FEATURE CLE AN AFTERNOON WITH RAY KELLY

CLE Credit: 1.0 Thursday, May 12, 2016 1:25 p.m. - 2:25 p.m. Hall 1AB Kentucky International Convention Center Louisville, Kentucky

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Kentucky Bar Association TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Presenters ...... i

The NYPD's War on Terror ...... 1

Post 9/11, NYPD's Counterterrorism Efforts Draw Praise, Fire ...... 11

Fighting Terrorism in New York City ...... 13

Ray Kelly Waves the 9/11 Flag ...... 19

Questioning Kelly: Francis Torres Analyzes the Speech ...... 23

Former NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly Was Right to Defend Police Tactics ...... 31

Former NYPD Commissioner Discusses Urban and National Security ...... 35

THE PRESENTERS

Ray Kelly c/o Greater Talent Network, Inc. 437 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10016 (212) 645-4200

RAY KELLY was appointed Police Commissioner of New York in January 2002 by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, making Kelly the longest serving Police Commissioner in the city’s history, as well as the first to hold the post for a second, separate tenure. He also served as Police Commissioner under Mayor David N. Dinkins from 1992-1994.

In 2002, Commissioner Kelly created the first counterterrorism bureau of any municipal police department in the country. He also established a new global intelligence program and stationed New York City detectives in eleven foreign cities. Under Kelly’s leadership, the NYPD lowered violent crime by 40 percent from 2001 levels, while also dedicating extensive resources to the successful prevention of any future terrorist attacks. Commissioner Kelly established the Real Time Crime Center, a state-of-the-art facility that uses data mining to search millions of computer records and puts investigative leads into the hands of detectives in the field. These department-wide improvements have served as the model for other law enforcement agencies around the world.

Currently, Commissioner Kelly serves as president of Cushman & Wakefield’s Risk Management Services Division, a position created specifically for him. As president, Commissioner Kelly focuses on helping clients identify potential vulnerabilities, as well as prepare for and manage risk across a number of critical areas, including physical and cyber security intelligence, crisis management, and emergency preparedness. He is also a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and an ABC News consultant.

In addition to twice serving as the New York City Police Commissioner, his career in public service includes directing the International Police Force in Haiti (appointed by then President Bill Clinton), serving as a vice president of Interpol from 1996-2000, commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service and undersecretary of enforcement at the U.S. Treasury Department.

As commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, he managed the agency's 20,000 employees and $20 billion in annual revenue. For his accomplishments, Commissioner Kelly was awarded the Alexander Hamilton Medal for Exceptional Service. As undersecretary for Enforcement at the U.S. Treasury Department (the third highest post in the department at the time), he supervised the department’s enforcement bureaus including the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. For his service as director of the International Police Monitors in Haiti, Commissioner Kelly was

i awarded the Exceptionally Meritorious Service Commendation by the President of the United States.

In the private sector, Commissioner Kelly served as senior managing director of global corporate security at Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.

A 43-year veteran of the NYPD, Commissioner Kelly served in twenty-five different commands before being named police commissioner. He was appointed to the New York City Police Department in 1963. Shortly thereafter he accepted a commission to the United States Marine Corps Officer Program. He served on active military duty for three years including a combat tour in Vietnam. He returned to the police department in 1966 and entered the New York City Police Academy, graduating with the highest combined average for academics, physical achievement and marksmanship. He was also a member of the inaugural class of the New York City Police Cadet Corps for three years while a student at Manhattan College. During his tenure time in the NYPD, Kelly received fourteen citations of merit for outstanding police work. Commissioner Kelly retired as a Colonel from the Marine Corps Reserves after thirty years of service.

Commissioner Kelly holds a B.B.A. from Manhattan College, a J.D. from St. John's University School of Law, an L.L.M. from New York University Graduate School of Law and an M.P.A. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has been awarded honorary degrees from the Catholic University of America, Manhattan College, St. John’s University, the State University of New York, the College of St. Rose, Iona College, Marist College, New York University, Pace University, Quinnipiac University, and St. Thomas Aquinas College.

In September 2006, Commissioner Kelly was awarded France’s highest decoration, the Legion D’Honneur, by then French Minister of the Interior Nicholas Sarkozy.

Renee Shaw KET 600 Cooper Drive Lexington, Kentucky 40502

RENEE SHAW is the host of Connections, the first statewide minority affairs program, and Legislative Update on KET. She began her career at KET in 1997 as a public policy reporter and associate producer. In addition, Ms. Shaw co-hosts election night coverage, hosts KET's health series and produces numerous other issue-centered programs. For more than a decade she produced Comment on Kentucky, KET's longest running public affairs program. She has served as an adjunct professor of media writing at Georgetown College and travels across Kentucky moderating public issues forums and speaking about diversity, media, political and state legislative matters. Ms. Shaw is a graduate of Western Kentucky University with degrees in broadcast journalism and political science and a master's degree in corporate communications.

ii THE NYPD'S WAR ON TERROR Frustrated by the lack of help from Washington, Police Commissioner Ray Kelly has created his own versions of the CIA and the FBI within the department. So how will we know if he has succeeded? If nothing happens. By Craig Horowitz Reprinted from New York Magazine, http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/features/n_8286/, last visited April 8, 2016.

Buried deep in the heart of one of New York's outer boroughs, in an area inhabited by junkyards and auto-body shops, is an unmarked redbrick building that stands as an extraordinary symbol of police commissioner Ray Kelly's obsessive commitment to the fight against terrorism. Here, miles from Manhattan, is the headquarters of the NYPD's one-year-old counterterrorism bureau.

When you step through the plain metal door at the side of the building, it is like falling down the rabbit hole—you're transported from a mostly desolate, semi-industrial area in the shadow of an elevated highway into the new, high-tech, post-9/11 world of the New York City Police Department.

The place is so gleaming and futuristic—so unlike the average police precinct, with furniture and equipment circa 1950—that you half expect to see Q come charging out with his latest super-weapon for 007. Headlines race across LED news tickers. There are electronic maps and international-time walls with digital readouts for cities such as Moscow, London, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Islamabad, Manila, Sydney, Baghdad, and Tokyo.

In what is called the Global Intelligence Room, twelve large flat-screen TVs that hang from ceiling mounts broadcast Al-Jazeera and a variety of other foreign programming received via satellite. The Police Department's newly identified language specialists— who speak, among other tongues, Arabic, Pashto, Urdu, and Fujianese—sit with headphones on, monitoring the broadcasts.

There are racks of high-end audio equipment for listening, taping, and dubbing; computer access to a host of superdatabases; stacks of intelligence reports and briefing books on all the world's known terrorist organizations; and a big bulletin board featuring a grid with the names and phone numbers of key people in other police departments in this country and around the world.

The security area just inside the door is encased not only in bulletproof glass but in ballistic Sheetrock as well. The building has its own backup generator (everyone learned the importance of redundancy on September 11); and the center is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Even the 125 cops in the bureau (hand-picked from nearly 900 applicants) look a little sharper. Some are in dark-navy polo shirts that bear the counterterrorism-bureau logo, and others are in suits that seem to be a cut above the usual discount-warehouse version of cop fashion.

Though the counterterrorism bureau is still in its infancy, law-enforcement officials from around the U.S. and overseas regularly come to see it and learn. And it was all put

1 together practically overnight—it opened in February of last year, little more than a month after Ray Kelly was sworn in as police commissioner.

The bureau, along with the NYPD's totally revamped intelligence division, and the high- level hires from Washington—a lieutenant general from the Pentagon and a spymaster from the CIA—is part of Kelly's vision to remake the NYPD into a force that can effectively respond to the world's dangerous new realities.

There are now New York City police officers stationed in London working with New Scotland Yard; in Lyons at the headquarters of Interpol; and in Hamburg, Tel Aviv, and Toronto. There are also two cops on assignment at FBI headquarters in Washington, and New York detectives have traveled to Afghanistan, Egypt, Yemen, Pakistan, and the military's prison at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba to conduct interrogations. Members of the department's command staff have also attended sessions at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

And there are the Hercules Teams, elite, heavily armed, Special Forces–type police units that pop up daily around the city. It can be at the Empire State Building, the Brooklyn Bridge, Times Square, or the stock exchange, wherever the day's intelligence reports suggest they could be needed. These small teams arrive in black Suburbans, sheathed in armor-plated vests and carrying 9-mm. submachine guns—sometimes with air or sea support. Their purpose is to intimidate and to very publicly mount a show of force. Kelly knows that terrorists do a lot of reconnaissance, and the Hercules Teams were designed to disrupt their planning. Like an ADT warning sign in front of a house, they're also intended to send a message that this is not an easy target.

The police commissioner now has what's called an STU (Secured Telephone Unit) on his desk. It is a phone line that enables him to talk to someone in the White House or the Pentagon without fear of being monitored. When a key on the phone is turned, the conversation is electronically encrypted.

"We are doing all these things," Kelly says over coffee in his fourteenth-floor office at police headquarters, "because New York is still the No. 1 target. We have been targeted four times, twice successfully, and the city remains the most symbolic, substantive target for the terrorists. These are cunning, patient, deliberate people who want to kill us and kill us in big numbers."

On a bright October day several weeks after September 11, Kelly and his wife, Veronica, were finally allowed to return to their Battery Park City apartment—not to move back in, but to pick up a few personal items. Before they left the building, one block from the World Trade Center, they went up to the roof. There, Kelly consoled his weeping wife as they looked in stunned disbelief at the devastation of their neighborhood.

Eight years earlier, back in 1993 when the Trade Center was attacked the first time, Kelly was police commissioner. Mayor David Dinkins was in Japan when the buildings were bombed, so Kelly essentially took charge. It was Kelly who went on television to calm the city, to let everyone know in his powerful Marine kind of way that everything was under control.

