White River Helicopter Accident Facilitated Learning Analysis

Incident Date: August 24, 2020

“Tom’s dedication to protecting lives from the devastation of fires

led him to lend his skills as a pilot to our neighbors in Oregon. His spirit of service and bravery represents the best of Montana.”

– Montana Governor Steve Bullock

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Contents

1. Tribute to Tom Duffy………….…………………………………………. 3

2. Executive Summary……………………………………………………… 4

3. The Facilitated Learning Analysis Process……………………………… 6

4. The Accident Story………………………………………………………. 8

5. Practices Worth Sharing and Lessons Learned………………………….. 18

6. Appendices A. Acknowledgments………………………………………………… 24 B. The Facilitated Learning Analysis Team………………………….. 24

3 1. Tribute to Tom Duffy

“Tom Duffy and his family are in Sharla and my thoughts today. Tom selflessly put his own life on the line to keep others safe from forest fires—in his own backyard and in communities hundreds of miles away. We’ll be forever grateful for the service in which he gave his life.”

– U.S. Senator Jon Tester

Thomas “Tom” Mark Duffy (1980-2020) of Bozeman, Montana, gave his life in a helicopter crash assisting the United States Forest Service, while fighting the White River Fire on August 24, 2020.

Tom was a successful entrepreneur and pillar of the community. Most importantly, he was a loving husband to his wife of almost two decades and devoted father to their three children.

Tom owned Excel Drilling and the Bozeman Hot Springs. He is remembered by friends as someone who was interested in learning about and exploring new frontiers. Tom is remembered fondly, not only for his decades of work in search and rescue (SAR), but also for his devoted service to his church and community.

Tom served on the executive committee of the Adventist Church for Montana as well as the North Pacific Union, the church’s entity that oversees five states in the region. The Adventist Church President for Montana wrote: “His love of family and God was very evident. Tom was a lay leader who devoted countless hours of his time and energy in faithful service.”1

Gallatin County Sheriff Brian Gootkin said that Tom was the third generation of the Duffy family to fly rescue missions for SAR who had flown SAR rescue missions for 20 years. He added that “Duffy was a big man with a big heart who brought calm and skill to every mission.”2

1 https://gleanernow.com/news/2020/08/montana-adventist-lay-leader-dies-firefighting-helicopter-crash 2 https://www.krtv.com/news/montana-and-regional-news/community-honors-bozeman-helicopter-pilot-who-died- in-a-crash

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To read Tom’s complete obituary click here.

To view the procession organized by the Wildland Firefighter Foundation click here.

“Tom was a 1.5-size human being with a five times bigger heart than most. Sweet, kind, gentle. Giant of a guy that was really comical to watch squeeze into a helicopter. But tremendously skilled, very good humored, very even-keeled with a very good head on his shoulders. And that made the difference for us in a lot of places and saved a lot of lives here.”

– Jason Jarrett3, Former Commander, Gallatin County Sheriff’s Office Search and Rescue, Montana

3 Other than Tom Duffy, along with the individuals we’ve cited from media sources for the memorial, and U.S. Forest Service personnel who assist others in the process of Caring for Our Own (see page 17), all of the names in this FLA have been changed.

5 2. Executive Summary

On August 24th, 2020 the Mt. Hood National Forest was battling a wildfire on the Barlow Ranger District that was sparked by lightning eight days earlier. The White River Fire was located approximately 32 miles south of Hood River, Oregon.

Fire activity on the eastern edge of the White River Fire started picking-up in the early afternoon of the 24th. At about 1215 that day, Air Attack noticed a spot fire that was growing in intensity. Helicopter 314 (N314), a Kaman K-1200 (K-MAX)4 flown by Tom Duffy, dropped water on the spot and put it out. Duffy continued doing bucket work throughout the afternoon. Toward the end of his shift, when Air Attack tried to reach him, he did not respond. His helicopter had crashed into the river, killing the pilot, who was the only person on board.

The National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) responded and took the lead role in investigating the crash itself. In the following weeks, the U.S. Forest Service conducted this Facilitated Learning Analysis around two areas: 1.) The Incident Management Team’s response to the accident, their coordination with cooperating agencies, and the successes and challenges encountered; and 2.) The underlying and/or situational conditions in Region 6 that were present during the time of the accident.

The NTSB will produce a separate report to be released upon conclusion of their investigation. That NTSB report will cover the helicopter operations (flight and crash), whereas this FLA report covers the response to the crash and the situational conditions present during the time of the accident.

Although there were some lessons learned during the incident itself, the Incident Management Team’s awareness of the prepositioning of important regional resources (and ability to engage them quickly), along with a disciplined approach to learning (preseason reviewing, updating, and drilling with Incident Within an Incident guides and mishap plans) allowed them to respond quickly to this incident.

The year 2020 has been unique for the nation as a whole. The issues facing the nation are similarly affecting the 2020 fire season. For example, COVID-19 guidelines require extra cleaning and disinfecting precautions. These take time to implement at every step, from the caches supplying the resources to the camps, ICPs, helibases, etc. that they serve. These conditions are explored in more detail in the body of this document.

4 For the duration of this document, this helicopter will be referred to as “H-314”.

6 3. The Facilitated Learning Analysis Process

The Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) process is meant to facilitate learning from unintended outcomes by interviewing people who were involved in an event and sharing a collective story of their experiences. The FLA Team also offers “Practices Worth Sharing” and “Lessons Learned.” By “Practices Worth Sharing,” we mean that participants highlighted specific practices that were in place that enabled them to respond efficiently. Participants in this incident also shared “lessons learned” which are lessons learned by the participants as the incident unfolded that will likely influence future actions if something similar were to occur again.

It is not an objective of this FLA to attempt to reveal the cause or causes of the helicopter crash.

It is an objective of this FLA to share the experiences of the 36 individuals that the FLA Team interviewed, comprised of: Forest Supervision, Law Enforcement, the Oregon National Guard (OR ARNG), Aviation Resources, Ground Resources, Dispatchers, Incident Management Team (IMT) members, and the firefighters assigned to the White River Fire.

