CASTLES IN THE SAND? AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING AND
DEVELOPMENT TO REPATRIATE LEBANON’S INTERNALLY DISPLACED
By
Amal I. Khoury
Submitted to the
School of International Service
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In
International Relations
Chair: .ba Nimer
Dr. M ie Mertus
Dr. Terrence Lyons
Dean of the School of International Service
Date
2006
American University
Washington D.C.
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ^
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Copyright 2007 by Khoury, Amal I.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CASTLES IN THE SAND? AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING AND
DEVELOPMENT TO REPATRIATE LEBANON’S INTERNALLY DISPLACED
BY
Amal I. Khoury
ABSTRACT
This dissertation uses a qualitative, constructivist stance to explore both the
theoretical linkage between peacebuilding and development as an effective approach to
state-building in post-conflict areas and the practical conditions in which development
and peacebuilding activities facilitate post-settlement, inter-group accommodation and
reconciliation in deeply divided societies. Taking Lebanon as a case study, it focuses on
the complex issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a major challenge confronting
policy-makers and investigates how development and peacebuilding policies and
programs can best promote sustainable return of displaced persons to their homes of
origin.
This evaluative case study critically examines various organizations' return
policies, programs, and projects that target IDPs in Lebanon and assesses whether and
how peacebuilding and development initiatives are implemented together within these
various policies. Analyzing data collected through interviews, context, archival analysis,
document analysis, fieldwork and observation, this dissertation derives lessons on ways
in which post-war, ethnically divided societies can be healed and rebuilt. The research
finds that, despite shifts in the focus of some programs, traditional approaches to ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. development programs, focusing on political and economic elements, still occupy the
center stage of local, national, and international responses to the IDP problem in
Lebanon.
Given the failure of such efforts, this study concludes that there is a profound
need for more comprehensive and integrative approaches to both development and
peacebuilding and for a greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human facets of the
IDP return process in Lebanon. It provides some lessons and recommendations from
which to draw useful ways of integrating peacebuilding and development not only for
Lebanon but for other post-conflict areas as well.
The importance of this study and its findings will remain of critical importance as
policymakers and authorities face new waves of displacement, following the violence in
Lebanon in the summer of 2006, and attempt to bring about a more lasting peace and
sustainable development in Lebanon. In a more general way, it contributes to new
thinking in the areas of international relations, conflict resolution, and development.
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Many people have been instrumental to the completion of this dissertation. I am
indebted to my mentor and dissertation advisor Mohammed Abu Nimer whose patient
guidance and care throughout the process made this undertaking uplifting. No words can
express my appreciation. I am also highly grateful to my committee members Marwan
Kraidy, Julie Mertus and Terrence Lyons for their continuous encouragement, support,
and invaluable advice. I feel fortunate to have worked with all of you; I have learned a lot
and have grown as a researcher, scholar and person in the process.
The welcoming atmosphere at American University made my years in the Ph.D.
program memorable. I am grateful to the School of International Service for a
Dissertation Research Fellowship, which made the research and fieldwork possible. I also
extend with sincere gratitude my thanks to the professors and staff for enriching my life
with knowledge. I would like to thank, among others, Dean Louis Goodman, Professors
Abdul Aziz Said, Stephen Silvia, Randolph Persaud, James Mittleman, Clovis Maksoud,
Patrick Jackson, and my academic advisor Mary Barton. This dissertation would not have
been ready for submission without the help of my editors Alison Long and Jessica
Worchel and the expertise of Ignacio Moreno,*the Bender Library Archivist. Thank you
all for your help.
Throughout this journey, I have greatly benefited from the unwavering support of
my colleagues and friends in the program. This achievement would not have been
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. possible without their constant encouragement. I have profited tremendously from our
many stimulating debates and conversations, whether in class, over the phone, or over
dinners and drinks. I especially want to thank Lynn Kunkle, my other half in the
“dynamic duo;” thank you for your friendship, support, faith, and reassurance. You were
there for me during the ups and downs all those years and for this I am greatly
appreciative. Ines Hoess, Apama Devare and Kiran Pervez have lent their perpetual
support, and have read several chapters of the dissertation, providing me with insightful
comments and feedback. Their friendship and encouragement were crucial to the
completion of this project.
I will especially remember the long conversations with my ‘buddy’ Kiran and
cherish her unrelenting faith in me. I am also grateful to Christopher Corpora and Ruth
Reitan who intellectually challenged me in constructive ways. Ruth and her husband
Andy single-handedly made our first year in the program more bearable and even fun
over weekly dinners and get-togethers. The many long nights preparing for the
comprehensive exams and over the course of writing would not have been possible
without the commitment and support of Huong Nguyen; who, in addition to her consider
intellectual insights, sustained us with her cooking and healthy food. I also want to thank
Anne-Claire Hervy and Lauhona Ganguly for believing in me and constantly encouraging
me. Thank you my friends for making me feel at home away from home.
This research would not have been possible without the help of the many local
experts I had the privilege of connecting with in Lebanon. I appreciate their time,
assistance and the invaluable information they provided which made this research so
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. interesting. In particular, I would like to extend my gratitude to Mr. Marwan Hamadeh,
Mr. Shadi Masaad, Ms. NaylaNawfal, Mr. Najem al-Hachem, Mr. Wajdi Lutfallah, Mrs.
Nancy Maroun, and Mr. Omar Mdawar. I also want to extend my gratitude to Dr. Paul
Salem who gave me gave me great advice in the early stages of my research and his
guidance throughout the field research. I would also like to thank all my interviewees and
all those who took their time to talk with me during my visits to the different offices and
villages. I would not have been able to complete this Ph.D. were it not for the support,
friendship, and continuous encouragement of my mentors at the American University of
Beirut. I would like to especially thank Randa Antoun and Nizar Hamzeh.
I am grateful to all my friends who supported and encouraged me throughout the
past six years. I specially want to thank Faten Ghosn for her empathy throughout the
whole process; Amal Chmouny for her constant encouragement and help in transcribing
interviews; Samer el-Kadi, Nader Tabbara, and Nada, Rami, Firas and Danny Dalloul for
reminding me that there is life outside and beyond the dissertation. Thank you all for your
unconditional friendship.
I am certain I will never find the words to fully express my gratitude to my
family. I am truly forever indebted to all of you for your unwavering confidence in me,
for your encouragement when things were hard, and for sharing in my joy when things
were well.
To my aunts Katy Alonzo, Doris Zarzar, Hala Irani, Ghada Gholam, and Hala
Azar, and to my uncle Nizar Khoury, thank you for all you have done for me. To my
grandmother, Rose, I am grateful for your love and inspiration. To Alfred and Dina
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Khoury thank you for your kindness and support. To Chris, Zeina, and Mia Stevens thank
you for your generous hospitality. To my in-laws, Elias and Nada Khouri, thank you for
your encouragement.
My sisters Ruba and Hala have always been my closest friends and confidantes,
and who have given me more happiness and love in my life than they will ever know.
Above all, I would like to express my love and gratitude to my parents. To my father,
Ibrahim, thank you for your unwavering confidence in me, and for sparking in me an
interest and a passion for politics that have driven me to realize this goal. To my mother,
Randa, thank you for nourishing my dreams and teaching me that my dreams were
always in my power to reach. Above all, thank you both for your love, support, and for
everything you have done in making me who I am.
Last but not least, I am grateful to my husband and best friend Nicolas: without
his constant encouragement, genuine love, friendship and support, this dissertation would
simply not have been possible.
vii
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ABSTRACT...... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT...... iv
LIST OF TABLES...... ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS...... xii
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION...... 1
Research Questions
Locating and Framing the Research
Case Study: The Return of the Internally Displaced in Lebanon
Statement of Purpose
Definition of Key Terms
Structure of the Study
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN...... 21
Methodology
Rationale for a Qualitative Approach
The Case for a Case Study Design
An Evaluative, Assessment Approach
Methods and Data Sources
viii
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW: IDP RETURN, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING: FROM ANALYSIS TO IMPLEMENTATION.....
Introduction
Forced Migration
Development
Peacebuilding
Linking Peacebuilding and Development: Theory and Practice
Conclusion
4. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: WAR AND THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT PROBLEM......
Introduction
Historical Background
Internal Displacement
Taef Agreement
Reconstruction Process
Response to the IDP Plight
Challenges in Responding to IDPs
Conclusion
5. WIDTH AND SUBSTANCE: THE AGENCIES' RESPONSE TO IDPS.
Introduction
Overview of the Agencies and Organizations
Conclusion
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Introduction
Development Initiatives and Return
Peacebuilding Initiatives and Return
One Approach does not Fit All: Selected Examples of Diverse Areas of Return
Assessment: Importance and Ways of Linking Peacebuilding and Development
Conclusion
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 375
Findings and Conclusions
Lessons and Recommendations
8. POSTSCRIPT 387
APPENDIX. 390
REFERENCES 392
x
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Table Page
1. Areas from which displacement occurred ...... 188
2. Areas where displaced settled or relocated ...... 189
3. Displacement according to sect ...... 190
4. Age distribution of the displaced population ...... 191
5. Types of accommodations during displacement ...... 195
6. Mode of occupation ...... 195
7. Employment status ...... 196
8. Levels of education ...... 197
9. Percentage of destroyed houses ...... ,210
10. Conditions of homes in areas of displacement ...... 210
11. Movement of return in some targeted villages as of 2003 ...... 225
12. Phase 1 villages according to region/Caza ...... 242
13. Funds allocated according to sector ...... 292
14. Funds needed to achieve return according to sector ...... 293
15. Funds allocated by sector in Beirut ...... 294
16. Funds allocated by sector in Mount Lebanon ...... 295
17. Funds allocated by sector in North Lebanon ...... 296
18. Funds allocated by sector in Bekaa ...... 297 xi
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19. Funds allocated by sector in South Lebanon, Western Bekaa and Rashaya ...... 298
20. Funds allocated by sector- Total ...... 299
21. Number and percentage of damaged villages in Mount Lebanon Cazas ...... 302
22. Number and percentage of destroyed villages in Mount Lebanon Cazas ...... 302
23. Economic activities in areas of return ...... 307
24. Villages that experienced rehabilitation of the agricultural sector ...... 309
25. Sanctuaries (in 2003) ...... 316
26. Community, sports, and camping facilities or centers (in 2003) ...... 318
27. Number of Home Return and Residents Committees according to provinces ...336
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Figure Page
1. Organizations’ projects: development and Peacebuilding 354
xiii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADF-Arab Deterrent Force
CDR-Council for Development and Reconstruction
CFD-Central Fund for the Displaced
CHF-Cooperative Housing Foundation
CMRC- Churches and Mosques Reconstruction Council
CNEWA/Pontifical Mission- Catholic Near East Welfare Association/Pontifical Mission
DAC-Development Assistance Committee
ERR- Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program
EU-European Union
FFD-Central Fund for the Displaced
FSF- Farah Social Foundation
HDI-Human Development Index
HRBA-Human Rights Based Approach
ICRC-Intemational Committee of the Red Cross
IDP-Intemally Displaced People or Persons
IF AL-International Fund for the Assistance of Lebanon
IGO-Intemational Organization
ILDES- Lebanese Institute for Economic and Social Development
xiv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IOM-Intemational Organization for Migration
IWA- Institute of World Affairs
LAF-Lebanese Armed Forces
LCRN-Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network
LCS-Lebanese Council of the South
LNF- Lebanese Non-Governmental Organization Forum
MCC- Mennonite Central Committee
MECC-Middle East Council of Churches
MNF-Multinational Force
MoD-Ministry of Displaced
NGO-Non-Govemmental Organization
OECD-Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OES-Operation Emirates Solidarity
P&A- Planning and Assessment for Conflict Zones Projects
PCIA-Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PPM-Permanent Peace Movement
PSIS- Program for Strategic and International Security Studies
RCDP-Rural Community Development Program
SDC- Lebanese Sustainable Democracy Center
UN-United Nations
UNDP-United Nations Development Program
xv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNESCO-United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF-United Nations Children Fund
UNIFEM-United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL-United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNRISD-United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNRSRD- United Nations Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced Program
UNV- United Nations Volunteers in Lebanon
USAID-United States Agency for International Development
USCR-U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
USIP-United States Institute of Peace
WRF-World Rehabilitation Fund
WTO-World Trade Organization
WV- World Vision International
YMCA- Young Men’s Christian Association
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
“/ have been like a bird flying across the globe, unfortunately, I have only felt happy in my own village and in my own wonderful land, the land o f Lebanon. ” Mikhael Neame
I was bom when the first clashes in what was to become the fifteen-year long
Lebanese civil war empted. I am, as many might define or view me, a child of war; what
I have chosen to study and analyze is very much a result of the experiences I lived. This
research is an endeavor to answer some of the questions that have haunted me for a long
time, both during the war and in the post-war period—mainly, what does it take to build
peace, as well as to experience what the pre-war generations of Lebanese and history
books refer to as pre-war “life in the Paris of the Middle East”? Hence, the premises of
this study emerged from my experiences living in a war-torn area, my reflections on the
literature I was exposed to during my studies, and the several trips I made back to
Lebanon after I moved to Washington, DC in 2000.
Research Questions
Even though I have been exposed first-hand to the atrocities of the war, I cannot
claim to have suffered what millions in the country have: the only things my family lost
during the years in which the war raged were our cars, which were burnt following an
1
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explosion, and a few shattered windows and doors—all of which were, of course,
replaceable. This is not equivalent to the loss of loved ones and homes that many in the
country have experienced. I have lived without electricity and water, slept in a shelter
(where I took my first steps), and missed days of school—but always within the
confinement of our own apartment building. This is different from being cuddled up in
make-shift homes, unfinished buildings, commercial centers, and schools, with thousands
of strangers and without my belongings, as was the case for millions of Internally
Displaced Peoples (IDPs). So, even though I understand what people in general go
through during a war, I knew very little of what internally displaced people really felt or
experienced—at least not until I began my fieldwork and, for the first time in my life, I
visited those areas of displacement.
My background provided me with a degree of legitimacy to undertake such
research: I was welcomed by those people with whom I share the memory of war, the
feeling of fear, and an understanding of Lebanese culture. What made this research all the
more critical is the fact that the limited scholarly literature on Lebanon, by focusing on
the causes of the civil war and the political and economic consequences, has downplayed
the social-human aspect of the country’s war and the issue of IDPs. Such an emphasis on
what went wrong has limited the discussion on what could be done to make things right
and how to deal effectively with the root causes of the problem. My exposure to the
literatures of international relations, conflict resolution, and development forced me to
think more comprehensively about the Lebanese conflict and its consequences.
Furthermore, I felt the urge to pursue some of the aforementioned questions,
which have troubled me for decades. The timing of such an investigation was ideal: more
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than twelve years after the end of violence, it is now possible to achieve a greater
perspective on the issues. Yet, during my fieldwork, I found how differently the issue of
internal displacement is understood, depending on who I was talking to—residents,
displaced persons, returnees, people not affected by displacement, organizational staff;
each had a specific view on what constitutes the problem, its impacts, and how it could
(or should) be solved. One thing common across the board, however, is the distinction
between ‘us (or me)’ and the ‘other,’ where relationships are defined in terms of
differences rather than similarities. Such reality is also reflected in the organizations’
work when they talk about residents and returnees: residents and the displaced, and
returnees and the displaced. Even though people from different sectarian affiliations and
backgrounds suffered from displacement, as will be delineated in subsequent chapters,
the distinction in most cases possesses a religious connotation: Christians are
distinguished from Muslims and Druze. However, most of the interviewees lamented the
collapse of friendships and the ‘good old days’ when they visited each other, ate dinners
together, and shared each other’s happiness and sorrow. All wished for the revival of
coexistence, but no one knew how the common feelings of fear, mistrust, and betrayal
could be overcome.
Hence, relying upon my background, experience, readings, fieldwork, and
conversations, I embarked on an exploration of pertinent questions: how can Lebanon
overcome its bloody and divisive past and regain a reputable coexistence? Although I
could have gone about investigating this question in numerous ways, I chose to focus
mainly on the internal displacement problem which, in my opinion, poses a major
challenge to state-building and to the post-conflict dynamic in societies emerging from
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civil wars. Theoretically, my interest resided in examining the linkage between
peacebuilding and development as a vital approach to state-building in post-conflict
areas. Where do peacebuilding and development theories intersect and what kind of
theoretical framework is needed to conceptualize the overlap and convergence between
the two? Under what conditions do development and peacebuilding activities facilitate
post-settlement, inter-group accommodation and reconciliation in deeply divided
societies? And what does a successful policy of return look like? While theories are
important for the advancement of knowledge, their application is equally crucial to the
development of the field. Hence, in this research, I go beyond these theoretical concerns
to investigate practical questions that ultimately will be beneficial to agencies and
organizations involved in post-war settings. Such questions include: How do we design
future development and peacebuilding projects in war-torn countries that promote
sustainable return of displaced persons to their homes of origin? What are the challenges
that face returnees in their communities? How can these challenges be addressed in order
to engender sustainable livelihoods? And how can we assess these interventions and their
impact on post-conflict state-building?
Locating and Framing the Research
In addition to my personal experiences, two challenges contributed to the idea of
this study. First, the changing nature of warfare has tested the efficiency of existing
mechanisms to deal effectively with post-conflict situations. Increasingly, conflict
dynamics have introduced new challenges to the theoretical thinking and practical ways
of understanding, working with, and successfully answering to the demands (or
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exigencies) of post-conflict realities. Second, the exacerbating problem of IDPs is a major
challenge confronting policy-makers in post-conflict areas. What made this question even
more interesting is the lack of attention given by the international community to IDPs
relative to other people of concern, who are mainly refugees who cross international
borders. There are imbalanced policy responses directed at each of these displaced
populations. At the same time, that the number of refugees has fallen by 4 percent to
around 9.2 million, while large increases in the number of internally displaced persons
(IDPs) are being recorded worldwide (“Refugees by Number,” 2005). With an estimated
25 million IDPs worldwide, Mooney calls the global crisis of internal displacement one
of the most pressing problems of our times (2003a, 163). Former UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, described the situation of IDPs as “the silent
tragedy of our times,” at a 1992 lecture.1
A number of studies have looked at internal displacement from an economic,
political, social, educational, and health perspectives; my research, while touching upon
those aspects of the problem, looks at it from a wider lens as it relates to issues of
development, peacebuilding, and reconciliation in post-war countries. The study is based
on the notion that population displacement is a growing problem to be reckoned with in
the international relations, peace and conflict resolution, and development studies/fields.
In such a context, this research focuses on internal displacement as a major challenge to
1 A review o f scholarly and practitioner literature, as done in chapter three, reveals that more attention is being given to refugees who enjoy the protection and assistance of the international community and who have international organizations to response specifically to their predicament. The problem is more acute when dealing with IDPs: by the mere fact of not crossing international borders they do not enjoy the protection o f the international community but are under the mercy of their governments. The only time that the international community can interfere in order to restore IDPs basic and human rights (like it did in Lebanon) are when summoned by the local state. Much work and analysis on IDPs are needed in order to redress such imbalance in response and protect all victims of displacement.
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nation-building in post-war settings. By focusing on internally displaced persons, this
research aspires not only to increase awareness of this understudied group of people, but
also to offer effective solutions to a problem that affects—either directly or indirectly—a
large portion of the world’s population. IDP return policies make up a small, yet
extremely important piece of the very large and complex puzzle of post-war
reconstruction, peacebuilding, and sustainable development in countries that have
suffered years of conflict and destruction. While there are different types of
displacement—developmental, environmental, natural disaster related, etc., this research
focuses on those displaced by conflicts and wars. This type of displacement has
increasingly become the focus of UNHCR, US Committee for Refugees, and the
Norwegian Refugee Council, to name a few, and has witnessed significant increase in
recent years. The study also assumes the position of the Lebanese government regarding
return: that all displaced communities—whether refugees or IDPs—have the right to
return to their homes and that such return is the only solution to the displacement
problem.2
It is not the intention of this study to blame the government for the war, or its
numerous consequences, including the problem of internal displacement, as this is not a
study of the Lebanese political system or the civil war in general. Also, this research does
not strive to find fault with the weakened approach that the government, as well as other
organizations and agencies, have adopted in responding to the dispossessed population. It
2 There is a debate in the forced migration field and in practice over whether displaced communities should repatriate in all areas and under different circumstances. UNHCR launched the “decade of repatriation” in the 1990s in which integration and resettlement- once believed to be alternative durable solutions to displacement, where overtaken by voluntary repatriation as the preferred and ideal solution to such a problem. Contrary to this dominant belief, however, some scholars, like Chaim Kaufmann, believe that return is not always the best policy for peace and prosperity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. seeks to explore the challenges within the design and implementation phases of such
programs in the country and constructively criticize them: positive criticism is the way by
which change can take place. This paper does not claim to present solutions to all the
problems, but instead provides a framework through which these challenges can be
explored.
Case Study: The Return of the Internally Displaced in Lebanon
To explore the vital issues presented above and the challenges facing IDP
repatriation, this study critically examines the programs and projects which the Lebanese
government and other organizations—both local and international—have been
implementing in the areas of return for more than twelve years.
A small country of 3.5 million people and 10452 sq. km, Lebanon has
suffered fifteen years of devastating conflict, which resulted in extensive material and
human destruction. The widespread damage in infrastructure and structure, major
economic difficulties, and political instabilities are some of the most disturbing results of
the civil war. However, the most devastating consequences of these years of violence and
massacres have been the numerous waves of displacement that have affected almost 30%
of the total population (Global IDP Database, 2004, 5). There is no accurate data on the
number of people who remain internally displaced and the “estimates range hugely
between 50,000 and 600,000” (Global IDP Database, 2004, 5).3 Such imprecision
3 While the number o f IDPs has reached at its high 1 million, there is no agreed number of the remaining displaced after the end of the war. The government estimates the number to be 79,000 families (average of 5 per family), other sources have it at 300,000 individuals; yet others believe that not many people have been repatriated since the end of the war and that the number is closer to 500,000 or 600,000.
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regarding the numbers of displaced in the country can be blamed on a number of
political, social, economic and logistical factors, including: the absence of a registration
mechanism for IDPs; the absence of precise and objective demographic data due to
political sensitivity; the fact that displaced in Lebanon do not live in camps; and, inter
alia, corruption.
Fifteen years after the end of the war, the rather large number of remaining IDPs
is disturbing for two reasons: first, because the Lebanese government has placed the
return of displaced as a top priority on its agenda; and second, because the government’s
adamant response was and still is closely related to its belief that the return of displaced
to their homes and communities and the restoration of their rights is essential to the
process of national reconciliation and crucial to the country’s peace, stability, and
prosperity.
Over the last thirteen years, the proliferation of projects in the areas of
displacement, as well as the billions of dollars spent on this endeavor, are a clear
testament of the motivation that underpins the response to IDPs. The political will
necessary to solve the problem is present and the government has voiced its sincere
commitment4 to the return of IDPs. Despite that, the problem of IDPs in Lebanon is still
far from being solved and the pace of return remains slow. The origin areas of
displacement still suffer from the loss of their populations—especially the youth—and
their fundamental social and economic structures. However, what is notable is that even
in areas that have been reconstructed, no substantial return has taken place. In addition to
4 There is some debate whether such commitment exists. Many believe that the government’s support for repatriation is not sincere but mainly a political tactic to gain more power.
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the difficult political and socio-economic conditions that pose a challenge to repatriation,
this study assumes that the programs and projects targeting IDPs also play an important
role in the success or failure of such a return process. This research does not assess
success or failure by the mere number of returnees, but goes beyond that to look at the
sustainability of the return and issues of livelihood. It is through analyzing these
programs of return that this study aims to recommend ways to improve the results of such
return policies and propose ways by which peacebuilding and development can be
conceptually and practically linked to ensure a more comprehensive and effective
response to the plight of IDPs in post-conflict areas.
Although displacement has occurred in all areas of Lebanon, two areas in
particular have suffered tremendously and have been the target of most efforts: Mount
Lebanon and South Lebanon, which will constitute the focus of this study. Conditions in
each area are different: in the former, inter-communal conflict and massacres and projects
for return started directly after the end of the way in the early 1990s; in the latter, the
Israeli invasions and occupation meant that no intervention could effectively take place
until after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. However, these different conditions allow us to
gain some interesting insights into the complexity of the displacement problem in
Lebanon.
The government’s return policy for internally displaced persons in Lebanon might
not appear as a particularly obvious case study to a lot of scholars and practitioners.
However, as a pluralist and diverse society, suffering from long-lasting violence and
conflict and still experiencing political, economic, and social challenges, Lebanon
constitutes a solid example of a post-conflict country which is attempting to deal with the
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root causes of its conflict, as well as the consequences of the latter internal displacement,
which has affected more than one third of the population and represents the most pressing
challenge. Although research and literature on the topic is not as extensive as that on
Bosnia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Iraq—especially in relation to internally displaced
people—Lebanon has engendered considerable and sustained interest from the
international community over the past twelve years, since the end of the civil war.
Moreover, it is on the ‘top ten list’ of countries with IDP populations. The substantial
number of projects implemented by the international community targeting the return of
the displaced complements the work of the Lebanese government and local NGOs; yet
the increase in efforts and initiatives has yet to solve the displacement problem. Lebanon
therefore is, in fact, a good case study as it offers an array of programs to evaluate and the
potential to investigate the questions this research sets out.
Both theoretical and practical considerations inform this study. Theoretically, the
case of Lebanon epitomizes a case where the cessation of conflict was not sufficient for
many IDPs to return to their homes and where officially organized and recognized
repatriation has not proceeded as smoothly as many had initially hoped. This will be
expanded upon in more detail throughout the paper. All of this suggests that the
repatriation process is more complex than is portrayed in the existing literature and that it
is based on numerous factors, which should be considered jointly in the return policy.
The fact that fifteen years after the cessation of war and twelve years of return projects
and initiatives have not ‘solved’5 the IDP problem in Lebanon indicates that a
5 A solution to the IDP problem in Lebanon according to the government is the repatriation of all displaced in the country.
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reassessment of the responses to the crisis is necessary—not only to the problem in the
country, but to the displaced problem in general.
At the practical level, accessibility and ability of entering the field shaped the
decision to choose Lebanon as a case study. My familiarity with the Lebanese history and
culture, as well as my mastery of the Arabic, French, and English languages, greatly
facilitated the fieldwork and interviews I carried out in Lebanon, as well as my analysis
of archival sources (newspapers, organization projects, publications, etc.). Rather than a
source of bias, being Lebanese proved to be a source of strength in an area where foreign
investigators are looked at with suspicion. Furthermore a familiarity with the context,
while simultaneously not being directly affected by displacement, allowed me to analyze
critically a problem in a country defined by complexity. Not having been displaced at any
point during war and not having a direct personal stake in the issue of displacement
provided me with the ability to objectively study the policy of return, yet always within
the cultural context. On the other hand, my first-hand experience with the traumas of war
and with post-conflict political, social and economic conditions, as well as the awareness
of the problems and challenges facing reconstruction and rehabilitation in such areas,
equipped me with the ability to understand the deeper needs and psychological
disposition of the displaced people. Also, on a practical level, the fact that there are a
number of initiatives seeking to encourage IDPs to repatriate, and that those efforts
continue despite the many challenges, makes it a good case through which lessons to
other post-conflict areas could be drawn.
This study is significant in that it raises awareness to the plight of IDPs in
Lebanon when very few studies have been carried out on the issue. The existing studies,
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consisting of only a few scholarly articles and books, are mostly confined to reports and
studies undertaken by the Ministry of Displaced and other organizations working with
IDPs in the country. Review of the literature shows no special reference to the subject in
the post-return stage, but focuses mainly on the displacement phase and the conditions
faced by displaced during their displacement.6 Furthermore, this study increases
knowledge about an understudied group of people, as most of the work referring to
displacement in Lebanon focuses either on the Palestinian refugees who settled in camps
in Lebanon since 1948 or on ‘Lebanese refugees’ who left Lebanon and settled in
countries around the world. In this regard, this research is the first comprehensive
academic scholarly study to examine the subject of the return of the displaced in the
country.
Purpose and Scope
This research is a multi-purpose study: it explores two vital topics for
international relations, conflict resolution, and development—the return of the displaced
to their homes of origin and the linkage between peacebuilding and development. It does
6 One important publication on the issue of IDPs in Lebanon’s is George Irani’sReconciliation Processes and the Displaced Communities in Post-War Lebanon (1997), a report compilation of the proceedings of a workshop that was organized by the Lebanese American University in Byblos, Lebanon (March 1-2, 1996). Looking at international aid in post-conflict societies, Mary Anderson published an evaluation of a UNICEF project in Lebanon in her 1999Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace- or Focusing War. on Mount Lebanon, Judith Harik published a couple of studies including a book chapter in 1997 entitled, “The Effects of Protracted Social Conflict on Resettlement of the Displaced in Postwar Lebanon.” Robert Kasparian also has a book in French on the situation of displaced entitled, “La Population Deplacee au Liban: 1975-1987: Synthese des Rapports de Recherche.” Ali Faour also published a book in Arabic, “Geography o f Displacement: Field Studies, Facts and Solutions.” Khalil Abourjaili also published a study in French entitled, “Mouvement de Retour des Deplaces a Leurs Localites d’Origine au Mont Liban Sud et Dans Les Cazas de Saida et de Jezzine de 1991 a 2003: Faits et Limites.” Some of these studies focus on the conditions of IDPs before and during displacement; others focus on the return phase. It is also important to note that most of the existing literature is in either Arabic or French and very few studies are in English.
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so by critically analyzing the return policy and programs for the displaced in Lebanon
and by investigating whether and how peacebuilding and development initiatives are
implemented together to provide for a safe, successful7 and sustainable return of
displaced people to their homes. Hence, in addition to its general aim at generating
knowledge about the integration of peacebuilding and development, it focuses on policy
making relating to IDPs in particular and post-conflict state-building in general. Through
in-depth examination and assessment of the programs and projects sponsored by the
different agencies active in the process, it engages in an intellectual, academic and
practical analysis of the conditions that contribute to return. It advances the understudied,
yet increasingly important notion, that linking peacebuilding and development is
necessary in dealing with post-conflict challenges such as the issue of internal
displacement.
Through such analysis, the ultimate purpose of this research is to derive lessons
on ways in which post-war, ethnically divided societies are healed and rebuilt. It attempts
to build a conceptual framework for reintegrating communities tom apart by violence by
examining the concepts behind the complex processes of reconciliation and reestablishing
relationships damaged by conflict and displacement. From a theoretical perspective, it
then outlines a comprehensive approach towards rebuilding such community cohesion
and reconciliation. In this way, I hope it will answer to the problems presented by the
compartmentalized and short-term-oriented approach adopted by governmental and non
governmental organizations. Such agencies currently undertake a large number of
7 Successful return connotes sustainability; it is not only going back to live in the village but also to reintegrate in these societies and become self-sufficient. Sustainability also entails the protection and assistance provided by the government and organizations to help returnees meet their needs in those areas.
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projects and activities, which are identified separately as development or peacebuilding
and conflict resolution initiatives: “they seem unable to link the two, both within their
programs and at a conceptual level” (Evans, 2004, 57). Such division of labor is not
effective in an era where the problem of internal displacement cannot be conceptualized
as merely a humanitarian problem, but rather, is considered central to national
reconciliation and sustainable peace and development in countries suffering from years of
civil strife. If the displaced issue is not addressed within a comprehensive framework,
which the study argues incorporates peacebuilding and development, no sustainable
return can or will ensue.
By analyzing the IDP return policy in Lebanon, this study emphasizes the
importance of adopting a holistic policy or approach which links peacebuilding and
development mechanisms in both programs and projects. Even though there is an
increased awareness of the importance of approaching these two matters simultaneously,
most of the research to date has been heavily theoretical with no practical applications. It
is this research’s aim to address this gap by operationalizing these concepts and offering
ways in which such a link can be implemented.
One major obstacle to such an integrative approach is that the existing work on
peacebuilding and development has been dominated by causal explanations, whereby it is
believed that development will lead to peace and vice versa. Such a notion is presented
by the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, who stated, “Without peace,
development is not possible: without development, peace is not durable” (Brown, 1999).
One way around such a lens is to think of the two as dynamic, complementary
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mechanisms or processes that continuously interact and have the potential lead to
sustained responses to post-conflict challenges.
While this research suggests an interconnected approach to internal displacement,
I hope that it will incite more integrative thinking and approach which combines
peacebuilding and development when answering to the challenges of post-conflict state-
building in general. As Sadago Ogata aptly stated, “There is a more comprehensive
approach to peace which recognizes the linkages between peace, development, and
freedom” (1992).
Definition of Key Terms
Before proceeding on to the outline of the dissertation, it is important to define the
key terms that will be used throughout the study and are of central importance to this
research. Other concepts will be elaborated on later in the study.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are people who “were forced to leave their
homes in their original place of residence and move to other areas inside their own
country” (Feghali, 1995). The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines
IDPs as,
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural human-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border” (OHCHR, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2; Martin, 2000).
Even though internal displacement can result from many factors, the focus of this
research is particularly on those who have been forced to flee from armed conflict and
situations of generalized violence (Vincent and Sorensen, 2001, 7).
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In the sense that they remain within their own country’s borders, IDPs are a
distinct group from refugees who “cross an international frontier because of a well-
founded fear of persecution” (Shacknove, 1985). In the UN Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, a refugee is defined as,
Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, of who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Ferris, 1985, 2-3).
As victims of violence, refugees find sanctuary outside their “nation’s borders” (Ferris,
1985, 6) and hence, unlike IDPs who stay within the confinement of their country of
nationality, are “entitled to international protection” (Ferris, 1985, 10).
Long lumped together with other displaced populations, internally displaced
persons have only recently become the subject of a separate field of study as their
numbers are quickly exceeding those of refugees. This study bolsters the emergence of a
field that focuses on internally displaced persons in order to become more responsive to
the specific situation and needs of IDPs, which differ to a large extent from that of
refugees. Still in its infancy, this field must grow in order to provide more effective
responses to the issue of internal displacement.
Development in this paper is not defined exclusively in economic terms, focusing
mainly on state, economic growth and transformation. Rather, it is more in line with the
emerging thoughts on development that focus more heavily on the micro- than the macro
level, and that make social aspects central to the discourse. This greater focus in the
development field on human and community development means that development
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nowadays means more than mere economic growth (Kyi, 1995, 12, 18). The opposition
to the exclusive focus on economics began to surface in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The primacy of the human aspect of development was increasingly acknowledged by the
UNDP, which increasingly placed special focus on people’s participation (Kyi, 1995,12).
“Today, development is more and more understood as sustainable human development,
addressing the human being in relation with both resource management and
participation” (Hamm, 2001, 1010). Reports published by UNICEF (Adjustment with a
Human Face)', the World Bank {Development Report)', and UNDP {Human Development
Report) emphasized that the core of development should come from below and should
consider the needs of the people. UNDP, a promoter of this new concept of human
development, defines it as “the process of enlarging the range of people’s choices,
increasing their opportunities for education, health care, income and employment, and
covering the full range of human choices from a sound physical environment to economic
and political freedoms” (UNDP, HDR, 1992).
Peacebuilding is an emerging concept that is gaining prevalence in the field of
conflict resolution. It is understood as “more than post-accord reconstruction,” but “as a
comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of
processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable,
peaceful relationships” (Lederach, 1997, 20). It refers to “the rehabilitation of regions and
countries ravaged by armed conflicts in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities and
to establish lasting peace” (David, 2002, 18). Peacebuilding is applicable to all phases of
the conflict and involves “the prevention and resolution of violent political and social
conflicts, the consolidation of peace once violence has been reduced and post-conflict
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reconstruction with a view of avoiding a relapse into violent conflict” (Tschirgi, 2002,
26). This final phase is the focus of this research. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros Ghali defines post-conflict peacebuilding as, “the collective action to identify
and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a
relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 46).
Reconstruction, following its use in Peter Sollis’ research, is defined “not solely
as the repair of damaged physical infrastructure and production capacity;” it is an
opportunity to change the status quo by addressing the political, social, and economic
root causes of the conflict (1994, 461). According to Sollis, post-war reconstruction must
go beyond a focus on typical infrastructure, livelihood and market rebuilding. It must also
deal with “the hidden scars of warfare through policies and programs which support the
reconstitution of the family and kinship ties and the social and cultural institutions that
are critical to aiding recovery” (1994,467). Reconstruction, therefore, is more than
physical and economic development and should be viewed from a wider perspective that
includes social, humane, and peacebuilding considerations.
Post-conflict areas refer to countries that were formerly tom by wars, but have
signed peace agreements which resulted in the ‘cessation of formal hostilities.’ Post
conflict does not imply the disappearance of the root causes of the conflict altogether, just
the termination of open armed violent conflict (Forman and Patrick, 2000). Kumar
defines post-conflict, or war-torn, societies as, “countries in the aftermath of violent
internal conflict;” “such conflicts end because of successful negotiations leading to the
signing of a peace accord or they come to an end when one party wins the war” (1998, 5).
Often, post-conflict is also referred to as the post-settlement phase of conflict, in which
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the focus is on the agreements’ implementation and the transformation and reconstruction
of new relationships (Abu Nimer, 2001, ix).
Structure of the Study
To address these issues, the study is divided into seven chapters and a postscript.
Chapter one provides the background and context for the research problem, briefly
describes the case study, and provides definitions of key terms that are essential for
understanding the study.
Chapter two explains the methodological approach for the study and the reasons
for choosing a qualitative, evaluative, single case study. It presents the overall research
methodology and design of the study and discusses both the strength and the limitations
of this study. In addition, it elaborates on the data collection methods, or techniques, and
expands on the operationalization of the two concepts of peacebuilding and development,
which are central to this study.
Chapter three synthesizes the theoretical context of the study and reviews the
relevant literature and theories that frame it. It situates the research in and emphasizes its
contributions to the existing literature of forced migration, development, peacebuilding,
and evaluation. The chapter also addresses the limitations and gaps in these theories and
the literature.
Chapter four provides a brief historical overview of Lebanon since the country’s
independence, with special focus on the relationships between the different communities
and groups. It further analyzes the causes of the war, the participants, and the main
issues. The main focus of this chapter is, however, on the Taif peace agreement and the
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post-conflict situation, and specifically one consequence of the war, i.e. internal
displacement. The second half of the chapter elaborates more on the issue of IDPs and the
governmental and non-governmental response to this challenge in the post-conflict
country.
Chapter five analyzes the return policy through an in-depth study and analysis of
the different organizations active in the process. It identifies the main actors and
participants in the field, investigates the projects, and their objectives and impacts.
Chapter six focuses primarily on the initiatives implemented in areas of return. It
first analyzes each of the development and peacebuilding initiatives and their impact on
return and then expands on ways in which they are either explicitly or implicitly linked.
The chapter elaborates on the achievements thus far and the limitations that stand in the
way of further integration.
Chapter seven concludes by recapping on the findings, drawing conclusions, and
advancing some policy recommendations on how integration of peacebuilding and
development in IDP projects. While those are drawn from the Lebanon example and
experience, they also provide lessons to other areas of conflict.
The postscript is a brief summary of the situation of displacement and the
response to it after the conclusion of the writing. It focuses on the new challenges
presented by the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah which resulted in additional
displacement.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
Not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that counts can be counted. Einstein
Designing and pursuing such sensitive research in a post-conflict area is not an
easy task, especially in a country like Lebanon where political and sectarian sensitivities
are still high fifteen years after the end of the war. This chapter examines in detail the
study’s methodology; the rationale for adopting a qualitative research design; the benefits
and limitations of such a design choice to the purpose or objective of the study; the
reasons Lebanon was chosen as a case study; the units of analysis; the tools employed to
gather and analyze data; the strengths and weaknesses of the methods used; the
framework applied to assess return programs and projects; the operationalization of
peacebuilding and development; and, finally, the difficulties that were encountered in the
research process.
Methodology
Moving away from the dominant traditionalist methodologies which reduce
phenomena to separate, objectively observable, empirically measurable variables and
analyze problems in cause/effect terminology, this research adopts a more holistic
21
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and comprehensive methodology that takes into account the increasing complexity and
interconnectedness that define today’s world and its problems. This study focuses on
“processes that cannot be measured in terms of quantity or amount: on the qualities of
these processes and the socially constructed nature of reality” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994,
8). Therefore, this research seeks to capture the dynamics and richness of the processes,
mechanisms, and outcomes which go beyond the quantitative research’s focus on cause-
effect relationship (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 8). Berg rightfully stated, “certain
experiences cannot be meaningfully expressed by numbers” (1989, 3)—a notion that
applies to the experience of displacement and return, which could only be understood by
recognizing the emotional and personal character of the problem and the lived
experiences of those displaced and returnees. This research, however, does not
delegitimize all the previous work that has been done through the traditionalist, limited
approach. Important information can be learned by examining the quantitative aspects of
the phenomena, such as the severity of the problem (by looking at the number of
displaced and the amount of money spent on return policies and programs), the
demographics of the affected population and its standards of living (economic, social and
political), as well as other tangible aspects of the problem.
This study, while benefiting from all the published numbers and statistics on
internally displaced persons, proceeds to analyze the understudied, intangible, qualitative
aspects of the problem by focusing on the phenomenon as a whole. It does not stop at the
living conditions during displacement or upon return, but rather goes beyond that in order
to understand people’s thoughts and feelings about all the factors that contributed to their
displacement, as well as their experiences of return. It supports the argument that
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understanding best occurs by approaching the phenomenon in its broader context and by
looking at relationships and interconnections between the different processes that make
up the problem (Wheatley, 1994).
This research is based on the belief that better knowledge is gained by studying
phenomena holistically rather than breaking them into separate, artificially-delineated,
linear variables. This mostly applies to conflict and post-conflict processes where
people’s lives are at stake and quantifying complex human emotions and interactions
does not seem adequate. It is becoming increasingly clear that many phenomena cannot
be reduced to simple, linear causal explanations, especially if the aim is to achieve a
comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the complex relationships between the
different systems involved in the problem of displacement and its solution. It becomes
evident from looking at the plan of return that there is no direct or clear relationship
between reconstruction and development, on the one hand, and return, on the other.
Building houses for people does not push them back to their villages: the issue is more
complicated (this is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters). Furthermore, it is
imperative that the solution to a humanitarian crisis like internal displacement be defined
according to the quality of the process and not solely the frequencies of occurrence; this
is done by delineating the perceptions of IDPs themselves about the process. These
notions are fundamental to this study’s methodological approach.
Rationale for a Qualitative Approach
After considering and researching different approaches and methods to the
conduct of this study, it became apparent that a qualitative approach would provide better
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answers to the research questions, as well as present a more comprehensive and holistic
picture of the issue of internally displaced and the return policies and processes for these
people. Such a qualitative approach permits an in-depth understanding of the intangible
factors that play a role in the return process, such as feelings, fears, and beliefs. It also
allows for a more accurate assessment of the peacebuilding and development initiatives
implemented in areas of return.
A qualitative method of inquiry provides me with the necessary tools to explore
and analyze an important social and human problem, that of internal displacement; it
further allows me to study the complexity of the return process, which is perceived by the
Lebanese government and active organizations in the field are the most viable solution to
a predicament that has burdened the country for more than two decades. An important
characteristic of the qualitative research, and one which facilitated studying such a
dispossessed population, is the fact that it provides for a detailed and complex view of the
topic, while allowing for the study of the displaced people in their “natural setting,” so
the researcher “can learn from them rather than judge them” (Creswell, 1998, 17; Patton,
1987, 13). As studying the return policy of displaced persons in Lebanon, in general, and
through the integrative lens of peacebuilding and development in particular, a holistic and
comprehensive approach is needed in order to identify mechanisms or processes that are
not easily distinguished and for which “theories are not available” (Creswell, 1994, 17).
Another important characteristic of the qualitative approach is that it provides the
researcher with the tools to explore and understand social realities and interactions in
their context and, as in this case, defined by the displaced, residents and returnees
themselves (Patton, 1987, 20; Pottier, 1993, 9). It allows the researcher to understand
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these populations’ experiences, hopes, and fears, as directly narrated by them. This
permits a fuller understanding of the complex network of relationships and of “how
things hand together in a web of mutual influence or support of interdependence”
(Becker, 1996, 53). Patton goes further to note that “the detailed attention to the context,
interdependencies, complexities, and idiosyncrasies, which is possible through this
holistic lens, and viewing them all in a related manner, is an advantage in the research
process” (1987, 17). I would add, and elaborate in the following chapters, that this is also
advantageous to formulating and implementing policies of return that truthfully answer to
the complex problems of displacement and repatriation.
