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Amazon's Antitrust Paradox
LINA M. KHAN Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox abstract. Amazon is the titan of twenty-first century commerce. In addition to being a re- tailer, it is now a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading host of cloud server space. Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth, it generates meager profits, choosing to price below-cost and ex- pand widely instead. Through this strategy, the company has positioned itself at the center of e- commerce and now serves as essential infrastructure for a host of other businesses that depend upon it. Elements of the firm’s structure and conduct pose anticompetitive concerns—yet it has escaped antitrust scrutiny. This Note argues that the current framework in antitrust—specifically its pegging competi- tion to “consumer welfare,” defined as short-term price effects—is unequipped to capture the ar- chitecture of market power in the modern economy. We cannot cognize the potential harms to competition posed by Amazon’s dominance if we measure competition primarily through price and output. Specifically, current doctrine underappreciates the risk of predatory pricing and how integration across distinct business lines may prove anticompetitive. These concerns are height- ened in the context of online platforms for two reasons. First, the economics of platform markets create incentives for a company to pursue growth over profits, a strategy that investors have re- warded. Under these conditions, predatory pricing becomes highly rational—even as existing doctrine treats it as irrational and therefore implausible. -
Monopolizing Free Speech
Fordham Law Review Volume 88 Issue 4 Article 3 2020 Monopolizing Free Speech Gregory Day University of Georgia Terry College of Business Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons Recommended Citation Gregory Day, Monopolizing Free Speech, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 1315 (2020). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol88/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MONOPOLIZING FREE SPEECH Gregory Day* The First Amendment prevents the government from suppressing speech, though individuals can ban, chill, or abridge free expression without offending the Constitution. Hardly an unintended consequence, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously likened free speech to a marketplace where the responsibility of rejecting dangerous, repugnant, or worthless speech lies with the people. This supposedly maximizes social welfare on the theory that the market promotes good ideas and condemns bad ones better than the state can. Nevertheless, there is a concern that large technology corporations exercise unreasonable power in the marketplace of ideas. Because “big tech’s” ability to abridge speech lacks constitutional obstacles, many litigants, politicians, and commentators have recently begun to claim that the act of suppressing speech is anticompetitive and thus should offend the antitrust laws. Their theory, however, seems contrary to antitrust law. -
U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East
U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy January 2013 Acknowledgments The co-chairs of the Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy thank the following for their assistance with various aspects of the Project roundtables and report: David Barnett, Beth Singer Design LLC, Toby Dershowitz, Erin Elfrink, Laura Grossman, Jamie Kamlet, Chen Kane, Elizabeth Kittrie, Galia Nurko, Lolan O’Rourke, Debbie Rubin, Jonathan Schanzer, Abram Shanedling, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond. For inquiries, contact [email protected] © Copyright 2013, The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy Co-Chairs: David Albright, Mark Dubowitz, Orde Kittrie, Leonard Spector, Michael Yaffe January 2013 • Washington, D.C. U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy Co-Chairs: David Albright, Mark Dubowitz, Orde Kittrie, Leonard Spector, Michael Yaffe January 2013 • Washington, D.C. ABOUT THE CO-CHAIRS David Albright, a physicist, is Founder and President of the non-profit Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. Mr. Albright has testified many times on nuclear issues before the U.S. Congress and advised many gov- ernments. He cooperated actively with the IAEA Action Team on Iraq in the 1990s. The media frequently cite Albright, and he has appeared often on television and radio. He is an American Physical Society (APS) Fellow. -
Privacy Online Nick Allard Brooklyn Law School, [email protected]
Brooklyn Law School BrooklynWorks Faculty Scholarship 1998 Privacy Online Nick Allard Brooklyn Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty Part of the Computer Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons Recommended Citation 20 Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal 511 (1998) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of BrooklynWorks. Privacy On-Line: Washington Reportt by NICHOLAS W. ALLARD* I. Policy Context ........................................................................... 514 II. Privacy On-Line: Overview of the Problem .......................... 518 III. Status Report on Federal Privacy Initiatives: Search for Solutions .................................................................. 527 A . Sum m ary .............................................................................. 527 B. Administration Policy Statements ................ 527 C. FTC Approval of Self-Regulation.................................... 529 D. Developments Abroad ...................................................... 531 E. Proposed Federal Legislation ........................................... 532 1. Encryption Legislation ................................................. 533 2. Privacy Legislation ........................ 536 IV . C onclusion ................................................................................. 538 t An earlier version -
Monopolizing Free Speech
MONOPOLIZING FREE SPEECH Gregory Day* The First Amendment prevents the government from suppressing speech, though individuals can ban, chill, or abridge free expression without offending the Constitution. Hardly an unintended consequence, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously likened free speech to a marketplace where the responsibility of rejecting dangerous, repugnant, or worthless speech lies with the people. This supposedly maximizes social welfare on the theory that the market promotes good ideas and condemns bad ones better than the state can. Nevertheless, there is a concern that large technology corporations exercise unreasonable power in the marketplace of ideas. Because “big tech’s” ability to abridge speech lacks constitutional obstacles, many litigants, politicians, and commentators have recently begun to claim that the act of suppressing speech is anticompetitive and thus should offend the antitrust laws. Their theory, however, seems contrary to antitrust law. Since antitrust is intended to promote consumer welfare in commercial markets, antitrust liability is typically reserved for firms that have harmed consumers economically. This generally requires showing higher prices or restricted output. As such, the courts have largely declared that speech entails noncommercial activity antitrust has no authority to govern, despite the emergence of rhetoric and lawsuits seeking to do just that. This Article argues that, contrary to precedent, antitrust law can and should promote commercial speech. The economy has evolved such that firms and consumers depend on information, ideas, and speech even when traded at zero prices—known as the “information economy.” In turn, technology firms encounter incentives to suppress types of commercial speech and, when wielding market power, the ability to do so. -
Upcoming Issues in the Court Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures 2000 Section 8: Looking Ahead: Upcoming Issues in the Court Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School Repository Citation Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School, "Section 8: Looking Ahead: Upcoming Issues in the Court" (2000). Supreme Court Preview. 87. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/87 Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview LOOKING AHEAD: UPCOMING ISSUES IN THE COURT In This Section: * THE MICROSOFT CASE, Meredith Lugo .................................... 413 In Micrsosoft Case, Tipping Scales Both Ways; Weght of Issues Arguesfor, Against High Court Review James V. Grimaldi ........................................................ 414 U.S. vs. Microsoft: The Overview; U.S. Judge Says Microsoft ViolatedAntitrustLaws with PredatoUBehavior Joel B rinkley ......................................................................................... 4 16 M'soft Tying Test May FallShort K aren D onovan .................................................................................... 422 The Microsoft Breakup Ruling On Appeal, Firm may be Able to Avoid Breakup David G. Savage and Davan Maharaj ......................................... 425 * THE NAPSTER CASE: Free Musicfor Consumers or Illegal Copyrght Infringement? Meredith Lugo ..........................................................