A. Background on the Forest and Context for the White River Fire

Forest/District Background The Mt. Hood National Forest is the “backyard” playground for the Portland, Oregon metropolitan area with a population of nearly 2.1 million people. Located 20 miles east of Portland, the 1.3 million-acre Mt. Hood National Forest is framed by the strikingly beautiful Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area to the north, the metropolitan area to the west, the Willamette National Forest and Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation to the south, and the sweeping dry lands of central Oregon to the east. One of the State of Oregon’s iconic landmarks, the 11,240-foot peak of Mount Hood stands sentinel in the middle of the Forest. Nearly 4.5 million people per year come to view the wildlife and wildflowers, camp, hike, boat the lakes, play in the streams, ski, mountain bike, hunt, fish, climb Mount Hood, and participate in a range of recreational activities and traditional uses in and around the Forest.

Figure 1– The Mt. Hood National Forest’s location and surroundings.

7 The White River Fire was located on the Barlow Ranger District on Forest’s east side. One of the popular locations on the Barlow Ranger District includes the historic “Barlow Road,” the final overland section of the culturally significant Oregon Trail. U.S. Highway 26, located on the District’s south end, sees approximately 7,000 annual average daily traffic. At the time of the White River Fire, the Barlow and Hood River ranger districts were being led by Kameron Sam, the Barlow District Ranger.

The Mt. Hood National Forest fire management on an average year responds to approximately 70 fires. Most of these fires are human caused and are less than one acre in size. Large scale fire management on the Forest is rare. Prior to 2020, the last major fire was the September 2017 Eagle Creek Fire that burned approximately 50,000 acres in the Columbia River Gorge.

Landscape Background The Forest is pursuing several current projects, including one in the fire arena aimed at creating a landscape of primarily live forests with relatively low fire hazard, to which fire suppression personnel can respond appropriately. There is heightened concern that undesirable conditions within the Barlow Ranger District could also adversely impact surrounding communities. The District is immediately adjacent to several landowners, including the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation and communities of Tygh Valley, Sportsman’s Park, and Pine Grove. In this area, light, flashy fuel and frequent down-canyon winds often result in fast-moving fires.

Values at Risk The values at risk communicated to the Type 2 Incident Management Team (IMT) focused on values on and off the Mt. Hood National Forest. Private property, local ranches, and the communities of Pine Grove and ultimately Tygh Valley were noted. The Pine Grove community is of greatest concern due to the prevailing winds, high density of homes, type of fuel involved, potential for crown fires, and limited road access. Concerns with air quality affecting these communities as well as the greater Portland area were also shared. The COVID-19 pandemic has also heightened both the public and the agency’s concern with community sensitivity to smoke.

The Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation was another value near the Mt. Hood National Forest that was at risk. This area is important to tribal members because it contains commercial timber, wildlife and wildlife hunting opportunities, wilderness trails, traditional food areas, cultural sites, and wood cutting areas.

Other resources on the Mt. Hood National Forest include: high-use recreation areas with dispersed camping and campgrounds; cultural resources, including the historic Barlow Road, a section of the Oregon Trail; active timber sales and stewardship projects; powerlines; the Lower White River Wilderness Area; wildlife habitat for sensitive species; and high-use trails.

Forest COVID Mitigations/Stressors The COVID-19 concerns began for the nation in March. The Mt. Hood National Forest Headquarters employees were starting to move back into their remodeled office in Sandy, Oregon. In addition, employees from the Clackamas River Ranger District were relocating to this location when they were mandated to telework due to COVID-19. Therefore, because of this telework mandate, neither the headquarters employees or the Clackamas Ranger District employees were able to occupy their new offices.

In response to the pandemic, the Mt. Hood National Forest stood-up a COVID Type 3 Team who worked abnormally long hours through early June to get plans in place. Several team members from this effort were involved in the White River Fire, including the eastside Fire Management Officer (FMO), Sam, as the Incident Commander; Carl, Forest Fire Staff; Charles, Westside Assistant FMO; and Clint, the Forest’s Patrol Captain.

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Around May 29, 2020 the Forest began to reopen most of the recreation sites on the Forest. After months of the public isolating in their homes, visitors flocked to their public lands as the weather improved. The Mt. Hood National Forest experienced more use and demands from the public than ever before, increasing the stress on public resources, employees, and law enforcement.

Popular sites were overcrowded. Visitors started spreading to areas of the Forest rarely used by public. The civil unrest in the country also had the public on edge as they escaped to the Forest. All of this stretched the capacity of an already heavily worked staff, including law enforcement personnel.

The Mt. Hood National Forest also started to respond to an above average number of abandoned campfires. A Forest Order was issued on August 4 banning all fires, including campfire or stove fire, charcoal fire or pellet fire for all general forest areas and campgrounds.

At the same time, hundreds of employees across the agency strategized and implemented changes regarding COVID mitigations for fire activities. The agency determined that active suppression would be a priority in order to reduce smoke concerns as much as possible. As a result, the aviation group acquired an expanded aviation contract for increased availability of fire incident air support. Therefore, this season saw a much greater utilization of air support for fire nationwide.

4. The Accident Story

Approaching the Day of the Accident The White River Fire was discovered on August 17 after a bout of lightning had passed through the Barlow Ranger District the previous day. The Columbia Cascade Communication Center (“Columbia Dispatch”) dispatched H-314 to locate the fire. Initially thought to be in the wilderness, it was west of the wilderness in steep country with extremely heavy fuel loading. Firefighters on the ground located and performed initial attack on the White River Fire. At the time, it was estimated to be 1-2 acres. Dry weather and winds hampered containment efforts. Figure 2 – Location of White River Fire (Photo credit: Fire Aviation, August 25th, 2020) Given the complexities of this fire, on August 19 the Mt. Hood National Forest ordered a Type 2 Incident Management Team (IMT). Over the next two days, the current Type 3 Team transitioned with this incoming Type 2 Team. At first, the fire didn’t seem overly complex. Hank, the Agency Administrator for the fire, remembered thinking: “it would not have prompted a District [with more frequent fire] to trigger a Type 2 Team response. They were struggling to get more people, we weren’t a regional priority – pretty low priority.” On August 21, the Type 2 IMT assumed command of the fire.

The IMT relocated the Incident Command Post from Rock Creek Reservoir to Tygh Valley and kept Base Camp in Camp Cody, an old work station turned group camp area near Rock Creek

9 Reservoir. Helibase was roughly 30 air miles north of the fire at the Ken Jernstedt Airfield in Hood River, Oregon5. The helibase had been previously established by Oregon Department of Forestry for other large fires earlier in the summer. Air Attack was flying out of nearby The Dalles Municipal Airport.

Figure 3 – Fire map with drop points, helispots, and divisions.