The objective of this research is to closely analyze the IDP return policy in
Lebanon by scrutinizing the projects implemented by governmental and non
governmental agencies in the country. A qualitative approach, according to Patton, is
highly preferred in an evaluative study such as this one because it accounts for the
“variations in the programs throughout their implementation” and “permits the capturing
of the processes in the programs, exploring the differences and similarities, as well as the
impacts of the programs” (1987, 13-4). Hence, adopting such an approach will allow for
a holistic, comprehensive assessment of the return policy for IDPs in Lebanon and better
capture the complexity of this humanitarian, political, economic, and social issue. Since
the end of the civil war in the early 1990s, serious efforts and huge amounts of money
have been allocated to the IDPs in Lebanon, specifically to their process of return to their
homes of origin. In the case of Lebanon, an evaluative study of the different facets and
projects of the policy of return has not yet been conducted even though it is necessary in
order to understand the impact of the program on the ground.
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More generally, the use of in-depth qualitative research is helpful to the
researcher whose main concern is to remain true to the complexity of post-conflict state-
building structures and to provide a better understanding of the intricate systems involved
in such a process. As such, this study seeks to understand one of the many challenges of
post-conflict state-building: the return of IDPs to their homes. Through this lens, the
study aims at developing a clearer conceptualization of the link between peacebuilding
and development which, I believe, can lead to more efficient post-conflict state-building
generally, and to more sustainable return in particular. In-depth, evaluative, qualitative
research can best serve this goal as it is adaptable to politically sensitive conditions such
as those that exist in Lebanon.
As mentioned above, qualitative inquiry is one in which the researcher attempts to
understand the complex interrelationships that exist in the context of the study—in this
case, those between peacebuilding and development. Through operationalizing the
different identified categories in both processes (detailed below), this study suggests
ways in which they can be linked when applied to return projects. This research, rather
than “seeking to identify cause and effect relationships, seeks [to] understand ... human
experience” (Stake, 1995, 38). It does not attempt to formulate linear, causal statements
or to identify causal relationships, as it is the underlying belief that such causal analysis is
too simplistic and will not reflect the complexity and changeability of the process under
study (Tilly, 1995). By adopting a qualitative approach, the study not only supports
Lieberson’s notion that “the possibility of formulating causal statements that are both
general and reasonable when conducting small N case analysis is greatly diminished”
(Ragin and Becker, 1992, 13). It also goes beyond that in order to admit that looking at
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causality detracts from the complexity, dynamics, and interconnectivity of the
phenomenon under study. I do not attempt to statistically test a universal, generalizable
theory on how to best link peacebuilding and development in post-conflict state-building,
in general, and IDP return, in particular. Complex social processes, such as the one under
study here, cannot be depicted by quantifying variables. Instead it must be studied in
terms of the mechanisms whose patterns of interactions have created such processes in
the particular context.
Identifying discrete variables that could be controlled and tested in lab-like
environments is not feasible given the intricate nature of displacement and return. Instead
of identifying variables, which could be captured in quantitative terms, my research
depicts processes and lived experiences. Displacement and return can only be understood
as courses of action, described by the people who experience them. The process of return
is much more affected by what people experienced, felt, and believed than it is by the
economic, social, and political conditions surrounding such process—even though these
also play a role in the decision to return in some areas, as will be detailed in following
chapters. Such experiences are gathered, described, and interpreted through a range of
data collection techniques detailed later in this chapter. As a qualitative researcher, I
think of my research as constantly progressing and changing. I was continuously exposed
to an enormous amount of information and data that I gathered as the research progressed
and discovered processes and ideas above and beyond my original research model
(Becker, 1996, 53). The aim for breadth, which is at the basis of the qualitative approach,
provides for a better understanding of the multifaceted process of return, as it allows the
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researcher to focus on all information—incidental and significant—emerging from
interviews, archival research, document analysis, and fieldwork (Becker, 1996, 58).
In addition to breadth, adopting such an approach provides depth in understanding
of the return process through active listening to the stories of the displaced and returnees
as they recount and interpret their first-hand experiences, as well as their particular, local,
social circumstances. While I am not claiming to have undertaken an anthropological
study, I do believe that such a qualitative approach and the methods adopted in this
research give me the necessary tools to conduct what Clifford Geertz calls ‘thick
description’ of the policy and projects of return, to the extent that it is reflected in the
dense and detailed description of the social and economic life of the displaced, residents,
and returnees, as well as their interpretation of those experiences (1974; Becker, 1996,
58). My study follows the lines of what I call thick descriptive analysis, i.e. one “that
goes beyond the mere or bare reporting of an act (thin description), but describes and
probes the intentions, motives, meanings, contexts, situations and circumstances of
action” (Denzin, 1988, 39). This way, a long-term vision and prescription for better
solutions to the IDP return policy in Lebanon are possible.
A qualitative approach is therefore descriptive, interpretative, inductive,
explanatory, and exploratory in nature. It allows for descriptive inferences, which in the
case of the phenomenon under investigation, is of utmost importance because the subject
has hitherto not been studied systematically. Furthermore, despite existing reports on
some aspects and projects of the IDP return policy, there has not been an extensive
academic study on the subject. Additionally, the researcher aims at describing people’s
experiences as they themselves make sense of them. Throughout the research, I sought to
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understand the process through observation and interviews (Creswell, 1994, 145). I
visited villages that have returned persons and others which did not. I also spoke to those
who have helped people return (government officials, project directors and fieldworkers),
as well as residents, returnees, and the displaced themselves in order to learn about their
experiences and familiarize myself with the overall process of displacement and return.
Such a description then allows for a more interpretative and analytical view of the topic
under study. This, in turn, permits me, as a researcher, to inductively build “abstractions,
concepts, hypotheses, and theories from details” (Creswell, 1994, 145). Different factors
come to play in the process of return—some more explicit than others. For this reason, an
interpretative approach is preferred so as to account for all factors, their relationships, and
interconnectedness. It also allows the researcher to “interpret phenomena in terms of the
meanings people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 3). By employing a wide
range of ‘interconnected, interpretive practices,’ I am able to obtain a better
understanding of the complex subject under study (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 3-4). This
study is also explanatory in that it tests relationships (Singleton and Straits, 1999, 91) and
recognizes “operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies
or incidence” (Yin, 1994, 6).
The study analyzes the process of return, beginning fourteen years ago, focusing
on its different aspects, projects, and the relationships between peacebuilding and
development over time. It is through operationalizing these two very important concepts
that a clearer idea about their applicability to, as well as intricacies of, a return process is
better captured. Finally, the study is exploratory in that it is relatively new and not much
has been written about it or the population being studied. For this reason, I listened to
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informants and conveyed their ideas and understanding (Singleton and Straits, 1999, 91;
Creswell, 1994,21). The aim of the qualitative research is to create knowledge that is
experience- and context-sensitive and beneficial to both scholars and practitioners. Its
strength lies in that, in its essence, it allows for a balance between description, analysis,
and interpretation, while preventing the dominance of one over the others.
The Case for a Case Study Design
While there are numerous qualitative approaches, I believe that a case study
design practically meets the objectives of the study (Yin, 1993, 1994; Stake, 2000;
Neuman, 1994). A case study, whether considered ‘an object of study’ (Stake, 1995) or a
methodology (Merriam, 1988), is “an exploration of a ‘bounded system’ or a case over
time through detailed, in depth data collection involving multiple sources of information
rich in context” (Creswell, 1998, 61). Case studies have been frequently used in the
social sciences, for they significantly contribute to the construction of knowledge
(Shwandt, 2000; Yin, 1994, 38). The revelatory nature of the single case study opens up
the way to further investigations and studies in the field in general and of the
phenomenon under study in particular (Yin, 1994, 40-1). It also allows for more in-depth
analysis of the adopted case, its uniqueness, and specificity. In this research, the case
study involves an empirical investigation of IDP return in Lebanon by using multiple
sources of data and evidence (which are detailed below).
The benefits of a case study design for the purpose of this study are numerous. It
both develops in a real-world setting and provides a rich and engaging exploration of the
issue under study (Mahoney, 1997). Yin rightfully states that this method is the
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“preferred in examining contemporary events over which the investigator has no control”
(1994, 8-9). Ragin moreover accentuates its importance and notes its contributions to a
holistic understanding and insights into historical processes (1987). Patton further
highlights the deep and detailed analysis that the researcher can do using such a
qualitative case study (1990, 54). The complex setting in which this study is conducted
calls for an inductive, rather than a deductive, case study design in which the conceptual
framework evolves from and through the study itself rather than being pre-defined and
structured from the outset (Huberman and Miles, 1994, 429).
The issue of internally displaced people’s return to their homes after a long period
of displacement is the focus of this study. The broad scope of the issue calls for the
adoption of an ‘instrumental case study’ (Stake, 1995, 3; Yin, 1994), i.e. one in which the
Lebanese case is used to illustrate and understand such a complex problem. Furthermore,
examining a concrete case is important in order to identify the conditions for success or
failure of return policies and programs, to study what is working and what is not, and to
explore what could be done to improve the results and impacts of those programs, rather
than just remain in a theoretical sphere. In addition, a concrete case study will provide a
concrete background for discussion of the level of integration between peacebuilding and
development, as well as obstacles and opportunities for such integration. The case of
internal displacement is particularly helpful in drawing such a discussion, as it is, to the
forefront of post-conflict state-building, while encompassing both reconstruction and
conflict resolution efforts and needs that are at the basis of a post-war recovery program.
Moreover, in Lebanon—as is the case of most pluralist and divided societies—such an
issue is at the center of the national reconciliation process and post-conflict stability.
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To delve deeper into the qualitative aspects of the return policy, a one-case study
design, rather than a comparative one, was adopted. While the overall case is that of IDP
return policy and program in Lebanon, sub-cases are used in order to illustrate the
intricacies of the processes. Various organizations’ programs and projects in return areas
of the country comprise the sub-cases. This allows me to assess the overall policy, its
organization, its comprehensiveness, its strength, its limitations, and its impact on the
ground, as well as to scrutinize the policy’s components, aspects, and implementers. Such
a design was also chosen for theoretical reasons and not merely for the sake of
convenience. It provides powerful empirical support for a theory, especially when very
few cases of a phenomenon exist. Most of the research on displacement has focused on
the experiences during displacement and very few have holistically dealt with the process
of return in the manner that this study does. Such an approach encourages a focus on the
o case’s “concrete individuality,” which will simultaneously lead to a more substantive
immersion into the case’s details, a better understanding of the phenomenon under study,
and a greater knowledge of the possibilities and challenges facing the issue of re
settlement in the specific area. The sub-cases are each examined separately in order to
provide a comprehensive understanding of the context within which they operate,
including the areas of return and the outcomes and implications of these projects in
relation both to resettlement and also to peacebuilding and development. So the aim is
not to compare these programs and projects but to utilize them in order to conceptualize
8 The concept was used by Max Weber,Methodology of the Social Sciences: Critical Studies in the logic of the cultural sciences (1949), 120.
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the larger shared context within which they interact and the overall return policy to which
they contribute.
Why IDP Return Policy in Lebanon as a Case Study?
Internal displacement, as mentioned earlier, is one of the biggest challenges faced
by post-conflict/war countries. While numerous return processes present themselves as
possible cases for this study, such as the experiences of Rwanda, Sudan, and Kosovo, the
IDP return policy in Lebanon was chosen based on numerous considerations—both
inherent to the case itself and instrumental, i.e. providing insight on other instances of
displacement and return.
Firstly, unlike these other cases that received much attention in the academic and
organizational circles, the problem of Lebanese IDPs has not come to the radar of the
intellectual and practical communities until the recent July 2006 war, which led to the
internal displacement of a million Lebanese. Most of the attention in the literature on
Lebanon has emphasized the civil war and economic reconstruction of the country, while
in reality; the IDP problem is one of the most pressing challenges to post-conflict
Lebanon and national reconciliation.
Secondly, with a relatively small area of 10,452 sq. km. or 4,015 sq. mi., (i.e.
about the size of Connecticut according to the State Department background note on
Lebanon), Lebanon has witnessed the displacement of more than one third of its total
population in the span of its fifteen year civil war (1975-1990). Moreover, it has not
experienced a substantial return of those displaced to their areas in the past fourteen years
since the policy for return gained a priority on the national agenda. Examining such a
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case allows for certain aspects of return policy conditions to surface that do not always
emerge from statistical data provided by larger studies. It also permits a closer look at the
intricacies of peacebuilding and development and their interactions and integrations.
Thirdly, the deep rooted, protracted, and prolonged nature of the Lebanese
conflict makes it an ideal case in which to dissect the comprehensive, multi-factorial
approach to the process of building peace after communal war. Despite the ‘peace’
agreement brokered in 1989, there are still irresolvable conflicts that challenge the
establishment of permanent solutions. This case allows for the testing of the possibilities
and limitations of peacebuilding and development in a deeply divided society,
particularly focusing on the divisive problem of internal displacement. Gaining insights
on the process of return is beneficial to government officials, practitioners, and academics
who are increasingly faced with this substantial problem to post-conflict state-building.
Fourthly, my familiarity with the culture and language was an important factor in
the choice of the case. While some might argue that being an ‘insider’ would bias the
study, I argue that any social research is, to some extent, affected by the researcher’s
values and identity—whether he/she is an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’ (Hermann, 78). While
the ethical debate about the role of the researcher looms large in the social sciences, I
believe that explicitly stating my background, assumptions, and orientation at the outset
of the research will clarify my position and diminish from the strength of the ‘fairness’
debate. I see myself as somewhere between an insider and an outsider. I am a Lebanese,
Christian, woman researcher who has lived in Beirut and experienced the fifteen years of
civil war in Lebanon, but was never displaced or forced to leave my home. I have never
directly—or indirectly—felt what it means to be uprooted. So, while I could be
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considered an ‘insider’ for being a Lebanese, I cannot be considered a complete insider,
as I am not part of the displaced community, I am not an official in the government, and I
am not working in one of the NGOs that are active in the domain of the displaced. This
middle-ground allowed me to make use of my background in positive ways which led to
a balanced review of the situation and blend of actual observations, interviews, and
personal accounts of experiences from those who directly suffered from massacres and
were or still are displaced, and from interviews and documentations from those working
with the displaced and for their return. My background, thus, brings strength to the
research for it allowed me to ask questions and perform investigations that total outsiders
would have difficulty obtaining and provided access to information “which are usually
off limits to an outsider” (Smyth and Robinson, 2001, 8).
My familiarity with the language and socio-cultural and political contexts of
Lebanon worked to my benefit as it made it easier for me to gather data and achieve
access to first-hand information and primary resources in Arabic. This is especially
important as it circumvented double-translations of interviews, documents, and
conversations. The only filtering through language barrier that took place happened via
my translation into English of those interviews and documents in Arabic or French.
Furthermore, I was able to gain entry to the villages and people’s homes. Those I
interviewed and spoke with said that they were more relaxed and willing to speak and
share their experiences with “someone from among them [i.e. Lebanese] rather than a
foreigner.” Also, my acquaintance with the culture allowed for an unprejudiced,
contextual interpretation, and, consequently, for findings with broader local relevance,
applicability, and policy impact (Smyth and Robinson, 2001, 7). While I do not claim that
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the ‘insider’ researcher can present an ‘objective observation’—as such does not exist in
the real world where all observation is socially situated—I attempted to present an
account of the situation as experienced and recalled by those interviewed and observed
through a wide range of interconnected interpretive methods (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994,
19) which I explain below.
Limitations of the Research Approach and Design
As much as it is important for the researcher to know the advantages of the
research approach she adopts, it is crucial that she understands its limitations as well. One
important limitation of the single case study approach is the inability to draw
generalizations, or rather, the limited generalizability of the findings as each case is
country specific and idiosyncratic. Creswell explains that “the uniqueness of a study
within a specific context mitigates against replicating it exactly in another context”
(1994, 159). Yin further elaborates on this point by noting that a single case study
“provides little basis for scientific generalizations... Case studies are generalizable to
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes... The investigator’s goal is
to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate
frequencies (statistical generalization)” (1994, 9-11). While such generalizations are not
attempted in this study, it is hoped that, to the greatest extent possible, the findings from
this case will be relevant to other conflict areas that suffer from internally displaced
persons, as well as to understanding refugee policy in general.
It is also hoped that the lessons drawn from the Lebanese experience will shed
light on the challenges and promises of incorporating peacebuilding and development
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initiatives in war-torn areas, specifically in the policies of IDP return. While the Lebanese
sectarian conflict has peculiar characteristics, it also has several aspects that it shares with
other ethnic and sectarian conflicts being played out in different areas of the world, e.g.
the Balkans, Central Africa, South Asia and the Middle East. Additionally, this study
hopes to contribute to the general knowledge regarding peacebuilding and development
in general, and return projects in particular. As Maoz has rightfully noted, even when
using a single case study methodology, there is an underlying assumption that despite the
fundamental differences and “no matter how unique each case may be, there are
underlying characteristics of many IDP return policy cases that are similar across
individual victims and circumstances” (2005, 176). A case-study design, thus, allows for
a comprehensive understanding of the group observed and from there, it may be possible
to develop more general theoretical concepts that can be applied in similar cases. The
main aim of such research is the “intrinsic study of a valued particular,” and not the
emphasis of “generalization” (Stake, 2000, 439).
While epistemologically qualitative methods “insist that we should not invent the
viewpoint of the actor and should only attribute to actors ideas about the world they
actually hold if we want to better understand their actions, reasons, and motives” (Becker,
1996,56), another limitation generally attributed to a qualitative case study approach
relates to the extent by which the researcher, as a social scientist, can objectively report
and analyze the situation without “implicitly or explicitly, attributing a point of view and
interpretations to the people whose actions they are analyzing” (Becker, 1996, 54).
During the fieldwork, I was able to converse with different people and visit different
villages—an approach that provided me with a comprehensive perspective of the issue as
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viewed by the different parties to the problem. Such openness to different views,
opinions, and perspective gave me the most objective understanding of the issue as
possible. In some villages, the challenge was to find people who were willing to speak
openly about what they really felt and were going through, without feeling intimidated by
the dominant perception or without appearing critical of the authorities or of other
members of the community.
Furthermore, as Becker states, “The nearer we get to the conditions in which they
actually do attribute meanings to objects and events, the more accurate our description of
those meanings are likely to be”(1996, 55). I would add that such level of involvement,
despite its positive implications on data gathering and information, can also have a
negative impact on the researcher’s perception as it might engender more subjective view
points and understandings. The fact that near-experience is not possible in the case of
displacement (as I was never displaced and cannot physically or emotionally go through
the same experiences and events that those displaced went and are still going through)
provided me with less vulnerability to this important limitation in case study research.
However, I was also aware that this could act as a limitation to understanding, and thus
attempted throughout my fieldwork and research to compel my interviewees to articulate
their experiences. Achieving this objective was facilitated by my visiting them in their
villages, houses, and work places and closely observing the physical surroundings in
order to get a feel of what they went, and are still, going through.
In addition to the general limitations of a single case study method, the case of
Lebanon specifically presents other challenges to the conduct of such an approach. On
the one hand, it is important to disclose the cooperation I received from those I
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interviewed and spoke with: everyone was helpful and responsive in the interviews,
interested in the research project, thought that such study was badly needed, and provided
me with necessary documents and materials on the issue. On the other hand, the
limitations and challenges to the study were many; gathering as much detailed
information about the case as possible proved to be a difficult task.
First, the lapse of time since displacement occurred—about thirty years ago—
coupled with the country’s unstable situation during that period (i.e. weakened divided
government, absence of institutions, etc.) made it difficult to obtain primary information
about the pre-displacement period and sometimes even to find people who could
remember, articulate, or were willing to recall their displacement experiences. Many of
those displaced have passed away or have become incorporated and accustomed to their
lives in the areas to where they fled, with their offspring born and raised away from home
with limited connectivity to their villages of origin.
Second, fifteen years have passed since the return policy was actively launched,
and, despite the official schedule to complete the return process in 2002 and then again in
2005, the policies, projects, and programs have been extended due to a failure to reach
their objectives. The new deadline for the completion of return is currently set at 2007,
however, it is most probable that this will be extended as well due to the additional wave
of displacement resulting from the July 2006 war with Israel. Another problem, arising
from the constant changes in ministers, directors of funds, program directors and other
employees, is the difficulty of efficiently and clearly tracking the details of the process of
return throughout the years. I addressed this limitation and was able to trace and
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interview some of those originally involved in the process; others, however, have passed
away and were therefore not accessible for interviews.
Third, that the issue of repatriation is highly politicized in Lebanon (something
discussed more in details in Chapter four) presented some challenges to the research and
the conducting of interviews in such a politically tense climate. Even though I was able to
interview a number of people involved in all aspects of the repatriation policy and
process—from high ranked government officials (Ministers), to local leaders (Mayors), to
organization project managers, to displaced, residents, and returnees—the overwhelming
majority asked to remain anonymous and not to be directly quoted or named in the study.
A confidentiality promise, therefore, was instituted in order to give those interviewed the
freedom to say what they really believed without fear or worry.
Fourth, the fact that programs and projects of return are ongoing presents a
challenge as change constantly occurred during the research and continues to occur even
now. Fifth, and most importantly, there are inconsistencies in information: data given in
reports and obtained from interviewees differed. In some cases, the numbers and
descriptions of processes, as provided not only by the different agencies’ reports, or even
by the different heads of those agencies and their teams, were contradictory. An
important factor contributing to such inconsistent numbers and information is the lack of
common indicators used to define IDPs and return: numbers are provided without
explanation on how they obtained and or determined.
Despite these limitations, this research attempted to present the displaced people
in Lebanon, in all their complexity, by portraying clearly the different approaches and
projects adopted in the different regions and by taking into consideration all the context-
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specific factors, as well as idiosyncrasies, of the displaced in those two specific areas. In
doing so, it attempts, to the greatest extent possible, to differentiate between different
Lebanese communities and the different conditions and factors that contributed to return
or lack thereof. Lebanese displaced people are not a homogenous population. In addition
to differences in age, religion, living standards, background, etc. these people differ in the
reasons for and circumstances of their displacement, as well as in their choice of post
displacement livelihood. In that sense, the findings of the research are not a to-do list that
could be easily applied to all resettled communities in Lebanon or to other nations
experiencing similar situations; instead, it should be considered a set of principles and
lessons that from which to draw useful conclusions for other post-conflict displacement
situations and for further comparative research.
An Evaluative, Assessment Approach
A comprehensive evaluation of the Lebanese return policy and its component
programs and projects, while necessary and much needed, is beyond the scope and
objectives of this research: the latter aims only at evaluating effectiveness and assessing
impacts and outcomes of that policy and interventions and their implementation on the
ground. Such an evaluative approach is useful for a number of reasons. First, little
research has thus far attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of the different
peacebuilding and development models and processes related to IDP return. Second, as
Fisher has noted, measuring the success or failure of efforts that encapsulate the complex
dynamics of humans in conflict is imperative in order for progress to be made in the field
(1997a). Third, an evaluative method can provide for a more unified approach between
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practice and research, between the academic and organizational boundaries (Fisher,
1997a). And finally, an evaluation and assessment approach, from an external
perspective, rather than “steered by the interests of selected members of the setting being
evaluated” (Greene, 1994, 982), can benefit the organizations tremendously, as well as
present more independent and objective policy recommendations that could be used both
by the organizations and by scholars in the field. This was especially important when I
interviewed Lebanese government officials and organization directors and project
managers about their program evaluations; some noted that they do internal evaluations at
the end of the program or each phase of the program (i.e. every 2 to 5 years), while
others—mostly smaller NGOs—noted that they carry out evaluation at the end of every
project or intervention, which were then either distributed internally or to participants.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines
‘evaluation’ as “an examination as systematic and objective as possible of an on-going or
completed project or program, its design, implementation and results, with the aim of
determining its efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and the relevance of the
objectives” (1986). Such program evaluation has become an important aspect of
qualitative research and through which researchers have been able or aspire to influence
social policy (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 23). According to Royse and Thyer, it is a
“management tool that you can use to make or help others make better decisions about
social and human service programs” (1997, 6). Smith further elaborates on program
evaluation and describes it as “the use of social science research methods to assess the
planning, implementation, or outcome of social programs in a political environment”
(1990, 15). Singleton and Straits also describe ‘evaluation research’ as one that consists
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of “the application of social research methods for the purpose of assessing social
intervention programs and policies” (1999, 421). The basic capacity of evaluation
research—to “produce and disseminate information” (Stokke, 1991, 2) about the
particular programs and projects under review for the purpose of learning from prior
experiences, to strengthen the program’s ability to meet the future needs of the targeted
population, as well as to achieve more efficiently the objectives of the project—is by
itself a advantage of this increasingly important method.
Case studies have a distinctive place in evaluation research and are central to
evaluation and impact assessment techniques. As was mentioned above, in order to
evaluate the return policy of IDPs in Lebanon, an embedded case study was adopted.
Here, multiple units of analysis—in this case different projects and programs—are
studied within a single case study design (Yin, 1994, 39). While the case under
investigation is one of a single ‘public’ policy program—namely, the return of internally
displaced persons—the analysis includes outcomes from individual projects within this
program in order to present a fuller, more comprehensive view of the workings of this
policy. The main aim of such an evaluative approach is to “inform and improve the
services and program policies at hand” (Greene, 1994, 981), it also aims at affecting the
“decision making about societal priorities and direction” (Greene, 1994, 982). Beyond
simply understanding their activities and workings, evaluating the implementation and
impact of projects and programs aiming at the return of IDP to their homes also hopes to
affect policy formulation, policy execution, and accountability in public decision-making.
Furthermore, it aims to provide objective assessments and feedback on those particular
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programs and projects and on return policy, in general. These assessments shed light on
how they could be improved or become more productive (Royse and Thyer, 1997, 7).
This study is important at this time because it allows for a broader analysis of
these projects and their social, economic, political, and cultural effects. Almost fifteen
years after the launching of the repatriation process in Lebanon, there is still lack of such
analysis. Most of what we know about the issue comes from human rights activists,
journalists, legal scholars, and policy analysts rather than from social science scholars
and researchers. This is a challenge, as there is little consensus on what criteria, other
than the number of returnees, should be used to assess such projects. This evaluative
approach requires the operationalizing of criteria (for peacebuilding and development)
that has not yet been operationalized or systematically applied. The policy relevance of
this study, thus, lies in the operationalization of the concepts of peacebuilding and
development, as well as in its intended critique on traditional approaches which see these
concepts in isolation of one another.
What was Assessed?
At the outset, I adopted a purposeful sampling technique in which projects that
show different perspectives on the problem, different processes, and different approaches
were chosen. However, during the fieldwork in Lebanon, I decided that the somewhat
limited number of organizations working in this field made it possible to study all the
programs and projects which, consequently, provided me with a holistic, broad, and deep
understanding of the dynamics of the return policy in Lebanon. At the same time, such an
overview sheds light on differences in program designs according to the type of
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organization (governmental and non-governmental, multilateral and bilateral, local,
regional, and international) and location (whether these programs are implemented in
what the government characterized as ‘easy’ or ‘difficult’ areas, depending on whether
they were partially or totally destroyed, and depending on whether they witnessed
massacres or not: more details on these categories are provided in Chapters four and five)
Assessing those projects is an important means by which to contextualize the programs,
their benefits, their limitations, their participants, and to gain a better idea about the
situation of those displaced prior to, during, and after the program’s implementation.
In addition to getting a clearer perspective on the IDP return situation in Lebanon,
this research has a larger objective which was stated at the onset of the study; the extent
to, and the ways in which, peacebuilding and development—two of the most important
aspects of post-conflict state-building—are integrated or linked in these projects. As
mentioned above, my initial plan was to study and assess a limited number of programs,
namely development agencies’ such as UNDP and USAID projects in the areas of
displacement and return in order to see whether and how they incorporate peacebuilding
and conflict resolution activities in their response to IDPs. However, following thorough
research, I decided to expand the research scope to include all types of organizations and
projects, both governmental and non-governmental, development agencies and conflict
resolution/peacebuilding organizations, to get a more representative and holistic
understanding of the return policy and its general dynamics. This scope can therefore
embody the complex relationships between the development and peacebuilding processes
in areas emerging from destructive conflict. Limiting my research to one type of
organization and program entailed the risk of simplifying the links between development
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and peacebuilding to causal explanations, such as peace leads to development and
development leads to peace, when causality is not what this research aims to portray. It
specifically attempts to correct this simple causality explanation, which I perceive to be
the central limitation in existing literature, research, and studies on the subject (this is
further discussed in the following chapter).
How were these Projects and their Impacts Assessed?
As my primary objective is to understand these projects and their impacts, I
adopted an interpretivist approach to evaluation (Greene, 1994, 532). I thoroughly
investigated, analyzed, and assessed these projects through the use of techniques derived
from both the development and peacebuilding literatures, as well as the newly emerging
literature on the linkage between the two.
The questions addressed in this research largely focus on analyzing the various
structures, the perceptions of success and failure, the nature of operation, and the impact
of these projects—all of which together help in assessing the overall return policy in the
country and the local reactions it receives. The aim is not to judge the worthiness of the
repatriation process, which is assumed to be the most efficient solution to the IDP
problem and the only path to reconciliation in the country; instead, the aim is to adjust
interventions, improve programs, and enhance their impacts (Royse and Thyer, 1997, 51).
As all those I interviewed expressed interest in my study, I anticipate that the information
and findings from this research will feed back to the organizations I studied and will help
them and others working in the field, as well as continually improve what they are doing.
I also hope that it improves the policies and approaches used by governments in order to
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address such a problem endangering post-conflict stability. In this sense, the study is
formative in nature because it assesses “programs that are still running and have not come
to a conclusion” (Royse and Thyer, 1997, 52; Chambers, 1994), as well as “programs that
are developing, innovative, or changing, where focus is on program improvement,
facilitating more effective implementation, and exploring a variety of effects on
participants” (Patton, 1987, 18). Another advantage of a formative evaluation approach
is that it allows for a comprehensive multi-perspective understanding of the programs by
permitting “feedback from participants” rather than from organization personnel only
(Royse and Thyer, 1997, 52). Furthermore, a constructivist approach to assess the
projects was adopted and by which I sought to understand the “meaningfulness of human
actions and interactions- as experienced and construed by the actors themselves- in a
given context” (Greene, 2000, 986).
In order to assess these programs and projects, I carefully read all the documents
from each of the organizations, so as to trace each program’s design, development,
budget, staff, target group, adopted measures, duration, objectives, implementation,
peacebuilding and development components, impacts on the attitudes and behaviors of
the displaced and the returnees, as well as impacts on the ground, definitions of success,
and identified challenges. I also designed my interviews specifically to obtain
information about and assess such aspects ranging from planning to implementation to
impact. These collected materials supplemented the interviews in which I attempted to
understand the viewpoints of all those involved in the project design as well as the
recipients on all aspects of the program. The interview (Appendix) included questions
about: goals and assumptions which helped to explore the use of conflict and/or
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development analysis when planning an intervention, as well as the organization’s overall
theoretical and ideological strategy, process accountability, so as to assess the
implementation process of the project or intervention, range of programs’ and projects’
results, so as to assess both short and long term impact of those projects on society and
the targeted population, and whether it is inclusive of the different communities, as well
as the extent the projects were able to reach out to this population (Church and Shouldice,
2002).
While such an evaluative approach is the most applicable one to this research, it is
important to keep in mind that there are significant strategic, conceptual, and empirical
challenges to effective monitoring and evaluation. One important challenge was the fact
that such evaluation was conducted in a politically-charged arena. Another challenge,
mentioned above, was the length of time this research covers as well as the extensive
numbers of activities. In order to address these challenges, “a dynamic evaluation
approach that is process-oriented, capable of capturing, monitoring not only anticipated
outcomes but also unanticipated consequences, treatment changes, and the larger context
of program implementation and development” is thus adopted (Patton, 1987, 19).
Operational Framework
Evaluating effectiveness and assessing the impact of the projects does not happen
solely in abstract terms. The concepts need to be operationalized and relevant criteria
need to be defined. Operationalization means making sense of a concept through allotting
“specific criteria or sets of interpretations” to it, which in turn make it easier to see “the
strength and weaknesses as well as successes and failures of a program” (Stake, 1995,
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96). As the ultimate objective of the study is to assess these return programs in terms of
development and peacebuilding, “operational definitions—the way these concepts are to
be defined and measured for the purposes of the evaluation—make the evaluation more
specific and precise;” they also “make the vagueness disappear” (Royse and Thyer, 1997,
17). Furthermore, operationalizing these concepts makes it easier for themes and patterns
to emerge from the content analysis of interviews, archival and document resources, and
observations.
Thus, this research assesses these efforts at repatriation and the extent to which
peacebuilding and development are being implemented and linked against a set of the
criteria and mechanisms discussed below. “These criteria and standards are the basis
upon which judgments of quality will be made” (Greene, 2000, 983). The challenge,
however, as mentioned above, is that these two concepts have not yet been systematically
or practically operationalized and talking about peacebuilding and development in a
general sense would defeat the purpose of this study. Aware of the fact that aspects of
peacebuilding and development cannot be easily classified into separate groups, and
aware of the complexity of both concepts which cannot be explained by a mere list of
criteria and processes, I nevertheless will delineate some working definitions I have
extrapolated from the interviews I conducted and the documentary and archival research I
have completed in order to more clearly evaluate the implementation of these concepts. I
do not, in any way, claim to have a comprehensive list of processes or criteria, but the
mechanisms presented and studied are sufficient to penetrate the complex relationship
and workings of such an elaborate system in general, and to the case of IDP return in
Lebanon, in particular.
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While this research calls for a conscious, necessary link between peacebuilding
and development in repatriation programs and projects, it recognizes the successes that
each was able to bring about independently. “It is quite possible that a project may fail
according to limited development criteria but succeed according to broader peacebuilding
criteria ... It is also possible that a project may succeed according to pre-determined
development criteria but fail in terms of beneficial impact on peace” (Bush, 1998). It
further recognizes the unconscious consequences that each has on the other or the
unconscious links that are embedded in the programs. “Development and humanitarian
initiatives can have positive but unintended peacebuilding impacts, which are therefore
‘undocumented and unable to inform future development work’” (Bush, 1998). However,
it maintains the necessity of consciously, explicitly, and efficiently integrating
peacebuilding and development efforts in projects that deal with displaced repatriation,
while concurrently presenting the reasons that such an integrative approach should be
adopted.
The appropriateness of any peacebuilding measure can be assessed by analyzing
the protracted conflict and accounting for all the contributing factors and effects of the
war. It is only by doing so that a realistic and context-specific framework for
peacebuilding can be developed. In the case of Lebanon, the operational aspects of
peacebuilding, which are an integral part of any peace accord, have hitherto been
neglected and no strategic components necessary for sustaining the peace agreement or
peace in general have been recognized. There is a conceptual murkiness about what
peacebuilding actually is and this, in turn, makes measuring success and failure more
difficult. However, the necessity of peacebuilding in projects of IDP return is
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unquestionable because in post-conflict areas and settings, where fighting and massacres
were the norm, it is proven very easy “to slide back into the protracted militarized
violence of the recent past. While violence may not be as pervasive or systematic as it
once was in these cases, the structures which nurtured such violence in the past remain
present and liable to explode suddenly” (Bush, 1998, 5). This is especially the case when
these issues are not dealt with in a sustainable way; in other words, if structural, cultural,
institutional, political, economic and social consequences of the conflict are not directly
targeted in the peacebuilding process. It is a guiding principle of this research that
“peacebuilding means nothing if it is not reflected in positive change in the lived
experience of those in those areas or those returning to those areas” (Bush, 1998, 12).
Throughout the study, this principle is used as an indicator of successful
peacebuilding in those societies ripped by violence and massacres. Improvements in
living standards and relationships of returnees and residents testify to the extent in which
‘peacebuilding’ is at the foundation of each project or in which it is used by agencies
merely to describe and legitimize their initiatives.
As was evident from the fieldwork, peacebuilding activities need to be
participatory in nature: that is, they need to be chosen and initiated by community
members. They also need to include all the affected parties in the participation—both in
terms of decision making and implementation (e.g. the local committees formed in
different villages in Lebanon). Peacebuilding should also be comprehensive in the sense
that it targets psychological, emotional, social, political, economic, and cultural aspects of
change. While interviewees accede that dealing with these aspects effectively will lead to
a considerable percentage of displaced returning to their homes and villages,
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peacebuilding initiatives have not occupied a serious role at the onset of return policy in
Lebanon. In fact, such projects are still relatively new to development projects.
Peacebuilding Criteria
Criteria that define peacebuilding activities and projects when it comes to IDP
repatriation are many. While some might look like short-term processes with short-term
impact, I argue that such activities, when sustained over a long period of time, will have
long-term effects on the process of return, in general, and on the relations between people
specifically. It is important to note that while some of those criteria may seem generic,
they are context-specific as they were brought up in the interviews I conducted and/or
emerged from archival and document analysis. Despite my awareness of the fact that
most of those criteria are complex and can fit into more than one category, I classified
them into separate groups for purposes of clarity and manageability.
Social: As became clear from my field research, the social aspect of
peacebuilding is the most emphasized in these projects. According to the majority of
those interviewed, whether participants in projects, returnees, and displaced persons, or
program directors, a positive sign of peacebuilding is the restoration of inter-sectarian
and inter-communal peace in these areas of displacement (and return). According to a
resident of one town, “Prior to dislocation, residents in the villages were living together
in harmony and befriending each other. As a consequence of displacement, these ties
were broken between old friends and neighbors” (Interview, Old man from Aley,
September 8, 2004). While rebuilding ties between those communities is a challenging
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task—keeping in mind the violent history and resulting mistrust between them—the job
is more daunting with regard to the younger generation.
A program director in an international organization working in the areas of return
explains, “Ties are totally absent among the younger generation who were either bom
away from the village or moved at an early age and settled elsewhere with no contact at
all with others from the village” (Interview, Caritas IDP Project Director, August 4,
2003). One of the indicators of successful peacebuilding mentioned by the interviewees
during the research is the re-socialization in those communities, i.e. the different
communities participating in each other’s wedding celebrations and funerals, visiting
each other during the holidays, etc. Most of those project directors and fieldworkers
interviewed reflect Rainier’s belief that bringing together displaced [returnees] people
with the domicile [residents] population in these different contexts will promote the
building of long-term relationships and friendships across these groups. Returnees and
residents have spoken of such occurrences when talking about the propensity of people to
coexist and their ability to forgive.
Another aspect of social peacebuilding includes cultural, educational, and
recreational coexistence projects (Bums, 2003, 91). On the educational level, prioritizing
the reconstruction of co-ed schools where students from different communities can come
together is of great importance not only to encourage the return of families to these areas,
but also to build relationships between the children and youth in those communities. A
local official in an area of return commented on the importance of rebuilding and
equipping schools, noting, “Families with school-age children will not consider returning
if educational opportunities are not provided... These schools, by bringing students from
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the different communities together will help forge peace and coexistence” (Interview,
Mayor of a returning village, July 18,2003). Reforming the curriculum to include peace
and conflict resolution education programs which promote the culture of peace and
peaceful attitudes among future generations and attempt to change attitudes towards
conflict and violence is also an important undertaking, especially in areas that
experienced increased levels of inter-communal strife.
A school teacher who returned to his village after years of displacement
emphasized the need for such programs to “advance an understanding of the ‘other’ and
humanizing him;” such programs also “help in removing stereotypes implanted in the
mind of this generation” (Interview, School teacher returnee, September 9, 2005).
Despite the fact that such projects are closely linked to the availability and accessibility
of schools (which are still lacking in most areas of return), education is considered a
significant factor in order to encourage return and build peaceful relations between
members of different communities.
Camps that bring members from the different communities (mostly children and
teenagers) together are a central aspect of social peacebuilding in Lebanon. These
initiatives occupy a central role in the process and involve a range of activities, from
recreational to more educational ones. Those participants interact and learn about each
other through play and general team-building activities. Most of those camps also include
sessions in which participants come together to confront their painful experiences and
stereotypes with the aim of helping them to re-humanize the “other” and see him/her as
similar or equal (Syeed, 2002; Raines, 2004, 9). Discussion of these camps will be
elaborated on in subsequent chapters.
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In addition to those organized camps, most interviewees have also mentioned
sporting events and youth clubs that bring people and children of different ages who
usually do not interact with one another to a common space for initiatives or activities
that directly impact individuals and communities. When in the short-term, those
‘common spaces’ allow for a change in attitudes among participants (Ross and Rothman,
1999, 11), the hope is that their long-term advantage will be to change the perception
about the conflict as a whole. One interviewee described her organization’s objective and
noted that “rather than stirring up negative competitive feelings, such events and
activities bring communities to respect each other and teaches them good sportsmanship”
(Interview, Caritas IDP Project Director, August 4, 2003).
Intra- and inter-group dialogues were also stated as important components of
strengthening the local capacities for peace via promoting communication between
members of the different communities, i.e. between residents and returnees. Varshney
highlighted the importance of such activities in bringing people together and allowing for
the emergence of peace (2001, 375). Numerous organizations working on the return of
IDPs in Lebanon, such as the Lebanese Conflict Resolution Network and the Institute of
World Affairs, have organized such dialogues, emphasizing their significance in building
a peace that leads to sustainable and permanent return. The people I interviewed
mentioned the different advantages of such efforts. For some they are networking
exercises; to others, they bring members from different communities together to tackle
common problems and find common solutions that are beneficial to everyone. Yet others
viewed them as tools by which individuals and groups can overcome persistent animosity
in ethnically divided societies—like any of the encounters mentioned above, they aim at
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tearing down negative images and stereotypes of the ‘other’ in order to lay the
groundwork for peaceful coexistence.
In addition to attempting to heal the damaged relationships between individuals
and groups through meetings and dialogues, activities that encourage relationships
through social cooperation were considered important components of peacebuilding.
Economic: In addition to the social, peacebuilding has an important economic
aspect as well. Income generating activities are not only essential for the development of
areas of return devastated by years of conflict and displacement, but can be instruments
of peacebuilding, especially when members of the different communities are brought
together. In other words, in post-conflict countries, such economic programs do not strive
to merely assist in the economic development of those regions, but to do so while also
building ties across the different communities. These dual objective programs, preferable
to those that focus on only one aspect for reasons of sustainability, offer a lens through
which the link between development and peacebuilding can be viewed. As one
interviewee noted, “When we go to a village with the aim to revive the agricultural
sector, for example, we do not just build irrigation systems, provide them with seeds, or
give them micro-credit loans, but we work with those farmers directly. We help create
agricultural cooperatives where they would come together and work for their common
interest and benefit” (Interview, MECC, ERR Project Director, July 7, 2003).
One of my interviewees also mentioned the revival of the public and service
sector in those villages as an aspect of peacebuilding. He noted, “If government bureaus
and banks open up offices here and employ residents and returnees from the different
communities, this not only provides opportunity for income generation and encourages
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economic development, but is a way to bring those people to work together peacefully
and befriend each other” (Interview, Weekend returnee, July 21, 2003).
Political: Peacebuilding also has a political aspect, which aims mostly at making
these communities more secure, promoting participation of the resident and returnee
communities in areas that suffered from displacement, and resuming normal life in these
areas. As security was considered a main incentive for return, the government took on the
responsibility to disarm the warring parties and dispatch national security and army
forces to areas of return in order to oversee safety. While many of the interviewees
mentioned security as one important factor in their decision to return, they maintained
that such security by itself was not sufficient: security needed to be supplemented by
economic and social security. Others mentioned the fragility of such security in the
absence of effective reconciliation and gave the example of a Christian man who returned
to one village and killed a number of Druze residents to avenge the murder of his parents.
Another important aspect of peacebuilding is participation in political life, both on
the local, village, or town level, as well as on the national level. Municipal and
parliamentary elections have been reinstated and displaced people, as well as residents
and returnees, are encouraged to cast their votes. While these elections have proven
important to reinstate confidence among residents and returnees, they do not have a direct
impact on the return process. This is often because displaced people who settled
elsewhere will visit their town or village on Election Day, cast their votes and go back to
where they resettled.
Reconciliation: This category emerged as an important aspect of the
peacebuilding initiatives in these areas and warrants a separate category even though it
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can be the result of or an important aspect of all above-mentioned activities. Trust
building, forgiveness, and transformation are among the essential components for such
reconciliation. This can be done directly through meetings, as discussed above, or
indirectly through encouraging common projects in the community. The bottom line is to
build person-to-person ties (Boustany, 2003), rebuild relationships between people who
fought each other for years, and more importantly, to promote the kind of relationships
that will withstand any negative political event that might occur in the future (as the
displaced issue in Lebanon being a political one, this could occur frequently).
Development Criteria
Similarly to peacebuilding, development also needs to be operationalized in order
for the assessment of impact to be more properly conducted. As made clear by the
interviews conducted and the data collected, development in the case of IDP return
should not be understood merely in economic terms (even though this aspect occupied
the majority of the government response to IDP return), but also as social, human, and
political development. It goes beyond the dominant/traditional development paradigms of
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s which were “outward-looking, technocratic, and generally
contemptuous of local resources and know-how” (Pottier, 1993, 13), to include aspects of
local involvement and empowerment. This participatory nature is an important aspect of
development in areas of return. In order for development to answer to people’s needs (in
this case to residents and returnees), it should initiate from the grassroots and reflect the
local views on needs and priorities. The realization that development will be successful
only if it involves the local communities in the planning and implementation processes
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emerged after years of failed attempts to repatriate IDPs. Even though a comprehensive
understanding of the concept and process of development makes it difficult to pin down
all its activities into criteria, there are some indicators or mechanisms that emerged
during my research and fieldwork, which are good starting points to understanding the
response to this complex human and political problem.
