<<

City Police Department Surveillance Technology

By Ángel Díaz PUBLISHED OCTOBER 7, 2019

n every age, police forces gain access to new tools Because the police insist on complete secrecy, however, and technologies that may advance their mission the picture is far from complete. The NYPD should not be Ito prevent and combat crime. The deployment of allowed to prevent the public and its elected representa- new technologies requires an understanding of their tives from learning basic information necessary on these impacts on the fundamental rights of the commu- technologies, which is critical to effective oversight and nities that police serve and the development of the establishment of safeguards to protect the privacy safeguards to prevent abuse. The New York Police and civil liberties of New Yorkers. The POST Act, intro- Department (NYPD), however, has purchased and duced by Council Member Vanessa Gibson and currently used new surveillance technologies while attempt- supported by 28 co-sponsors, would require NYPD to ing to keep the public and the City Council in the dark. take these steps.

This chart provides an overview of the NYPD’s surveil- lance technology, based on publicly available information, as well as the potential impact of the use of these tools.

1 Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law Facial Recognition

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

Facial recognition Facial recognition raises Chief of Detectives Memo #3 (2012). Garbage In, Garbage Out systems attempt the following concerns: – Face Recognition on to identify or verify NYPD’s Facial Identification Section (FIS) runs Flawed Data (Georgetown the identity of Race, Gender, and Age static photos obtained from various sources, Law Center on Privacy & individuals based Bias. Numerous studies including databases of arrest photos, juvenile Technology) on their face. have found that facial arrest photos of children as young as 11, and Different systems recognition performs photos connected to pistol permits, among The NYPD uses altered analyze face poorly when analyzing others.6 The system analyzes a photo against images in its facial characteristics the faces of women, those databases and generates potential recognition system, new in photos or children, and people matches.7 The system will return a list of 200+ documents show (The video feeds, or with darker skin tones. 1 potential matches from which an FIS investi- Verge) through real-time This places communities gator selects one.8 surveillance. already subject to over- Review on the effects of policing at greater risk of Where the footage is blurry or otherwise unus- age, gender, and race de- misidentification. able, the NYPD can use photo editing tools to mographics on automatic replace facial features in a reference photo so face recognition (The Privacy. Facial recog- it more closely resembles those in mugshots.9 Visual Computer, Volume nition is recognized as The NYPD has also run photos of celebrities 34) extraordinarily intrusive, through its facial recognition system to try to challenging reasonable identify suspects that resemble the celebrity She Was Arrested at 14. expectations of privacy where the original photo returned no match- Then Her Photo Went and lacking necessary es.10 The effectiveness of these techniques is to a Facial Recognition oversight. This is why a doubtful. Database (The New York number of groups have Times) called for a moratorium on facial recognition. Gender Shades: In- tersectional Accuracy Free Speech. Law Disparities in Commercial enforcement use of facial Gender Classification recognition can chill the (Proceedings of Machine exercise of First Amend- Learning Research, Vol- ment rights by exposing ume 81) protesters to persistent surveillance and identifi- NYPD ripped for abusing cation. facial-recognition tool (NY Daily News) Regulation. There have been widespread calls for Coalition Letter Calling for its regulation2, and some a Federal Moratorium on cities — such as San Face Recognition (ACLU) Francisco3; Oakland4, CA; and Somerville, MA5 — Face it: Recognition tech- have even banned its use. nology isn’t close to ready for prime-time (NY Daily News)

Face it: This is risky tech. We need to put strong controls on face-recogni- tion technology (NY Daily News)

Facial Recognition Is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy ()

Interactive Facial Recogn- tion Map (Fight for the Future)

2 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology Video Analytics

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

These systems an- Video analytics raise the No standalone NYPD policy is available, IBM Intelligent Video alyze surveillance following concerns: though video analytics may fall under the Analytics (IBM Vendor camera footage Public Security Privacy Guidelines that gov- Material) and attempt to False Positives. Informa- ern the NYPD’s . isolate people and tion from video analytics These guidelines make no mention of video IBM Presentation Regard- objects within can be incorrect and analytics, however, and they do not include ing NYPD Video Analytics the video feed. lead to unnecessary and standards governing the use or storage of Development (IBM) Video analytics use potentially dangerous analytics information. algorithms to spot police encounters. IBM Used NYPD Surveil- particular articles IBM developed object identification technolo- lance Footage to Develop of clothing and Free Speech. Video gy through a partnership with the police that Technology That Lets Po- luggage. Certain analytics, like facial gave the company access to the department’s lice Search by Skin Color versions claim they recognition, can chill First camera footage.11 The NYPD then acquired (The Intercept) can find people Amendment activity by IBM’s object identification system to incor- in surveillance exposing individuals to porate it into the NYPD’s Domain Awareness The Dawn of Robot Sur- footage that match persistent surveillance as System.12 veillance: AI, Video Analyt- a particular hair they move about the city. ics, and Privacy (ACLU) color, facial hair, As of April 23, 2019, IBM stopped marketing and even skin tone. Racial Bias. Without certain versions of its Video Analytics program adequate controls, to additional cities.13 It is not clear what this targeting individuals means for IBM’s existing customers. based on their perceived ethnicity has the ability According to the NYPD, the analytics system to exasperbate racial is intended to automatically alert NYPD offi- disparities in policing. cials to activities, such as “suspicious package was left” or “loitering.”14 Privacy. Video analytics allow for persistent sur- A version of IBM’s Intelligent Video Analytics veillance as individuals 2.0, which allows users to search based on move throughout the city, ethnicity tags, was allegedly tested but never challenging traditional incorporated into the NYPD’s broader surveil- expectations of privacy. lance infrastructure.15