2 Now Kelly is staking his reputation and his legacy on the fight against terrorism. "Four months after 9/11, when Kelly was about to be sworn in, you just didn't get a sense of confidence at the federal, state, or local level that changes were being made," says former NYPD first deputy commissioner John Timoney, who was recently named police chief of Miami. "Ray could easily have said, 'What do I know about this stuff? It's the Feds' job.' It takes a lot of courage to do what he's doing. He's leaving himself open to be second-guessed and criticized if things don't go well. So he's making decisions that may benefit the city but be detrimental to him personally."

Kelly is familiar with being second-guessed and criticized. He served as NYPD commissioner during the final eighteen months of the Dinkins administration, in 1992 and '93. Though he was essentially finishing Commissioner Lee Brown's term, he did manage several significant accomplishments. He cleaned up and restructured Internal Affairs, which was a serious mess. And it was Kelly, not Bratton or Giuliani, who took care of the squeegee guys.

Not that anyone knows it. "When Bratton came in with his arrogance and swagger, he showed Ray up nine ways from Sunday," says a former high-level member of Bratton's own team. "Giuliani and Bratton lumped him in with Dinkins as one big ineffective management disaster."

So Kelly has plenty of reasons to want to make his mark this time. Even so, isn't combating terrorism primarily a federal responsibility?

When I ask Kelly this question, he looks at me long and hard. He is a man who knows his way around Washington. In addition to his time in the mid-nineties as undersecretary of the Treasury, he was head of the Customs Service. He also worked for Interpol and was a special State Department envoy in Haiti where he was sent to establish and train a police force.

"I knew we couldn't rely on the federal government," Kelly says finally. "I know it from my own experience. We're doing all the things we're doing because the federal government isn't doing them. It's not enough to say it's their job if the job isn't being done. Since 9/11, the federal government hasn't taken any additional resources and put them here."

Has any kind of an increased federal presence been asked for? Soldiers? Fighter planes? More FBI agents? "Asked for?" he says, repeating my question incredulously. "Would you think it would have to be asked for? Look," he says, shifting in his chair and crossing his legs so the .38 in his ankle holster is visible. "It's a different world. We've redeployed. We've got 1,000 people on this. All seven subway tunnels under the river are covered, and it's the same with all the other sensitive locations. It's taken constant attention. It's extremely difficult. But make no mistake: It's something we have to do ourselves."

Every morning at eight, in the commissioner's conference room on the top floor of police headquarters (another NYPD venue where, by the way, you can watch Al-Jazeera), Kelly is briefed by his two key players in the counterterrorism battle: Lieutenant General Frank Libutti, who runs the department's counterterrorism bureau, and David Cohen, formerly No. 4 at the CIA, who is now in charge of the NYPD's intelligence division.

3 The two men couldn't play more to type if they were actors hired to fill these roles. Libutti, a fit, silver-haired 35-year veteran who was in charge of all Marine forces in the Pacific and the Persian Gulf, is, in a word, crisp. His navy pinstripe suit looks perfectly tailored, his shirt is starched, and he has an open, forthright manner. He is friendly in a lieutenant-general-determined-to-stay-on-message sort of way. He calls terrorists "the bad guys."

Cohen is a much grayer, more recessive presence. He has been described as "bookish," but that's not quite right. His look is much closer to that of, say, a software designer, someone who appears both geeky and cunning.

Cohen rarely gives interviews, and in the days following his appointment, he seemed to be amusing himself and perhaps trying to create a mysterious aura by playing with the reporters who questioned him. He was very sketchy on the details of his background. When asked his age, he'd respond only that he was "somewhere between 28 and 70." (For the record, he's 61.)

"I knew we had to do business differently," Kelly says of his marquee hires. "I thought we had to get some people with a fresh outlook and with federal experience to help us."

With Libutti, Kelly gets someone who has command presence, a man who has known pressure and conflict—he was injured three times in Vietnam. Libutti also has a record of accomplishment as someone who can, as they like to say in the military, organize and marshal forces and execute an objective. And in fact, he was able to "stand up" the counterterrorism bureau (Marine-speak for get it up and running) within weeks.

Job one for the new bureau is threat assessment on landmarks, public and private properties, and the city's infrastructure. The bureau has nine five-man teams, whose members were schooled at the federal law-enforcement training center in Georgia.

These teams could, for example, look at the Brooklyn Bridge, a Con Ed plant, or the offices of New York Magazine. Once an inspection is complete, the team produces a written report that includes detailed security suggestions. Though most of the sites are chosen by the bureau based on risk level, some are done by request. This process has helped the department establish closer ties to the business community.

The counterterrorism bureau also does independent intelligence analysis. The focus is on techniques. If two suicide bombers in a row in Israel are wearing Columbia ski jackets, for example, they'll identify the marker and issue an alert so cops here are aware of this.

Cohen's challenge, on the other hand, was to re-create and give new relevance to a division in the Police Department that already existed. "Our intelligence division was in essence an escort service," says Kelly. "They handled dignitaries and bigwigs when they came into town. It was an intelligence service in name only. We simply had to get better information. We didn't know what was going on in our own city, let alone the rest of the world."

On paper, Cohen is exactly what Kelly needed to execute his vision: a high-level guy from inside the intelligence community who has knowledge and access. Someone who can get the right people on the phone and find out what they know. Libutti is plugged in

4 as well. Just before joining the NYPD, he was a special assistant to Homeland Security secretary Tom Ridge. He served as a liaison between Ridge and the Pentagon.

One morning in Libutti's ninth-floor office at police headquarters, he and Cohen talked about their roles. They are kind of like the Rumsfeld and Tenet of the Police Department. Cohen, who is fairly expansive considering his reputation, admits that when they signed on, their roles were not all that well defined.

"When we got here, there was no counterterrorism doctrine for a city like New York," he says in a faint Boston accent. "There was no playbook, no manual you could turn to and say, 'We should do two of these and a couple of the things in that chapter, and we have now built our counterterrorism program.' The process for us has been to write and implement the playbook simultaneously. And it's like trying to change the tires on a speeding car."

What comes through most clearly from the two men is that the lifeblood of their efforts is information. Cohen makes this point when he discusses the recent incident in London when authorities arrested three men suspected in a plot to unleash cyanide in the Underground: "When something like that happens, we need to know in real time everything we can find out about it. Obviously, the subway is a real hot spot for us given that three and a half million people a day use it. So we need to understand what kind of operation they tried to roll up, was it pre-surveillance-stage, planning-stage, was it really cyanide, was the subway the real target? The more times things get rolled up overseas, the smarter we get. And the smarter we get, the stronger we get."

The flow of quality information is also critical in helping Kelly decide how to respond to threats. Most threats that come in, according to Cohen, don't name a place, so it is often difficult even to be sure New York is the target. "You have to understand the nuances of the threat," Cohen says. "Where it's coming from, how to define it, what it really means. Frank and I help interpret the information, and that enables the commissioner to make an informed decision about responding. This war is going to go on a long time, and you've got to calibrate your response. You don't want to burn everyone out."

What Kelly has done with Libutti and Cohen, essentially, is to create his own FBI and CIA within the New York City Police Department. "This is all about Ray Kelly's contempt for the Feds and how they blew it, over and over again," says a former member of the NYPD who knows the commissioner well.

"The Feds kept getting information they didn't act on," he continues. "So what Kelly's trying to do is say, 'Hey, just in case they don't fix all that stuff at the FBI and the CIA, we gotta find out the things they're finding out. And we gotta act on them.' Let's face it: A lot of this isn't rocket science. It's cultivating sources, talking to informants, running down leads, getting search warrants, and following up on every piece of information you get. In other words, it's good, solid investigative police work. The kind of thing New York cops do every day."

It's not every day, however, that a major figure in law enforcement like Kelly does something so contemptuous of the system. Yet there has been no outrage, no intramural

5 rock-throwing over what he's done. Even the FBI, which has traditionally looked down on local cops, has barely raised an eyebrow over Kelly's moves.

One possible explanation for the FBI's passivity is that the agency has been under such relentless critical fire from Congress and the media that it is in no position to take on new battles. Another possibility is assistant FBI director Kevin Donovan, who was recently put in charge of the FBI's New York office. Donovan gets high marks for competence and as a team player. By all accounts, he is someone who looks to eliminate problems rather than create them.

But the most significant factor may be the most obvious. Given everything that has happened, the FBI may simply be happy to have the help. When I interviewed both Donovan and Joseph Billy, the agent in charge of counterterrorism in New York, they praised Kelly and his cops with alacrity.

"This is a very big city," says Donovan, "and we just don't have the resources to collect all the information. We don't have 40,000 eyes and ears on patrol like the NYPD. We have 1,100 agents in this office. And no one knows the streets here like the local officers. They know what to look for at two in the morning. They know what's out of place, what doesn't seem right. What Ray Kelly is doing makes perfect sense and is complementary to what we do. No city is better prepared right now than New York."

Tom Reppetto, who heads the Citizens Crime Commission and has written a history of the department called NYPD: A City and Its Police, more or less agrees with Donovan. In addition, he says, the FBI is not an immediate-response agency in any event. You wouldn't call the FBI, for example, if you found a bomb in Union Square Park.

"Remember, too, that the police can do a lot of the counterterrorism work as part of their regular duties," Reppetto says. "You'll notice there's been a surge in arrests of homeless people recently, and they seem to be getting arrested under bridges and in tunnels. Know why? Because police are spending a lot of time under bridges and in tunnels."

The relationship between the FBI and the NYPD has probably never been more critical than it is right now. The FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force is one of the key instruments in the effort to protect the city. The task force was a relatively sleepy backwater run by the FBI but made up of both agents and detectives. One of Kelly's earliest moves was to pump up the number of detectives from 17 to 125, a huge commitment that the FBI matched. Kelly's intensity and his willingness to push the envelope were demonstrated early on when he tried to muscle control of the JTTF away from the FBI. According to sources, Kelly and Libutti sent a two-star police chief named Phil Pulaski over to the JTTF, which is housed at the FBI's New York headquarters.

