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CHAPTER Sacrifi ce and Sacred Values: 14 Evolutionary Perspectives on Religious Terrorism

Richard Sosis, Erika J. Phillips, and Candace S. Alcorta

Abstract Evolutionary theories of religion and sacred values are essential for understanding current trends in terrorist activity. We clarify religion’s role in facilitating terror and outline recent theoretical developments that focus on four cross-culturally recurrent features of religion: communal participation in costly ritual, belief in supernatural agents and counterintuitive concepts, separation of the sacred and the profane, and adolescence as the critical life phase for the transmission of religious beliefs and values. These four characteristics constitute an adaptive complex that evolved to solve problems of group cooperation and commitment, problems faced by all terrorist organizations. We examine how terrorists employ these features of religion to achieve their goals and describe how terrorists utilize costly rituals to conditionally associate emotions with sanctified symbols and signal group commitments. These sanctified symbols are emotionally evocative and motivationally powerful, fostering ingroup solidarity, trust, and cooperation. Religious beliefs, including promised rewards in the afterlife, further serve to facilitate cooperation by altering the perceived payoffs of costly actions, including suicide terrorism. Patterns of brain development unique to adolescence render this the ideal developmental stage to attract recruits, inculcate sacred beliefs, and enlist them in high-risk behaviors. We conclude by offering insights, based on our evolutionary analysis, concerning conflict resolution when sacred values are in dispute. Key Words: cooperation, religion, ritual, sacred values, terrorism

Introduction of 180 per year from 2001 to 2005 (Atran, 2006). In recent years there has been a rise in the pro- At least 70% of suicide attacks from 2000 to 2003 portion of terrorists motivated by religious con- were religiously motivated (Atran, 2004). From cerns. Th is trend is particularly troubling because 1980 to 2003 suicide attacks accounted for only there is a signifi cant correlation between religious 3% of all terrorist incidents, but (excluding 9/11) motivation and the lethality of terrorist attacks they infl icted 48% of the fatalities, and 73% if 9/11 (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Hoff man, 2003). Data is included (Pape, 2005). collected by the US State Department on 3,932 Some scholars have argued that secular state- terrorist attacks between 1968 and 2007 indicate sponsored terrorism is somewhat constrained because that attacks by religious groups were four times as states do not want to undercut their claims of legit- lethal as attacks by secular groups (Berman, 2009). imacy and alienate potential supporters who would One reason religious terrorism is so deadly is the revile indiscriminate violence against civilians increased use of suicide attacks, which have risen (Richardson, 2006). In contrast, “religious terror- from an average of 4.7 per year from 1981 to 1990, ists often seek the elimination of broadly defi ned to 16 per year from 1991 to 2000, to an average categories of enemies and accordingly regard such

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large-scale violence not only as morally justifi ed but consisting of two words that are both notoriously as a necessary expedient for the attainment of their diffi cult to defi ne. To demarcate the scope of our goals” (Hoff man, 2006, pp. 88–89). Religiously inquiry into religious terrorism, we begin by clar- motivated terrorists “want a lot of people watch- ifying what these concepts, religion and terrorism, ing and a lot of people dead” (Simon & Benjamin, mean. We believe that our defi nitions, derived from 2000, p. 71). Why would religious terrorists not feel an evolutionary approach, can help distinguish reli- as constrained as secular political actors? Why would gious terrorism from other forms of violence and they want more people watching? Why is religiously cast light on specifi c elements of religion that ren- motivated terrorism becoming more common? Why der it particularly effi cacious for achieving terrorists’ would anyone become a suicide bomber? And what objectives. governmental policies can stem religiously motivated violence? Defi ning Terrorism In this chapter we explore how the evolutionary What constitutes terrorism is not straightforward sciences can inform us about religious terrorism. and may depend on one’s vantage point; there is truth Th e dominant approach to the study of terrorism, to the adage “one person’s terrorist is another’s free- by academic, intelligence, and military researchers, dom fi ghter.” Not surprisingly, many defi nitions of is grounded in rational choice models. We argue, terrorism have been off ered. Th e US Department of however, that rational actor approaches cannot State defi nes terrorism as “Premeditated, politically explain why individuals sacrifi ce their lives for lands motivated violence perpetrated against noncom- lacking material wealth, abstract ideological causes, batant targets by subnational groups or clandestine insults to intangible values such as honor, and other agents” (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/). Th e Federal seemingly irrational motivations. We believe evolu- Research Division of the Library of Congress con- tionary research on religion and sacred values can siders terrorism to be “the calculated use of unex- explain such sacrifi ces. pected, shocking, and unlawful violence against Th is chapter will proceed as follows. We begin noncombatants (including, in addition to civilians, by defi ning religious terrorism. Th en we clarify reli- off -duty military and security personnel in peaceful gion’s role in causing, motivating, and facilitating situations) and other symbolic targets perpetrated terror. Next we examine how recent work on the by a clandestine member(s) of a subnational group evolution of religion and sacred values can help us or a clandestine agent for the psychological purpose address the questions posed earlier. We conclude of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or with a discussion about the adaptability of reli- intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian gion and how our approach can inform confl ict population into accepting demands on behalf of the resolution. cause” (Hudson, 1999, p. 164). Th ere are four prominent features that recur in What Is Religious Terrorism? most defi nitions of terrorism (Jongman & Schmid, Religious terrorism is a concept not without con- 1983). First, terrorism involves violence and/ troversy. Th e controversy concerns whether religious or destruction. Second, the attack has a political terrorism exists at all. Some argue that terrorism is motive. Th ird, there is an intention to strike wide- never religious per se because political motives are spread fear in the attacked community. Fourth, always the root cause of terrorist activity (Bloom, the victims of the attack are civilians. We will con- 2005; Pape, 2005). Moreover, it is unclear how to sider terrorism to be attacks that exhibit these four distinguish between secular and religious terrorism features. (Nardin, 2001). Others, such as terrorist expert Bruce Hoff man, maintain that the “radically diff er- Defi ning Religion ent value systems, mechanisms of legitimation and Similar to “terrorism,” there are likely as many justifi cation, concepts of morality, and worldview” defi nitions of “religion” as those who study it. (2006, p. 88) explain why religiously motivated ter- Even the Latin origins of the English word remain rorism is so lethal, and thus it justifi es distinguish- obscure and do not provide guidance. According to ing religious terrorism as a distinct category. While the Oxford English Dictionary, “religion” is either Hoff man is likely correct, those who emphasize that derived from relegere (to read over again) or relig- it is diffi cult to distinguish religious terrorism from are (to bind), but even if the latter as some schol- other types of terrorism are also justifi ed in their con- ars contend, it is unclear whether the binding is to cern; religious terrorism is an ambiguous category, the gods, community, or both. James Frazer, in his

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classic study Th e Golden Bough, defi ned religion as regularly coalesce. Examining how the elements of “a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to religion interrelate is important for understanding man which are believed to direct and control the how terrorists eff ectively employ religion to further course of nature and of human life” (1915/2010, their political goals. p. 53). In the most infl uential sociological examina- We have previously argued that religion may best tion of religion in the 20th century, Emil Durkheim be understood as an evolved complex of traits incor- wrote that “a religion is a unifi ed system of beliefs porating cognitive, aff ective, behavioral, and devel- and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, opmental elements (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005). Central things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and prac- to this complex are four cross-culturally recurrent tices which unite into one single moral commu- features of religion: nity called a Church, all those who adhere to them” • Communal participation in costly ritual (1912/1995, p. 44). • Belief in supernatural agents and Th ese defi nitions, and the hundreds of oth- counterintuitive concepts ers that have been off ered by scholars, either fail • Separation of the sacred and the profane to incorporate some aspects of what others believe • Adolescence as the critical life phase for the to constitute religion, or they are unable to distin- transmission of religious beliefs and values guish religion from other cultural institutions. If religion is anything at all, it is an inherently fuzzy Later we examine these features of religion and category with unclear boundaries. Th erefore, rather show how terrorists use each of these features to than off er a descriptive defi nition of religion, many solve inherent problems they face in achieving their scholars have concluded that religion can be best objectives. defi ned and studied by considering its constituent parts (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005; Atran & Norenzayan, Defi ning Religious Terrorism 2004; Bering, 2005; Bulbulia, 2005; Molloy, 2008; We consider religious terrorism to be politically Whitehouse, 2008). motivated violent and/or destructive attacks aimed Essentialist defi nitions of religion, which break at civilians that seek to strike fear in the victims’ religion down into its more easily defi nable core ele- communities and that employ an ideology usually ments, have two particular advantages for the study transmitted during adolescence that encompasses of religious terrorism. First, essentialist defi nitions costly ritual behavior, beliefs in supernatural agents, avoid endless debates concerning whether Marxism, and separation of the sacred and profane. patriotism, atheism, and so on are religions. It is clear Notice that in contemporary societies, our four that religion shares some core elements with other core elements of religion co-occur within secular cultural institutions, and indeed, this approach contexts as well. For example, the adoption of com- clarifi es that most of religion’s core elements are munal rituals and initiation rites by nominally sec- not unique to religion. Ritual, myth, music, and ular terrorist groups, such as the Liberation Tigers taboo, to consider a few examples, are also mani- of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and their quasi-deifi cation fest in other cultural institutions, including politics of Marxist-Leninist ideals, blurs the line between and sports. Not surprisingly, as we’ll discuss later, what is secular and what is religious (Roberts, so-called secular terrorism shares many features 2005). Th ese groups engage important elements of with religious terrorism. Second, by breaking reli- the previously described religious adaptive complex gion down into its core elements it becomes obvious and reap many of the adaptive benefi ts achieved by that these elements did not evolve together. Ritual, religion. Th us, despite avowing secular ideals, their for example, has antecedents in many other species behavior falls within our defi nition, and indeed, (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005, 2007; D’Aquili, Laughlin, we can gain a much better understanding of their & McManus, 1979) and presumably has a much success by examining them through the lens of reli- deeper evolutionary history in our lineage than gious terrorism. many other core elements, such as myth. Religion, It is also worth emphasizing that religious ter- therefore, did not simply appear in the human line- rorism is never exclusively religiously motivated; age; its evolution consisted of uniting cognitive pro- there is always some political motivation as well cesses and behaviors that for the most part already (Juergensmeyer, 2004b; Pape, 2005). Th e balance existed. Although these elements evolved separately, between religious and political motivation diff ers they coalesce in similar ways across all cultures and between terrorist groups; some groups rely on reli- at some point in human evolution they began to gious motivation more than others. For example,