3 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology Monitoring

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

Social media Social media monitor- NYPD Detective Guide (2013) and Opera- Government Monitoring monitoring can be ing raises the following tions Order 34: Use Of Social Networks for of Social Media: Legal and divided loosely into concerns: Investigative Purposes – General Procedure, Policy Challenges (Bren- three categories: New York Police Department (2012). Policies nan Center) False Positives. What permit officers to monitor social media for (1) Monitoring or people say and do on information and investigative leads. NYPD monitoring of Black tracking an individ- social media are difficult Lives Matter protest ual, a group, or an to interpret, and connec- Handschu Guidelines (2017). These guide- movements via social affiliation (e.g., an tions on social media can lines are the result of a settlement arising out media (The Appeal) online hashtag) via be given undue impor- of the NYPD’s unconstitutional surveillance publicly available tance or misunderstood of protesters and religious minorities. The NYPD Social Media information; completely. Handschu Guidelines allow officers to carry Monitoring Policy Allows out general topical research, but they prohibit For Use Of Aliases, Has (2) Using an Privacy. Social media them from searching for individuals’ names.16 Exceptions For Terrorist informant, a friend monitoring is intrusive, Activity (Tech Dirt) of the target, or challenging individuals’ However, to develop intelligence information an undercover reasonable expectations or to detect or prevent terrorism or other un- Stop and Frisk Online: account to obtain of privacy in online com- lawful activities, the NYPD is also permitted to Theorizing Everyday information from a munications. conduct online searches in the same manner Racism in Digital Polic- protected or private as any member of the public, which would ing in the Use of Social account; or Racial Bias. In the permit the police to access popular social Media for Identification of context of gang inves- media platforms.17 Criminal Conduct and As- (3) Using soft- tigations, communities sociations (Social Media + ware to monitor of color (especially chil- Various NYPD units engage in social media Society, Volume 3) individuals, groups, dren) are more likely to monitoring, including the Intelligence, Juvenile associations, or have their online activity Justice, Counterterrorism, Gang Enforcement, The Strange Aftermath of locations. surveilled. Internal Affairs, Executive Staff Identity Pro- the Largest Gang Bust in tection, and Threat Assessment divisions.18 New York History (Vice) Police officers can Free Speech. Surveilling also obtain war- social media also has The full extent of social media monitoring by Private Eyes, They’re rants or use other the potential to chill free the NYPD is unknown, but it has been used in Watching You: Law En- legal processes expression, including investigations ranging from tracking alleged forcement’s Monitoring of to direct a social by causing individuals gang activity19 to surveilling Black Lives Matter Social Media (Oklahoma media platform to to self-censor and by protesters.20 Law Review, Volume 71) provide informa- monitoring lawful protest tion, such as direct activities and other forms The Wildly Unregulated messages, metada- of protected association. Practice of Undercover ta, and subscriber Cops Friending People on information. (The Root)

To Stem Juvenile Rob- beries, Police Trail Youths Before the Crime (The New York Times)

Undercover cops break Facebook rules to track protesters, ensnare crimi- nals (NBC News)

4 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology Criminal Group Database, aka the “Gang Database”

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

Gang databases Gang databases raise the There is no public NYPD policy. The informa- Groups Demand to See contain information following concerns: tion we know about the NYPD’s use of the Criteria for NYPD Gang about individuals gang database comes from NYPD’s testimony Database (Courthouse who police regard Racial Bias. The vague during city council proceedings. According to News Service) as confirmed or and broad criteria for in- the NYPD, there are two ways individuals get suspected gang clusion, open the door to added to the Gang Database: NYPD Gang Database Can members. The racial bias. NYPD officials Turn Unsuspecting New criteria for inclusion have acknowledged that (1) Self-admission of “gang membership” to Yorkers into instant Felons in the database are as many as 95 percent a member of the NYPD25, being identified as (The Intercept) not always known, of the people in its gang a gang member by two “independent and but can include database are Black or reliable sources,” or “social media posts ad- NYPD honcho insists poorly-defined Latinx.23 mitting to membership in a gang.” It is unclear gang database saves lives, activities such as whether NYPD requires a clear declaration but a teary City Council associations with Impact on immigration of membership, or if vague associations per- member said it can have suspected gang status. A gang affilia- ceived by investigating officers will do. devastating consequenc- members, various tion can have negative es (NY Daily News) styles of dress, consequences for an (2) If any two of the following circumstances numerous clothing individual’s interactions are true: How Gang Victims Are La- colors, and certain with federal immigration (a) Frequent presence at a known gang loca- belled as Gang Suspects tattoos. authorities. Immigration tion (this criteria may capture huge numbers (The New Yorker) and Customs Enforce- of people who have no association besides re- In some instances, ment (ICE) agents have siding in an area with active gang members); The Database (BRIC TV, activity far removed been known to target (b) Possession of “gang-related documents” Vimeo video) from gang connec- individuals that have (without more information, it is difficult to tions, such as draw- been identified as gang determine what kinds of “documents” are The fightagainst the ing a high school members in police being referred to and whether there may be NYPD gang database (The mascot21 or simply databases.24 The extent innocuous reasons to possess them); Policing and Social Justice frequenting an area of information sharing (c) Association with known gang members (it Project, Youtube video) where gangs are between the NYPD and is possible to have friends and family who are known to assem- ICE is not properly under- gang members without joining it); When a Facebook Like ble22 has landed stood. (d) Social media posts with known gang Lands You in Jail (Brennan individuals in a members while possessing known gang para- Center) gang database. False Positives. Gang phernalia, such as beads, flags, and bandanas databases are notori- (there are many reasons to pose with known Spotlight: The Dangers ously inaccurate and gang members for social media, including for of Gang Databases over-inclusive. Individuals safety or familial ties); and Gang Policing (The generally do not know if (e) Scars and tattoos associated with a partic- Appeal) they are in the database, ular gang; or and there is not always a (f) Frequently wearing colors and frequent mechanism for challeng- use of hand signs that are associated with a ing their inclusion. particular gang.

