specific changes in discursive practices and political strategies resonated with voters and why. The results of the content analysis show that the movement’s discourse and strategies shifted from far-right to right-wing populist between the two presidential elections. The analysis reveals these changes resonated with voters in times of crisis and were effective in the Rassemblement National’s path to power.
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 3 POWER Note on Translations
This thesis concerns a French topic and involves a content analysis of works written in the French language. For the purpose of readership, I translated direct quotes included in this thesis that were examined during the content analysis into the English language. The original
French language is reproduced in a footnote below each direct quote for the use of Francophone readers. Words that were used in the content analysis are left italicized in the original French language throughout the thesis and are defined in the endnotes section. Additionally, sources in the English language are quoted as examples for further analysis that have translated primary source quotes from the French language without providing original quotes. The English translations by those authors are relied upon in the absence of the original quotes and are included in this thesis.
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 4 POWER Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..5
Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………………………………8
Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………...... 17
Analyzing the Rise of the Rassemblement National………………………………………..……26
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….41
Translations……………………………………………………………………………………....46
Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………………47
References………………………………………………………………………………..……....50
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 5 POWER INTRODUCTION
The final round of the French 2017 presidential election was a historical moment. It was the first time in six decades that the main political right and left parties were not represented in
France’s final round. Emmanuel Macron won on a centrist platform with the La République En
Marche!i, rejecting “left” or “right” labels while Marine Le Pen ran as a right-wing populist with the Front Nationalii (FN), which has since been renamed as the Rassemblement Nationaliii (RN)
(Friedman, 2017). The RN was established as a far-right party in 1972 with Jean-Marie Le Pen,
Marine’s father, as leader. Prior to the 2017 presidential election, the RN had failed to secure a large number of votes to make it a prominent party in France. Though Marine only gained 33.9 percent of the votes in the 2017 final round, it was the political movement’s most notable accomplishment and the largest vote share an RN candidate has received (Ministère de l'Intérieur). After Marine failed to advance from the first round in the 2012 presidential election with 17.9 percent of the votes, she was able to gain a significant increase in voter support within five years, shaping the French political landscape (Ministère de l'Intérieur).
The 2017 presidential election followed the recent trend of a re-emergence in right-wing populism in the European Union (EU) and reflected the crumbling of both left and right political parties. As right-wing populism continues to shape the political future with its growing success, it is important to analyze the reasons behind that success to determine future political implications for France and the EU. Using the RN in France as a case study, this thesis will examine political strategies used in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections to identify how the
RN was able to achieve greater success in the 2017 presidential election. This leads me to my research questions: What changes in political strategies did the RN make between 2012 and 2017 to attract voters? Moreover, why were voters more attracted to the RN in 2017? FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 6 POWER First, I will analyze immediate changes in discourse, platform, and rhetoric made between Marine Le Pen as current RN leader (2011-present) and her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen as former RN leader (1972-2011) to identify why Marine had greater success as a presidential candidate in one year than Jean-Marie had in nearly forty years. Second, I will analyze the shift in discourse, platform, and rhetoric Marine and the RN made between 2012 and 2017 to rebrand the political party from Jean-Marie’s leadership as a political movement under Marine’s leadership. Third, I will identify specifically when French voters became more attracted to the
RN and the reasons for why.
Methodology
I conducted a content analysis to answer my research questions. Content analysis is used to collect and analyze data to discern the meanings attributed to an issue within a given context
(Saraisky, 2015). The process involves “discerning meaning about attitudes, symbols, cultures, and institutions from which inferences are ultimately drawn” (Saraisky, 2015). Content analysis is not focused on literal interpretations of the text, but rather patterns and trends that exist in the text (Saraisky, 2015). Though I am investigating changes in the RN’s discourse, platform, and rhetoric, I chose to conduct a content analysis instead of a discourse analysis. Content analysis is objective and quantitative, allowing reliability and replicability while discourse analysis is subjective and qualitative (Saraisky, 2015). Unlike discourse analysis, content analysis comes from an “understanding that meaning can be counted and coded, and content analysis uses a codebook with an a priori coding scheme that allows the researcher to map the patterns and meaning of a particular content from which inferences are drawn” (Lowe, 2004). This method provides the ability for anyone to conduct and replicate the analysis. FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 7 POWER I gathered all communication that was published on the RN’s official website between
2011 and 2017 for four prominent leaders of the RN to gain a holistic view and analyze abundant data. These four leaders are Marine Le Pen (leader), Steeve Briois (vice-president), Wallerand de
Saint Just (treasurer) and Nicolas Bay (general secretary). The communication gathered included press releases, speeches, open letters, press conferences, and free forums. Before reading the texts I gathered from the RN’s website, I researched published academic literature on the RN’s history, differences between Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen’s leadership, and a variety of discourse analyses to create my coding set of categories. Though discourse analysis can be subjective, I used a variety of discourse analyses that considered different themes in my literature review to gain a clearer idea of potential patterns. The literature I used to create my coding set of categories is included in this thesis. The communication I gathered was in the French language, therefore I created my coding set of categories in French (See Table 1, Appendix).
After creating my coding set of categories, I counted how many times the four leaders referenced those categories in the texts gathered from the RN’s website to determine a pattern and the main focus of its discourse, platform, and rhetoric. Content analysis has been critiqued for its focus on word count as it could overlook the context of the text, which is why I also examined the context and the language used between the four leaders and the French public. I conducted my analysis in French to maintain language integrity and original meaning; however, I translated example excerpts included in this thesis to English for the purpose of readership. The combination of my coding set and examining the texts allowed me to identify specific shifts in discourse and rhetoric, along with which years these shifts occurred in.
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 8 POWER THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Roots of Right-Wing Extremism in France: the Influence of Alain de Benoist and the
Nouvelle Droite on the Rassemblement National
The Nouvelle Droiteiv (ND) is a cultural school of thought that emerged in France as a response to the growing liberalism and failure of both the extreme-right and extreme-left in the
1960s (Bar-On, 2001). Political scientists describe the ND as neo-fascist, an extreme-right ideology, or set of political beliefs, drawn from fascism. They describe the ND as neo-fascist because its ideology is a form of populist ultra-nationalism that aims at national rebirth (Bar-On,
2001). Alain de Benoist, the ND’s most influential intellectual, rejects the label of neo-fascist, claiming critics use that label to delegitimize his ideas. He further claims the ND’s criticism of society varies from older forms of far-right ideology and fascism; it combines left-wing and right-wing characteristics. It borrowed ideas from the New Left movement such as anti-racism and anti-nationalism while also adopting right wing stances of collective identities (Bar-On,
2001). Political scientist Tamir Bar-On argues the blend of these two spectrums is a survival strategy used to not only appeal to a larger audience in the post-Cold War era, but also resurrect right-wing ideals by avoiding overt strategies and ideals used by former right-wing movements, such as fascist-Nazi identification (Bar-On, 2001& Mammone, 2008).
When the ND was founded in the 1960s, transnationalism and globalization played an increasing role in global politics and economics encouraging the free movement of people, cultures, and ideas. This free movement led to cultural pluralism, or the co-existence of various cultures, throughout Europe, a phenomenon the ND strongly opposed. There are claims that this opposition to cultural pluralism makes the ND racist; however, the ND disputes the racist claims FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 9 POWER by arguing its own view of cultural differences. The ND’s view of cultural differences is based on the ND’s own concept of differentialism where it professes to support diversity, uniqueness, and equality of different cultures, while also believing each culture is rooted in its own specific space and should remain in its geographical place.
The ND aims to make its ideas culturally hegemonic as a strategy of mainstreaming and diffusion. It makes its ideas seem “normal” so that they become part of the everyday lexicon and are thought of as “common sense”. Rather than stating that cultures are unequal, differentialism is rooted in the idea that cultures are inherently different, and that they belong in a particular location. Using this idea of “belonging”, the ND argues different cultures have become dislocated from where they “belong” as a result of migration. Thus, different cultures are incompatible in new spaces and are viewed as threats to national and/or European identity which the ND constructs in homogenous terms. It believes transnationalism and globalization threaten a homogenous European identity because it allows the infiltration of various cultures, beliefs and ideas into European society, altering European culture.
Western Europe experienced sizable migration flows from former European colonies in
Africa, Indonesia, and the West Indies in the 1960s and 1970s (Fassmann & Munz, 1992).