As the Type 3 Team was transitioning to the Type 2 Team, fire behavior was increasing. The White River Fire seemed to flare-up one day and settle down the next. Hal, Branch 1, recalls the diurnal winds not flowing in the typical manner. They were experiencing down-canyon winds during the day. On August 23, aviation assets worked to manage flare-ups and provide intel as the fire burned in the confluence where Deep Creek meets White River. They had also successfully squashed a spot fire that had started that evening on the south side of the White River. Fire crossing the river was a major concern for the IMT and the Forest.

Helicopter pilots were working the fire on the heavily timbered, steep slope leading down to the White River Canyon in Division A. The Type 2 Team decided to continue with the strategy the Type 3 Team had implemented. Operations Chief, Carter, explained that the IMT “had found a place on the eastern end of the fire in Division Alpha where they put in a couple of check lines to slow things down and give them time to work on a road system coming off Drop Point 25 and some dozer line down to the White River.”

5 This airport serves approximately 15,000 flight operations annually and provides aircraft storage in hangars and tarmac tie-downs. The Western Antique Aeroplane and Automobile Museum next to the airport is a major tourist attraction that draws many general aviation visitors. Airport management accommodates wildfire response needs by utilizing existing taxiways or other areas of the airport for staging and emergency operations.

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Figure 4 – Close up of the White River Fire map. “They had built some hand line and they wanted to connect it to the river. They had made good progress and we were keeping it in check—slowing it down for them.” – Air Attack, Frank

Fire Activity Increases on the 24th On August 24, fire activity started picking up. At approximately 1215, Frank, Air Attack, noticed another spot fire had started across the river in a rock scree. H-314 dropped water on the spot and put it out. However, a new spot fire ignited within 700 feet from a section of handline to the east, which prompted Operations Chief Carter to take a recon flight with Robert, Branch 2, out of Cody Camp to assess the fire behavior and look for potential holding features.

Air Attack Loses Contact with H-314 at 1800 H-314 had been working for about an hour into his third fuel cycle and had about 2-3 more bucket drops before he would need to go back for fuel. Helicopter 8AC (H-8AC), a skycrane, was coming in to fill behind H-314 and called dispatch to say that he was 16 minutes out and would be on scene shortly. At that time, Air Attack called H-314 but was unable to make contact. He recalled: “I heard nothing. And I called. And I called. Nothing. Then I called Columbia Cascade Dispatch and said: ‘I lost contact with 314, where are you showing him on AFF?’”6

6 Automated Flight Following (AFF) is an online government application that automatically tracks the location and velocity of specially-equipped aircraft and provides this near-real-time to dispatchers, aviation managers, and other authorized users—utilizing geolocation and data communication devices installed in all firefighting aircraft. AFF tracks position, speed, altitude, and heading and transmits the data via satellite to a ground-based flight monitoring systems.

11 He remembers having a “flight following” application open on his iPad, but that he was having trouble connecting to AFF—and H-314 wasn’t showing up. His first thought was that it might not mean anything because “flight following doesn’t work efficiently all the time and helicopters can be so low they aren’t on there.” 7

Dispatch called back and said: “He’s showing active.”8 Air Attack flew over the location based on the coordinates from dispatch9 and called back to say: “I’ve lost contact with 314 and he is not where he last pinged.” One of the initial attack dispatcher’s heart began to sink as she saw the aircraft dispatcher’s growing concern over the inability to reach H-314.

The Aircraft Base Radio Operators (ABRO) in the communications trailer at the helibase picked up the conversation between Air Attack and dispatch on their radio. They informed Kyle, the Helibase Manager Trainee, of what they were hearing. Immediately, Kyle called dispatch to find out about the status of H-314 and then he called Lucas, the Air Support Group Supervisor (ASGS) at Camp Cody. Dispatch echoed what the ABROs heard in the communications trailer: “Air Attack lost commo with H-314.”

Air Attack later recalled, “The odd thing was that he was still showing active, so that’s when I really started looking for him. I went to where I knew he had been dipping. He had this one hole in an oxbow he was using. In the course of a few days, he pulled out probably over a hundred buckets. I got to looking very close and then I started to notice debris.” At approximately 1817, Air Attack called Branch 1 to have him notify ICP about the downed aircraft.

There was no positive communication with H-314. Everyone in the dispatch center was monitoring closely, and the minute AFF turned red, Levi, the Dispatch Center Manager, began delegating tasks to those around him. Chris, the Assistant Center Manager, was assigned to call the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Interior Office of Aviation Safety, and the U.S. Forest Service Mishap Hotline. Quincy, the Aircraft Dispatcher, stayed on the radio and kept track of what was happening in the field. Dakota, the Initial Attack (IA) Dispatcher, contacted Wasco County 9-1-1 and requested assistance from their Search and Rescue Team. The Dispatch Center Manager began calling Forest leadership and the Regional Office to notify them of the situation. Other people in the center began filling in the holes left behind as the others began responding to keep the office running.

Command and General Staff Start the IMT’s IWI protocol Steph, the IMT’s Planning Operations Section Chief, and Ian, the IMT’s Plans Trainee, were reviewing a new planning application at ICP when the Incident Commander Trainee came over. “Steph, Steph are you copying the radio traffic? Sounds like there’s an aircraft down.” The Command and General Staff initiated their Incident Within an Incident (IWI) procedures which had been complicated by poor communications on the fire.

7AFF uses satellite-to-ground based technology and will track aircraft regardless of the altitude or flight level. Tracking aircraft using ground radar-based tracking software and applications will be affected by the altitude the aircraft is flying. If the aircraft goes below line of site to the radar station it will not be shown. 8 The Aircraft Dispatcher kept a timer for 15-minute check-ins with the helicopters working the White River Fire even though they were “flight following” locally with Air Attack and being tracked by Automated Flight Following (AFF). Every 15 minutes, the Aircraft Dispatcher would note the location of the aircraft from AFF. Per protocols, if there was an incident with aircraft on the fire, the Incident Within an Incident would proceed through dispatch and not the incident Communication Unit. When Air Attack called in inquiring about H-314 there was one-minute left on the timer. 9 Air Attack recognized that the latitude and longitude provided by dispatch was for the location where the pilot was working, not dipping.

