U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy January 2013 Acknowledgments The co-chairs of the Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy thank the following for their assistance with various aspects of the Project roundtables and report: David Barnett, Beth Singer Design LLC, Toby Dershowitz, Erin Elfrink, Laura Grossman, Jamie Kamlet, Chen Kane, Elizabeth Kittrie, Galia Nurko, Lolan O’Rourke, Debbie Rubin, Jonathan Schanzer, Abram Shanedling, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond. For inquiries, contact [email protected] © Copyright 2013, The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy Co-Chairs: David Albright, Mark Dubowitz, Orde Kittrie, Leonard Spector, Michael Yaffe January 2013 • Washington, D.C. U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy Co-Chairs: David Albright, Mark Dubowitz, Orde Kittrie, Leonard Spector, Michael Yaffe January 2013 • Washington, D.C. ABOUT THE CO-CHAIRS David Albright, a physicist, is Founder and President of the non-profit Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. Mr. Albright has testified many times on nuclear issues before the U.S. Congress and advised many gov- ernments. He cooperated actively with the IAEA Action Team on Iraq in the 1990s. The media frequently cite Albright, and he has appeared often on television and radio. He is an American Physical Society (APS) Fellow. Prior to founding ISIS, he worked as a Senior Staff Scientist at the Federation of American Scientists and as a member of the research staff of Princeton University’s Center for Energy and Environmental Studies. Mr. Albright is the author of Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Arms Trade Arms America’s Enemies (Simon & Schuster, 2010). Mark Dubowitz is the Executive Director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a non-partisan policy institute based in Washington, D.C. His policy work focuses on Iran and Syria, sanctions, nonproliferation, and the use of technology to encourage democratic change. Mr. Dubowitz has testified before the U.S. Congress on Iran sanctions issues and advised the U.S. government and foreign policymakers. Mr. Dubowitz heads FDD’s Iran sanctions project, which provides research and analysis on energy and financial sanctions and tracks the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Mr. Dubowitz also directs FDD’s Iran human rights project, which provides research on human rights sanctions. He co-leads FDD’s work on sanctions against the regime of Bashar al-Assad and is a founding member of the FDD Syria Working Group. ii U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East Orde Kittrie is a tenured Professor of Law in the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, where he is affiliated with the McCain Institute for International Leadership, and a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Professor Kittrie has testified on nonproliferation issues before both houses of Congress and served on a special National Academies of Science committee, created by Congress, to make recommendations on how to improve U.S. nuclear, chemical and biological weapon nonproliferation programs. From 2008 to 2012, he chaired the Nonproliferation, Arms Control & Disarmament committee of the American Society of International Law. Prior to entering academia, Mr. Kittrie served for eleven years (1993- 2004) at the U.S. State Department. As the Department’s lead nuclear affairs attorney for three years, Kittrie participated in negotiating five U.S.-Russia nuclear agreements and a U.N. treaty to combat nuclear terrorism. In other assignments at the State Department, Mr. Kittrie directed the Office of International Anti-Crime Programs and was the lead attorney for arms and dual-use trade controls. Leonard Spector is Deputy Director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies’ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), and leads the Center’s Washington, D.C. office. Mr. Spector joined CNS from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), where he served as an Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Prior to his ten- ure at DOE, Mr. Spector served as Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Director of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project. Earlier in his career, he served as Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Energy and Proliferation Subcommittee, where he assisted in drafting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Michael Yaffe is a Professor and former Academic Dean at the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Prior to joining the NESA Center in 2001, Dr. Yaffe was a career Foreign Affairs Officer in the U.S. Department of State where he concentrated on Middle East regional security and weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation. He served on U.S. delegations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory and Review Conferences, Madrid Middle East Peace Process’s Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group, General Conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency, NATO, Conference on Disarmament, and other international forums. About the Co-Chairs iii Table of Contents 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 19 CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF THE CHALLENGES FOR U.S. NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 23 CHAPTER 2: IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 24 A. Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Context 26 B. Next Steps in Economic Sanctions 26 1. Sanctions and Iran’s Nuclear Policy 28 2. Iran’s Nuclear Program Is Moving Ahead 31 3. Sanctions Have Had a Major Impact on Iran’s Economy But Have Not Altered Iran’s Nuclear Course 34 4. Additional Sanctions Necessary to Change Iran’s Nuclear Course 34 a. Existing U.S. sanctions on Iran must be implemented with much greater intensity and impact 35 b. The U.S. government should announce its intention to use sanctions to impose a de facto international embargo on all investments in, and trade with, Iran (other than provision of humanitarian goods) if Iran does not comply with applicable UN Security Council resolutions 37 c. If the U.S. government is unwilling to immediately announce its intention to use sanctions to impose a comprehensive trade embargo on Iran, the United States should, at a minimum, take other immediate steps 43 d. Continue working to ensure that implementation of sanctions on Iran does not inadvertently block the provision to Iran of humanitarian goods 45 C. Options for Next Steps to Constrain Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs 45 1. Enhancing Constraints on Supply of Goods Iran Needs for Its Nuclear and Missile Programs 45 a. Strengthen the U.N. Iran Sanctions Committee and its panel of experts 46 b. Encourage improved implementation by China 51 c. Encouraged improved implementation by Turkey 52 d. Improved implementation by other countries of transit concern 53 e. Further restrictions on Iranian access to the international financial system 54 f. Improved detection and disruption of procurement efforts 56 g. Careful monitoring of Iran’s plutonium options 57 2. Enhancing Covert Efforts to Delay and Constrain Improvement of Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities 57 a. Intelligence operations aimed at information gathering on program’s status 58 b. Sabotage iv U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East 58 3. Credible Threat of Military Action 59 a. Undertake additional overt preparations for the use of warplanes and/or missiles to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities with high explosives, so as to reinforce the credibility of this threat 60 b. Specify red lines or triggers for military action 61 c. Increase Iranian isolation, including through regime change in Syria 62 d. Potential Israeli air strike against Iran 62 4. If We Wake Up One Morning and Discover Iran Has Acquired a Nuclear Weapon Despite Our Best Efforts, What Will Be the Best Options for Attempting to Deter Its Use? What Steps Should Be Taken Now to Facilitate Those Deterrence Options? 63 a. U.S. policy should be to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon 65 b. Several deterrence-maximizing steps should be taken now in case Iran ends up acquiring a nuclear weapon despite U.S. best efforts 67 5. Negotiations, Incentives, and Concessions: What Would Constitute an Acceptable Deal? 73 CHAPTER 3: PROLIFERATION BY STATE ACTORS (OTHER THAN IRAN) IN THE MIDDLE EASt—ChALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 74 A. Overview 76 B. Reduce demand 76 1. Reinforce peaceful orientation of nuclear power programs in region 76 2. Reinforce United States security commitments 77 C. Control supply 77 1. Expand adherence to IAEA Additional Protocol and tighten United States nuclear cooperation agreements to preclude enrichment and reprocessing in the Middle East 79 2. Enhance Middle Eastern governments’ capacities to combat illicit trade in WMD-related technologies and materials and to protect against WMD 79 a. Establishment of a regional network of national WMD law enforcement coordinators 79 b. The United States also should create and promote mechanisms for facilitating interaction among the regional parties, the United States, and other exporting states on regulatory and law enforcement issues related to strategic trade and controlling sensitive dual-use goods 79 c. The United States should more vigorously encourage and assist regional governments to develop and implement effective laws and systems for preventing the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials 80 3. Cultivate a culture of nonproliferation responsibility and cooperation throughout the Middle East at the official level and in civil society and the private sector 80 4. Expand the scope of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) 80 5.