France was confronted with surges of former French residents and immigrants from other former
French colonies (Fassmann & Munz, 1992). For example, more than one million immigrants from Algeria resettled in France (Fassmann & Munz, 1992). It was difficult to specify who immigrated or emigrated and from which country as there were no reliable data or records available (Fassmann & Munz, 1992). This made it nearly impossible to determine who was a citizen and who was a migrant. This created many problems because “nationality or citizenship FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 10 POWER is the decisive criterion for distinguishing between “locals” and immigrants” in Western
European countries (Fassmann & Munz, 1992). The ND’s ideas attempt to create that distinction through cultural differences. Differentialism often translates into the ND’s construction of the immigrant as an “Other”, who, by virtue of “cultural difference” is inherently a threat to
European identity. This problematization of immigration through the lens of culture rather than race was powerful in mainstreaming extreme right-wing ideas while circumventing the label of
“racism.” This idea, which many critics have labeled as “cultural racism” were readily inserted into the political mainstream to say people are not racist, but rather they simply reject those who refuse to accept and adapt “our way of life” (Titley & Lentin, 2012). According to the researcher
Alana Lentin, “our way of life only makes sense when there is somebody to define it, and defend against it” (Titley & Lentin, 2012). Alain de Benoist and the ND have chosen to define and defend a “European way of life” through the new concept of cultural racism by stripping race of its biological basis and bringing the idea of inherent cultural differences back into the cultural political mainstream. This new form of racism in modern culture has been effective in attracting a wider audience.
This view had far-reaching global effects in the post-Cold War era as the world became more interconnected through globalization. It inspired the re-emergence of right-wing movements in various nations, including France, the ND’s origin. The ND inspired the formation of the RN in France and continues to influence its views today. The ND and the RN share similar views such as the “obsessive fixation on a homogenous and cohesive internal cultural identity which ultimately dreads immigration and multicultural societies” (Bar-On, 2001). Despite these similarities, the ND places itself on a different political spectrum and Alain de Benoist even FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 11 POWER declared an ideological war with the RN in the early 1990s (Bar-On, 2001). He attempted to distance himself from Jean-Marie Le Pen who utilized overt forms of racism and made anti-
Semitic claims (Bar-On, 2001). Jean-Marie often openly discussed his denial of the Holocaust to the media, creating controversy within the political and social spheres, while turning voters away from the RN and right-wing ideals. Unlike Jean-Marie, Alain de Benoist sought to implement new strategies of mainstreaming differentialism that did not involve racism on a biological basis when he formed the ND. Jean-Marie’s continued use of “biological racism” is typically considered the reason behind the RN’s failure in being a political success during the 1980s and
1990s.
It wasn’t until Marine Le Pen, his daughter, became the RN’s leader in 2011 that the RN saw a significant rise in support. The strategies Marine utilizes align more with the ND than the strategies used by her father. There are two specific ND strategies that are analyzed as part of
Marine’s various changes to the RN later in this thesis: the use of cultural racism and cultural hegemony. Similar to the ND, Marine distanced herself and the RN’s strategies away from the controversial forms of racism used by Jean-Marie by using an anti-immigrant rhetoric informed by “cultural racism” instead (McCulloch, 2006). The appeal of “cultural racism” to French voters increased over time through Marine’s discourse, allowing her to gain greater support than Jean-
Marie had in the past. Marine received 17.9 percent of votes in 2012 and 33.9 percent of votes in
2017, while the highest percent of votes Jean-Marie had gained was 17.79 in the 2002 presidential election (Ministère de l'Intérieur). In addition to the use of “cultural racism”, Marine began to monopolize debates in the political sphere with one idea. She specifically monopolizes debates with the idea of anti-immigration. This is a strategy of cultural hegemony by Alain de FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 12 POWER Benoist and the ND to homogenize ideas so that everyone debates using the ND’s own concepts.
The homogenization of ideas creates platform consistency to increase reliability of those ideas while also having greater appeal to a wider audience. For example, Marine’s use of anti- immigration as a consistent platform for various social, political, and economic issues offers credibility to the idea that immigration is the root cause of those issues, attracting support from new groups.
The Rassemblement National as a Right-Wing Populist Movement
After becoming leader in 2011, Marine Le Pen made huge strides to rebrand the party
Jean-Marie created. The main strategy she used was rebranding the party as a movement to attract more voters. While still keeping far-right wing characteristics, she started incorporating populist characteristics. Under her leadership, the RN has shifted from being a far-right party to a right-wing populist movement.
Far-Right Politics
Far-right politics are politics that are placed further on the left-right political spectrum than the traditional right. Far-right politics in the European Union (EU) have been influenced by the ND and share similar traits with it. It rejects existing forms of neo-liberal, democratic governments in a platform of anti-immigration. The Schengen area within the EU allows free movement within EU member-states without border control. This concept of lack of borders is part of the larger phenomenon of globalization that the far-right also rejects. Globalization not only fosters a borderless world where economic and political decisions are made without restrictions of national borders, but also cultural erosion, or the loss of cultural elements and values due to transnational influences. The EU is considered to be an agent of globalization FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 13 POWER because its lack of borders encourages free movement of goods, services and people. This concept of free movement and lack of national boundaries invoked a response of Euroscepticism, or the opposition of EU integration. Euroscepticism is based on the principle that the transfer of powers to supranational institutions such as the EU, discourages national sovereignty and the ability for nations to make decisions for themselves (Szöcsik & Polyakova, 2019). The impact on national sovereignty is one of the many reasons why the European far-right rejects the EU’s institutional order (Bonikowski, 2016). Furthermore, the lack of national boundaries fosters cultural erosion where certain cultural elements are forgotten while being influenced by transnational cultures. The European far-right opposes this phenomenon and rather, supports ethnopluralism which recognizes cultural diversity and uniqueness; however, each culture has its own specific space and should remain in its geographical place (Spektorowski, 2003). This view is borrowed from the ND and similarly, the European far-right uses the concept of differentialism and “belonging” to portray its view of ethnopluralism (Spektorowski, 2003). It idealizes the concept of a “Self” by excluding the “Other”. The “Self” is a socially constructed identity that reflects sameness in a specific space while the “Other” is any being that fails to fit that identity.
French citizenship laws do not make a distinction between immigrants who have recently acquired citizenship and those who are “native” French people, or those who have a history of family roots in France; however, this distinction is made by the RN. The RN uses the controversial expression ‘Français de souche’v to define French citizenship and nationality based on ancestral roots in France. The expression is used to make ethno-racial distinctions and exclude immigrants who have acquired recent citizenship because they are not “native”. Based FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 14 POWER on this expression, the RN considers all immigrants as an “Other,” even if they are legal citizens, while considering the ‘Français de souche’ as the “Self”.
Populism
Populism does not have a clear definition amongst scholars; however, opposition to the elite is generally agreed upon. This opposition is translated into the “elite” versus the “people” where the “elite” refers to decision-makers and the “people” refers to the general public (Noury
& Roland). The focus is on the “people” and to convey that idea, populists refer to themselves as being a part of a movement instead of a political party. Populists believe the title of a political party reinforces the notion of the “elite” because party leaders often are the “elite” as they are decision-makers of political, economic, or social establishments. Instead, populists want the
“people” to believe they are part of a movement towards a better society, not a political party decided by the “elite”.
This distinction between the “elite” and the “people” is the main strategy used by populists to mobilize political support. According to scholars, “populist rhetoric represents an attempt to forge a solidary ‘people’ through its rhetorical invocation” (Levinger, 2017). A case study exploring populist discursive strategies found that leaders utilize a “three-stage emotional arc; emphasizing the love of the insider, fear of the outsider, and anger against the corrupt elites who have betrayed the interests of the nation” (Levinger, 2017). Similar to the European far- right’s use of differentialism, populists also emphasize the notion of a homogenous national identity, a national “Self” that is opposed to the migrant “Other” through exclusionary rhetoric.
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 15 POWER Right-Wing Populism
Right-wing populism combines ideas from both the far-right and populism. In the EU, right-wing populism is generally known for its focus on anti-migration. An anti-migration platform is primarily used to address solutions to various issues of political, economic, and social issues. The use of a single solution to address issues is a strategy borrowed from the ND; the homogenization of one idea in the political mainstream establishes credibility of the movement and attracts greater support in problematic situations, such as the 2015 refugee crisis. Since 2015, there has been a surge in the number of asylum seekers, immigrants, and refugees entering the
EU because of turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Populists are against these waves of migrants and try to link current problems to migration. For example, migrants were blamed for the series of terrorist attacks throughout Europe between 2015 to 2017. Populists attempt to make similar types of connections with a variety of issues to fuel their own ideas.
A main feature of a right-wing populist platform is Euroscepticism. As previously mentioned, right-wing ideology includes opposition to the EU’s lack of borders and free movement. Euroscepticism similarly exists in right-wing populism through criticism of migration (Noury & Roland). Far-right populist discourse depicts migrants being a threat to society. In addition to claims of migrants being perpetrators of terrorist attacks, it claims migrants cause economic insecurity and increased unemployment rates in countries because migrants take jobs away from what right-wing populists define as citizens (Schain, 2018).