Pulaski is generally viewed within the NYPD as brilliant—he designed and set up the police lab. However, as one cop put it to me, he also has a "Ph.D. in pissing people off." So he trooped over to the JTTF and told them, after the FBI had been in charge for over twenty years, that he was now the boss. Though you can imagine the reaction by the Feds, Donovan managed to maintain his cool and prevent a truly damaging explosion. He simply told Libutti it was not going to work. "You can't send a guy to my house," the director reportedly said, "and have him say he's in charge. Especially without even calling me." Libutti said he was sorry and reeled Pulaski back in.

6 But the response from the two sides when this episode is brought up is perhaps more revealing than the incident itself. "Pulaski had a job to do," says the FBI's Joseph Billy. "He had to integrate a large number of detectives into the task force, and he's a very results-oriented individual. There was some tension, but it all worked out. The FBI is still the lead agency for the JTTF."

Libutti is not quite as conciliatory: "Without criticizing their efforts, part of our responsibility is to reach out to the federal side and demand excellence in support of what we're doing. I got a guy over there—Pulaski—who's hard-charging. His job is to keep me posted, and he's going to press, press, press, to turn over every rock to find out everything that's happening on the federal side. I think I know what's going on. What worries me is what I don't know."

Part of what Kelly learned during his first term as commissioner—and its aftermath—is the importance of perception. It may not be fair and it may not be right, but sometimes it is not enough just to do a good job.

Self-promotion is not Kelly's natural mode, but it seems he has learned a few things from watching eight years of Giuliani. Kelly has become the face of the NYPD in the same way that Giuliani was always the face of New York. If there's a bodega robbed in the Bronx on a Sunday afternoon, it is most likely Ray Kelly who will be on the six- and eleven-o'clock news.

He also must have recognized, coming back to the NYPD, that no matter what he did on the crime front, he would not get any credit. When the FBI crime stats were released last month, New York's numbers were terrific. That week, in an editorial celebrating the continuing crime decline, the New York Post congratulated Kelly this way: "The local crime rate continues to drop—even as crime nationwide is on the rise—because Kelly and Mayor Bloomberg continue to employ the previous administration's anti-crime tactics."

Terrorism, by contrast, is Kelly's fight. But for all of the risk and the additional headaches, Kelly may, ironically, end up getting very little credit on this front even if he succeeds. When you're battling street crime, success and failure are easy to measure. Murder goes up or goes down. Rapes increase or they decrease. But how do you measure the terrorist acts that didn't happen? The ones all the painstaking work may have prevented? In fact, some of the successes may never even be made public when they do occur.

In November, the Times ran a full-page story with the headline deepening shadows that stated in its lead, "Once again, it's not uncommon to feel a vague sense of dread when walking down a shadowy street." And "New Yorkers are more fearful these days."

"You don't want this kind of perception to fester," Kelly says with a hint of frustration in his voice. "I'm aware it's out there. But it is a little difficult to deal with when it's not based on some reality."

With the crime numbers way down from four years ago, why do average people say they feel less safe? What has changed for them? "The elephant in the corner of the room," Kelly says, "is 9/11. That's why people feel less safe."

7 So Kelly's job is to end the fear. Not the fear of conventional street crime, which continues to be under control, but fear of a menace that can be very hard to see. "Kelly's a very methodical guy who does things step-by-step, by the numbers," says Reppetto. "And he is clearly determined that if something does happen, nobody is going to be able to say they didn't do everything possible to stop it. There won't be some report issued afterward saying the NYPD fell short."

The most obvious tests of Kelly's new counterterrorism strategy are large public events. And two months ago, with several hundred thousand people gathered in Times Square for New Year's Eve, the pressure was really on the commissioner and the NYPD. They had executed what Kelly calls their "counterterrorism overlay package." Undercovers were everywhere. Intelligence officers mingled in the crowd. Sharpshooters were on the rooftops. Police boats were on the water, choppers were overhead, and Hercules Teams were ready to move.

Kelly also had the department's Archangel package in place, which includes ESU teams equipped to detect a chemical or biological attack and to respond if one does in fact occur.

The five days leading up to the celebration had been especially difficult. There were intelligence reports detailing serious harbor threats, including information about a possible plan to stage eight separate diversionary acts culminating with a major terrorist attack. All the locations were covered. The water had an eerie, blacker-than-usual look to it because it was mostly empty. No pleasure boats were allowed out.

Police had also been looking for the five men who might have come across the border from Canada using illegal documents. Michael John Hamdani, the Pakistani document forger under arrest in Toronto, told the NYPD detective who interrogated him about the men. This prompted the FBI to instigate and then call off a nationwide manhunt. Hamdani, however, didn't say they were terrorists, just that they were trying to sneak into the U.S. For Kelly, this highlighted what he believes is an ongoing alien-smuggling problem. Cops hit various locations around the city during the day, and several arrests were made.

Kelly also had credible intelligence that something might happen between Christmas and New Year's Day at the stock exchange. All week, Hercules Teams had been flooding the financial district. And then, of course, there was the gathering in Times Square itself.

"We were covering a lot of bases," says Kelly. "But we were addressing all these things appropriately. We all felt we'd done everything we could've reasonably done to make the night a safe one. You can really see the force and the power of the Police Department manifestly displayed on a night like New Year's Eve."

Finally, at around 1:30 in the morning, when most of the crowd had drifted away, Kelly had a momentary flash of relief, and satisfaction. The night had been so well handled that there were only three arrests—for disorderly conduct—in a crowd of hundreds of thousands of people. But Kelly's pleasure was short-lived. "When you get past a particular event now, there's the next event you have to address. And we were concerned about New Year's Day."

8

Kelly has taken on this burden at an extraordinarily difficult moment for the Police Department. With the city facing its most serious deficits in 30 years, budget cuts have hit the department hard. By July, Kelly will be down 3,000 officers from the roughly 40,000-man force he took over last January. In addition, he has 1,000 cops assigned full-time to his fight against the terrorists.

In an attempt to fill in the gaps, Kelly has energetically tried to convince the federal government that the cost of protecting New York is no longer just a municipal responsibility. Though a half-billion dollars of need has been identified, Kelly and his staff have whittled it down to a $261 million list that includes money for training and equipment. Despite several trips to Washington, Kelly has so far made no progress.

He has also been a good soldier and not publicly fought with the mayor over budget issues. When the mayor was booed last week at the graduation ceremony for 2,108 new cops—largely because his budget-cutting included talk of police layoffs—Kelly enthusiastically came to his defense. However, the police commissioner was not always so sanguine about the cuts. When Bloomberg made his first statement last July calling for 7.5 percent cuts across all city departments, sources say, Kelly balked.

According to one source, Kelly initially told the mayor he couldn't play ball on the budget cuts. He was not going to be the police commissioner on whose watch crime began to go up because the department was underfunded and undermanned. Though everything was worked out amicably, Bloomberg's people actually contacted several former commissioners—including Bratton and Timoney—to see what they were up to. "The conversations were to put out friendly feelers that were one stop short of 'Are you still available?,' says the source.

The potential downside for Kelly of this focus on counterterrorism is enormous. "I know there's a universe out there just waiting to say, 'Aha, I told you so,' " he says. "But let me tell you something. We're taking care of business. There is this notion that this administration cannot do it all, something's gotta give. Well, the city is safer than it's ever been in modern history."

Before September 11, the nightmare that haunted New York's police commissioners— and commissioners in other big cities as well—tended to revolve around police brutality and race—Amadou Diallo, say, or Rodney King. One commissioner who left his job not all that long ago while riding a wave of popularity in his city reportedly told a confidant that he believed he was "one 3 a.m. phone call away from having it all fall apart." Since 9/11, of course, "having it all fall apart" means something entirely different—and much scarier. "We don't know the time and we don't know the place," says Libutti, "but we do know the bad guys are coming back."

Sitting in his office one recent evening as a cold wind whipped across the plaza in front of police headquarters, Kelly showed no signs of the pressure he is under. "I enjoy this job and I'm living in the moment," he said while eating a cookie. "The world has changed, but I believe I'm doing the right thing. We're the biggest, most important city in the world, and this is the biggest, most talented police force. And we have done everything we can reasonably do to prevent another attack."

9

10 POST 9/11, NYPD'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS DRAW PRAISE, FIRE by AirTalk September 09, 2011 Reprinted from AirTalk, http://www.scpr.org/programs/airtalk/2011/09/09/20612/police-tactics/, last visited April 8, 2016.

After the attacks of Sept. 11, the New York Police Department's counterterrorism tactics have raised concerns about civil rights and unchecked power. If you ask NYPD Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, his record speaks for itself. Since Sept. 11, 2001 there have been no successful attacks in New York. That, he says, is thanks to the NYPD efforts.

Kelly created the NYPD's Counterterrorism Bureau, the first of its kind in the nation, in 2002. But the agency's investigative techniques and alleged demographic profiling have resulted in criticism over the NYPD's focus on the Muslim community.

"Get real. We live in a very dangerous world," said William Bratton, former LAPD chief, on AirTalk Friday. "We're doing it within the law. Cameras in public spaces are allowed."

Bratton said that New York remains the number one terrorist target in the world and, he says, the most significant threats are coming from within the Muslim community.

New York's proactive policing is a welcome change to a common law enforcement mentality, Bratton said. "We very frequently talk about it's not a matter of if an attack is going to occur, it's just a matter of when."

The effort to protect New York's 8.2 million residents has vastly transformed the role of local cops since the attacks in 2001. The Department's Intelligence Division was overhauled and given both the tools and the people to analyze and detect threats, as well as the authority to thwart them.

The city's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) oversees the operational control of the Counterterrorism Bureau. Detectives partner with FBI and CIA agents on terror investigations in New York and around the world. The Department recently came under fire for also using undercover officers of Arab and Muslim descent to gather information on potential homegrown threats.