Reconstruction: Physical reconstruction or rebuilding of infrastructural integrity
(roads, sewage, electricity, and water) has dominated the response to IDPs in Lebanon.
When talking to representatives from the Ministry of Displaced and from the Central
Fund for Displaced, they vehemently defended their choice to spend the largest
percentage of the money on such reconstruction and rebuilding. According to them,
people will not return home if such basic needs are not properly provided or made
available. Such services will pull people back to their villages, so they may restart their
lives in as normal conditions as possible. The displaced and returnees I interviewed also
highlighted the importance of such development, but denied that it was the sole role for
their choice to return.
Economic development: Economic development appears to be the most important
factor in the decision of whether to return or not. Because areas of displacement have
been totally devastated by the war or simply ignored during dislocation, this process
entails the improvement of living standards for both residents and returnees by generating
new business in these areas, creating jobs, bringing in new capital and technology,
restoring agriculture, building roads to markets, irrigation systems (the latter being very
important, as most areas of return are rural), and giving economic incentives for people to
return (micro-credit programs, cash grants for the purchase of materials and services,
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etc). Interviewees from the government and organizations have mentioned the increasing
importance of such activities and the increased attention those objectives are receiving in
their programs.
As one interviewee noted, “It became apparent after a while that rebuilding
houses and basic infrastructure is not enough... Homes remain in the most part empty...
There is need to revive the economy and provide opportunities or incentives for those
displaced to return and be able to make a living to sustain themselves and their families”
(Interview, Butcher and ex-architect, Bhamdoun, September 11, 2005). While such a
process does not occur overnight and requires long-term commitment and work, there is
increasing awareness for the need to build efficient, affordable modes of public
transportation between those villages and towns and the cities or areas where displaced
have resettled. The size of Lebanon makes for short distances between the different
regions and consequently, displaced people can return to their homes while maintaining
their jobs in areas where they have resettled. As one interviewee noted, “There are bus
lines between the village and different areas including Beirut... Bus routes do not cover
all towns and villages yet... You need more people to return in order for such buses to
function more frequently and cost efficiently...” (Interview, Bus Commuter, Mtoleh,
August 4, 2003).
Social development: In order to encourage people to return, there is need to
provide social services in these areas as well. The most stated concern from interviewees
is the availability of health services, such as hospitals, health centers, mobile clinics,
doctors, and nurses. The stated need for medical attention is most often coupled with a
need for education. Rebuilding schools is, according to most interviewees, a very
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important aspect of their decision to return, especially as most of them have school-aged
children and feel reluctant to permanently live in their villages due to lack of educational
opportunities. This, as will be detailed later, contributed in some cases to what was
known as seasonal return, i.e. spending summers in the villages and going back to their
places of resettlement during the academic year. Most of these structures had existed in
the villages, but were destroyed during the fighting. Restoring them has not been on the
priority of agencies, which have tended to focus more on reconstructing the infrastructure
and providing the basic needs for residents and returnees.
Another important aspect of social development entails the opening of banks,
grocery stores, libraries, community centers, etc. Such community development programs
have an important collaborative aspect to them, which bring people closer together and
foster the revival of their communities. The inclusion of women and youth in
development is also an important feature of social development. Providing them with
opportunities like micro-enterprise credit programs, vocational training (such as sewing,
tapestry, and pottery), and technical training (such computers, mechanical, and carpentry)
plays an important role in the economic prosperity of those towns and villages.
Political development: This is also considered an important aspect of return
process, for it makes returnees feel that they belong and have a say in the administrative
and political processes in their areas. Aspects of such development include: elections and
election monitoring, promoting competent governance, and promoting confidence in
structures and authorities. Reviving local political and governmental structures and
allowing for fair and open elections in these areas, both for local representatives
(municipal and mayoral elections), and for deputies (at the national level), provides those
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residents and returnees with more stability and a feeling of renewed confidence in the
system and the state.
Human development: Providing for basic human needs and rights in areas of
return is necessary for the development of those towns and villages. Such rights and
needs include physical security, health security, education opportunities, employment
prospects, and political freedoms.
These are a few of the operational aspects of peacebuilding and development that
emerged from the interviews and data collected in Lebanon. While it is not a
comprehensive list by any means, it does provide an idea of the evaluative methodology
used to assess the projects and their impacts on the ground. A more detailed list emerges
from the study of the different agencies and organizations involved in the repatriation
process in Chapter five and from the analysis of their projects and policies in Chapter six.
Furthermore, it is important to note that while these criteria have emerged from the
fieldwork in Lebanon and represent people’s views on the process of return in that
particular context, most of them have a generic and broad scope that goes beyond this
project and can be used to assess the processes of return in other settings and contexts as
well.
Methods and Data Sources
In this research, I investigated the IDP return policy in Lebanon through
triangulation among data sources and methods. This multiple methods approach, or
triangulation, “reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon
in question” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 5). Using multiple techniques further diminishes
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possible biases—both personal and from other sources of information—as it allows for
‘checks and balances’ on the information itself and its interpretation. As “objective
reality can never be captured” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 5), triangulation acts as an
“alternative to validation” and adds “rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to
any inquiry” (Flick, 2002, 230-1). For the purpose of this study then, context analysis,
interviews, document analysis and observation (in the sense that I visited villages and
spent time informally chatting with residents and returnees in their homes, shops, or on
the streets) were the adopted methods for data collection and analysis.
My research began before heading to Lebanon for my fieldwork. It involved
monitoring the work and programs of several organizations and agencies that had
working and updated websites9, reading articles and browsing through online archives,
and corresponding with project directors by email. Through such research, I was able to
learn about the different groups’ structures, types of involvement, and projects in the
field. I was also able to set up a number of interviews before arriving to Lebanon. Once
in Lebanon, the process went rather smoothly. In addition to the interviews I set up from
DC, I was introduced to other contacts, and through the snowball technique (in which
each interviewee suggested other organizations to study and individuals to interview), I
was able to interview the main actors in the field and cover the major components of the
return policy. I was also able to engage in informal interviews or conversations with
9 This was a bit o f a challenge: in some cases, like with the Ministry of Displaced, the websites were down throughout my research and I was not able to access them except once or twice at the beginning of the research process. In other cases, websites were not updated on a regular basis, some even were last updated in the late 1990s early 2000s. Most of the local non-governmental organizations do not even have websites and others do not provide details about their work and programs relating to IDPs online.
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displaced, returnees, and residents during many visits I made to the different areas of
return.
Interviews
I chose active, open-ended, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews as a means to
get unrestricted information from respondents and give them the liberty to expand more
on their answers as well as interject information that is not necessarily related to the
questions asked. Such an approach, while systematic and comprehensive, allows for
unguarded, in-depth discussions with interviewees and helps capture the complexity of
the return process and attitudes towards it (Lofland and Lofland, 1995). It helped me
capture and reflect the intricacies of this sensitive process and the different factors—
historical, demographical, geographical, political, economic, social, and psychological—
which affect it. Limiting respondents’ answers and solidly structuring the interview
hinders the ability to obtain detailed information on all factors of the problem. It further
deters “the understanding of human behavior from the subject’s frame of reference”
(Singleton and Straits, 1999, 36) that a semi-structured interview permits. Furthermore,
the highly sensitive subject matter of the research, as well as the high status of some of
the respondents, called for this type of interview as it made interviewees feel more at ease
about how and what to answer and permitted a balance between wide-ranging and
spontaneous discussion and a highly restrictive one. It also allowed for more relaxed
atmosphere and conversations in which interviewees had more time to reflect on their
own experiences and provide me with details about the impact of their work.
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As I needed specific information about the workings of the return policy in
general and the sensitivity of the programs to peacebuilding and development needs in
particular, I did employ a set of questions to ask (Appendix). Nevertheless, I incorporated
a certain degree of leeway to ask additional questions, which would likely emerge from
the conversations themselves, and to expand on some of the comments that seemed
interesting for the research but were not in the original set of questions. Such flexibility
was not accompanied by chaos; on the contrary, it entails several validity tests embedded
in it. First, it calls for conformity in the questions asked—that is, to make sure that
respondents get the same set of questions and themes to expand on—which makes the
identification of patterns more accurate. In semi-structured interviews, the questions are
asked in a systematic and consistent order to all respondents, but at the same time, allow
the interviewer some freedom to explore beyond the answers to their prepared questions
(Berg, 1989, 17). Second, it limits the impact of the interviewer; each question will be
asked the same way to all, rather than be affected by the conversation per se. The
differences in answers can thus be attributed mostly to the respondents’ beliefs and
understandings rather than to misunderstandings or the interviewee’s influence. So while
on the one hand, the idea is not to restrict respondents in any way, having a set and fixed
list of questions to ask all interviewees makes “variation between responses” attributable
to the differences between the respondents and their work and not a reflection of how the
questions are phrased (Nachmias, 1992, 224).
At the same time, though, I am aware of the limitations of such an approach to
interviewing. While, as mentioned above, the open-ended interviews provided freedom
for respondents to answer in their own terms, as well as to provide the interviewer with a
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wealth of information and rich details that will contribute to the study, the very large
volume of information which is inevitably gathered can be a burden to transcribe, reduce,
or analyze (Mahoney, 1997, 7). (The way I dealt with the abundance of information is
described later in this chapter). Such an approach also entails more work as a result of
“the varied length of responses, the difficulty with inarticulate respondents, the difficulty
in getting it all down accurately, and reluctance of many persons to reveal detailed
information” (Singleton and Straits, 1999, 281-2).
From the beginning, I believed that to capture the intricacies of the return policy,
face-to-face interviews would be a necessary tool as they would allow me to obtain high
response rate, make unobtrusive observations, and establish trust and rapport with
respondents (Singleton and Straits, 1999). In addition, such interviews provide the
researcher with the opportunity to see the respondent and relate to his/her body language,
comportment, and setting, which is not possible through phone or Internet (by email)
interviews, and which add to the understanding of the subject matter (Singleton and
Straits, 1999). By meeting personally with my respondents and explaining the project and
its objectives in a clear manner, I was able to eliminate some of the fears they had about
exposing their weaknesses and failures. Any person questioned about their work and
involvement, especially in such a highly sensitive and politicized issue as the IDP return
in Lebanon, is likely to feel a bit threatened by such an investigation. Therefore, I tried to
put my respondents at ease by asking questions in a non-aggressive, subtle manner and
by promising confidentiality. I also gave them the option of being interviewed in Arabic,
English or French depending on their preference. Such multi-lingual approach was not a
challenge for me as I am fluent in all three languages. I believe that it led to a more
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accurate representation of my respondents’ views and made them more comfortable
answering questions.
In a country emerging from years of civil strife and where sensitivities between
communities are still at a height, no extensive publications and research on sensitive
topics (e.g. internal displacement) exist. Interviews, thus, make up the basis of the study
as they provide first-hand, crucial, and detailed information on the issue from the
perspectives of government authorities, project directors, fieldworkers, displaced people,
returnees, and residents. These interviews, in addition to capturing the different
perspectives, also provide information on the different stages of the projects from the
design stage to the implementation stage: from the problems encountered to the successes
achieved (Mahoney, 1997, 5).
While I began with a select sample of interviewees I identified through the
extensive online research and preliminary document, reports, and newspapers reading and
analysis10, the list continued to expand as the fieldwork proceeded, as additional people
were referred to me by those I was interviewing. Such a snowball effect or approach was
particularly helpful for it amounted to me being able to interview the majority of those
responsible for return projects and the most active people and organizations in the field. It
was important to include diverse people from different organizations (governmental,
local, and international) in order to ensure the study with more credibility and a
comprehensive outlook. Interviews with project directors and fieldworkers provided a
great deal of insight about both the planning phase of the projects and their
10 Two resources were of particular assistance in this early stage of the research process: the Global IDP Project, a yearly country study on internal displacement sponsored by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center in Geneva, (http://www.intemal-displacement.Org/I. and the Lebanese NGO’s Forum online database o f different organizations and agencies active in IDP projects in Lebanon.
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implementation on the ground. Interviews with government officials, residents, returnees,
and displaced also gave a multi-leveled view of the developments in the return process,
by accessing the ideas of those who write policies, those who implement them, and those
who are personally affected by those policies.
Hence, while I sought at the beginning to choose few organizations and study
their responses to IDP return, I later decided that in a country as small as Lebanon where
few organizations are actively working on this issue in the field, there is no need to
choose among the organizations according to certain criteria (size, type, etc), but that my
study will be more valid by looking at all organizations. (More details on all those
organizations are provided in Chapter five). This helped reduce idiosyncrasies that relate
to the structural factors (size, budget, type, years of experience, and operation, etc.), as
well as truly allow for a comprehensive look into the problem of displacement and return.
Such an inclusive view on the issue helps best evaluate the impact of those projects and
the degree to which policies are being reflected practically and the efficiency of those
projects in dealing with the underlying causes of the conflict, as well as the needs of
those displaced and returnees.
As it happened, my point of entry was through governmental resources. My first
interview was with the director of the Council for Development and Reconstruction
(CDR). The second interview was with the Minister of Displaced at that time, Marwan
Hamadeh, and numerous ministry employees who provided me with oral accounts about
what is taking place in term of projects and work for ensuring the return process, as well
as written data on the displaced and the policy of return. They also put me in contact with
other activists working on the process of return. These first encounters helped me
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familiarize myself with the dynamic and general reactions to IDP return policy in the
country. Starting on the official level was not a conscious choice: I had to interview
people when their time permitted. So I went back and forth between interviewing
government officials (in addition to the Minister and Central Fund for Displaced director
present at the time of the fieldwork, I conducted interviews with former ministers and
fund director and interviewed the newly appointed Minister which took office after my
fieldwork was done), project directors, fieldworkers, and residents, returnees, and
displaced. While some of those interviewed were wary about the government’s handling
of the policy, the fact that I started my interviews with government officials did not
receive negative reactions from other interviewees; this was due, in part, to the fact that I
was careful to keep an open mind and allow all my respondents the same amount of time,
attention, and respect without making judgments in the course of the interviews. In short,
I continued proactively and consciously to elucidate all sides of the problem, without
taking sides or giving preferences. This was because the objective of my study was to
gather as much information and view points as possible to provide a fuller account of the
policy and process.
While interviewees from government and other organizations were selectively
chosen for formal interviews, a number of other informal interviews were conducted with
residents of the villages (those who were not displaced and stayed in their homes during
the whole period), returnees (those who have returned home after the launching of the
return policy after the end of the civil war), and displaced people who remained in Beirut
but were not able to return yet. Those people were randomly chosen during visits to the
villages, or, in the case of the final group, those interviewed were either referred to me by
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acquaintances or our paths crossed in an accidental way (e.g. the cab driver I rode with on
my way home from the Ministry of Displaced after an interview there, a small market
owner on a busy street of Beirut, etc.)
My interviewees did not only direct me to other officials in organizations and
governmental institutions, but also to other researchers and journalists who worked
closely on the IDP problem in the country. For example, I toured a few villages with a
researcher/anthropologist who was working on her Ph.D. in anthropology at Oxford
University. She had been in Lebanon for a couple of years when I met her and had lived
for a period of time in the village of Breeh (one of the villages that have not experienced
any kind of return since the launch of the program in 1992). I met her next to her
apartment in the Shouf region and drove with her through the area to Breeh. There, we
visited a number of houses and I had the opportunity to chat with different people from
different generations about my research (i.e. conduct informal interviews about their
experiences and thoughts). My escort’s knowledge of the village dynamics and residents,
and the fact that she had befriended them and gained their trust throughout the years,
made it easier for me to obtain information. People were more open to my questions and
accepted to talk to me and answer my questions. They did not allow me to tape their
responses.
I also had an interesting experience during a visit to an area that suffered
displacement in the Iqlim region. I was escorted by a journalist referred to me by one of
my respondents who had experienced displacement first-hand. In a trip that lasted for
hours one afternoon, I was able to see the different dynamics characterizing areas of
displacement and return. We drove through villages and towns that were still mostly
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rubble, others that were rebuilt but remain empty, areas where residents stayed, and other
areas that experienced some percentage of return. During the visit, I learned a lot about
the pre-displacement and current situations of those villages, spoke with some residents,
and a few returnees. We ended our trip with a visit to the home of the journalist’s parents
who had returned along with his sister and her family to the village and who were living
in a building that was still under reconstruction (cement, with no finishing). From them, I
learned about their need to come back to their homes and belong, the hardships faced by
returnees, and the hopes for a better future.
Those two trips were among the many I conducted to areas of return, however,
they were the only ones in which I was accompanied by someone who knew the area and
maintained connections there. Going on those two visits with people who are
knowledgeable about the villages’ history, dynamics, and residents was a positive
experience for me, as I was unfamiliar with the area. It also taught me ways in which I
could approach my respondents in a comfortable way in order to increases the chances of
their opening up to me about their experiences and opinions about the issue. However, I
decided to undertake other visits on my own, in case the presence of people known in
those villages was affecting in any way the content of their answers. These village visits
were very helpful in that they revealed different aspects of the problem and allowed me
to interact with people from whom I learned a great deal about the different perspectives
and positions regarding the issue of return. They added tremendously to the depth and
breadth of information I gathered from more formal interviews and document analysis.
Also, I was able to “engage in conversations with different people to gain information
about their feelings, motives and interpretations of events” (Singleton and Straits, 1999,
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348). During these excursions to the different areas and villages, I had the opportunity to
spend some time talking with residents who were settled in the villages and returnees
who were trying to put their lives back together. In some villages, however, there were no
residents or returnees, and I just drove around to see the extent of the reconstruction and
the general atmosphere that these areas experience (more details on the different villages
are provided in Chapter 4).
Throughout my work, I strived to remain as objective and balanced as possible in
order to present the most comprehensive and valid picture of the return policy and
projects. As displacement had occurred from hundreds of villages, it was not possible to
visit each one. Following extensive research, I chose to visit villages that satisfy the
different categories as identified by the Ministry of Displaced and subsequently adopted
by most organizations: villages that were totally destroyed, villages that were partially
destroyed, and others that did not suffer from any significant destruction; villages that
were being reconstructed and others that remain in ruins; villages that were homogeneous
before the displacement waves and those that were heterogeneous or had a mixed
population; villages where there was complete return, others that witnessed some level of
return, and villages that did not experienced any level of return. Detailed description of
some of those villages is provided in chapter 5.
I interviewed over 70 people actively involved in the process of return in one
capacity or another in different stages between 2003 and 2005 and had informal
conversations with numerous others in different settings (i.e. either during one of my
visits to areas of displacement or when I least expected—during my daily activities in
Beirut). While some interviews were scheduled prior to my trip to Lebanon, others were
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set up during my visits. In general, apart from for few instances, scheduling interviews
was easy and people were very responsive and helpful. Respondents agreed to meet with
me on short notice and despite their busy schedules. No one who was interviewed
questioned the authenticity of the research or my intentions. It was encouraging to see
that all interviewees showed interest in the study and articulated the need for such timely
and important research; they also added that they would be interested in the results of the
completed research. Such support and encouragement continued to be reflected in email
correspondences and phone conversations I had with some of the interviewees after
returning to the US and throughout the writing period. The purpose of this post hoc
correspondence was to stay as updated on any new and current developments in the
return policy and the problem of displacement as possible. Although a great deal of
crucial information was gathered during the formal interviews, e-mail correspondences
and other conversations enhanced and strengthened my understanding of the subject, as
well as its context.
While the number of interviewees might seem low, my sample is particularly
strong as it represents a variety of those involved in displaced return, from prominent
leaders, to local authorities, from residents to returnees and the displaced themselves. It
also represents the reactions of both givers and recipients of such assistance. In short, the
sample accurately reflects the landscape of IDP work in Lebanon. When identifying the
interviewees and the sites for visits, I was sure to include all relevant players in the field,
as well as include the different categories of villages. As my trips to Lebanon coincided
with holidays or vacations, some people I hoped to interview were not available. In order
to compensate for this absence, I found interview transcripts, speeches, and/or articles by
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those people in which they described their position vis-a-vis the policy of return and the
work that was being done in this regard.11 Although I was not able to schedule interviews
with high level officials due to the sensitive political nature of the topic, I was able to
capture some of their views by reviewing speeches and interviews that the latter had
made throughout the years. This was also done in the case of people who had passed
away since the beginning of the repatriation process and who had been actively involved
in the return policy-making and policy-implementation.
Formal interviews with government officials, NGO personnel and program
managers were, for the most part, tape-recorded, however, those interviewed asked not to
be identified in the research. I gladly agreed to such an anonymity promise, as it “helps
people be more upfront about their private thoughts and experiences and thus provides
better validity for our results” (Becker, 1996, 7). It further allows respondents to make
statements that might have political ramifications and which otherwise would be
withheld. It is important for the interviewer to be aware of this issue and of the
limitations that would result if such an anonymity promise were not granted or promised,
especially with regard to a politicized and sensitive topic such as IDPs. Therefore, due to
the sensitivity—both politically and emotionally—of the issue and because of the
confidentiality promise I made to my respondents, their names will be not be disclosed in
this research—a standard required by professional and institutional codes of ethics.
Nevertheless, in order to capture all the details from the conversations and interviews,
especially those lasted between one and two hours each, I found it greatly beneficial to
111 gathered numerous interviews in newspapers and magazines with government and organization officials elaborating about their work with displaced and the return policy. I also gathered newspaper articles in which journalists and reporters talked to displaced, residents and returnees about their experiences. This data dates from 1991 to the present.
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tape-record these sessions. Such specific and accurate details became the basis for
analyzing the data.
Interviews with displaced people, residents, and returnees took the form of formal
or informal conversations; the latter was more prevalent in the methodology. In the
formal interviews, respondents refused to be taped (and some even refused to reveal their
name). In those cases, lengthy and detailed handwritten notes were taken during the
interview. In informal conversations, notes and comments were written after the
exchange. I spoke with a variety of people like mini-market owners, construction
workers, students, teachers, carpenters, farmers, unemployed people, etc. In addition to
speaking to inhabitants of various villages, I carried out similar conversations with
displaced people who were in Beirut. They shared with me their thoughts about the return
projects as well as the reasons behind their hesitance to return to their own villages. Such
informal interviews provided me with a clearer understanding of displaced people’s first
hand experience and memories of war and displacement, as well as their reaction to the
return policies. Such interviews also shed light on how those projects impacted the lives
of returnees and displaced, while allowing me to understand how “the programs and
policies are experienced by the participants in the particular contexts” (Greene, 2000,
988).
The importance of interviews for my study lies in the loosely defined,
constructionist view adopted in this research, namely, that there are no absolute criteria
forjudging reality but rather that such criteria “are derived from community consensus
regarding what is real, what is useful, and what has meaning” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994,
167). It is individuals who give meaning to activities and phenomena (Denzin and
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Lincoln, 1994, 167). There is “no foundational standards by which truth can be
universally known” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994,177), hence, the heightened importance
of interviews to discover the different truths and actions. The fact that I was an ‘outsider,’
not affiliated with the government and organizations, not having close connections to
either, and not having links with displaced villages, made it easier for respondents to
open up to me and for me to delve into their worlds.
Context, Archival, and Document Analysis
The interviews were supplemented by extensive archival and documentary
research. Such research provides insights into the setting that cannot be realistically
ascertained in another way. Newspaper clippings and articles covering the issue of the
displaced since it began in the 1970s and 1980s, the issue of return since 1989, and policy
statements and speeches throughout the years, were collected and reviewed. Even though
the return policy for the displaced was not officially instituted until 1992, at the National
Meeting, 1989 marks the year when the Taif agreement—in which return was presented
as a government policy and priority in order to promote national reconciliation in a
country tom by years of conflict—was signed and is thus an important starting date for
the study of the return policy process.
While newspaper articles and stories are important references in this kind of
study—which evaluates and analyzes a currently ongoing political, social and economic
problems in the country—and while the issue is widely and regularly covered by the
media, the data gathered had to be supplemented by academic and scholarly work. Such
sources proved difficult to find due to the lack of theoretical research on the specific topic
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of IDPs in Lebanon. There is even less research on peacebuilding and development when
relating to the problems of displaced persons. I was able to find only one book in French,
one in Arabic, a couple of articles, few reports, and a small number of book chapters that
dealt directly with the issue of IDPs in Lebanon. This lack of information and studies on
the topic and the challenges it poses to the research is discussed in the following chapter.
A review of documents and reports from the different organizations on their
programs and projects dealing with the issue of repatriation also supported the analysis.
These documents ranged from those providing general information about the
organizations’ structures, missions, and work, to those that dealt more specifically with
the projects for displaced return, evaluation, and assessment of those policies and
activities. While some of this information was accessed from the organizations’ websites
prior to the fieldwork and continuously throughout the writing, as well as from archival
research in Lebanon, other reports and documents were collected during visits to these
organizations and/or interviews with project directors and staff. Interviewees were very
generous in providing me with documents and written material that explained their work
and put it into context. However, one problem presented itself with these types of
sources, namely, accessing confidential organizational documents, such as evaluations
and assessments of projects, as well as budget reports. Data or information in such non
public, confidential records was often difficult to obtain. I tried to compensate for this
through interviews by asking questions that provided some idea about these issues and
about the failures and successes of those projects. It is hoped that this research, being of
academic basis, will be more accessible to a larger number of people and will provide a
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clearer idea about facts that are usually kept confidential, for the organization’s internal
use only.
In addition to these documents, political talk shows about IDP return policy and
the IDP problem, in general, were analyzed. Throughout my study, I was able to watch
10 such shows that brought politicians and analysts together to discuss this question.
While some of the guests were directly involved in the process (for example, former
Minister of Displaced Walid Jumblatt), other deputies, ministers, religious leaders, and
community leaders also discussed the issue on national TV and took questions from
listeners.
The number of documents and amount of data gathered were immense due to the
fact that analyzing documents that date back to the 1989 and/or documents that describe
the projects and their workings is not sufficient to have a comprehensive understanding
of the problem. One cannot understand the problem of internal displacement and the
challenges faced when trying to solve it, except through understanding the dynamics of
the Lebanese conflict in general. The issue of displacement dates back more than thirty
years ago and grounding the issue in history, using multiple sources of inquiry,
establishes the credibility and rigor of this study and helps to locate it in its context.
Fieldwork and Observation
Observation was a third qualitative method employed in this research and it
provided a great deal of data that helped in the evaluation of the projects of return. As a
research technique, observation allows for firsthand data gathering on the programs,
processes and behaviors being studied (Mahoney, 1997, 1). Through observation, I had
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direct access to enter and directly understand the context of the study and to identify all
sorts of outcomes and reactions in the particular setting. Despite the advantages of the
observation technique, its limitation include the enormous amount of time it requires; the
possible effect it will have on the people, prompting them to change their behaviors; and
the possible selective, biased perceptions of the researcher which would distort the data
(Mahoney, 1997, 2). Nevertheless, the advantages of observations outweigh its
limitations. It was only through direct experimenting of the physical environment in
which projects are taking place that I could understand the extent of project
implementation and the reactions of the actors involved as well as the relationships that
take place between people themselves, between them and their environment, and between
them and the project personnel (Mahoney, 1997, 3).
Throughout the fieldwork, I was never a full participant in any of these projects.
The observations that I did during my visits to the villages were informal ones, focusing
on the dynamics taking place between the different actors. Furthermore my chats with
residents and returnees provided me with the most meaningful data about the programs
and the situation of displacement and return, without endangering the validity of the
information and impacting those observed to change their behaviors and attitudes—which
is one of the dangerous consequences or pitfalls of the full participant role (Patton, 1990).
One limitation, however, was my inability to directly observe any dialogue meetings or
camps, as such activities either did not coincide with my stays in Lebanon or were not
being held due to financial constraints. I was, however, able to obtain reports on such
activities from the government and organizations, which sponsored those initiatives and
familiarized myself with these efforts.
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Data Analysis
Data analysis from the interviews and other forms of data sources was done in an
inductive manner (i.e. where categories emerge from the material rather than classify
material according to already developed categories), through content analysis of the
information, which proved to be a good way of managing and interpreting the large
amounts of qualitative materials collected in the course of the research. As mentioned
briefly above and as what will be detailed in chapter 6, categories or criteria were
developed according to analytical themes that emerged from the data. As the objective of
this study is not merely to describe the context, intentions and projects of actors in the
field or to classify the collected data in ways to help in their analysis, the research went
further in order to connect the ensuing categories (within development and
peacebuilding) and to study their relations and how they interact (Dey, 1993, 44-5).
The information was coded in a way that allowed themes, patterns and
relationships to emerge, hence explaining the dynamic of return policy, both in theory
and practice. In order for this ‘coding’ to be possible, a thorough review of all collected
data was done. I familiarized myself with the interviews by listening to the tapes and re
read my notes multiple times. While I did a word-by-word transcription of some sections
of the interviews, I summarized others when typing them up—especially the sections that
were not very clear in terms of sound quality. In addition to the recorded interviews, I
went through the notes I took during these interviews, which described the characteristics
of the respondents, as well as the overall mood of the interviews (Mahoney, 1997, 8). I
also read carefully and repeatedly through the more detailed notes written during the non-
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recorded interview and looked for indicators or categories in events and behavior
(Frechtling and Sharp, 1997, 2).
In addition to interviews, documents and other data were systematically
scrutinized to in order to reveal patterns (Berg, 1989, 42-43). The main aim of such
analysis was to evaluate whether, and to what extent, peacebuilding and development
activities are integrated into these projects, and if so, whether they are integrated
consciously or unconsciously. In other words, the analysis of the data was both holistic,
looking at the entire case, as well as embedded, looking at specific aspect of the case
(Yin, 1994; Creswell, 1998, 63). Such an approach to data analysis allowed for a detailed
description of the case, analysis of themes and issues, and interpretation or assertions to
emerge (Stake, 1995; Creswell, 1998, 63). At the end, “lessons learned” from the case
were presented and analyzed (Lincoln and Guba, 1992; Creswell, 1998, 63).
Consequently, the data was analyzed and interpreted in a way that helped the researcher
make sense of all the information collected and answer the research questions.
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the methodological approach at the foundation of the
study and presented an operational framework by which the concepts of development and
peacebuilding, in the context of return policy in Lebanon, are evaluated or assessed. This
approach was adopted because it best answers to the objectives of the study by allowing
for findings that are of importance to both scholars and practitioners; that have theoretical
as well as practical significance; and which are policy-relevant. The operational
framework proposed is applied to the repatriation of Lebanese IDPs in Chapters five and
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six to show the extent to which development and peacebuilding are linked and to suggest
sustained initiatives that do so. Even though the generalizability of findings from this
embedded, single case study is not guaranteed, the evaluative method is intended to
present a thorough understanding of return policy and processes that might be applied
(perhaps with minor amendments) to other post-conflict contexts. The following chapter
will present a systematic review of existing literature, before then embarking on the case
analysis.
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LITERATURE REVIEW: IDP RETURN, DEVELOPMENT
AND PEACEBUILDING: FROM ANALYSIS
TO IMPLEMENTATION
Introduction
This study is innovative in that it bridges subject matters that have not been
studied within the same field and which have been—both in theory and practice—at the
fringe of the International Relations discipline. Even though internal displacement,
development, and peacebuilding are vital aspects of post-conflict state-building, literature
that links the three remains scant, if not nonexistent. This chapter surveys the existing
literature on these three themes, while analytically looking for areas of interaction
between them. Moving away from mainstream IR literature which focuses on states, this
study focuses on the role that individuals and organizations play in defining the
international system as well as local structures.
This research focuses mainly on post-conflict situations and the obstacles that
states emerging from conflict face in their respective rebuilding and re-stabilizing
process. Particularly, it is concerned with an increasingly challenging issue to both
governments and the international community1: the problem of forced migration. Forced
1 The international community refers to multilateral and bilateral agencies; intergovernmental international or regional organizations, transnational non-governmental organizations, charitable foundations/philanthropic organizations, relief agencies, and private firms involved in development and humanitarian assistance (Kumar, Women and Civil War 5)
83
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migration, which connotes “people involuntarily leaving the places of permanent
residence individually or jointly due to the existent man-made or natural threats or
persecution and seeking asylum on other territories within the country or across its
borders” (Chemia, 1999), poses problems that transcend humanitarian concerns to
include developmental and peacebuilding ones. For this reason, this chapter explores the
evolution of the theory and practice of the return of internally displaced persons,
development, and peacebuilding processes in post-conflict contexts.
This chapter is divided into four sections, each providing a theoretical and
conceptual background and focusing critically on the issues involved in the research. It
starts out with an in-depth look at forced migration and its consequences. It briefly
outlines the differences and similarities between refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs), but focuses more on the latter—which is at the heart of this research.
This first section explores the existing literature on this understudied group of people,
who they are, what are the challenges they face during displacement, and what are the
obstacles for their return to their homes. It also highlights the limitations in the literature,
as well as new studies on this rapidly growing population. While there are several causes
for displacement (economic, political, social), this study focuses on conflict-induced
displacement.
From the review of the displacement literature, it becomes clear that IDPs pose a
challenge to development and that solutions to their plight is an engine for such progress.
The second section in this chapter, therefore, reviews the evolving literature on
development as it relates to IDPs. It mostly emphasizes the importance of moving beyond
the traditional concept of development as merely economic and/or political, to including
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its social and human aspects. This comprehensive/holistic understanding of development
is an important achievement in the field for it truthfully reflects the complexity of the
process and the international/national contexts in which it takes place. This section
further explores the development projects and evaluates their implementation on the
ground, as well as their effects on the return process. Development in this research
incorporates economic, social, human and political aspects and is participatory in nature.
Ultimately, this section will focus on this emerging understanding of development.
While IDPs were mostly the concern of the development field and literature, the
dynamics of post-conflict situation have also pushed it to the forefront of the conflict
resolution field, where it was increasingly linked to a country’s ability to rise from
conflict, build peace, and stabilize. IDPs are not only an important facet of any peace
agreement; their return is progressively believed to be an important and essential
condition for peacebuilding, reconciliation, and the sustainability of peace. The third
section, thus, elaborates on the relatively new concept of peacebuilding; it goes beyond
simply defining the concept, but strives to operationalize it by drawing the link between
building peace and repatriating the displaced. This section also highlights the advantages
and challenges of peacebuilding in return projects and evaluates the application of its
mechanisms and processes in areas of return.
The fourth and final section in this chapter elaborates the main thesis of this
research; the importance of linking peacebuilding and development in post-conflict areas.
While literature on how to work in post-conflict areas has increased in the past years and
while many scholars and practitioners have voiced the necessity of comprehensive
approaches to these challenging contexts, very few studies have in actuality introduced
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ways in which to link peacebuilding and development—either theoretically or in practice.
What exists in the scholarly literature is an awareness of the challenges and difficulties of
actually drawing and implementing these linkages; in practice, the main concern is with
the difficulties in evaluating these connections and their effects on the ground. This
section critically studies the existing literature, in general, and focuses on those areas
related to IDP return, in particular. It further tackles the relationship between
development and peacebuilding in return projects and presents the literature on
evaluation and the challenges of assessing such programs on the ground. I believe that
tackling the issue of integrating peacebuilding and development using a practical lens,
like that of IDP return, is of utmost benefit to this newly emerging field.
Forced Migration
There is no exact period of time to which the phenomenon of forced migration
can be traced. Such human movements have occurred, in different forms, throughout
history and have been caused by various factors, including ecological or natural disasters,
political or religious conviction, persecution, fear of retaliation, systematic violations of
human rights, economic hardships, development projects, poverty and famine, armed
conflicts and communal violence (Loescher, 1993; Newland, 1993). However, the most
common cause of forced migration, at least since the end of the Cold War, has been
armed civil conflicts. Internal conflicts in countries like Angola, Colombia, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Bosnia, and Lebanon have led to a massive number of refugees and IDPs, who
remain in most cases, even years after the end of the violence, away from their homes and
communities. The persistence of the problem over a number of many years—in some
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cases, decades—and the difficulty in dealing with its root causes, makes finding a
solution which will eventually lead to their return and repatriation rather difficult.
Refugees vs. IDPs
In addition to its different causes, forced migration expresses itself in different
ways and results in two important types of displaced people; ‘internally displaced’
persons and refugees. The degree to which both groups should be differentiated,
however, has been a matter of debate. According to some scholars, the clear distinctions
humanitarian and refugee law draw between the two groups are believed to exaggerate
the differences—differences which are limited to time, space and experience during
displacement (Kumar, 2001, 11; Hyndman, 2000, 5). Lake even goes to the point where
he calls displaced people internal refugees (1990, 5). Other scholars and practitioners
reject this simplistic, technical ‘border crossing’ distinction and believe that IDPs, who
11 vastly outnumber refugees today, are distinct in several ways. First, by remaining close
to the source of disruption and unable to find sanctuary elsewhere, IDPs continue to be
vulnerable to abuse and human rights violations (Deng, 1993). Second, IDPs fail to
receive the domestic and international protection they need; this lack of assistance is due
to the issue of state sovereignty, as well as to the difficulty in locating displaced people
or, in some cases, distinguishing them from the local population (Cuny, 1991). Third, the
absence of established camps and/or registration systems makes the task of identifying
them even more challenging. Deng further explains this limitation, “there is neither an
13 IDPs are estimated at 20-30 million, almost twice the number of refugees. According to Francis Deng, there are 35-40 countries that suffer from serious problems of displacement (Deng, 1995)
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institution charged with collecting the information nor a consistent methodology applied
by the various groups that do collect data” (Deng, 1995, 2). This process of registration,
which is missing in most countries suffering from IDP problems—including Lebanon—is
primarily important in order to “ensure an accurate assessment of the scale of
displacement crisis and the conditions facing the displaced” (Vincent and Sorensen,
2001,278-279). Without such a system, it is impossible to monitor the number of IDPs in
a country, for they tend to flee to safer areas and assimilate or adapt to their
environment—as is the case of long-term displacement like in Lebanon. The distinction
made in this study between the two groups is founded on differences of location and
mechanisms to which the may turn in response to their plight and to protect their rights. I
believe that these two aspects are the most important factors in explaining the need to
deal with these populations as distinct entities.
No formal, legal, or generally accepted definition o f‘internally displaced persons’
exists. While all of the definitions agree on the compulsory and internal nature of such
displacement, they disagree on the categorization of reasons or factors that led to such
movements. The most widely adopted definition of IDPs is the one issued by the UN
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which describes them as, “those persons or
groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places
of habitual residence (suddenly or unexpectedly), in particular as a result of or in order to
avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of
human-rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized State border” (Martin, 2000). The problem with this
definition, however, is that it encompasses a broad category of people and exacerbates
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difficulties in determining the exact number of IDPs in a given country or worldwide.
Refugees, on the other hand, have benefited from a more official and established
definition. In the UN Convention Relating to the Status o f Refugees, a ‘refugee’ is defined
as,
Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country o f his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UN General Assembly, 1951; Ferris, 1985, 2-3; Shacknove, 1985).
These definitions result in a number of complications. Although both IDPs and
refugees suffer from the same problems, the fact that internally displaced people stay
within the confinement of their country of nationality, while refugees seek asylum in
other countries, necessitates different ways of dealing with each of these two groups. The
refugee issue has been a concern for the international community since the creation of the
League of Nations. It was then that universal standards for the protection of those people
replaced previous localized efforts to help them; refugees came to be regarded as an
international problem, to be dealt with on an international level. However, an
international, institutionalized system of laws and regulations dealing with the refugee
problem did not materialize until 1951, with the establishment of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the adoption of the UN Refugee
Convention to provide both international protection and solutions for refugees (UNHCR,
2000, 1-2).
Such international response—i.e. the existence of an independent institution or
international regime/instrument that takes responsibility for refugees—did not and still
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does not exist for IDPs who remain, with the exception of some widely publicized cases
like Ethiopia, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and most recently Sudan and Lebanon14, off the
international community’s radar. Hence, contrary to the relatively timely response to
refugees, awareness of the IDP problem grew only beginning in the late 1990s. Despite
the lack of structural arrangements to deal with IDPs, the UN’s appointment of the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons
reflected an emerging interest in the issue within the international community. Other
factors leading to such awareness included: the continuously increasing number of IDPs;
the strains they put on the areas and communities in which they sought refuge; the
willingness of the international community to intervene in order to protect human rights
within a state; the recognition that in a world ripped by conflicts, the successful return
and reintegration of displaced people are conditions for lasting peace and reconstruction;
and the realization that the plight of internally displaced persons threatens the security
and stability of the international system. This is how, despite the fact that emergent
interest in this population did not yield official integration of responsibility for IDPs
within existing regimes, internal displacement “has emerged as one of the most pressing
humanitarian, human rights and political issues facing the international community”
(Vincent and Sorensen, 2001, xiii).
With the growth of such interest, proposals as to how the international should
respond to the plight of IDPs also developed. Some proposed a contingent and need-
14 The growing awareness to the plight of IDPs is illustrated by the media’s coverage of the 2006 Lebanon war which focused on the million Lebanese who were forced to flee their homes and sought refuge inside the country (in schools, parks, etc.) Most of the people ignored the fact that one million Lebanese (about one third o f the total population of the country) were also internally displaced during the Lebanese civil war between 1975 and 1990 and the majority continues to be so. The issue was not as pertinent in international consciousness.
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based approach, under which the UN General Assembly and the Secretary-General would
ask UNHCR to formally expand its conventional mandate in certain circumstances and
provide care for other displaced populations, such as IDPs (which happened in the cases
of Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Somalia, for example)15 (UNHCR, 1993). Others
suggested a more permanent and structured approach, one which supports the creation of
a new agency to assist and protect this group of people (Cohen, 1994; UNHCR, 1993;
Deng, 1993; Girardet, 1992). A more moderate suggestion from those supporting an
enduring response was the introduction of formal adjustments to the UNHCR mandate,
whereby its assistance and protection would include IDPs. Despite the resonance of this
latter approach both in scholarship and practice, such recommendations have not yet been
operationalized. Several reasons were provided by the UN’s failure to bring about any of
the recommended changes. These include lack of funding and legal framework for
implementation, distraction from primary responsibility towards refugees, and the high
risks involved in protecting and assisting people in conflict situations (Camilleri, 2003, 9;
Cohen and Cuenod, 1995, 15). However, I believe that the unwillingness and/or inability
of the UN to take any major steps has more to do with the politics and structure of the
UN, as well as the premium it places on state sovereignty.
Hence, in its efforts to improve capacity and response to internal displacement,
the most significant steps the UN has taken have revolved around raising awareness and
advocating for the creation of systematic reporting and monitoring of IDPs and their
needs. In 1992, UN Secretary-General at that time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, appointed a
15 According to Camelleri (13) in the majority of cases where it assisted IDPs, the UNHCR’s role mostly emerged from a preventative rather than humanitarian angle where its aim was to avert additional refugee crises.
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representative, Francis Deng, to “raise awareness of the problem and investigate ways to
improve protection and response” (Deng and Cohen, 2). Deng’s mission resulted in The
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, presented to the Commission on Human
Rights in 1998. These 30 principles, in the form of a non-binding ‘normative framework,’
was intended to “help create the moral and political climate needed for enhanced
international attention and guide the action of states, non-state actors, and international
humanitarian and development agencies, in dealing with crises of internal displacement,”
(Deng and Cohen, 1998a, 12). They were the “first international standards specifically
tailored to the needs of IDPs” (Sanchez-Garzoli, 2004,1), as they “identify [ied]
immediate and long-term needs of the internally displaced in a variety of sectors”
(Vincent and Sorensen, 2001, 9; Deng and Cohen, 1998a, 6-7; Sanchez-Garzoli, 2004, 2).
These Principles, “which are based upon existing international humanitarian law and
human rights instruments are to serve as an international standard to guide governments,
as well as international humanitarian and development agencies in providing assistance
and protection to IDPs (Vieira de Mello, 1998, 11).
Mooney further elaborates on the significance of the Guiding Principles as an
instrument that brought together “the many norms of special importance to the internally
displaced that were previously diffused in an array of different instruments and,
consequently, were not easily accessible or sufficiently understood” (2003a, 163).
Despite the importance of such principles in guiding our understanding of IDPs in
general, such guidelines have not been officially adopted by Lebanon; there has been no
reference to these Guiding Principles either in the national legislation or in any policies of
IDP return.