As of June 2018, the NYPD’s gang database contained around 17,600 individuals, down from a high of 34,000.26

5 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology Predictive Policing

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

There are two Predictive policing raises There is no public NYPD policy, but the de- NYPD Predictive Policing types of predictive the following concerns: partment has stated that its Public Security Documents (Brennan policing programs: Privacy Guidelines for the Domain Awareness Center) place-based and Racial Bias. Predictive System govern predictive policing. These person-based. policing tools incorporate guidelines do not refer to predictive polic- Predictive Policing Goes historical policing data ing systems, and they describe the Domain to Court (Brennan Center) Place-based to generate predictions. Awareness System as a system to “monitor predictive policing This makes it likely public areas and public activities,” which does ‘Red Flags’ as New uses algorithms to that these systems will not describe predictive policing. Documents Point to Blind analyze data sets in recreate biased polic- Spots of NYPD ‘Predictive order to try to pre- ing practices that have The NYPD uses its own proprietary system Policing’ (The Daily Beast) dict where certain resulted in the over-po- that tries to locate hotspots for a particular crimes are likely licing of communities of crime based on an unknown number and Court: Public Deserves to occur. These color or data that has type of data inputs.27 Much of what we know to Know How NYPD Uses estimates are used been manipulated to about the NYPD’s system comes from the Predictive Policing Soft- to inform where reflect higher or lower Brennan Center’s three-year legal fight with ware (Brennan Center) police officers are incidences of crimes. For the NYPD over our public records request for deployed. example, historical NYPD documents about the development and use of Dirty Data, Bad Predic- arrest data may be taint- the system. tions: How Civil Rights Person-based pre- ed by its unconstitutional Violations Impact Police dictive policing ana- stop-and-frisk program We do not have a complete picture of the sys- Data, Predictive Policing lyzes data sets in or by data manipulation tem’s inputs and outputs, but the NYPD says Systems, and Justice order to generate a tactics such as falsifying that its system “was not designed to store, (New York University Law list of individuals an arrest records to meet maintain, or archive output predictions.”28 The Review Online) algorithm believes arrest quotas. failure to archive predictions frustrates the are likely to commit ability to study or audit the system for bias The Police a crime. Privacy. Predictive polic- and related concerns. Department’s Domain ing tools undermine con- Awareness System (NYPD stitutional requirements NYPD correspondence with potential vendors academic article) that police should target suggests an openness to using data inputs individuals based on indi- that could function as racial proxies, though vidualized suspicion, not it’s not known if these inputs are incorporated statistical probability. into the NYPD’s system. These include demo- graphic data, school enrollment, educational attainment, income levels, journey to work, poverty levels, median income, and population under age 18.29

6 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology Cell Site Simulators, aka “Stingrays”

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

Cell site simulators, Cell site simulators raise There is no public NYPD policy. Cellphones, Law Enforce- also known as the following concerns: ment, and the Right to Pri- Stingrays or IMSI In 2017, a judge held that police vacy (Brennan Center) catchers, are Privacy. Cell-site simula- use of Stingrays requires a warrant support- devices that trick tors can locate and track ed by probable cause.31 Prior to this ruling, Brooklyn Court: NYPD’s phones within a individuals as they move NYPD stated that its practice was to obtain Use of Cell-Phone certain radius into throughout public and a pen-register order — an order issued by a Trackers Unconstitutional connecting to the private spaces, including judge — so long as police can show reason- (Brennan Center) device rather than when they are within a lo- able suspicion.32 a cell tower, thus cation that would require Did the Police Spy on revealing their a warrant to enter. They Between 2008 and 2015, NYPD used Sting- Black Lives Matter Pro- location to the are also indiscriminate, rays in over 1,000 investigations.33 There is no testers? The Answer May operator of the tricking every phone publicly available information on whether the Soon Come Out (The New device. within their radius into police purged extraneous data. York Times) providing identifying in- Police departments formation. In a dense city New York Police Are use cell-site simu- like New York, this means Using Covert Cellphone lators to pinpoint numerous bystander Trackers, Civil Liberties the location of devices will be picked up Group Says (The New phones of targeted along with the targeted York Times) suspects. Cell-site device. simulators can also log IMSI numbers Free Speech. Without (unique identifying appropriate safeguards, numbers) of all mo- cell-site simulators can bile devices within a be used to identify the given area. individuals who attend protests or particular Additionally, while houses of worship. there is no evidence NYPD has used this functionality, some cell-site simulators can intercept com- munications that a phone is sending or receiving, and they can even change the content of those communica- tions.30

7 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology Automated License Plate Readers

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

Automated license ALPRs raise the following Public Security Privacy Guidelines (2009). Documents Reveal ICE plate readers (AL- concerns: Using Driver Location PRs) are devices License Plate Reader Devices Operations Data From Local Police for that are attached to False Positives. Infor- Order (2013). Deportations (ACLU) police cars or fixed mation from ALPRs can on poles to capture be incorrect and lead to The NYPD operates nearly 500 license plate Documents Uncover the license plates of unnecessary and poten- readers as part of its Domain Awareness NYPD’s Vast License Plate all cars passing by. tially dangerous police System,35 and as of 2013, the department had Reader Database (ACLU) License plate reads encounters. a database of 16 million license plate reads.36 are also frequently Thousands of ICE employ- run against a “hot Privacy. ALPR data The NYPD has used license plate readers to ees can access license list” of, for instance, can provide a detailed collect information about the cars parked in plate reader data, emails stolen cars or AM- account of an individual’s mosque parking lots.37 show (The Verge) BER Alerts. movements. It can be used to target people Through its contract with the vendor Vigilant License plate reader error In addition to who visit sensitive places, Solutions, the NYPD now has access to a leads to traffic stop at license plates, such as immigration clin- database that contains over 2.2 billion license gunpoint, court case (Ars ALPRs can capture ics, protests, or houses of plate reads.38 Vigilant Solutions has a national Technica) photographs of worship. database of license plates, a national network cars, along with of private ALPRs, and analytical tools that al- Data Driven: Explore photos of the driver Impact on Immigration low police to “stake out” areas, predict where How Cops Are Collecting and passengers. Status. Police agencies certain individuals may be, and track individu- and Sharing Our Travel This information can choose to share als outside of New York City.39 Patterns Using Automat- is uploaded to a their ALPR information ed License Plate Read- database where it with federal immigration We do not currently know if NYPD shares the ers (Electronic Frontier can be analyzed to authorities. According to data it gets from its own ALPRs with other cli- Foundation) study movements, a public records request, ents of Vigilant Solutions as well as other law associations, and ICE has received ALPR enforcement or federal immigration agencies, Privacy advocate held relationships to data from 80 different as some cities do. at gunpoint after license crimes. police departments, plate reader database including Fairfield, CT; mistake, lawsuit alleges San Diego, CA; Orange (The Verge) County, Texas; and Ath- ens-Clarke County, GA; among others.34