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Judge Zvi Cohen, who presided over the trial of Intercultural contact is certainly not new; social members of the Jewish Underground, a terrorist and cultural changes initiated by such contact con- network that sought to blow up mosques on the stitute a dominant theme throughout human his- Temple Mount (see Gorenberg, 2000), described tory (Wolf, 1982). What is new about the advent three motivations for these convicted terrorists: “Th e of global industrialization, however, is the scope fi rst motive, at the heart of the Temple Mount con- and rate of change it has initiated. Social change spiracy, is religious. Th e second motive—the secu- introduced by industrial urbanization has been rity of settlers in the West Bank . . . A less prominent identifi ed as a major factor in the global health motive is that of relations among friends” (Pedahzur transition (World Health Organization [WHO], & Perliger, 2009, p. 46). Not only will the balance 2001). Increased blood pressure, elevated corti- between religious and political motivations diff er sol levels and changes in cortisol profi les, as well between terrorist groups, but as Judge Cohen noted as escalated EBV antibody levels, have been docu- for the Jewish Underground, motivations will vary mented in populations worldwide as they are inte- within a single operation. Moreover, some religious grated into a global industrial economy (Dressler & terrorists act alone, but as we will discuss later, rela- Bindon, 2000; Flinn & England, 1995; McDade, tions and commitments among friends are also a 2002; McDade, Stallings, & Worthman, 2000). powerful motivator for many terrorists. Th ese markers all indicate activation of the body’s “stress system.” Although adaptive as a short-term Th e Landscape of Contemporary response to immediate environmental threats, Religious Terrorism long-term activation of this system can be deadly It has been claimed that terrorism is probably as (Sapolsky, 1996). Escalating rates of depression, old as Homo sapiens (Atran, 2010, p. 91), but the schizophrenia, and other psychoses (Krabbendam story of contemporary terrorism, especially the reli- & van Os, 2005; McGrath et al., 2004; Sundquist, gious variety that we will explore here, begins with Frank, & Sundquist, 2004; van Os, 2004), as well the forces of globalization. Globalization is often as an unprecedented incidence of suicide, particu- lauded for bringing people together and increas- larly among adolescents, have all accompanied the ing the knowledge we have of one another. But for urban industrial transition (Desjarlais et al., 1995). many, globalization is perceived as the uncontrol- Th e World Health Organization (2001) reports that lable spread of Western norms and values—norms mental and neurological disorders make up 11% of and values that are believed to be at odds with their the global disease burden and are expected to rise to own (Ruthven, 2004). While some view globaliza- 14.6% by 2020. Depression, a precursor for 80%– tion as a means to bring about peace and under- 90% of all suicides, is currently among the top 10 standing, at times globalization may fuel cultural causes of death in most countries that report rates, confl ict (Schneider et al., 2003). In addition to and it is among the top three causes of death in the confl icting cultural values, those living in underde- population aged 15–34 years (WHO, 2001). Th ese veloped regions of the world can witness via mass escalating rates of depression, schizophrenia, and media technologies, particularly the Internet, the suicide within urban environments are particularly extraordinary economic disparity between them- pronounced among adolescent males (see Alcorta, selves and the West. 2010). Immigrants to Western societies and their Th e stress and anxiety of rapid cultural change descendants, who seek to maintain their traditional has not gone unnoticed by religious commenta- cultural ways, can fi nd themselves being pulled in tors. Sayyid Qutb, leader of the Egyptian Muslim two divergent directions. For those in such a situa- Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, described tion, intercultural contact can result in “social ambi- the “hideous schizophrenia” of modern life. He guity, role confl icts, and status inconsistencies and argued that this schizophrenia was a product of incongruities” (Alcorta, 2010), fostering cognitive the Christian West’s separation of religion from the dissonance, feelings of powerlessness, and a sense physical world, the distinct compartmentalizing of anomie. Even ambitious men from immigrant of religion and science (Qutb, 2007). In a discus- communities, who are well educated and fi nancially sion on Qutb’s writings, Paul Berman insightfully secure, often fi nd limits to what they can achieve observes that Qutb “put his fi nger on precisely the in Western society. Such experiences of anonymity, inner experience that Salman Rushdie described in devaluation, and powerlessness can have very real Th e Satanic Verses many years later—the schizophre- and severe psychological and physical aff ects. nia or alienation, the feeling of being two instead

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of one, the pain of living in two worlds at once, the be imposed on populations, even by force, for their experience that Muhammad Atta and suicide sol- own good (Atran, 2010). diers of 9/11 must surely have felt in their everyday Marc Sageman (2008) has shown that global jihad existences in the West” (2004, p. 76). terrorism has occurred in three major waves. Th e fi rst wave consisted of those who fought against the Muslim Jihad Soviets in the 1980s. Th ey were upper- and middle- Terrorism is a political tool that has been class college-educated Egyptian professionals, and employed, with varying success, by all the world most were married. Th e second wave spanned the religions (Hoff man, 2006). Because of its geopo- 1990s and ended with the US-led military invasion litical impact, considerable media and scholarly of Afghanistan after 9/11. Th e second-wave jihadis attention has focused on Islamic terrorism with the were mostly middle-class Europeans and Saudis. unfortunate consequence that in the West terror- Many of them held advanced degrees in science or ism is often implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) medicine, and overall they were materially and edu- associated with Islam. Th ere is no inherent relation- cationally better off than their populations of ori- ship, however, between Islam and terror. Th e causal gin. Th e third wave began after the United States factors behind the rise of terrorism in the Islamic and British invasion of Iraq in 2003. Many of these world are varied but include perceptions of injus- jihadis were either second-generation or infant tice, colonization, and the disparity in economic immigrants from the West, and they were primarily and technological development (Lewis, 2003). lower or middle class. Atran (2010) has found these Th e Islamic world in the Middle Ages was phil- jihadis, in contrast to previous waves, to be more osophically and scientifi cally more advanced than marginalized, underemployed, and have a history the Christian world; only China was comparable of prior criminal activity unrelated to jihad. Th ey among civilizations (Lewis, 2002). And the military often fi nd religion in their early 20s and are more power of the Islamic world was unparalleled (Karsh, likely to be single. 2007). Th e contrast in the Islamic world between Why has the profi le of jihadis changed from edu- then and now, however, could not be more strik- cated, economically well-off men to petty criminals ing. Th e annual Arab Development Reports (http:// who are newly religious? Atran argues that US coun- www.arab-hdr.org/), which do not include data on terterrorism eff orts forced “would-be terrorists to the considerable Muslim populations throughout rely on local, low-cost, underground, and informal South East Asia, describe a remarkable gap between methods of fi nancing. In addition, the elimination the West and the Arab world in literacy, book trans- of Al Qaeda’s training facilities in Afghanistan and lations, scientifi c research productivity, Internet use, the disruption of its networks for supplying exper- and other indicators of human development. Th e tise in logistics, bomb making, and so forth, meant reports further highlight the signifi cant economic that jihadis would have to fi nd new means for exe- gap between the Arab world and the West. While cuting terrorist operations” (2010, pp. 207–208). the glory of Islamic civilization has passed and been Petty criminals, who live at the edge of cultural con- supplanted by Western civilization and imperialism, tact and personally experience the impacts of ano- this history has not been forgotten in the Islamic mie and devaluation discussed earlier, have been well world and often serves as a source of animosity situated to fi ll that niche. Moreover, because they toward the West. are disenfranchised and looking for a moral cause In this context it is not surprising that many to take up, they are “even more altruistically prone Muslims have turned toward their faith for answers, than others are to give up their lives for their com- comfort, and stability. Yet, as globalization expands rades and a cause” (Atran, 2010, pp. 207–208). Western cultural and economic infl uence, Muslim hegemony and sacred values are perceived to be Th e Relationship Between Religion threatened. Western values, including democracy, and Terror are viewed by some as inferior to Muslim values Th e media may be responsible for the popular that, it is believed, derive from Allah. Muslim law, belief that religion, especially Islam, and terror are sharia, must be protected and prevented from being strongly associated (on the US State Department’s subjugated to human law. Accordingly, democ- list of foreign terrorist organizations, less than half racy is viewed as inherently fl awed because humans are religious). Suicide terrorists in particular are are limited in their wisdom and may not willingly often depicted in the media as delusional religious choose to live by sharia. Th erefore, these laws must fundamentalists, hopelessly brainwashed and out of