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However, in the absence of an agency specifically responsible for IDPs and
meeting their needs, “the most effective system at this point is one that builds upon the
capacities of existing agencies” (Cohen and Cuenod, 1995,13). As will be detailed later
in the study, UN agencies play a major role in repatriating IDPs in Lebanon. The
UNHCR, for example, is involved in situations of internal displacement without having a
specific date on IDPs. UNHCR, however, did not become involved in Lebanon’s IDP
problem until the final, 2006 wave of one million Lebanese were forced to leave their
destroyed villages and homes. In addition to providing buses for the return of those who
had fled to Syria, UNHCR continues to provide relief supplies to returnees to South
Lebanon and to the remaining displaced around the country. Its focus is on rebuilding and
relief. The UNDP eventually added a humanitarian emergency response program to its
mandate, through which it responds to IDPs. With the creation of such emergency
response, UNDP began recognizing the continuum of ‘relief to development’ in its
programs and activities, especially when dealing with IDPs.
The UNDP, as will be detailed later in the study, is one of the most active
organizations involved in repatriating IDPs to their areas of origin in Lebanon. It began
its work with IDPs in Lebanon in the early 1990s and continues to play an important role
in emergency response coordination, emergency relief distribution, and recovery
following the latest wave of displacement in the country. United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) provides social services (health care, education, nutrition, etc.) to displaced
women and children. As in the case of the UNDP, UNICEF attempts to combine relief
and development by “training and utilizing people from the community as health
workers, teachers, etc. and by supporting indigenous organizations rather than creating
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new ones” (Cohen and Cuenod, 1995, 23). Such efforts where not limited only to UN
organizations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has expanded its
capacity and allocated a large percentage of its budget to deal with IDPs and civilian
victims of internal or civil conflicts (Cohen and Cuenod, 1995, 16). The ICRC and the
Lebanese Red Cross Society have been and continue to be involved in relief efforts to
IDPs in Lebanon following the numerous conflicts and wars. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) also assists with the transport of displaced persons to
their areas of origin and their reintegration in the communities (Cohen and Cuenod, 1995,
28). IOM is currently coordinating its efforts with UNHCR to ensure the return of
refugees and IDPs following the latest wave of violence in Lebanon.
Responding to IDPs
Systematic information about responses to internally displaced people’s social,
economic and psychological conditions remain scarce and incoherent, despite emergent
concerns about their constantly increasing numbers in an era filled with armed conflict
and ethnic cleansing. The location of IDPs is perceived as the central reason for the slow
development of institutional arrangements for protecting and assisting this population.
Furthermore, the absence of binding international instruments of response to IDPs’ plight
makes such intervention even more challenging. As mentioned above, by crossing
borders, refugees become the responsibility of the international community; IDPs, who
stay within the confinement of their own country, remain the responsibility of their own
government. This means that despite the increasing international awareness to the issue
of IDPs, the role and response of the international community remains limited and can
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only proceed as far as it does not interfere in the national affairs of a state or violate the
state’s sovereignty. Although both refugees and IDPs suffer from the similar problems
and needs, the only way the international community can respond to the plight of the
latter is by invitation from the government and in cooperation with it. “As IDPs remain
within their national boundaries the international community only takes action if the
government is unable or unwilling to assist the displaced population” (Baaroy, 2003, 5).
This is clearly illustrated by the Lebanese case where the government was the main
initiator of the return process and its main watchdog despite its relatively limited human
and financial resources (which will be expanded on later in the study).
In addition to the limited number of official responses, responses to IDPs are
limited by their focus on the emergency nature of the humanitarian situation. Most of the
programs and projects emphasize the provision of basic needs, services and supplies-
mostly shelter, food, water, sanitation, etc. (Baaroy, 2003, 2). This short-term outlook,
with its focus on ‘band-aid measures,’ is further reflected in the emphasis placed on
facilitating the return of displaced persons to their homes and the relative absence of
attention to the process of reintegration, which is necessary for the long-term
sustainability of such return, the stability of the areas, and the security of those returnees
(Bailliet, 2003, 3). Such an outlook dominated the return policy in Lebanon: ‘success’ is
measured by the number of individuals and families who return, with little to no attention
paid to whether such return is permanent and sustainable or whether the returnees are
reintegrating in their communities and villages. More financial and political support is
needed to address the root causes of the problem and evaluate the efforts in development
and peacebuilding that will establish the opportunities for a permanent return and
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peaceful reintegration. This principally humanitarian relief approach has proven to be
ineffective in dealing with the complexity and the seriousness of the IDPs’ plight, as it
does not endorse permanency. The need for the emergence of a longer-term strategy
highlights the notion of a ‘developmental approach’ to assistance. Despite the fact that it
is not a very new idea, NGOs, relief agencies or governmental authorities have not yet
widely or uniformly adopted such an approach. Black notes, “The notion of a
‘developmental’ approach to refugee assistance is not new. However, it is also worth
noting that it has hardly become accepted practice. It could be argued that far from relief
agencies becoming more developmental in their outlook, development agencies have
become more and more concerned about relief’ (1998,175). Short-term humanitarian
solutions are still predominantly and widely adopted in projects of return.
A long-term approach is necessary in order to ensure the successful reintegration
of IDPs—an essential condition for the consolidation of the peace process in countries
tom by years of conflict. It is becoming clearer that to facilitate lasting solutions to the
problem of internal displacement—especially in post-conflict settings which have
suffered years of inter-communal violence and are rife with ethnic, religious, or political
divisions, e.g. Lebanon, Bosnia, and Sudan—solutions for IDPs should be linked to
national dialogue and reconciliation (UNHCR, 2000, 140). To attain this objective, there
must be increased pressure to move beyond the humanitarian understanding of the
problem and to emphasize coordination of activities between the government and
different agencies. The involvement of the different types of organizations—other than
humanitarian ones, such as the UNDP—in projects targeting the IDPs is of utmost
importance.
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For parties and organizations involved in the process of return, it is clear that
“peace and development in post-conflict situations cannot be achieved solely by initiating
modest, short-term projects for vulnerable groups” (UNHCR, 2000, 143). Although the
problem at the outset presents itself as a humanitarian issue, and even though basic needs
and services have to be provided to the displaced, long-lasting solutions cannot be
reached without considering the following concerns: the need to address the structural
problems that gave rise to the conflict in the first place and the need to provide economic,
social, and political assistance to those displaced. Increasingly, the literature is also
emphasizing the importance of linking peacebuilding and development in post-conflict
state-building. However, it is not clear what such an approach would look like: while the
importance of such linkage is gaining prominence, no model has been put forward or
applied. The case of Lebanon further accentuates the importance of such a
comprehensive, long-term outlook approach by focusing on one aspect of a country’s
rebuilding process: the problem of the displaced. It will propose a model for integrating
peacebuilding and development, while highlighting the challenges that such an approach
presents—both theoretically and in practice.
Inter-Agency Coordination
One of the most important challenges to a long-term comprehensive approach to
IDPs is the lack of coordination between the different actors dealing with the issue.
Vincent and Sorensen elaborate on this issue, noting that many intergovernmental
organizations, NGOs, and local actors work with the internally displaced, “each
approaching the issue according to its own mandate. While all are contributing to the
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response, none are meeting 100% of the needs of the internally displaced” (2001, 276). In
the case of Lebanon, such coordination existed at the outset of the response: meetings
were held regularly between the different agencies involved; villages were divided into
clusters and each agency was assigned a cluster in order to avoid replication of initiatives
in one village or area to the detriment or overlooking of another. Such organization of
efforts was both necessary, due to the large number of affected towns and villages, and
was possible, according to the ERR director, because of the availability of funds
(Interview, MECC, ERR Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003).
In addition to streamlining the response, such coordination entailed the sharing of
expertise between the different organizations involved in the process of return (Cohen
and Cuenod, 1995, 30). The Brahimi Report further expanded on the necessity of
cooperation between the different agencies and suggested that, “coherence, integration,
and coordination among all actors needs to be carried out at both the analytical stage
(information gathering, risk assessments, evaluation and impact assessment) and at the
implementation stage (engaging local, regional and international actors)” (Carment and
Schnabel, 2001, 5). One of the governments’ responsibilities must be to formulate a
national policy on internal displacement, in which it clearly divides the responsibilities
between the different government departments, as well as advances mechanisms for
coordination among them and between government agencies and local and international
organizations/partners (Mooney, 2004, 2). While this was the case at the onset of the
response in Lebanon, the enormity of the problem, the weakness of the government, the
lack of sustainable sources of funding, and the politicization of the problem have made
such coordination and its maintenance challenging.
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Moreover, in addition to coordination, it is also necessary for these organizations
involved in a number of different initiatives to support participatory methodologies and
encourage local capacities in order to bring about changes in their responses and “shift
from short-term humanitarian relief towards longer-term investment in community
development, sustainable livelihoods, conflict resolution,” and peacebuilding (Vincent
and Sorensen, 2001, 277). That some of the IDPs’ needs are not met by the programs and
projects implemented in the areas of return has to do with the fact that, “too often IDPs
don’t have a say in the decisions that affect their lives” (Mooney, 2004, 3). Therefore
another responsibility of the national government is to ensure that IDPs’ views and needs
are taken into account at all stages of the process, starting with the design of programs, to
their implementation, and until their problem is resolved (Mooney, 2004, 3). An
increasing acknowledgment of the roles and responses of the internally displaced
themselves, with regard to return and reintegration, has necessitated a more
developmental, flexible, participatory, and contextual response to their problem. This has
led, in recent years, to increased coordination of efforts between the international
community and local/national authorities. (These issues are presented in details later in
this chapter.) While such local capacities were not seriously accounted for at the start of
the process of return in Lebanon, they began to occupy a central role in the response to
internally displaced people, especially amongst the international and non-governmental
communities. Most of the program directors I interviewed emphasized the necessity and
importance of such local participation and illustrated the successes of their programs in
areas where they based their work on local needs assessment, participation, and
involvement.
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Preferred Solutions to Forced Migration
The literature on conflict-induced displacement reveals three durable solutions to
the problem: resettlement/integration in the areas of displacement; flight across the
border (i.e. becoming refugees) or resettlement in other areas; and voluntary repatriation
(or return to their place of origin) (Stein and Cuny, 1991).16 Although considered the
most preferable and optimal solution to displacement, repatriation has garnered the least
scholarly inquiry, while the bulk of the literature focuses primarily on the legal and
institutional aspects of the problem.
That repatriation is the “best and most durable solution” to displacement crises
has dominated the policies of government and international organizations in the field of
forced migration studies (Harrell-Bond, 1989). Defined as a right by which an individual
can go to his/her place of origin and from where he was forced to flee, repatriation is
based on the belief that return contributes to development and peacebuilding and signals
the end of conflict; legitimizes the post-conflict political order and democratic processes;
and contributes to the economic recovery of war-tom societies (UNHCR, 1997, 159-164).
Nevertheless, it is important to account for the positive role development and
peacebuilding play in bringing about IDP return. As the case of Lebanon illustrates,
massive and diverse efforts are needed in order to restore peace, and development in
areas of displacement encourages and facilitates return. Development entails an array of
activities including: reconstruction of homes; restoration of legal and political systems;
16 Section V of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement addresses return, resettlement and reintegration in details and “emphasizes the responsibility of the national authorities to establish the necessary conditions” to enable and facilitate these processes and ensuring “secure environment in the areas of return and resettlement” (Sanchez-Garzoli, 2004, 1).
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rebuilding economic life; rejuvenating social networks and institutions; rehabilitation of
basic infrastructures and basic survival needs of the society (i.e. health, education,
services, water, sanitation systems, banking system, roads, telecommunication, etc.); and
reconciliation (Francis, 2002, 36).
Repatriation or return is not only the most viable, ideal, and common solution to
the growing problem of internal displacement; it is also the most technically difficult to
implement. Such difficulty can be attributed to numerous factors, most important of
which is the limited attention span and resources of both the national governments and
the international community. Successful repatriation requires reintegration, which in turn
necessitates a long-term commitment to physical reconstruction, political, economic and
social rehabilitation, rebuilding community networks, restoring sources of livelihood, and
re-establishing the rule of law. Merely paying the expenses of transportation to take these
displaced back home or providing returnees, a minimum of material aid, does not sustain
this process. Rebuilding post-conflict societies is not an easy task: it goes beyond
reconstructing buildings and physical structures (development) to include social,
psychological and mental structures (peacebuilding). Such a process is particularly
challenging when pre-war situations cannot be re-instituted and when memories (of war,
displacement, and suffering) cannot be erased (Oberg, 1996, 26).
Reconstructing war-torn societies means reconstructing 1) human beings, soul and bodies, 2) social structures, 3) culture, 4) environment, and 5) a peace culture of reconciliation, repentance, forgiveness, respect, healing of collectively and individually acting out the sorrow, learning to live with it and simultaneously moving toward a vision of peaceful existence, either together or as good neighbors (Oberg, 1996, 26).
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Repatriation, i.e. the physical movement of displaced people back to their areas or
homes of origin, thus, involves more than mere relocation, as is illustrated clearly in the
case of Lebanon and in other post-conflict settings around the world. For it to be
successful, reintegration of this group of people must take place at the social, economic,
and political levels of community life. Such a reintegration process has proven to be very
challenging because, although some scholars and practitioners believe that IDPs “have
returned to a social structure with which they are already familiar” (Taylor, 1976, 225),
the reality is much more complex: both communities and returnees generally changed
during the period of displacement. Reintegration is thus a challenging and complex
process that requires the assistance of both governments and local and international
organizations.
The complexity of reintegration is illustrated by the different understandings of
the concept: to some it corresponds with readjustment (Taylor, 1976), to others with
rehabilitation (Dei, 1991), and yet others believe it is a process of re-adaptation and re
absorption. While each of those definitions presents an important facet of the
reintegration concept, they do not pay attention to the changes that took place both within
the displaced and resident communities during displacement. Each definition also does
not promote changes in living and working conditions. The complex process of
reintegration, while entailing the reinstating of an attachment and identification with the
place of former residence, should also advocate adapting to the changed circumstances
and state of affairs in order to make sense of and improve people’s livelihood.
Ultimately, reintegration is a necessary condition for establishing sustainable
return and lasting peace. It reflects the degree of the returnee’s satisfaction with his
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economic and social living standards and success, his psychological well-being, and
political situation. Chimni describes reintegration as, “a process which enables formerly
displaced people and other members of their community to enjoy a progressively greater
degree of physical, social, legal, and material security” (2003, 200-1). Furthermore, for
reintegration to take place, returnees must reconcile with the residents and restore or
build constructive relationships with the communities to which they return; “repatriation
could not be successful without effective reconciliation” (Landgren, 1998). Years of
displacement and an inability to overcome the traumas of conflict and of dislocation
makes such a process of reconciliation (i.e.; the consolidation of constructive social
relations between different groups of the population) much more difficult. What is
important to keep in mind, and is demonstrated by the Lebanese experience, is that such
reintegration is a complex, non-linear, multi-leveled process (social, educational,
economic, political, psychological, and legal) that takes place in the peacebuilding as
well as development contexts (Kingma, 2000).
After reviewing the literature on the topic of displacement and repatriation, it is
safe to conclude that return and reintegration have not really been a central concern of
scholastic study. The chief focus has been on the length of displacement and the process
of returning home, without much discussion of how to sustain such return or what to do
to assist returnees once home. This has left the local and international community, the
government, and local and international non-governmental organizations active in return
areas, with no guidelines on how to bring about viable, integrated, and peaceful
community development to return areas, or areas in transition. With escalation in civil
conflicts in the post-Cold War era and the diverse challenges posed by refugee and
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displaced populations on local and host governments, more academic books and articles
have begun to deal with the aftermath of return to areas of origin. Most of the literature
on this topic, however, is in the form of UN and other organization documents in which
the latter describe their experiences and programs in post-conflict state-building, provide
some lessons learned, and recommend return initiatives and processes to sustain such
return.
Challenges Faced during Displacement
While each situation of displacement presents unique conditions and obstacles,
common challenges of all IDPs include ensuring safety; finding food and shelter;
rebuilding one’s social and economic life; and adapting to new realities (Vincent and
Sorensen, 2001, 265). These are met, to different degrees and in different ways, by
internally displaced people—depending on the situation and conditions they face in the
areas of displacement.
Receiving Assistance: Unlike refugees who mainly stay in camps in areas of
resettlement, internal displacement manifests itself in different areas. In some countries,
like Rwanda and Sudan, IDPs crowd together in camps in dire conditions and receive
humanitarian assistance; in other countries like Lebanon, they live in overcrowded
conditions in apartments or abandoned and damaged buildings with no electricity, water,
and other basic needs. For these displaced, unlike those living in camps, assistance is not
available. In countries like Colombia, displaced people merge into the community and
adapt to their new lives, largely to the extent that they cannot be distinguished from the
locals. Still, in other places, IDPs live with relatives and family members, with whom
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they attain their security and access to the community without being identified as
outsiders (Deng, 1995, 3).
When researching IDPs, one cannot help but note that in most of the cases they
desire to remain unidentified and that they tend to flee to areas where people from similar
ethnic and religious backgrounds are located. This poses a challenge to the ability of
providing them with assistance and for ascertaining their exact numbers. Moreover,
different living conditions present diverse challenges for the displaced, as well as for
those attempting to delineate effective solutions to the former’s problems. The case of
Lebanon exemplifies this challenge: IDPs in Lebanon have never stayed in camps; they
have fled their areas of origin and resided in abandoned partially destroyed buildings,
illegally occupied apartments and commercial centers, and, after more than twenty years
of displacement in some cases, have assimilated with their environments. This has not
only made it difficult to account for all IDPs and estimate of the size of this population,
but it also made it impossible to provide them with humanitarian assistance throughout
their years of displacement. In some situations, however—i.e. during short-term waves of
displacement, including the Israeli attacks of 1996 and the war of 2006—most of the
displaced who took refuge in public schools and parks received some kind of assistance
(food, mattresses, sheets, etc.) from governmental and non-governmental, local and
international agencies.
Special Needs: The living situation is not the only problem facing displaced
people. Francis Deng, after studying different cases of internal displacement, concluded
that,
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Even in situations where internally displaced are intermingled with other populations, IDPs often have specific and unique needs that call for attention. A lot face emotional trauma associated with displacement and are in need of counseling. Despite their assimilation in the community, they are often perceived and treated as a marginalized group, face unemployment and have access to only inadequate educational facilities” (1995, 5).
Few would contest that IDPs in Lebanon suffer from inferior living conditions and
livelihoods and that they do not have the same opportunities as residents of the cities or
towns where they have relocated. Furthermore, the emotional and psychological distress
experienced by IDPs often became more pervasive during the process of return,
especially since counseling services were (and are still) not available to this population.
Relationship with Host Community: In addition to the impacts displacement has
on the IDPs themselves, the communities—both those from which they fled and those
where they settled—also suffer from disruption and long-term political, social, and
economic consequences (Deng and Cohen, 1998a, 2). IDPs primarily relocate to cities
and thus comprise a wave of urbanization, which might have serious implications on
national development, the economy, and social issues. Such unbalanced development of
urban centers, to the detriment of rural areas and communities, makes the return process
in Lebanon even more challenging and complicated. Furthermore, the country as a whole
suffers from the government’s inability to solve this national problem in order to advance
the process of national reconciliation and ultimately achieve economic, social and
political stability and development. The link between solving the IDP problem and
reconciliation is detailed later in the chapter.
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Obstacles Facing Return
In order to be successfully implemented, repatriation should start after the factors
contributing to the displacement are addressed. That is, the process should occur when
stability and security are regained. Unfortunately, in a rush to return IDPs to their homes,
governments and organizations tend to begin the process too early, before the root causes
for displacement are identified and/or addressed. The fact that repatriation often takes
place amid destruction and conflict is a major challenge to successful implementation of
return. Repatriation in such conditions is almost wholly unsuccessful and dangerous, as
illustrated by numerous accounts of vengeance killings that take place in those areas upon
return. (Examples of such acts will be further elaborated in the next chapter).
Many factors play a role in the decision to return home and the process of
reintegration in a community once called home. In addition to the length of the
displacement period, return is dependent on financial assistance, security, and economic
considerations. Reintegration is even more demanding and takes more time. It depends
on the attitudes of the returnees, the reception they get from those who chose to stay in
the area or village, economic conditions (whether they are able to find jobs and sustain
their families), availability of financial assistance to help them re-start their lives and
rehabilitate their homes, and the solutions put forth to address the factors which led to
displacement in the first place. These are only few of the aspects that, if positively dealt
with, would contribute to successful reintegration.
Long-term Displacement: Returning home is the final phase of displacement
according to Cuny (1991). Return often comes after a long period of dislocation where
those displaced have suffered from insecurity, unemployment, lack of access to
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resources, and substandard living conditions (Deng, 1993, Cuny, 1991). The length of
displacement can be a serious obstacle to return: when the period has extended beyond a
single generation, there is less willingness to return home. “Contrary to common belief,
people may not necessarily return home once the main causes for displacement have been
removed. Many have constructed new houses and built new livelihoods in their place of
‘exile’ and find it impossible or unattractive to give up what has become their home.
Others who do return find that home has become unfamiliar” (Vincent and Sorensen,
2001,281).
The case of Lebanon illustrates the difficulties and challenges associated with
long-term displacement (lasting more than a decade in most cases) and its effects on the
reintegration process. A majority of Lebanese IDPs have assimilated to their host
communities, in most cases finding a source of income to sustain their families. Their
children (some of whom were too young to remember fleeing their areas of origin or
were bom during displacement) are enrolled in schools and have built their social
networks in these new areas. In addition to these aforementioned factors that weigh on
the decision to return, the disconnect from the village and its residents following conflict
and massacres also makes the decision to return harder.
Financial support: In most of the cases, returnees go back to devastated villages
or towns that are undergoing rehabilitation, but still suffer infrastructural destruction and
a lack of utilities (electricity, water). The money that is allocated to IDPs by the
government and the international community in order to rebuild and reconstruct their
homes and lives is often not enough, and IDPs end up for living in unfinished houses.
The dearth of funds and the extensive pressure placed on government agencies by the
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demands of villages experiencing return have led to slower-than-hoped-for changes. In
addition to poor living conditions, the areas of displacement (and return) suffer from lack
of economic and social development. In most cases, the agricultural capacity of these
villages has been chipped away by the war; schools and religious shrines destroyed; and
hospitals, clinics, and community centers devastated.
Economic development: One of the most pressing obstacles facing return is the
lack of economic development. Such development is believed to facilitate economic
growth and lead to social stability. This is important because, as the case of Lebanon
clearly illustrates, returnees will not resettle in their communities unless they are able to
sustain themselves (Deng, 1995, 9). In order for repatriation to succeed, and for displaced
to actually want to return, implementation of economic-readjustment initiatives should be
a priority in governmental and organizational agendas. The UNHCR, in its State o f World
Refugees Report, made the case for a systematic linkage between repatriation and
development assistance: it is a precondition for return, as it helps returnees and
communities cope with the difficult transition (2000, 114). Such development assistance,
however, should entail both short and long efforts and projects; it should strive to create
employment opportunities, provide income generating opportunities, and restore basic
infrastructure. Such projects would “help stimulate the recovery and reconstruction of
communities” (Deng, 1995, 10).
Sustainable return: Return requires more than simple development however. In
addition to development needs, repatriation is closely linked with the absence of violence
and the elimination of the causes of conflict that led to displacement in the first place
(Deng and Cohen, 1998a, 11). Thus, peacebuilding is an important feature of a successful
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return process as it helps build confidence, trust, and reconciliation among returnees and
between them and their communities. Displacement is often the result of violent actions
by one group or community against the other; in the case of Lebanon, it was the result of
violent conflicts and massacres between residents of the same or neighboring villages.
For this reason, sustainable return is dependent upon building peaceful relations between
the members of the community—between returnees and residents—and reinstating trust.
Security: Another obstacle for return is security concerns. In order for the
displaced to repatriate and reintegrate into their communities, they must feel secure upon
return. It is important for returnees to be able to “recommence their lives without fear” in
secure and safe areas (Deng, 1995, 8). Most of those who do not return base their
decision on “lack of confidence in the durability of peace, sometimes coupled with a
reluctance to return to the area where they had experienced terror” (Mooney, 2003b).
With the absence of legal instruments to deal with the rights and protection of internally
displaced persons, the government and organizations overseeing the return of IDPs
should see to the protection of returnees from reprisal, as well as their rights to reclaim
their land and homes (which, in most cases, are occupied by others). If absent, these
factors act as obstacles to reintegration and return (Deng, 1995, 4). While on the one
hand, returnees should feel secure and welcomed, residents should be assured that acts of
vengeance and retaliation will not take place. One case in Lebanon highlights the
difficulty in achieving such security without engaging communities in peacebuilding: a
man whose family was murdered by Druze went back to the village and murdered a
number of its residents in an act of retribution. This incident delayed the wider return
process in the village and kept the Druze resident community on edge.
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Push/pull factors: As has been mentioned above, repatriation requires the
availability of certain conditions favorable for return in areas of origin. The absence of
such dynamics from those areas and their accessibility in areas of displacement or
resettlement present serious obstacles to this constructive solution (i.e. return)—a
solution that signifies the overcoming of a history of instability and violence. A common
model used in migration studies, by which we can account for those factors and their
impacts on repatriation, is the push/pull model. As violations and insecurities (economic,
political, and social) are among the factors that pushed displaced to flee their homes
originally, pull factors (incentives to return) bringing them back are those that redress
those problems. The latter include a range of issues from economic services (e.g.,
employment), social services (e.g., housing, schools, health care), and political and
security factors (Cuny, 1991; Hakovirta, 1986). While those pull factors would lead to
better chances of return to displaced areas, their availability in areas of displacement
might counter-balance the desire to repatriate; the displaced might decide to stay in their
‘new homes,’ regardless of the conditions back home. Ultimately, pull factors must be
greater than push factors in order for return to occur.
While all these issues are important obstacles to return, the lack of “credible
information on the numbers and conditions of IDPs,” which is due to the absence of
registration systems, is a major impediment to the repatriation process. Such information
is “essential to designing effective programs for the returnees” (Sanchez-Garzoli, 2004,
7; Mooney, 2004, 2). Such systems also make possible the involvement of displaced in
their process of reintegration and repatriation, which is essential to success. The more
returnees participate in planning and managing of their repatriation, the more sustainable
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these returns are (Sanchez-Garzoli, 2004, 4) “Efforts must be made to proactively seek
out the views of the displaced and to take them into account in the design of policies,
laws, and programs to protect and assist them” (Sanchez-Garzoli, 2004, 9-10).
Development
Approaches and Theories of Development
Western-oriented theories have dominated development studies for decades. A
review of the literature on development demonstrates that the leading theories
underpinning scholarly analysis and development agencies’ agendas are those of
modernization and dependency; both of these theories reflect the tendency to understand
development in economic terms. Modernization theory posits that there is an “original
state of backwardness or underdevelopment characterized by, among other things, a low
rate of economic growth” (Ake, 1996, 9-11). The way out of this underdeveloped stage is
to adopt appropriate strategies in order to become more developed; or rather, to become
more Western.17 Dependency theory, also based on Western development model, holds
that the periphery (underdeveloped or developing countries) is dependent upon the center
(the industrialized or developed countries). The theory asserts that the process of
underdevelopment at the periphery is maintained as a precondition for development in the
center.18 Hence, it becomes clear that “development theories were originally dominated
17 For more on the modernization theory o f development, see Ronald Chilcote,Theories of Development and Underdevelopment (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); Brian Smith,Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996); M. Shamsul Haque, Restructuring Development Theories and Policies: A Critical Study (Albany: State University of New York, 1999) 18 For more on dependency theory see Andre Gunder Frank,Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Rune Skarstein,Development Theory: A Guide to
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by economists and focused on the state and macro phenomena. Social aspects were
secondary to the goal of economic growth and transformation” (Sano, 2000, 739).
In the 1970s, a paradigm shift in development research began to emerge. Long
dominated by a macro approach, the field shifted toward a more multi-disciplinary and
micro-orientation in the hope of better understanding and responding to an increasingly
complex world. It was not until the 1980s and 1990s, however, that opposition to the
exclusive focus on economics fully crystallized. Traditional approaches to development
were being criticized not only for being Western-centric, but for ignoring local cultural
contexts and needs—a major reason for their failure to bring about growth in developing
areas (Amin, 1989; Mehmet, 1995; Kothari, 1988).
The new challenges brought about by post-conflict areas have exacerbated the
problem: development must be approached in a more comprehensive way in order to take
into account all the other factors contributing to instability and underdevelopment—not
merely economic ones. Consequently, a literature on alternative theories of development,
critical of the conventional understandings of development theories and prioritizing social
and community participatory development (Pieterse, 2001; McGee, 2002) has begun to
emerge. It posits that while the traditionally dominant theories of development are
characterized by ‘broad explanatory frameworks’ and reflect the trajectory for the
developing countries in the footsteps of the developed ones, they leave much out, such as
the local contexts, history, needs of indigenous people, culture, etc. (Pieterse, 2001). Such
aspects are of particular importance when devising strategies to respond to humanitarian
Some Unfashionable Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions (London: Sage Publications, 2001); Ronaldo Munck and Denis O’Hearn (eds.), Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm (London: Zed Books, 1999).
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problems, such as internal displacement. Sustainable, long-term development, especially
in this complex era, must arise from both endogenous and indigenous perspectives
(Rahman, 1993; Tucker, 1999), while meeting the needs of the people it is targeting.
Sustainable development, then, focuses on the human being, placing him or her at the
center, and allows for local contexts to influence the chosen path to development (Banuri
et. al., 1994, 7).
While economically-oriented development plays a major role in post-war country
reconstruction, the focus of this research is on human and community development,
which are gaining prominence in the field and which provide a lens through which groups
such as internally displaced people can be more accurately heard and studied. “Today,
development is more and more understood as sustainable human development,
addressing the human being in relation with both resource management and
participation” (Hamm, 2001, 1010). Peter Uvin further noted the attention increasingly
placed on the issues of “empowerment, social cooperation, equity, dignity, security, and
sustainability” on the development community’s agenda (1998, 105). Reports published
by the UNICEF(Adjustment with a Human Face) the World Bank {Development Report),
and UNDP {Human Development Report)19 emphasized the fact that the core of
development should come from below and should take into consideration the needs of the
people as articulated by the people targeted by the development community. This is
increasingly reflected in practice through programs and initiatives, such as those dealing
with the IDPs in Lebanon.
19 The UNDP has published the Human Development Report (HDR) yearly since 1990.
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The UNDP is a strong advocate of the new concept that defines ‘human
development’ as, “the process of enlarging the range of people’s choices—increasing
their opportunities for education, health care, income and employment, and covering the
full range of human choices from a sound physical environment to economic and political
freedoms” (HDR 1992,2; Hamm, 2001,1010). The goal of such development is not
merely to increase national incomes, but to “create an environment in which people can
develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs
and interests” (UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/hd/). One of the most important characteristics
of human and community development projects is that they are devised in a way that will
sustain their benefits even beyond their implementation period—i.e. after government,
local, and international organizations complete their mandates. This is an essential quality
of projects effectively dealing with vulnerable groups, like IDPs, and their repatriation to
precarious areas.
Another central issue in human development, which is crucial to the repatriation
process, is people’s participation in the process beyond their role as “beneficiaries” (Kyi,
1995, 12). As this research shows, however, such a participatory approach is easier
described in theory than it is implemented in practice. While all project directors
interviewed in Lebanon emphasized the importance of such local involvement, and in
some cases provided examples of initiatives in which such participation occurred, it
became clear that this integral aspect of social development theory has not yet been
effectively operationalized. Pugh rightfully observes, “neither donors nor implementing
agencies and NGOs engage host populations formally and extensively in decision making
for needs assessment, project design, and project evaluation... There is little effort by
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outside agents to facilitate the imaging of a future by local communities” (2000, 127-
128).
My observations in the field in Lebanon and Pugh’s commentary based on his
research on Bosnia-Herzegovina attest to the fact that such limitation in participatory
approach is a reality in various post-conflict contexts. However, one cannot deny that
efforts are being made, on both theoretical and practical levels, to find ways in which
public participation can be incorporated into the planning and implementation of projects.
Such inclusion not only allows for a feeling of ownership of the process, but leads to
initiatives that are more accountable to the needs of the local communities (Pugh, 2000,
129). Allowing displaced to participate in the decisions and mechanisms that affect their
lives, for example, empowers them and gives them control of their future. Furthermore, it
involves all levels and groups in society (women, children, youth, etc.) in the
determination of their own needs and the strengthening of the community’s indigenous
capacities. Such feelings of ownership and involvement lie at the foundation of
sustainability.
In addition to a sustainable human dimension, development has increasingly
integrated a human rights component. Advocates of a human rights-based approach
(HRBA) to development call for the integration of “norms, standards and principles of
the international human rights system into the plans, policies, and processes of
development” (UNHCR, http://www.unhchr.ch/development/approaches-04.htmlV That
both human development and human rights are people-centered and share the same
concerns for promoting and realizing indivisible social, economic and political rights
such as security, adequate standard of living, health, work opportunities, and education
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among others, make such incorporation not only important but, to a certain extent,
inevitable. This is especially true in an era where the economic, political and social
aspects of life are interdependent (Hamm, 2001,1005). While there is no universal set of
criteria for a human-rights based approach to development, its basic characteristic
revolves around the promotion of sustainability and empowerment of the people
themselves in the formulation of policy and programs. In other words, this approach
emphasizes the right of people to participate in the determination of the course of their
own development and hence advances a bottom-up rather than a top-down policy; i.e. it
endorses development from below (Hamm, 2001, 1019; Sano, 2000, 737-8).
Amartya Sen further elaborates on an important aspect of human rights-based
development, stating that, “without ignoring the importance of economic growth, we
must look well beyond it.. .Development has to be more concerned with enhancing the
lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy” (1999) UNDP is emerging as one of the
leading forces for the HRBA to development, stating its importance: “at times when
human rights are endangered, such as in conflict and peace-building situations and in
socio-political transitions” (Hamm, 2001, 1017). However, the extent to which such a
human rights based approach to development remains theoretical or has been effectively
translated into practice is not clear. While the human rights approach to development,
especially in relations to issues of displacement, is gaining prominence in the literature,
according to Hamm, “the conceptual framework of human rights approach to
development needs to be supplemented by a practical framework that proposes adequate
steps to be taken. This covers planning, implementation, and evaluation of development
according to human rights standards and criteria” (Hamm, 2001, 1022).
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Concomitant with the notion of human development and a human-rights based
approach to development--and of particular importance to the population under study in
this research (IDPs)—human security has gained greater recognition since the end of the
Cold War, the increase in intrastate conflicts, and the rising impact of those conflicts on
the civilian populations. It places individuals at the center of security considerations and
its ultimate objective is to ensure “freedom from fear and freedom from want” (UNIDIR,
http://www.unidir.org/html/en/human_security.html). Human security is “widely used to
describe the complex of interrelated threats associated with civil war, genocide and the
displacement of populations” (Human Security Center, 2005,
http://www.humansecuritycentre.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=109). In
one of the most comprehensive books on contemporary security dilemmas facing the
international system and states today, Sean Kay rightfully identifies the problem of
internal displacement as a major challenge or threat to human security (2006, 277). The
case of Lebanon further illustrates the close link between human security and
development in countries that have suffered from years of conflict, “where the minimal
conditions of human security for individuals and communities are not met, sustainable
human development is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve” (Ball, 2001).
A people-centered approach to development and a concern with security which
puts individuals and communities at the center are the focus of this research. I believe
that such community/human/social development contains within it the elements
necessary to respond to post-conflict situations and the potential to integrate
peacebuilding. As the case of Lebanon also reveals, the focus on the population
(expanding its capabilities, choices and opportunities) leads to the qualitative change
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necessary to bring societies devastated by years of war, violence and displacement back
on their feet (Korten, 1997).
National Human Development Reports
In addition to its annual global human development reports, which greatly
affected the overall thinking on development approaches and activities, the UNDP has
published numerous national human development reports that highlight such
development as operationalized according to particular national experiences and
priorities. Since 1997, amidst Lebanon’s reconstruction process, the UNDP Lebanon
country office, in collaboration with local experts from civil society, has produced three
such national reports (www.undp.org.lb). Before describing these reports and their
assessment of the situation of human development in Lebanon, it is important to note that
since the publication of the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990, Lebanon was
classified as medium-level human development. According to the 2005 HDI, Lebanon
ranked 81 among 177 countries (UNDP, HDR2005).
The first national report, A Profile o f Sustainable Human Development in
Lebanon, was prepared in 1997 as part of a wider effort in the context of a joint project
with the Council for Development and reconstruction. It aimed at “operationalizing
sustainable human development through raising awareness and promoting a process of
policy dialogue and action towards building broad national consensus on a strategy and
approach to development that is people-centered and sustainable over time” (Mountain,
1997). The report examined the inadequate state of sustainable human development in the
country with regard to a number of issues and sectors, including one of the most pressing
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national concern issue since 1992, that of internal displacement. According to the report,
the return policy and response to IDPs have failed to adopt a human development
orientation, which could explain the low rate of success in repatriating and reintegrating
IDPs in their areas of origins (NHDR, 1997, www.undp.org.lb). The limited, short-term
approach aiming at repatriating the displaced in an expedient fashion is to blame for such
an ineffective solution to the problem. There is need for long-term strategies that go
beyond compensation, to provide proper and sufficient incentives, relating to human and
social conditions, in order to encourage return. Such a long-term approach also has to
deal with the root cause of displacement in order to find lasting solutions to the problem.
In terms of local participation, an important aspect of human development, the report
noted the effort by the government to encourage such involvement through the formation
of village committees. However, it outlined the need for additional measures by which
these groups could exercise their power more efficiently (UNDP, www.undp.org.lb).
Today, ten years later, the need for the return policy’s re-orientation toward long
term, people-centered sustainable development is even more pronounced, although only
minimal steps have been made in this direction, as will be elaborated in subsequent
chapters (NHDR, 1997, www.undp.org.lb). The second national report, Youth and
Development, published in 1998 painted an even bleaker picture of the state of human
development in the country. Although focusing particularly on the subject of youth, it
provided a national perspective on human development, based on the country’s
experiences. The report outlined the continued efforts on rebuilding physical
infrastructure, but to the detriment of human resources and social aspects of development.
Nevertheless, it correctly called for a balance to be struck in order for initiatives to be
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sustainable on the long-run and to have actual impacts on the lives of people (NHDR,
1997, www.undp.org.lb).
Development in Post-conflict Context
A post-conflict country like Lebanon, i.e. one “in which open warfare has come to
an end” (Junne and Verkoren, 2005,1), presents tremendous challenges to the
development process. The complexities of the situation render regular approaches to
development, whether economic or human, by themselves inefficient in bringing about
positive change and progress. For this reason, the focus of this research is on post-conflict
development, which “refers to the multiple processes of reconstruction on social,
political, economic, cultural, and physical levels of society” (UNDP, HDR 1990). As
discussed above, such development aims at increasing the economic growth of a state as
well as promoting human development on all those levels. Hence, in the aftermath of
wars, development is, in fact, a complex concept that strives to help people achieve
productive lives and access resources and rights. It is through this lens that a synthesis of
the different types of development described above and a more complex response to the
problem of internal displacement, specifically the IDP return policy in Lebanon, can be
examined.
The most important condition for post-war development to be successful is for it
to be defined and guided by the needs and culture of the local context in which it takes
place. Garcetti and Gruber illustrated this ‘central tenet’ of development with the
example of Eritrea, warning against such process “be dictated by external actors whose
definitions of appropriate initiatives and their implementation may not be guided by the
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best interests” of the targeted community (2000, 227). In societies emerging from many
years of violent strife, development programs need to be internally defined in order for
them to have impact on the ground and accurately reflect the needs and aspirations of the
local population (Garcetti and Gruber, 2000, 230). However, while “adopting standard,
one-size-fits all development policies is counterproductive in post-conflict context”
(Junne and Verkoren, 2005, 307), there are certain criteria that do and should define post-
conflict development work in general.
First, economic development does continue to occupy an important aspect of the
process, but rather than being defined by mere economic growth, it specifically
“addresses the grievances of different groups, allows compromise between contending
factions, and offers sufficiently attractive alternatives to the main opponents” (Junne and
Verkoren, 2005, 2). Economic development, in such contexts, aims at paving the way for
a common, peaceful future by giving the different groups in the community something to
work on together (Junne and Verkoren, 2005, 2). Post-war economic development also
refers to the daunting task of reconstruction after years of war have left behind a great
amount of physical and infrastructural destruction. However, as Brown insightfully warns
us, mere rebuilding might reinforce the same structures that led to the war in the first
place. Junne and Verkoren summarize his point, “reconstruction and development of
infrastructure after war is not a mere technical task but requires a deep understanding of
socioeconomic and physical elements as they relate to long-term needs of a country and
its community” (2005, 14). For this reason, such projects need to be done with broad
public participation and include projects that create bridges between people and
communities. Economic development after wars also should aim at improving standards
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of living by creating jobs and opportunities for people and communities devastated by the
conflict and investing in social infrastructure such as education and health (Jeong, 2005,
133). Projects such as production cooperatives (agricultural, textile, carpentry, etc.),
micro-credit, and small-scale agricultural production are but a few examples of job
creation (Jeong, 2005,142-143).
Second, any post-conflict development should have a security component to it.
Moreover, as the case of Lebanon demonstrates, security is a prerequisite to development
and affects the latter’s prospects. Increasing the presence of a state security apparatus in
areas that suffered from intense violence is an important incentive for people to return to
their homes and invest in such devastated regions. The dispatched forces ensure the
disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, as well as their peaceful
reintegration into the communities (Salomons, 2005). Unfortunately, because fear and
mistrust are not easily eliminated, incidents of vengeance might occur and impede any
attempts at stability. However, the existence of a strong political and social will,
enforcement capabilities, and economic resources can lead to a peaceful society
(Salomons, 2005).
Third, post-conflict development also entails the building and developing of state
and local institutions. With years of war leading to the collapse or weakening of the state,
rebuilding these official institutions is a necessary task in order to put the country back on
its feet and to ensure citizens’ protection (Junne and Verkoren, 2005). Furthermore, the
creation of local governance and institutions, such as village committees, associations,
councils, etc., in which all factions in a community are represented, is also important.
Strong and representative institutions are necessary because, “the participation of local
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populations in rebuilding their communities gives them a sense of regaining control over
their own lives” (Jeong, 2005, 139).
Fourth, due to the devastating impacts of war on social institutions, post-conflict
development must include the revival and reform of education and health care systems.
This entails the rebuilding of schools, hospitals, and clinics in the different areas
devastated by wars. Degu notes the importance of reforming educational curricula, as its
content does affect the attitudes and ideas prevalent among future generations and the
community (2005). For example, in multicultural communities, there is need for a
curriculum that encourages respect and diversity and emphasizes peacebuilding and
conflict resolution.
Fifth, such a process must include the return and reintegration of the displaced
population. Mentioning this aspect as a fifth point in the process does not suggest in any
way that it is the least important. To the contrary, it is vital for the success of any post
conflict development and to the stability and national reconciliation of societies emerging
from conflict. However, as the remainder of the study will show, the success of any
return program is closely linked to each of the above mentioned processes either as a
necessary condition for such return or as elements of sustainability. The reintegration of
IDPs upon their return to their areas of origin requires their involvement in “productive
activities” (Jeong, 2005, 134), which encourage cooperation between them and the
resident communities.
All these aspects of a post-conflict development framework are tightly linked
together and embody the conditions necessary for progress in the aftermath of war. At the
foundation is the link between economic, social and human development; a long-term
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vision; cooperation between local and international actors; and the correlation between
development and peace, which is elaborated on below and throughout the study. At this
stage of the research, I will present the generic framework by which I examine the return
of IDPs in Lebanon, the specific activities in dealing with the Lebanese post-conflict
situation are elaborated on at length in different parts of this research.
Development in Practice: Responding to Post-conflict Areas
While in theory, the shift from a purely economic understanding of development
to one that combines economic, political, social and human factors has gained
prominence in the academic and organizational literature, it is making slower headway in
practice. This is due in part to the uncertainty of what such projects entail and the longer-
term commitment they require. However, more often we see a pattern evolving within
development agencies away from traditional short-term relief activities aiming at
alleviating symptoms, to a greater involvement towards institutional and policy changes
via attaching more attention to the fundamental causes of the problems at hand (Korten,
1997). It is becoming a norm, especially when dealing with post-conflict areas, that
“long-term development strategies are needed to bring lasting transformation of
economic” and social structures (Jeong, 2005, 123).
As stated above, post-conflict areas necessitate projects that include humanitarian
relief aspects as well as long-term development and peacebuilding ones to reduce
tensions between former adversaries which, in turn, will lead to sustainable return,
reconciliation, and reintegration of IDPs. According to Moore, “there are several
identifiable challenges in the current post-war, international environment which require
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changes within the international community in order to provide effective development
assistance to mitigate or prevent conflict” (2001,1). The major problems facing this shift
from short- to long-term initiatives remain, for the most part, the long-term commitment
and the lack of funding.