It is not known whether the NYPD shares ALPR data with ICE, but the Public Security Privacy Guidelines permit the sharing of ALPR infor- mation with government entities.

8 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology Domain Awareness System

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

The Domain Aware- DAS raises the following The system’s Public Security Privacy Guide- How New York City is ness System (DAS) concerns: lines (2009) specify that the purpose of the watching you (City & is a network of DAS is to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, State New York) cameras, software, Privacy. DAS creates a but the NYPD may use these technologies for sensors, databases, system of persistence ordinary police investigations, including the NYPD Domain Aware- devices, and related surveillance that covers detection of loiterers.41 The guidelines fail to ness System (DAS) (The infrastructure that vast swaths of New York cover technologies, such as video analytics, Institute for Operations provides informa- City, which can be used that have been incorporated since they were Research and the Man- tion and analytics to monitor the move- issued. agement Sciences) to police officers ments of New Yorkers as for the purposes they move throughout The NYPD’s DAS collects and analyzes data The New York City Police of “public safety” the city. from a variety of sources in lower and mid- Department’s Domain and to “detect, town , including approximately: Awareness System (NYPD deter, and prevent False Positives. False 9,000 CCTV cameras, some owned by the article, INFORMS Journal potential terrorirst matches from various NYPD and some owned by private entities on Applied Analytics, activities.” components, such as that share their feeds with police.42 Volume 47) automatic license plate 43 readers, can place ƒƒ500 license plate readers, plus infor- innocent people at risk mation obtained from contractor Vigilant 44 of dangerous police Solutions. 45 encounters.40 ƒƒRadiation and chemical sensors. ƒƒNYPD databases, including arrest records, Data May be Shared. criminal records, etc..46 The extent to which in- formation obtained from ƒƒShotSpotter coverage (see below for addi- the DAS is shared with tional information).47 federal agencies, such as immigration authorities, ƒƒ911 calls.48 remains unknown.

Drones

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

Drones are re- Drones raise the follow- Patrol Guide: Use of Unmanned Aircraft New York’s New Eyes in motely operated ing concerns: System (2018). the Sky (Slate) aircraft — ranging in size — that can Privacy. Without proper The NYPD’s policy specifies that it will not New York Police Say They be equipped with oversight, drones can en- equip drones with facial recognition, but Will Deploy 14 Drones various camer- gage in forms of surveil- it contains a large carve-out for situations (The New York Times) as, sensors, and lance that can redefine where there is a “public safety concern.”49 It is other devices. For reasonable expectations unclear if there are any restrictions on running Eyes In The Sky: The Pub- example, they can of privacy. Drones can historical drone footage through a separate lic Has Privacy Concerns deploy cameras also be used to collect in- facial recognition system. About Drones (Forbes) capable of facial formation about bystand- recognition, and ers who are not connect- The policy also specifies that drone footage New NYPD Drone Policy can also contain ed to a law enforcement will only be retained for 30 days, but it con- Represents A Serious GPS trackers and investigation. These risks tains a carve-out that allows this period to be Threat to Privacy (New Stingray devices. are largely invisible, as extended for various types of legal investiga- York Civil Liberties Union) drones can be difficult tions.50 for ordinary persons to detect or protect against According to the NYPD, the department depending on their size deploys drones for uses such as crowd or altitude. control, hostage situations, and reaching remote areas. The NYPD says drones will not Free Speech. Without be used for routine police patrols, to enforce proper oversight, drones traffic laws, or for “unlawful surveillance,51 but can be deployed to sur- the NYPD has deployed drones to monitor veill individuals in ways protesters at least once during the 2019 NYC that chill free expression. Pride March.52

9 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology X-ray Vans

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

These vans use “Z X-ray vans raise the There is no public NYPD policy. Split Decision on NYPD’s backscatter” x-rays following concerns: X-ray Vans (ProPublica) that bounce off The ways in which the NYPD uses x-ray vans objects, allowing Privacy. X-ray vans raise and for which types of investigations remain NYPD has super-secret the police to see privacy and constitu- largely unknown.53 X-ray vans (New York into vehicles and tional concerns, as they Post) behind walls as the potentially allow police to van drives by. examine intimate details Public Sees Through of human bodies, private NYPD X-Ray Vans (Polic- vehicles, and even inside ing Project at NYU School homes. of Law)

Health. X-ray vans raise The NYPD Is Using Mobile health concerns as they X-Ray Vans to Spy on may expose individuals Unknown Targets (The to doses of ionizing Atlantic) radiation.