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Figure 5 – The water dip site (the “oxbow” in the river). Until they were able to set up more portable repeaters, all IWIs, not just those involving aviation resources, would have to go through Columbia Dispatch. The Command and General Staff gathered around the designated outdoor table and began making notifications. “We were all hoping for the best. Aircraft down is always nerve racking. We all put on our game face to do what we have to do. Focus on mission at task,” Steph recalled. Anxiously, they waited for more information from the scene.

While still in the air looking for H-314, Air Attack called the recon helicopter that was just launching out of Cody Camp and told them: “I need you to go low level in this area and check to see what’s going on.”

When the recon helicopter H-0WH arrived, they started looking for any signs of life. As they got a bit lower, the recon pilot could identify specific pieces of the debris and said: “We need to go in for a closer look.” The pilot instructed Carter, the Operations Section Chief, Robert, Branch 2, and Finn the Helicopter Manager to “talk to me about the trees and snags.” Then everyone in the helicopter began providing the pilot with safety-related information: “You are good to the left, good left” etc. The pilot of the recon ship told Carter: “If you need to take pictures of the area, now is the time.”10 The recon ship also provided more accurate coordinates that reflected the actual location of the downed helicopter to Air Attack and Columbia Dispatch.

A crowd began to gather around the picnic table as the Command and General Staff started getting updates. Henry, the Air Operations Branch Director, called the National Guard Extraction medevac helicopter11 staged in Madras, Oregon as soon as he heard the aircraft had gone down. It wasn’t long before they received reports from the recon ship. The scene was more of a debris

10 Ops recalled thinking: “I hadn’t even thought about that. I was concentrating on us not becoming something on top of this one.” At that time, he said he “kind of stuck his iPad into the bubble and snapped a few pictures.” Ops recalled the pilot offering: “Well, you can open the door to get better pictures.” But Ops declined. He later recalled thinking that it might have been better to take video at that time in order to share information about the “whole environment.” 11 On August 19, 2020 the Oregon Governor declared a state of emergency due to threat of wildfires in Oregon. The Governor’s declaration authorizes the Oregon Department of Forestry and the Oregon Office of the State Fire Marshal, in coordination with the Oregon Office of Emergency Management, to utilize personnel, equipment and facilities from other state agencies in order to respond to or mitigate the effects of the wildfire emergency. Federal entities work with state agencies to mitigate threats and accommodate resource shortages. This plan reduces the time it would take to mobilize National Guard resources for wildland fire use. Once activated, this agreement prepositions a hoist capable medevac on 24-hour standby centrally located to serve multiple ongoing fires. Teams managing fires nearest the medevac staging area have direct ordering capabilities. Other fires not immediately in the vicinity have to order through the Northwest Coordination Center (NWCC).

13 field. They weren’t hopeful for any survivors to be found. The Command and General Staff moved their gathering to the Communication tent where they could continue to support IWI operations and keep Forest and Regional leadership informed. The IMT’s Deputy IC continued to manage the White River Fire while the IC stayed and worked the IWI plan.

Getting to the Pilot With better intel of the scene, Air Attack asked for the National Guard Extraction aircraft to be ordered out of Madras. The extraction aircraft had hoist capabilities that could get an injured individual out of the steep canyon faster than a ground response.

Hudson, Branch 212, was traveling in the area of Keeps Mill gathering situational awareness on the south side of the river when he was able to pick up bits and pieces of radio communications. From the broken radio traffic, he was able to discern the location of the accident and, like other ground personnel on the fire, he began referencing maps to determine if there were access points down to the accident near his location. He also heard Branch 1 coordinating with DIV M to send a squad from the Winema Interagency Hotshot Crew (IHC) to the south side of the river via the junction of roads 48 and 43 (Drop Point 75) to attempt to gain access. Hudson changed his scouting plans and headed to tie-in with the Winema Hotshot Superintendent because he felt “it would be a feat in itself to get someone out of the canyon.”

Meanwhile, in the air, H-8AC called Air Attack and asked: “What about the pilot? What information do you have? What do you need me to do?” Knowing that he had the recon helicopter (H-0WH) on scene, Air Attack sent H-8AC back to the helibase in order to control congestion and maintain a sense of calm.

Air Attack called the recon ship to ask if they still needed to continue the recon of the spot fire. Operations Chief Carter said: “No, we need to get the aircraft out of the air.” Carter later recalled: “The surreal thing was looking down at a helicopter already crashed in the middle of the river and you are in that same spot in a helicopter. That did sit me back a little bit.”

Once the recon ship landed, Air Attack asked Ops to have the helicopter stay there because the Air Attack’s plane was getting close to timing out and the hoist ship had been ordered. Air Attack wanted an aircraft available to help the hoist ship in case he had to get out of there.

With aviation grounded, Hal (Branch 1, now acting as the IWI IC) was working the accident using a “Primary, Alternative, Contingency, Emergency” (PACE) model. His primary plan was the National Guard hoist ship that Air Attack requested. If that didn’t work out, his next option was access through an old timber clear cut on the slope located south of the river. Winema IHC had made it around to the south side of the river and began clearing the heavily overgrown 013 spur road for drivable access, while the crew EMT and Squad Leader brought the trauma kit and Traverse Rescue Stretcher (TRS) to the end of the 013. The spur road would take them ½ to ¾ of a mile to the rim of the canyon where a steep ridge with mature timber leads the way down the slope to the river.

12 Hudson stepped into the Branch 2 role once the IWI was initiated and Robert, the original Branch 2, stepped into the Safety Officer role.

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Law Enforcement Responds As Air Attack was working with ground resources and relaying information back to dispatch, Zach, a Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) working the fire, caught parts of the initial transmissions. He called the Mt. Hood National Forest Patrol Captain, Clint, to determine if they should respond. With the information he had at the time, the Patrol Captain was under the impression that the pilot may need rescuing. He directed Zach to gather the two other LEOs patrolling the fire and head toward the crash site to assist however they can.

It was the end of his shift, but Clint quickly put back on his patrol gear and headed out after contacting the Wasco and Clackamas county SAR coordinators. The plan was to meet with the county search and rescue teams at the junction of the 48 and 43 roads (Drop Point 75).

Zach called Mike and Neil, two other LEOs, asking them to meet him at the junction of roads 48 and 43. As Mike drove to meet them he stopped and asked firefighters working along the 48 Road if they had information regarding the accident. No one he spoke with had any information to share. With little more than a latitude and longitude from dispatch, and general direction from their Patrol Captain, the three LEOs head off toward the accident scene.