Jay Kopstein, former deputy chief for the NYPD, told AirTalk's Larry Mantle that everything the police did was lawful and in the public's best interest.

"The gathering of the information is available to police," Kopstein said, just as "it's available to journalists."

These counterterror efforts have cost tens of millions in federal grants and city funding, but Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Adviser to the President of the RAND Corporation, told KPCC's Larry Mantle that the money spent on counterterrorism is appropriate and effective.

11 Since 9/11, the United States has thwarted thirty-two terrorist plots created by individuals associated with or inspired by al-Qaida.

"Their capacity to carry out another attack on the scale of 9/11 has been largely removed," Jenkins said. "We still worry about truck bombs and individual shooters, but that's a vast improvement."

NYPD's approach to counterterrorism has been largely lauded as successful. When a car bomb nearly went off in Times Square in May 2010, President Barack Obama thanked Kelly for his work defending the city.

"There's a considerable amount of resources dedicated to the protection of the citizens that the citizens don't see," Kopstein said.

Post 9/11, the U.S. has developed a sophisticated system of collecting intelligence regarding threats. Organizations pool intelligence in a national counterterrorism center that can help authorities find clues and develop leads on possible attacks.

According to Jenkins, the center receives 8,000 to 10,000 pieces of information every day, which must be sorted and properly disseminated to local authorities.

"The problem they face," Jenkins said, "is the volume of information."

This weekend's 10th anniversary of 9/11 has prompted a "credible but unconfirmed" report of a possible terrorist attack on New York and Washington.

Jenkins told AirTalk that three individuals were mentioned in the report and that authorities can now use the federal database of terrorism intelligence to search for the suspects' recent communications, travel records and other clues that may confirm the report.

Guests:

William Bratton, Chairman of Kroll, a risk consulting company; former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (2002–2009); he was also Chief of the New York City Transit Police, Boston Police Commissioner and New York City Police Commissioner.

Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Adviser to the President of the RAND Corporation; he started RAND's terrorism research in 1972 and is the Co-Editor of the recent RAND study "The Long Shadow of 9/11: America's Response to Terrorism."

Jay Kopstein, former Deputy Chief for the New York Police Department (NYPD) who retired in 2010 after thirty-seven years of police service; for the last twelve years of his police career he was assigned to Operations Division and was involved in the planning and coordination of most large special events and significant incidents in New York City.

12 FIGHTING TERRORISM IN NEW YORK CITY New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly takes 60 Minutes behind-the-scenes of the nation's most sophisticated counter-terrorism squad in America's largest city 2011 Sep 26 Robert Anderson, Pat Milton and Nicole Young, Producers Reprinted from CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fighting-terrorism-in-new-york-city/, last visited April 8, 2016.

As the top terror target in America, New York City has taken every measure to defend itself from another 9/11. The New York Police Department's counter-terrorism unit is one of the most sophisticated in the world – complete with sea, land and air capabilities all dedicated to thwarting an attack. Correspondent Scott Pelley gets a personal tour from the anti-terror unit's architect and leader, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly.

* * * * * * * *

The following script is from "The counter-terrorism bureau" which aired on Sept. 25, 2011.

This week, the United Nations General Assembly is in New York with 137 heads of State moving all over town. No city, at any time, has a security challenge like that. And this year it comes as U.S. intelligence is investigating "credible information" that terrorists want to target New York with a car bomb.

After 9/11, New York City decided that it would never leave itself vulnerable to terrorism again. So Ray Kelly, the police commissioner, began to build something unique. Kelly tends to get things done. He was born in New York City 70 years ago. Fought with the Marines in Vietnam, joined the NYPD as a cadet, and along the way picked up a law degree and a master's degree from Harvard.

Now, ten years after 9/11, with an investment of billions of dollars, Kelly has created, what he believes, is the most powerful and technologically advanced counter-terrorism bureau that anyone has ever seen.

By air, land and sea – the nation's largest counter-terrorism squad is on the beat in America's largest city. One thousand officers – many of them armed like soldiers – are part of a presence that is meant to send a message: New York City is too tough a target. NYPD counter-terrorism is the creation of police Commissioner Ray Kelly.

Ray Kelly: We're the number one target in this country. That's the consensus of the intelligence community. We're the communications capital. We're the financial capital. We're a city that's been attacked twice successfully. We've had thirteen terrorist plots against the city since September 11. No other city has had that.

Kelly is a classic cop. He started as an NYPD cadet and rose all the way to commissioner. He left the force before 9/11. But within four months of the attack, the mayor asked him to come back.

Kelly: I jumped at the chance.

13 Pelley: You knew you needed to do what?

Kelly: I knew that we had to supplement, buttress our defenses of this city. We couldn't rely on the federal government alone. I believed that we had to create our own counter-terrorism capacity, indeed our own counter-terrorism division. And, that plan was put into effect fairly rapidly. And the reason we were able to do that is this is a hierarchical organization.

Pelley: You call it a hierarchical kind of organization. In other words, you're the boss.

Kelly: That's correct. That's the way it works here.

Pelley: And you've got 50,000 people working for you.

Kelly: 35,000 uniformed police officers, 15,000 civilian employees. That's correct.

His police force is bigger than the FBI because no cop has more to protect than Ray Kelly.

Kelly: We're going to the U.N.

We were with him, in his hi-tech command truck last Wednesday when he headed to the east side as New York hosted the United Nations General Assembly. He wanted to be there when President Obama arrived. To prepare for those 137 heads of State, Kelly has to understand the threats that all of those foreign leaders have at home so their local troubles don't play out here.

Kelly: We have to look abroad. We do that with the Secret Service, to see what the issues are in another country. Does that raise the threat level here?

The threat level in New York was already high. Intelligence said that there could be a car bomb attack on the tenth anniversary of 9/11 and that worry had still not been resolved.

Vinny Giordano: All our interior and exterior checkpoints are up and running. Bomb squad's completed all its sweeps and their Ops are up.

Kelly had the tower of the U.N. Secretariat building surrounded. Snipers on the roof tops, divers in the river, helicopters above. Mr. Obama slipped into the U.N. with the Secret Service, under the blanket of the NYPD. All of this came just ten days after Kelly's team had secured the most sensitive event in the nation.

It was the 9/11 National Memorial on the tenth anniversary of the attack on America. Osama bin Laden had written about attacking again on this very day. And Kelly had more than 8 million New Yorkers to protect.

As the names of the fallen were being read, Kelly was watching from his brand new Joint Operations Center.

From here he can see everything. All in one cavernous room Kelly has representatives from the military, the FBI, Federal Emergency Management, state and local first

14 responders. The center is a symbol of the ten years and three billion dollars that he has spent to prepare for every kind of threat.

Pelley: Are you satisfied that you've dealt with threats from aircraft, even light planes, model planes, that kind of thing?

Kelly: Well, it's something that's on our radar screen. I mean in an extreme situation, you would have some means to take down a plane.

Pelley: Do you mean to say that the NYPD has the means to take down an aircraft?

Kelly: Yes, I prefer not to get into the details but obviously this would be in a very extreme situation.

Pelley: You have the equipment and the training.

Kelly: Yes.

Kelly gave us an extraordinary look inside the counter-terrorism bureau, the training – like this assault team practicing for a hostage situation in a subway car – and the astounding technology that has been designed and built specifically for the NYPD.

We started with the threat that no one wants to imagine – a nuclear device smuggled into the city.

Out on the East River, we went along on an NYPD boat that was designed by one of the federal government's nuclear laboratories.

Mike Riggio: Within the boat itself we have permanently mounted and installed radiological and nuclear detectors. And the good news is that the detection equipment is very sophisticated and it is very sensitive.

Beyond the water, Kelly has radiation detectors circling the city in helicopters; in trucks down on the street. And thousands of cops have automatic nuclear detectors on their gun belts. The technology is so sensitive Inspector Mike Riggio told us they often stop pleasure boats – for a reason that we found amazing.

Riggio: We'd pull up along side the boat and we'd interview. And that lets us find out that, hey this person may have just had some type of medical procedure.

People who had medical radiation treatments, trigger the detectors.

Pelley: So you like your chances of detecting a dirty bomb or a nuclear device?

Riggio: We do. We do.

Kelly has built something else that most New Yorkers never see. It is nearly impossible now to walk a block in lower Manhattan without being on television. There are 2,000 cameras, and soon there will be 3,000 – all of which feed into this control center housed in a secret location.

15 Jessica Tisch: Nobody has a system like this.

Jessica Tisch helps run this $150 million surveillance system that monitors the cameras and all those radiation detectors. A powerful computer, using artificial intelligence actually watches all of the cameras at once and it knows if a package has been left in one place too long.

Tisch: The camera has identified that this is the shape and the size of a potentially suspicious unattended package. It's narrowing in on it.

Pelley: And it counted how long that bag was motionless.

Tisch: Right.

Pelley: And this center will call a patrol officer and say, "Hey go check out that bag."

Tisch: Absolutely.

Look what happened last year when the cameras picked up a bag dropped outside the New York Stock Exchange. Within minutes the bomb squad moved in, they used a portable X-ray to look inside and then the bomb tech crawled up to open it.

Tisch: And thank God, it's someone who dropped their lunch.

Pelley: Somebody's lunch.

It's not just lunch bags and suspicious packages that catch the computer's eyes. Tisch showed us how the system can search for a suspicious person – based on a description. A red shirt for example.

Tisch: And I can call up in real time all instances where a camera caught someone wearing a red shirt.

Pelley: So the computer looks essentially through all the video.

Tisch: Yep.

Pelley: Finds all of the red shirts. And puts it together for you.

Tisch: Video canvasses that you used to take days and weeks to do you'll now be able to do with the snap of a finger.

But the most important part of counter terrorism isn't technology – it's cops on the ground gathering intelligence – Kelly's force speaks 60 languages and dialects and he has his own intelligence officers all around the world.