Gunshot Detection System (ShotSpotter)

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

The privately Gunshot detection sys- There is no standalone NYPD policy, but it Here’s How the NYPD’s developed tems raise the following may be subject to the DAS’s Public Security Expanding ShotSpotter ShotSpotter concerns: Privacy Guidelines, since gunshot detection System Works (DNAinfo) system uses systems are incorporated into the NYPD’s sensors to pick up False Positives. This sys- Domain Awareness System. Privacy Audit & Assess- sounds that appear tem can make mistakes ment of ShotSpotter, to be gunshots. and confuse ordinary The NYPD’s ShotSpotter system uses sensors Inc.’s Gunshot Detection Audio snippets background noise as that triangulate the location of sounds that Technology (Policing are automatically gunshots. may be gunshots. If a ShotSpotter employee Project at NYU School of sent to vendor believes a shooting occurred, the system then Law) employees who Privacy. Recordings of sends data, including audio of the incident, to attempt to verify ambient noise can be the Domain Awareness System.54 Cameras The NYPD’s newest tech- whether the misued to target voice within 500 feet are programmed to capture nology may be recording sound represents surveillance by record- footage before and after the suspected conversations (Business a shooting. The ing audio from selected gunshot.55 Investigators at the NYPD Domain Insider) vendor employee ShotSpotter devices. Awareness System then transmit relevant then transmits data to field officers.56 information about the potential shooting to police department clients.

10 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology DNA Database aka the Local DNA Index System

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

DNA databases DNA databases raise the Detective Guide (2013) contains redacted N.Y.P.D. Detectives Gave a contain genetic following concerns: instructions for collecting “abandoned” DNA Boy, 12, a Soda. He Land- information about samples in both “controlled” and “uncon- ed in a DNA Database individuals, which Privacy. Biometric sam- trolled” environments. (The New York Times) can be analyzed ples for DNA databases against a suspect’s can be collected without Chief of Detectives Memo #17 (2010). The NYPD detectives demand- DNA for a potential appropriate standards memo contains instructions for how to collect ed DNA swabs from hun- match. According that respect individual “abandoned” DNA samples from objects such dreds of black and Latino to media reports, privacy. Individuals are as water bottles, bubble gum, and apples men while hunting killer of the NYPD’s DNA not always given a full for submission to Office of the Chief Medical Howard Beach jogger (NY database contains and accurate representa- Examiner (OCME) for examination. Daily News) as many as 82,473 tion of how their genetic genetic profiles, profile will be used, and Many individuals in DNA databases have How Juveniles Get Caught including samples there are often no proto- never been accused or convicted of any crime, Up In The NYPD’s Vast obtained from cols for deletion. and there are limited avenues for impacted DNA Dragnet (Gothamist) children.57 indivudials to request deletion. In addition, voluntary Legal Aid Society is Work- samples can be collect- There are three methods for the NYPD to ing to Protect New Yorkers ed from children that obtain biometric samples for DNA analysis: From ‘Genetic Stop and are incapable of giving Frisk’ (NowThis News) informed consent. Finally, ƒƒVoluntary sample. Officers can ask indi- the secret collection of viduals to provide a biometric sample for Push to solve gun cases “abandoned” genetic DNA analysis, but they are not necessarily fuels rapid growth of New samples means that required to disclose that it may be used for York’s DNA database (NY many individuals have no an unlimited number of investigations and Daily News) notice that their genetic that the sample will be retained indefi- information was collect- nitely. They are also not required to tell New York Examines Over ed and added to a city individuals that they are allowed to refeuse 800 Rape Cases for database. consent. At times, police collect biometric Possible Mishandling of samples from children without a lawyer, Evidence (The New York Racial Bias. Commu- parent, or guardian present. Times) nities of color are likely overrepresented in DNA One New York State court ruled that the Can DNA Evidence Be Too databases resulting from NYPD violated a minor’s Fourth Amend- Convincing? An Acquitted overpolicing of specific ment rights against unreasonable search Man Thinks So (The New communities. and seizure when they collected a genetic York Times) sample for DNA analysis where they received a written consent from the minor In New York City, Gun without the presence of his parent, guard- Cases Fuel Growing, Un- ian, or attorney.58 regulated DNA Database (The Trace) ƒƒSecret collection of “abandoned” samples. NYPD officers will obtain “aban- City’s DNA database doned” genetic samples from discarded swells as cops log New objects, such as water bottles, chewing Yorkers’ genetic material gum, and apples. For example, police ( Daily Eagle) officers bring suspects into interrogation rooms, wait for the suspect to take a OCME Laboratory Proto- drink or smoke a cigarette, and collect the cols (NYC Office of Chief sample once a suspect throws the object Medical Examiner) away.59

ƒƒCourt-ordered collection. A court will order a suspect to provide a sample for DNA profiling where the prosecution can establish: “(1) probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime. (2) a ‘clear indication’ that relevant material evidence will be found, and (3) the method used to secure it is safe and reliable.”60

11 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology Body Cameras

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

Body cameras are Body cameras raise the Body Camera Patrol Guide (2018). All uni- Body cameras can’t solve used to record an following concerns: formed patrol officers in New York City are all our problems (USA officer’s inter- equipped with body-worn cameras.63 Today) actions with the Effectiveness. As part public and store of the settlement related In New York City, members of the public can A Big Test of Police Body the video for future to the NYPD’s unconsti- request video under the Freedom of Informa- Cameras Defies Expec- review or use in tutional stop-and-frisk tion Act, but when it relates to evidence in a tations (The New York criminal or civil program, a federal judge criminal case the video is turned over to the Times) proceedings. ordered the NYPD to prosecutor’s office. If a camera records an offi- develop a mechanism for cer-involved shooting or other high-profile in- Body-Worn Cameras: While body cam- officers to electronically cident, NYPD works with “relevant authorities” What you need to know eras have been record certain police to determine if video can be made public.64 (NYPD) promoted as a tool encounters.61 for police account- The benefits of police ability, they have However, the cameras body cams are a myth largely functioned remain under the control (TechCrunch) as evidence-gather- of police, who can decide ing devices. when to activate them. Police Body Worn Cam- Even when the cameras eras: A Policy Scorecard are rolling, police officers (The Leadership Confer- can add audio commen- ence & Upturn) tary that skews public perception of an incident NYPD Completes Rollout (e.g. yelling “stop resist- of Body-Worn Cameras ing” to a cooperating to All Officers on Patrol person). (NYPD)

Privacy. Absent safe- The Hidden Bias of Cam- guards, body cameras eras (Slate) can function as mobile surveillance devices, recording information about people and places that officers encounter while on patrol, regard- less of their relationship to a suspected crime.