As they traveled down the 48 Road with lights and sirens, Hal, Branch 1, called over the radio to all resources working on the 48 Road: “Law Enforcement coming in hot. Get off the road.” While Hal was occupied with warning firefighters of the on-coming vehicles, Operations, who had joined Hal after his recon flight, picked up the hoist ship as they were inbound and were “looking for direction.”

The Pilot is Recovered Air Attack continued to circle the fire monitoring fire behavior and waiting for the National Guard helicopter to arrive. When the National Guard arrived, there was difficulty coordinating communication over the victor radio.13 Unable to connect over the victor frequencies, Air Attack reluctantly used Air to Ground primary to communicate with the National Guard. They began to assess the situation and made a plan for engaging. The rescuer they put on the ground determined that the pilot did not survive the crash.

The hoist ship pilot asked Air Attack: “Do you want us to recover the pilot?” Air Attack responded that the hoist was likely the best recovery option.14 Ops said: “Do not leave him there. Pull him out. I don’t want him in there overnight.” No one involved wanted to leave the pilot there. Nobody knew how the fire would impact the scene. It was relayed back from several individuals on the ground and Air Attack to retrieve pilot. The National Guard crew and team members continued to discuss the immediate next steps including where to take the pilot’s body. The National Guard called their Command. It was decided to take the pilot’s body to Madras for the Wasco County Medical Examiner to take possession. Air Attack was approaching the end of the plane’s fuel cycle and had to return to The Dalles Airport.

Meanwhile, Winema IHC continued to clear the 013 spur. While they worked, the IHC Superintendent scouted out ahead, looking for access down to the river. He eventually made it down to the crash site to see the National Guard Medic load the pilot’s body into the litter. At this point, the IHC Superintendent began flagging a route back to the end of the 013 spur. As he made his way back, he could see the recovery mission take place. The National Guard Extraction

13 “Victor Radio” is the common jargon among aviators used to describe the VHF AM air to air band radio. A “Victor Air Link” is basically a portable repeater that can be set up for extending the range of the air to air frequency(s) for radio flight following. 14The Department of Defense regulations require the pilot to verify that there is not a better/safer recovery option before they can continue.

15 Aircraft hovered approximately 30 feet above the tree tops as they hoisted the rescuer and pilot Tom’s body up to the helicopter. Their rotor wash was blowing embers everywhere and fire activity was picking up.

At 1951, about one hour and 45 minutes after losing contact with H-314, the downed helicopter had been located and the pilot’s body recovered.

When the request came into dispatch asking for assistance coordinating with the county Medical Examiner, it fell upon Dakota, the Initial Attack Dispatcher at Columbia Dispatch, to make that phone call. She made the initial call asking for assistance from the Sheriff’s Search and Rescue Team, and relayed information back and forth with Wasco County 9-1-1 all evening.

Dakota had been documenting everything she was communicating to Wasco County into WildCad,15 and now she had to share with them the news that there were no survivors. She recalled thinking that the process of documenting what she was doing seemed very routine until it all changed when she had to request the county Medical Examiner to meet the National Guard helicopter in Madras.

Sharing the Confirmed News with Helibase The Regional Aviation Safety Manager (RASM), Iris, just happened to be driving back to her home in Maupin from a trip to the Northwest Coordination Center in Portland when she received the notification that a helicopter had gone down on the White River Fire. Realizing she had passed the highway exit for the helibase in Hood River, she promptly turned around to drive there and see how she could help. Iris was familiar with most of the people at the helibase because she had made a safety visit there the day before.16 When she pulled into helibase, people were holding up their radios trying to get better communication reception.

With poor communications with the fire and the ICP, people at the helibase had little information about pilot Tom’s status and H-314. For the helibase manager trainee, Iris’s arrival was “like an angel descending from heaven.” He felt that she was “a shepherd to help the sheep.” She corralled questions and put people at ease.

Trying to bring a level head to the situation, the RASM had little time to do anything before she received a call confirming the fatality. “Are you sure?” she asked carefully as she saw about 18 people looking at her and waiting for information. “Do I communicate that to them? I want to make sure it’s correct.” She had the helibase manager gather everyone together. The mechanic for H-314 was on the phone and told the person on the other end of the phone that they were about to receive new information. The RASM said that she could wait to address the group until he was done with the call. Instead of finishing the call he handed her the phone.

Before taking the phone, Iris asked: “Who will I be speaking with?”

“The owner of the company,” replied the mechanic.

As the phone was being handed to her, she was informed that the owner of the company was also the father of the pilot.

15 WildCad is a GIS-based Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, used by wildland fire agencies across the country that streamlines the process of ordering firefighters and equipment. 16 It is important for the reader to note that during the safety visit, employees at the helibase had an impromptu chance to ask crucial questions about the National Guard helicopter and how it would be used. However, if that meeting had not taken place, certain information including specific local protocols would not have been communicated to them. This led the Unit Aviation Officer, Beth, to suggest that a one-page document about the National Guard Extraction Aircraft be circulated among aviation resources that addresses: 1.) ordering protocols, 2.) helicopter capabilities, and 3.) communication frequencies.

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Respectfully and solemnly, Iris took the phone and stepped behind the Communications trailer and shared the news of the fatal accident with him.

She returned from speaking with the father of the pilot and shared the news with everyone else at the helibase. She helped them prioritize their next actions by saying: “Let’s not worry about paperwork right now. Let’s focus on what you need to do for you.”

Ground Response Called Off Once the National Guard ship communicated it was a “recovery” and not a “rescue” mission, Branch 2 struggled to reach Winema IHC. Due to what he called “unacceptable communications” via the command repeaters, it was difficult for him to contact Winema IHC to keep them from bailing down the slope into the canyon. He finally managed to do so and proceeded to make his way down to Drop Point 75 to tie-in with law enforcement and other ground responders for the accident.

Watching the county law enforcement at the junction, it became clear to Branch 2 that they were operating with limited information. Initially, he couldn’t figure out why they were arriving like a “swarm of bees.” He tied-in with Hal, Branch 1, and Clint, the U.S. Forest Service Patrol Captain, at the staging area for the SAR.

Hudson, Branch 2, started sharing what he knew of the situation with Patrol Captain Clint. It came as a bit of a surprise to Clint that the National Guard was involved and already recovering the body. From the moment he learned of the accident, he had been operating under the assumption that the pilot was alive. He wouldn’t have sent his officers in had he known. His officers were hiking, thinking they were going to help rescue an injured individual.