Kelly: Abu Dhabi, Amman, Jordan. They are in Lyon, France which is where Interpol is located. They're in Paris, Madrid, Tel Aviv, London, in Montreal, Toronto, Singapore, and the Dominican Republic.

Pelley: Why do you have New York City cops in all those cities?

16 Kelly: They're there to act as trip wires or listening posts. Is there anything going on there that (as I say) can help us better protect the city.

When terrorists strike overseas, as they did here in Madrid in 2004, NYPD cops respond and send intelligence back in real time.

In Madrid, Kelly's officers learned that bombs placed on the trains were assembled near the stations – immediately in New York, security was tightened in the neighborhoods around the subways. In Mumbai, India, 2006, the NYPD saw that the train bombs had been left in overhead racks. That morning in New York the cops zeroed in on the luggage racks in mass transit.

When Mumbai was hit again, hotels were taken hostage. The NYPD discovered that Indian police didn't have the layout of the hotel interiors. So Kelly's intelligence unit has now built a video library of the hallways, walkways and doorways of 700 New York City hotels. Kelly told us that good intelligence stopped a post-9/11 attack on one of the city's greatest landmarks.

Kelly: We had received information in some communications that the bridge in the Godzilla movie was being observed as a possible target.

Pelley: That's the conversation that the terrorists were having?

Kelly: That's right.

Pelley: That they were interested in the bridge.

Kelly: That's how they characterized the bridge.

Pelley: I see. And so somebody got a copy of the Godzilla movie and said, "Wait a minute, that's the Brooklyn Bridge."

Kelly: Uh-huh. True.

Kelly laid on extra security. And the next intercepted call from the terrorists said the weather in New York is too hot – in other words too many cops. Part of the strategy is to put force on display. At random, 100 police cars will swarm part of town just to make a scene. It happens with complete unpredictability. Cops signal subway trains to stop to be searched. And sometimes they hold the trains until they've eyeballed every passenger.

Of all of the things the counter-terrorism squad thought of – this one really impressed us. It's the NYPD cricket league – 12 teams, 200 kids. All because cricket is the national pastime of Pakistan, NYPD Inspector Amin Kasseim started the program.

Amin Kasseim: Back in the old days, we played baseball, basketball with the kids. But as we have these new immigrant communities coming from overseas, we have to find the sports that they love, that they genuinely love. Cricket is the sport the South Asian community loves.

Hundreds of Muslim immigrant parents now have their kids playing for the NYPD. The trouble with counter-terrorism is that the cops have to bat a thousand every day – the

17 terrorists only have to get through once. And it very nearly happened on Kelly's watch last year when a Pakistani terrorist parked a car bomb in Times Square.

This was the scene after a street vendor saw smoke coming out of the car and called a cop. The bomb squad discovered the bomb and defused it. Later, the FBI built a bomb just like it to see what would've happened.

Kelly: We've been lucky. But we've been good. And, certainly as the Times Square bombing is concerned we were lucky. And we'll take luck any time.

Pelley: What message do you have for the potential terrorists out there, who have their eye on New York City?

Kelly: If you see the movie Casablanca, and you have Humphrey Bogart talking to Colonel Strasser. And he says that he would advise the Nazis to think twice about invading certain parts of New York City.

Question from Casablanca: How about New York?

Humphrey Bogart: Well, there are certain sections of New York, Major, that I wouldn't advise you to try to invade.

Kelly: Well that's our message. "Stay away."

18 RAY KELLY WAVES THE 9/11 FLAG Dan Collins, New York Editor-at-Large 03/05/2012 12:48 pm ET | Updated May 05, 2012 Reprinted from The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-collins/police- commisioner-ray-ke_b_1321342.html, last visited April 8, 2016.

New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie versus Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Ray Kelly. Throw in Long Island Congressman Peter King. It's a nightmare of something you tried to avoid on school playgrounds a lifetime ago.

The issue is the NYPD's anti-terrorism activities, which seem to have extended well outside the city lines. Christie is ticked off that New York police officers have been compiling dossiers on Muslim businesses, restaurants, places of worship and student groups in New Jersey. Without his knowledge.

The New York police brass, he fumed, thought they were "masters of the universe."

"I wish Chris Christie was more concerned about keeping people alive than he is about trying to score cheap political points," sniped King, who heads the House Committee on Homeland Security.

Kelly shot back that some people have "short memories as to what happened here in 2001." This is the ultimate diss. When the fight is between the guy who wants to do more to avoid a terrorist attack and – well, it doesn't matter. The guy who wants to stop terrorism always wins.

Volley back to Christie, whose spokesman said that the real lesson of 9/11 was that law enforcement agencies were supposed to coordinate.

Okay, Commissioner, your turn.

"The notion that the Police Department should close our eyes to what takes place outside the five boroughs is folly, and it defies the lessons of history," Kelly said in a speech over the weekend. "If terrorists aren't limited by borders and boundaries, we can't be either."

So true. Which is why we have, er, the FBI and the CIA and the monster Department of Homeland Security. The questions raised by the activities of New York City cops begins with the matter of why they're the ones doing it.

And what, by the way, are they doing, precisely. Compiling dossiers of what Muslims in the greater metropolitan area are up to – where they go to eat, what businesses they run, where they worship, what their kids do outside of school. The theory is that you may pick up information about some guy who's talking trash about terror. Or that if you learn a possibly dangerous target has somehow made his way into the country, you will have some good ideas of where he might go to get a bite to eat or pray.

If only others (presumably including former Mayor Rudy Giuliani) had taken the same approach after the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, Kelly suggested, the Sept. 11

19 attack might have been averted. "It was precisely our failure to understand the context in 1993 that left us vulnerable in 2001," the commissioner insisted. "We won't make that mistake again – on Mayor Bloomberg's watch or mine."

But the failure pre-9/11 had nothing to do with a lack of knowledge of where Muslims in New Jersey like to go for a snack, or how many times their kids pray when they go white-water-rafting (a detail an undercover officer reported after tagging along with a bunch of college students on an outing.) It was that the World Trade Center continued to be the focus of terrorist obsession overseas. Pick up on that one concept, and you've got your anti-terrorism strategy. Miss it and you could send the entire department out to shop at every Muslim-owned store in the Northeast and it would mean nothing.

The closest call we've had since 9/11 occurred in Times Square in 2010, where it was street vendors who spotted a smoking SUV that turned out to be a home-made car bomb. If You See Something, Say Something.

Kelly is understandably obsessed with not allowing another terrorist attack on his watch. And you're not going to get most New Yorkers – or New Jerseyans – to get exercised over anything he does, no matter how crazy and excessive, in the name of homeland security.

This is particularly true if the intrusions bother somebody else. The law-abiding Muslim citizens are rightfully ticked off. Who wants to think that the New York cops are putting your restaurant on a list of places where a terrorist might want to drop by to have dinner while he's planning to blow up a synagogue? Who wants to think that an undercover cop might have joined your kid's white-water rafting trip just to report back on what the rafters talked about and how many times they prayed?

Try to imagine how enthusiastic the area would be about Kelly's obsession if he felt compelled to close down all the tunnels to New Jersey for a week to do some special surveillance. Or if he decided there was a danger that old Irish Republican Army members were allied with al-Qaeda, and sent cops out to make a list of every enterprise run by an Irish Catholic on Long Island. See how thrilled Peter King is when he discovers there was an undercover officer on a retreat at a local convent, filing reports on what the priest said in their sermons and how many participants went to confession.

This is a what-if game, in which for the players, the safest course of action is almost always to overdo it. We have New York City police officers in foreign countries, gathering intelligence of some kind. The city cops have their own weapons to shoot down incoming aircraft.

I have no idea how much of this is really sensible. Neither do you. The problem is, there's nobody with the power and access to information who's trying to make sure things stay under control.

There's nobody watching the New York City police to guard them from overreaching. Sure, the Civilian Complaint Review Board looks into allegations of police brutality. The department's own Internal Affairs Bureau investigates police misconduct. But there's no agency that keeps an eye out to make sure the department isn't going off on a crazy mission in another state.

20 Except the mayor. But Michael Bloomberg has shown absolutely no inclination to reign in Kelly.

At 70, the Police Commissioner has now been at his job for ten years, longer than anyone else in the city's history. He has 52,000 people working for him, and while most of them are in the business of fighting regular crime, a growing chunk of the department is in the anti-terrorism business, running intelligence efforts that reach into 11 foreign cities, not to mention New Jersey and Connecticut.

Kelly's achievements are genuine. He's kept the crime rate down, and there have been no successful terrorist attacks in New York City on his watch – although the latter achievement has been matched by every other police chief in the United States.

We simply can't judge. Except to note that in other areas, Kelly has shown signs of serious slippage in recent years. There would probably have been no ongoing Occupy Wall Street movement if it had not been for the stupid and brutal overreaching of police officers charged with controlling the demonstrations.

Kelly showed up in a rabidly anti-Muslim movie, The Third Jihad, which was shown to police officers undergoing anti-terrorist training. There's no reason to doubt his claim that he didn't realize what the film was actually about, but that doesn't explain how it wound up on the police department lesson plan.

I wish Bloomberg was on the case. But he isn't. No one in authority is going to cast an objective eye on these police operations unless the department does something so counter-productive we all can't help but notice – a local version of the Afghan Koran burning, or a screw up in which there are so many law enforcement groups watching the same target that the target gets away in the confusion.

Until then, as long as Kelly waves the 9/11 flag over everything he's doing, he has immunity. But this whole scene makes me worried, very worried.

21

22 QUESTIONING KELLY: FRANCIS TORRES ANALYZES THE SPEECH By Francis Torres December 27, 2013 Reprinted from Brown Political Review, http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/tag/ray-kelly/, last visited April 8, 2016.

It wouldn't be surprising if, five years from now, Brown still looks back at 2013 as the year of the Ray Kelly Event. It's rare for a single moment to affect an entire community, especially ours — spread out as we are across disciplines, nationalities, outlooks and College Hill itself — but this was one of them. Protesters, engaging in what they would have called "constructive irreverence" (a term brought to our campus by President Paxson herself) sparked an intense debate on the nature of free speech and on the University's long legacy of student activism. The discussion soon expanded beyond Brown's campus, as news outlets ranging from Huffington Post to Fox News commented on the events of October 29.