Despite the fact that organizations are placing more attention on human and social
development in their programs, most funds, according to CIDA, are still allocated to
emergency relief and reconstruction efforts rather than to sustainable development and
peacebuilding programs. This is a problem when dealing with post-conflict areas in
general and internally displaced people in particular. While short term projects such as
UNIFEM’s provision of seeds and tools and their income-earning activities for internally
displaced women are important, and “while the tendency in dealing with the displaced
has been to focus on emergency assistance, there is a need to look beyond this phase to
rehabilitation, reconstruction and long-term development” (Deng, 1995, 17). Projects and
programs should be designed to “benefit displaced populations since their integration will
prove essential to peace and stability in the nation as a whole” (Deng, 1995, 17).
In addition to the challenges of time and funding, another problem to effectively
dealing with post-conflict situations lies in the fact that, in practice, most of the
development projects are devised, planned and implemented by the agencies without
appropriate attention to the local context and needs. As this research shows, there has
been a gradual move away from this dominant organizational mentality to one that
involves encouraging local capacities on all phases of the program. People’s participation
in such projects and programs has become an imperative of the development process and
its subsequent success over the last two decades. Initiatives are more “oriented to the
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needs and capacities of the indigenous actors” (Moore, 2001, 2), and even, sometimes,
emerge from those localities. In relations to IDPs, this entails “integration of uprooted
population into national development plans”—both in the design and implementations of
the programs (Cohen and Cuenod, 1995, 3). UNDP, for example, which initiated projects
aimed at assisting displaced persons and returnees into its mandate, believes that “micro
projects involved in the rehabilitation of clinics, schools, and water systems or aimed at
creating income-generating opportunities” in areas of return are an effective way to
involve the community in its own process of return and allow them to identify their own
needs (UNHCR, 2000, 143). In addition to these micro-projects, UNDP focuses on long
term development and reconstruction, in which it also aims to include the community.
Even though more work and structural change are needed in order to embed such an
approach in the institutions themselves, we are seeing more movement and efforts
towards that objective. A major problem remains the question of how to translate the
theories into practice. The War-Torn Societies Project, a collaborative project of the
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the
Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS) of the Geneva
Graduate Institute of International Studies headed by Mattias Stiefel, which was launched
in 1994, is but one example of efforts aimed at clarifying appropriate policy options for
societies emerging from conflict.
In addition to the long-term approach and local participation, an important
emerging trend is the recognition of development agencies that their work would not be
successful if it did not address the conflict context within which they were operating.
Many non-governmental (NGOs), intergovernmental (IGOs), and governmental agencies,
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both multilateral and bilateral, are increasingly trying to include conflict resolution,
management and/or prevention in their work. The World Bank, for example, created a
Post-Conflict Unit in 1997 and, in doing so, acknowledged the peculiarities of dealing
with countries emerging from conflict (Collier, 2003). In a report published in 2004, the
World Bank presented its broadened approach to dealing with post-conflict situations:
rather than merely focusing on rebuilding infrastructure, it “seeks to understand the root
causes of conflict, to integrate a sensitivity to conflict in its activities, and to promote
assistance that minimizes the potential causes of conflict” (Bannon et al., 2004, 8).
However, the task is not an easy one and requires training, funding, while “identifying
and supporting mechanisms that address the developmental cause of conflict and supports
for peace” (McCandless, 2002,4; McCandless and Abu Nimer, 2002,1). A more detailed
discussion on those challenges based on the major literature on the nexus between
development and peace is provided in the fourth section of the literature review below.
Peacebuilding
Defining Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding is a relatively new concept in the peace and conflict resolution field
and has emerged as one of the most important aspects of involvement to build
“sustainable conditions for peace in post-conflict societies” (Keating and Knight, 2004,
xxxi). It became widely used after then United National Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali announced his Agenda for Peace in 1992. Peacebuilding connotes
activities that go beyond conflict management and crisis intervention; to include activities
that have a long-term impact and which target change in the structures and relations that
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initially led to violence. With a range of approaches, processes and stages, peacebuilding
aims at transforming relationships that govern parties in conflict towards more
sustainable and peaceful ones (Lederach, 1997). When it first emerged in the early 1990s,
peacebuilding, as an approach to resolving conflict, was perceived as a series of activities
designed specifically to help countries recover from violent conflict. Boutros-Ghali
defined post-conflict peacebuilding as “the collective action to identify and support
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into
conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 46).
Prevention remains one of the most important tasks of peacebuilding (Miall et al.,
1999, 188). Boutros-Ghali understood peacebuilding as primarily political, economic,
and military stabilization. His definition, according to Jeong, had a great impact on the
field but has not proven “sufficient to end a protracted conflict based on ethnic and
religious rivalries and opposing political and economic interests” (2005, xi). Hence, in his
book, he described peacebuilding operations as ones “that go beyond political and
strategic considerations to incorporate the perspectives of civilian security, social
rehabilitation, and reconciliation, reflecting on the concerns of the populations that have
been victimized by violence” (Jeong, 2005, xi). For Burgess and Burgess, peacebuilding
is “in many ways the most difficult part of conflict resolution, because it involves the
most people and the deepest personal and interpersonal feelings, hopes and fears” (1997,
232-233). Peacebuilding is a process with the main objective to restore normal, healthy
relations between the parties in conflict. Rather than dealing superficially with the
conflict, it aims at targeting its root causes; it also focuses on the people and context,
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while emphasizing the healing of psychological and social wounds inflicted by the
conflict (Galtung, 2000; Boulding, 1995).
Later, peacebuilding began to be viewed not only as a response to conflict, but as
a means to prevent and mitigate conflicts within societies (Ball, 2001; Lederach, 1997;
Boulding and Oberg, 1998). The applicability of peacebuilding to all phases of the
conflict involves “the prevention and resolution of violent political and social conflicts,
the consolidation of peace once violence has been reduced, and post-conflict
reconstruction with a view of avoiding a relapse into violent conflict” (Tschirgi, 2002,
26). Lederach defines peacebuilding as a
Comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or condition. It is a dynamic social construct” (1997,20).
According to Lederach, the emergence of peacebuilding has signaled a paradigmatic shift
in the conflict resolution field; a break from “the traditional framework and activities that
make up statist diplomacy concerned with the resolution of issues” towards an approach
that focuses on restoring and rebuilding relationships (1997, ix).
Furthermore, the peacebuilding process itself involves all sectors/levels of
society, rather than just the leaders, and addresses the root causes of the conflict, not
simply to its immediate issues (Cockell, 2000, 16). Peacebuilding is a complicated and
difficult process that requires long-term commitment. It involves concepts, such as
forgiveness, reconciliation, economic, social, and political transformation, which might
take generations to establish. Lisa Schirch elaborates further on this understanding of
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peacebuilding as a complex and continuous process. According to her, peacebuilding is
not confined solely to post-war areas or countries experiencing conflict: such work
should take place in any society as a way to prevent violence, gratify human needs and
ensure just and sustainable peace in a society (2004).
However, peacebuilding today remains mostly associated with post-conflict areas;
“what to do when the fighting stops” (Paris, 1997, 54). The focus is on how to prevent
violence from recurring in countries emerging from civil conflict (Hamburg, 1993, 8).
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan further emphasizes peacebuilding’s restorative
character when he refers to it as, “actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to
consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation” (1998). It refers to
“the rehabilitation of regions and countries ravaged by armed conflicts in order to prevent
the resumption of hostilities and to establish lasting peace” (David, 2002, 18). David
further points to three elements he views as central to peacebuilding, and which are
essential to the use of the concept in this study: “the rehabilitation, reconstruction and
reconciliation of societies that have suffered the ravages of armed conflict; the creation of
the security-related, political and/or socio-economic mechanisms needed to build trust
between the parties and prevent the resumption of violence; and an external intervention
to help create conditions conducive to peace” (2002, 20-21).
Peacekeeping. Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding
As is reflected in peace and conflict resolution literature, the role of peacebuilding
in post-conflict or post-settlement phase is crucial in that it helps reestablish relationships
and cooperation among parties formerly locked in conflict, which in turn will facilitate
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the reconstruction phase (Fisher, 1997b). The strength of peacebuilding as an approach to
peace, rather than peacekeeping and peacemaking, lies in the fact that it deals with the
root causes of the conflict and aims at long-term sustained solutions to the existing
problems (Galtung, 1976; Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Zartman and Rasmussen, 1997;
Licklider, 2001; Ball, 2001; Paris, 2001; Kritz, 2001).
When he first introduced the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding in An Agenda
for Peace, Boutros Ghali differentiated it from peacemaking and peacekeeping (1992).
Although it was the first time peacebuilding was introduced into the realm of practice,
such a distinction was previously presented by Galtung in 1976 and has since gained
importance and support in the conflict resolution literature. The differences between
peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, both in theoretical and practical terms,
lie mostly in the following areas: their objectives, their mandates the nature of their
activities, the people involved, and their visions. Peacekeeping is more related to the
settlement of conflict and is usually carried out by United Nations forces that are
deployed in areas emerging from conflict to maintain peace and security. It is a short
term approach, which mostly aims to monitor ceasefires. The UN defines ‘peacekeeping’
as “ the deployment of UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties
concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently
civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the
prevention of conflict and the making of peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:11) Burgess and
Burgess’s Encyclopedia o f Conflict Resolution defines ‘peacekeeping’ as “the prevention
or termination of violence within or between nation-states through the intervention of
third -party neutral military, police or civilian observers” (1997). A peacekeeping force,
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the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), was created by the Security
Council in 1978 to confirm Israel’s withdrawal behind the ‘blue line,’ a border
demarcation between Lebanon and Israel, in order to “restore international peace and
security and assist the Lebanese government in restoring its effective authority in the
area” (UNIFIL Lebanon, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/). For 28 years20,
it mainly acted as a buffer at the Israel-Lebanon border, helping with the de-mining of the
South after the full Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon in 2000.
Throughout its mandate, however, UNIFIL did not interfere in internal conflicts. In
August 2006, this mandate was expanded following the Israel-Hezbollah war to include:
monitoring the cessation of hostilities, accompanying and supporting the Lebanese armed
forces deploying in South Lebanon, ensuring humanitarian access to the civilian
population, and assisting the voluntary and safe return of IDPs (UNIFIL Lebanon,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/).
Peacemaking is an initiative taken by states and organizations to bring two
warring parties together to the negotiation table, as a step towards reaching a peace
agreement. It goes beyond the mere cessation of violence (peacekeeping) to actually
involve “the resolution of issues in the conflict” (Burgess and Burgess, 1997, 234).
Burgess and Burgess define ‘peacemaking’ as “a negotiation process, the goal of which is
to bring about a permanent end to hostilities by reconciling the interests and/or needs of
the groups in conflict” (1997, 236-7). Peacebuilding, described above, is more of a long
term, multi-level effort (or process) to help countries emerging from conflict function
20 Since its deployment to Lebanon in the late 1970s, UNIFIL’s mandate is up for review and extension every six months. This attests to the short-term vision of the peacekeeping approach.
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effectively (Lederach, 1995, 1997; Curie, 1971; Galtung, 1996). Boutros Ghali further
presented peacebuilding’s contribution by stating that it “encourages more deliberate
links among the various actors of the UN system, help develop and effective division of
labor among their respective forms of assistance- humanitarian, social and economic, as
well as political and military- and attend especially to their interrelationship over time”
(Cousens and Kumar, 2001,2). The strength of peacebuilding, rather than peacekeeping
and peacemaking, lies in the fact that it deals with the root causes of the conflict and aims
at long-term sustained solutions to the existing problems (Galtung, 1976; Boutros-Ghali,
1995; Zartman and Rasmussen, 1997; Licklider, 2001; Ball, 2001; Paris, 2001; Kritz,
2001).
Conflict Settlement/Management, Conflict Resolution, and Peacebuilding
Another important differentiation is between settlement, resolution, and
transformation: peacebuilding connotes the transformation of conflict rather than its mere
settlement or resolution. Conflict settlement (or management) does not address the
underlying causes of an existing conflict or the needs of those concerned (Ury and Fisher,
1981; Bercovitch, 1984, 1996; Zartman 1985, 1995; Reimann, 2001). Mainly a political
agreement between leaders of the parties in conflict, and involving third party
intervention and mediation, it results in what Galtung called negative peace, or mere
cessation of violence (Burton, 1990). This top-down approach focuses on actors rather
than relations or structure. It aims at controlling the conflict and not resolving it by
managing it to be more constructive rather than destructive to the sides. Even though it
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falls short of resolving or transforming the conflict, conflict settlement is considered an
important means to or first step towards that end (Francis, 2002, 26).
Conflict Resolution addresses the underlying causes of violence and contributes to
their elimination (Burton, 1987,1990; Fisher, 1997a). It employs more strategies (Track I
and Track II) (Reimann, 2001, 13) to addresses both direct and indirect violence (Miall,
2001, 3). The difference between resolution and settlement is that the former goes beyond
the negotiated interests and tries to meet the basic needs of all parties involved. Conflict
resolution involves some political and socio-economic changes that lead to more just,
inclusive, and peaceful societies.
Conflict transformation aims at long-term peacebuilding efforts. It entails changes
in the relationships and results in what Galtung calls ‘positive peace,’ or elimination of
structural and cultural violence in addition to cessation of direct violence (Lederach,
1995,1997; Curie, 1971; Galtung, 1996). Its objectives are more far-reaching than the
other strategies: it does not merely aim at stopping the conflict but attempts to change the
relationships between the conflicting parties, by dealing with direct, cultural and
structural violence (Reimann, 2001; Curie, 1971; Lederach, 1995, 1997; Galtung, 1996).
In terms of approach, conflict transformation theorists believe that the potential for
peacebuilding exists in the local communities and hence any solution should be rooted in
the local, traditional culture and needs. Miall summarizes conflict transformation as a
“comprehensive and wide-ranging approach, emphasizing support for groups within the
society in conflict rather than for the mediation of outsiders. It also recognizes that
conflicts are transformed gradually, through a series of smaller or larger changes as well
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as specific steps by means of which a variety of actors may play important roles” (2001,
3).
Even though looking at those approaches in a compartmentalized way as
presented above provides a clear understanding of each, the case of Lebanon illustrates
that such distinctions are not possible in practice. The path from war to peace is a
complex process and therefore, must incorporate all these different processes and phases
in order to be sustainable. The Lebanese case also proves the challenges for such a
comprehensive approach to a solution in deeply divided societies.
Peacebuilding in Lebanon
While many scholars and practitioners view the return of displaced persons as one
of the many tasks of peacebuilding (Cousens, 2001, 9; Jeong, 2005), this research defines
peacebuilding as the set of efforts, activities, or initiatives that contribute to a sustainable
return. Such activities include the participation of the community in the reconstruction of
the infrastructure; joint development, and socioeconomic projects requiring intergroup
cooperation; education for mutual understanding; prejudice reduction, cross-cultural
activities and confidence building measures (Burgess and Burgess, 1997, 232). In other
words, through interactions, peacebuilding tries to build bridges between ordinary people
in the community and returnees (in the case of IDPs).
The extent to which peacebuilding was (and is) an integral aspect of the resolution
of the Lebanese conflict is questionable. As will be detailed in the subsequent chapters,
building peace in the country tom by decades of civil strife remains precarious mostly
due to the failure to deal with the root causes of the conflict in the post-settlement
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phase—contrary to what the official political rhetoric wanted the Lebanese and the world
to believe. This not only presents a hurdle to solving one of the most pressing issues
facing post-conflict state-building, namely internal displacement, but also to the
processes of national reconciliation, sustained reconstruction, development ,and viable
lasting peace in the country.
Reviewing the history of Lebanon (chapter 4) and closely scrutinizing the
governmental and non-governmental response to the problem of IDPs in the country
(chapter 5) reveals that peacebuilding never took place. Most of the attempts at peace
were at managing or settling the conflict. Whatever peacebuilding took place was in the
aftermath of the war; not directly in the signing of the Taif Agreement, but years later
after the realization that the more ‘traditional’ approaches adopted were not successful in
bringing about a timely reconciliation. To put it differently, peacebuilding in Lebanon is
operational rather than structural. 01 As will be elaborated in chapter 6, this post-conflict
peacebuilding is increasingly taking the form of “concrete cooperative projects that link
formerly warring parties together” (Keating and Knight, 2004, xxxv). Some of the
projects that are taking place in areas of return are “designed to be mutually beneficial, to
contribute to socio-economic development for all parties, and to confidence building
between former combatants” (Keating and Knight, 2004, xxxv).
21 This differentiation was proposed by the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict’s Final Report in 1997. According to this report, operational peacebuilding refers to post-conflict strategies to reconstruct peace and prevent the recurrence to violence. Structural peacebuilding, on the other hand, refers to pre-conflict tactics that address the root causes of conflict (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report. New York, Carnegie Corporation, 1997).
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Approaches to Peacebuilding
Because of its relative newness in the field of peace and conflict resolution, there
is “continuing confusion over what constitutes peacebuilding” (Cousens, 2001, 4). This is
reflected in the broadness of the understanding and definition of the concept as shown
above. In addition, common weaknesses in the literature exist over “what comprise its
appropriate objectives and what are likely to be its most effective methods” (Cousens,
2001, 4). Approaches to peacebuilding are varied and it is outside the scope of this study
to enumerate and describe them all. My purpose is more modest, as I explain the
approaches that are applicable to or best help describe the process as it applies to the
Lebanese context.
At the basis of this research is what scholars have described in a 2003 ground
breaking volume, Positive Approaches to Peacebuilding: A Resource for Innovators, as
positive approaches to peacebuilding. With the aim to promote a better future in countries
ripped by years of conflict, such approaches shift their focus from conflict and its
consequences toward cooperation and coexistence, in order to bring about positive
change. Such a positive approach is important to my research not only because it
espouses changes in relationships, but because it identifies activities that work for the
specific context (Sampson et al., 2003). The focus on local capacities, as the source of
societal peace and a positive preferred future for all those involved, has only recently
emerged as an underlying concept in NGOs response to IDPs in Lebanon which will be
elaborated in Chapter 5.
The current approach to the peacebuilding process in Lebanon can better be
described as a combination of what Cousens and Kumar described as deductive and
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inductive (2001, 12; Tshirgi, 2002, 28), with greater focus on the former. While the
deductive approach focuses on what international agencies and organizations have to
offer, the inductive one takes the particular needs and capacities of individual cases as
their point of departure (Cousens and Kumar, 2001; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Jeong,
2002). Deductive approaches, which “refer to the diversity of policy instruments, tools
and capacities developed by the international community in support of the broader
peacebuilding agenda,” (Tshirgi, 2002, 27) seemed to have flourished in the last decade
as international organizations started reviewing their mandates and operations to promote
a role for peacebuilding (Leonhardt, 2000).
“Inductive approaches,” on the other hand, “refer to the context-specific strategies
that have arisen in response to the particular constellation of socio-economic-political-
military factors underlying a specific conflict.”(Tshirgi, 2002, 27; Cousens and Kumar,
2001,12) Inductive approaches to peacebuilding, unlike deductive ones, “are
characterized by their focus on the dynamics of particular conflicts rather than on
institutional or sectoral mandates and competencies” (Tshirgi, 2002, 28). They are more
related to what we understand as positive approaches to the process. Rather than
deductively identifying and expanding “the range of tools, capacities and resources
available to the international community for peacebuilding” (Tshirgi, 2002, 28), inductive
approaches are “concerned with tailoring concrete strategies in response to peculiarities
of a given conflict” (Tshirgi, 2002, 28; Cousens, 2001, 8). Inductive approaches to
peacebuilding are witnessing an increase on the country level, including in Lebanon,
especially due to the challenges that the international community faces in its work in
numerous post-conflict areas. Tshirgi summarizes the difference between the two
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approaches as follows: “Inductive approaches have served to translate peacebuilding
policy into practice in specific contexts; while deductive approaches refer to policy
making more generally in development agencies.”(2002, 28)
Along the same lines, peacebuilding in Lebanon is taking place within the
existing structure rather than attempting to radically change it. Even though
peacebuilding implies dealing with the underlying causes of the conflict, the approach
adopted in Lebanon is mainly based on “specific programs, policies, and practices that
can be employed to resolve civil conflicts and restore conditions to the point where peace
can be sustained” (Keating and Knight, 2004, xxxv). Conceived by John Paul Lederach
as a holistic, multidimensional, multisectoral (involving actors from the grassroots, local
political, local civil and international levels), and nonlinear process
(1997, 60-1), it falls short of the more radical approach supported by Johan Galtung and
Elise Boulding, which calls for a drastic transformation of society from a structure and
culture of violence to one of peace. Such a shift is believed to emanate from the masses in
a bottom-up approach (Keating and Knight, 2004, xxxv).
Peacebuilding in Practice
Peacebuilding is not a simple concept or an easy process: as is illustrated above,
with the various understandings and elements involved, peacebuilding in theory has been
understood differently by different scholars. This problem is not limited to the theoretical
realm but translates to the practical aspect of the process as well: while everyone is
raving about its importance—especially in post-conflict areas—there is no set framework
as to what is actually involved in it.
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As mentioned above, the main aim of peacebuilding is to transform the way
individuals, communities and societies live in order to promote peace. This is done by
healing or creating relationships, fostering mutual trust, respect and interdependence, and
promoting reconciliation. In practice, such peacebuilding is reflected in numerous
projects that, in the case of Lebanon, are carried out in the post-conflict context. These
activities to change attitudes and behaviors take place on the levels of education; training
and workshops; inter-religious dialogue; macro and micro development; trauma healing;
and reconstruction. However, as the case of Lebanon will show, in deeply divided
societies where tensions are high, such projects are sometimes easier to conceptualize
than to implement or to sustain; this is, at least in part, because they mostly deal with
human beings’ feelings and perceptions, are not immediate.
In the case of IDP repatriation in the Lebanese context, such types of initiatives
are relatively new, customized to the local context, and “furnish the conditions necessary
for returns” in displacement areas (Pugh, 2000, 119). These programs mostly grow from
the needs of the affected population, have a long-term vision, are comprehensive and
attempt to include all levels and elements of society (Scholdan, 2000). They include
projects that bring returnees and local communities together in discussion forums,
reconciliation conferences, dialogue sessions, and camps; this is done not only to engage
in conversation, but to build friendships and relationships with one another and develop
mutual trust (Lake, 1990, 14). Such initiatives are very important in areas where
communities have not coexisted for a long time or where they carry dehumanizing
images of each other (Francis, 2002, 17). Other projects are focused on the educational
sector and the promotion of peace education and co-ed schools in areas of return—both
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as an incentive for families to return and to create a place in which children and youth of
estranged communities in divided post-conflict societies, like Lebanon, can socialize,
humanize, and learn about one another. Also, along the lines of promoting cooperation
between the different groups, development and rehabilitation projects are increasingly
bringing members of the communities together to work together on mutually beneficial
projects, such as building roads, planting trees, rehabilitating homes, etc. Subsequent
chapters go into greater detail about peacebuilding in practice, especially with regard to
the specific case of IDP repatriation in Lebanon.
Such peacebuilding initiatives are gaining prominence in responses to post
conflict situations, especially with the increased importance on human development and
security. The proliferation of local and international organizations with conflict resolution
focus as well as the noticeable shift in development organizations to include conflict-
sensitive programs in post-conflict contexts confirms the necessity of focusing on the
communities as the basis for sustainable and peaceful state- or nation-building, following
years of civil rifts and conflicts. However, as will be elaborated below, this is not an easy
flawless endeavor especially in highly politicized, volatile, and divided societies.
Linking Peacebuilding and Development: Theory and Practice
The literature devoted to linking peacebuilding and development and the value
thereof is scant: not much research and publication exist on such connection neither in
theory nor in practice despite the increasing “demand for integrated frameworks and
approaches by those interested in understanding and evaluating the effects their
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development work has on peacebuilding, and vice versa” (Paffenholz et.al., 1). I
investigate the correlation in this research, for I believe that understanding the nexus
between peacebuilding and development is of utmost importance to assessing IDP return
policies and projects in Lebanon (and in other localities afflicted by an internal
displacement problem).
Theory
As is apparent from the review of the literature above, much scholarly work has
addressed the topics of peacebuilding and development, but no systematic attempt has yet
been made to connect the two. The importance of a link between peacebuilding and
development, especially in ‘post-conflict’ settings, is only beginning to be understood
and the literature illustrating the convergence of development and peacebuilding agendas
in post-conflict contexts is growing but remains limited (Tshirgi, 2002, 25). The nascent
literature linking conflict and development is sparse (and preliminary). With the
proliferation of post-conflict areas and the increased challenges posed by destruction,
displacement, and instability, there is “a compelling need to rigorously and routinely
examine these issues in an integrated manner with an eye towards developing joint
conceptual and practical strategies” (McCandless and AbuNimer, 2002, 1).
In scholarly literature, the claim to a necessary link between peacebuilding and
development rests on different notions and views (McCandless and Abu Nimer, 2002, 1).
On the one hand, to proponents of the widely accepted belief that conflict hinders
national development, there is an important relationship between development and levels
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of low and high intensity (social) conflict. According to this perspective, conflict
undermines any attempts at sustainable development.
On the other hand, there lies the idea that development (policies) influence
conflicts by either exacerbating them or assisting in their peaceful resolution (Terlindin,
2002, 61). With the Collaborative for Development Action (which is the process of
evaluating Local Capacities for Peace efforts in a broad spectrum of conflict and
organizational case studies), Anderson has developed a framework—known as the Local
Capacities for Peace (detailed in her 1996 Do No Harm)—to help aid agencies be
conscious of the peacebuilding potential of their work. This ‘Do No Harm’ debate,
launched by Mary Anderson99 , “highlighted the need for a more systematic attention to
the impact of development aid on conflict” (Leonhardt, 2002, 40). At the base of the
argument is that organizations working in conflict and post-conflict areas should not fuel
or prolong violent conflict. Trying to answer the question of how development can be
undertaken in ways that build sustainable relations and equitable structures that lead to
lasting peace, Peter Uvin outlines the evolving relationship between development and
conflict/ peace efforts. He identifies seven paradigms or stages in which this convergence
process takes place, beginning with the least to the most integrative; i.e. from the notion
that development promotes peace to that of the global system reform movement. After a
critical examination of all these approaches, he concludes that most of the development
agencies’ current work in, or interaction with conflict areas, falls in the third and fourth
22 The ‘do no harm’ theory is the result of Mary Anderson’s Local Capacities for Peace Project, which is a collaboration of many humanitarian relief organizations searching for a way to avoid the harmful aspects of relief work on recipient populations. The assumption behind this project is that aid unavoidably becomes part of the conflict scenario and can make things worse as well as better.
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paradigms, which respectively deal with the ‘do no harm’ approach promoted by
Anderson and the post-conflict agenda (2002).
While the first paradigm “looks at minimizing the negative impact of all
humanitarian and development assistance under conditions of conflict,” (McCandles and
Abu Nimer, 2002, 2),23 the second refers “to reconciliation and transitional justice,
demobilization and reintegration and democratic policing” (McCandles and Abu Nimer,
2002,2). There is a trend taking place in these agencies as they try “to design projects in
such ways that do not do harm and are spending significant amount of resources on new
post-conflict sectors like reconciliation and reintegration, etc.” (Uvin, 2002, 20). Uvin
clearly demonstrated the important change in discourse, by which issues that originally
were inconsistent with development approaches are increasingly becoming essential
components of it (2002, 9). However, he questioned the extent to which a positive
correlation between development and peace could actually be proven, especially with the
negative effects that development work might have in post-conflict areas (2002, 11;
Anderson, 1996). While these literatures and others24 have dealt with the importance of
the link between development and peace (or the lack thereof) in a detailed way, by
looking at different case studies, an obvious limitation remains the absence of elaborate
theories despite the clear attempts to formulate (or develop) such premises.
23 For more information on this paradigm, also see Lancaster, 1999; Anderson 1999; Brynen 2000; Forman and Patrick 2000. 24 The rising concern with the nexus between development and peacebuilding led to a proliferating literature on the topic, including three journals: the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development; Peace, Conflict and Development; and Conflict, Security and Development.
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Practice
On a practical level, the notion of linking peacebuilding and development is
gaining attention, and agencies, especially in relations to their work in post-conflict areas,
are reframing their agendas to reflect sensitivity to the issues and challenges presented by
war-torn areas. In a 1997 speech to the Security Council, Secretary General Kofi Annan
noted that, “It is imperative that peace building and development go hand in hand. We in
the United Nations system recognize that helping societies emerge from post-conflict
situations is a challenge that must be met” (Brown, 1999, 3). This was reflected in the
analysis of development and peacebuilding projects and their evolution above. However,
despite a substantial amount of policy papers published in the past few years, a number of
conferences, reports and meetings sponsored by agencies such as USAID and UNDP, and
organizational changes, this convergence of peacebuilding and development is not always
reflected in the work of agencies on the ground. Most organizations still “have mandates
that are limited to specific and defined sets of problems and responsibilities” to which
they are “expected to confine its activities” (Bradlow and Grossman, 1995, 411). Issues
that do not fall within their particular mandates are thus left to other organizations in the
field. While this premise was accepted as norm and helped regulate the work of the
different agencies implementing projects in the same area, its validity is increasingly
being called into question. In a world where everything is related and intertwined and
where a comprehensive collaborative work is needed to deal with post-conflict situations,
such an approach does not seem to be effective.
The increasing recognition of the limitations of a compartmentalized approach
pushed some organizations and agencies to broaden the scope of their activities to
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become more responsive to the interconnected problems (Bradlow and Grossman, 1995,
415-416). Agencies created bureaus specialized in dealing with development and
reconstruction in post-conflict areas. The USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, the
World Bank’s Post Conflict Reconstruction Bureau and the UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis
Prevention and Recovery; the Canadian government’s Peacebuilding and Human
Security Division within its Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and a
Peacebuilding Unit within its International Development Agency are only few examples
(Jeong, 2002, vii).
In order to address this problem and to overcome the limitations of existing
development theories and programs dealing with areas emerging from conflict, donor or
development agencies “have begun to identify ways in which they could better
implement their current mandates or expand them in order to respond to the multiple
peacebuilding requirements of conflict-torn, conflict prone, or post-conflict countries”
(Uvin, 2002, 27). The movement of the development agencies to include peacebuilding
initiatives in their relief planning is a positive change, but continues to face some
challenges. Terlinden elaborates more on those challenges: while development agencies
are seeking to promote change by revising their policies, they are hesitant to undertake
significant reform to be fully able to incorporate and reflect peacebuilding in their work
(2002, 62-3). Reasons for such hesitancy include: the difficulty of funding such projects;
the complexity and length of the process that it requires; and the lack of professional
skills, among others (Terlinden, 2002, 62-3).
There is a growing recognition in the practical circles that development projects
must have conflict-sensitive analytical tools high on the agenda of development (Ruth-
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Heffelbower, 2002; Leonhardt, 2002). Uvin notes that development agencies are already
expanding their traditional response to be more responsive to conflict prevention,
resolution and peacebuilding (2002). Leonhardt elaborates on the considerations and
criteria that should be integrated into projects (2002). Those are: “long-term commitment
to the conflict; primacy of those directly affected by the conflict; emphasis on trust and
dialogue; and flexibility,” all of which, according to her, are “the criteria of good
peacebuilding initiatives” (Terlinden, 2002,46). As the case of Lebanon clearly shows,
the issue of flexibility is of utmost importance: programs should be flexible to the extent
of adjusting to the local context in which they are implemented and constantly changing
with the demands and evolution of that context. A number of scholars, such as Rothman,
“strongly and increasingly believed that it is counterproductive to impose ‘pre-cooked’
sets of indicators and frameworks on a variety of conflict situations” (2001; Leonhardt,
2002, 48).
In addition to their ability to adapt, such programs should place the affected
population at their center and focus on interaction and trust between individuals and
communities. Randi Garber further advances the idea that agencies should undertake
some practices that provide a space for relationship-building. By looking at the health-
related programs, in areas such as Palestine-Israel, Former Yugoslavia,and Haiti, Garber
evaluates ways in which people from different sides of the conflict could be brought
together to cooperate (2002). Garber’s idea presents an important framework, which, if
expanded to other areas and programs, such as IDP return, could lead not only to
reconstruction and rebuilding of infrastructure but also to the rebuilding of social
cooperative relations. People from different sides of a conflict, for example, could be
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brought together to rebuild infrastructure, schools, revitalize the agriculture, plant trees,
etc. In the process, they will be rebuilding their relationships. The growing awareness to
the importance of this aspect of interventions was illustrated in the interviews I conducted
in Lebanon with project directors and fieldworkers. However, despite some promising
achievements, “no development agency has yet systematically integrated conflict-
sensitive tools into its entire programming cycle” (Leonhardt, 2002, 50). One of my
interviewees explained, “In a politicized environment like Lebanon, it is still not
acceptable to frame our projects in relations to inter-communal relationship building. The
issue is very sensitive and might lead to opposition from certain groups; to a general
feeling of uneasiness... That is why we structure the programs in terms of development,
while implicit in those initiatives is the goal of bringing communities together and
building relationships” (Interview, Caritas IDP Project Director, Beirut, August 4, 2003).
The same is true of peacebuilding or conflict resolution agencies attempting to
introduce a development aspect in their work. In addition to integrating peace into their
development work, organizations such as the MCC, CRS and WV also engage in conflict
resolution or peacebuilding activities more directly. These activities can be itemized into
the following categories: civil society-building, trauma healing and reconciliation,
education, training and capacity building; dialogue and mediation; and advocacy work.
Organizations have tried to bridge between peacebuilding and development by adopting
projects that, while developmental in nature (e.g. reconstructing homes and schools or
planting trees), these initiatives purposely brought people from conflicting or opposing
parties and sides to work together on projects considered beneficial to all. These
participatory projects bring different actors in a community together, creating a societal
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infrastructure to prevent and manage conflict. They contribute to transformation of
community attitudes. However, due to their relatively new nature, such projects have not
been studied to the extent that development programs and have not adopted clear and
defined frameworks of action, where this link between peacebuilding and development is
explicitly outlined.
The scattered nature of the efforts in rebuilding post-conflict areas and their un
sustainability are increasing demands for “more systematic approaches to peacebuilding”
(Jeong, 2002, 147). Jeong takes on the task of proposing such a “synergetic model” for a
“more concerted approach to rebuilding post-conflict societies” (2002,147). The case of
Lebanon exemplifies both the challenges of such organized and comprehensive
approaches in a country emerging from years of civil strife and destruction, where
numerous organizations are working on the ground, as well as the necessity for such an
approach; this is particularly the case when dealing with internally displaced people
whose repatriation requires both development and peacebuilding initiatives.
Project, Program and Policy Assessment
The challenge posed by development and peacebuilding projects is not mainly
limited to designing, planning, and implementing initiatives that are responsive to post
conflict areas. It goes beyond that to include the difficulty of evaluating the impacts of
such projects on the ground. The lack of frameworks and criteria to assess mushrooming
programs in these volatile regions has become a subject of increasing concern to both
scholars and practitioners. Especially when it relates to return policies and projects,
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evaluation is a daunting task considering the number of agencies and parties involved in
the process. The following limitations contribute to this challenge.
Lack of coordination: Currently, the dominant method of evaluation provides for
the separate assessment of projects and programs targeting the return of displaced people
without allowing space for appraising the impacts of the overall return policy. Agencies
evaluate their own work “without locating it within the bigger picture of response to a
problem” (Cassen, 1994, 1). Such a project-based approach is limiting especially if it
does not relate to or develop into a process- based evaluation; i.e. how each of the
projects contributes to the overall goals of peacebuilding and development and eventually
to IDP return (Abdalla et.al, 2002, 17). Not taking into consideration coordination efforts
or complimentarity between initiatives dealing with the same problem makes it harder to
assess the strengths or weaknesses of return policies.
Compartmentalization: This entails the traditional compartmentalized way of
looking at evaluation presents a further challenge for understanding such complex
holistic projects. As Saunders clearly noted, “common methods of social-science
evaluation are rooted in the traditional thinking: they continue to focus on institutions and
on technically definable issues rather than on the whole human beings and relationships”
(1999, 222-3). It is impossible to understand return projects or policies by omitting the
human/social/communal aspect of the problem and response.
Long-term impact: the long-term, rather than short-term, impact of those
programs discourages evaluation before the end of the program. Approaching long-term
impact projects this way presents challenges not only to understanding the workings of
the project itself but for improving those projects while they are being implemented in a
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way that better reflects the local context and needs. In other words, there should be a
way by which “short-term evaluations of long-term effects” is done (Zartman, 2000,
229). Such short-term evaluations should not affect the more comprehensive long-term
impacts of the projects (Abdalla et. al., 2002, 46); instead, they should be viewed as
learning tools.
Access to data: The unavailability of full records and documentations and/or their
inaccessibility to the public makes the task more difficult (Saunders, 1999, 240). The
problem in post-conflict situations, and in the case of Lebanon, is that data on internally
displaced people is not regularly or efficiently collected.
Criteria: While some progress is being made on the development project level
evaluation, there is still no agreement on what criteria should be used to assess
peacebuilding programs. That criteria for peacebuilding projects are less elaborate than
those for development projects is well illustrated by Ross and Rothman who note that
“there is at present no clearly articulated consensus in the field about what constitutes
success in conflict resolution” (Zartman, 2000, 233). In addition to the lack of criteria,
evaluating peacebuilding activities is burdened with the requirement for researchers or
evaluators “to mechanically measure qualitative factors or agree on their interpretation”
in contrast to development, “which has measurable outcomes” (Jeong, 2002, 162). The
process of return has been slow and frustrating due to the long-time focus on quantitative
results (increasing number of returnees) rather than qualitative ones (improving the
conditions for them to sustain themselves). This issue is elaborated in greater detail
25 For more details, see Ross and Rothman’s Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorizing Success and Failure (1999)
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below, in the context of discussing the different proposed frameworks for evaluating
development and peacebuilding projects.
Despite those limitations and challenges, there is no debate regarding the merit of
evaluation and its necessity. It is generally agreed upon that evaluation is both an
assessment and a learning tool in development and peacebuilding initiatives (Church and
Shouldice, 2002, 4). While on the one hand it is carried out to study impact, on the other,
it could used to improve the project and the agencies practice (Church and Shouldice,
2002, 4). Evaluation is part of the process and it should take place at every stage of the
project, not only towards the end. In other words, “any evaluation must focus on how
change happens, not just on whether it takes place.. .Continuous judgment is essential to
enhancing the quality and reach of the work” (Saunders, 1999, 222).
Useful Frameworks by which to Assess Development and Peacebuilding
The challenges facing agencies and governments in implementing development
projects in post-conflict areas has led to the emergence of different frameworks by which
to evaluate their implementation and impacts. The main force behind such a surge arises
from the growing awareness of the impact of development on conflict as well as the shift
in development theory from a purely economic/short-term one to a more comprehensive,
human, and long-term one. The need for a conceptual framework to evaluate the function
of development cooperation in conflict and post-conflict situations is becoming more
important (Scholdan, 2000). Examples of those frameworks include the 1997 Guidelines
on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation proposed by the OECD Development
Assistance Committee (DAC); UNDP’s 1996 Building Bridges between Relief and
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Development: a Compendium o f the UNDP Record in Crisis Countries; the European
Commission’s 1996 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development', the 1998 European
Commission’s The Role o f Development Cooperation in Strengthening Peacebuilding,
Conflict Prevention and Resolution', the World Bank’s 1998 Post-Conflict
Reconstruction: The Role o f the World Bank.
The most influential tool in the understanding of the relationship between
development and conflict (or peacebuilding) and an important basis for future work has
been Kenneth Bush’s A Measure o f Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
(PCIA) o f Development Projects in Conflict Zones. This working paper, written to the
Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative and to the Evaluation Unit of the
IDRC (International Development Research Center, Canada) in 1998, provided for the
analysis of the role of development in conflict and peacebuilding by explicitly showing
the link (or relationship) between development, conflict and peace. However, this report
looks at the problem from the development lens and studies its impacts on conflict and
peace. Bush elaborates on his objectives: “this Working Paper is intended to be a
contribution to the development of a more systematic and self-conscious means of
assessing approaches to development work in violence prone regions” (Bush, 1998, 5).
Bush further described his study as one that,“does not seek to develop the definitive
evaluation tool for assessing or anticipating the impact of development projects on the
peace and conflict environment within which they are set. The uniqueness of each project
and the fluidity of their environments conspire to frustrate attempts to impose a rigidly
uniform framework. Rather, this study develops an approach to guide our interpretation
and assessment of the impact of the widest range of development projects in a more
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systematic manner than is currently the case” (Bush, 1998, 5). The overall aim of this
project is to “empower individuals and institutions both to understand better their work,
and, more importantly, to induce the changes necessary to amplify the positive impacts
and to minimize negative impacts on the peace and conflict environment” (Bush, 1998,
5).
Elaborating on Bush’s ‘framework’ and recognizing the difficulty of working in
conflict zones, Paffenholz and Reychler introduced the Planning and Assessment for
Conflict Zones Projects (P&A) Approach, “intended as a comprehensive approach to
facilitate the planning, assessment, and evaluation of interventions for conflict zones”
(Paffenholz and Reychler, 2005, 2). The difference between this approach and Bush’s, is
the former’s ability to be implemented in both development and peacebuilding projects.
The P&A approach “is a basic model that focuses on the needs for peacebuilding in a
given country or area, tailors the intervention’s objectives and activities towards these
needs through identifying the peacebuilding relevance and developing peace and conflict
result chains and indicators for monitoring. “The basic model provides separate modules
for planning, assessment and evaluation purposes focusing separately on peace and aid
interventions” (Paffenholz and Reychler, 2005, 2). The contributions of this approach lie
in providing “systematic assessment of how projects can contribute directly or indirectly
to unintended outcomes like for example, how development interventions can contribute
to peacebuilding.. .This is becoming more and more of a necessity, as there can be no
sustainable social and economic development without peace” (Paffenholz and Reychler,
2005, 3).
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As mentioned above, the P&A approach is used to assess both peacebuilding and
development projects. The former interventions are projects, programs and policies that
are planned with the purpose to contribute to peacebuilding. The P&A approach is used
to “ensure the relevance of the intervention in terms of peacebuilding and to monitor,
assess and finally improve the effects of the intervention on peacebuilding and to avoid
risks and problems caused by violent conflict by engaging in a systematic planning,
assessment/evaluation process” (Paffenholz and Reychler, 2005, 6). On the other hand,
the approach is applied to interventions that have development or humanitarian work as
their objectives in order “to reduce the risks the intervention will encounter in the violent
conflict situation. This ensures that the intervention will not have an unintended negative
effect on the conflict dynamics, and it increases the chance that it will also contribute to
peacebuilding. This is equally true for humanitarian, security and other types of
interventions” (Paffenholz and Reychler, 2005, 6).
In addition to the different reports and studies that dealt with the topic,
development agencies have also realized the importance for “peacebuilding to be an
intrinsic element of development cooperation strategies and identified structural stability
as the encompassing policy goal for humanitarian assistance and development
cooperation in conflict and post-conflict situations (Scholdan, 2000). It also began to be
recognized the importance developmental agencies and NGOs, such as UNDP, play in
peacebuilding and that “peacebuilding operations should be closely coordinated with the
programs of those agencies” (Keating, 2000, 34). Even if they have distinct mission
statements, such organizations and peacebuilding organizations are interconnected and
influence one another. The problem is how to strengthen this link.
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While evaluation of development projects and their impacts on conflict and peace
have been on organizations’ agendas for some time, the relatively new emergence of
peacebuilding projects explains the lack of criteria for their evaluation. But as
development organizations have introduced ways to assess their projects in post-conflict
areas, peacebuilding organizations are also trying to find better evaluatory methods for
their work. Examples of such research include Church and Shouldice’s paper on The
Evaluation o f Conflict Resolution Interventions, in which they question the approaches to
peacebuilding and conflict resolution project evaluation (2002, 41), and the report by
Mary B. Anderson and Lara Olson, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project. Those studies
agree that there are no standardized evaluation criteria for peacebuilding interventions.
However, different scholars and practitioners have presented different ways by which to
assess these projects. Jeong proposed two types of criteria: objective and subjective.
According to him, the former “assesses direct and tangible outcomes in political,
economic and social areas,” while the latter “is based on perceptions and expectations
and are non-quantifiable or tangible” (2002,162). David, on the other hand, divides
criteria by which peacebuilding can be evaluated into two other different types: long-term
(with focus on development) or short-term (mere reconstruction) (2002, 42). Rothman
and Ross drew the distinction between internal and external evaluation of peacebuilding
projects: the former referring to their success in relations to the people benefiting and
participating in it; the latter referring to their overall external impacts on the political,
economic and social processes (1999). Rothman proposed the use of Action Evaluation
as a model to evaluate peacebuilding interventions: criteria of success in this case emerge
from participant themselves and are internally defined (1997). Also, such a model
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provides projects with the ability to “adapt to changes in context and changes in the goals
and interests,” in order to meet the needs of the targeted population (Church and
Shouldice, 2002,20).
