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Revisiting South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program REVISITING SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM ITS HISTORY, DISMANTLEMENT, AND LESSONS FOR TODAY Institute for Science and International Security The Institute for Science and International Security is a non- profit, non- partisan institution dedicated to informing the public about science and policy issues affecting international security. Its primary focus is on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology to additional nations and to terrorists, bringing about greater transparency of nuclear activities worldwide, strengthening the international non- proliferation regime, and achieving deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. Copyright © 2016 by Institute for Science and International Security Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) Press 440 1st Street NW Suite 800 Washington, DC 20001 USA www.isis- online.org @TheGoodISIS Library of Congress Control Number: 2016912653 CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform North Charleston, SC ISBN-13: 978-1536845655 ISBN-10: 1536845655 Front cover photograph credits: Armscor and Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa Limited. All unsourced photos in the book are from David Albright. REVISITING SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM ITS HISTORY, DISMANTLEMENT, AND LESSONS FOR TODAY DAVID ALBRIGHT WITH ANDREA STRICKER institute for science and international security june 2016 Dedicated to all those who strive for a world free of nuclear weapons. CONTENTS Preface, ix Acknowledgements, xi Chapter 1: Laying the Foundation, 1 Chapter 2: Developing Nuclear Devices, 23 Chapter 3: Getting Highly Enriched Uranium, 45 Chapter 4: Emergence of a Military Nuclear Program, 73 Chapter 5: Kentron Circle Facility, 91 Chapter 6: Nuclear Strategy and Arsenal Expansion, 129 Chapter 7: Advena Central Laboratories, 149 Chapter 8: Nuclear Rollback, 183 Chapter 9: Dismantling the Nuclear Weapons, 195 Chapter 10: International Verification, 219 Chapter 11: Ensuring Against Reversal, 245 Chapter 12: Highly Enriched Uranium Inventory, 267 Chapter 13: Lessons for Today, 275 PREFACE Twenty five years ago South Africa acceded to Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty after dismantling its nuclear weapons. Yet, the full story of that nuclear weapons program was not revealed pub- licly at that time. Parts were hidden from the International Atomic Energy Agency as well. Now, after many years of work by the media and independent experts, with the cooperation of a number of for- mer members of the nuclear weapons program, a much fuller picture of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program has emerged. At the Institute for Science and International Security, work on South Africa’s nuclear program goes back to its founding in 1992. One of its first projects was working with African National Congress (ANC) officials, who were interested in learning more about nuclear non- proliferation in anticipation of assuming key government posi- tions in a democratic South African government. This cooperation led to contacts with several former members of South Africa’s nu- clear weapons program and a range of collaborative endeavors with them. It included two tours of the old nuclear weapons production sites. On the trip in August 2002, Albright was allowed to photo- graph the old weapon production sites before they were modified beyond recognition of their original purpose. Many of these images appear here for the first time. PREFACE We at the Institute are pleased to present the first comprehen- sive, technically- oriented history of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program and its dismantlement. Although not every question could be answered, this history reveals a great deal of new information about that program. This book also takes stock of the lessons today of this dynamic and complicated nuclear weapons program. Although none of the nine states that currently possess nuclear weapons appear on the verge of following South Africa’s example, the South African case contains many valuable lessons in non-proliferation, disarmament, export controls, and verification. We hope that this book will therefore be regarded as a useful contribution to policy debates and a compendium of information on South Africa’s nuclear weapons program and its dismantlement. x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Revisiting South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program is made possible in large part by support from the Project on Advanced Sys- tems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC), Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, under Grant No. N00244-15-1-0005. PASCC is supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). In addition, the re- search of this report has been supported over the years by a range of US foundations, too large to enumerate. However, we want to single out the Rockefeller Foundation for its support of our work with the African National Congress nuclear policy group in the early 1990s. We would also like to thank members and officials from the African National Congress, Armscor, and the Atomic Energy Cor- poration, and its successor organization South African National Nuclear Corporation. Several individuals at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were also invaluable, and we thank them as well. We also thank Jerrica Goodson, who while working at the In- stitute, assisted in the preparation of this report. Finally, we thank the participants of a May 2016 presentation at the George Washing- ton University Elliott School of International Affairs who informed and improved this report. CHAPTER 1 LAYING THE FOUNDATION South Africa’s nuclear development dates back to World War II when the US Manhattan Project was looking worldwide for uranium to make nuclear weapons. In 1944 Great Britain requested South Af- rica’s Prime Minister Jan Smuts to investigate reported deposits of uranium in South Africa and South West Africa (now called Na- mibia).1 Following an extensive investigation, Smuts announced that uranium had been discovered in many of South Africa’s gold mines.2 After several years of exploration and development, South Africa started its first full- scale uranium extraction plant in 1952, built with extensive US and British aid. By 1955 sixteen uranium extraction plants were in operation.3 Until the mid-1960s, South Af- rican uranium was sold to the Combined Development Agency, the purchasing organization created by Britain and the United States to obtain adequate uranium supplies for their nuclear weapons programs. Initially, the development of uranium production was controlled directly by the South African Prime Minister’s office. However, in 1948 the country’s Atomic Energy Board (AEB) was established by an Act of Parliament to control all nuclear matters, particularly the production and sale of uranium on behalf of the government. The First United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva in 1955, stimulated the AEB’s interest CHAPTER 1 in creating an indigenous South African nuclear research and de- velopment program. Upon its return, the South African mission to the UN conference recommended that South Africa send scientists abroad for training to enable them to build an experimental reactor. It also recommended the construction of a nuclear power reactor at Cape Town. In November 1956, the AEB established the Research Advisory Committee. One of its first acts was to appoint A. J. A. “Ampie” Roux, then a senior official at the Council for Scientific and Indus- trial Research (CSIR), to draft a nuclear research and development program. The committee also hired the AEB’s first two research engineers. They were charged with surveying the processes for pro- ducing heavy water as a moderator in nuclear reactors. One month later, the government created a national Commis- sion of Enquiry into the Application of Nuclear Power in South Africa, under terms of reference drafted by the AEB. The commis- sion appointed Roux to draft a plan for a South African nuclear research and development program. While Roux was producing his report, the two AEB engineers started to investigate heavy water in the first applied research un- dertaken by full-time AEB staff. The AEB had come to believe that it could economically produce heavy water. After six months of study in South Africa, the two AEB engineers spent 18 months working intensively with the Heavy Water Group at the Harwell Atomic Energy Research Establishment in Britain. They also visited heavy water plants in Germany. NATIONAL PLAN Roux spent about a year and a half developing his draft plan for a South African nuclear research and development program. After visiting ten countries, interviewing hundreds of experts, and seeking the views of South African governmental, mining, and industrial au- thorities, he presented his plan to the AEB in June 1958. Roux’s ambitious plan recommended a dramatic shift in South African industry from a “repair and maintenance” industry to a highly sophisticated industry capable of manufacturing nuclear 2 LAYING THE FOUNDATION reactors.4 The plan’s objectives included enabling South Africa to derive additional benefit from its position as a major uranium pro- ducer and permitting it to make significant contributions to nuclear energy. Roux was also reportedly aware of the need for a program that could keep South Africa’s best scientists and engineers from im- migrating to other countries. Roux’s plan recommended the pursuit of four major avenues: • Development of the production and refining of nuclear ma- terials, including heavy water and thorium, but especially uranium.
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