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touch with reality. Th is characterization, however, transformation from political to religious struggle is inaccurate. Th e terrorist career itself is extraor- encourages actors to perceive that they are partic- dinary, but individuals who eventually become ipating in something of divine signifi cance that terrorists are otherwise quite ordinary. As Atran transcends individual self-interest. Among Sikh mil- observes, “Anthropologically and psychologically, itants in the Punjab, Juergensmeyer describes join- terrorists usually are not remarkably diff erent from ing the struggle as “motivated by the heady sense the rest of the population” (2010, p. 36). Berrebi of spiritual fulfi llment and the passion of holy war” (2007), for example, has shown that Palestinian (2004a, p. 2). Atran (2010) describes how many of suicide bombers have above average education and the men responsible for the Madrid train bomb- are economically better off than the general popula- ings wanted to belong to, or lead, something bigger tion. Krueger (2007) also demonstrates that poverty than themselves to feel important and infl uential on is not a predictor of participation in political vio- a cosmic scale. Fighting for Islam, or at least their lence or support for terrorism. Moreover, Sageman understanding of it, provided them with the feeling (2004) found no evidence of psychopathology in an of personal importance they had been seeking. Th e international sample of Muslim terrorists. Leaders stress of social ambiguity and status inconsistencies, of terrorist organizations are clear that recruits may as mentioned earlier, can be alleviated by aligning not be depressed or suicidal. As one spokesman for oneself with a cosmic cause, releasing the person the Palestinian Islamic Jihad explains, “In order from the social and economic pressures of the mate- to be a martyr bomber you have to want to live” rial world. (Richardson, 2006, p. 117). Terrorists themselves It is remarkable how successful contemporary ter- point out that even suicide bombers have plenty of rorists have been in shaping worldviews so that they hope; otherwise there would be no point in killing are consistent with their own views. Bin Laden, for themselves (Atran, 2003). instance, has been particularly successful in trans- If terrorists in general, and suicide bombers in forming his local grievance (i.e., getting US troops particular, are not crazed religious zealots, what off “Muslim” soil) into a cosmic clash between then is the relationship between religion and ter- civilizations. Th e use of religion to transform local rorism? Various researchers, as noted earlier, have power struggles into cosmic confl icts benefi ts ter- argued that terrorists have political, not religious rorist groups who may otherwise be viewed as goals (Berman, 2009; Bloom, 2005; Juergensmeyer, economically and politically self-serving. In an age 2003; Pape, 2005). Former US Ambassador Michael of instantaneous electronic communications, such Sheehan commented, “A number of terrorist groups religious framing of essentially local confl icts serves have portrayed their causes in religious and cultural to broaden both the ideological and geographic base terms. Th is is often a transparent tactic designed to of terrorism. A second consequence of the religious conceal political goals, generate popular support framing of political confl icts is the extension of the and silence opposition” (http://www.brookings. horizon for victory. Terrorists perceive that they are edu/events/2000/0210terrorism.aspx). Th us, reli- fi ghting a cosmic war in divine time, thus eliminat- gion may not be the root cause of confl icts, but it ing incentives to “win” within one’s own lifetime. is rather a tool used by terrorists to achieve their Commenting on an interview with Hamas leader goals. Recast in evolutionary terms, religious beliefs, Abdul Aziz Rantisi, Juergensmeyer observes that “[i] rituals, and institutions are proximate mechanisms n his calculation, the struggles of God can endure that facilitate otherwise improbable behavioral out- for eons” (2004b, p. 35). comes. But why would religion be an eff ective tool for terrorists? Here we review six main reasons. Moral Justifi cation Religion also facilitates terrorists’ goals by pro- Framing the Confl ict viding moral legitimacy to their cause (Hoff man, Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that while religion 2006; Juergensmeyer, 2004c). All contemporary is not the cause of most confl icts involving terror, world religions impose a moral framework upon religion is the means by which terrorists trans- their adherents, thereby enabling terrorists to pre- late a local political struggle into a cosmic war. In sent their confl icts in morally absolute dichotomies, other words, terrorists often frame their disputes in such as good versus bad or righteous versus evil. religious rather than political terms. Th is has var- While legitimizing ones’ own cause, religions are par- ious advantages, most signifi cantly in motivating ticularly eff ective at demonizing those with opposing others to sacrifi ce themselves for the cause. Th is views. Th e history of religion is replete with examples

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in which ingroup passions are aroused and outgroup personal signifi cance to create contextual meaning hatreds are dangerously ignited. One consistent pre- (Belanger, Baum, & Titone, 2009; Sidtis, 2006). dictor of suicide terrorism is a religious diff erence As a result, each new generation reinterprets reli- between the perpetrator and victim (Pape, 2005). gious texts in relation to their own meaningful Th is occurs even when the terrorist group appears experiences, thereby keeping them living, relevant, to have secular motivations, such as the LTTE, and fresh. Past interpretations are not necessarily who were Hindus fi ghting a Buddhist majority. rejected per se, but they are transformed or ignored In Berman and Laitin’s (2008) extensive sample of by the community. Th ey remain available, however, suicide terrorism, almost 90% of the attacks were should cultural change make their message relevant aimed at victims of a diff erent religion. Data from again. the ongoing situation in Iraq would undoubtedly Th e sacred writings of contemporary religious tra- lower this percentage, as Muslim suicide bombers ditions are vast repositories that leaders draw upon are killing other Muslims, but that confl ict also high- at various points in history, emphasizing aspects that lights that categories such as Muslim, Buddhist, or are socially and politically expedient, and disregard- Hindu are too broad. Enemy “outgroups” can exist ing those that are not. Terrorists often rely on these within these broad categorical labels. Indeed, reli- repositories, including alternative interpretations of gious extremism typically emerges concomitantly sacred texts that have been largely forgotten by main- with secularism and begins with intrareligious con- stream adherents. Consider, for example, the Jewish fl ict, such as the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Underground, mentioned earlier. Th ey sought rab- Egypt and ultimate incarceration and execution of binical sanction for their operation, as is common many of its members and leaders, including afore- among religious terrorists (Hoff man, 2006, p. 89), mentioned Sayyid Qutb (Armstrong, 2000). but no prominent rabbis would endorse their plans. Since they were unable to gain approval from living Spiritual and Eternal Rewards rabbis, “they sought justifi cation for attacking the Religion not only provides a divine dimension Temple Mount mosques in the teachings and adju- and moral legitimacy to terrorist activity; it also dications of rabbis who were no longer living. For defi nes the rewards that combatants can attain. example, Dan Be’eri scoured the writings of Rabbi After considering the benefi ts that Sikh militants Zvi Yehuda Kook for some reference to a possible attain, Juergensmeyer concluded that “[t]he reward endorsement of the plan for exploding the mosques” for these young men was the religious experience (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009, pp. 60–61). in the struggle itself: the sense that they were par- ticipating in something greater than themselves” Extended Communities of Support (2004a, p. 2). In addition to such spiritual rewards As we discuss later, terrorist networks exploit of transcendence, religion may also explicitly off er religion’s ability, typically through intense ritual and benefi ts in the afterlife that can rarely be matched in shared counterintuitive beliefs, to create tight social this world. Th e 9/11 hijackers all believed that they bonds. But many religions, especially contempo- “would meet in the highest heaven” (Lincoln, 2003, rary world religions, also create extended commu- p. 98), which we can assume helped them rational- nities. Whitehouse (2004) argues that repetitive ize their actions. rituals provide a cognitive foundation for abstract communities. Infrequently performed rituals that Adaptability are highly evocative and emotionally arousing cre- While religions are often viewed as a conserva- ate strong bonds among performers. Whitehouse tive social force, they are in fact highly responsive claims that these experiences are stored in episodic to social, political, and economic conditions. We memory and have long-term neurological eff ects. return to the misconception of religion as infl exible In contrast, the memories of low-arousal repetitive later; here we simply emphasize that the vast sacred rituals, such as daily prayer, are stored in semantic writings and mythical traditions of contemporary memory. While performers of a painful initiation religions play an important role in religion’s fl exibil- rite will recall who participated in the ritual, regular ity, a quality that makes religion an eff ective tool for churchgoers would be unable to recall who attended terrorists. Religious texts that endure do so because church on any particular Sunday, unless there was they are open to multiple interpretations. Extensive a notable event to help recall. However, regular use of metaphor and poetry in religious texts and churchgoers would be able to describe in detail oral traditions engages subconscious processes of what happened on any particular Sunday because