Evaluating the Link between Peacebuilding and Development
Whereas “awareness is growing in both the peacebuilding and development
communities about the need to better understand the influence and impact of their
programs and policies in a more systematic way—particularly in post-conflict
environments—the increasing recognition among international agencies, scholars, and
practitioners of the need to treat peacebuilding and development in an integrated way is,
not sufficiently matched when it comes to evaluation” (Paffenholz et.al., 2005, 1). The
absence of criteria for evaluating the link between development and peacebuilding poses
a challenge to the study of return projects in post-conflict areas. It does not have to do
with lack of awareness to the necessity of linking peacebuilding and development, but
rather with the complexity of such integration. Some of the challenges that face in
fostering such linkages include: the pressures on people involved in one type of
organization or the other to learn new concepts and practices that they are not familiar
with; lack of funding; the competition between the different organizations on the ground
(McCandless and Abu Nimer, 2002, 1). According to Paffenholz and Reychler, there is
no comprehensive approach that “enables both aid and peace communities to
systematically plan, assess, and evaluate—and thus improve—their interventions in post
conflict situations” (Paffenholz and Reychler, 2005). However, the P&A approach they
propose attempts to bridge development and peacebuilding in evaluation by looking at
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the relevance of development and peacebuilding of the projects with regard to: their
efficiency, their effectiveness, their impact assessment, their sustainability, coordination
and coherence, coverage and participation (Paffenholz and Reychler, 2005, 20-1).
Using the techniques of interviews, document reviews and observations, through a
case study method, I try to fill this gap by introducing some criteria to measure
interconnected development and peacebuilding projects and their success in areas of IDP
return in Lebanon. The criteria that emerged from this research not only highlighted the
peculiarities of the return process in Lebanon but also helped to measure and
operationalize the concepts of development and peacebuilding in post-conflict areas.
Both quantitative and qualitative indicators usually account for the success or lack thereof
of return policies. Quantitative indicators provide basic information about the working of
the policy and might include, in addition to budget for the projects, the number of people
that have benefited from it (i.e. in the case of return projects, the number of returnees).
Qualitative indicators on the other hand, are important to measure perceptions, processes,
and changes over time. However, it is important to note that these criteria or categories
should be flexible and should respond to the context in order for evaluation to be more
efficient and reflective of the reality on the ground. Even though the indicators or criteria
for peacebuilding success are mostly qualitative and abstract, there is a “need to translate
them into concrete and measurable accomplishments” (Church and Shouldice, 2003, 6).
This research operationalizes both peacebuilding and development in order to evaluate
the projects that are being implemented in return areas.
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Conclusion
The review of the existing literature on forced migration, development and
peacebuilding provides the context within which to understand the return policy in
Lebanon. It presents the changing nature of these concepts as they relate and adapt to the
demands of a world in which humans are at the center. The increasing interest in human
development, conflict transformation, and link between development and peacebuilding
in post-conflict areas supplies the framework within which the return of IDPs, an
increasing challenge in post-conflict societies, will be analyzed. Furthermore, the review
highlighted the gaps and challenges, especially regarding the link between peacebuilding
and development, which my research will attempt to address.
While this chapter broadly introduced the concepts and challenges in the research,
the next chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the Lebanese political, economic and
social history, specifically focusing on the post-war situation and the problem of internal
displacement in the country. An overview of the policy to deal with internally displaced
persons—mainly their repatriation—will also be detailed.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: WAR AND THE INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT PROBLEM
“The guns have fallen silent. That’s all that’s happened. Emotions have yet to reconcile. Hatreds have yet to be removed” Tawflk Mishlawi, political analyst
Introduction
While the previous chapters have presented the problem of IDPs and the
challenges involved in the return process in general, this chapter focuses specifically on
the case of Lebanon, which exemplifies a post-conflict country that has suffered from
long years of wars, conflicts, and devastation. Even though armed hostilities formally
ended 16 years ago, this chapter, by recounting the country’s history and describing its
current situation, demonstrates that conflicts persist and pose a challenge to activities and
programs that aim at national reconciliation and sustainable peace.
In order to understand Lebanon’s modem history, it is important to first revisit the
evolution of the Lebanese state, a process that shaped and still shapes the dynamics of
present-day Lebanon. While it is not the objective of this research to present a detailed
account of hundreds of years of Lebanon’s history, it is however necessary to present
some events that had a tremendous impact on the political and social systems of the
country. The chapter will expand more on the post-independence period focusing
161
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specifically on the Lebanese civil war, which tore the country for fifteen years and
redefined the political and social makeup of this small nation. Even though the war
resulted in an array of challenges and problems, the chapter will detail the issue of
internal displacement and elaborate on its consequences on the country in general and on
the displaced population in particular. The issue of displacement is important to study
because the return and reintegration of displaced persons in their communities are
important steps to ending the war and building the basis for civil peace in Lebanon
(Faour, 1993, 10). It is also an important lens through which to study the essential link
between development and peacebuilding. The discussion on displacement will continue
with a closer look at the1989 Taif Agreement, which put an end to the long-lasting war
and ignited interest in the issue of IDPs as a factor in national reconciliation. The chapter
will conclude with an extensive investigation of the current situation of and response to
internal displacement. 1 ft
Historical Background
Lebanon, a small country of 10452 sq km (-4000 sq miles), is a multi-sectarian
society of nineteen officially recognized sects, divided into four main religious groups;
26 The latest war that erupted in July 2006 between Hezbollah and Israel while I was still editing my dissertation led to the displacement of an additional one million Lebanese from their villages and neighborhoods in South Lebanon and South Beirut. This population, however, is not included in my current research and analysis for several reasons: first, displacement was so recent that there is still no accurate data and my dissertation research was done long before; second, such displacement did not occur as a result of inter-communal massacres but as a result of Israeli attacks, and does not necessarily add to the peacebuilding-development link argument at the basis of this research; third, unlike the other waves detailed in this chapter, the majority of those displaced stayed in parks and schools throughout the month long conflict and returned to their villages when the cease-fire was declared; and fourth, the government and internal security proved more efficient in dealing with this latest wave by containing the displaced to those public institutions and instantaneously ending any illegal occupation of commercial centers and private residences. Nevertheless, this latest war, the wave of IDPs resulting from it, and its interesting dynamics and lessons will be the subject of a future research project.
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n < Muslims, Christians, Druze and Jews . Until the early 1970s and the eruption of civil
war, Lebanon was known as the Switzerland of the Middle East and was considered a
model of pluralism and modernity in the area. However, as will be expanded below, prior
to 1975, Lebanon was not always a peaceful country and it had its share of short-lived,
civil conflicts that, unlike the 1975 civil war, did not result in the paralysis of the political
system and the collapse of the state.
Multi-communal Lebanon was, for the longest time, viewed as “an example of
successful, peaceful and democratic coexistence, as one of the few viable cases of
consociation outside Europe” (Hanf, 1993, 40). This peaceful and harmonious, multi-
communal coexistence did not last for long and soon Lebanon became “the proverbial
case of a country tom apart by bloody and internecine warfare” (Hanf, 1993, 40).
Lebanon, hence, emerged as an example for other countries suffering from intractable
and deeply complicated political, social and economic problems and the word
‘Lebanonization’ became a “word of warning” (Hanf, 1993, 40) or a “trademark for all
‘problematic conditions’ including political fractionalization, societal chaos, and
economic fragmentation” all over the world (Collelo, 1989, xxi). According to Rigby, it
“became a term used to depict a Hobbesian condition occasioned by the complete
collapse of the political order” (2000a, 1). The divided characteristic of Lebanon arises
from the priority given to “communal socialization processes over those emanating from
the center [or the state]” (Harik and Meho, 1996, 69). The civil ‘conflicts,’ which erupted
27 The Jewish community, while originally a small one, decreased in size tremendously with the creation of Israel in 1948 and again saw a large wave of immigration at the onset of the civil war in 1975. Today, this community counts for no more than a couple hundred of people. For more information about the Jewish community in Lebanon, see Kirsten E. Schulze, The Jews of Lebanon: Between Coexistence and Conflict, Sussex Academic Press, 2001 (a revised edition of the book will be available in December 2006).
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as consequences of such confessional-based identities, further reinforced these primordial
sectarian tendencies by encouraging stronger communal bonds among the different
confessional groups in the country (Azar, 1984).28
There is little agreement in the conflict resolution field on what an intractable—or
to use Edward Azar’s terminology, protracted (Fisher, 1997a)—conflict is. However,
scholars and practitioners do point to some characteristics of these conflicts, including
their intensity, their complexity, their deep-rooted causes (identity, human needs, etc.)OQ ,
their endurance and ongoing nature—that they last for years, sometimes even decades;
and their resistance to management, resolution and transformation (Bercovitch, 2003).
Taking Lebanon as his major case study, Azar defines protracted conflict as “the
prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as
security, recognition, acceptance, fair access to political institutions, and economic
participations” (Azar, 1991, 93). Other characteristics of such conflicts include their
devastating consequences on the human (loss of life), physical (destruction of homes and
infrastructure), economic, and emotional, social and psychological (fear, hatred, anger)
levels (Burgess and Burgess, 2003), their “blurred demarcation between internal and
external sources and actors”, their “multiple causal factors and dynamics”, their weak
political structures which lead to the inability of the state to respond to its citizens’ needs,
and the fuzziness of their “starting and terminating points” (Azar, 1990, 6).
28 This idea is further elaborated by Samir Khalaf, "Ties that Bind: Sectarian Loyalties and the Restoration of Pluralism in Lebanon," The Beirut Review, 1, 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 32-61. Also see “Lebanon’s War,” Middle East Report, number 162, January/February 1990. 29 John Burton (1990), Herbert Kelman (1965), Jay Rothman (1997) and John Paul Lederach (1998) spoke of the absence o f fundamental human needs such as security and identity as major causes and drivers of intractable conflict. They argue that such needs are non-negotiable and non-compromisable which makes these conflicts difficult to resolve. Permanent solutions to these conflicts require changes in the structure of societies and systems that bring such conflict about.
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These conflicts can be internal in nature, i.e. occur between different groups
within a state, such as is the case in Lebanese, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland conflicts.
They can also take place between states, such as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the
India/Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. Intractable conflicts are not really hopeless or
irresolvable (for example, the Apartheid in South Africa was resolved), however, they
differ from other types of conflict in that they require a “multi-faceted and more
prolonged approach” to their resolution (Burgess and Burgess, 2003). They also require
time, as the problems and consequences resulting from the conflict usually persist long
after violence comes to an end. When elaborating on the causes or sources of such
protracted conflicts, Azar makes the link to a colonial legacy and needs deprivation
(1990). He was the first to note that “studying protracted conflict leads one to conclude
that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term” (1990, 155), a notion that, as
detailed in the previous chapter, has special resonance for this research.
The 1800s Civil Wars and the Establishment of the Confessional System
The establishment of Mount Lebanon in the early 16th century marked the
emergence of Lebanon as an independent entity in the Ottoman Empire. Mount Lebanon
was characterized by peace, stability, and coexistence between its diverse inhabitants,
until the 1820s when communal problems began to emerge. These tensions culminated in
the 1840s and led to the “end of the principality, the cantonization of Mount Lebanon,
and the establishment of the first confessional-based councils as governing bodies”
(Sirriyeh, 1989, 3). This new political system, imposed by the Ottomans in the hope of
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restoring stability and promoting social and political equality between the two main
groups (Maronites and Druze), continues to define the Lebanese entity today, but on a
wider scale (Christian-Muslim). While it did prove ineffective in stabilizing Mount
Lebanon in the 1800s, its value was further questioned in the 1900s, especially with the
advent of the civil war that ripped the country for fifteen years. This political structure
remains a matter of debate today between those who want to maintain the status quo and
ensure equal representation and those who want to change it to a more proportionally
representative system, which is surely believed to favor one community over others.
The first violent armed clashes recorded between Maronites and Druzes erupted
on September 14, 1841 and shook the relatively peaceful coexistence of the Mount
Lebanon area. Mixed towns, where people from different religious backgrounds had
hitherto coexisted, soon became the battleground for “the bloodiest massacres in the
history of Lebanon” (Abraham, 1981, 69; Salibi, 1965, 49; Khalifah, 2001, 42). It is said
that the conflict, which lasted for several months, was triggered by the Druze’s feeling
that their authority and political rights were being challenged (Abraham, 1981, 83) and a
fear that Maronites were “impoverishing and weakening their community” (Picard, 1996,
19-20). In order to put a stop to the violence and restore peace and stability, the Ottomans
resorted to the ‘Qaimaqamiya’ system which divided Mount Lebanon into two separate
districts; one headed by a Maronite (North) and one by a Druze (South). This system was
intended to allow the two communities to share political power equally and live
peacefully, side by side (Khalifah, 2001,42; Fawaz, 1994, 27; Baaklini, 1976,43).
However, it proved to be unsuccessful in maintaining peace between the two
communities and violence erupted again in 1845. Religion in this conflict was used more
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explicitly as a force by which coalitions and constituencies were held together (Abraham,
1981,92). Initiated by the Maronites, this brief clash was the consequence of a campaign
to release “their co-religionists in the mixed districts” (Abraham, 1981, 93). To avoid
further escalation and collapse of the system, the Ottomans interfered to maintain a
balance of power and rather than resolving the conflict, ended it in a stalemate.
Tensions persisted in Mount Lebanon and communal strife continued to intensify
until, after a period of relative calm, violence exploded again in 1860. This civil war
witnessed clashes between the communities in mixed district and led to the massacres of
thousands of Maronites by the Druze. The Ottomans interfered again to establish a new
system, based on confessional representation: the Mutasarrifiyya, which “introduced
relative autonomy in the Lebanon Mountains and formed the basis of the current
confessional system” (Hanf, 1993, 59). The aforementioned 19th century civil wars
contributed to the development of sectarianism and were the result of a historical process
that began with the creation of Mount Lebanon. A more elaborate form of this
confessional system continued to be “reflected in the structure and functioning of the
Lebanese political institutions and became rooted in the political culture of the Lebanese
society” (Sirriyeh, 1989,4).
From Ottoman Rule to French Mandate and the Creation of Greater Lebanon
The Mutasarrifiyya system brought back political stability and coexistence to
Mount Lebanon. Unfortunately, uncertainties reemerged after the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire at the end of World War I and the beginning of the French Mandate. While the
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Christians welcomed the change, Druze and Muslims had doubts and suspicions about
the French policy and its favoritism towards the Maronites. These fears proved valid as
the formal separation of Lebanon from Syria and safeguarded the Maronite community’s
power in the country, with the creation of Greater Lebanon on August 30,1920, which
marked (Ismael, 234).
The new state was the outcome of the French Mandate’s expansionist policy and
power consolidation, which incorporated several areas (Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre)
into what was Mount Lebanon. The result was a drastic change in the demographic
makeup of the country: while Mount Lebanon had been predominantly bi-confessional
(Druze and Maronite), Greater Lebanon emerged as a multi-confessional entity
comprised of diverse sectarian Christian and Muslim communities (Orthodox Christians,
Sunni Muslims, Shi’a Muslims). Consequently, the influence of religious and sectarian
affiliations on power was further consolidated and the biggest challenge facing Greater
Lebanon was its ability (or lack thereof) to “organize coexistence between different areas
with very different histories and between several religious communities of which no
single one had anything remotely like a majority” (Hanf, 1993, 66). This challenge was
translated in the ‘identity war:’ Muslims wanted to remain attached to the Syrian
hinterland rather than see the emergence of what they perceived to be a Western- and
Christian-oriented Lebanon; Christians welcomed the autonomy that such a structure
would provide them, as a minority group within a Muslim-dominated region. In 1958,
such identity conflict exploded into what became known to many as the first civil war,
which will be elaborated on below.
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The Birth of the Republic
The 1926 constitution declared Lebanon a republic and introduced a
consociational political system (or model of government) that favored Christians
(Collelo, 1989, 53-55). The new constitution, which institutionalized coexistence
between the different groups, accentuated sectarian identity awareness and “its provision
for a temporary and equitable distribution of sects in public office and the ministries
constitutes the confessional basis for Lebanon’s current political and administrative
system” (Sirriyeh, 1989, 4). This important document officially entrenched the
consociational model of government as the most adequate means for maintaining a
balance of power in the pluralist country. Arendt Lijphart, who first introduced the
concept of consociational democracy in scholarly literature, defines it as “government by
elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with fragmented political culture into a stable
democracy” (1969, 216). Hence, accommodation and compromise between the different
communities in Lebanon in order to prevent majority dominance by one group over the
other constitute the basis of the system.
Consociationalism has been prescribed, by many, as the most adequate framework
for divided societies like Lebanon. According to its main proponent Arendt Lijphart, it
takes into account religious differences on the basis of which proportional representation
in political and public administration takes place (1977). While such a system was
successful in maintaining relative balance and stability for centuries—a testimony to its
positive aspects—its failure to adjust and evolve according to the changing demographic
reality led to violent conflict; this is an important reminder of the weakness and
limitations of such structure. While it accommodates differences in the short term, such a
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system proved to be an obstacle to long-term improvement or change. As will be
illustrated below, it eventually became a major contributing factor to or cause in the
eruption of violent conflict in Lebanon.
Until 1989, the division of power in the country remained, based on the last
official census to be carried out in Lebanon (in 1932) reflected Maronite dominance over
Muslims and recorded a 6:5 ratio in positions of power in Lebanon. The shift in power in
favor of Muslims throughout the coming years, mostly due to “differential birth rates and
emigration by Christians” (Rigby, 2000b, 169), was not reflected in the political and
administrative power divisions which intensified tensions and brewed the seeds for future
civil wars- as will be expanded below. Even though the period from 1926 and
independence did not erupt in full-fledge violent conflict, the newly created Lebanese
Republic witnessed a great deal of animosity between the Maronites, on the one hand,
and an alliance of Sunni Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians, on the other. These
periods of turmoil were crystallized via issue of identity: the alliance’s opposition to a
Western-oriented independent Lebanese state and the calls for merger with Syria.
Independence and the National Pact
Lebanon gained independence from the French on November 22, 1943; however,
it continued to be influenced by the system put in place by the Ottomans and later
developed by the French. There was no other option in sight for the government of the
liberated country but to maintain stability and govern itself. In 1943, the Lebanese
National Pact, a gentlemen’s oral agreement between the Maronite President Bechara
Khoury and the Sunni Prime Minister Riad Solh, further emphasized the consociational
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or confessional state design and deeply entrenched confessionalism in the country’s
political, economic and social structures. Not veering far from the stipulations of the
1926 Constitution and aiming at safeguarding a system in which different minorities can
peacefully coexist, it “comprises a number of mutual renunciations and guarantees, a
compromise formulation on the identity of the country and on power-sharing between the
religious communities” (Hanf, 1993, 72). Moreover, in the National Pact, Christians
agreed to renounce the protection of Western powers and Muslims renounced their plans
for a union with Syria and other Arab States.
Nevertheless, two major criticisms of the Pact can be made. First, it legitimized
sectarianism rather than nationalism. And second, it failed to address or adequately deal
with the changing social, economic and demographic realities on the ground. The
allocation of political and administrative powers at a 6 to 5 ratio, in favor of Christians,
was still based on the 1932 national census. Not taking into account the possibility of a
change in balance of numbers over time contributed to the continued rivalries between
the different groups in the country.
The First Post-Independence Civil War: The 1958 Crisis
While tensions continued to brew in the country, the major threat to the existence
of the Lebanese system was the 1958 crisis, which was instigated by the attempt of then-
president Camille Chamoun to amend the constitution in order to serve a second term.
Chamoun’s efforts to stay in office were brought about by his concern over the growth of
Nasserism’s influence on Muslims in Lebanon and his need to safeguard the Western
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imprint on the country. The perceptions of threats and violations led to an inter-
communal conflict that demanded US intervention and resulted in the replacement of
Chamoun by General Fouad Chehab as president.
This brief 1958 crisis accentuated the conflict over identity and the growing gap
between Muslims and Druze. The former believed in Lebanon’s Arab identity and
wanted to make Lebanon a member of the United Arab Republic (the unification of
Egypt and Syria) (Eken and Helbling, 1999, 185), and the latter—mostly the Maronite
majority—who supported the West (Sirriyeh, 1989, 4).
The Civil War
There is no consensus on what actually triggered the civil war in Lebanon and
played a role in prolonging it for fifteen years. Economic (Makdisi and Sadaka, 2002),
political (Khazen, 2000), social (Johnson, 2001); and regional (O’Ballance, 1998) factors
were all sited for playing the major role in its outbreak. What was agreed upon, however,
was that although the Lebanese civil war erupted in 1975, the seeds leading to its
explosion were long present and embedded in the history of Lebanon. Michael Hudson
blames the collapse of Lebanon’s political system on, “the difficulty in applying the
consociational model to developing countries” where “the system is too static to
accommodate changes unleashed by social mobilization” (Hudson, 1976, 113). The
Lebanese system, created to maintain balance and harmony between the different
confessional groups in the country, was not able to adjust to the wide-ranging political,
economic, and social developments (Najem, 1998, 10). While the Lebanese war was
dubbed civil, it can more accurately be described, in Lederach’s words, as “internal and
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internationalized” (1997, 12). In other words, even though it was fought between groups
located within the boundaries of the Lebanese state, the war was exacerbated by regional
events, most importantly by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Other factors that played a
role in extending the conflict for a period of fifteen years included: the flow of around
400,000 Palestinian refugees to Lebanon, following the creation of the state of Israel in
1948 and the many Arab-Israeli wars30; the Palestinian militant groups who fought Israel
from Lebanese territory (and also participated in the civil war alongside the Lebanese
National Movement); the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 and continued occupation of
South Lebanon until 2000 (and the Israeli support to some Lebanese Christian militias);
the Syrian military presence in the country; and the flow of arms from Iran to Lebanese
Shiite factions.
Most Lebanese date the beginning of the civil war to April 13, 1975 (Sirriyeh,
1989,4), specifically to the shooting by unidentified gunmen at a church gathering
attended by Maronite Phalange Party Leader Pierre Gemayel in Ain al-Rummaneh, in a
suburb of Beirut; this incident led to the death four Phalangists, and the subsequent
retaliatory attack by Phalangist militiamen on a bus carrying Palestinians and Muslim
Lebanese massacring 36 Palestinian occupants in the same area (Sirriyeh, 1989, 6;
Haddad, 1985, 47). Word of the Ain al-Rummaneh incidents spread like wildfire and
fighting erupted throughout the country between Christians on one side and the
Muslim/leftist/Palestinian alliance on the other (Hiro, 1993,19). Soon after the clashes
30 For more on the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, see Haddad, S. 2003. The Palestinian Impasse in Lebanon: The Politics of Refugee Integration. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press; Suleiman, J. 1999. “The current political, organizational, and security situation in the Palestinian refugee camps o f Lebanon.” Journal of Palestine Studies 29 (l):66-80.
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began, the government collapsed and the army disintegrated allowing the situation to spin
out of control for a period of fifteen years and embroiled an array of local, regional and
international actors.
While these incidents ignited the civil war, numerous factors acted as fuel for the
explosion. These include changes in demographics, where the Muslim population
outgrew that of the Christian population, leading to disproportional representation in
governmental and administrative institutions and a rising demand for more egalitarian
power-sharing; a growing economic disparity between the different groups and sectors in
society, leading to feelings of alienation among some groups. This gap unfortunately
coincided with a sectarian factor in the sense that some sects perceived themselves as
deprived of economic resources and from participation in economic decision-making; the
lack of nationalistic feelings, with people identifying themselves more in terms of
community and sect rather than the country; thecountry’s geopolitical location, which
made Lebanon an easy target for the pressures of the different external powers (Israel,
Iran, the Palestinians, Syria, the US, etc.) and a stage on which they could fight out their
own battles.
Even though the civil war is primarily described by the majority of historians and
scholars as a sectarian conflict, the aforementioned factors and the complex composition
of the opposing factions reveal the inaccuracy of such a characterization when attempting
to understand comprehensively and clearly the situation. The civil war, despite a sectarian
or confessional aspect to it, is more a war between those favoring the status quo, adamant
to maintain it (the Lebanese Front) and those seeking change it (the Lebanese National
Movement).
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The long-lasting conflict passed through several stages before it ended in 1990.
Those phases witnessed heavy fighting between different groups at different times and in
different areas of the country. Kasparian and Beaudoin divided the years of civil strife
into three stages. The first phase occurred from 1975 to 1977 and was described by
Abraham as a “left-versus-right-struggle” (Abraham, 1981,173), where fighting took
place between Christian Lebanese and Palestinians with their Lebanese allies or
supporters. In addition to fierce combat, this period also experienced a rupture of
relations between Christian Lebanese and the Syrians who entered Lebanon to defend the
Christians against Palestinian abuse (1995,18). The second stage, from 1978 to 1982,
saw continued Lebanese-Syrian fighting as well as inter-fighting in Beirut (Kasparian and
Beaudoin, 1995,19). Described as a “largely PLO war effort against the Lebanese-right”
(Abraham, 1981, 173), this stage was also chiefly defined by the Israeli invasions of 1978
and 1982. The third stage of the war, between 1983 and 1986, saw intense fighting
between different factions of the Lebanese society in different areas of the country over
chiefly ‘Lebanese issues’ (Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1995, 20; Abraham, 1981,173).
A fourth and final stage of the conflict, between 1987 and 1990, can be added to
the aforementioned model. This period was exacerbated by the emergence of two
governments—one Muslim and one Christian—each claiming legitimacy and a
deteriorated political system incapable of overcoming the crisis (Brown and Farhad,
1995, 135). This last stage was characterized by two distinct sub-periods. Firstly, in a
War of Liberation, General Michel Aoun- Prime Minister of the Christian government
launched an offensive against Syrian presence in Lebanon and called for the liberation
and independence of the country from outside forces. The fighting, which erupted
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between East Beirut (the Christian quarter of the city) and West Beirut (the Muslim
quarter of the city and a stronghold of Syria presence) soon took a sectarian character.
The Taif Accord, endorsed by the majority of Lebanese political parties in 1989, did not
put an end to the conflict. Rather, the second sub-period emerged. The War of
Elimination began on January 31, 1990 when Michel Aoun declared war on his main ally,
the Christian Lebanese Forces. This war was sparked by the support of Samir Geageah’s
(leader of the Lebanese Forces) for the National Reconciliation Agreement. Even though
it lasted less than two months, the war, “which was an intra-Christian war in the Christian
heartland,” resulted in a number of dead and wounded civilians (Brown and Farhad,
1995,136).
Failed Attempts at Containing the Conflict
In addition to the fighting, the fifteen years of civil war witnessed numerous
efforts at ending the devastating conflict. These efforts were carried out by different
actors—national, regional and international—on both the formal and informal levels.
However, these attempts failed to put an end to the fighting and violence. The major
reasons for their failure, in my opinion, were that they aimed only at quick and short-term
solutions to the conflict, falling short of reconciliation between the warring parties.
Reconciliation would have entailed developing a national consensus, reforming the
political system, dissolving militias, reconstructing the country, and demanding the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Furthermore, those attempts were top-
down, involving chiefly leadership and excluding the masses. As this research is not
about the Lebanese civil war per se, I will not present an exhaustive list of those
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interventions. Bur for the purpose of this brief historical background, I will focus on the
ones I believe impacted the evolution of the conflict and the ensuing post-conflict
developments.
Officially, efforts on a local stage involved the creation of a National Dialogue
Committee headed by then Prime Minister Rashid Karami in 1975. Even though this
initiative was launched in the early months of the war in an attempt to spare the country
from continued bloodshed, it did not amount to much more than “a dialogue of the deaf’
in which each party was committed to its own agenda and unwilling to compromise its
position (Rigby, 2000a, 12). The Dialogue Committee accentuated the two opposing
trends in Lebanese politics: a Christian (mainly Maronite) satisfaction with the status
quo, and increasing Muslim demands for constitutional reforms. Formal meetings were
also held outside Lebanon in Geneva (1983) and Damascus (1985) in order to find a
solution and put an end to the conflict. Even though those failed to bring an immediate
cessation to the hostilities, they allowed for the discussion of important elements and
were important steps in the incremental process that led to the Taif Accord in 1989
(Krayem, 1997).
Also on a formal level, a regional intervention by the Arab League was launched
in the Summit conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in October 1976. A major limitation of
the conference was in its failure to address the underlying political and demographic
problems. By only touching upon the security situation, its proposed prescriptions for the
Lebanese conflict intended only short-term treatment. The resulting agreement mandated
a cease-fire in Lebanon and dispatched an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to impose and
supervise its application. The peacekeeping force was predominantly composed of the
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Syrians, with some Saudi Arabian, Persian Gulf States, Libyan and Sudanese forces
backup. The ADF was not successful in controlling the PLO or imposing the cease-fire
and became an active participant when, in 1978, clashes erupted between the ADF and
the Christian militias. At that point, Arab foreign ministers created the Arab Follow-Up
Committee, composed of Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, in order to end
fighting between the Syrians and Christians. The Committee was unsuccessful in
resolving the dispute and reaching a political settlement. Unfortunately, internal and
regional factors worked against the Arab initiative. Soon after being dispatched to the
warring country, the ADF forces—with the exception of the Syrians (who were the
majority)—withdrew from Lebanon. The ADF initiative, thus, rather than put an end to
the violence and hostilities in Lebanon, in fact legitimized and subsidized the Syrian
presence (some will call it ‘occupation’) in the country. The Syrian forces remained a
major power broker in Lebanese affairs and withdrew from Lebanon following a popular
protest rally in April 2005.
The civil war in Lebanon was not only the concern of regional states and leaders.
On a formal international level, the United States was able in 1981, through its special
envoy Ambassador Philip Flabib, to put an end to the fighting that erupted in 1978
between the Israelis and Palestinians in Lebanon. This mediated cease-fire was respected
by both parties, for ten months, before a string of incidents led to the full-fledged Israeli
invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982; the latter’s mission was to destroy PLO forces in
the country. Throughout this period, Ambassador Habib worked on a settlement that
would lead to the evacuation of Syrian troops and the monitoring of PLO fighters from
Beirut by a three-nation Multinational Force (MNF), composed of Americans, French
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and Italians (Knudsen, 2005, 2). A series of devastating suicide attacks led to the
withdrawal of the MNF less than two years after it was first deployed in September 1982
(Knudsen, 2005, 2). This withdrawal agreement, which also would lead to an Israeli pull-
out from most of the Lebanese territories, was signed on May 17, 1983 by the
representatives of Lebanon, Israel, and the United States. However, the agreement was
fragile and contested by a number of parties—not surprising given the internal divisions
within the country, as well as at the regional and international levels. The Israelis did not
believe it to be in their interest; the Syrians opposed it on grounds that it presented a
threat to their security interests; the ‘Muslims’ in Lebanon thought of it as humiliating to
the country; the Soviet Union saw in it as an American gain; Iran opposed it and the
American presence in Lebanon, etc. After a series of suicide bombing attacks on the
American Embassy and marine barracks in Lebanon by Iranian-sponsored groups, the
United States withdrew its forces in 1984. The Lebanese Government, under tremendous
pressures by Syria and the Muslims, announced on March 5, 1984 that it was canceling
its unimplemented agreement with Israel.
Reviewing the failure of each of these formal efforts demonstrates that they all
focused heavily on the political and official levels and merely attempted to contain the
conflict, rather than to deal efficiently with the root causes of the problem. The
continuation of war called for a different type of interventions to take place on an
informational level and include non-officials. One such initiative in 1984 was the
interactive problem-solving forums initiated by Edward Azar, an American political
scientist from Lebanese origin (Azar, 1990). Assessing the different failed intervention,
Azar saw that the Lebanese conflict was not going to be resolved by solely focusing on
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the political actors on an official level. He argued that a better way for dealing with the
conflict was to informally bring influential representatives of the various religious and
political groupings in Lebanon to a common setting in which respective needs and fears
could be shared and discussed (Fisher, 1997a, 245). Such forums in which identity-based
concerns are addressed were considered to be an appropriate mean by which a
breakthrough from intractable conflict to peace can be achieved. So in 1984, various
religious and political leaders from the different factions in Lebanon were brought
together to the United States for a series of meetings. The objective of the meetings was
to provide a forum for the parties to “share the fears and goals of each and to outline the
principles for movement towards a united Lebanon” (Keashly and Fisher, 1996, 256).
The first meeting produced a consensual agreement on an independent and integrated
Lebanon. The second meeting worked more on outlining the principles for this united
country and establishing an informal network for ongoing discussion (Keashly and
Fisher, 1996, 256).
Although the results of those meetings were not readily apparent, the ongoing
network did “produce a ‘National Covenant Document’ in 1988, outlining the steps for
reunification that were integrated into the 1989 Taif agreement that brought peace to
Lebanon” (Keashly and Fisher, 1986, 256). Despite the fact that it did not immediately
put an end to the conflict, this effort was of particular importance for two main reasons.
First, it was innovative in bringing Lebanese from different communities and groups
together, to talk openly about their grievances and demands in a forum outside Lebanon
and try to find common solutions to the problem facing the country. Second, it provided
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the foundation for the officially sponsored Taif agreement, which ended the Lebanese
war years later, in 1989.
In addition to these forums, other informal initiatives inside Lebanon were also
taking place, including peace campaigns, marches, protests, and demonstrations. These
were organized by civil society groups and activists who wanted to defy the emerging
reality of sectarian and religious divisions in the country and to put an end to the
bloodshed claiming the life of hundreds of thousands of people (Messarra, 1988). These
movements brought together a large number of Lebanese from different backgrounds and
from all walks of life. Even though these efforts did not directly put an end to the
violence, they provided the necessary signs for warring parties that time had come for
some compromises to be made to try and find an acceptable solution to the long-lasting
conflict.
Despite all these efforts on both formal and informal levels, the war in Lebanon
continued for fifteen years. The major reason behind the failure of these interventions lies
in the following: their ineffectiveness in dealing with the root causes of the conflict; their
focus on short-term solutions to the problem, which aim at mainly putting an end to the
direct violence and promoting some kind of coexistence between the different
communities; and their failure to address a number of fundamental issues, such as
structural and cultural change, and justice and reconciliation between the communities,
”3 1 that would lead to long-term stability. Furthermore, these efforts were mainly
31 For a chronological table of the major agreements and attempts at settlement,see Conference on Lebanon, American Task Force for Lebanon, Working Paper (June 27-30, 1991) Washington, DC: 79-80. Also see description of different interventions: 81-88.
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undertaken at the official level, failing to include the people or mass level and lacking
appropriate follow-up and ways to help people deal with the past.
Consequences and Costs of the Civil War
Fifteen years of war had a devastating toll on Lebanon and its people. Like every
civil conflict, it left behind a legacy of physical, social, psychological, economic, and
political destruction. The absence of official and reliable data, facts and figures as well as
detailed statistical studies on the impacts of the war presents a challenge to any attempt to
offer exact numbers and percentages of the costs and damages. However, one can get a
good idea about the extent of the devastation from the numerous scholarly and media
accounts on the civil war and its aftermath.
Human destruction: It is estimated that between 150,000 and 200,000 (around 7%
of the population) men, women, and children lost their lives during the civil war and
more than 300,000 (or 10% of the population) were seriously injured. In addition to the
death and injury tolls, some 20,000 Lebanese have been missing or unaccounted for since
the civil war period (O’Ballance, 1998). The conflict also led to the displacement of a
million people (about one third of the total population); more than a million others fled
the country. Those waves of forced migrations had a tremendous impact on the country’s
social makeup and coexistence, which is still felt in the country today. Mixed areas were
replaced by relatively homogenous ones. This segregation along confessional lines has
led to diminished interaction between the communities, a reality reflected in uni
confessional political parties, schools, and workplaces—a phenomenon that Robert Fisk
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dubbed “cantonization” (1990). Furthermore, the unprecedented degree of emigration led
to an increased brain-drain and the loss of half of the country’s manpower (Saidi, 1986).
Physical devastation: The fifteen years of conflict led to massive physical
destruction—estimated at $25 billion (Knudsen, 2005,1). Commercial and residential
centers; industrial plants; and housing units were ravaged. Social infrastructure, such as
schools and hospitals were damaged; public services like education, health, housing,
electricity, water, communications and transportation were destroyed and in constant
shortage. The effects of this physical damage can still be felt in Lebanon today: hundreds
of thousands of people are still without homes; schools and hospitals in rural areas have
not been rebuilt; shortage of electricity and water is a characteristic of daily life.
Furthermore, the war has completely or partially destroyed hundreds of towns and
villages throughout the country (Feghali, 1997).
Economic breakdown: The Lebanese economy, which was vibrant and strong in
the pre-war period, remained stable for a few years after the beginning of the conflict
before it began collapsing (Mackey, 1989; Rabinovich, 1985). Mackey blames the years
of destruction, the erosion of the social fabric, and the sense of hopelessness for the
destruction of the economy. She notes, “Everything that propelled Lebanon’s prewar
prosperity had either been destroyed or fatally curtailed by the war” (Mackey, 1989, 227).
The decline in service sector (banking, tourism, education, and health care—the
backbone of the country’s economy—trade and budgetary deficits, low “growth rate of
domestic production and spending” (Saidi, 1986), inflation, and devaluation of the
Lebanese pound brought the country to unfamiliar levels of underdevelopment (Saidi,
1986; Mackey, 1989). This was intensified by the declining confidence in the Lebanese
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market, the soaring levels of inflation, and the arrest in foreign investment (Adwan and
Sahyoun, 2001). The structural and infrastructural destruction was estimated at billions of
dollars and the reconstruction process, which was launched at the end of the war, sucked
the country into more debt. The government’s loss of control was illustrated in the
militias’ powers to the extent where such groups had their own services and taxation
systems to parallel (sometime even replace) governmental institutions and structures
(Adwan and Sahyoun, 2001; Picard, 2000). So at the end of the war, the economy was in
shambles with a $2.2. billion GDP and sky-high inflation (Knudsen, 2005, 4). And
despite the fact that Lebanon “was unable to attract significant foreign aid to help rebuild
the country” (Knudsen, 2005, 5), the Lebanese economy has only returned to its feet
since the early 1990s, with the revival of tourism and banking. This revival, however,
was short-lived: in July 2006, the Israeli attack on Lebanon plunged the country back in
destitution—the destruction of infrastructure and houses, the crippling of tourism, the
large wave of internal displacement and of emigration—brought back Lebanon to the
1970s.
Political collapse: It did not take long after the beginning of the civil war for the
shaky political structure—one of the many factors contributing to war in the first place—
to crumble. The weakening and collapse of the government, the paralysis of the divided
political system, and the inability to curb hostilities led to the disintegration of the central
authority and the emergence of militias that grew into entities with their own institutions
such as media outlets, schools, hospitals, etc. (Mackey, 1989, 230). The State’s public
institutions were undermined: the army was split along sectarian lines; the parliament
disintegrated; the judiciary came under the control of warlords; control agencies were
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paralyzed; and corruption was rampant (Adwan and Sahyoun, 2001). Furthermore, the
absence of central authority led to continued foreign intervention in Lebanese affairs.
Throughout the war, external forces either directly participated in the conflict or
indirectly financed and armed the different militias and parties. The susceptibility of the
Lebanese entity to regional and foreign will and forces is still very much the case today.
Psychological and emotional destruction: In addition to these ‘visible’
consequences on Lebanese citizens, the lengthy civil war left immeasurable emotional
and psychological scars that are deeply entrenched in their consciousness. Samir Khalaf
noted that a state of demoralization prevailed over Lebanese—a state agitated by fear,
intimidation, humiliation, and helplessness (1987). Citizens were not able to secure their
basic and physical needs for survival, but have been instead “compelled to resort to
devious and irregular means to guarantee water, electricity, telephone, and fuel” (Khalaf,
1987, 243). Add to this the loss of loved ones, the loss of homes, uprootedness, etc. and
one has a greater understanding of how all these experiences shaped and continue to
shape the Lebanese.
Internal Displacement
The most devastating consequence of the Lebanese civil war came in the form of
massive internal displacement, which affected every area of the country and left almost
one third of the country’s population displaced. Repeated waves of displacement
occurred throughout the period of the civil war and, at its height, amounted to one million
displaced people throughout the country (Assaf and El-Fil, 2000, 31). In other words, a
substantial number of the Lebanese (the total population of Lebanon is estimated at 3-3.5
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million) found themselves, at some point during the war, fleeing their homes and seeking
refuge in ‘safer’ areas of the country. The lack of exact and reliable numbers on displaced
persons and the discrepancies in estimates from one source to another are, in large part
due to the difficulty in gathering such information during war situations and in part due to
the absence of a system of registration. While the UN Inter-Agency Mission to Lebanon
in 1991 estimated the number to be around 900,000; local estimates range between
500,000 and 900,000” (Feghali, 1993, 2). However, the many estimates which place the
number of displaced at about 40% of the total population, brings the phenomenon of
forced displacement to the fore of Lebanon’s war and post-war problems.
The distinct stages of the civil war, presented by Kasparian and Beaudoin,
coincided with the different large waves of displacement: the first wave at the beginning
of the war was characterized by ‘confessional divisions’ and saw a Christian exodus from
Zahle, the Bekaa, the North region, and the Shouf towards the Metn, Keserwan and East
Beirut (1995). The Christian displacement from the Shouf was caused by a series of
massacres by Druze in retaliation to Kamal Jumblat’s assassination. This period also
witnessed a Shi’a displacement from the South as a result of Israel’s aggressive policies
and incursion towards West Beirut and its suburbs (Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1995, 18-
19). Within Beirut, displacement took a sectarian character: “about 40,000 inhabitants
from the Christian pockets in the south-western suburbs around which predominantly
Muslim suburbs and Palestinians camps had subsequently spread” left their homes to
resettle in predominantly Christian areas in East Beirut (Hanf, 1993, 345). At the same
time, a Muslim counter-movement from east to west was taking place (Hanf, 1993, 345).
The division of Beirut into a Christian, eastern sector and a Muslim, western one along a
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demarcation line was the result of such confessionally-based resettlement. This first wave
of displacement involved between 250,000 and 300,000 persons, i.e. about 40% “of the
total of the displaced population between 1975 and 1987” (Feghali, 1993, 2).
The Christian exodus from the Bekaa and Beirut continued through the second
stage of the war (Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1995, 19-20). In addition, flight from South
Lebanon as a result of the Israeli invasion and from Beirut, the North Bekaa valley and
Mount Lebanon due to intensive fighting resulted in the displacement of 150,000 people,
or 20% of the total displaced population (Feghali, 1993, 2). The third phase of the war
exacerbated the situation in the Shouf and witnessed yet further Christian mass flight
from the area, which according to Kasparian and Beaudoin, “emptied the Shouf from its
Christian population” (1995, 20). This massive wave of displacement from the Shouf, in
addition to flight from east Sidon, resulted in the displacement of 200,000 persons or
about 35% of the total number of displaced and constituted the most serious wave of
forced displacement in the country (Feghali, 1993, 2). We should also add one final phase
of the war (1989-1990) to Kasparian’s model, as those last years of civil war further
witnessed a massive Christian exodus from Iklim Al-Kharoub and East Sidon (Faour,
1993,180) and a movement towards Keserwan and the North (Kasparian and Beaudoin,
1995, 22). This stage saw the displacement of yet another 160,000 persons (Feghali,
1993,2).
As is apparent from those waves of displacement, the problem has affected every
segment of the Lebanese population everywhere in the country; it was not confined either
to members of one religious community or to one specific area. Collelo elaborated more
on such displacement in terms of scope and duration and noted that it was sometimes
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heavy and at other times intermittent; mostly fast, but sometimes slow; temporary (e.g.
the case of the evacuation from Beirut during the Israeli invasion and siege in 1982 when
the majority of the people returned home after the Israeli withdrawal) or permanent (e.g.
the case of the Shi’a and Palestinian exile from East Beirut in 1976; the Christian
expulsion from the Shouf area in 1983; and the Shi’a evictions from South Lebanon as a
result of Israeli aggressions - in those cases, displaced people never returned home and
are up till this day ‘displaced’) (1989, 52). Hence, people from different sects and
different areas all suffered from displacement. According to government figures, at the
end of the war, displacement from Mount Lebanon was the highest at 62% of the total,
followed by South Lebanon 23.6% and Beirut at 7.9% (Hobeika, 1992).
Table 1. Areas from which displacement occurred
Area of Displacement Percentage
Beirut 7.9%
Mount Lebanon 62%
North Lebanon 4.2%
South Lebanon 23.6%
Bekaa 2.3%
Total 100%
Sources: Ministry of Displaced; UNDP
Movements of resettlement countered those of exodus. Different areas saw waves
of arriving families: Beirut and its suburbs (20.5%), South Lebanon (17.8%), Mount
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Lebanon (49.4%), the Bekaa (6.8%) and North Lebanon (4.2%) saw large resettlement
movements (Hobeika, 1992).