Similar to the ND’s concept of differentialism, it also claims migrants from different countries are a threat to the space of “belonging” by bringing different cultures into the space of the nation, which is envisioned as culturally homogenous. FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 16 POWER The Rassemblement National’s Shift from Far-Right Party to Right-Wing Populist Movement
The shift from being a far-right party to a right-wing populist movement happened under
Marine Le Pen’s leadership. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen, the RN was originally named Front
National (FN). He used inflammatory anti-Semitic, racist language and overt racist imagery to convey the FN’s views on anti-migration and cultural belonging. In the context of the post-
World War II taboo on overt racism, this hurt its credibility in 2007, causing the party to lose
7.35 percent of the support it had gained in the 2002 presidential election when Jean-Marie was runner-up. Marine shifted her rhetoric away from overt racism when she started to rebrand the
FN as a populist movement to appeal to a wider support base. She kept certain far-right ideas from Jean-Marie’s leadership, specifically the anti-migration focus; however, she rebranded those ideas with populist strategies of “cultural racism”, differentialism, and exclusionary rhetoric in its discursive practices. This exclusionary rhetoric emphasizes the concept of “we” versus “them”. This strategy is also central to populist effort to rebrand itself as a movement.
After losing in the 2017 presidential election, Marine Le Pen changed the party’s name from
Front National to Rassemblement National (Paris, 2018). According to her, the “name change is a historical moment in the life of [its] movement” as she aims to rally a larger base of the French people (Paris, 2018). Her populist rebranding through rhetoric and discursive strategies is the main reason why the RN gained greater support and success in recent elections. Marine Le Pen has been able to transform its reputation between the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections by aligning the movement’s ideals and strategies with populism and the ND’s use of differentialism,
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 17 POWER LITERATURE REVIEW
Research has been conducted to identify underlying factors behind the Rassemblement
National’s political revival under Marine Le Pen’s leadership. Studies distinguish two main factors that contributed to the RN’s impressive gains after change in leadership. They found that
Marine Le Pen (1) shifted the RN’s discourse to be more populist in tone and content and (2) managed to reframe the theme of immigration. These studies focused on the movement’s discourse, which they define as “a combination of stylistic, rhetorical and ideological elements”
(Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). Using the ‘supply and demand’ framework, these studies argued that the shift towards a populist discourse along with reframing the movement’s discourse of immigration, helped the RN attract greater support.
The success of a movement or party relies on its ability to respond to activists’ demands for actions (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). To demonstrate this relationship, a supply and demand metaphor was introduced by the social psychological literature on social movement and party activism (Klandermans, 2007, 2013). This metaphor is often used in populist literature to explain the relationship between party elites and activists. The original metaphor applies to the free market economy; however, in the political realm, it compares party elites to entrepreneurs and activists to consumers (Klandermans, 2007, 2013). In the market economy, a company must either match consumer demand or create a desire for a product and/or service to increase consumption to become successful (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). Applying this metaphor to party activism, “a demand for populist radical right politics does not necessarily result in the emergence of such a party and its success at the party system level”, (Mudde, 2007; Stockemer
& Barisione, 2017). Instead, it is the ability of movements and parties to convince the masses that activism is necessary (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). While Jean-Marie Le Pen was leader, FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 18 POWER the RN lacked the support needed to be successful. After the change in leadership, Marine Le
Pen needed to convince the masses to see the need for the RN’s beliefs and values in order to be successful.
Marine Le Pen’s Shift Towards Populist Discourse
A Comparative Analysis: from Jean-Marie Le Pen to Marine Le Pen
A study conducted by Stockemer and Barisione identified what changed in the supply- side of right-wing support and activism between Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen. The RN uses a
‘master frame’ that advocates for “anti-immigrant, anti-establishment, and national sentiments” since it was established over forty years ago (Benford & Snow, 2008; Stockemer & Barisione,
2017). Within this frame, French society is portrayed to be governed by corrupt elites and tainted by foreign influences (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). These two views align with populism and the ethnocentric view influenced by Alain de Benoist. The ethnocentric view is advanced by an anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner political discourse linked to public insecurity, unemployment rates, and welfare programs that benefit the French exclusively (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017).
This view is still seen under Marine’s leadership; however, there are differences in the way she and Jean-Marie show it through rhetoric.
Populist messages of elite corruption, anti-foreigner, and anti-immigration had influenced
Jean-Marie’s rhetoric and platform in the 1980s and 1990s; however, it was not apparent in his speeches and platforms throughout the final years of his leadership. In his speeches, far-right elements of overt biological racism, anti-Semitic claims, and denial of the Holocaust significantly overshadowed his populist messages. By contrast, Marine “replaced her father’s radical statements with a populist but respectable rhetoric” (Alduy & Wahnich, 2015). These differences in rhetoric and extent of populist appeal became clear in Stockemer and Barisione’s FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 19 POWER comparison of Jean-Marie’s last presidential programme as party leader in the 2007 election to
Marine’s first presidential programme as leader in the 2012 election. Jean-Marie’s presidential programme “contained 69 pages, adopted a pseudo-scientific style, and presented numerous data and statistics. The tone was neutral, and there were no direct references to himself” (Stockemer
& Barisione, 2017). These characteristics do not align with the three main populist characteristics visible in Marine’s presidential programme-- anti-elitism, use of strong and simple language, and addressing the masses. In Jean-Marie’s presidential programme, there were no mentions of reuniting the people of the national community nor advocacy for the lower and middle classes, which is the base of populism. His programme also lacked references to French elites and failed to mention the elite corruption populists believe to be occurring. The only instance in which populism was slightly apparent was in his criticism of international elites
(Stockemer & Barisione, 2017).
On the other hand, Marine’s programme did incorporate the populist characteristics of anti-elitism, use of strong and simple language, and addressing the masses. Rather than a presidential programme, Marine presented her platform as her ‘personal’ project, “which presents Marine as a ‘crisis manager’ and as a leader of the people who could rebuild France”
(Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). This is apparent in her title ‘My Project, for France and for the
French People’ and ‘Marine Le Pen, the voice of the people, the spirit of France’ (Stockemer &
Barisione, 2017). Marine put herself at the center of the ‘project’, whereas Jean-Marie did not.
Marine presented herself as a representative of “the French people” and the numerous references to herself attempted to show that she is the only leader to advocate for the “honest and hard- working people who not only face unfair foreign competition but are also governed by corrupt political and social elites” (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). For example, she blamed the French FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 20 POWER debt crisis on the enormous spending of party “elites” and their extravagant lifestyles. She advocated for ridding France of corruption, dependence on international institutions and organizations, and power of the “elite”. The second populist feature of a strong and simple language is apparent throughout Marine’s programme, especially in the difference of length between her and Jean-Marie’s. Her programme was only 16 pages and often used simple words for the masses to clearly understand, including the target groups of lower and middle classes
(Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). This aided her in incorporating the third feature of addressing the masses. Her programme focused on issues lower and middle classes specifically face, such as low wages, unemployment, and security against foreign social, political, and economic influences (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017).
The analysis and comparison between the two presidential programmes are important in understanding the subtle changes between the transition of leadership. It is evident that Marine incorporated populist characteristics while Jean-Marie did not. Though this analysis is useful and serves as an underlying basis for this thesis, the study solely focused on two works- a presidential programme in 2007 and 2012. Rather than analyzing one of Marine’s works, this thesis reviews her online speeches, press releases, and reports between 2011 and 2017 to gain greater insight and analysis into the changes of the supply-side of right-wing activism and support.
The Use of Social Media in Marine’s Shift Towards a Populist Discourse
A difference in political strategy between the two leaders that cannot go unrecognized is the emergence of the Internet and social media. Unlike Jean-Marie, Marine has a greater ability to reach various groups of potential voters through the Internet and social media platforms.
When Jean-Marie was leader from 1972 to 2011, he did not have the same ability as Marine to FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 21 POWER use these platforms. The Internet combined with the shift towards a populist discourse have been powerful in gaining greater support during her leadership. Focusing solely on the shift in political discourse, Stockemer and Barisione conducted a separate content analysis of press releases on the RN’s Facebook page from 2013 to 2015 to identify if there was a shift and whether it resonated with the French audience. Their content analysis of 355 press releases confirmed Marine’s discourse had become more populist in the early years. Stockemer and
Barisione found that Marine strategically tried to convince the masses to support the RN by incorporating populist characteristics into her platform and shifting towards a populist discourse,
“which combines elements from both a populist ‘ideology’ and a populist communication
‘style’”. The discourse uses a “language that is ‘slogan-based, tabloid style’ that not only employed continuous references to “the people,” but also strong charismatic leadership and messages that assign blame to “elites” in an ‘emotionalized way’” (Stockemer & Barisione,
2017). Marine and her administration made references to ‘the French people’ more than referring to herself. The study also found that Marine made “more explicit references to ‘UMPS’, the
‘elites’ and ‘corruption’ in detail (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). Compared to Jean-Marie’s discourse and administration, she made twice as many references to ‘we’ and ‘us’ through the
French word ‘nous’ than references to herself (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). She portrayed herself as an outsider to the French political system in these Facebook posts in order to be seen as an anti-elite, alternative representative in restoring France. These are common characteristics of populism; the RN is creating a demand for its movement by framing the movement’s platform through populist characteristics.