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the same rituals are performed in the same manner focal points in occupations involving a religious dif- every week. Whitehouse argues that the storing of ference” (Pape, 2005, p. 89). And of course, martyr- ritual knowledge in semantic, rather than episodic, dom itself means to sacrifi ce one’s life for one’s faith. memory leads to anonymous religious communi- Religion provides the rituals and symbols to both ties. What makes someone a Christian, for example, motivate and memorialize these local heroes, thereby are abstract properties of belief and performance aff ording them an otherwise unattainable status that that do not need to be witnessed by the entire pop- is also eternal. Pape observes that “[s]uicide terrorist ulation for one to be considered a member of the organizations commonly cultivate ‘sacrifi cial myths’ religious community. that include elaborate sets of symbols and rituals to Terrorists rely on extended anonymous commu- mark an individual attacker’s death as a contribu- nities, which are created by frequent ritual perfor- tion to the nation” (2005, p. 29). mance, for political and material support. Th ose Th e bonding that occurs through religion does willing to take the risk of a terrorist operation are not always have to be strong to be eff ective for ter- generally few in number; it is the support of the rorists. As Atran (2010) shows in numerous con- extended community that is vital for terrorists to texts, terrorism often begins on the football pitch; achieve their political aims (Merari, 1993). Th us, friends are simply recruiting friends and the com- it is the larger public rather than the victims who mitments are ones that have been built by growing are the real targets of terrorist activity. It is the pub- up and playing together. On the other hand, some licity of spectacular terrorist attacks that serves as terrorist networks are loosely organized collectives the oxygen that feeds the fi re of modern terror- of virtual strangers. For example, most members of ism (Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009). And the Jewish Underground did not even know each increasing media technologies, of course, have only other and most people involved simply did one added fuel to this fi re. Menachem Livni of the aspect of an operation, such as driving somewhere or Jewish Underground, for example, “was so preoccu- fi xing something, without knowledge of the plans pied with public support for the underground that for the entire operation (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009). he followed the public opinion polls in the news- Although members did not have strong bonds, they papers measuring the support for their terrorist did share similar religious commitments, which attacks” (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009, p. 56). Attacks facilitated being drawn into various activities at do not have to successfully injure or kill anyone the requests of friends. Indeed, given the loose to be successful in the eyes of the perpetrators. As connections in the social network of the Jewish Atran notes, “With publicity, even failed terrorist Underground, it is unclear how they could have acts succeed in terrorizing; without publicity, terror- accomplished any of their goals (they murdered ism would fade away” (2010, p. 278). three Arab mayors) without their shared religious identity and commitment. As Berman remarks on Religious Symbols, Myths, and Rituals the Jewish Underground’s failure to carry out their Religion’s most signifi cant role in terrorism primary attack, bombing the Temple Mount, “Th eir may be its incorporation of emotionally evocative strong theological commitment to their cause must and highly memorable symbols, myths, and rituals have been necessary for the Underground’s mem- that serve to individually motivate and collectively bers to attempt such dangerous and severe acts of unify diverse individuals under a common banner. destruction, yet it was not suffi cient for their con- All terrorist groups face the challenge of creating spiracy to succeed” (2009, p. 9). group commitment and individual devotion to a common cause. Anthropologists have long noted Terrorism and the Core Elements that fundamental “faith-based” elements of reli- of Religion gion, that is, symbols, myths, and rituals, foster this We defi ned religious terrorism earlier to include ingroup commitment better than any other social four cross-culturally recurrent features of religion. institution. Not surprisingly, secular and religious We have previously argued (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005) terrorists alike maintain communal rituals and ini- that these elements of religion derive from ritual tiation rites that communicate an individual’s level systems selected for in early hominin populations of commitment to the group (Atran, 2003; Dingley because they contributed to the ability of individu- & Kirk-Smith, 2002; Roberts, 2005). For religious als to overcome ever-present ecological challenges. terrorists, cohesiveness is further fostered through By fostering cooperation and extending the com- powerful religious symbols, which “often become munication and coordination of social relations

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across time and space, these traits served to max- curious feature of religious terrorist organizations, imize the potential resource base for early human such as Hamas and Hizbollah; in addition to their populations, thereby benefi ting individual fi tness. violent operations, these terrorist organizations serve Here we explore how these four characteristics make as mutual aid societies, providing resources and religion an eff ective tool for terrorists. services that weak and ineff ective governments are unable to supply. In an insightful analysis employ- Communal Participation in Costly Ritual ing economic signaling models, Berman argues that Among the most signifi cant challenges terror- the cooperation needed to produce these collective ists face is ensuring that fellow insurgents are trust- services benefi t terrorist actions by reducing the worthy and will not defect on the cause (Berman, likelihood of defection: “Having already weeded 2009). How can a prospective terrorist guarantee the cheaters and shirkers out of their mutual aid that he will not reveal the locations of hidden con- operations, they can be confi dent that the remain- spirators, secret codes of communication, and that ing members are loyal” (2009, p. 17). he will not turn aside when asked to carry out a risky Surprising to many observers, costly religious or suicidal attack? At fi rst glance, evolutionary the- demands are today increasing in many commu- ories of religion would appear to hold little prom- nities throughout the world. Indeed, the global ise for answering these questions or understanding rise in religious terrorism has been paralleled by a terrorism at all. Natural selection favors genes that worldwide growth in religious fundamentalism. get themselves into the next generation, yet terror- Fundamentalism typically refers to a religious ide- ists often take great risks with their lives and some ology that embraces scriptural literalism and tra- of course intentionally sacrifi ce themselves for their ditional religious values. Current fundamentalist ideological beliefs. Such actions seem to contradict trends, however, have placed higher demands on evolutionary expectations. Th e solution to this puz- their practitioners than the traditional practices that zle lies in understanding religion as an evolved sys- they claim to emulate. For example, the standards tem of communication, which off ers mechanisms of kashrut (laws pertaining to edible food) among that can promote ingroup trust and overcome com- Ultra-Orthodox Jews are more stringent now than mitment problems (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005; Atran at any time in Jewish history (Sosis, 2009). Signaling & Norenzayan, 2004; Bulbulia, 2004a; Henrich, theory suggests three factors that may be motivating 2009; Irons, 2001; Rappaport, 1999; Sosis, 2003). the fundamentalist trend toward increasing ritual Irons (2001), for example, posits that the primary requirements. First, the rising costs of membership adaptive benefi t of religion is its ability to foster may be a direct response to increases in perceived risk cooperation and overcome problems of collective of apostasy faced by religious groups; a risk gener- action that humans have faced throughout their ated by the rapid improvement in mass media tech- evolutionary history. Th e costliness of religious nologies, which expose wide audiences to Western activities, or specifi cally what Sosis (2006) refers to secular values and culture. Second, and somewhat as the four “B’s”—religious belief, behavior (rituals), paradoxically, the multicultural openness of Western badges (such as religious attire), and bans (taboos)— societies may also contribute to fundamentalist enables them to serve as reliable and honest signals trends. While the celebration of multiculturalism of group commitment. Only those who are com- has yet to embrace aggressive fundamentalism, in mitted to the group will be willing to incur the societies where group diff erences are tolerated and energetic, time, and opportunity costs of religious even encouraged, maintenance of ingroup cohesion belief and performance. In other words, adherents requires that groups increase their distinctiveness in pay the costs of religious adherence, but by doing so order to preserve the relative costliness of the group’s they demonstrate their commitment and loyalty to previous bans and badges. Th us, multiculturalism the group and can thus achieve a net benefi t from may actually initiate movements toward fundamen- successful collective action and other status benefi ts talism, even while vehemently rejecting fundamen- available to trusted signalers (see Bulbulia, 2004b; talism’s message of possessing life’s only true path. Sosis, 2003; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003). Notably, Juergensmeyer (2002) observes that one Th e increased commitment and trust result- of the universal features of religious terrorists is a ing from religious signaling provides strategic strong rejection of Western multiculturalism. Th ird, advantages for religious terrorists over other mili- signaling theory predicts an increase in signal costs tant groups, enabling them to reduce the threat of as resource competition escalates. In highly com- defection. Signaling models also off er insight into a petitive modern multicultural nation-states, the