Future iterations of body cameras may be equipped with facial recognition technolo- gy,62 raising additional concerns about privacy, effectiveness, and racial bias.

12 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology SkyWatch & TerraHawk Surveillance Towers

How It Works Impact NYPD Policy & Scope of Use Further Reading

Surveillance towers Surveillance towers raise SkyWatch Detective Guide (2013), redacted. Brooklyn Bureau: NYPD allow officers to the following concerns: TerraHawk Detective Guide (2013), redacted. Towers May Defuse Cop, monitor areas from Community Friction (City several stories Privacy. Surveillance NYPD may deploy surveillance towers in Limits) above street level towers impose a feeling response to a rise in crime within a particular as well as record of persistent monitoring, area,67 but they have also been used to mon- NYPD Removes Contro- movements within challenging reasonable itor protests, such as Occupy .68 versial Surveillance Tower a targeted area. expectations of privacy. The current number of towers deployed by From Tompkins Square Surveillance towers can NYPD is unknown. Park (Observer) Each SkyWatch also be used to collect in- tower contains formation about bystand- Surveillance towers are also used to col- flood lights, a com- ers who are not connect- lect “probative” and “potentially probative” mand desk, devices ed to a law enforcement images, according to patrol guides, but the to detect vehicle investigation. meaning of these terms is unclear. speeds, tinted win- dows, digital video Free Speech. Per- According to media reports, TerraHawk Tow- recorders, and sistent monitoring from ers have been deployed in , Far customized surveil- surveillance towers can Rockaway, Coney Island, and Howard Beach. lance cameras.65 chill associations among 69 SkyWatch have also been deployed in Har- individuals. lem70, Crown Heights71, downtown Manhattan The standard (Zuccotti Park)72, Bedford-Stuyvesant Brook- equipment placed lyn73, and the of Manhattan on TerraHawk ()74. towers is unknown, but their patent- ed technology contemplates the use of surveillance cameras along with infrared detectors, motion detectors, and a thermal im- aging device.66

13 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology Endnotes

1 See, e.g., Joy Buolamwini and Tim Gerbu, “Gender Shades: 15 George Joseph and Kenneth Lipp, “IBM Used NYPD Surveil- Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classifi- lance Footage to Develop Technology That Lets Police Search By cation,” available at: http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwin- Skin Color,” The Intercept, September 6, 2018, available at: https:// i18a/buolamwini18a.pdf; See also Abdurrahim, S.H., Samad, S.A. & theintercept.com/2018/09/06/nypd-surveillance-camera-skin- Huddin, A.B. Vis Comput (2018) 34: 1617, available at: https://doi. tone-search/. org/10.1007/s00371-017-1428-z; See also Jacob Snow, “Amazon’s 16 2017 Handschu Guidelines at Section IX(B)(1), available Face Recognition False Matched 28 Members of Congress with at: https://www.aclu.org/sites/all/libraries/pdf.js/web/viewer. Mugshots,” available at: https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-tech- html?file=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aclu.org%2Fsites%2Fde- nology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-false- fault%2Ffiles%2Ffield_document%2Fraza_exhibit_a_to_order_ap- ly-matched-28. proving_stipulation_of_settlement_revised_handschu_guidelines. 2 See Coalition letter urging federal moratorium on face recogni- pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-14,800 tion for law enforcement and immigration enforcement purposes, 17 See id. at Section IX(B)(2). available at: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_docu- ment/2019-06-03_coalition_letter_calling_for_federal_moratori- 18 See Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. um_on_face_recognition.pdf. Department of Justice and Police Executive Research Forum, “Social Media and Tactical Considerations” at 13 (2013) (identifying NYPD 3 San Francisco “Stop Secret Surveillance” ordinance, File units that engage in social media monitoring, and exploring use by In- No. 190110, available at: https://sfgov.legistar.com/View. telligence and Juvenile Justice as case studies), available at: https:// ashx?M=F&ID=7206781&GUID=38D37061-4D87-4A94-9AB3- www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/ CB113656159A. Technology/social%20media%20and%20tactical%20consider- 4 The final revisions to Oakland’s Surveillance and Community ations%20for%20law%20enforcement%202013.pdf. Safety Ordinance are pending, but see Charlie Osborne, “Oakland fol- 19 See David Uberti, “How Social-Media Surveillance of Teenagers lows San Francisco’s lead in banning facial recognition tech,” ZDNet, Led to a New King of Policing,” The Nation, April 19, 2019, available at: July 19, 2019, available at: https://www.zdnet.com/article/oakland- https://www.thenation.com/article/jeffery-lane-digital-street-book- city-follows-san-franciscos-lead-in-banning-facial-recognition-tech/. review/. 5 See City of Somerville Massachussetts Agenda Item 207566, 20 See id. at 13-16; see also George Joseph, “Years After Protests, available at: http://somervillecityma.iqm2.com/Citizens/ NYPD Retains Photos of Black Lives Matter Activists,” The Appeal, Detail_LegiFile.aspx?Frame=&MeetingID=2941&MediaPosi- January 17, 2019, available at: https://theappeal.org/years-after-pro- tion=&ID=20375&CssClass=. tests-nypd-retains-photos-of-black-lives-matter-activists/. 6 See NYPD correspondence with DataWorks Plus, Document 21 See Hannah Dreier, “He Drew His School Mascot – and ICE La- 020238-020312 at page 74-75 available at: https://drive.google.com/ beled Him a Gang Member,” ProPublica, December 27, 2018, available drive/folders/1OxzGtFuWBU9PecG2cmpE8QfVwZm9kr22. at: https://features.propublica.org/ms-13-immigrant-students/hun- 7 NYPD, Real Time Crime Center FIS Presentation, available at: tington-school-deportations-ice-honduras/. https://drive.google.com/open?id=18yVMSMAblqcE_nAlGf9XRl- 22 See Ali Winston “Vague Rules Let Ice Depoart Undocumented Unik8xWOh_. Immigrants as Gang Members” The Intercept, February 17, 2017, 8 See id. available at: https://theintercept.com/2017/02/17/loose-clas- 9 See id. sification-rules-give-ice-broad-authority-to-classify-immi- grants-as-gang-members/. 10 NYPD, Real Time Crime Center Facial Identification Section (FIS), presentation by Detective Markiewicz (Sept. 17, 2018) (notes 23 See Jeff Coltin, “Why everyone is suddenly talking about the on file with Clare Garvie at Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & NYPD gang database,” City & State New York, June 13, 2018, available Technology). at: https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/criminal-justice/ why-everyone-suddenly-talking-about-nypd-gang-database.html. 11 See George Joseph and Kenneth Lipp, “IBM Used NYPD Sur- veillance Footage to Develop Technology That Lets Police Search By 24 Emmanuel Felton, “Gang Databases Are a Life Sentence for Skin Color,” The Intercept, September 6, 2018, available at: https:// Black and Latino Communities,” Pacific Standard, March 15, 2018, theintercept.com/2018/09/06/nypd-surveillance-camera-skin- available at: https://psmag.com/social-justice/gang-databas- tone-search/; see also IBM Presentation to NYPD “IBM SVS 4.0 es-life-sentence-for-black-and-latino-communities. Research and Development Status Update 6 for NYPD,” (hereinafter 25 See Statement of Chief Dermot Shea, Chief of Detectives, “IBM Presentation”) October 16, 2012, available at: https://www. New York City Police Department, Before the New York City Council documentcloud.org/documents/4452844-IBM-SVS-Analytics-4-0- Committee on Public Safety, Committee Room, City Hall, June 13, Plan-Update-for-NYPD-6.html. 2018, at 4. 12 See Vexcel Presentation “Vexcel – NYPD: Domain Awareness 26 See id. System; IBM Delivery Transition Review,” at slide 3, available at: 27 See E.S. Levine, Jessica Tisch, Anthony Tasso, and Michael Joy, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4452846-Vex- “The New York City Police Department’s Domain Awareness System,” cel-NYPD-DTR-02-04-10.html. Informs Journal on Applied Analytics, January 18, 2017, available at: 13 IBM, Software withdrawal: IBM Intelligent Video Analytics, April https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/inte.2016.0860 (sub- 23, 2019, available at: https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/Show- scription required). Doc.wss?docURL=/common/ssi/rep_ca/2/897/ENUS919-092/ 28 See Affidavit of Lesa Moore, Supreme Court of the State of New index.html&request_locale=en. York, County of New York, Index No. 160541/2016 at Page 2, available 14 See Statements of NYPD Inspector Salvatore DiPace, “New York at: https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Lesa%20 City’s Hidden Surveillance Network Part 2 – by Scientific Ameri- Moore%20Affidavit%20in%20Compliance%20-FINAL%20-%20 can,” September 16, 2011, available at: https://www.youtube.com/ %28%23%20Legal%209761080%29%20%281%29.pdf. watch?v=LSf4YCB3Hi0l; see also IBM Presentation at slide 22-50. 29 See Predictive Forecasting of Crime, a KEYSTATS presidenation