Months later, the dust has mostly settled and the heated emotions of those tense days have cooled. The dialogue goes on, though, and the results of an investigation into the protests by a university-appointed committee have yet to be announced. Many questions still remain, and now one of the most central can finally be answered: Had the speech gone on as originally planned, what would Ray Kelly have said?

This article is not another opinion on what happened on October 29, but rather an attempt to analyze and critique the arguments Kelly would have raised had he been permitted to speak. The most immediate (and least exciting) insight from the speech vindicates one of the protesters' main points: Kelly's speech reveals no information the commissioner hasn't shared before. If anything, the defensive tone and predictability of his argument shines a light on the intellectual vacuity of many of NYPD's so-called proactive policing policies.

The problem with Kelly's emphasis on 'Grandmother's Love Over Violence' is that it hardly has anything to do with the rest of the commissioner's speech — or the reality faced by thousands of civilians every day on the streets of New York.

For starters, even the idea of "proactive policing" isn't very consistent throughout Kelly's speech. The commissioner would have started his presentation by giving an example of what this policy is meant to achieve: helping disadvantaged heads-of-household and community parishes keep their young people safe, educated and out of trouble. His story about Grandmother's Love Over Violence and the NYPD-Brooklyn Clergy Coalition is indeed a great example of what proactive policing should look like, as it emphasizes peaceful interaction between police officers and civilian organizations based on reciprocity and mutual respect. These sorts of initiatives can and should provide underprivileged communities with much-needed tools of self-empowerment.

The problem with this example is that it hardly has anything to do with the rest of the commissioner's speech — or the reality faced by thousands of civilians every day on the streets of New York. His later comments on proactive policing leave aside any talk of communities, especially minority ones, in favor of a polemical focus on trying to validate

23 NYPD's more controversial policies. In this context, the introductory story comes off as little more than a vain attempt to gather sympathy before diving into more divisive topics.

Mainly concerned with legitimizing the ramped-up NYPD operations of the last twelve years, Kelly wastes no time getting to the big statistics. He boasts of the 72 percent overall crime reduction rate over the last two decades. Homicide figures come next, as Kelly cites a decrease of more than 80 percent since 1990. Shooting incidents also went down by 74 percent since 1993; by his calculations, NYPD policies implemented since 2002 have saved 9,172 lives.

At first glance, this appears to be the story of one of the most successful law enforcement initiatives in recent history. However, these achievements are not demonstrably the result of better policing.

By the mid 1990's, New York City was experiencing a major drop in crime rates. The NYPD at that time was under the leadership of Kelly's predecessor, William Bratton, who also defended the use of stop-and-frisk and proactive policing as crime-prevention tools. Every bit the policy hardliner as Kelly, Bratton also developed the computerized crime- tracking program CompStat, and implemented the "broken windows approach," which proposes that more stringent enforcement of lower-level crimes can have a deterrent effect on more serious ones. These developments laid much of the groundwork for Kelly's post-9/11 enhanced law enforcement policies. But in fact, crime was already dropping in New York since before many proactive policing policies such as stop-and- frisk were expanded under Bratton, and later Kelly. The statistics presented in the speech don't necessarily indicate that the NYPD has become more successful or even more efficient.

The graphs Kelly included in his presentation show how crime rates — particularly homicides — have also gone down since 2002, the year he became Police Commissioner. 2012 ended with just 419 homicides in NYC — a fifty-year low — and Kelly states that at the current rate, 2013 will end with about 330. However, this drop coincides with a massive reduction of street stops-and-frisks. The number of stops by police officers decreased dramatically from an all-time high of 200,000 in the first quarter of 2012 to around 21,000 in the third quarter of 2013. In the words of the New York Times editorial board: "If stops alone were holding back a hidden tsunami of crime, the city would have been overwhelmed by now."

Like much of the discourse in the stop-and-frisk debate, Kelly needs to be reminded that correlation is not causality. A study by sociologist and NYU professor David Greenberg analyzed Bratton's policies and concluded that they didn't necessarily lead to lower crime rates. According to Greenberg, a host of other factors could have all played a part in making New York safer, including a growing economy, job creation, minimum wage raises, fluctuations in the illegal drug market, and decreasing crime rates at the national level. Some theories even speculate that an increase in family planning methods could be linked to the drop in crime. Although, as Kelly observes, crime dropped faster in New York City than in other cities, there remains no conclusive proof that revamped law enforcement is the primary cause of the trends.

Kelly goes on to mention two of the operations at the heart of his proactive policing agenda: Operation Impact and Operation Crew Cut, which he points to as sources of the

24 improvements in New York's crime rates without addressing any of the factors mentioned above.

The first of these policies, Operation Impact, is based on "hot spot policing," which consists of assigning newly minted cops, fresh out of the academy, to areas with a high incidence of dangerous crimes — areas Kelly calls "designated impact zones." This sort of crime mapping is, of course, unavoidable for good policing work. Some areas are simply more crime-ridden than others. But Operation Impact's focus on recruiting new officers has its drawbacks. Because the program places rookies in high-crime areas, mostly populated by minorities, those with little experience may confuse these geographic correlations between race and crime for causation. The misapprehension only reinforces the stereotype of minority communities as naturally more crime-stricken, and could subsequently increase the tendency towards racial profiling by police. Race influences more than just which communities are targeted, or who is profiled and stopped; a recent report by the Office of the Attorney General of New York shows that minorities who are stopped-and-frisked by police are more likely to be arrested and convicted for misdemeanors and non-violent crimes than white citizens. This can both artificially inflate crime rates in disadvantaged communities and lead to insufficient policing in whiter areas of the city.

Another of Kelly's initiatives, Operation Crew Cut, is based on the premise that gangs, or "crews," are the perpetrators of a high percentage of violent crimes and should be monitored more aggressively. Part of the operation, according to Kelly's text, involves identifying gang members who may just be "wannabes" and can still be guided down the right track. In providing resources for families to help their children stay away from illicit activity, this initiative appears closer to the vision of community-engagement projects that Kelly begins his speech with. However, the creation of a "team of investigators dedicated to monitoring social media" to catch any suspicious gang activity seems to justify the worries about invasions of privacy and misinterpretation of messages. Police officers take on false identities online, often posing as young women in order to gain access to suspects' accounts. The police look for photos, taunts, boasts, threats and gang-specific lexicon, but all of these things are easy to mistake. Idle fights, empty threats and even the wrong slang — or being invited to the wrong party — could cause mistaken arrests. Says Kelly: "Gang members have posted photographs of themselves in front of a rival's apartment building and surveillance pictures of those who they threaten to kill next." But who hasn't posted a picture of themselves in front of a building? Even if mistaken arrests don't result in conviction, an open arrest can take time and effort to dismiss, and in the meantime can have high costs — financial and otherwise — for the suspect. When violence does occur, the stakes are much higher because the surveillance information allows police to build conspiracy cases.

Finally, more than halfway through the speech Kelly brings up the topic of the hour: the NYPD's so-called policy of "engagement," otherwise known as stop-and-frisk. He describes the program as an extension of the "long-established right of the police to stop and question individuals about whom we have reasonable suspicion" and calls the practice "as old as policing itself." It begs an interpretation of what exactly suffices as "reasonable suspicion," especially given the high correlation between race and the stops.

Kelly begins his defense of stop-and-frisk with one of the most publicly celebrated outcomes of the policy: the seizure of more than 7,000 illegal weapons in 2012. But let's

25 put this into perspective. According to an Attorney General's report, only 6 percent of all stops between 2009 and 2012 resulted in an arrest. Only 2 percent of these arrests (0.1 percent of stops) were due to weapons possession. Likewise, crimes involving violence represented only 2 percent of all stop-and-frisk arrests. The 7,000 weapons seized in 2012 were the result of 533,042 stops that year. That's one weapon found for every 76 people stopped-and-frisked.

Despite the low percentage of stops that produce arrests, let alone confiscated weapons, Kelly praises them as a life-saving strategy that has primarily benefitted the city's black and Latino communities. He says in his speech that groups made up 87 percent of all murder victims and 96 percent of all shooting victims in 2012, so the logic follows that confiscated weapons — especially guns — statistically contribute more to these groups' safety than that of white communities.

Of course, Kelly doesn't pay as much attention to the fact that blacks and Latinos are also stopped-and-frisked more often as well, complicating Kelly's perception of what it means to be safer. In 2012, African-Americans, who make up 23 percent of the city's population, made up 55 percent of all stops. Latinos, who comprise 27.5 percent of the city population, were involved in 32 percent of stops. On the other hand, only 10 percent of stops in 2012 involved a white suspect. The Attorney General's report argues that stops of blacks and Latinos are not only "the majority of stops each year, but also the majority of the increase of stops." Every year that stop-and-frisk keeps operating as it is, the racial disparity between whites and minorities increases.

The case of marijuana arrests resulting from the stops illustrates another key flaw in Kelly's reasoning. Whites stopped and arrested for marijuana possession are nearly 50 percent more likely to have their case dismissed and to avoid conviction than blacks and Latinos. Ironically, considering Commissioner Kelly's comments about making the city safer for minorities, the most common reason for stop-and-frisk arrests isn't illegal weapons but marijuana possession. This preferential treatment feeds back into the NYPD's institutional bias. Conviction statistics for marijuana possession are artificially skewed towards minorities and consequently help justify further racial disparity in stops.

The number of stops by police officers decreased dramatically between 2012 and 2013. In the words of the New York Times editorial board: "If stops alone were holding back a hidden tsunami of crime, the city would have been overwhelmed by now."