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higher costs incurred by religious fundamentalism 2008). Atran, for example, maintains that Hamas are likely to be off set by the economic and politi- benefi ts from sacrifi cing its high-quality youth: cal gains achievable through religious consolidation “[t]hrough spectacular displays involving the sac- and organization of group membership. rifi ce of their precious ‘human capital’ (educated Th e evolutionary signaling theory of religion youth with better-than-average prospects), they also assumes an inverted-U-shaped relationship between signal a costly commitment to their community, the costliness of religious activity and ingroup which the community honors by providing new vol- cooperation. Since imposing costly requirements unteers and added funding” (2010, p. 363). Second, upon group members is challenging and greater- it is possible that suicide bombers recoup their losses than-optimum costs are expected to negatively through benefi ts to their kin (Qirko, 2009). For impact group cohesion, most groups are predicted example, the families of Palestinian suicide terrorists to impose less than their optimal level of costly receive fi nancial payments (up to US $10,000) for requirements and thus be observed on the increas- their martyred sons and daughters. However, Israel’s ing side of the U-shaped distribution. Experimental, policy of destroying suicide bombers’ homes would cross-cultural, and ethnohistorical research eval- appear to counterbalance these indirect fi tness gains uating this prediction has been largely supportive and be a strong negative incentive to sacrifi ce one- (Ginges et al., 2009; Ruffl e & Sosis, 2007; Soler, self for one’s family. Noting research that Hezbollah 2008; Sosis & Bressler, 2003; Sosis, Kress, & Boster, suicide bombers attained above-average education, 2007; Sosis & Ruffl e, 2003, 2004). Religious ter- Azam (2005) argues that suicide bombers may be rorists of course employ religiously defi ned costly investing in future kin generations (their higher requirements to signal commitment, resulting in education makes them appreciate the impor- high levels of ingroup cohesiveness and trust that tance of investing in the future). However, this are essential for carrying out their clandestine activ- poses a signifi cant collective action problem, and ities (e.g., Hassan, 2001). As Pape describes, terror- it would appear that under most conditions one ists have “a close bond of loyalty to comrades and would be better off letting someone else make the devotion to leaders; and they have a system of ini- investment (i.e., sacrifi ce one’s life for future gen- tiation and rituals signifying an individual’s level erations). Th ird, life history theory predicts that of commitment to the community” (2005, p. 8). risk aversion decreases when life expectancy is low, Interestingly, among many terrorist cells these ritu- particularly among adolescents, and there is con- als also include the recording of a video testament siderable empirical work supporting this predic- prior to an attack (Atran, 2003). Such video tes- tion (e.g., Bulled & Sosis, 2010; Hill & Hurtado, taments not only serve to immortalize the suicide 1996; Wilson & Daly, 1997). High-risk responses terrorist and his cause among followers; they also to dangerous and uncertain environments are often create undeniable contracts. Defecting on a mission adaptive, although it is unclear how suicide bomb- after declaring and documenting one’s intentions ers could individually benefi t from their actions. would result in severe psychological, social, and pre- A fourth possibility is that the payoff s motivating sumably spiritual costs. suicide bombers are not material but rather oth- Evolutionary signaling theory assumes that the erworldly. Indeed, when applying evolutionary short-term costs of displaying a signal are repaid signaling theory to religious activity, both Sosis through individual gains. Th is creates a particular (2003) and Bulbulia (2004b) incorporate per- challenge for understanding suicide terrorism from ceived gains into their models, which include pay- a signaling theory perspective since individuals are off s attained in the afterlife. Th ey independently obviously not around to reap any benefi ts from their found that afterlife payoff s can dramatically alter actions. How can suicide terrorism possibly consti- the dynamic of the game and favor costly reli- tute an adaptive response? Th ere would appear to be gious activity. Moreover, we suspect that not only four noncompeting alternative explanations. do martyrs expect to reap their heavenly rewards, First, while the individual faces the ultimate sac- but that they also include the reputational benefi ts rifi ce, suicide terrorism is likely to benefi t the group, they expect to receive as a martyr into their cal- and Pape’s (2005) analysis showing that groups culations (e.g., Richardson, 2006, p. 124), even deploying suicide terrorists tend to achieve their goals though they will of course not be around to enjoy supports this interpretation. Suicide terrorism may their newly attained status. If afterlife rewards and off er the most promising example of strong selective concerns of postmortem reputation are motivat- pressures operating at the group level (Villarreal, ing suicide bombers, such beliefs are likely to be

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maladaptive, unless kin signifi cantly benefi t from to reward and punish deeds that are now viewed being related to a martyr. within a moral framework. Several evolutionary Not only are costly rituals eff ective for creating researchers have emphasized the role that supernat- the trust and close bonds needed for successful sui- ural punishment plays in promoting community- cide missions, but they are also eff ective at instilling defi ned moral behavior, and specifi cally ingroup the individual motivation and building the coali- cooperation (Atkinson & Bourrat, 2010; Bulbulia, tional support necessary for terrorists to achieve 2004b; Johnson, 2005; Schloss & Murray, 2011; their political aims. Ginges et al. (2009) argued that Sosis, 2005). Recent experimental evidence indi- religion’s relationship to suicide attacks may derive cates that “even subtle unconscious exposure to from religion’s ability to enhance individual com- religious ideas can dramatically encourage prosocial mitment to coalitional identities via collective rit- over selfi sh behavior” in theists and atheists alike ual. In a series of experimental and survey studies, (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Ginges et al. showed that support for suicide attacks Evolutionary cognitive scientists have further was related to attendance at worship services. Th eir noted that the counterintuitive concepts that char- fi ndings were consistent among Palestinian and acterize religious beliefs, such as bleeding statues Israeli samples, as well as a cross-cultural sample of and virgin births, are both attention arresting and six religions in six countries. In their studies, sup- memorable (Atran, 2002; Boyer, 2001). Th ese port for suicide attacks were unrelated to religious features make them particularly eff ective for both beliefs or prayer frequency, but attending commu- vertical (across generations) and horizontal (within nity services at a house of worship was a highly sig- generations) transmission and can help explain nifi cant predictor of support for martyrdom and why religious ideologies, including those of ter- measures of outgroup hostility. Attending worship rorists, often spread quickly through populations. services is likely to reinforce individual emotional In addition to their mnemonic effi cacy, they com- commitment to group symbols, including beliefs, prise almost unbreakable “codes” for the unini- while signaling coalitional commitments and gener- tiated. Counterintuitive concepts are not readily ating the popular support terrorists need to thrive. generated on the basis of intuitive concepts; thus, the chances of spontaneously re-creating a preexis- Belief in Supernatural Agents and tent counterintuitive concept are exceedingly low. Counterintuitive Concepts By incorporating counterintuitive concepts within Th e second feature of the adaptive religious com- belief systems, religion creates reliable costly signals plex that Alcorta and Sosis (2005) describe concerns that are diffi cult to “fake.” Sosis (2003) has argued supernatural agents and counterintuitive concepts. that repeated ritual performance fosters and inter- Evolutionary cognitive scientists have shown that nalizes these counterintuitive beliefs, which typi- the supernatural agents of religious belief systems cally include a nonmaterial system of reward and are “full access strategic agents” (Boyer, 2001). Th ey punishment, including expectations about afterlife are “envisioned as possessing knowledge of socially activities. strategic information, having unlimited perceptual Although afterlife rewards are rarely a prime moti- access to socially maligned behaviors that occur in vator of suicide terrorism (Atran, 2010; Berman, private and therefore outside the perceptual bound- 2009), they are a critical feature of successful ide- aries of everyday human agents” (Bering, 2005, ologies that enable terrorist organizations to moti- p. 418). Furthermore, accumulating research indi- vate recruits to carry out their missions. As a Hamas cates that humans exhibit a developmental pre- member describes, “We focus his attention on disposition to believe in such socially omniscient Paradise, on being in the presence of Allah, on meet- supernatural agents, appearing in early childhood ing the Prophet Muhammad, on interceding for his and diminishing in adulthood. Cross-cultural stud- loved ones so that they, too, can be saved from the ies conducted with children between the ages of 3 agonies of Hell, on the houris [virgins], and on fi ght- and 12 years indicate that young children possess ing the Israeli occupation and removing it from the an “intuitive theism” that diff erentiates the social Islamic trust that is Palestine” (Hassan, 2001, p. 39). omniscience of supernatural agents from the fallible Female martyrs are promised to be the chief of the knowledge of natural social agents, such as parents virgins and exceed their beauty (Richardson, 2006, (Kelemen, 2004). By late childhood, supernatural p. 122). Even kamikaze pilots were assured that agents are not only socially omniscient, they are they would be “transcending life and death” (Atran, regarded as agents capable of using such knowledge 2003, p. 1535). Experimental studies demonstrate

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that humans have a natural inclination to believe communal symbols. Th rough processes of incentive that some element, typically a soul, survives death learning, as well as classical and contextual condi- (Bek & Lock, 2011; Bering, 2006). Indeed, most tioning, the objects, places, and beliefs of religious of us, including atheists, have diffi culty conceiving ritual are invested with emotional signifi cance. Th e of a complete cessation of mental and social activity use of communal ritual to invest previously neutral following death. Nobody knows what it is like to be stimuli with deep emotional signifi cance creates a dead, so people attribute to dead agents the men- shared symbolic system that subsequently weights tal traits that they cannot imagine being without. individual choices and motivates behavior. Religious and other cultural beliefs serve to enrich It is noteworthy that the sacred may most or degrade beliefs in the afterlife, but Bering’s work commonly be encountered as physical space suggests that appeals to rational arguments about (Eliade, 1959). Pape (2005) argues that at the root the irrationality of afterlife beliefs are likely to face of each suicide terror campaign is a dispute over strong resistance. If it is strategically important to land—an occupying power that must be removed alter terrorists’ beliefs about the afterlife, the great- from the homeland. Such conditions are ripe for est success can be achieved by exposing children religious symbolism and, indeed, homelands in and adolescents to alternative belief schemas before these confl icts are almost always publicly perceived they are exposed to the afterlife rewards promised as sacred. Sosis (2011) argues that the sacralization by terrorists. of land is an adaptive strategy aimed at increasing coalitional commitment. Pape (2005, p. 85) com- Separation of the Sacred and the Profane ments that “[a]lthough boundaries may be ambigu- Th e separation of the sacred and profane and the ous and history may be contested, the homeland is emotional power of sanctifi ed symbols are critical imbued with memories, meanings, and emotions.” for understanding how terrorists utilize religion for Religious rituals sustain memories, shape mean- their benefi t. Religious ritual is universally used to ings, and foster these emotions. Religion’s reliance defi ne the sacred and to separate it from the pro- on such emotionally evocative symbols also explains fane (Durkheim, 1912/1995; Eliade, 1959). As why religious terrorist groups are more successful noted by Rappaport (1999), ritual does not merely than secular ones in mobilizing their forces (Bloom, identify that which is sacred; it creates the sacred. 2005). Religious terrorists do not appeal to rational Holy water is not simply water that has been dis- political arguments to win public approval; they rely covered to be holy or water that has been rationally on sacred symbols imbued with emotional power to demonstrated to have special qualities. It is, rather, enlist followers in their cause. water that has been transformed through ritual. For Once recruits are secured, group solidarity can adherents who have participated in sanctifying ritu- be further enhanced through negative aff ect rituals. als, the cognitive schema associated with that which Neuropsychological research has shown that nega- has been sanctifi ed diff ers from that of the profane. tively valenced stimuli are both more memorable Of greater importance from a behavioral perspec- and have greater motivational power than positive tive, the emotional signifi cance of holy and profane stimuli (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 2002). As water is quite distinct. Not only is it inappropriate a result of this “negativity bias,” negatively valenced to treat holy water as one treats profane water; it is elements of religion provide a more reliable emo- emotionally repugnant. While sacred and profane tionally anchored mechanism for the subordination things are cognitively distinguished by adherents, of immediate individual interests to cooperative the critical distinction between the sacred and the group goals (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005). Research on profane is the emotional charging associated with the rituals that terrorist cells employ is scant, but sacred things (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005). apparently deprivation, such as lengthy fasts, is not It is the emotional signifi cance of the sacred uncommon (Friedland, 1992; Hassan, 2001). that underlies “faith,” and it is ritual participation One of the most productive areas of evolution- that invests the sacred with emotional meaning. ary analyses of terror is the work by Ginges, Atran, Extensive research indicates that emotions con- and colleagues on sacred values. Psychologists stitute evolved adaptations that weight decisions have shown that people fi nd it insulting when and infl uence actions (Damasio, 1994). Th e abil- monetary prices are placed on their sacred values ity of religious ritual to elicit both positive and (e.g., McGraw, Tetlock, & Kristel, 2003; Tetlock, negative emotional responses in participants pro- McGraw, & Kristel, 2003). Tetlock (2003) argues vides the substrate for the creation of motivational that some categories of mental operations are off