* Table 2. Areas where displaced settled or relocated
Area of Relocation Percentage
Beirut 20.5%
Mount Lebanon 49.4%
North Lebanon 4.2%
South Lebanon 17.8%
Bekaa 6.8%
Outside the country 1.3%
Total 100%
Sources: Ministry of Displaced; UNDP
In addition to the division along geographical or regional lines, some analysts
have categorized IDPs along sectarian lines. The politicized environment along religious
lines explains the different numbers found in the research on this population. According
to Faour, Shi’a had the highest number of displaced families, followed by Maronites,
Sunnis, Catholics, Orthodox, and Druze (Faour, 1993, 33). However, Sayah noted that
80% of those displaced are Christians (2002, 126). Boutros Labaki also supports Sayah’s
reported number of Christians affected by displacement and compares them to the
approximate 20% Muslims who suffered from uprooting (Labaki, 207). Due to the
political sensitivity of the issue, no official estimates exist regarding the sectarian
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division of the displaced populations. The emphasis of the process, from the beginning,
has been on common suffering and equal treatment—how displacement has equally
devastated all communities in the country and how the response to the plight has not
differentiated between people on the basis of their religious or sectarian affiliation.
However, in primary field surveys conducted by the Internal Security Forces in 1991, the
following data was found:
Table 3. Displacement according to sect
Sect Percentage
Muslim- Sunni 18%
Muslim- Shi’a 33%
Druze 1.9%
Muslim- others 0.9%
Christian- Maronite 31%
Christian- Orthodox 6%
Christian-Catholic 8%
Christian-others 1%
Unspecified 0.2%
Total 100%
Sources: Ministry o f Displaced
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The results of the survey showed that 53.8% of the displaced were Muslim and
that 46% were Christians. Talking about displacement in such sectarian terms remains an
issue of contention today and no other official survey was done on a sectarian level to
prove or disprove the findings.
Another survey of IDPs was based on age categories. It is estimated that most of
those displaced where children and young adults, which explains the challenges of
reintegration and low rate of return (detailed later in the chapter).
Table 4. Age distribution of the displaced population
Age group Percentage
0-14 24.27%
15-24 22.01%
25-34 18.79%
35-44 10.97%
45-54 8.46%
55-64 7.09%
65+ 5.74%
Undetermined 2.67%
Total 100%
Source: Ministry of Displaced
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Focus of the Study
For the purpose of this study, the geographical focus will be Mount Lebanon and
South Lebanon, as they are the areas that were most affected by ‘permanent’ long-term
internal displacement and have been the focus of all governmental return programs and
policies in the country. Furthermore, the diverse factors and conditions of displacement
and resettlement of these two areas shed light on the different aspects and challenges of
the return process and provide a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the
problem.
Displacement from Mount Lebanon was the result of local conflicts and
massacres which erupted between the Maronites and Druze after the Israeli withdrawal
from the area and which ultimately resulted in the expulsion of Christians from the Shouf
(Sayah, 2002,121). These communal waves of displacement from Mount Lebanon
villages and cities followed acts of violence, which began in Iklim Al-Kharoub and the
Shouf coast spread to other areas of the North Metn (Metn al Shamali), Baabda and Aley-
all confessionally mixed villages where Druze and Christians lived together (Faour, 1993,
79). While the calm periods in the 1970s encouraged some Christians to return home
after short periods of displacement, the waves of the 1980s were more permanent and
substantial return to those areas has not happened as of yet.
Displacement from South Lebanon was mostly associated with the Israeli
occupation and large-scale destruction. The exodus from the South, which mainly
affected the people from the Shi’a sect, occurred mostly in a sudden fashion and did not
leave them any time to take any of their belongings with them. Migration movements
from areas on the border increased when Israeli aggressions intensified and what most
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people had hoped would be a short-term relocation but had turned into long-term
permanent resettlement—mostly in the distraught areas of southern suburbs of Beirut
(Faour, 1993, 96). As they previously owned “productive land, livestock, small
businesses, and homes,” these people felt abruptly dispossessed, in economic hardship,
and living in overcrowded unfit rooms and apartments (Sherry, 1999, 5). According to
participants in the National Congress for Displaced People, the revival of public
institutions in those areas and the restoration of government sovereignty over all
Lebanese territory are conditions necessary to end the problem of displaced people in
South Lebanon (Shehab, 1992; Kandeel, 1992). However, it was acknowledged that the
solution to the IDPs from the South was not solely in the hands of the government, but
was dependent on Israel’s withdrawal: it was only after Israel ended its occupation of and
presence in those areas that a state strategy to rebuild the villages and return the IDPs
could begin (Faour, 1992).
It is important to note that included in the category of displaced people from the
South is the wave of IDPs from Eastern Sidon (which consists of 12 villages) in 1985.
This movement was not the result of Israeli military attacks or occupation, but rather the
consequence of inter-communal violence and intimidation, which forced 90% of the
Christian residents of this area to flee their homes and properties. One participant in the
1992 National Congress described the situation in those villages: all houses were looted;
20% were totally destroyed; 20% were partially destroyed; crops were damaged; and
water, electricity and telephone lines have been cut. This poses a challenge to the process
of return to those areas (Kweiter, 1992).
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At the national level, these different waves of displacement resulted in
homogeneous religious geographical areas or districts in different parts of the country
(Dagher, 2000, 83). Such outcome illustrated the beginning of a phenomenon that
continued throughout the war years and increasingly replaced the mixed, heterogeneous
living situations that had hitherto characterized Lebanon. The consecutive waves of
displacement, then, resulted in the shake-up of the country’s national unity and
intensified confessional divisions/feelings. The basic instinct of people, uprooted from
their homes by hatred, hostility and fear, was to seek safe haven in areas dominated by
their co-religionists (Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1995,18). This led, according to Sirriyeh
to “a drastic redrawing of the country’s social geography” (1989, 22).
At the individual and communal levels, such dislocation resulted in the displaced
people’s loss of “economic and social status,” as well as living standards where they had
to “live in dire conditions in illegally occupied vacant houses, hotels, and plots of land”
(Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1995, 11). Others sought refuge in schools, theaters, business
buildings, embassy buildings, cultural centers, health centers, etc. where they resettled
(Table 5). The housing problem had economic repercussions to it during the repatriation
process: most of the displaced families had illegally occupied houses or rooms and a huge
amount of the money allocated had to be paid for evictions and compensations (Table 6).
For the most part, hence, those displaced stayed in those unlivable shelters with little
food, poor sanitation and health, lack of employment (Table 7), and education (Table 8).
According to Assaf and Fil, “the fragmentation and disintegration of the government
made it impossible to put a halt to illegal occupation and/or provide IDPs with shelter,
security, food, and medical care” (Assaf and El-Fil, 2000, 31).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5. Types of accommodations during displacement
Accommodation Percentage
House 29%
Apartment 58%
Chalet 1.5%
Room in school or monastery 1.4%
Room in uninhabitable buildings 3.3%
Shack 1.1%
Multi-family room/Shared room 1%
Others 4.7%
Total 100%
Source: Ministry o f Displaced
Table 6. Mode of occupation
Mode of occupation Percentage
Own house and/or land 18%
Legal rent 17%
Staying for free with relatives or 14%
friends
Staying for free legally with the 2%
help of an organization
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Staying for free legally with 9%
the help of a political party
Illegal occupation of the 12%
residence for free with the help
of a political party
Illegal occupation of the 22%
residence for free by personal
initiative
Others 6%
Total 100%
Source: Ministry of Displaced
Table 7. Employment status
Status Percentage
Employed 25.05%
Unemployed 74.95%
Total 100%
Source: Ministry of Displaced
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Table 8. Levels of education
Level Percentage
University 10%
Technical 5%
High school 11%
Middle school 24%
Elementary school 50%
Total 100%
Source: Ministry of Displaced
In addition to these visible problems, one should keep in mind the emotional and
psychological traumas inflicted on those people. This not only worsened the situation
during displacement but also posed a challenge to the return process. More on the plight
of IDPs and the return policy is provided below when analyzing the response to this
uprooted population.
Taif Agreement
The Taif Summit was not much different from preceding interventions in terms of
being limited to the formal official level and its failure to resolve, rather than manage, the
underlying causes of the conflict. However, it did differ in three major aspects: first, it
had at its foundation the National Covenant Document in which participants in Azar’s
forums prescribed ways of ending the conflict; second, it was convened at a time when all
parties were worn out by the conflict; and third, it dealt with the Muslim community’s
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grievances while preserving Christian rights and power through introducing amendments
to the Lebanese political system and structure.
A Tripartite Arab High Commission from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Algeria
established in May 1989 sponsored this official initiative that brought together Lebanese
deputies in Taif, Saudi Arabia in September of that same year. The timing of the
initiative was perfect: after fifteen years of fighting, the parties to the conflict had reached
what Zartman calls a ‘hurting stalemate’ and thus were willing to seek peace (1985).
After long and intense negotiations, participants endorsed a draft of the agreement on
September 30. Formally adopted by the Lebanese parliament upon return to Lebanon (58
of the 62 attending endorsed the accord on October 22 (Brown and Farhad, 1995, 135)
and ratified in early October of that same year, the agreement became known as the Taif
Agreement or the Charter of National Reconciliation. Even though it “did not mark any
radical departure from the National Pact of 1943” (Rigby, 2000b, 175), as it upheld the
* consociational principle that had existed since the creation of the country, it did introduce
amendments to the power sharing formula in the sense that it became more reflective of
the demographic reality (although some believe that it opted for a balanced egalitarian
representation rather than real proportional one): the 6-5 ratio was replaced by a 6:6
division of power. Such egalitarian representation in governmental and administrative
positions, rather than encouraging nationalistic feelings in the country, strove to “regulate
32 The last parliamentary election in Lebanon took place in 1972 before civil war erupted in the country. 62 of the 73 surviving deputies agreed to meet in Taif to discuss an end to the war. Those 62 deputies were equally divided between Christians and Muslims (31 of each group). A major debate at the time was the extent to which those members of the parliament were representatives of the people and can make decisions and sign agreements on their behalf. It is however important to note that during most of the civil war, the democratic electoral system o f the country was not totally paralyzed: presidential elections took place in 1976 and in 1982.
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the conflict of interest between the various sects” (Rigby, 2000b, 175). Hence, with no
clear victor, the long and devastating Lebanese war ended in a stalemate with the Taif
Accord.
The atmosphere in the Taif was detached from the reality on the ground and it
was not until December 24, 1990 (more than a year later) that the hopes for implementing
the Accord began to materialize. The delay was caused, most importantly, by General
Michel Aoun’s War of Elimination. After the defeat of Aoun, “a new government of
national reconciliation—composed of 30 ministers representing most militias, religious
and political groups—was formed and charged with implementing the Taif Accord”
(Brown and Farhad, 1995, 137). After a long period of extreme divisions, illustrated by
two competing governments from 1988 to 1990, this first government was a proof of the
egalitarian representation introduced by the Taif Agreement.
The post-Taif system remained much like the one that prevailed before the civil
war. The signatories to the agreement did not introduce any drastic changes to the
confessional structure, but rather ‘revised’ it to better respond to the changing
demographics and realities on the ground. This was translated in a more balanced
distribution and division of power between the different branches of the government-
some kind of ‘checks and balances.’ In order to meet this goal, some of the executive
powers of the President (a Maronite Christian) were transferred to the Cabinet (where
Christians and Muslims were to be equally represented) and the Prime Minister (a Sunni
Muslim) who presides over the cabinet. The authority of the Speaker of the House (a
Shi’a Muslims) was increased and his term extended from one year to four years (the
length of a parliament’s term). Furthermore, the Taif Agreement instituted binding
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consultation by which the president was compelled to consult with parliament members
before appointing a Prime Minister. The legislature or the parliament seats were
increased to 128 allowing for parity between Christians and Muslims.
Beyond the fact that it put an end to the devastating civil war and introduced a
‘balanced’ division of power, the Taif Agreement is criticized for not bringing positive
peace to the country but rather the mere absence of war (i.e. negative peace). The
Agreement’s limitation lies in the fact that it managed the conflict (short-term solution)
rather than resolved it (long-term response). It failed to deal effectively with the root
causes of the conflict (political, economic, social, etc.), and the needs and grievances of
the grassroots or the Lebanese or even to include people in the negotiation, settlement or
implementation process. By not addressing these grievances and needs, the agreement did
not permit, let alone encourage, reconciliation. Sectarian hatreds among Muslim and
Christian adversary groups, which contributed to the outbreak of the war and its
continuation for fifteen years, did not simply cease to exist after the war ended, and
according to Farid El-Khazen, "This wound has not healed" (Hockstaher, 1999). "The
idea is that we should forget the war, turn the page and move on. It's a scandal"
(Hockstaher, 1999). According to a participant in the National Congress, “the Taif even
failed to reconcile all warlords with each other... Instead, it deepened sectarian conflicts
among political figures” (Mroueh, 1992).
The ‘forget and move on’ approach was most acutely illustrated by the
appointment of the warlords to the first ‘national government’ after the war. National
33 The 128 seats in the parliament are distributed equally between Muslims and Christians. The 64 Muslim seats are divided as follows: 27 Sunnis, 27 Shia, 8 Druze and 2 Alawis. The 64 Christian seats are divided as follows: 34 Maronites, 14 Greek Orthodox, 8 Greek Catholics, 5 Armenian Orthodox, 1 Armenian Catholic, 1 Protestant, and 1 other Christian sect (Brown and Farhad, 136).
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reconciliation was understood as the distribution of state institutions and political
authority among the many warlords. This provided the latter with the power to “issue
themselves a general amnesty covering all the crimes of the war and its atrocities”
(Adwan and Sahyoun, 2001), without having to deal with these horror or allow the people
to come to terms with their past.34 In a country that had witnessed gross human-rights
violations and multiple, brutal massacres of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians carried out
by all sects, such amnesty was a prescription for instability (Fisk, 1992). The memory of
the atrocities of war had not been erased from the minds of the people, and therefore,
required addressing. In order for Lebanese to come to terms with those events and be
able to move on with their lives, investigations should have taken place and the culpable
brought to trial. There must be reconciliation and forgiveness for an effective resolution
to take place. The different groups involved need to talk about the past, but the General
Amnesty law was a large impediment to that.
It became clear that the mere signing of the Charter of National Reconciliation did
not necessarily mean that the process of reconciliation was successful or that it was
unproblematic. In the Lebanese post-conflict context, the “inclusion of all parties in the
decision making process; economic reconstruction; reintegration of former militants and
fighters; repatriating hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons;
restructuring the police force; strengthening civil society; human rights protection;
institutionalizing the rule of law; and establishing democratic governance,” are all
34 The General Amnesty Law (Law 94/91) was passed by the Lebanese government in 1991. It granted amnesty for all crimes committed by militias and armed groups before March 28, 1991. This law not only stopped legal actions against war crimes but also initiated a process by which militias were turned into parties and their leaders assumed ministerial posts
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challenges to the process, especially that concrete steps on how to deal with these issues
were not incorporated into the Agreement (Ero, 2000).
Post-War Reconciliation?
The centrality of reconciliation for the issue under study necessitates that I first
analyze this concept as it applies to the Lebanese context, even though the subject is dealt
with in different parts of the research and will be further assessed with relation to IDP
return in subsequent chapters. It is important to note that the Lebanese have recognized
the importance of post-war reconciliation, as is exemplified in the Taif Agreement (aka
the Document of National Reconciliation). The centrality of reconciliation for state-
building in areas emerging from years of civil war and destruction has been increasingly
acknowledged in the literature, as noted in the previous chapter. Long and Brecke have
further suggested that the low-cost forgiveness approach works best in redressing
divisions and ending sectarian animosity in such deeply divided, post-conflict societies
(Long and Brecke, 2003). While the Taif Agreement was theoretically intended to
accomplish that, there is very little proof that such objectives were effectively translated
to practice. Lebanon has not witnessed any post-war reconciliation or public conciliation
processes of any form (e.g. truth commissions, public apologetics, etc.). As mentioned
above, the post-conflict settlement had led to the inevitability of such practices through
the issuance of an Amnesty Law, which implicitly encouraged forgetting rather than
forgiving. A common observation was made by most of those interviewed for this study,
namely, that Lebanese people themselves are not done with the war.... They still have
feelings of anger and mistrust against people who belong to other ‘sectarian’
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communities, even if they are neighbors... They did not get the chance to reconcile. Farid
el-Khazen, commenting on the post-war political process, corroborated that what
remained “missing in the transition from war to peace was national reconciliation” (2003,
59).
This continues to be the case today. Sixteen years after the end of the war we still
have not seen a revival of social heterogeneity, which had been the country’s main
characteristic before the start of the war. Rather than the mixed confessional pre-war
make-up, for the most part, villages and towns have become uni-confessional (Knudsen,
2005,16). Nasr illustrates this feature of pre-war Lebanon by noting that 44% of the 1330
villages and towns in Lebanon had inhabitants of more than one sect (2003, 149). (This is
an issue is elaborated later in this chapter). This reality is likely to continue, especially in
light of the continued failure at repatriating IDPs to their areas of origin. That such return
has not been successful (i.e. did not meet the stated objective of full resettlement of IDPs)
is the most prominent testament to the absence of national reconciliation in the country
(Global IDP Database, 2004; Knudsen, 2005,16).
Reconstruction Process
The newly appointed government’s priority was to get the country back on its feet
by dealing with the physical, structural and mental destruction legacy left behind by
fifteen years of civil war. For this purpose, it launched an aggressive post-war
reconstruction strategy that involved, in addition to the restructuring of the political
system (as agreed upon in the Taif Accord), economic, structural, and infrastructural
reconstruction (Kaldor, 1999, 133-4). However, as Esposito rightfully asserted,
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rebuilding Lebanon is not merely about institutions, it is more importantly about people
(Esposito, xiii-xv). As the case of Lebanon today portrays, the physical reconstruction of
the country without human healing and reconciliation cannot lead to peace and
development.
The overarching government belief of national unity—as it came to be known-
meant a belief that Lebanon would recover from the years of conflict through a program
of reconstruction and development; this would require going beyond the pressing
emergency needs of the country, to include investments in different sectors: physical
infrastructure (electricity, telecommunications, roads, etc.); social infrastructure
(education, culture, health, social affairs, housing and resettlement); public services
(water, waste, public transportation); productive sectors (agriculture, industry, tourism,
etc.); and status apparatus (government buildings, security forces, rehabilitation of public
administration, etc.). Even though such reconstruction was to take place in the different
regions of the country, precedence was given to Beirut and efforts were focused on the
rebuilding of a new central business sector in the capital city which would “serve as a
symbol for reconstruction and would house Lebanon’s reborn financial sector that would
then stimulate further economic development” (Adwan and Sahyoun, 2001).
Acknowledging the challenges and enormity of such a reconstruction project, a
two-phased program, known as Horizon 2000, was introduced in 1993 as a framework by
which such work would be implemented. Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was the main
benefactor of that $20 billion reconstruction program which aimed at “IMF-like
macroeconomic stabilization through currency revaluation” (Adwan and Sahyoun, 2001).
The plan was based on a “borrow-to-builf ’ strategy and was funded by grants and loans
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from countries, organizations, aid agencies, and banks (Knudsen, 2005, 5; Najem, 1998).
The priorities of the Lebanese government, however, were reflected in the program: the
first phase, for which most of the funds were allocated, focused on rebuilding basic
infrastructure—i.e. on reconstruction. Social infrastructure or development was the object
of a less funded and less publicized Phase II (Najem, 1998, 63). In other words, Horizon
2000 was conceived to have a “two-fold task: 1. provide the private sector with an
economic and financial environment conducive to the revitalization of its activities and to
the resumption of its investments; 2. consolidate public confidence in the (one) state and
the future of the country” (Norkonmaa, 1995). Other programs sponsored by the Council
for Development and Reconstruction, such as the National Emergency Reconstruction
Program, and other private companies, such as Solidere (a private real estate company
which focused on the rebuilding of downtown Beirut) were also involved in the
reconstruction process (Najem, 1998, 46).
The slow progress in reconstructing the country illustrates the challenges posed
by post-conflict situations, on the one hand, and, on the other: the “lack of serious
government commitment to such projects; the inability of the government, weakened by
years of war, to efficiently implement such a large project; and the lack of available
financial resources” on the other (Najem, 1998, 31-2). The daunting process of planning,
financing and executing a comprehensive program of reconstruction was estimated at no
less than $20-30 billion, which required various forms of substantial international
financial and technical support and assistance. Mobilizing such resources has proven a
challenge for Lebanon despite the creation of the International Fund for the Assistance of
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Lebanon (IFAL), provided for by the Taif Accord, in order to rehabilitate and reconstruct
the country (Feghali, 1993, 3-4).
Throughout the post-conflict years, numerous donors—both governmental and
international—contributed to the reconstruction process. These included Arab agencies
and organizations such as the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the
Kuwait Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, the Abu Dhabi Fund; European countries
and organizations such as France, Germany, Italy, and the European Community; and
from international governmental and non-governmental organizations, such the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Fund for Agricultural
Development, and several UN agencies (Feghali, 1993, 3-4). However, the contributions
allocated to the process of reconstruction in Lebanon were not enough. As a result, today,
efforts at rebuilding and rehabilitating the destroyed country are still ongoing.
Concerning internal displacement, one of the most severe social needs, which the
program aimed to meet, was aimed at repatriating people to their homes of origin by
restoring basic needs such as electricity, water, infrastructure (sewage systems, roads,
etc.), and communicative technologies (phone lines, etc.). The overarching belief was that
such projects would establish an environment in which citizens could resume their
normal life. However, the housing and resettlement sector only accounted for 9% of the
Horizon program and was based mostly on grants and loans to the displaced and those
living in war-damaged houses (Najem, 1998, 79). The limitations of such an approach
and the limited funding for an enormous political, social, and economic problem, i.e.
IDPs, are issues elaborated on more below and in the next chapter.
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Response to the IDP Plight
The issue of internal displacement was recognized as one of the most serious and
pressing problems in post-war Lebanon: solving it meant not only reviving coexistence
between the different communities in the country, but was also a symbolic confirmation
of state sovereignty after years of collapse (Faour, 1993,153). President Elias Hrawi, in
his opening statement to the National Congress for Displaced People, contended that only
“once we secured the return of all people displaced by war to their home towns, could we
secure the return of a strong peaceful, democratic Lebanon” (1992). The Taif Agreement
states that “the return of the displaced is the prelude to national entente and the safeguard
of social peace and security” (Dagher, 2000, 83), and an ‘undeniable’ human right,
according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Repatriation was considered the
necessary condition for sustainable peace and permanent national reconciliation (El-
Husseini, 1992). In a workshop on internal displacement in Lebanon, Irani noted that “the
solution to this complex problem will mean the difference between true reconciliation
and a fragile, tentative, and imposed peace” (Irani, 1997, 13).
The return of displaced was thus considered the first step in the march towards
ending the Lebanese war, removing its negative consequences (e.g. the geographical
barriers and cantons that had materialized), and ending the state of chaos and insecurity
(Faour, 1993,153). The Taif Agreement “sought a just and enduring solution to the
dilemma of displaced;” and “required the government to solve completely the problem of
IDPs, and acknowledge the right of every Lebanese citizen displaced since 1975 to come
back to the place from which he or she was displaced; to establish the legislation that
safeguards their rights and ensures the means of reconstruction” (Assaf and El-Fil, 2000,
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32). It stated that “the problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be resolved fundamentally
and the rights of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he
was evicted shall be established” (Taif Agreement). It stressed the right of return and
“pledged financial support to enable them to reconstruct their homes and villages” (Assaf
and Fil, 2000, 32).
Despite the increased attention to the problem, the response to IDPs has not been
as efficient as one might have expected. Sixteen years after the end of the war and
fourteen years after the launch of the IDP return policy or program—despite sustained
government and non-governmental efforts—return has been slow and only a third of the
displaced have returned home (Global IDP Database, 2004; Feghali, 1995). Some
estimates place return as low as 20% (Sayah, 2002, 126); according to the Ministry of
Displaced, “79,500 people have been able to return since the end of the conflict,
excluding returnees to the South and West Bekaa areas” (Global IDP Database, 2004).
The success of the return policy and effective return of people that have been
displaced for more than a decade to their places of origin can be closely linked to a
comprehensive approach to the problem—one which itself guarantees stability for
returnees in areas of return. Such an approach would focus on four main areas. First, it
has to deal with the causes of forced migration in order to ensure security and eliminate
fears and emotional obstacles to the return process (Faour, 1993; Birkeland, 2003, 7). In
his speech during the National Congress in 1992, Member of Parliament Mikhael El-
Daher noted that reinstating security in those areas necessitates the “deployment of the
national security forces in areas where re-settlement is taking place. This in turn will
promote positive circumstances which would allow for such process (1992). As will be
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elaborated later, the deployment of armed security forces in those areas of return
occupied a major aspect of the policy. Even though it did convey an aura of peace and
stability, it did not necessary deal with the root causes of the problem and failed, in some
instances, to prevent the occurrence of revenge killings.
Second, reconstructing destroyed homes and villages can be seen as another
important aspect of the policy. This is done by providing displaced with loans and grants
to help them rehabilitate or reconstruct their homes and support different organizations
and governmental agencies in their projects to reconstruct the villages. This part of
reconstruction includes the rehabilitation of infrastructures, as well as social structures
such as schools and hospitals. I believe that this step is necessary for any return to occur,
especially with the extensive amount of destruction and damage done to these villages
(Tables 9 andlO). However, and as will be elaborated on further below and in subsequent
chapters, this step has been prioritized by the Lebanese government without necessarily
dealing with the emotional concerns of people first. It might even be fair to say that it has
occupied the main focus of the government, to the detriment of the personal/emotional
aspect of the process.
According to primary government statistics, most of the IDPs’ houses were either
totally or partially destroyed which presents a major obstacle to the process of return. The
extent of structural and infrastructural damage in the two main areas, however, has been a
challenge to the government and agencies that do not have the necessary funds to carry
out such a huge undertaking. Funding has been depicted, by many (especially
government officials), as the major and sometime only reason for the persistence of the
IDP problem in the country. According to displaced themselves, the amounts dispensed
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for reconstruction or rehabilitation have not been enough to get the job done; most of the
houses remain unfinished and sometimes even uninhabitable. Other displaced blame the
prolongation of the problem on the skewed policy, which gives priority to the
reconstruction of infrastructure and homes, to the detriment of other social structures like
schools and hospitals whose availability weigh a lot on the decision to return.
Table 9. Percentage of destroyed houses
Region Percentage
Mount Lebanon 57%
South Lebanon 28%
Beirut 8%
North Lebanon 5%
Bekaa 2%
Total 100%
Source: Ministry o f Displaced
Table 10. Conditions of homes in areas of displacement
Condition Percentage
Fully destroyed 33.8%
Partially destroyed 17.41%
Not suitable for residence 12.79%
Good condition 36%
Total 100%
Sources: Bureau for Displaced People; National Congress for Displaced People
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This brings us to the third important area of focus in the approach to IDPs: to
provide the necessary conditions for living to returnees. Return cannot be separated from
providing and securing the means of living, education, and other life necessities. In that
sense, a developmental plan must provide new alternatives and ways for the displaced in
order for them to return. Employment opportunities in return areas are a necessary
condition for such process to be permanent (Faour, 1993,154-160). There needs to be
more awareness of the close link between the issue of displaced persons and development
in Lebanon. The problem of internal displacement, hence, cannot be solved without a
comprehensive development plan; this plan must include not only reviving the displaced
areas’ infrastructures and structures, but involves economic and social plans such as
agricultural production, job opportunities, and basic services (Faour, 1993, 154-160).
Despite certain necessary criteria, plans of return need to be flexible and adaptable to the
setting as different areas and towns may differ from one another in terms of needs and
possibilities depending on the factors that are in play.
A fourth necessary aspect of an effective return policy is giving special attention
to building trust and settling emotion-laden disputes between various members of the
community and the displaced; that is, it should be remembered that displacement did not
occur in a vacuum, but was the result of bloody conflicts and wars (Faour, 1993,207).
In addition to the abovementioned features of a sound comprehensive return
policy, there should be awareness of the importance of coordination of the efforts of all
organizations and parties and at all levels—local, regional and international. The
enormity of such a social and human disaster requires time to address and cannot be
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effectively responded to by one party and limited resources (Faour, 1993, 171).
Furthermore, a solution to the problem of internal displacement in the country requires a
comprehensive perspective and planning prior to implementation, as both reconstruction
and reconciliation are needed for the sustainability of the process. Howard Adelman
warns that if not done carefully, “return and resettlement can be closely related to the
resumption of violence and the end of peace” (2002, 290).
Government Plan and Role
The issue of internally displaced people occupied primary importance on the
government’s agenda in the post-war era. The signatories of the Taif Agreement decided
that peace in Lebanon will be more sustained and the reconciliation process will be more
effective if internally displaced repopulate or resettle in the areas they fled. Hence, the
return process embodied the basic elements for potential success: political encouragement
and material assistance. It should be noted, however, that the government faced a
tremendous challenge from the outset: its failure to assist IDPs during their displacement
provoked increasing criticisms, as it was blamed for the suffering and humiliation
incurred by the uprooted population throughout the past decades. One displaced person
explains: “I held the state fully responsible for the bad living conditions that displaced
people have undergone... My kids had to sleep in a bus for a whole month before we
found a house for them... We never felt we belonged—all displaced persons felt like
strangers on their own land” (Saad, 1992).
The underlying assumption and driving force behind the government’s programs
to assist IDPs is the recognition that internal displacement is an acute problem that is
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negatively impacting national reconciliation, development, and peace in Lebanon. The
slow rate of return, even after fourteen years of work, attests to the fact that as is the case:
there is “still no integral policy within the government on the issue of internal
displacement, and the various commitments made have in the main not been matched by
practical implementation” (Deng, 1995, 14).
Even though there were previous attempts at finding a solution to the issue of
displaced—such as the Beit El-Din conference in 1990—the official, ‘concrete’ response
to IDPs began with the June 1992 National Conference for the Displaced (or Congress on
the Displaced). It was organized by the government to assess the needs of the displaced
and to devise a return plan that best met their demands and answered to the concerns of
those involved. The meeting, held in Beirut over a period of nine days, was the first to
deal with the issue and bring together all concerned parties: 224 political and
governmental officials (ministers, deputies), political parties, governmental and non
governmental institutions/organizations, academics, and delegates representing the
displaced families (Dagher, 2000, 87). The stated aim of the congress was to pound out a
comprehensive, dramatic, but realistic settlement to this looming humanitarian problem;
(Farah, 1992) or in the words of the State Minister for Displaced People’s Affairs, Elie
Hobeika, “to find a fair and lasting settlement to the problem of people displaced by war”
(Hobeika, 1992a).
According to participants, the demands that were voiced included: deployment of
Lebanese Armed Forces in the areas of return to maintain security; allocation of money
for the reconstruction of villages and homes; reconstruction and rehabilitation of schools,
universities or colleges, and hospitals; creation of job opportunities; encouragement of
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artisans, industry and agriculture; rehabilitation of infrastructure; provision of basic needs
and services; revival of municipalities; dialogue between Christian returnees and Druze
inhabitants aimed at reconciliation; issuance of legislations which would secure
immediate return; adoption of a seduction strategy to encourage people to return;
construction of sports courts and fields; sponsorship of cultural programs which foster
diversity; establishment of housing compounds to help those with limited wages or those
who were forced to evict illegally occupied houses; creation of a housing fund; creation
of an independent fund for people displaced by war; establishment of a ministry
responsible for displaced people’s affairs; and creation of a National Council for the
Displaced (Dagher, 2000, 87).
A statement of resolutions was published by the Congress for the Displaced
People on July 15th 1992; this document was put before the government for endorsement.
The resolutions reflected the demands made by the attendees. In line with those
recommendations, the government agreed to put in place a structure by which it could
effectively deal with the return process. This included the creation of the Ministry of
Displaced, which was given the task of dealing solely with the issue of IDPs, and the
Central Fund for the Displaced, whose prerogatives included the disbursement of money
for repair and reconstruction of homes. The dominant belief in governmental circles as
well as among those affected by displacement was that the creation of the Fund for
return—in addition to the Ministry of Displaced—aimed at achieving a comprehensive
policy that would effectively solve the complex problem. These two governmental
agencies were established to oversee the General Plan for the Return—a phased strategy,
beginning with villages where the return was considered easier, and proceeding to those
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villages where massacres and local fighting took place, thus demanding some sort of
reconciliation between those living in the villages and the returnees (Feghali, 1995).
The phased approach to the process was one recommendation emanating from the
1992 National Congress, as it was believed that return policy should be implemented in
stages for purposes of security and political, as well as due to a lack of funds to finance
the whole process in one stage (Fares, 1992 ; Feghali, 1992). According to the proposed
plan, the original target date for the completion of the return process (the return of all
displaced) was 1996; however, the deadline has been extended numerous times since and
is now set to the end of 2007. It is believed that this cut-off date will be pushed back
again due to the unavailability of funds and the latest war on Lebanon in July of 2006.
This most recent war not only resulted in another wave of displacement, and thus an
increased demand for more funds, but also to extensive infrastructural and structural
damage. The exact date of the next deadline remains undecided for now.
A Phased Approach
All parties concerned believed that a three-phased approach to repatriation would
be the best way to implement the return process. Targeted villages were categorized
according to basic criteria and in accordance with the political, security, geographical and
financial realities and conditions on the ground. The process was designed to begin with
the ‘less challenging’ villages—that is, the areas where solutions would easily be attained.
These towns were chosen according to the following criteria. First, politically speaking,
the causes leading to displacement were not so drastic as to halt immediate repatriation
(i.e. no inter or intra communal violence or massacres); such villages embodied an
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atmosphere that allowed for everybody’s participation in the process of return.
Geographically, these villages were also areas distinct from others that suffered from
displacement; these towns are contingent to one another, which made it easier to
guarantee basic services, needs, and infrastructure. Another important criterion for these
first-phase villages centered on relatively higher levels of security and the existence of
capabilities to insure immediate and future security. Finally, and critically, villages
targeted in the first phase were ones for which the necessary funds for reconstruction and
rehabilitation were available (Hobeika, 1992b, 9). This phase was targeted populations
and areas that were considered “the easiest” to which displaced persons could return. If
such villages witnessed a return of a large number of people in a short amount of time, it
was reasoned, such a trend will encourage others to feel confident and secured about
repatriating (Feghali, 1995).
This first phase, which exhausted most of the Ministry and Fund’s efforts, time,
and funds, was considered to be a necessary step towards the second phase, which mostly
involved heterogeneous areas that suffered from tremendous levels of destruction; such
villages would require huge amounts of loans to support returnees’ repatriation and allow
for reintegration. In addition to the almost total destruction of houses, these areas also
suffered from low security and economic hardship, thus calling for long-term
involvement and interventions to revive and build up confidence in those villages and
encourage return.
The third and final phase was considered to be the most challenging and time-
consuming. Programs and initiatives at this point would target villages in need of the
longest-term initiatives and programs. Such villages were ones that had been totally
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destroyed and which had suffered a dark history of massacres and inter-communal
violence. In those areas, more time and resources would be required in order to rebuild
the social fabric and neighborly relations between residents and returnees in these areas.
The focus then would be primarily on reconciliation, for without trust and forgiveness,
return would never materialize. Furthermore, those areas, suffering from extremely low
levels of security and minimal opportunities for economic or social subsistence, were the
greatest challenges. This third phase in the return process, not surprisingly, included areas
controlled by Israel in the South (Faour, 1993, 213-4).
Objectives of the Return Strategy
The government’s primary objective was to reconstruct destroyed homes and
villages in order to encourage return. This necessitated the removal of rubble, which, in
addition to facilitating the reconstruction process, was believed to constitute a positive
psychological factor as it eliminates the traces of war (Feghali, 1998, 4). Specifically,
rebuilding destroyed areas included the reconstruction of basic infrastructure (such as
roads); the restoration of basic needs (i.e. electricity, water, etc.); and the reconstruction
of homes. Also, ending illegal occupation of houses and properties was a key activity of
this central objective. Such efforts, initiated shortly after the creation of the ministry and
fund for displaced, were also supported by other ministries (the Ministry of Public Works
and Transport, the Ministry of Energy and Water, etc.) in order to ensure efficiency and
sustainability. The work of those agencies is detailed in the next chapter.
Also based on the recommendations from participants in the National Congress,
the issue of security occupied the second component of the government’s return policy:
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army and security forces were deployed to areas of return to guarantee safety and
stability. The main aim was to ensure that violence and acts of vengeance did not occur
between the communities and the returnees. Although these forces did in fact achieve
some level of security and stability in those areas, there were numerous problems in
many villages; this can be attributed to the fact that the forces were deployedwithout first
making efforts to reconcile estranged groups or to help those who witnessed acts of
massacres and bloodshed come to term with the past. My interviewees mentioned a few
examples of such instances of violence; one was the story of a man, whose parents were
massacred at the hands of Druze when he was a child, returned to the village and shot ten
members of the Druze community in revenge; another story described a man to who set
fire to a store owned by a Druze in order to revenge the destruction of his father’s
business and their home.
However, while security might have been a dominant factor in the decision
whether or not to return, it was not a sufficient determinant for the displaced’s decision:
economic considerations and the ability to sustain one’s self upon return emerged as the
most important reasons for the decision to return or not. Hence, for the sustainability of
the process of return, projects bringing about economic opportunities for returnees were
considered an important aspect of any policy of return. Other objectives of the
development plan include: to reconstruct and/or rehabilitate destroyed villages and
houses, secure job opportunities, means of living, schools, hospitals and other important
needs for those returnees were another objective of the process. Some of those families,
which have settled for so long in the areas of displacement and have secured an
acceptable livelihood for themselves and their children, would not consider returning if
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these conditions were not met in the areas of return. Furthermore, guaranteeing such
economic and social services would lead to economic prosperity and social cohesion in
the villages, which again, are necessary conditions for a successful process of return
(Faour, 1993,156). After rebuilding or rehabilitating the areas, securing those villages
and towns, and guaranteeing some necessary economic and social structures and services,
an additional objective is to rehabilitate the productive economic sector—whether
agricultural, industrial, artisan and handicraft, commercial and/or touristic (Feghali,
1995). The revival of the economic sector is important to the development of those areas,
as well as to the livelihood of both residents and returnees.
A final objective, especially important for areas that suffered from inter-
communal bloodshed and massacres, is that of civil reconciliation. There is need for trust
and relationship building between the resident communities and the returnees in order for
successful and sustainable repatriation to occur. Such an objective was overridden by
those aimed at reconstructing and rehabilitating the areas, as will be made clearer in
subsequent chapters. The low percentage of funds allocated to such initiatives as
-2C proposed by the general plan for return is therefore not surprising.
In order to promote such reconciliations and involve communities and returnees
in the process, the Ministry of the Displaced created “committees of return” which, it
believed, would help in the “reconciliation process between victims and victimizers in
several Lebanese villages,” in addition to involving those affected by displacement and
return to participate in their own needs assessment and voice their priorities (Interview,
35 As is noted throughout the dissertation, the amount required to meet the objective of full return changed over the years. The allocated sum for the whole process was at $450 million (other sources note it was $543 million) but there are claims that double that amount or around $1 billion has been spent so far without the objectives being reached (Former CFD Director, Beirut, June 17, 2003).
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Director of MoD/UNDP project, Beirut, June 18, 2003). The Ministry also became
involved in “reconciliation efforts that bring displaced (Christians and Muslims) to
confront those who have caused their displacement in the framework of a mediated
reconciliation ritual supervised by the Ministry of Displaced and respected individuals
from their own villages” (Irani, 1997,13). However, these efforts still take a back seat to
physical reconstruction in villages and, thus, do not aim at ‘building peace’—according
to the Ministry, the “Lebanese are not in conflict and do not need peacebuilding
initiatives” (Interview, Director of MoD/UNDP project, Beirut, June 18, 2003). The
government’s approach to reconciliation and criticisms of that approach are detailed in
the following chapters.
According to office estimates, and despite the allocation of huge sums of money
to the repatriation process, the rate of return remains low overall and varies from one
village to another (Dagher, 2000, 87). This slow and low rate of return, after so many
years, has caused many to criticize the government for corruption and bias in the
allocation of return funds or fund mismanagement (Dagher, 2000, 89). The politicization
of the process resulted in, among many things, “assistance going to people who did not
qualify as displaced” (Sayah, 2002, 126). Also, while some people did not receive
assistance, others got more than they actually should have. In some villages, more
evacuations were paid than there were houses (Adwan and Sahyoun, 2001). Others have
criticized the Fund for disproportional distribution of funds, where the Druze got more
money than the Christians, even though the latter accounted for about 75% of the
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'IC displaced population (Gambill, 2003). According to Sayah, the process of return was
linked to the overall political project of the country and for this reason, the priority was to
give more money to people who had sought refuge in downtown Beirut; the evacuation of
these displaced was seen as the best place to start the reconstruction process (2002, 126).
The vast majority of the funds were disbursed by the government to residents who had
occupied homes and properties of displaced people, as well as to the displaced who had
illegally occupied buildings and homes in the areas to where they had fled. This was
considered an important step toward encouraging higher rates of return (Faour, 1993,
131).
The Role of Non-Governmental and International Organizations
The issue of internal displacement is much too large for the government to deal
with alone. The Ministry of Displaced program—without the willingness of the displaced
to return and without foreign aid—would never materialize. There was need for all
parties involved to have confidence in the process in order for peace to be established and
for repatriation to occur (Picard, 1996, 147). So while the government was the leader in
initiating a national policy for return, it acknowledged the need for cooperation and
coordination amongst different organizations and parties; this resulted in significant
opportunities and roles for international and local non-governmental agencies in the
process of reintegrating the internally displaced (Global IDP Database, 2004). The role of
36 However, according to the Ministry of Displaced Report:The Achievements: 1993-1997, the total compensations paid to Christians amounted to 49% and for the Muslims (including Druze) to 48%. The other 3% went to families of military personnel, which was consolidated under one category even though it includes both Christians and Muslims. It is important to note that no achievement report has been published by the Ministry of Displaced since then.
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NGOs in the return process has been highlighted in the National Congress in 1992.
According to the Farah Social Foundation representative, there needed to be full
cooperation between nongovernmental institutions and the state in order to secure a safe
return of all displaced people to their homes and towns (El-Mukhtar, 1992). NGOs could
contribute to the resettlement of IDPs in several ways, including; offering medical
services, food aid, care to handicapped and orphans, and helping in collecting money for
funds created to rebuild homes of displaced families (El-Muhtar, 1992). The war has led
to the collapse of the state and the weakening of the government (politically and
economically), which necessitated such cooperation and partnership to fulfill the
demanding costly task of repatriation.
It is important to note, however, that the role of international and bilateral
organizations vis-a-vis the displaced did not commence after the civil war ended. “During
the civil war, several international and bilateral organizations provided food, medication,
blankets and other emergency relief assistance to the internally displaced and war-
affected population through governmental and non-governmental relief agencies
(NGOs)” (Feghali, 1993, 3). While these activities were common during the war, no
formal assistance or relief programs existed after the war came to an end: due to financial
constraints, NGOs restricted their operational activities and diverted their attention to
other areas that support the official national policy for return (Feghali, 1993, 3). The
efforts in the post-conflict era were more development-oriented and looked at the long
term rather than merely the emergency or relief aspect of the problem.
Many local and international non-governmental efforts at helping IDPs were and
continue to be carried out in Lebanon; nevertheless, the rate of return remains low. Since
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1992, the issue of internal displacement has increasingly taken center stage in
government policies. It continues to be used, even today, as an instrument in the hands of
politicians, especially for elections purposes. A few years into the program, large
amounts of money had been spent on repatriation but had not produced the expected
results. Criticisms of the approach IDPs increased and possible improvements were
proposed. This shift was paralleled by an increase in the international awareness of the
problem posed by IDPs in societies emerging from conflict and attempting to rebuild. In
addition to discussions in political circles, IDPs became an increasingly an important
topic for academics, practitioners, displaced people, returnees and residents themselves.
One important attempt at understanding the limitations of the existing approach is worth
mentioning: the non-government sponsored 1996 workshop on “Reconciliation Processes
and the Displaced Communities in Post-War Lebanon” was a follow-up to the
“successful and innovative three-day conference (funded by the USIP and the Greenville
Foundation), entitled “Acknowledgment, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation: Alternative
Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Lebanon” (April 14-16 1994) (Irani, 1997, 13).
This main objective of this meeting, which brought together scholars, displaced
and returnees, was to “study the problems of the displaced and the methods of
reconciliation in post-war Lebanon” (Nassar, 1997, 11). It was convened at a time when
most people thought that the “thorny issue” of displacement had reached an “impasse”
(Nassar, 1997, 11). Its aim was to “address the role of reconciliation and dialogue in the
process of resettling members of war-displaced Christian and Muslim communities in
Lebanon and provide them with effective tools to manage their conflict” (Irani, 1997, 13).
Such activities were not considered central to the process, as it was over-dominated by
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physical and material reconstruction. Nevertheless, this workshop, which took place in a
university setting, put into perspective the role of non-governmental organizations and
average individuals or citizens in the formulation of the policy of return. In order for
progress and change to take place in the policy, it became imperative to bring “all
concerned parties and sides together in an open forum to create the required climate to
reach a fair solution and create a strong society” (Nassar, 1997,11).