14 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology for the New York City Police Department, at 2-7, available at http:// 49 See William Alden, “There’s a Fight Brewing Between the NYPD www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Keystats%20De- and Silicon Valley’s Palantir,” BuzzFeed News, June 28, 2017, available sired%20Data%20Elements.pdf. at: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/williamalden/theres-a- 30 See Promotional Material from GammaGroup, “3G-GSM Tactical fight-brewing-between-the-nypd-and-silicon-valley; see also NYPD Interception & Target Location,” available at: https://info.publicintelli- Patrol Guide: Use of Department Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), gence.net/Gamma-GSM.pdf. available at: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/ public_information/public-pguide2.pdf#page=687. 31 See New York v. Gordon, 58 Misc.3d 544, 550-51 (2017), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_27364. 50 See id. htm. 51 See Ashley Southall and Ali Winston, “New York Police Say They 32 See id, see also NYPD FOIL Response to Request #15-PL-3861 Will Deploy 14 Drones,” The New York Times, December 4, 2018, at 4, available at: https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/releas- available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/nyregion/nypd- es/NYPD%20FOIL%20Appeal%20Response%20Stingrays.pdf. drones.html. 33 See NYPD response to NYCLU FOIL Request, available at: 52 Noah Manskar, “NYC Pride March Will Be Especially Huge for https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/releases/NYPD%20 Stonewall Anniversary,” Patch, June 25, 2019, available at: https:// Stingray%20use.pdf. patch.com/new-york/new-york-city/nyc-pride-march-will-be-espe- cially-huge-stonewall-anniversary. 34 See Vasudha Talla, “Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Loca- tion Data From Local Police for Deportations”, March 13, 2019, avail- 53 See In the Matter of Grabell v. New York City Police Department, able at: https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-bor- 139 A.D.3d 477, 479 (2016). der-patrol-abuses/documents-reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data. 54 See NYPD Technology: Helping the Finest Keep NYC Safe,” 35 See Testimony of Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and February 17, 2017, available at: http://nypdnews.com/2017/02/nypd- Counterterrorism John J. Miller, New York City Policy Department, technology-helping-the-finest-keep-nyc-safe/. Before the New York City Council Committees on Public Safety and 55 See Rocco Parascandola and Oren Yaniv, “De Blasio, NYPD Un- Fire and Criminal Justice Services, November 12, 2014, at 4. veil $1.5M ShotSpotter system, detects gunshots via sensors around 36 See Joseph Goldstein, “Weekly Police Briefing Offers Snapshot city and alerts police automatically,” , March 16, of Department and Its Leader,” The New York Times, February 10, 2015, available at: https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd- 2013, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/nyregion/ unveils-1-5m-shotspotter-system-bronx-article-1.2151679. weekly-briefing-provides-lengthy-snapshot-of-kelly-and-nypd. 56 See NYPD Technology: Helping the Finest Keep NYC Safe,” html?_r=0. February 17, 2017, available at: http://nypdnews.com/2017/02/nypd- 37 See Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, “With cameras, infor- technology-helping-the-finest-keep-nyc-safe/. mants, NYPD eyed mosques,” Associated Press, February 23, 2012, 57 See Jan Ransom and Ashley Southall, “N.Y.P.D. Detectives available at: https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2012/with-camer- Gave a Boy, 12, a Soda. He Landed in a DNA Database,” The New as-informants-nypd-eyed-mosques. York Times, August 15, 2019, available at: https://www.nytimes. 38 See Mariko Hirose, “Documents Uncover NYPD’s Vast License com/2019/08/15/nyregion/nypd-dna-database.html. Plate Reader Database,” ACLU, January 25, 2016, available at: https:// 58 See People v. K.M., 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 28363 at *6. www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/location-tracking/docu- 59 See, e.g. People v. Blank, 2018 N.Y. Slip Opp 28274. ments-uncover-nypds-vast-license-plate-reader-database. 60 See Matter of Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 291 (1982). 39 See Agreement Between New York City Police Department and Vigilant Solutions for License Plate Recognition Data & Law Enforce- 61 See Floyd. v. City of New York, Case 1:08-cv-01034-AT, Document ment Archival & Reporting Network, dated as of April 9, 2015 at Exhib- 619 “Order Regarding Documenting Police-Citizen Encounters,” July it 1 (Contractor Scope of Work), available at: https://www.nyclu.org/ 19, 2018, available at: https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/up- sites/default/files/20150409_NYCC_ALPR_foil.pdf loads/Order-re-lower-level-doc-pilot_0.pdf. Axon, a leading manufacturer of body cameras, has said it 40 See Colin Lecher, “Privacy advocate held at gunpoint af- 62 ter license plate reader database mistake, lawsuit alleges,” The will ban the use of facial recognition in its products because the Verge, February 21, 2019, available at: https://www.theverge. “technology is not yet reliable enough.” See First Report of the Axon com/2019/2/21/18234785/privacy-advocate-lawsuit-california-li- AI & Policing Technology Ethics Board, available at: https://www. cense-plate-reader. policingproject.org/axon. New York City Police Department Newsroom, “NYPD Completes 41 See NYPD Public Security Privacy Guidelines, April 2, 2009 at 63 Pages 2-3, available at: https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/down- Rollout of Body-Worn Cameras to All Officers on Patrol,” March 6, loads/pdf/crime_prevention/public_security_privacy_guidelines.pdf 2019, available at: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr0306/ nypd-completes-rollout-body-worn-cameras-all-officers-patrol#/0. 42 See Testimony of Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism John J. Miller, New York City Policy Department, 64 See Body-Worn Cameras, What you need to know, available Before the New York City Council Committees on Public Safety and at: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/equip- Fire and Criminal Justice Services, November 12, 2014, at 4. ment-tech/body-worn-cameras.page. See FLIR SkyWatch Options, available at: 43 Id. 65 https://www.flir.com/ globalassets/imported-assets/document/skywatch-options.pdf. 44 See Agreement Between New York City Police Department and Vigilant Solutions for License Plate Recognition Data & Law Enforce- 66 See TerraHawk, LLC patent for “Vehicle for deploying a mobile ment Archival & Reporting Network, dated as of April 9, 2015 at Exhib- surveillance module,” available at: https://patents.justia.com/pat- it 1 (Contractor Scope of Work), available at: https://www.nyclu.org/ ent/9669690. sites/default/files/20150409_NYCC_ALPR_foil.pdf 67 See e.g., Jen Chung, “After Bloody Weekend, NYPD Beefs Up Patrols, SkyWatch Towers,” Gothamist, June 4, 2013, available at: 45 Id. https://gothamist.com/2013/06/04/after_bloody_weekend_nypd_ 46 See Thomas H. Davenport, “How Big Data is Helping the NYPD beefs_up.php. Solve Crimes Faster,” Fortune, July 17 2016, available at: http://for- tune.com/2016/07/17/big-data-nypd-situational-awareness/. 68 See Tana Ganeva, “Is all that NYPD surveillance legal?” Salon, November 4, 2011, available at: https://www.salon.com/2011/11/04/ 47 See id. is_all_that_nypd_surveillance_legal/. 48 See id.