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limits because they require the assignment of fi nite and group identity can mean that “[m]atters of appraisals to values that our moral communities principle, or ‘sacred honor,’ are enforced to a degree treat as unquestionable and absolute commitments. far out of proportion to any individual or immedi- To mix the sacred with the profane and consider ate material payoff when they are seen as defi ning sacred values in fi nite terms is to commit a taboo, ‘who we are’ ” (Atran, 2010, p. 345). and those who do so generally feel impure and Group identities can be fi rmly established early desire to morally cleanse themselves. A belief that in life. Psychologist Brian Barber, who studies youth martyrdom is a means of symbolic moral cleansing experiences with violence and war, explains that per- leads some down the path toward suicide terrorism sonal experiences with violence shape how youths (Bodansky, 2007). respond to the confl ict in which they are raised. Commitments to a sacred and higher cause According to Barber, “much of identity can be enable terrorists to achieve greater sacrifi ce than is sourced externally, in that political confl ict can lit- typically possible with traditional reward structures erally divide and defi ne who one is (ethnically, reli- that are based on material incentives. As Atran keenly giously, politically, culturally, etc.)” (2008, p. 306). observes, the “jihad fi ghts with the most primitive Collective identity can be critical for youths, and and elementary forms of human cooperation, tribal living through an intense confl ict can bind a pop- kinship and friendship, in the cause of the most ulation together. For Palestinian youth, for exam- advanced and sophisticated form of cultural coop- ple, the “extensive engagement in the struggle, eration ever created: the moral salvation of human- and their willingness to sacrifi ce for it—even their ity” (2010, p. 35). In a survey of Palestinian support childhood—was thoroughly informed by a realm for suicide bombings, support was not based on a of meaning that comprehensively detailed for them belief that Jews or Israelis are inherently bad or evil; their identity and justifi ed and legitimized the goals it was a perceived sense of injustice that predicted a and tactics of their fi ght” (Barber, 2008, p. 307). belief that Islam sanctions martyrs (Atran, 2010), an injustice committed against the group. Another sur- Adolescence as the Critical Life Phase for the vey (Atran, 2010) found that people are distrustful Transmission of Religious Beliefs and Values of polls showing that the other side wants an “open Th e human brain demonstrates great plasticity society” or peace; sacred values are preserved and during development. Infancy, childhood, adoles- protected even in the face of empirical evidence. cence, and adulthood are marked by diff erentiated In a study on reactions to compromises aimed growth patterns in various brain cortices and nuclei at ending the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, Ginges (Alcorta, 2006). Th e diff erential patterns of brain et al. (2007) found that there was some anger and growth across the life course create sensitive peri- disgust, as well as some propensity for violence, ods for particular types of learning. Th e unique when respondents were asked to compromise over a changes occurring in the adolescent brain render sacred value. Th ese responses actually increased for this a particularly sensitive developmental period individuals deemed “moral absolutists” when the in relation to social, emotional, and symbolic stim- compromises included an additional instrumental uli. Social stimuli assume increased importance as incentive, such as money. As a guest of the Pashtun the adolescent enters into sexual, competitive, and tribes in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden was the coalitional nonkin relationships. Risk taking and benefi ciary of sacred values associated with hospital- novelty seeking escalate, particularly in males, and ity. Th ese sacred values, based on group identity and human sensation-seeking scores peak (Steinberg, forms of cooperation, override the rational choice 2007). At the same time, mental processing speeds of receiving the millions of dollars that have been increase, the ability to focus on task-relevant infor- off ered for the capture of bin Laden. Atran argues mation improves, and abstract, symbolic reasoning that the “[d]evotion to some core values may repre- develops (Dahl, 2004; Kwon & Lawson, 2000). sent universal responses to long-term evolutionary Th e brain changes that occur during adolescent strategies that go beyond short-term individual cal- development drive the social and sexual behaviors culations of self-interest but that advance individ- of the teen years (Dahl, 2004; Steinberg, 2007). ual interests in the aggregate and long run” (2010, Th e higher impulsivity, increased risk taking, and p. 345). Sacred values can surface for issues with enhanced novelty seeking of adolescent males are comparatively little importance or historical back- related to the changes occurring in the dopami- ground when they become tangled up with confl icts nergic pathways of the brain. Th e resultant behav- over collective identity. Th e fusion of sacred values iors motivate adolescent males to move from the

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security of their kin networks to the less predictable in adolescence . . . [and] many retired ‘terrorists’ and more competitive arena of nonkin interactions reveal a mellowing of attitude” (2005, p. 28). Of (Alcorta, 2010). course, by the time those raised in a culture of mar- In addition to the heightened sociality and emo- tyrdom reach adolescence they are already prepared tional responsivity of adolescence, this developmen- to sacrifi ce themselves without further indoctrina- tal period is also marked by the ongoing maturation tion (Atran, 2003; Brooks, 2002). Bloom observes of both the social processing region of the brain, the that by the age of 6, Palestinian boys and girls report temporal cortex, and the abstract, “executive” pro- that they wish to grow up and become isitshhadis cessing region, the prefrontal cortex. A shift in the (martyrs). “By the age of 12, they are fully commit- brain’s reward circuitry to greater prefrontal domi- ted and appreciate what becoming a martyr entails” nance occurs concomitantly with the ongoing mat- (2005, p. 88). As a senior member of the Palestinian uration of this region. Th ese simultaneous changes group al-Qassam declares, “it is easy to sweep the in the adolescent brain provide a unique window streets for boys who want to do a martyrdom oper- of opportunity for the creation of emotionally ation” (Hassan, 2001, p. 39). Nonetheless, the pro- weighted and socially meaningful symbolic sche- fi le of those who actually carry out suicide attacks mata, and for integrating these schemata into the may be somewhat older (Hassan [2001] reports a brain’s reward circuitry (Alcorta, 2006; Blakemore, range of 18–38 years among Palestinians), sug- 2008). As a result, adolescence is a time when com- gesting that the enthusiasm of youth must be bal- munal ritual performance is likely to be particularly anced with training and the development of trust infl uential (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005). to carry out such a mission. Indeed, Benmelech and Adolescent rites of passage comprise one of the Berrebi (2007) found that older and more educated most consistent features of religions across cultures Palestinian suicide bombers were assigned more (Lutkehaus & Roscoe, 1995). Rites of passage not important targets, caused more casualties in their only teach initiates the social and cultural mores attacks, and were less likely to fail. of the group as embodied in unfalsifi able beliefs; they also imbue these beliefs with emotional sig- Secular Terrorism nifi cance and motivational force. Participation in While some have questioned whether religious rites of passage engages unconscious emotional pro- terrorism exists (e.g., Nardin, 2001), it might be cesses, as well as conscious cognitive mechanisms. more appropriate to ask whether secular terrorism Such rites frequently evoke intense emotions of exists. One advantage of the evolutionary approach love, anger, fear, and awe and associate these emo- we off er here is that by delineating the core adaptive tions with socially signifi cant symbols and beliefs. features of religion that facilitate cooperation we Because such symbols are deeply associated with can avoid defi nitional quagmires concerning what emotions engendered through ritual, they take on constitutes religion. Th is is important because we motivational force. Th e use of communal ritual to suspect that similar to their religious counterparts, evoke emotions and conditionally associate them successful secular terrorists employ some of these core with socially salient symbols can be expected to be features, such as emotionally evocative symbols, rit- particularly eff ective during adolescence as a result uals, and myths. For example, although it is claimed of the brain changes occurring during this time. that the LTTE movement is “secular and is eager to Abstract social mores are thus not only cognitively maintain its secular status” (Schalk, 2003, p. 395), instantiated; they are also imbued with motivational there is considerable evidence that they employ the salience through sanctifi cation. When such rites are same features of religion that religious terrorists use simultaneously experienced by groups of individu- to achieve their aims. Th e LTTE, for instance, use als, the conditioned association of evoked emotions Hindu symbols for purposes of recruitment and rely with socially relevant cognitive schema creates a cul- on the language of religious martyrdom to justify tural community bound in motivation, as well as and reward the sacrifi ce. And similar to the func- belief. tion of video testaments, prior to suicide missions It is therefore not surprising that most terror- Tamil Tigers partake in a “ritual dinner” with their ists begin their militant life during adolescence. leader, obviously sealing their commitment to carry Victoroff suggests that the “typical development of out the attack (Gambetta, 2005). Furthermore, the terrorist sympathies perhaps follows an arc: young annual “Heroes’ Day” ritual celebration, commem- adolescents are plastic in their political orientation orating the LTTE martyrs, inspires the masses and and open to indoctrination. Positions harden later mobilizes support (Roberts, 2005). In a detailed