After confirming there was a shift in discourse, Stockemer and Barisione tried to determine the extent to which Marine’s populist discourse resonated with its audience. They FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 22 POWER argued the populist discourse did resonate better because Marine’s press releases received
Facebook ‘Likes’ more than three times as many than prior to 2013. When considering this claim, however, it is important to consider the greater number of Facebook ‘Likes’ may not necessarily be a result of better resonance, but rather an increase in the number of people viewing these Facebook posts.
The case study offers insight into specific details of the shift in discourse; however, the two-year time frame in which this study was conducted fails to offer a complete overview of how the movement changed discourse since Marine became leader. This limitation became the basis for this thesis. Rather than analyzing a two-year time frame of 2013 and 2015, this thesis not only analyzes changes in discourse between 2011 and 2017, but also analyzes the references of additional categories not included in Stockemer and Barisione’s content analysis. Stockemer and
Barisione identified references of ‘nous’vi, ‘français’vii, ‘Front National’, ‘je’viii, ‘UMPS’,
‘peuple’ix, ‘trahison’x and ‘elites’. This thesis conducts a similar analysis using additional categories to represent other aspects of the movement’s discourse such as its exclusionary mechanisms and Euroscepticism.
Marine Le Pen’s Nationalist, Emotional Appeal in Populist Discourse
A different study conducted by Cocuz aimed to identify the strategies used by Marine Le
Pen in her shift towards populist rhetoric. Rather than focusing on the anti-elite and corruption aspects like Stockemer and Barisione’s studies, Cocuz studied the nationalist sentiment of her discourse and rhetoric. She found that Marine’s nationalist rhetoric is made in connection with a range of issues, from Euroscepticism to migration, and is often rooted in home-related themes
(Cocuz, 2017). She found this to be a “typical strategy of reaching out through emotional arguments meant to give more weight to the message, to make it more meaningful for a larger FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 23 POWER target group than the regular voter pool” (Cocuz, 2017). She “built on the emotions of the people,” typically using fear to reinforce right-wing populist ideas about the need to protect those who “belong” in the French space and excluding “the Other” for security purposes. Excluding
“the Other” for security purposes is influenced by the concept of what William Walters characterizes domopolitics, or politics of the home. Domopolitics refers to a type of conceptualization of the nation that became dominant in the post 9/11 period, in which the government represents the nation as a home and in which the home is a ‘sacred space’ to be protected (Walters, 2004). Marine Le Pen expressed the concept of domopolitics by attaching the notion of the “home” throughout her references of “the French people,” or people that identify with French nationality (Cocuz, 2017). For example, repetitions of the phrase “chez eux”xi such as “la France est la maison des Français, c’est leur chez eux”xii are seen throughout her speeches, to emphasize nationality as belonging to the country (Cocuz, 2017). This exclusionary mechanism is also expressed through juxtapositions of opposition words such as “us” and
“them” (Cocuz, 2017).
Cocuz’s case study provides greater awareness of the language and stylistics used by
Marine Le Pen after she became leader. It is important to identify the specific changes in her language to analyze the impact it has had on voters. In addition to Stockemer and Barisione’s studies, Cocuz’s study lays the framework for the discourse analysis conducted for this thesis.
These three case studies describe subtle shifts towards populism in her discourse that will be used on a larger scale of analysis between 2011 and 2017.
Reframing the Rassemblement National’s Theme of Immigration
As previously mentioned, right-wing populism in the EU is generally known for its focus on anti-migration. As a right-wing populist movement, the RN is also focused on anti-migration; FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 24 POWER however, it specifically targets the Muslim population. France experienced waves of migrants in the 1960s and 1970s from its former colonies in northern Africa, such as Algeria, who were predominantly Muslim (Fieschi, 2020). French citizenship was granted to any Algerian who decided to reside in France through the 1962 Evian Treaty, which eventually fueled far-right hatred and racism based on ethnicity under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership (Fieschi, 2020).
Marine kept an anti-Islamic sentiment as part of the RN platform when she became leader; however, she reframed its anti-Islamic discourse to shift away from Jean-Marie’s racism based on ethnicity to the ND’s strategy of “cultural racism” for the 2017 election.
Laïcitéxiii and “cultural racism” in Marine’s reframing of anti-migration discourse
To investigate this further, Almeida conducted a study to examine how Marine reframed the discourse (Almedia, 2017). The study found that the movement created this discourse by excluding the Islamic community in the context of defending the French model of laïcité, or secularism (Almeida, 2017). Under this secular model, there is a separation of church and state where the French government does not favor any religion. By contrast, there is little to no separation between church and state in Islamic governments. By defending secularism, Marine creates a discourse excluding Muslims from French society while avoiding explicit terms such as islam radicalxiv, islamismexv, islam fondamentalistexvi (Almeida, 2017). This approach is crucial in understanding potential reasons as to why Marine was able to gain a significant number of voters. Unlike Jean-Marie who did use overt racist terms when discussing the Muslim population, Marine distanced herself and the RN from “biological racism”. Instead, she used strategies by Alain de Benoist and the ND to focus on “cultural racism”, a concept based on emphasizing cultural differences between ethnic or racial groups. Laïcité is a fundamental and unique part of the modern French political system. It can even be argued that it is one of the FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 25 POWER essential factors that constitute French identity. Marine excluding the Muslim population by defending laïcité was a powerful way to gain support from groups that typically have not voted for the RN. The ND’s strategy of “cultural racism” has the ability to better resonate with the
French through its emotional, nationalist appeal. Marine excluded Muslim populations through
“cultural racism” frequently throughout 2011 and 2017, often blaming the various terrorist attacks and security issues Muslim immigrants in general to create that emotional, nationalist appeal present in populist discourse.
Almeida’s findings are significant in distinguishing Marine’s exclusionary techniques; however, it fails to show the potential impact on an election. A study by the City University of
New York explored the intersection of secularism, Islamist terrorism and voting preference in the
Tunisian 2014 general election to see the powerful impact the appeal to secularism as an exclusionary technique can have (Ozen, 2018). Specifically, the study attempted to analyze the
Islamic-secularist issue as a determinant of voting preferences. The victory of the Islamist
Ennahda in Tunisia during the 2011 elections was seen as Islamist movements gaining political success in the region (Ozen, 2018). In 2014, however, the party lost its majority in Tunisian
Parliament while the secular party Nidaa Tounes won the election (Ozen, 2018). The Tunisian government is also rooted in secularism, and as a result of the French colonial legacy the separation between church and state continues to play a role in the political sphere. Similar to the
RN and Marine Le Pen, Nidaa Tounes used political discourse to frame Islam and the Muslim community as a threat to Tunisia (Ozen, 2018). Nidaa Tounes used the failures of the Islamist
Ennahda government to convince voters that the nation was stable and peaceful during the old authoritarian regime (Ozen, 2018). By reverting back to the authoritarian but secular regime,
Tunisia will no longer have instability. (Ozen, 2018). The study found that Tunisians who FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 26 POWER favored the secular regime responded well to this discourse and were more likely to vote for
Nidaa Tounes (Ozen, 2018).
Both Almeida’s and the City University of New York’s studies have a strong impact on this thesis’s analysis of exclusionary mechanisms used by Marine Le Pen. Though Almeida’s research focuses solely on the 2012 presidential election, further investigation for this thesis shows that Marine used consistent mechanisms and discourse for the 2017 presidential election as well. The Tunisian election also offers a comparative study into how an appeal to secularism could influence votes in places where the idea of laïcité is embedded in concepts of citizenship, similar to French politics.
ANALYZING THE RISE OF THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL
The RN’s rise can be explained through the 21st century financial crisis, migration, and external threats of globalization that weakened voters’ confidence in both the political right and left ideologies, creating an opportunity for a new ideology to enter the political space. The RN strategically exploited the new lack of confidence by shifting towards populist modes of appeal and discursive strategies. Populist discourse was effective in attracting support; however, I found that populist discourse alone was not the reason why the RN was able to gain a significant number of votes between the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. My findings show that populist modes of appeal and discursive strategies in times of crisis were primarily effective in the RN’s path to power.