15 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology 69 See Andy Cush, “Here’s the Newest Tool in the NYPD’s Surveil- lance Arsenal,” Animal New York, November 15, 2012, available at: http://animalnewyork.com/2012/heres-the-newest-tool-in-the- nyps-surveillance-arsenal/. 70 See “NYPD Installs ‘Sky Watch’ in Neighborhood,” CrownHeights.info, November 23, 2006, available at: http://crown- heights.info/crime/3780/nypd-installs-sky-watch-in-harlem-neigh- borhood/. 71 See id. 72 See Nick Turse, “What Happened When I Tried to Get Some Answers About the Creepy NYPD Watchtower Monitoring OWS,” AlterNet, November 6, 2011, available at: https://www.alternet. org/2011/11/what_happened_when_i_tried_to_get_some_answers_ about_the_creepy_nypd_watchtower_monitoring_ows/. 73 See Orsianmi Burton, “An encounter with “SkyWatch” on a block in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, Anthropoliteia, May 8, 2014, avail- able at: https://anthropoliteia.net/2014/05/08/an-encounter-with- sky-watch-on-a-block-in-bedford-stuyvesant-brooklyn/. 74 See Catherine Rafter, “NYPD Removes Controversial Surveil- lance Tower from Tompkins Square Park, The Observer, July 28, 2015, available at: https://observer.com/2015/07/nypd-removes-contro- versial-surveillance-tower-from-tompkins-square-park/.

16 Brennan Center for Justice NYPD Surveillance Technology