These racial disparities were the main reasons Judge Shira Scheindlin declared the current stop-and-frisk policy unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in the federal class action lawsuit Floyd v. City of New York. In his speech, Kelly says he "disagree[s] strongly" with the ruling and responds to Scheindlin by arguing that minorities are more likely to commit a crime, and therefore more likely to be stopped than white people, much in the same way that men are more likely to be criminals than women. Kelly also argues that "the racial distribution of stops generally reflected the racial distribution of arrestees." That's called a tautology: If individuals stopped are also those who get disproportionately arrested, of course that argument is then narrowly true. He also cites a 2007 study by the Rand Corporation indicating that the racial distribution of stops generally reflects the racial distribution of crime suspect descriptions. However, the Attorney General's report shows police data indicating that only about 15 percent of stops are made on the basis that an individual fits the description of a crime suspect. Despite the circuitous reasoning and grasping analogies,

26 Kelly's argument still comes down to this: because crime suspects are more likely to be black and Latino, it is apparently justifiable to disproportionately stop people of these groups, even though the great majority of them will not match a crime suspect description. Simply stopping individuals who do fit a crime suspect description would seem to be a preferable solution.

Kelly's [sic] goes on to emphasize that Judge Scheindlin found only 6 percent of the stops between 2004 and 2012 to be "apparently unjustified." Even if her judgment was sound, Kelly argues, there is no way that such a small percentage "shows a systematic practice of racialized profiling" or provides evidence of institutionalized racism. It makes one wonder about what Kelly considers a "justified" stop. After all, only 6 percent of stops lead to arrests. Furthermore, the Attorney General's report indicates that the percentage of convictions resulting from those stops is half that of the arrests, or 3 percent of all stops. If the arrest and conviction rates are so low, how can this policy be justified against the other 94 percent of stop-and-frisk incidents at issue in Floyd?

The answer may just lie in the hands of the officers doing the stopping. According to New York's Civilian Complaint Review Board, investigations of stop-and-frisk complaints revealed that some officers underreported their stops. In 2012, roughly a fifth of investigated complaints involved cases in which the officer in question had neglected to fill out a UF-250 form, required after every stop. An astonishing 33 percent of investigations dealt with officers who had not prepared a memo summarizing the details of the stop, also a vital part of the NYPD's documentation process. Without this information — all of which is written out by the police officer conducting the stop — it is extremely difficult to prove that the stops were unconstitutional. Despite these findings, Commissioner Kelly states in his speech that NYPD has "become more careful about recording each [stop] in detail as required by law," without elaboration.

Tellingly, one of the immediate reforms mandated in Judge Scheindlin's ruling is meant to fix exactly this problem. Scheindlin proposed "revision of documentation" of stop-and frisk encounters, as well as a new UF-250 form that will include a detailed explanation as to why a search was performed. Another potential change might include a tear-off form stating the reason for the stop and explaining how to file a complaint, to be handed to the subject of the search afterwards.

Commissioner Kelly does not believe these measures are necessary. He cites a 1968 court decision, Terry v. Ohio, which upheld the use of stops by police departments. To use the commissioner's phrasing, stops are "one of the tools of the job." Limiting the efficiency of this tool would, in his opinion, have a negative impact on police officers' work. But a closer reading of the Terry decision would show Commissioner Kelly that stops must be based on a "reasonable articulable suspicion" that a crime may occur. According to the Center for Constitutional Rights, an officer must be able to "articulate specific facts that give him or her a basis to reasonably suspect that criminal activity may be afoot." These suspicions are meant to be specific to the individual being stopped, in order to avoid systematic, unjustified searches that could potentially infringe on civil rights. Judge Scheindlin's ruling does not eliminate stops from the NYPD's toolbox, but rather establishes accountable measures to ensure that the legal requirements established in Terry v. Ohio are actually followed.

But the NYPD's active disregard for the "reasonable articulable suspicion" clause also affects NYPD's counterterrorism and intelligence operations. As Kelly states in his

27 speech, the department follows a set of rules called the Handschu guidelines to avoid violating the civil liberties of the individuals it investigates. The Handschu guidelines are the result of a 1985 case settlement between the NYPD and a group of leftists that sued for being spied upon for political purposes. Originally, the guidelines stipulated that detectives had to have "specific information" about a future crime to justify starting an investigation. Under the guidelines, no person can be subject to investigation because of their "political, religious, sexual or economic preference[s]." Like so many other guidelines, Handschu's real message went out the window after the events of September 11. In 2003, a judge changed the Handschu rules to allow the NYPD intelligence chief to authorize investigations — both on book and undercover — with just a "reasonable indication" that a future crime was afoot. Kelly notes that the guidelines provide members of the police force the ability to attend public events, prepare reports of potential threats and view public online activities. But the public nature of much of the actions of the NYPD have been at best questionable, although Kelly promises that all operations are "in keeping with Handschu protocol." The countervailing evidence is considerable: Operation Crew Cut and the attempt to befriend potential suspects online using fake personas, police attendance at "private event[s] organized by a student group," and "undercover officers and confidential informants" entering mosques are just a few example of how NYPD's intelligence operations have been increasingly relying on less than transparent methods.

Despite Kelly's assurance that the department does not target Muslims or political dissidents, substantial complaints make a case for the contrary. From 2010 to 2012, the Associated Press published a Pulitzer Prize-winning series of articles on the NYPD's secret monitoring of political dissidents and Muslim communities. One of the pieces tells the story of how the department's intelligence unit went undercover to infiltrate the meetings of "liberal political organizations" in 2008 and kept files on activists and protesters from around the US — despite all of the monitored activities being completely legal.

Kelly also argues that "the racial distribution of stops generally reflected the racial distribution of arrestees." That's called a tautology: If individuals stopped are also those who get disproportionately arrested, of course that argument is then narrowly true.

Several of the AP articles highlight NYPD's intrusion into the lives of Muslims both within and outside New York. Mosques were monitored and infiltrated, Muslim-owned businesses were cataloged, and any Muslims in New York that had legally changed their name to an Americanized one were automatically investigated. But perhaps most importantly, the AP reports argue that the counterterrorism program has not been as effective as it's often said to be. Despite its mixed results, Kelly writes about the program as the crowning achievement of his time in office. Citing sixteen plots foiled since 9/11, the commissioner makes a strong case for the unit's efficiency. The AP reports also cite a list of fourteen alleged terrorist plots that Congressman Peter King (R-NY) believes were stopped thanks to the NYPD's counterterrorism efforts under Commissioner Kelly. However, the articles state that the list "includes plans that may never have existed, as well as plots that the NYPD had little or no hand disrupting." All of this leads to doubts about the purpose and efficiency of Kelly's prized antiterrorism unit.

Beyond all of the quantitative data that's left unaddressed, Kelly's arguments completely ignore the physical, emotional and economic consequences that result from the NYPD's flawed policies. African-Americans, Latinos, Muslims, and other discriminated groups are

28 not receiving the essential social service of security from their state. Instead, they are constantly reminded of how intensely New York sees them as a threat. The alienating effects of this structural violence erode trust in state institutions and, ultimately, the rule of law. Kelly points out that a majority of NYPD officers are themselves minorities, apparently implying that somehow having a racially varied police force delegitimizes charges of racism. This point is one of the weakest in his speech, as it completely disregards the systematic, structural oppression that disadvantaged minorities face from many institutions of power — regardless of the races of their members. To put it bluntly, it doesn't matter what background police officers come from if they're required to follow a flawed protocol in order to do their job.

Despite all the criticism directed at policies like stop-and-frisk, Kelly still believes he has public opinion on his side, noting that his approval rating is 63 percent However, the Quinnipiac University survey he cites showing 70 percent approval for the NYPD and an 83 percent approval rating for counterterrorism programs also contains some facts he neglected to mention. The same survey shows that 66 percent of those polled expressed support for creating a position of an inspector general to independently monitor the Police Department — one of the remedies proposed in the Floyd v. City of New York decision. More importantly, the survey shows that 51 percent of voters disapprove of the stop-and-frisk policy, with much wider margins of disapproval among the black and Latino communities.

Kelly holds on to the hope that an appeal against the Floyd decision will pull through and annul all the procedural alterations Judge Scheindlin ordered for the NYPD. He and his supporters — such as outgoing mayor Michael Bloomberg — celebrated when the U.S. Court of Appeals halted Scheindlin's decision while it considered the city's appeal. Explaining the decision, the three-judge panel that removed Scheindlin from the case said that they did so because Scheindlin had compromised "the appearance of impartiality," by allegedly guiding the case to her courtroom in violation of judicial code and granting interviews while a decision was still pending.

While the outgoing commissioner might think that these developments will safeguard his legacy, he will likely be disappointed. The recent landslide victory of Democrat mayoral candidate Bill de Blasio spells certain change for the NYPD and its proactive policing policies. On the campaign trail, de Blasio condemned the current policies as racial profiling and pledged to support Judge Scheindlin's ruling, as well as a commitment to apply the measures stated in her opinion. The city's appeal of her decision will almost certainly be dropped as soon as he takes office. Though Kelly's speech highlights his supposed concern for the wellbeing and rights of minorities, those same people will likely be the ones celebrating the end of his regime. Proactive policing's greatest advocate will spend the coming years watching much of his policing framework being undone. If the facts are any indication, New York will be better off for it. Grandma's love might be better directed at the next NYPD commissioner.

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30 FORMER NYPD COMMISSIONER RAY KELLY WAS RIGHT TO DEFEND POLICE TACTICS Daniel Kaniewski∗ October 21, 2015 Reprinted from The Daily Signal, http://dailysignal.com/2015/10/21/former-nypd-commissioner- ray-kelly-was-right-to-defend-police-tactics/, last visited April 8, 2016.

Not too long ago cops were seen by most as heroes deserving our respect and gratitude (picture the moments after 9/11). But recent incidents, such as yesterday's killing of a New York City police officer, have left officers feeling like they are under siege.

An increase in crime from a "Ferguson Effect" might be making all of our communities less safe as police officers struggle to do their jobs within the current climate.