The 2009 Eurozone Financial Crisis
The Eurozone crisis was a banking and sovereign debt crisis in the EU that began in 2009 when Greece and several other member-states experienced the “collapse of financial institutions, high government debt, and rapidly rising bond yield spreads in government securities” (Kenton, FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 27 POWER 2020). To manage the problem, the EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to provide financial-aid packages to them and required member-states to adopt tough austerity measures. This failed to solve problem as the financial-aid packages were a high monetary investment for those member-states, almost leading to bankruptcy while austerity measures lowered economic growth (Alzons, 2019). When Europe eventually fell into a recession, the
EU’s economy faced greater challenges (Alzons, 2019).
The Eurozone crisis led to higher unemployment rates and debts, causing a widespread loss of confidence in the EU. It caused decreased trust levels in national and supranational institutions, driving Euroscepticism throughout the EU (Alzons, 2019). Voters not only lost trust in those institutions, they also lost trust in mainstream political parties (Alzons, 2019). Those parties were losing their attractiveness and failed to fulfill their political promises. This created a new demand for different representation that do not represent the mainstream parties. This new demand was apparent in various member-states, including France. It was during this time that
Europe saw the rise in popularity of right-wing populist movements because they did not represent the mainstream parties.
The Eurozone crisis and the voters’ lack of trust in mainstream parties are important factors in analyzing the RN’s rise. When the financial crisis began in 2009, Jean-Marie Le Pen was still leader. His response to the crisis was ‘less government,’ a strategy similar to
Reaganomics (Clercq, 2011). After Marine became leader in 2011, she shifted the RN’s economic discourse to advocate a strong, state regulated economy and to reject all the neo-liberal ideas that had driven European economic growth in the previous two decades: free trade, globalization, and the power of services and the financial industry (Clercq, 2011). She strategically focused on criticizing the “elites”, which include leaders of mainstream parties and FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 28 POWER the EU. She started rebranding the RN to backlash against the EU for being an agent of globalization in 2011. Her Eurosceptic claims “lent credence to the [RN’s] contention that
France surrendered control of its economy to foreign financial interests and control of its border to an influx of cheap foreign labor” (Goldhammer, 2015). From an economic perspective, she claimed that the EU failed to protect the working class because the balance of power had shifted from national governments and politicians to the financial markets driving the EU’s economy.
Her plan to restore national competitiveness included “quitting the euro, closing French borders to Chinese imports, and re-establishing France’s regulatory role in economic affairs” (Clercq,
2011). She even made remarks against former President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) for submitting France to a capitalist model of globalization. According to her, “[t]he real fault line is between nationalists and globalists, between economic patriots and those who believe that nations and borders must disappear and that there should be no obstacles whatsoever to commerce, that everything is for sale and everything can be bought, and that there should be no controls on the flows of capital, products and people” (Clercq, 2011).
She rebranded the RN’s economic platform to include these drastic changes almost immediately in 2011 while the Eurozone crisis was still occurring. Marine’s new ideas did not coincide with the left nor the right, making the new economic platform appealing to a wide audience and to those who lost confidence in mainstream parties. The French working class were most susceptible to changing their political viewpoints as they were severely impacted during the financial crisis. Marine adjusted the economic platform to criticize the corrupt “elites” and foreign influences that not only caused the Eurozone crisis, but also created a loss of jobs for the
French working class. This strategy aligned with populism. These changes showed greater success in the 2012 presidential elections than Jean-Marie’s platform and branding of the RN in FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 29 POWER prior elections. Though Marine failed to pass the first round of the 2012 presidential election, she received 17.9 percent of votes which was the highest an RN candidate had received in its history
(Ministère de l'Intérieur).
After the 2012 presidential election, France fell into a recession as a consequence of the
Eurozone crisis. Economic issues prior to the 2012 election proceeded to be prevalent in subsequent years and were still prominent issues for the 2017 presidential election. In 2013,
Marine continued to rebrand the RN and the shift towards a right-wing populist movement became more apparent. In addition to keeping anti-elite and anti-globalization sentiments, she centralized her platform around anti-immigration, a common characteristic of right-wing populism. Though anti-immigration had always been an aspect of the RN’s platform, she changed it to present immigration as the root cause of all problems facing France. From an economic perspective, immigrants were entering the French economy and stealing jobs away from the working class. She presented EU regulations as “tyrannical, as involving unnatural competition and inducing a feeling of unsafety and distrust” (Cocuz, 2017). This was not a new idea; however, to make the idea seem different than the one in the political mainstream, she used emotion rather than facts to capture the audience’s attention. When discussing anti-immigration and economic problems, she frequently made references to ‘le peuple français,’xvii creating a sense of nationalism and unity. References to ‘le peuple français’ is a mechanism that excludes immigrants and reinforces traditional nationalist sentiments that existed prior to the effects of globalization. She began framing immigrants as a threat to the French economy and the economic well-being of ‘le peuple français,’ by harming job prospects. The message behind her discourse was that France needed to “provide for its own workforce first, to cater to its need for workplaces and thus allow people to feel as belonging to their nation” (Cocuz, 2017). FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 30 POWER The immediate shift in Marine’s anti-immigration discourse after the 2012 election is evident in the results of the quantitative analysis I conducted. While in 2012 Marine’s number of mentions for ‘l’immigration’xviii is 0, it increased to 10 in 2013 (See Table 2, Appendix).
Similarly, her number of mentions for ‘le peuple français’ in 2012 is 0, while increasing to 15 in
2013 (See Table 2, Appendix). When examining the 2017 election, these strategies showed to be most effectively resonating in regions experiencing increased poverty, high unemployment rates, and amongst young French nationals between the ages of 18 and 25 (Aisch, Bloch, Rebecca Lai
& Morenne, 2017). Changes in strategy, discourse, and shift towards right-wing populism allowed Marine to gain greater support from more groups in the 2017 election than 2012.
The European Union’s Migration Crisis
After the 2012 presidential election, the RN homogenized the idea of immigration as the primary cause for all of France’s problems. It used the ND’s strategy of cultural hegemony to monopolize its anti-immigrant view into the mainstream. The RN framed immigrants as the source of all economic and social problems. For example, in a 2013 document analyzed for this investigation, Steeve Briois, the RN’s vice-president, stated “the massive influx of foreigners from Eastern Europe over the last few weeks into our territory and carrying tuberculosis represents a potential health catastrophe that France and our compatriots cannot afford”2 (Briois,
2013). Rather than rejecting immigrants on a racial basis, Briois framed immigrants as a health concern that could impact the health and safety of the French society. This discursive strategy was frequently used by the four leaders I investigated. The RN framed immigrants as a concern in various aspects, such as health and economic, using the ND’s strategy of cultural hegemony,
2 L’arrivée massive ces dernières semaines sur notre territoire d’étrangers en provenance d’Europe de l’Est et porteurs d’une souche ultrarésistante et contagieuse de tuberculose représente une catastrophe sanitaire potentielle que la France et nos compatriotes ne peuvent pas se permettre d’assumer. FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 31 POWER or monopolizing discussions with one idea. Similar to Briois’s statement, I also observed the other three leaders commonly referred to immigrants as ‘les étrangers’xix in its rhetoric. Out of the documents reviewed, ‘les étrangers’ was used 138 times between 2011 and 2017 (See Table
6, Appendix). This was most likely to emphasize immigrants as foreign influences.
In addition to using the ND’s strategy of cultural hegemony, I found that 2015 was a crucial year in gaining support for the 2017 presidential election. The EU started experiencing a migrant crisis in January 2015, known as the refugee crisis. More than one million migrants and refugees entered EU borders that year (BBC, 2016). They were primarily from Syria,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, and Kosovo, and escaped war, armed conflict, poverty, and violence
(BBC, 2016). France had a total of 273,126 refugees in 2015, the second highest number of refugees after Germany (World Bank). Many EU member-states, including France, had difficulty coping with the mass influx, causing various divides in public opinion about how to manage the problem. The center-right, centrist, and leftist parties advocated for the refugees from a human rights perspective; however, right-wing populist movements like the RN failed to acknowledge that perspective. Instead, the RN used this as an opportunity to emphasize its anti-immigrant sentiment through exclusionary mechanisms and labels in the media. Before analyzing this discourse; however, it is crucial to understand the subtle differences between the commonly used terms of migrant, immigrant, asylum seeker, and refugee. According to the United Nations, a migrant is a general term to characterize someone’s movement either within a country or between countries (United Nations). An immigrant is one who moves into a foreign country for permanent residence. While both asylum seekers and refugees are “forced to flee its national country because of persecution, war, or violence,” an asylum seeker is “someone whose request FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 32 POWER for sanctuary has yet to be confirmed” while a refugee is someone whose request for sanctuary has been confirmed (UNHCR).