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ethnographic study, Roberts shows that these rites the sacred land, Jewish-American soldiers were for martyrs “parallel the manner in which they reluctantly permitted to enter Saudi Arabia. To approach the deities [and] enables those Tamils who replace their Jewish dog tags, Jewish soldiers were are so inclined to appeal to the divine forces and given dog tags labeled “Protestant B” (Darvick, convince themselves that their actions, and those of 2003). Pragmatism trumped sacred values. And the LTTE, are in harmony with the cosmological since 1972, successive Israeli governments have con- arrangements” (2005, p. 83). Th erefore, the secu- sistently proclaimed Gaza as eternally united with lar-religious distinction made by Western societies Israel (Lustick, 1993); nonetheless, governance was with institutionalized religious systems may not be transferred to the PLO in 1993 and in 2005 Israeli a useful paradigm for examining the determinants settlements were dismantled and the remaining set- of terrorist activity. Rather, analyses would be better tlers relocated to Israel. served by concentrating on how terrorist organiza- Religion is not infl exible, and sacred values are tions use the particular characteristics of the human not eternal. But why does religion appear to be resis- religious adaptive complex we have outlined here to tant to change? One of the remarkable features of inspire group commitment and individual action. religion is its ability to adapt to local environmen- tal conditions while adherents experience partaking Religion as an Adaptive System in an eternally consistent and changeless tradition. Aside from the four core features of religion dis- Rappaport (1999) argues that religion achieves cussed earlier, another aspect of religion that makes this through a hierarchy of religious discourse. it a valuable tool for terrorists is its adaptability. Th is He claims there is an inverse relationship between may seem surprising. Terrorists who profess strong the material specifi city of a religious claim and the religious commitments are viewed as infl exible and durability of the claim. Religious ideas are hierar- resistant to change. Because of their religious com- chically organized within communities and at the mitments, it is believed, there is no possibility of apex of a community’s conceptual hierarchy is what the compromise necessary for successful negoti- Rappaport refers to as ultimate sacred postulates, ation. Th eir own statements would seem to attest such as the Shahada, Shema, or Vandana Ti-sarana to infl exibility. For example, Osama bin Laden’s for Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist communi- mentor, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, regularly repeated ties, respectively. Th ese ultimate sacred postulates his trademark slogan, “Jihad and the rifl e alone: lack material specifi city and are highly resistant to no negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogues” change. However, below ultimate sacred postulates (Rubin & Rubin, 2002). in the religious hierarchy are various cosmolog- Religious sanctity is often conceived by insiders ical axioms, ritual proscriptions, commandments, and outsiders to be permanent and eternal. But this directives, social rules, and other religious asser- is simply incorrect, and the error has been made by tions that do experience varying levels of change, scholars and laypeople alike. Pioneering scholars of depending on their material specifi city. religion, such as Durkheim, repeatedly asserted that Religious norms and practices change all the time, “there is something eternal in religion” (1912/1995, but it is understood by those who experience such pp. 429 and 432) and modern commentators have changes as an intensifi cation of acceptance (Purzycki made similar claims (e.g., Berman, 2010, p. 205). & Sosis, 2009; Rappaport, 1999). Religions rarely In describing the sacralization of space, Hassner invalidate the old completely; change occurs by (2003, p. 6) states, “Once a religious presence, a adding to previous practices and beliefs and elabo- hierophany, has been identifi ed in a place, it grants rating upon them, while other beliefs and practices the place permanent sanctity.” But religions are not slip away unnoticed. Once sacralization is internal- eternal and sanctity is not permanent; religions are ized, it is indeed very diffi cult to convince adher- fl exible, malleable, and often respond adaptively to ents that something consecrated is no longer holy. changing environmental conditions, and Hassner Hence, when undergoing change, religions often is fully aware of this. For example, in other work retain the most sacralized elements and augment Hassner (2006) carefully describes how mosques in them. Missionaries often retain the dates of pagan Iraq were targeted and recklessly destroyed when celebrations, Jewish prayers appear in the Catholic US troops were inside, suggesting a temporary sus- Mass, and many indigenous populations have held pension of their sanctity. Also during the fi rst Gulf onto their pantheon of gods and ancestral spirits by War, despite laws preventing Jews from entering incorporating them into the Biblical myths that are Saudi Arabia because their presence would defi le now prominent in their lives.

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Two other misconceptions about the infl exibil- level is also required, where visions, images, emo- ity of religion are worth mentioning. First, religious tional states and experiences overlap and induce communities, even fundamentalist communities, each other and fi nd their representation in symbols” are not homogeneous in their beliefs. In interviews (2002, pp. 103–104). By and large we agree, but we one of us (R. S.) conducted among Israeli Ultra- would add that describing how terrorists think at a Orthodox Jews, some have confi ded that they are cultural level is not suffi cient either. We maintain agnostics or atheists, but they remain in their com- that an evolutionary analysis, at the proximate and munities despite their lack of belief because they ultimate levels, that explains why symbolic images view the Ultra-Orthodox way of life positively, or at and sacred values are such eff ective motivators is least better than the alternatives. Other researchers also needed. Evolutionary explanations of terror- have reported similar experiences (e.g., Margolese, ist actions can address shortcomings of the ratio- 2005; Winston, 2005). Goody (1996) has shown nal choice models, particularly in analyzing sacred that doubt is widespread in world and indigenous values, and provide us with a powerful approach to religions and he argues that doubt is an inherent understand, and ultimately combat, terrorism. part of religious belief; theologians have made sim- While sacred values are used by terrorists to ilar claims (Lamm, 1985). Second, outsiders expect secure coalitional support, they also hold the key religious actors who have articulated and ritually for resolving diffi cult confl icts that have been displayed their priorities—typically implying that framed in religious terms (Sosis & Alcorta, 2008). their religious commitments are their ultimate For example, Ginges et al. (2007) have shown how concern—to behave in ways that directly refl ect this symbolic concessions with little economic value, ordering of priorities. Religious cognition, however, such as apologies, carry signifi cant weight among appears to be strongly encapsulated, preventing confl icting parties. Using an evolutionarily stable most religious actors from pursuing fi tness-destroy- strategies (ESS) approach, Sosis (2007) has shown ing behaviors (Bulbulia, 2005). Th us, while many how in territorial confl icts, sacralizing land can out- may express extreme commitments to their sacred perform other strategies; it appears that strategies values, even martyrdom, the actions of most who that sacralize land can only be defeated by other articulate such views do not match the enthusiasm sacred strategies. He has argued that to solve sacred of their rhetoric. land confl icts, the hierarchy of sacred values needs To summarize, viewing religion as infl exible is to be reordered. Fortunately, life is sacred in all the not only inaccurate, but it impedes productive con- world religions (e.g., Deuteronomy 30:19, Koran fl ict resolution (Gopin, 2002). Religions are com- 4:29), providing the possibility of a sacred life strat- plex adaptive systems that respond eff ectively to egy outcompeting a sacred land strategy. Although changing socioeconomic and ecological conditions it is diffi cult for the sacred life strategy to emerge (Alcorta & Sosis, 2005; Purzycki & Sosis, 2009; when embraced by only a few within a population, Sosis, 2009). One of religion’s vital adaptive fea- it can stabilize if it is able to achieve high frequency. tures is its ability to appear timeless and unchanging Th e key is convincing disputants that life has greater to adherents yet be responsive to varying circum- sanctity than land. Such debates are ongoing among stances (Rappaport, 1999). Religions achieve this theologians. In Judaism, for example, the sanctity of slight of hand by retaining core religious elements life is captured by the concept pikuach nefesh, and while readjusting social rules to accommodate new some prominent Orthodox rabbis, such as Joseph realities. Music, metaphors, poetry, and unfalsifi able Soloveitchik, have argued that saving human lives postulates all contribute to this adaptability. Change has greater sanctity than the Land of Israel. Ovadia for adherents is not experienced as something radi- Yosef, former Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel and cally new; it is experienced as increased acceptance spiritual mentor of the Ultra-Orthodox Shas polit- of eternal and personally relevant truths that have ical party, used this argument in 1979 to justify always been part of their religious tradition. returning the Sinai to Egypt, and regarding the con- fl ict with the Palestinians he stated: Conclusions Dingley and Kirk-Smith suggest that “positing If the heads of the army with the members of the a rational and causal ‘means-end’ calculation may government declare that lives will be endangered not be a suffi cient explanation for all terrorist acts unless territories in the Land of Israel are relinquished, by themselves. An understanding of how terrorists and there is the danger of an immediate declaration think on a subjective and culturally determined of war by the neighboring Arab [states] . . . and if