So how should we address this looming crisis in policing?

As police chiefs around the country look for solutions, a veteran top cop just might have the answers.

In his recent book, Vigilance: My Life Serving America and Protecting Its Empire City two-time NYPD Police Commissioner Ray Kelly describes how he successfully confronted the twin challenges of crime and terrorism.

During Kelly's twelve-year tenure 9,500 fewer people were murdered than in the preceding period and NYC had the lowest murder rate of any major U.S. city.

While many factors likely contributed to the crime decline, Kelly is a strong believer that police tactics played a significant role and he makes a convincing case.

Police Tactics Help Save Lives

"Stop and frisk," as critics labeled the policing tactic would become a defining characteristic of Kelly's tenure. (Kelly better describes the tactic as "street inquires…or, at most, stop, question, and sometimes frisk").

Kelly is an attorney and a civil libertarian who strongly believes the practice was an essential tool to enforce the law in New York City. He confronts those who mischaracterized it – including a sitting district court judge and the now mayor of New York City, Bill de Blasio.

Kelly went so far as to commission an independent study of the program – which confirmed the program did not target minority populations. Unfortunately the judge and de Blasio did not let the facts overcome their biases.

∗ Daniel Kaniewski, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at The George Washington University. Kaniewski served as special assistant to the president for Homeland Security in the George W. Bush administration.

31 The judge would not allow the study to be admitted as evidence and de Blasio used his false narrative about the program to gain the votes he needed for the mayoral election.

When the appellate court subsequently reprimanded the judge and blocked her decision, de Blasio was unfazed. Soon after he took office the mayor abandoned the appeal that the city would have almost certainly won. In doing so, Kelly lamented:

"De Blasio shrugged and walked away from a routine and useful policing tool, snatching law enforcement defeat from the jaws of legal victory. People will lose their lives as a result."

Legitimate Concerns

Of course, sometimes there are legitimate grievances against the police. When I privately asked Kelly about recent police misconducts, the former commissioner reminded me that every profession has a few bad apples and the goal should be to weed them out.

And if an officer violates the public's trust then the onus is on the department's leadership to take decisive action.

As Kelly describes in his book, when an officer shot and killed an unarmed citizen the commissioner did not wait for internal investigations to be complete to render his own public judgment that the shooting was unjustified. This was much to the dismay of the police union, but he was operating in what he felt was the public's best interest: to call it like he saw it.

Countering Terrorism

Kelly's efforts to enhance policing in NYC were not limited to crime fighting; he took a similarly proactive approach for NYPD's counterterrorism efforts.

Following 9/11 federal law enforcement agencies were keenly focused on terror threats. Kelly highlights that while he worked in earnest with the Feds, he had a responsibility to protect the citizens of New York in a way that he felt that FBI would never be able to achieve. He launched a world-class counterterrorism and intelligence apparatus that focused exclusively on safeguarding the city and its residents. Kelly acknowledges that creating this capability – unique among U.S. cities – may have occasionally caused tensions with federal authorities, but it's clear that assigned primacy to NYC citizens, rather than bureaucratic scuffles. His passion is hard to question.

Today if you walk up to Freedom Tower you'll face its hulking 200-foot base of steel- reinforced concrete on which the 70-story building rests. The imposing structure sends an unmistakable message of "never again" to anyone seeking to attack the American icon.

But it almost wasn't so. The building façade was to be glass, and its atrium open, vulnerable to repeat history. Kelly intervened and successfully appealed to harden the structure and create appropriate standoff distance from busy streets. Thus it's not an overstatement to say that Ray Kelly shaped NYC's post-9/11 landscape in a way that will deter future attacks.

32 Ray Kelly's counterterrorism and crime-fighting tactics yielded real results: disrupted terror attacks and dramatic reductions in crime.

Now with the mayor of New York rolling back the police tactics Kelly spearheaded and officers across America feeling the weight of recent controversies, we risk returning to the cities of yesteryear, vulnerable to crime waves and terror attacks.

Alternatively, as Kelly suggests, we could choose to empower those who have sworn to protect us and ask them to remain vigilant in our defense.

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34 FORMER NYPD COMMISSIONER DISCUSSES URBAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY Mary Price Reprinted from http://www.vmi.edu/Content.aspx?id=10737433502, last visited April 8, 2016.

LEXINGTON, Va., Nov. 2, 2015 – Former New York Police Department Commissioner Ray Kelly addressed a wide battery of urban and national security concerns in a talk given to a standing-room-only audience at Virginia Military Institute earlier today.

A fifty-year veteran of public service, Kelly became police commissioner in 2002, just months after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and would go on to become the longest-serving commissioner in the city's history. Under his leadership, violent crime in the nation's largest city fell by 40 percent.

Kelly was invited to VMI by the H.B. Johnson Jr. '26 Distinguished Lecture Series.

Members of the Leadership Book Program recently read his just-published memoir, Vigilance: My Life Serving America and Protecting Its Empire City. Prior to his talk, Kelly discussed his life's work, and the book, during a breakfast gathering with members of the book club.

Kelly's talk at the Institute took the form of a moderated question-and-answer session, with Col. Dave Gray, director of VMI's Center for Leadership and Ethics, serving as the moderator. In attendance were not only a large number of cadets and interested community members, but also a dozen or more police officers from surrounding jurisdictions.

While wide-ranging, the questions tended to focus on lessons Kelly had learned from his years not only at the NYPD, where he established the first counterterrorism bureau at any municipal police department, but also his years as a U.S. Marine, which included time spent in combat during the Vietnam War.

Asked about the leadership traits he'd learned in the Marine Corps, Kelly talked about many of the qualities a leader should have, among them justice, decisiveness, dependability, tact, loyalty, and enthusiasm.

"Leaders are made, not born," observed Kelly. "You learn basic tenets in the military, and you use them the rest of your life."

Kelly recalled that as a company grade officer in Vietnam, he not only had the opportunity to put his leadership skills to the test, but also to learn lessons that would bear fruit down the road at the helm of a police force larger than the FBI. He noted that in many ways, a crime-ridden area is little different from a combat zone.

When Gray asked Kelly about leadership of one's peers, a vital skill for cadets at VMI, the former commissioner replied that going "back to basics" was the way to go. "Treat people fairly," he commented. "Praise in public, criticize in private."

Kelly did draw a distinction between the military, in which commissioned officers start ahead of enlisted personnel, and police departments, in which everyone starts at the

35 same level. "You have to make people understand in a nice way that you're the boss," he said.

Problem solving was another central focus of the discussion. Asked how he'd lowered New York City's crime rate, which was once one of the highest in the country, Kelly talked about the need to simply have more manpower – which, in New York City's case, amounted to obtaining sufficient funding to hire 5,000 more officers.

But those officers didn't just sit behind desks, or cruise around in patrol cars. Community policing, in which police officers work with community members to identify and solve problems, was key to Kelly's crime-fighting strategy. At the same time, Kelly allowed that many people have a negative view of police and thus don't see them as potential allies.

"What you strive for is mutual respect," said Kelly, who is now president of the risk management services division for a commercial real estate company with an international presence.

"Mutual problem-solving can build that respect."

On a larger level, Kelly had to address the issue of terrorism head-on during his tenure as police commissioner. "We knew we had to do something different" in the wake of the terrorist attacks that stunned a nation and left more than 3,000 people dead, said Kelly.

Kelly reached outside of the traditional system to hire individuals who didn't have a police background, including a former CIA director and a retired lieutenant general in the Marine Corps. In addition, Kelly's Real Time Crime Center included listening outposts in eleven foreign countries, with personnel specifically trained in counter-terrorism operations.

Kelly noted that as a result of these and other efforts, at least sixteen terrorist plots have been foiled since Sept. 11, 2001.

Efforts to fight crime are, of course, fraught with the delicate balance between police acting on a reasonable suspicion that an illegal act has been or will be committed and preserving the civil liberties of a suspect.

Kelly was asked about New York City's policy of "stop, question, frisk," in which police officers stop individuals suspected of committing a crime, question them, and frisk them for weapons. Critics of the program have claimed that this procedure unfairly targets African Americans and other minorities.

In his response, Kelly pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned this policy in the 1968 case Terry v. Ohio. "[Stop, question and frisk] is a tool that has to be in the tool kit of every police officer," said Kelly.

Furthermore, the former commissioner noted that statistics have borne out that the NYPD is not engaging in racial profiling. He stated that historically, 69 percent of the violent crimes in New York City have been committed by African Americans, but only 53 percent of the stop, question, and frisk stops have targeted individuals of that race.

36 Kelly also voiced support for the use of body cameras by police, saying that they can help deter violent crimes.

Near the end of the interview, Kelly took a handful of questions from his audience. Cadet Charles Borinstein '17 asked about the difference between a leader who can make change happen and one who cannot.

In his response, Kelly said of the Sept. 11 attacks, "Don't let a good crisis go to waste." He noted the difficulty of making change in a unionized organization such as the NYPD, but said this challenge was counterbalanced by a "very supportive" Mayor Michael Bloomberg and the obvious need to do things differently to prevent another terrorist attack.

"You have to make the people affected by the change see it in their self-interest," Kelly noted.

The next questioner, Cadet Trey Rose '16, asked Kelly to discuss the threat of cyber terrorism – what form it would likely take and how it could be prevented.

"Cyber [terrorism] is the elephant in the corner," replied Kelly, who mentioned that the nation's electrical grid is particularly vulnerable to a cyber attack. Kelly also noted that far too many individuals are leaving themselves open to cyber crime each day, as studies have shown that the most common passwords used in America is "123456" or simply "password."

Just before the program concluded, Gray asked Kelly if the former commissioner had any advice for cadets planning a career in either law enforcement or the military.

Describing a career in those fields as "an immediate opportunity to do good" and "a great way to make a living," Kelly counseled, "If you're at all inclined in that area, go ahead and give it a shot."

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