The RN’s main message was for the EU and France to place greater importance on border control because protecting citizens is the most important responsibility of the state. It wanted France to be a contained region where the construction of borders separates itself from the internal and external conflicts of other countries, such as the conflicts driving the refugee crisis. This desire for border control is rooted in the concept of space and what William Walters describes as domopolitics. Domopolitics sees “the home as our place, where we belong naturally, and where by definition; others do not” (Walters, 2004). It portrayed the government’s responsibility to protect the safety of those who belong naturally (i.e. French citizens) by using home-related themes in its discourse. A nation’s government is referred to as a ‘home’, where the safety of the nation relies on the nation’s space itself (Walters, 2004). Discourses surrounding domopolitics mobilized emotion, creating a narrative that the identity of those who “belong naturally” will be protected only if the government rejects what could be a danger to the national space. Within this context, refugees fleeing persecution, war, or violence, are considered to be a deviation from the normal conventions of settled life and instead of being seen as victims of external forces, they are considered to be posing a threat to social order and identity
(Papastergiadis, 2010; UNHCR). Domopolitics and the conception of the ‘home’ thus served as a metaphor to rationalize a series of security measures. In the case of France, the RN argued for the use of border control as a site of filtration and selection of who can enter the ‘sacred space’ of France (Darling, 2011). In 2015 Marine stated the need to “build a new model of society and FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 33 POWER effectively preserve our security and our identity in this twenty-first century from all dangers”3
(Le Pen, 2015). The refugee crisis was seen as a danger to the French identity.
Refugees were stigmatized as dangerous by the RN through various labels which were used as instruments of exclusion. My analysis found that the RN used the umbrella terms of ‘les migrants’xx and ‘les immigrants’xxi even when addressing issues of refugees and asylum seekers.
The categories ‘la migration’xxii and ‘l’immigration’ in this study was used to include the grammatical variations of the terms in the French language, such as migrants and immigrants as nouns and adjectives, rather than using separate categories for each. Between 2015 and 2017, the four leaders mentioned ‘les réfugiés’xxiii a combined total of 30 times, while the combined total of la migration was 258 and l’immigration was 278 between those years (See Table 6,
Appendix). The low mentions of les réfugiés was surprising because it was one of the main political topics in France and other EU member-states at that time. After analyzing the documents, I observed that the RN distanced itself from the term les réfugiés and used general, umbrella terms of ‘les migrants illégaux’xxiv and les immigrants in an effort to dehumanize the situation. The terms ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum seeker’ specifically distinguish a type of migrant that is associated with the need for humanitarian assistance and human rights. In 2015, when all media platforms emphasized the refugee crisis, it was frequently with emotional photographs, personal stories, and videos of the conditions they were forced to be in. Those terms were eventually attached with emotion. By refusing to engage with terms associated with emotion, humanitarian assistance, and a human rights crisis, the RN was able to generalize the situation with its already existing anti-migration platform. From the RN’s perspective, asylum seekers and
3 Il nous faut sortir de ce confort relatif pour bâtir un nouveau modèle de société et préserver efficacement notre sécurité et notre identité dans ce 21e siècle de tous les périls.
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 34 POWER refugees were equivalent to migrants. It framed all migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, as a threat to the French space whether it be related to health, safety, external conflicts, etc.
The 2015 refugee crisis did not create a new discourse, but rather it emphasized this pre- existing one. This was especially effective in gaining supporters in the northeast and southeast along French borders, places that served as entry points for refugees (Aisch, Block, Rebecca Lai
& Morenne, 2017). Refugee camps were set up along the coastlines, directly affecting and causing dismay amongst the French who lived in those areas. There were refugee camps in popular cities of Paris, Lyon, Nice, and Calais; however, the conditions of one specific camp gained widespread coverage in the media. Approximately ten thousand migrants and refugees from the Middle East and East Africa settled in the northeastern city of Calais (McAuley, 2017).
The camp was known as the “Jungle” and became a popular spot for those trying to cross the
English Channel and reach the United Kingdom (UK) that was twenty miles away (McAuley,
2017). The “Jungle” was polluted, lacked sanitation, and carried numerous diseases. The RN framed this situation as a threat to French health associating refugee camps with sickness and disease, similar to the example of Briois’s statement in 2013 (McAuley, 2017). Public narratives such as this, premised on fear of the “Other,” categorized as those who did not “belong,” to suggest that border enforcement is necessary to protect the vulnerability of the national public from imagined threats to health, identity, and security. Migrants were contaminating the ‘sacred space’ of France, thus the need for urgent action. Marine and the RN criticized the “elite”, which included former French President François Hollande (2012-15) and EU decision-makers for letting the “Other” enter. The RN framed President Hollande and the EU’s expectations of allowing and assimilating refugees as a disproportionate burden on the French because of the FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 35 POWER location of France. France’s coastline along the Mediterranean Sea and general proximity to the countries experiencing conflict made France a popular entry point for asylum seekers and refugees rather than other member-states. The RN additionally framed the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), family separation, language barriers, unemployment, lack of education and healthcare, homelessness, etc. experienced by refugees as burdens.
Though the rhetoric and discourse for its anti-migration platform was constant between both elections, 2015 was a turning point in the lives of many French voters and in politics. After the Eurozone crisis and the recession, voters were still dissatisfied with former French President
François Hollande when 2015 started and continued to be dissatisfied with the way the refugee crisis was being handled. This dissatisfaction caused many voters, especially along the coastline, to find the RN appealing instead of President Hollande and his Socialist Party at the time. The exclusionary techniques and labels used to illustrate the migrant and refugee threats to French identity were effective in creating nationalist sentiment and solidarity amongst the French.
Appeals to nationalist sentiment and solidarity were crucial in Marine’s efforts to transform the
RN from being a political party to a movement for the people. An increasing number of French voters condemned President Hollande for the crisis that continued to occur in France. The discontent with mainstream parties motivated French voters to take part in a movement different from the mainstream parties. The RN’s populist appeal to the need to protect French identity by rejecting immigrants was effective in part; however, my research indicates it was anti- immigration discourse combined with anti-Islamic sentiments that made the discourse especially appealing.
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 36 POWER French Identity in Crisis
A predominant number of asylum seekers and refugees who entered EU and French borders in 2015 came from countries with large populations of Muslims, such as Syria, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. In the same year, France also experienced a series of terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists and jihadists, which prompted the RN to specifically target Muslim immigrants in
France. Though the perpetrators of those terrorist attacks came from high-profile, transnational terrorist groups and were not asylum seekers or refugees, the RN’s anti-immigration discourse combined with anti-Islamic sentiments resonated with voters.
Charlie Hebdo Shooting
In January 2015, two brothers named Saïd and Chérif Kouachi attacked and killed 12 workers in Paris at the Charlie Hebdo headquarters, a French satirical newspaper, using rifles
(BBC, 2015). They identified themselves as members of Al-Qaeda, a transnational militant
Islamic organization (BBC, 2015). They targeted Charlie Hebdo headquarters after it published controversial cartoons of Mohammad (BBC, 2015). Charlie Hebdo was known for its mockery of Islam and promotion of laïcité, or secularism. Two days later, a terrorist attack by the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occurred in the suburbs of Paris, killing more people (BBC, 2015).
The consecutive terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists immediately prompted national unity and a renowned patriotism across France. Emotional, anti-terrorism rallies were held at the end of that deadly week where at least 3.7 million marched in cities all over France (Sayare, 2015).
Nationalist phrases and signs, such as ‘Liberté, égalité, fraternité’xxv, ‘Marchons face à la terreur,’xxvi and ‘Je suis Charlie’xxvii were widely used. The phrase ‘Je suis Charlie’ was used by millions at rallies and as hashtags on social media following the attack to symbolize French solidarity (Sayare, 2015). It was not only a phrase to remember the attack, but a phrase that FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 37 POWER supported French principles, such as freedom of speech and laïcité. Former President François
Hollande even declared the murders to be an “attack on the very identity of France and pledged an even firmer application of laïcité” (Sayare, 2015). In response to the attacks, Marine Le Pen redefined laïcité to represent a collective French identity and values. She used it as a conduit for exclusion and framed Islamic practices to be incompatible with French identity because of its lack of separation between state and religion. She claimed French traditions and national values need to be protected from the “Islamization of society” (Alouane, 2017).
The new wave of nationalism after the attacks made the RN appealing to different audiences. In response to the growing movements and rallies, she used emotion as a strategy to stress the urgency in protecting French identity from immigrants as the terrorist attacks were from Muslim immigrant families. She deployed populist rhetoric, emphasizing love of the “Self”
(the French) and fear of the “Other” (immigrants). This combination is what propelled the RN as a political movement because fear of the “Other” by itself is not enough to mobilize a movement.