Furthermore, the County Sheriff overheard the conversation and was disturbed not only by the decision to remove the body from the scene but also that it was transported out of the county without consultation with the Sheriff’s Office. It was the Sheriff’s jurisdiction and they had legal responsibility for securing the scene and initiating a death investigation if warranted. Together they worked on getting the Wasco County Medical Examiner over to Madras to take custody of the pilot.

LEOs Still Responding The moment their Patrol Captain had directed the three Forest Service LEOs to respond, the officers jumped into their vehicles and headed “Code 3” to Barlow Road near the junction of forest roads 48 and 43. One of the responding officers had been working on the Forest for several years. He believed that he knew how to access the location they had for the helicopter.

The road got rough as the LEOs turned onto the Barlow Road. Two of the responding LEOs began to pull away from the third as his truck couldn’t handle the rough road. He finally caught up when the other two had to stop to chop out a downed tree. The three continued on the Barlow road east toward the fire before coming to another downed tree in the road. Parking their vehicles in the sand off the road, the three officers grabbed their personal protective gear and decided to continue on foot.

As these three LEOs were hiking, they started to notice black burned ground on one side of the road. As they continued pushing forward (at times, they were having to cut their way through the thick vegetation), they were calling out hazards and snags to each other. Communications were scratchy on the R6 Law radio channel, but the Patrol Captain was able to share that: “the whole world was responding.” They weren’t hearing much radio traffic as radio communication was poor on the fire. It wasn’t long before they noticed there was fire on both sides of the road. If the pilot survived the crash he would need help. They were determined to render needed aid and help

17 get the pilot out that night. In the distance, they could hear a helicopter but thought nothing of it because there were helicopters working the fire.

After pushing hard to cover the ground to the crash site, the LEOs attempted to reach Columbia Dispatch just as it was getting dark. They believed that they were about 15 minutes from the scene. It was then that they heard the news that the pilot hadn’t survived. Their efforts to get there fast were for nothing. They coordinated with their Patrol Captain to pick them up on a spur road near Forest Creek Campground and take them back to their patrol vehicles on the other end of the Barlow Road near Faith Springs. Clint, their Patrol Captain, was “glad they went in to render aid but that road was rough. That road was scary. There was fire on both sides. It’s a rough road.”

Taking Care of Our Own A Critical Stress Incident Management (CISM)17 Team was ordered immediately by the Forest and arrived two days later to help personnel process what they had gone through. Many who had been close with Tom found the CISM Team’s presence very helpful. Beth, the Unit Aviation Officer, expressed concern about the impact the incident had on the individuals working at the helibase. She appreciated the assistance provided by the agency and the CISM Team. She recalled thinking that expressing care for personnel was the most important part of all. She said: “The flag ceremony was powerful. Everyone went through a super terrible situation. But I think we’re getting better at talking about things like this and being there for each other. We’re in this together and we are going to figure this out together. We have gotten a lot better at buddy checks, lots better at following up, and we are going to continue to do that. Nobody wanted this, but continuing to support people is first and foremost.”

The Region 6 Casualty Assistance Program (CAP) Coordinator, Monica Neal18, arrived at the airbase the morning after the incident. She met with employees and began to set up support those affected.19 CAP also gave the authority to the Forest Service, with support from the Chief of the Forest Service, to allow an employee from Region 6 to travel to the memorial service to honor Tom and his family. Monica worked in close contact with Burk Minor, President of the Wildland Firefighter Foundation (WFF), to coordinate what actions the Forest Service could take to support the family, and what kind of assistance was needed from the WFF.

With the assistance of the Oregon Honor Guard, CISM, CAP, and the WFF honored Tom with a farewell procession as he made his final trip home. The full procession can be viewed by clicking here.

Kyle shared, “I can still see Tom at morning briefing laughing at my dumb jokes. I did not know him really well, but he impressed because he was such a commanding figure. He filled up every inch of the cockpit of that heli. He really had a presence in a group of people, and for me that image is burned in my head.

17 CISM is a branch of the U.S. Forest Service’s Casualty Assistance Program (CAP) that is a relatively new overarching employee-support program. Each region has a CAP coordinator who works with the regional CISM coordinator, the regional hospital and family liaison coordinators, and the Honor Guard coordinator. 18 Because we want this document to be directly useful to those who may need it as a resource, we did not change the names of the CAP representative, Monica Neal or Burk Minor, President of the Wildland Firefighter Foundation (WFF). Further information on CAP can be found here and information for the WFF can be found here. 19 Before CAP, the Forest Service guidelines were very limited in the support available for contractors. Now, the new regulations that are in place make it easier to take action when needed. For example, due to CAP, Monica was able to secure a Forest Service employee Honor Watch for Mr. Duffy.

18

“Duffy was a big man with a big heart that brought

calm and skill to every mission.”

– Brian Gootkin, Gallatin County Sheriff

5. Practices Worth Sharing and Lessons Learned

The White River Fire IWI revealed both “Practices Worth Sharing” (steps taken by those involved that are worthy of sharing) and “Lessons Learned” (opportunities to make change that surfaced during the IWI). The majority of this learning can be applied generally, across a range of circumstances.

I. Practices Worth Sharing

A. Identify and Preposition Important Regional Resources

1. Prepositioned Hoist Ship The Northwest Coordination Center (NWCC) worked with the state to strategically stage National Guard hoist ships across the State of Oregon. In this IWI, the National Guard Extraction Aircraft was responding within approximately15 minutes. From time of dispatch to implementation of hoist was less than one hour.20 Having hoist- capable units staged near and on standby for wildland fire use is a critical part of having a rapid response for rescue and medical response on an incident. It proved to be a timely and effective tool on the White River Fire IWI response.

2. Timely Response to Take Care of Our Own The CISM Coordinator was contacted within hours of the IWI. Peer support resources were on the ground with firefighters and cooperators within two days of the IWI. Participants suggested that it was both timely and effective. Additionally, being aware of the Casualty Assistance Program (CAD) and how to use Regional resources enabled the Oregon Fire Service Honor Guard to arrange the procession for Tom quickly and thoughtfully.

B. Review, Update, and Drill Using IWI Guides and Mishap Plans

1. Familiarity with the Mishap Guide Saves Valuable Time Dispatch followed their Interagency Aviation Incident Response Guide and Checklist, commonly referred to as the “mishap plan” or “guide.” In addition to making several internal notifications, they contacted Wasco County immediately to notify the Sheriff and request search and rescue assistance for a downed aircraft. They drilled annually on IWI’s and this training helped them know how to follow their protocols.