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territories are relinquished the danger of war will be the subordination or assimilation of the real family removed, and that there are realistic chances of lasting (genetic kinship) to the larger imagined commu- peace, then it appears, according to all the opinions, nity of ‘brothers and sisters.’ Indeed, the complete that it is permissible to relinquish territories of the subordination of biological loyalty to loyalty for the Land of Israel . . . [according to the principle of] cultural cause of the Ikhwan, the ‘Brotherhood’ of pikuach nefesh. the Prophet, is the original meaning of the word (Rosenfeld & Tabory, 1990) Islam, ‘submission’ ” (Atran, 2010, p. 13). Th ere are some scholars, including prominent It is clear that successful confl ict resolution will need evolutionary scientists such as Dawkins, who have to operate in the currency of sacred values. Tragically, attacked religion because of its alleged association however, sacred values are rarely taken seriously by with violence (see Purzycki & Gibson, 2011). It negotiators and policy makers. Representatives of is argued that a humanistic science should replace religious communities, for example, have been left religion or at least that a proper scientifi c education out of the majority of negotiations between Israelis could eliminate dangerous religious thinking. But and Palestinians. As confl ict specialist Marc Gopin as Atran points out, “An underlying reason for reli- remarks, “Religious fi gures are generally considered gion’s endurance is that science treats humans and part of the problem, but not part of creative solu- intentions only as incidental elements in the uni- tions by most people in the public policy arena. verse, whereas for religion they are central” (2010, Religion itself is seen as so explosive politically that p. 429–430). And as mentioned earlier, many ter- to even touch upon it lays the president and high rorists have degrees in science, so it is not clear that a offi cials vulnerable to intense attack” (2002, p. 46). scientifi c education would necessarily reduce levels Ironically, although evolutionary science is often of terrorism. What is needed, however, is a scientifi c viewed as an enemy of religion, our analyses sug- understanding of how terrorists employ and manip- gest that religious and sacred values must be taken ulate religion and sacred values for their benefi t. seriously for confl icts to be resolved and peace Only through such understanding can we begin to sustained. identify eff ective strategies for combating religious We have focused our discussion on how evolu- terrorism. tionary theories of religion and sacred values can inform us about terrorism, but there are numer- Future Directions for Research ous ways in which evolutionary analyses can be Our review of evolutionary perspectives on reli- productively applied to the problem of terrorism gious terrorism leaves many questions unanswered (see Sagarin & Taylor, 2008). Some scholars, for and points to the need for considerable research. We example, have posited that humans have been able consider a few areas that we believe deserve partic- to extend social relations beyond kin through an ular attention. “imagined kinship” (Qirko, 2009). Political scientist Gary Johnson (1987) has explored the usage of kin- 1. Th ere is some debate among evolutionary ship terminology as a means to inspire self-sacrifi ce. researchers regarding the role of religious beliefs in He posits that the purpose of employing kin terms motivating and supporting terrorist attacks. Ginges is to elicit altruistic behavior among nonkin. Poets, et al.’s (2009) study on support for suicide attacks, orators, and writers use kin terms when they seek to for example, has been criticized by Liddle et al. evoke or create an emotional bond with a human (2010) for prematurely rejecting the religious-belief group to which an individual is not otherwise nat- hypothesis. Liddle et al. argue that Ginges et al. urally bonded. Examples include American patri- failed to measure religious beliefs per se but rather otic speeches of “brotherhood,” the 1970s feminist used measures of devotion as proxies for religious movement’s usage of the word “sisters,” and frequent beliefs. We agree with Liddle et al. that it is impor- use of kinship terminology in Christianity. Atran tant to examine the genesis of motivationally salient suggests that friends in terror networks often use religious beliefs in relation to suicide terrorism. Th e familial terms and act as substitute families, while approach we have presented here, however, sug- many real families are unaware that their children gests that such religious beliefs represent proximate or siblings are involved in terrorist activities until it mechanisms derived from and reinforced through is too late. Islam, he argues, is a potent ideology for group ritual. Ritual is a vital mechanism that terror- terrorist recruiters because “[n]early all major ideo- ists employ to instill beliefs and secure commitment, logical movements, political or religious, require but detailed studies on the ritual lives of terrorists

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are limited. Comparative research that examines the of fertility decisions that integrate evolutionary relationship between group ritual, religious beliefs, signaling theory and life history theory, but such and suicide terrorism is needed to productively integrated models are likely to be important for advance discussions on the role of religious belief understanding the relationship between fertility, in motivating and supporting terror. Testing for religion, and terrorist activity. a direct eff ect of religious belief on terrorist activ- ity or support for terrorist activity, however, is not Acknowledgments straightforward. As Ginges et al. note, “To retest We thank Todd Shackelford and Viviana Weekes- the belief hypothesis empirically one needs to do Shackelford for helpful comments on an earlier draft so in a manner that does not measure independent of this manuscript, and Sosis thanks the Templeton and dependent variables that are so close in mean- Foundation for generous funding of this research. ing as to make relationships between these variables entirely unsurprising—or tautological” (2010, p. References 347). Evidence of post hoc religious justifi cations Alcorta, C. S. (2006). Religion and the life course: Is adolescence by terrorists, public testimonials of religious belief, an “experience expectant” period for religious transmission? In Patrick McNamara (Ed.), Where God and science meet. Vol. and support for violence in sacred texts do not pro- 2: Th e neurology of religious experience (pp. 55–80). Westport, vide adequate data for testing the religious-belief CT: Praeger Publishers. hypothesis; sophisticated research methods that dis- Alcorta, C. S. (2010). Biology, culture, and religiously moti- entangle casual eff ects will be required. vated suicide terrorism: An evolutionary perspective. Politics 2. Th e study of sacred values is in its infancy. and Culture. Retrieve January 2012, from http://www. politicsandculture.org/2010/04/29/biology-culture-and- Future work must address how sacred values arise, religiously-motivated-suicide-terrorism-an-evolutionary- become internalized, and spread. Among religious perspective/ communities, myths that support claims to sacred Alcorta, C. S., & Sosis, R. (2005). Ritual, emotion, and sacred lands, for example, are often quickly embraced symbols: Th e evolution of religion as an adaptive complex. (Sosis, 2011), but we are not aware of any studies Human Nature, 16, 323–359. Alcorta, C. S., & Sosis, R. (2007). Rituals of humans and ani- that systematically examine the spread of sacred val- mals. In M. Bekoff (Ed.), Encyclopedia of human-animal rela- ues in any population. Most important, research is tionships (Vol. 2, pp. 599–605). Westport, CT: Greenwood needed to understand the fl exibility of sacred values Publishers. and the social conditions under which sacred values Armstrong, K. (2000). Th e battle for God. New York: Random can ignite violence and bloodshed. House. Atkinson, Q. D., & Bourrat, P. (2010). Beliefs about God, the 3. Our analyses suggest that adolescence is the afterlife and morality support the role of supernatural polic- critical development phase during which terror- ing in human cooperation. Evolution and Human Behavior, ists are created, and thus adolescents should be the 32, 41–49. focus of considerable terror-related research. Atran, S. (2002). In gods we trust: Th e evolutionary landscape of 4. Rigorous experimental and ethnographic religion. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of suicide terrorism. Science, 299, studies that examine the determinants of religious 1534–1539. change, especially among extremist forms of reli- Atran, S. (2004). Mishandling suicide terrorism. Washington gion, are urgently needed. Quarterly, 27, 67–90. 5. Selectionist logic suggests that high-risk Atran, S. (2006). Th e moral logic and growth of suicide terror- behaviors, such as terrorism, are more common ism. Washington Quarterly, 29, 127–147. Atran, S. (2010). Talking to the enemy: Faith, brotherhood, and the in high-fertility populations (e.g., Wilson & Daly, (un)making of terrorists. New York: HarperCollins. 1997). Recent studies by economists indicate a Atran, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2004). Religion’s evolutionary land- link between terrorism, religiosity, and fertility scape: Counterintuition, commitment, compassion, commu- decisions (Berman, 2009). Such investigations nion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 713–730. are important because if there is a positive rela- Azam, J-P. (2005). Suicide-bombing as intergenerational invest- ment. Public Choice, 122, 177–198. tionship between terror and fertility, encourag- Barber, B. K. (2008). Contrasting portraits of war: Youths’ ing demographic transitions through such means varied experiences with political violence in Bosnia and as expanded female educational and economic Palestine. International Journal of Behavioral Development, opportunities may be one means of reducing ter- 32, 298–309. ror activity. We suspect that the predictive power Bek, J., & Lock, S. (2011). Afterlife beliefs: Category specifi c- ity and sensitivity to biological priming. Religion, Brain & of the models that have been employed by econo- Behavior, 1, 5–17. mists would be enhanced if informed by life his- Belanger, N., Baum, S. R., & Titone, D. (2009). Use of prosodic tory theory. We currently lack evolutionary models cues in the production of idiomatic and literal sentences by

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