Rather, “this fear must be embedded within a stable and coherent narrative about the national community” (Levinger, 2017). In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo shooting, Marine created the narrative that Muslim immigrants were a threat to laïcité and thus, a threat to French identity.
My quantitative analysis supports the RN’s use of this populist rhetoric and discourse. Prior to
2015, Marine alone used ‘l’identité’xxviii twice between 2011 and 2014 (See Table 2, Appendix).
In 2015; however, she used ‘l’identité’ 12 times and a total of 19 times between 2015 and 2017
(See Table 2, Appendix). The total of all four leaders prior to 2015 was 18 times, while 2015 received a significant increase to 34 times and a total of 57 times between 2015 and 2017 (See
Table 6, Appendix).
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 38 POWER Paris Terror Attacks
France was still experiencing the effects of the Charlie Hebdo attacks when it faced another act of terrorism in November 2015. There were six deadly attacks coordinated by ISIS on a major stadium, concert hall, restaurants and bars, leaving 130 people dead and hundreds severely injured (BBC, 2015). The motives behind the attacks were not clear; however, it was clear that Islamic extremists and jihadists were targeting France.
The attacks were believed to be organized in France and Belgium with many attackers in possession of explosives able to penetrate the country (BBC, 2015). This revealed major failures in border security that the RN exploited to push its anti-immigrant platform. It blamed the EU decision-makers, stating immigrants that pose a threat to France were able to enter because of free movement. It claimed the need to secure borders was more crucial than ever. This discourse was apparent in nearly all the RN’s communication with the public. For example, in 2015
Nicolas Bay, the RN’s general secretary, stated “if the government really intends to ensure the safety of the French in the face of the Islamist threat, it should then urgently adopt the measures called for by the National Front: the suspension of Schengen”4 (Bay, 2015). Attacking border control was not new, it had always been an objective for the RN; however, the consistent terrorist attacks by immigrants allowed the RN to re-emphasize its Eurosceptic stance. In 2014, ‘les frontières’xxix was not mentioned once by Marine but was mentioned 22 times in 2015 (See Table
2, Appendix). Similarly, the total mentions of ‘les frontières’ by the four leaders in 2014 was 14 times and 59 times in 2015 (See Table 6, Appendix). Between 2015 and 2017, it was used 118 times (See Table 6, Appendix). Likewise, Schengen was also used more frequently. Between
4 Si le gouvernement entend réellement assurer la sécurité des Français face à la menace islamiste, il devrait alors adopter d’urgence les mesures réclamées par le Front National : la suspension de Schengen.
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 39 POWER 2011 and 2014, Schengen was used only 12 times by all four; however, between 2015 and 2017 the total was 50 (See Table 6, Appendix). Though its Eurosceptic stance pre-dated the attacks, it was appealing to a wider range of people because free movement and lack of borders supplied a potential answer for how these tragic events could have happened. It was after these attacks by immigrants that stronger border security measures seemed logically persuasive to some voters.
The tragedies of 2015 marked a turning point for French politics; France faced the
Charlie Hebdo shooting, Paris terrorist attacks, and the refugee crisis in the same year. French lives and society were constantly changing as tragic news continuously swept the country, reviving feelings of nationalism. The RN’s rebranding as a populist movement already incorporated nationalist rhetoric prior to 2015, but that year’s political and societal instability made the movement appear credible to some voters. The French were attracted to the RN’s nationalist, anti-immigrant rhetoric because the perpetrators for the terrorist attacks did not
“belong” to France and had immigrant ties, making the discourse seem plausible to them. The quantitative analysis shows this was also the year in which the RN had the most changes in its discourse. It adapted to the security crisis that was occurring and narrowed its discourse to specifically incorporate those events to indicate credibility of the movement. It referred to immigrants as a general group prior to 2015, but after the attacks it consistently changed to
Muslim immigrants. Marine and the RN maintained this discourse as attacks by Islamic extremists and jihadists continued.
July 2016 Terror Attacks
There were two terrorist attacks in July 2016 that ISIS claimed responsibility for (BBC,
2016). The first one occurred in Nice on July 14th. A 19-ton cargo truck deliberately slammed through a crowd of hundreds celebrating Bastille Day, the day that marked the beginning of the FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 40 POWER
French Revolution in 1789 (BBC, 2016). The second one occurred on July 26th in Saint-Etienne- du-Rouvray at a church (BBC, 2016). I discovered that these two attacks occurred on important days of French history. The fact that both attacks happened on key dates that helped define modern-day France makes it more likely ISIS was attacking French identity and values itself.
Bastille Day signifies a turning point in the revolution where the violent uprising symbolized the power abuse by the monarchy in 1789. In modern day, French identity and values are still rooted in the reforms and ideals of the revolution. Similarly, July 26th marked the beginning of the
Second French Revolution in 1830 where the French overthrew a monarchy that increased the power of the Church (Britannica, 2019). The terrorist attacks on those specific dates could be interpreted as attacking the very fundamental principles of France which makes Marine’s rhetoric and discourse of protecting French identity appealing.
Marine and the RN used exclusionary rhetoric that grouped Islamic extremists and jihadists with the general population of Muslims. In the aftermath of these terrorist attacks, it not only framed Muslims as a threat to French identity, but also a threat to national security. I observed that mentions of terrorism in its communication with the public was consistently linked to Islam to frame Muslims as a threat. My quantitative results show that in the larger discourse of anti-immigration, Muslims were excluded in the RN’s discourse on the basis of identity and terrorism. The category ‘l’islam’xxx in this study was used to include the grammatical variations of the terms such as Islam, Islamic, Islamist and Muslims. The total mentions of the category
‘l’islam’, increased from 30 times in 2014 to 182 times in 2015 and 73 times in 2016 (See Table
6, Appendix). Similarly, the total mentions of ‘la terrorisme’xxxi was 3 times in 2014, 55 times in
2015, and 39 times in 2016 (See Table 6, Appendix). In addition to the quantitative analysis, the discourse analysis I conducted shows Marine and the RN attempted to shape a misleading FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 41 POWER perception that the only terrorism that existed in France was by Muslim perpetrators, thus they were a threat to national security. This is seen through its total mentions of the categories ‘la sécurité’xxxii and ‘l'insécurité’xxxiii. ‘La sécurité’ has its highest total number of mentions of 47 times in 2015 and 29 times in 2016, while ‘l'insécurité’ was mentioned 12 times in 2015 and 11 times in 2016 (See Table 6, Appendix). Though major attacks in 2015 and 2016 were carried out by Muslim perpetrators, it was not true of all terrorist attacks that have happened in France.
Despite this, French voters found the anti-immigrant, anti-Islamic discourse attractive for the
2017 presidential election because of the crisis that was occurring.
CONCLUSION
The results of my content analysis show that between the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections, the RN’s discourse, platform, and rhetoric shifted from being far-right to right-wing populist. Marine started rebranding the party almost immediately in an attempt to rebuild its reputation after Jean-Marie’s inflammatory anti-Semitic, racist language, and overt racist imagery caused it to lose 7.35 percent of votes between the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections
(Ministère de l'Intérieur). Marine started incorporating populist elements in the 2012 platform; however, because she had been the RN’s leader for one year, she was not able to thoroughly complete rebranding before the election. Despite this, she did incorporate populist elements of criticizing corrupt elites and foreign influences while advocating for the working class. Though support had increased from Jean-Marie’s 10.44 percent in the 2007 presidential election to
Marine’s 17.9 percent in the 2012 presidential election, the increase in votes was not sufficient enough for Marine to enter the final round (Ministère de l'Intérieur).
The shift towards a populist discourse and rhetoric was effective in the RN’s ability to gain a larger vote; however, I found that populist discourse alone was not the reason why the RN FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 42 POWER was able to attain a significant number of votes between the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. I conclude that populist modes of appeal and discursive strategies in times of crisis were primarily effective in the RN’s path to power. The Eurozone financial crisis caused voters to lose trust in supranational institutions and mainstream parties because they were negatively impacted through loss of income and unemployment. This weakened voters’ confidence in both the political right and left ideologies, creating an opportunity for the RN’s ideology to enter the mainstream political space. Voters who were negatively impacted by the financial crisis found
Marine’s criticism of mainstream party leaders and EU decision-makers attractive during and after the 2012 presidential election.