20 An Aeromedical Evacuation Pilot from the National Guard received a phone call at 1816 hours. The initial message was that there was an aircraft down. He and his crew started to get ready to launch and stayed on the phone with the White River Fire’s Air Operations Branch Director for 1-2 minutes until they verified the situation. The pilot recalled: “That was perfect timing to get us involved early in the process. Calling us early in a situation like this, even if all of the information hasn’t come in yet, helps reduce our response time.”

19 2. The Best Incident Materials Must be Easy to Access and Easy to Use in the Moment The Mt. Hood National Forest’s aviation mishap plan was thorough but easy to use. Based on the national template, it is not augmented with very much “extra” information and was, therefore, streamlined for effectiveness. Dispatchers noted that they had reviewed the plan prior to the incident and while noting that it was a brief document, recognized that it had everything they needed in one place.

C. Take Deliberate Time for Learning

1. Learning Within the Incident Management Team The Incident Management Team (IMT) conducted an After Action Review the day following the IWI. This provided a good opportunity to review what went well and what needed improvement. For example, the IMT learned that in lieu of multiple calls being placed to the dispatch center from multiple team members, they would establish a dedicated phone line to support informed decisions and facilitate the transfer of information. They also learned that it would have been easier for the IWI’s IC to brief incoming resources responding to the incident if they would have identified a staging area and provided that information to dispatch.

2. Learning with Cooperators The IMT and the Agency Administrators met with County Law Enforcement the day after the IWI to improve communication coordination moving forward. This was a helpful step to improve relationships between the agency and the County. Specifically, IMTs have an uphill battle because they are often “outsiders” to the community, without the luxury of established relationships. This puts an even higher priority on cooperator meetings. Exploring the expectations and format of these meetings may be a fruitful exercise for both Forests and IMTs. While it is frequently extremely challenging to find time on an incident, it could pay dividends in the event of a catastrophic event.

D. Establish Command and Roles Immediately Participants noted that the Dispatch Center Manager was calm, cool, and collected. He assigned roles and directed the work of others. This helped them focus on the task at hand. The Dispatch Center Manager, Levi, recalled: “Everyone is watching the leader. If one person panics, they all panic.” A similar sentiment was shared by the Aircraft Dispatcher, Quincy, when he recalled the importance of remaining calm on the radio. He explained: “The tone in your voice, how you come across the radio, sets the tone of the incident.”

20

II. Lessons Learned

A. If You “Inherit” a Decision, a Plan, or an Established Location, like a Helibase, be Sure to Know What Hurdles You Still Might Have to Clear. It is not uncommon to have the helibase, spike camps or other entities supporting the fire located away from the ICP. In fact, the helibase is almost always located elsewhere for safety reasons and logistics. It is important for personnel who are located away from the ICP and the main camp to be connected to what is happening on the fire and that their voices and concerns can be shared. The helibase for the White River Fire was established at the Ken Jernstedt Airfield located in Hood River, Oregon. The airfield had been recently used by previous state-managed fires. This helibase was a 1.5-hour drive from the White River Fire ICP and was a very busy General Aviation (GA) airfield, with no Air Traffic Control (ATC). Overall, if you inherit a helibase, ICP, spike camp or any other predetermined location, make sure you continually monitor emerging issues and continued effectiveness by engaging with personnel at the site.

1. If the helibase is located away from the fire and the IMT, set expectations regarding face-to-face communication frequency and content. In order for people to stay in the loop as information changes on a fire and to ensure people feel supported, setting clear expectations about when and how to communicate with dispersed personnel is important for keeping them informed and feeling supported. We have learned a great deal about working virtually. IMTs may need to take advantage of technology platforms that allow them to stay connected to the helibase and keep the communication flowing in both directions.

2. Identify critical position vacancies and have a plan for coverage and communicate the plan. On the White River Fire, the IMT worked to fill vacancies, yet critical positions such as the Aircraft Base Radio Operator (ABRO) and Helibase Manager (HEBM), were not staffed by incident personnel at helibase for several days. Instead, the HEBM position was filled by a staff person from the local Forest. For example, a Communication trailer arrived at the helibase (1-2 days late). Although it was on site, there wasn’t anyone to staff it.

3. Identify and plan for fluctuations in the pace of activities at functioning airports. The Fixed Base Operator (FBO) of the airfield rearranged the way the helicopters were laid out from how the state was utilizing the space for the helibase by relocating the helicopter pads to interfere less with general aviation traffic. Additionally, the airfield regularly experiences influxes of general aviation due to “fly-ins.” In addition, the Western Antique Aeroplane and Automobile Museum located nearby shares the airfield. There are advantages and disadvantages about having helibases at functioning airports. The important lesson is to be ready to adapt based on potential fluctuations.

4. Be especially aware when communication workarounds are in place. On this fire, the helibase did not have radio communication capability directly to the fireline or ICP and the “Victor Air Link” was only partially supplied, installed at ICP rather than helibase. This meant that all aircraft requests for the fire were made through the dispatch center, and then relayed to the helibase over the phone. Additional communication difficulties were experienced between the National Guard aircraft and Air Attack on the air to air frequencies. Ensuring awareness of

21 critical communication shortages across the system, and planning accordingly, is an important piece of preparedness.

B. Successful Future Planning will Have to Account for Direct and Indirect Effects of COVID. The COVID-19 pandemic has had an impact on most everything we do. It has changed how IMTs respond to incidents (example: some team members remain virtual), who is available for team assignments, where ICPs are located and configured, and the cleaning and disinfecting procedures of shared spaces. All of these changes have the potential to disrupt normal operations. For example, the cleaning and disinfecting process alone can increase the preparation and delivery time of orders being delivered to the incident. And all of these changes are happening when there is an increase in visitor use to our public lands. Further, increased visitor use on public lands during the pandemic has stretched our resources and put added pressure on the limited number of law enforcement personnel available within the U.S. Forest Service. Specifically, the Mt. Hood National Forest is one of the more heavily visited national forests in the Pacific Northwest because of its proximity to Portland. In 2020, they have seen at least a two-fold increase in recreation use due to the pandemic.

1. IMTs may have positions that are filled virtually or may not be able to fill all of the positions on their rosters. IMTs are trying to strike a balance of having the necessary resources on site and filling some assignments virtually when possible. They may not bring with them the same resources that people are accustomed to seeing at ICP. For the White River Fire, the Type 2 Incident Management Team was not able to fill roles for Public Affairs, Safety and other important positions. It was noted that many orders came up as “Unable to Fill” on this fire as well as other fires during this time period.

2. Drills and other types of preparedness training may not have happened because of COVID. Preparation for the 2020 fire season was not the same as it has been in the past. The ability to gather resources, partners, cooperating agencies, and others for drills and preparedness was not possible because of COVID-19 protocols and mitigations. For example, employee start dates were postponed. This caused onboarding to take place when the field season was well underway, limiting time and interaction with supervision, co-workers, cooperators, and partners.

3. Drills and other types of training need to take into account the pressure on resources the pandemic poses and train accordingly. If the pandemic continues, IMTs will need to adapt so that they can prepare and drill for incidents and be prepared for future wildfires with our partners and cooperators. Teams may need to bring on additional resources to relieve a stretched and stressed workforce and may need to include additional members to their rosters in anticipation of a certain number of team members not being able to travel.

C. Building a Common Understanding of the Larger System Increases Overall Resiliency. Although firefighting and law enforcement are both first responder jobs, interaction between the two is not always broad enough or deep enough. Coordination typically comes in the form of incident security—a very different set of circumstances than a Search and Rescue mission. It is therefore no surprise to find that there is a gap in understanding that these two factions could work more closely together. While it is unreasonable to expect all of us to understand every nuance of all other jobs we may

22 interact with on an incident, it is still worthwhile to build that understanding over time. In the spirit of learning, let’s explore the perspective each group held at the time.

1. Forest Service law enforcement knew some pieces of critical information, but maybe not others. Specifically, they knew that a SAR had been called for a downed helicopter. They knew the Sheriff’s office was coordinating a SAR response and that they could arrive on scene sooner. They understood that time was of the essence in order to save a life. However, they may not have been aware of the following:

a. The IMT had access to a hoist ship to rescue any injured firefighter on the incident. They were unaware that the IMT had requested the National Guard hoist ship to attempt to rescue the pilot.

b. The IMT communication plan changed as the IMT installed command repeaters and the complexity of the fire grew. Forest Service law enforcement had some of the fire frequencies programmed into their radios but not the one that was used during the IWI. They therefore had no knowledge of the IMT’s response.

c. It is standard operating procedure to tie-in with incident leadership on a fire before entering the fire perimeter, regardless of mission. This allows for ground supervisors to account for individuals for whom they are responsible. This ensures that the IMT can track the whereabouts of anyone wanting to enter the fire, prepare them for potential conditions, and potentially keep them out of harm’s way in an active fire environment.

2. The IMT knew some pieces of critical information, but maybe not others. Importantly, the IMT knew they had the hoist ship prepositioned. However, they may not have known the following:

a. It is the responsibility of Wasco County to lead and coordinate all search and rescue operations within their county.

b. The Aviation Mishap Guide dictates notifying the Sheriff who accepts or declines the SAR mission/assistance request.

c. The Sheriff and Wasco County Search and Rescue had launched a rescue attempt for the downed pilot in coordination with Forest Service Law Enforcement.

d. The Wasco County Sheriff is responsible for the accident scene and the removal of the body must be approved by the Sheriff.

3. Even if you understand the overall system, emergencies often require individuals to step into unfamiliar roles. Emergency situations can highlight the need for additional skill development within ourselves and our teams. As a wildland fire community, we have developed various resources to assist firefighters and support personnel. Tools like the Medical Incident Report and the Aviation Mishap Guide help individuals walk through the IWI process. Courses aimed at helping prepare for Critical Incident Management such as “You Will Not Stand Alone” provide additional resources for taking care of employees and their families during and after traumatic events. Participants

23 interviewed for this FLA identified these types of needs as a result of this incident’s IWI.

a. Share the daily Incident Action Plan (IAP) with law enforcement, the National Guard, or other medevac assets and other local resources. Valuable information about medical resources (capabilities and location) as well as leadership structure, communication frequencies, and other IWI-specific procedures are identified in the IAP.

b. The Regional Aviation Safety Manager (RASM) was faced with the difficult task of unexpectedly serving as the notifying official when she was handed the phone at the helibase and told that it was the owner of the company, who was also the deceased helicopter pilot’s father. While making such a notification can be extremely difficult for everyone involved, not everyone receives training in this area. The “You Will Not Stand Alone” course includes training on making notifications. Although it may seem like notifications will be taken care of by someone else (for instance, law enforcement) it doesn’t always work out like that. Even if you never make a notification yourself, the training is useful in gaining an appreciation of the full process.

24 6. Appendices

A. Acknowledgements The members of the FLA Team would like to thank the Mt. Hood National Forest for supporting the work of our team in an extremely turbulent time. During the process of conducting this FLA the nation moved to a PL5 and the State of Oregon “has been choked by some of the worst air quality in the world with such dense concentrations of tiny particles from wood smoke that it’s been considered unhealthy or even hazardous to breathe.”21 Additionally, 500,000 Oregonians were under an evacuation notice (Level 1, 2 or 3) and more than 40,000 were evacuated.22

Various first responders are working hard to push through a long and trying fire season. The FLA Team greatly appreciates each person who gave us their time during interviews and the Mt. Hood National Forest for prioritizing learning by hosting this FLA.

B. The Facilitated Learning Analysis Team

Joe Alexander Director of Recreation, Minerals, Lands, Heritage, and Wilderness Programs U.S. Forest Service, Northern Region

Erin Uloth District Ranger Mt. Baker Ranger District Mt. Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest

Jody Prummer District Fire Management Officer Grande Ronde Fire Zone Wallowa-Whitman National Forest

Kevin Merrill Forest Aviation Officer Black Hills National Forest

Erin Kidwell National Federation of Federal Employees- Forest Service Council, Region Six Vice President, Timber Contracts & Appraisals Mt. Hood National Forest

Megan Saylors Squad Leader Redmond Interagency Hotshot Crew

Rebekah Fox Associate Professor, Communication Studies Department Texas State University

21 https://deqblog.com/2020/09/16/wildfire-smoke-brings-record-poor-air-quality-to-oregon-new-data-shows/

22 https://www.oregon.gov/newsroom/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?newsid=37303