I observed that the RN’s shift towards right-wing populism was evident after 2012. There is a shift towards using an emotional, nationalist language when communicating with the public, a common populist discursive strategy to mobilize support, which was not present in the texts I analyzed for 2011 and 2012. Emotional, nationalist language proved effective in 2015 and 2016 when France faced the refugee crisis and consistent terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists and jihadists. The RN opportunistically used language of national unity to emphasize its exclusionary discourse of French identity. This appealed to some voters who participated in movements and rallies during this time. Some voters were not only drawn to the RN’s nationalist discourse, but also its rebranding as a movement rather than a party because of the sense of unity the RN attempted to frame.
In addition to implementing the populist emotional, nationalist language, Marine and the
RN homogenized the idea of immigration as the primary cause for all of France’s problems. It continued to reject globalization, foreign influences, and neo-liberal institutions such as the EU, through the lens of anti-immigration. The consistency of a common anti-immigration idea helped FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 43 POWER rebuild the RN’s reputation to appear reliable to voters because it no longer seemed as radical as it did when Jean-Marie was leader. During the crisis in 2015 and 2016, it specifically targeted
Muslim immigrants through a culturally racist discourse that portrayed them as threats to French identity, security, and values. It used the ND’s concept of differentialism to support its claim that
Islamic practices and Muslims do not “belong” in France where laïcité plays a large role in
French politics and society.
When a crisis happens, voters tend to criticize current leaders in their response to the situation, which is why some voters were drawn to the RN’s criticism of leaders. Voters also tend to believe simple explanations for a crisis rather than trying to understand complex explanations, even if the simple explanations are not the truth. The RN framed immigration as the primary cause for all problems using simple, slogan-based language in its communication with the public which made its ideology easy to understand across various socio-economic classes. This type of language was favorable because the RN targeted the working class as its primary voting population. In response to the terrorist attacks, it framed Muslim immigrants as the cause of France’s problems, using language that associated them with danger and terrorism.
Though this is not an accurate representation of the Muslim population in France, some voters believed it to be true because it was a simple explanation and seemed reliable based on the profiles of the perpetrators behind the terrorist attacks.
The refugee crisis and terrorist attacks happened close to the upcoming presidential election and remained prominent issues in 2017. I conclude that the support the RN gained in
2015 and 2016 through its changes in discourse and rebranding as a movement is the primary reason for why Marine entered the final round in the 2017 presidential election with a 16 percent vote share increase from 2012. Other researchers may suggest alternative reasons such as FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 44 POWER economic insecurity in France, or the Brexit Leave Campaign and the election of Donald Trump as transnational influences; however, the communication I analyzed did include events such as those. The four leaders had discussed these various topics using the categories I created in my coding set. It is important to note; however, that the literature I reviewed prior to creating my coding set of categories were primarily on far-right and populist research, allowing the possibility for other perspectives to also be plausible explanations. Additionally, the RN’s social media archives on Facebook or Twitter for 2011 to 2017 would have been helpful in my research had it existed because social media has played a prominent, global role in shaping recent elections. Analyzing social media posts for future research would be useful because social media has transformed the relationship between politicians and voters to an interactive one.
Though the RN’s change in discourse and rebranding as a movement did not translate into a presidential win, its use of the ND’s and populist strategies have now become commonplace in the migration debate in France and the EU. These strategies have also translated into numerous right-wing populist mayors and representatives in French and European parliament since 2012. A growing coalition of right-wing populist leaders in the EU, including
Marine, are attempting to capitalize on the momentum to launch a European wide ‘movement’; however, the nationalist orientation and Eurosceptic components currently hinder its ability to expand. Despite this, I predict Marine and the RN will continue to gain support for the 2022
French presidential election if a similar right-wing populist discourse is used. The current
COVID-19 pandemic has affected thousands in the EU and has spread rapidly because of free movement within Schengen and immigration to EU member-states. Thousands of French and EU citizens have expressed their discontent with the way President Macron and EU decision-makers are approaching the pandemic. The RN would need to specifically narrow its discourse on the FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 45 POWER pandemic; however, its view on anti-immigration and criticism of current leaders and decision- makers could potentially resonate with a larger population in 2022 than it did in 2017. COVID-
19 is a global crisis that will have far-reaching effects on future elections in France and the EU.
Though the future is now more uncertain than ever before, it is possible that this global crisis could help the RN continue its path to power in the 2022 presidential election.
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 46 POWER i The republic on the move! ii National Front iii National Rally iv The New Right v Native-born Frenchman vi We vii French viii I ix People x Treason xi At their home xii France is the home of the French, it’s their home xiii Secularism xiv Radical Islam xv Islamism xvi Fundamental Islam xvii The French people xviii Immigration xix Foreigners xx Migrants xxi Immigrants xxii Migration xxiii Refugees xxiv Illegal migrants xxv Liberty, equality, fraternity xxvi Let’s face the terror xxvii I am Charlie xxviii Identity xxix Borders xxx Islam xxxi Terrorism xxxii Security xxxiii Insecurity
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 47 POWER
Appendix
Table 1. Coding Set of Categories.
Categories English Translation les frontières borders l’identité identity la sécurité security les étrangers foreigner l’immigration immigration l'Islam Islam la terrorisme terrorism les réfugiés refugees le peuple français the French people l'insécurité insecurity la migration migration Schengen Schengen Note. The categories of l’immigration, l’Islam, la terrorisme, and la migration include grammatical variations of those terms as nouns and adjectives.
Table 2. Content Analysis of Marine Le Pen (2011-17)
Categories 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 les frontières 0 0 7 0 22 9 2 l’identité 0 0 2 0 12 6 1 la sécurité 5 0 6 0 15 3 1 les étrangers 0 0 3 0 6 7 0 l’immigration 0 0 10 0 39 9 0 l'Islam 0 0 0 0 39 8 0 la terrorisme 1 0 2 0 27 9 0 les réfugiés 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 le peuple 8 0 15 0 5 2 2 français l'insécurité 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 la migration 0 0 1 0 13 4 0 Schengen 0 0 2 0 5 2 0 Note. Marine Le Pen’s communication with the public was published 11 times between 2011 and 2017 on the RN’s official website.
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 48 POWER
Table 3. Content Analysis of Steeve Briois (2011-17)
Categories 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 les frontières 0 10 4 5 9 8 1 l’identité 0 4 1 2 2 1 2 la sécurité 0 3 0 3 9 4 1 les étrangers 0 12 10 5 6 3 4 l’immigration 0 43 27 16 17 6 4 l'Islam 0 5 5 1 13 2 17 la terrorisme 0 0 1 2 5 3 4 les réfugiés 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 le peuple 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 français l'insécurité 0 8 6 4 3 0 0 la migration 0 2 0 3 38 66 15 Schengen 0 2 1 1 6 8 2 Note. Steeve Briois’s communication with the public in 2011 was not published on the RN’s official website.
Table 4. Content Analysis of Wallerand de Saint Just (2011-17)
Categories 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 les frontières 0 0 0 2 3 2 3 l’identité 0 1 1 0 3 1 0 la sécurité 0 2 2 6 3 11 9 les étrangers 0 0 1 0 2 4 4 l’immigration 0 3 1 0 2 4 4 l'Islam 1 7 3 3 17 6 11 la terrorisme 0 0 0 0 4 11 9 les réfugiés 0 0 1 1 3 5 3 le peuple 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 français l'insécurité 0 6 6 5 3 7 6 la migration 0 1 0 0 5 17 9 Schengen 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 49 POWER
Table 5. Content Analysis of Nicholas Bay (2011-17)
Categories 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 les frontières 2 2 0 7 25 29 5 l’identité 0 0 0 7 17 9 3 la sécurité 0 3 1 7 20 11 6 les étrangers 7 6 2 8 26 18 4 l’immigration 7 25 6 29 105 51 17 l'Islam 1 3 4 26 113 57 13 la terrorisme 0 0 4 1 19 16 3 les réfugiés 1 0 0 2 4 11 2 le peuple 0 2 1 6 4 0 0 français l'insécurité 1 1 0 2 4 4 0 la migration 1 0 0 2 21 45 25 Schengen 0 3 0 2 14 13 0
Table 6. Total Numbers of Content Analysis (2011-17)
Categories 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 les frontières 2 12 11 14 59 48 11 l’identité 0 5 4 9 34 17 6 la sécurité 5 8 9 16 47 29 17 les étrangers 7 18 16 13 40 32 12 l’immigration 7 71 44 51 170 74 26 l'Islam 2 15 12 30 182 73 41 la terrorisme 1 0 7 3 55 39 16 les réfugiés 1 0 3 3 9 16 5 le peuple 8 6 16 6 9 2 2 français l'insécurité 1 15 15 11 12 11 6 la migration 1 3 1 5 77 132 49 Schengen 0 5 4 3 25 23 2
FRAMING A CRISIS: EXPLORING THE RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL’S PATH TO 50 POWER
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