Local and international organizations working with the issue of displaced
provided different types of assistance to different villages around the country. Some of
those organizations were secular (e.g. UNDP and the LCRN), while others were
religiously affiliated (e.g. Caritas Liban and the Middle East Council of Churches).
Although have worked independently and implemented projects and/or allocated funding
to returnee communities in areas of return (e.g., PPM and LCRN), others worked in
collaboration with the government (e.g. UNDP and Farah Foundation). Taken together,
these organizations provided more than $12 million dollars in reconstruction and
rehabilitation projects (Sayah, 2002, 126). This money has been used to execute projects
to bring together communities in the areas of return, to encourage returnees to go back to
their homes, and to provide support to needy displaced, regardless of religious affiliation.
The fact that the problem of IDPs in Lebanon has not been solved (Table 11),
despite millions of dollars spent on rehabilitation and reconciliation projects, makes it
clear that working in post-conflict areas requires long-term commitment and continuous
evaluation and adjustment of programs. The end of hostilities does not necessarily mean
that peace has prevailed. It further illustrates that a balanced response to
reconstruction/rehabilitation, on the one hand, and reconciliation, on the other, is a
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prerequisite for success. In Lebanon, more money was spent (and continues to be) on the
physical and material aspect than on the human emotional one. In a 1998 conference
paper, Kamal Feghali, who was the then-head of the bureau of displaced people and later
the coordinator of the Socio-Economic Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Displaced
program, provided the following figures which illustrate the point: while L.L 284.8
billion was spent on reconstruction and rehabilitation, only L.L 7.695 billion went toward
reconciliation (1998, 7-8).
Table 11. Movement of return in some targeted villages as of 200337
Province Number of No return Partial return
villages
Mount Lebanon 148 22 126
(Aley, Baabda,
Chouf)
South Lebanon 67 0 67
(Jezzine and Sidon)
Total 215 22 193
Sources: Ministry o f Displaced; ILDES
Berdal and Malone clearly described it, “grievance and conflicts of interest
usually persist after the end of hostilities and, in turn, affect the “peace building”
activities initiated and sponsored by international organizations, NGOs, and donor
37 Not much has changed since then as the process o f return was halted due to lack o f funding. The government declared that it will resume the allocation of funds to the CFD starting October 2006.
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countries” (2000, 9). The role of NGOs and governmental agencies in dealing with IDPs
is detailed in the next chapter.
Challenges in Responding to IDPs
Numerous programs and projects—both governmental and non-governmental
(which will be discussed in the next chapter)—have targeted displaced people in order to
assist their return over the past fourteen years. The return process has been slow and, for
most part, ‘unsuccessful’ (i.e. not meeting the set goal). The major obstacle facing this
plan of return was the fact that only few of those displaced were willing to go back to
their villages of origin—due to political, economic, social and security considerations.
Urban vs. Rural
Economic and geographical disparities between geographical areas and strata of
the population existed long before the Lebanese civil war. At the start of the war in 1975,
Beirut represented “more than fifty percent of the population, over-two-thirds of
economic activities, two thirds of overall employment, the entire state administration, all
the country’s higher education, and ninety five percent of the banking activity (Nasr
2003, 153). Faour also highlighted the peculiar population distribution that characterized
Lebanon where “more than % of the population lives in coastal areas that make up 10%
of the total area of the country” (1993, 41). This reality was reflected in political
developments and governmental services and resources, which focused on the needs of
certain areas to the detriment of others. This continued in the post-war period when the
largest share of the reconstruction expenditures was spent on and in Beirut (Faour, 1993,
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43; Nasr, 2003, 152). As will become clear below, this disparity in development and
attention to urban areas will pose a challenge to the return process, as the majority of the
internally displaced had fled their homes in villages and mountainous (rural) areas;
unfortunately, compared to the capital and coastal areas, these areas were the most
underdeveloped. What then would motivate IDPs, who mostly sought refuge in urban
cities, to relocate to their villages and towns?
Security
The sense of insecurity—both physical and economic—made the majority of
displaced unwilling to even consider returning to their original areas and homes (Sirriyeh,
1989, 22; Ellis, 2002, 207). As was mentioned above, the deployment of security forces
helped to maintain some sort of security in those areas, but a few incidents and
skirmishes between residents and returnees prevented a profound sense of security to
emerge. This was coupled by the lack of job opportunities and economic prospects and
made residents, returnees, and displaced alike unsure about their future.
Absence of Basic Needs and Services
The amount of infrastructural and structural destruction posed a challenge to
return. The absence of electricity, water, and telecommunications made it difficult for
people to go back to those villages and reside there, especially during winter time with no
heating systems. Furthermore, the destruction of social infrastructure like schools,
hospitals, and clinics made the choice to return more difficult.
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Politicization of the Problem
The politicization and [political] sensitivity of the issue (Dagher, 2000, 87) was a
serious obstacle to the prospect of return in a small consociational country where
displacement mostly occurred on sectarian terms. Despite the fact that people from all
sects and religions suffered throughout the civil war, the inter-communal massacres and
the resulting homogeneity of villages gave the internal displacement problem in
Lebanon-—as it did all major problems, including the civil war—a sectarian/religious
characteristic. Furthermore, to some, the Ministry of Displaced has also been highly
problematic, especially since the appointment of Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, as the
first Minister in 1992. Christians, in particular, did not trust Jumblatt who, they believed,
had played a role in their displacement from Mount Lebanon (Assaf and El-Fil, 2000,
32). The subsequent appointees to the post of Minister of Displaced, through today, have
been close allies of Jumblatt; this has led people to think of the Ministry as a partisan
instrument rather than a neutral body, aimed at effectively solving the problem of IDPs.
They questioned whether those appointees could objectively lead a body that had “control
over some of the public and private subsidies for resettling Christians in their native
villages in the Shouf ’ (Picard, 1996, 167). However, in a country like Lebanon, the de
politicization of the process of return was not feasible or realistic and the issue of the
displaced was and will continue to be used as a political instrument (or leverage) in the
hands of leaders. For example, the issue of IDPs and the importance of return were used
as political flashpoints in the latest parliamentary elections campaign (the first election
after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005). It brought together Walid
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Jumblatt and Strida Geagea —leaders of two parties that were engaged in violent
combat against each other during the war years and in political opposition since the
1990s—in a ‘reconciliation’ festival. The meeting, held in a village in the Shouf, was
meant to act as proof and commitment to the process of return and to coexistence
between the different communities.
Corruption
In addition to the politicization of the process, corruption is said to be another
obstacle for efficient and sustainable return. Soon after the National Fund for the
Displaced began its work, debates about the allocations of funds arose and, “many
grievances were aired regarding the inequality in the payments of indemnities to the
families” (Dagher, 2000, 88-89). Furthermore, “a report from the Central Fund for the
Displaced of February 1999 revealed that former officials of the fund had
misappropriated scare resources earmarked for the return of mainly Christian families
•3Q displaced during the war.” Such accusations about the fund continue today and
instances of malpractice are used to explain why, despite spending millions of dollars, a
very small percentage of the displaced have returned to their homes (Rigby, 2000b, 177).
One afternoon, after completing a series of interviews at the Ministry of Displaced, I
hailed a taxi to take me home. The driver, seeing files in my hand, started a conversation
38 Strida Geagea is the wife of Maronite Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea who was imprisoned for 11 years for a church bombing that took place after March 28, 1991 and hence was not included under the General Amnesty Law (an issue that was and still is one of contention among many Lebanese). He was the only warlord to be detained after the war for a crime. Geagea was released in 2005. His wife, who emerged as a powerful party ‘leader’ working on her husband’s release (especially following the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and the lessening of Syrian influence) was elected deputy in the new parliament. 39 Interview with Shadi Massaad, President of the Central Fund for Displaced,Al-Bina ’ Magazine, issue 1970, May 1, 1999; see also Central Fund for Displaced report of 1999, “The Current Administrative Situation o f the Central Fund for the Displaced,” quoted by Nicolas Nassif in An-Nahar, March 15, 1999.
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with me, thinking I was a claimant, following up on the status of my application at the
Ministry. When I explained to him that I was a researcher working on IDP return, he
sighed and started accusing the Ministry and Fund of corruption; he told me that he
himself was a displaced from a town in the Shouf and had filed his claim ten years ago,
but has not received any money to rebuild his house. He explained, “when we were in the
village, my wife will watch (baby-sit) some of the neighbors’ kids during the day; now
they are telling me that I cannot get money for the house because it is a commercial
property. But this was not a day care or a school; this is the apartment we lived in. I did
not get any money and my neighbor was paid twice for one apartment... I don’t want to
talk in sectarian terms but they oblige you to... is it because I am Christian that I don’t
get money I am entitled to, and my Druze neighbor gets paid more than he should?”
(Taxi driver, Beirut, August 9, 2003).
Symbolic and Sketchy Reconciliation
Another challenge to the process of return is the failure to effectively and truly
address the root causes of displacement. Peace in Lebanon—which was officially
brought about by the Taif Agreement—has been limited to settlements between political
leaders and has dealt primarily with structural issues; that is, the peace has not been
disseminated to the ‘street’ or the ‘masses.’ Moreover, this settlement did not address
emotional issues. As detailed above and will become more apparent in the following
chapter, the largest percentage of the money allocated to the return process was spent on
reconstruction and rehabilitation. A smaller percentage of the money has been allocated
for the reconciliation process in the more difficult—or deeply tom—villages. Even so,
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the majority of reconciliation that has taken place thus far has been symbolic in nature—
either between community leaders or in larger festivals, where people are given the keys
to their homes. The attempts at rapprochement or ‘reconciliation’ between communities
focuses on the leadership level and can be exemplified by two major events: the
Beiteddine Conference in July 1998 and the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir’s visit to the Shouf
in August 2001 (Ellis, 2002, 208).40 These symbolic efforts, although limited in impact,
have been overseen by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt; this could, then, be seen as a
testament to the priority given to reconciliation. These events were described as ones in
which “poignant embraces brought back together old neighbors and long-time friends,
priests, and sheikhs, all eager to forget and forgive, and keys of the abandoned houses
were handed to their owners under spotlight of TV cameras” (Dagher, 2000, 88-9).
Another form of reconciliation—as understood by the government—was the
payment of “blood tributes to the families who had lost members during the 1983 Shouf
waves of massacres and reprisals” (Dagher, 2000, 88-9). However, while it is possible to
reconstruct and compensate for material losses, no sum of money could truly compensate
for loss of human life (Faour, 1993, 164). Reconciliation must be deeper and more
comprehensive: while the focus on rehabilitating infrastructure and reconstructing homes
is important, the lack of attention to rebuilding relationships between people is a serious
challenge to the return process. As Kumar rightly explains, returnees “and the people
who stayed during the conflict harbor resentment toward each other, generating social
40 The Patriarch’s visit to the Shouf and his meeting with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt were considered a milestone in the Christian-Druze relations in Mount Lebanon. At the end of the meeting, both leaders announced the end to the Druze-Maronite communal conflict. However important this proclamation and its expected impact on the morale of the population, such reconciliation was mainly confined to the leadership level with no serious efforts at the public level. Hence, the formal reconciliation between the two leaders did not lead to the return o f IDPs to the Shouf (Picard, 2002, 168).
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and political tensions in the local communities” (1998, 8). In Lebanon, Sammak notes,
“although most displaced Lebanese want to return to their original homes, some
displaced families are hesitant to do so due to the traumas they have suffered, while those
who are now living in the areas affected by displacement are apprehensive about the
return of those who were displaced” (2002,136). In other words, a successful repatriation
policy needs to target both the communities living in these areas and who have not fled,
as well as the returnees.
Long-term Displacement
When the return process was launched, displaced people had been away from
their homes and villages and places or origin for more than ten years. Such a duration of
displacement presents a further challenge to repatriation as displaced had, in the most
part, adjusted to their new lives and surroundings; a new generation had been bom with
no link to their original homes; most of the IDPs had found jobs, etc. (Kasparian and
Beaudoin, 1995, 90). The effects of long-term displacement, which in some cases
amounted to 25 years, are ongoing social and psychological consequences persist. As
Dagher explains, “For more than a third of the displaced population, the forced character
of their migration had ceased to exist” (2000, 90). Therefore, most of those who decided
to return have been older people who have nothing to lose by moving back. However,
this also led to another social division of the older and younger generations. While older
people preferred to come back to their homes, where they felt they belonged, younger
people, who had limited ties to their place of origin, preferred to remain where they had
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resettled; it was in their new residence that they felt they belonged, found employment
and enrolled their children in school.
Unsustainability: The ‘Weekend and Holiday Return’
The social and economic reality of areas of return led many people to rebuild,
reconstruct or rehabilitate their homes with the money given to them in installments by
the Fund without in fact living in them permanently. Most of the return has been dubbed
‘weekend return,’ with no signs of a normal life, continuity, or persistence. In 1997, for
example, five years after the start of the return process, the Ministry of Displaced
confirmed that of the 60% of families that have been given money to rebuild their houses
in Baabda, Aley,and the Shouf areas, only 33.2% had returned (Dagher, 2000, 89).
Displaced were going back home to spend their weekends, holidays, or vacations, but
then returning to the areas in which they had resettled, in order to continue the routine to
which they had become accustomed during their years of displacement. This remains a
reality in Lebanon today. As Hanf rightfully said, “those who have created new
livelihoods elsewhere will need more convincing” to come back (1993, 347).
There is no lack of efforts—by both governmental and non-governmental
bodies—to reintegrate the internally displaced (Global IDP Database, 2004). The
repatriation process, however, is slowed down by tight budgetary constraints, destroyed
infrastructure, political feuds, lack of schools and economic opportunities, and the
inadequacy of physical security in some areas of the country. Furthermore, the projects so
far has focused primarily on successfully returning or repatriating the displaced with little
attention paid to enabling them to resume a self-sustaining life—this would entail
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providing them with social services, means of production, education, health facilities, and
other such basic needs.
IDPs who suffered numerous years of hardship and poverty would not take the
chance of relocating—even if merely back to their villages and homes—unless there was
aid available to develop the community to be economically, socially, and culturally self-
reliant. The fear of more suffering, poverty, and instability was also exacerbated by long
years of displacement and war: displaced Lebanese suffered disconnect from their
villages of origin and, in some cases, assimilated to their new environment. Without
providing the necessary incentives—education, jobs, basic needs, infrastructure,
protection, etc. the already settled IDPs rarely desired to return and start their life over,
again. This has proven especially true with regard to second generation displaced persons
who have little memory of their village of origin. Hence, the major challenge to the return
process in Lebanon is the short-sightedness of those who are devising the programs and
projects of return. Repatriation should not be considered the end of this long and
challenging process, but only an initial step. There must be a forward-looking assessment
of post-return integration of those internally displaced persons after their relocation to
areas that have suffered from pervasive destruction and continue to be affected by
security and economic concerns (Garcetti and Gruber, 2000, 221).
Conclusion
This chapter has detailed the issue of internal displacement, which is considered
to be the heart of Lebanon’s hitherto inability to move towards sustainable peace, and the
principal obstacle to national reconciliation and stability. Conflict transformation and
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reconciliation, necessary conditions for solving the IDP problem in Lebanon, are ongoing
and ‘prolonged’ processes, beginning in 1989 and still have long ways to go (Schulze,
2001b, 272). The inability of the government and non-government forces to solve such a
central problem after years (decades) of work and billions of dollars attests to the fact that
the return policy adopted has not effectively addressed the issue at hand. These
limitations will be detailed through an assessment of projects in the next chapters. There
must be a more comprehensive, long-term strategy which understands that national
reconciliation and peacebuilding is a necessary condition to solving the problem and that
such reconciliation should start-—in particular in villages that have become
homogeneous—with programs that entail adversaries facing one another. In other words,
the policy of return should shift its focus from a primarily development-orientation to one
that gives similar importance and priority to peacebuilding.
The basis for reconciliation, as embodied in the Taif Agreement, is very weak.
Lebanon has failed to acknowledge or deal effectively with past grievances, nor has it
emphasized the common heritage and mutual interests that connect all Lebanese. In
addition to the “lingering problem of displaced citizens” in the country (Irani, 2000, 3),
the persistence of “mistrust and fear between the various Lebanese communities and a
lack of trials for militia leaders who committed human rights abuses in Lebanon,”
contribute to the difficulties for reaching true reconciliation (Irani, 2000, 3). Having not
dealt with such sensitive issues nor human reconstruction, post-war efforts of the
Lebanese government concentrated mainly on physical and infrastructure rebuilding. The
ineffectiveness of such an approach calls for a more people-centered, comprehensive
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approach to development and peacebuilding. It is important to look beyond the
humanitarian perspective in order to devise a more long-term policy.
As the evaluation of projects in the next chapter shows, there has been increasing
awareness of the need to comprehensively assess the needs of both residents and
returnees in areas that suffered from massive displacements and destruction. There has
also been a growing acknowledgement of the need to devise long-term plans that go
beyond the mere return home towards developing a broader strategy that promotes
sustainable development in those areas. In other words, the need for livelihood
opportunities in those areas is beginning to engender numerous economic and
development projects, which will result in job opportunities. Furthermore, understanding
the importance of reconciliation for sustainable return, additional meetings, dialogue, and
alternative activities that bring together opposing communities have been sponsored.
However, as will be shown, more effort is needed to make such initiatives a central part
of the programs and not just short-term changes and innovations in the overall policy.
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WIDTH AND SUBSTANCE: THE AGENCIES’
REPONSE TO IDPS
Introduction
As mentioned in previous chapters, the attention paid to the issue of internal
displacement in Lebanon since 1992 has not yet yielded any substantial results: the most
optimistic estimate places the rate of return at 40%, while the more commonly agreed
upon estimate does not exceed 20%. Such slow response is surprising to those involved
in the process—whether displaced people, residents, returnees, ministers, project
directors, coordinators and fieldworkers. While most interviewees blamed this low rate of
return on the challenges mentioned in the previous chapter, i.e. lack of funding, tight
budgetary constraints, corruption, destroyed infrastructure, political feuds, lack of schools
and economic opportunities, and the inadequacy of physical security, many of them also
attributed it to the failure of the government and other agencies and organizations to
respond comprehensively to the needs of those displaced—especially in areas that
suffered from inter-community conflict and massacres.
It is clear, from the previous chapter, that the response to IDPs has not been
limited by the number of agencies and actors actively investing and working on the issue;
the allocation of governmental and private funds to the policy and programs of return
237
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(even though a dominant complaint by interviewees is the lack of funding); the length of
time spent on the issue of displaced; or by the numerous and different types of projects
that are being implemented in the areas of return. So why it is that, after almost fifteen
years of efforts and work, a solution to the IDP problem and in repatriation not been
found? What should happen in order for the new 2007 deadline for the completion of the
return process and the closing of the IDP file to be met? Will it be met or pushed back
again, especially in light of the July 2006 Israeli war?
This chapter provides a detailed description of the projects and programs dealing
with the return of displaced to their homes by looking at the different agencies involved
in the process of return. Moving beyond description, it practically analyzes these projects
and their impacts on the ground. More specifically, it examines the program outputs and
explores the effectiveness of those programs and what they have accomplished. It further
illustrates the importance of linking peacebuilding and development by looking at some
examples of successful programs. As the previous chapters have suggested, and as will be
outlined in this chapter and its subsequent analysis, meeting both development and
peacebuilding objectives is a necessary condition for a successful return policy in post-
conflict Lebanon.
Overview of the Agencies and Organizations
Agencies and organizations of different types, sizes, and natures have actively
participated and continue to be involved in the process of IDP return in Lebanon. While
existing agencies and organizations introduced some participatory aspects, to include
IDPs, into their work, others were created for the sole purpose of repatriating this
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uprooted population. Also, while some began their work with IDPs during the war,
providing emergency relief assistance during displacement, most of the concentrated and
long-term efforts were launched after the official launch of the Plan of Return in 1992.
For purposes of clarity and manageability, I will divide the review of the agencies’
program according to the type of response: national, which comprises government and
local NGOs efforts; and international, which includes bilateral, multilateral, and
international NGOs.
National Response
The national response to the problem of internal displacement—incorporating
both governmental agencies and local non-governmental organizations—has not seen a
lack of efforts and initiatives aiming at the return of internally displaced people to their
homes. Since the end of the war and the launch of return policy in the early 1990s, efforts
of one kind or another have been taking place in areas of displacement and return.
The Government
The Government’s response to IDPs began with the signing of the Taif Agreement,
which stated that the right of every Lebanese to return home would be the basis of
national reconciliation. A number of governmental institutions were set up and/or revived
to spearhead the reconstruction/reconciliation process. These included the Ministry of the
Displaced, the Central Fund for the Displaced, the Council of the South, and the Council
for Development and Reconstruction. These institutions, however, have been increasingly
criticized for being tools of nepotism, manipulated by some warlords to increase their
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power and control (Adwan and Sahyoun, 2001). This is not overly surprising given the
deeply divided and politicized character of the country.
Ministry of Displaced (MoD)
The Ministry of Displaced is one of two central government structures established
by a ministerial decision on January 4, 1993, to specifically address and solve the
problem of internal displacement in Lebanon. Along with the Central Fund for the
Displaced, it was conceived as an important tool by which the ‘theoretical’ concepts
introduced by the Taif Agreement—particularly those relating to the issue of
displacement and return—could be translated into practice (Global IDP Database, 2004,
42). Its main function was to rehabilitate infrastructure; repair, rehabilitate, reconstruct
and evacuate houses; improve the economic sector; develop social services such as
education and health, and achieve national reconciliation (Global IDP Database, 2004,
58).
Acknowledging the enormity and complexity of the problem of internal
displacement and the different conditions that led to such displacement from different
villages and towns, the Ministry introduced its phased approach to IDP return on May 12,
1993. Such a strategy, which dealt with the issue in an incremental manner, encouraged
repatriation after years, and in some cases decades, of displacement by initially focusing
efforts on what were considered ‘easy’ villages and returning as many families as
possible with the existing funds and support of the different sectors. The hope was that a
return movement to those areas would bring the process more legitimacy, propagate a
sense of security, and inspire confidence in the returning population in general—a kind of
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a snow ball effect (Feghali, 1995, 14; Feghali, 1998, 4). The three-phased approach,
therefore, began in towns and villages that were considered relatively easy. Such areas
were homogeneous, experienced a minimal amount of destruction; maintained a certain
level of human and economic security and functioning socio-economic services and
structures; possessed infrastructures that could be rehabilitated easily with the existing
funds; and had not witnessed massacres and violence occurred between neighbors
(Jumblatt, 1993).
The second phase of the process focused on villages that suffered from massive
material and economic destruction; some were homogeneous and others heterogeneous;
security continued to be an issue; social structures had been destroyed; infrastructure
needed reconstruction; though massive massacres had not taken place. Towns grouped in
this second category required more time, efforts, and funding. Villages clustered in phase
three of the Ministry’s return program were those who witnessed displacement as a result
of bloody conflicts and massacres between residents of the same village or between the
residents of two or more neighboring villages. As a result, merely reconstructing and
rehabilitating homes, infrastructures, and socio-economic structures would not be
sufficient for return, as people still felt hatred and vengeance. In these villages,
reconciliation and peacebuilding were necessary conditions for return (Feghali, 1995).
According to the Government Policy of Return, studies are conducted, villages for
each phase were chosen, and work began only after the completion of the preceding
phase. For this reason, the exact number of villages in each phase was not set in the
general plan. However, primary reports on phase one intimated targeting at least 192
villages (Table 12).
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Table 12. Phase 1 villages according to region/Caza
Region/Caza Number of villages
Mount Lebanon 149
South Lebanon 39
Beirut 3
Bekaa 1
Total 192
Source: Ministry of Displaced
No estimated numbers have been given for phases two and three of the plan;
however, a report by the Ministry of Displaced/United National Program for the
Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced mentioned at least 40
villages in phase two and 17 villages in phase three, referred to as ‘reconciliation
villages.’ However, no published reports have recorded the exact numbers of villages for
each of the phases. The UNDP has placed the number of total villages affected by
displacement at 949, 174 of which were either partially or totally destroyed (UNDP,
NHDR, 1997). The lack of updated or exact numbers can be attributed to one or more of
the following: a lack of funds, the politicization of the issue, the lack of coordination
between different agencies, lack of systematic and modernized survey tool, and the
precarious post-conflict context. Regardless of the reason, this represents one challenge
to the research as mentioned in chapter 2. More important to this study than the number
of villages in each of those phases is the type of response, as this is the framework and
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focus by which this analysis is conducted.41 One should note that despite the emphasis
on a phased approach to return, it was difficult maintaining such division and the process
witnessed the implementation of projects simultaneously, in a number of villages which,
under the aforementioned criteria, fell under different phases. Such confusion was due, in
large part, to the proximity of villages to one another and the increasing number of
organizations and agencies working on IDP return.
Central Fund for the Displaced (CFD or FFD)
The Fund was created on January 4, 1993 as a complementary arm to the
Ministry, with the main role of funding the process of return (Global IDP Database 2004,
58). According to primary studies, the CFD was allocated a budget of $450 million from
the government to implement the plan of return and ultimately close the IDP file. Some
studies even put the starting credit account at $475 million. This amount of money,
however, was not disbursed immediately: it was allocated according to availability and
yearly government budget (Shaya, 2004). Former Minister of Displaced Abdallah Farhat
and Fund Director Fadi Aramouni explained the process noting that their hands were tied,
so to speak, as they had to wait for money to be dispensed in order to make the promised
payments for reconstruction and reconciliation to those entitled to it. This presented a
challenge to meeting the needs of returnees in a timely manner—and hence delayed the
execution of the plan. It also increased the level of criticism towards these agencies,
41 It is also important to note that the UNDP had divided the response to IDPs along different lines. It did mention two phases: the first one being a general survey or study o f all villages of displacement with no interventions taking place and the second phase especially emphasizing 6 pivots and including about 60 villages where the first activities were focused (UNDP Reintegration and Socio-economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced Program). Yet others have noted that the division of villages was based on their centrality or importance both to the regions as well as being to the return process in general (like for example, areas closer to Beirut).
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charging them with corruption and failing to fulfill their promises. These criticisms were
articulated not only by the displaced themselves, but also by politicians. One former
director of the CFD even noted that the money spent on displaced was almost double the
originally allotted amount and that these amounts were not spent appropriately or where
they should have been (Interview, Former CFD Director, Beirut, September 22, 2004).
While funding remains mainly governmental in origin, i.e. from the state’s budget, the
CFD received some money from individuals and other organizations, such as the $2
million donation made by then Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, following his son’s
wedding.
CFD is divided into 5 directorates, each with a clearly defined task. The Office of
the CFD President, which employs 22 staff, provides administrative support, supervises
the institutions’ operations, and meets with community representatives. The Engineering
Directorate has an administrative staff of 20 people who provide support for a team of 40
engineers and architects; these specialists supervise construction work to make sure that
those who receive compensation use it in a proper way. The Directorate of Evictions has
an administrative staff of 12 and a team of 25 inspectors who check the specific details of
an applicant’s file and the validity of the application. The Financial Directorate employs
30 persons and is responsible for paying the compensations. The Administrative
Directorate, made up of 22 employees, handles personnel matters and provides
administrative support (“Executive summary,” 38-9).
The Fund plays a number of roles, including investigating cases of illegally
occupied houses, paying disbursements for evacuation, preparing technical reports to
estimate compensations for rebuilding, and observing the progress of work (“Government
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Policy and Achievements,” 2). The money is dispensed following a process in which
applicants first submit proper documents and applications to the MoD; then an
assessment by teams of engineers and specialists representing the Central Fund and the
Ministry is performed on the ground. Through these site checks, the Fund assesses the
value of compensation, issues a list of beneficiaries, and announces the dates and places
of payments. The payment plans for rehabilitation (or restoration) and rebuilding differ:
the disbursement of funds was divided into either two or three payments, depending on
whether the houses needed rehabilitation or reconstruction and according to periodical
assessments made on site (“Government Policy and Achievements,” 2). Due to the
economic situation; the reconstruction payments, which were originally given on three
installments (40%, 40%, and 20%), are now paid in two (50% each) (Interview, CFD
Director General, Beirut, August 9, 2003). In addition to this financial assistance to
rehabilitate and rebuild damaged houses, another type of monetary compensations aimed
at helping displaced resettle in their original homes were earmarked for evacuations of
illegally occupied houses, buildings, and commercial centers. Eviction payments were
calculated per housing unit; each received $5000. The compensation for those who were
displaced from the Israeli-occupied zone were paid $8000, due to the fact that they were
unable to return home and were forced to find other living accommodations (Global IDP
Database, 2004, 39). However, due to the lack of funding, the CFD has been paying a
fixed $5000 to everybody (Interview, CFD employee, Beirut, August 9, 2003). The Fund
also pays a compensation of $20,000 per victim, to be collected by the victim’s family
following a successful reconciliation carried out by the MoD (the reconciliation process
adopted by the Ministry will be analyzed in the next chapter).
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The shortage of funds translated into the CFD’s inability to make the necessary
payments to meet the deadline it had set out for eviction notices and consequently, the
latter had to be delayed (Global IDP Database, 2004, 39). Such fiscal deficiency was also
exposed in the inability of the Ministry to pay individuals’ their compensations for home
rehabilitation and reconstruction in a timely manner: while some families received all of
their payments, others have either only received one or no payments from the Fund—a
common complaint by both returnees and Fund officials. Commenting of the amount paid
for people to rebuild their houses, the mayor of one of the villages of return noted that the
amounts dispensed covered, at most, 1% of the damage (Interview, Mayor, July 17,
2003). The director of the Caritas project also commented on the compensation issue and
noted how the families in the 44 villages where Caritas is active have not been paid their
full compensations (Interview, Beirut, August 4, 2003). The majority of those displaced,
returnees and residents interviewed also complained about the lack of funding and/or the
failure of the CFD to continue payments as promised.
“The amount allocated for rebuilding do not meet our needs, construction material are getting more expensive.. . “ I started rebuilding my home but ran out of money, the Fund has not paid the second installment yet... I frequently visit the Fund’s office to check about the money but they say they do not know when funds will be available... I have an unfinished home now; I cannot even afford to put up windows or doors... I don’t think we will go back now.. .1 have kids and it gets very cold up there” (Fund beneficiaries, Beirut Fund offices, August 9, 2003).
Such complaints are common amongst returnees who have gone back, but now live in
unfinished quarters due to lack of funding, as well as from potential returnees whose
decision regarding return was based on whether they could provide a livable space for
their families.
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Lebanese Council of the South (LCS)
As mentioned before, internal displacement, which affected all areas of Lebanon,
hit the regions of Mount and South Lebanon particularly hard. The different causes and
reasons of displacement and the situation in South Lebanon at the end of the war, led to
varying responses to IDPs. While reconstruction and rehabilitation were common reasons
for stimulating return in both areas, the inter and intra-communal violence in Mount
Lebanon necessitated reconciliation processes and initiatives in addition to the
aforementioned development projects; South Lebanon was more impoverished than the
Mountain region; and the level of insecurity and instability from the Israeli presence and
the feeling of immanent attacks dominated the dynamics of the South. Due to the
demands of internal displacement, the inability of a single institution to deal with it, and
because of the Lebanese Council of the South’s familiarity with the region and the
people, the Council was given responsibility for the displaced from the South (however,
some analysts and individuals argue that the only reason for such division of labor is
political, leading to increased control and power of the Shi’a leader Nabih Berri).
The Lebanese Council of the South predated the government’s plan of return; it
was established as a governmental institution in the 1970s originally to help residents
affected by Israeli actions in South Lebanon and the Western Bekaa Valley. The Council
was the vehicle through which emergency aid, reconstruction, poverty alleviation and
development projects to the South were channeled. Funded by the government, it
undertook the development of infrastructure, social services projects, provided financial
assistance to families of those imprisoned by Israel, and helped families expelled from
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the South in 1996 by providing them with monetary ($2000) and medical assistance
(Sherry, 1999, 6).
In addition to assisting those suffering from Israeli violations, the Council was
also given the responsibility for those displaced by internal conflicts in East Sidon and
the Jezzine coastal area. A special percentage of the Council’s budget was allocated to
help these displaced via compensations to rebuild and rehabilitate their houses. The
Council worked in 40 villages in this region and gave 18 million LL (or ~USD 12,000) for
rehabilitation and 30 million LL (or -USD20000) for reconstruction of homes. Its work
expanded after the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000: the Council
supported the return process by providing money for returnees to the liberated areas in
order to rebuild their livelihoods. Victims of violence, who wanted money to support
their rebuilding tasks, were required to go in person to the Council and fill out an
application. According to the information provided on the form and to an evaluation by a
team from the Council on the ground, the abovementioned amounts were granted.
However, the lack of appropriate funding and unclear guidelines for receipt of assistance
made the Council’s work more difficult and subject to much criticism.
Other Ministries
Various ministries were summoned to help and support the Ministry of the
Displaced, especially in areas that were not experiencing return. This collaboration was
necessary because the process of return was a governmental initiative; problems in the
areas of displacement touched on every aspect of life and required as much man power
and funds as possible; and the Ministry of the Displaced had only a limited budget.
Emphasis was placed on infrastructure rehabilitation, social services, and security which
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were considered the main factors in the IDP’s decision to return home; however, other
ministries’ work was not constrained to such a mandate, nor did it prioritize areas of
displacement as the entire country had suffered from destruction during the war and was
in need of rehabilitation. It should be noted that the government attempted, to the greatest
extent possible, to present itself as responding equally to all areas of the country, despite
the blatant focus and favoritism of Beirut in terms of efforts and funds.
For the purpose of this study, I will highlight the different ministries’ work in
areas of return to highlight the cooperation between the different agencies. The Ministry
of Public Works focused its efforts on areas destroyed by war, on removing debris in
order to pave the way for reconstruction and to rehabilitate roads and infrastructure in the
villages; it did so in coordination with other ministries and the Council for Development
and Reconstruction. The Ministry of Energy and Water’s primary role was to ensure that
water and electricity were available in the villages—necessary to achieve the living
standards for which people would return. The Ministry of Education took on the task of
rehabilitating, building, and equipping schools in the displaced areas; again, this was a
measure taken in order to encourage permanent return of displaced and their children to
the villages and towns. However, the criticism voiced by most of the interviewees was
that such activities were not done in a timely manner and did not begin until much later in
the process. The Ministry of Defense assisted in maintaining security in the areas of
return by assuring a military presence. It also assisted Internal Security forces in carrying
out evictions areas around the country (especially Beirut) and de-mining (mostly in the
South). The Ministry of Interior financially supported municipalities and public
institutions in order to revive and strengthen their role in areas of return. It also deployed
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internal security forces to assist in eviction of illegally occupied lands and homes (An-
Nahar, 1992).
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)
Established by Legislative Decree No. 5 on January 31st 1977, the Council for
Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is the major public authority in charge of the
country’s reconstruction and development process (UNDP, 2002). It was created
primarily due to the need for a more powerful and efficient public authority than the
Ministry of Planning, one that could deal with the enormous task of addressing the
extensive destruction caused by two years of civil war. CDR was entrusted with the tasks
of planning reconstruction and development programs; preparing investment plans and
securing funding for those projects (both foreign and local financing); and implementing
them.42
However, the continued civil war and ensuing destruction posed tremendous
challenges to the CDR, which rendered it almost inactive throughout the war years. It was
only at the end of the war in 1991, when it was faced with increasing pressures to revive
the devastated country, that the government reinvigorated the Council and allocated it the
responsibility for national reconstruction.43 In order to strengthen it and make it more
responsive to the post-war reality, amendments of certain provisions of the Legislative
Decree No. 5 were introduced and signed on December 7, 1991; this became known as
42 For more information, on the creation and work of CDR, check the CDR website at: www.cdr.gov.lb 43 This was mainly constrained to the rehabilitation of physical and social infrastructure (Wetter, 6).
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Legislative Decree No. 91-117.44 The CDR, hence, became the most active government
unit in the post-war period.
The rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country was a daunting task well
beyond the financial capabilities of the weakened Lebanese government. For this reason,
CDR launched the Horizon 2000 Plan in 1993 by which to mobilize external financing
(mostly from Arab countries, Europe and the World Bank) to support the reconstruction
process. The Plan “consists of securing, over the period 1995-2007, a cumulative volume
of public investments of $18 billion which are estimated to generate during the same
period in the private sector investments of $42 billion. These investments are expected to
maintain an average annual GDP growth rate of 8 per cent. This in turn should raise
Lebanon's income level to the upper limit of the middle-income countries” (Norkonmaa,
1995). It also provided for projects in sectors of power/energy; water and waste water;
telecommunications; transportation; roads and highways. The Plan also invested in social
sectors such as health and education.
CDR was not created for the sole purpose of helping IDPs, but according to a
senior program specialist in the Council, it also supported the repatriation process. It
should be noted, however, that the CDR did not give any priority or preference to
displaced villages or areas of return (Interview, CDR Senior Program Specialist, Beirut,
June 11, 2003.). Today, it continues to be “the most important institution in the
reconstruction program of the country” (Najem, 1998, 85).
44 For more information on the amendments, see http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/340/342/law no91- 117.html
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Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
The complexity and security demands of the return process also called for the
Lebanese Army’s assistance in returning displaced and facilitating the rehabilitation of
the villages (Global IDP Database, 2004, 53). The Army was not deployed to fight but for
peacekeeping and logistical support. A dispatch sent by the Army Commander General
Emile Lahoud to the units explained the LAF’s role,
Each unit is required to take the necessary security measures to ensure the return of the displaced to their original residences as specified in the first phase, under normal circumstances providing security and ease to the returnees and prohibiting any assaults on them or their properties and encourage those hesitant to overcome their fears and follow in the footsteps of those who returned” (Lebanese Army, http://lebarmy.gov.lb/).
The dispatch also delineated security measures, including checkpoints at the entrances to
villages and towns, as well as the setting up of posts in key locations from which patrols
could emanate throughout the day and night. Other responsibilities included coordinating
between returnees and residents in those villages; solving difficulties that might stand in
the way of the return process, such as evictions of illegally occupied homes and
properties; collecting illegal weapons; hearing complaints; and solving conflicts
(Lebanese Army, http://lebarmy.gov.lb/).
The LAF’s work depended on the needs of the areas to which they were
dispatched. While in some cases, they removed wreckage, cleaned gutters, planted trees,
rehabilitated agricultural roads and sports arenas, in others they maintained security
(Mount Lebanon) and yet in others their major task was to clear landmines planted by the
Israelis in South Lebanon; these landmines were recognized as the major obstacle facing
return to that area due to safety and economic (agricultural) interests (Lebanese Army,
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http://lebarmy.gov.lb/). While the Lebanese army took the lead in the de-mining process,
the limited capacity of the government—in terms of funds, expertise and material—to
deal effectively with the problem and its consequences has led to substantial
collaboration from numerous organizations. Such organizations included USAID and the
World Rehabilitation Fund; millions of dollars have been allocated to this process—
which is ongoing today (USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/pop_health
dcofwvf/reports/evals/wvlebanonO 1 .html).
The Local NGOs
The work of local NGOs has been complementary and supportive of the
government’s initiative of return. However, the shortage of funding, the voluntary basis
of their work, the lack of coordination, and the unsure relationship between the
government and such organization all posed serious challenges: many NGOs simply did
not have the capacity to deal with such an enormous humanitarian and costly issue with
vast political, social and economic implications. Therefore, only few Lebanese NGOs
worked on the IDP problem, primarily by sponsoring workshops, training sessions,
common projects, etc. These organizations and their work are described below.
The Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network (LCRN)
The Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network, a local NGO founded in 1996 with
the help of a group of intellectuals and practitioners, was the first organization of its kind
in the country. LCRN’s work is not confined to Lebanon: it has carried out projects in
other Arab and Gulf countries, providing “training on conflict management,
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interventions, reconciliations, and dissemination of information” (Interview, LCRN
Executive Director, Beirut, July 4,2003).
In Lebanon, LCRN engages in numerous conflict resolution training and
activities. It’s most important work with internally displaced people targeted Mount
Lebanon. There, it carries out peacebuilding work and conducts numerous reconciliation
workshops in areas of return. Such efforts are particularly important in this region, which
suffered from sectarian conflict between Maronites and Druze whose consequences are
still reflected in the continued tensions and clashes between the two communities. Most
importantly, according to its director, LCRN focuses on restarting communication,
building trust, and creating cooperation and understanding between residents and
returnees. It does so through a number of different activities and projects that brings
them together to cooperation and work towards a common goal (Interview, LCRN
Executive Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003). LCRN mainly focuses its projects and activities
on youth and depends largely on the younger generation’s commitment and assistance in
order to implement them. Such activities have included workshops on problem-solving
and reconciliation; and joint programs of action between different villages; etc. (Global
IDP Database, 2004, 54).
The LCRN’s methodology of involvement in projects has evolved throughout the
years and consists of “in-depth interviews and investigations of the context and situation,
visits to the area(s), substantial pre-workshop preparation, training workshop, constant
follow-up, and assistance including process evaluation” (LCRN Newsletter, 2001). The
objective is not only to transmit skills to the participants in the intervention but to make
sure that those skills will be used in the specific context.
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The LCRN does not have a paid staff; it works mainly on voluntary basis.45 The
Network funds its activities through grants from and contracts with international and
local organizations and institutions and foreign Embassies. For example, its work in
Mount Lebanon was mostly funded by the Dutch Embassy (Interview, LCRN Executive
Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003). The number of activities it conducts, thus, is largely
dependent on access to such funds. The organization is currently suffering from a serious
funding problem, which explains the decrease in activities (Interview, LCRN Executive
Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003).
Permanent Peace Movement (PPM)
Founded in 1991, the Permanent Peace Movement is a non-profit, social,
intellectual, humanitarian, and independent organization with the main aim of resolving
conflict and reducing the use of violence in Lebanon. PPM’s groups of volunteers and
specialists have carried out projects and organized workshops and conferences on
numerous topics including nonviolence, human rights, and democracy in Lebanon and
the Arab world. PPM has worked with displaced and returnees in a number of areas and
organized several initiatives with the aim of bringing people together to build a common,
peaceful future (Permanent Peace Movement,
http://www.arabinfomall.org/en/Index.aspx?orgid=77§ionid= 1 -). Such initiatives
have included one-day training workshops that brought together 30-50 persons, mainly
youth, each time to learn about nonviolence and meditation. These sessions also provided
45 The LCRN works out o f the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies where the Director has a small office space in which he can hold meetings with the group of volunteers to prepare for a project as well as with possible funders (even though most of those latter meetings take place at the funder organization).
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a space for participants to talk about problems that they have experienced and try to find
possible solutions. The PPM had done 20 such trainings in 90 villages. However,
realizing that one-day sessions are not enough, the Movement held more intensive four
day (two 2 weekend sessions) capacity building sessions for participants who showed
interest according to questionnaires that PPM distributes at the end of its one-day
meetings. These longer sessions focused more on discovery of needs, priorities and
program design (Interview, Founder and Director of PPM, Beirut, June 17, 2003).
In its work with the displaced, the PPM has focused on initiatives that encourage
communities to live together. According to the director of the Movement, their work was
based on the rationale that twenty years of displacement has led to violent social
disintegration which time alone cannot redress. Such degeneration has left
No common traditions and customs which unite the two communities; no economic trade relations between them; no cultural activities that bring them together... Other than their children’s schools, they share nothing... That’s why our work does not focus on the level of one village only but rather pushes people to think on the wider level... we had participants in our meetings from 8-9 villages, they all knew their needs and programs... and they started to meet to specify needs and work together... In that way, we built social, economic and common relationships between them as individuals, regardless of their village or sectarian identity (Interview, Founder and Director of PPM, Beirut, June 17, 2003).
The Director of the Movement did not provide me with any information or
supporting documents on the size and budget of the organization. He did not mention the
exact number of projects or workshops that they have executed either. However, he
repeatedly referred to their financial problems and noted that the lack of funding was the
main challenge to and limitation for their work. He also explained that due to the lack of
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money, they could not “even hire a secretary or get a land-line (telephone number)”46
(Interview, Founder and Director of PPM, Beirut, June 17, 2003). He highlighted that
their work was totally on voluntary basis, which posed a challenge to the continuity of
projects. These projects not only depended on the availability of volunteers, but also of
funds, which the Movement received from international and local organizations. “The
economic situation of the country made it more difficult for people to do voluntary work;
they need to get money to support themselves and their families... the difficulty of
finding committed volunteers is one factor that explains the decrease in activities”
(Interview, Founder and Director of PPM, Beirut, June 17, 2003). Another factor was the
lack of funds available for such work in the country, “most of the money has been
diverted to reconstruction and development of South Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal
in 2000” (Interview, Founder and Director of PPM, Beirut, June 17, 2003).
Farah Social Foundation (FSF)
An independent local social medical organization, Farah Social Foundation was
founded in 1988 by a group of experts and specialists. It has been involved in providing
social and medical services to low income people in deprived areas and has thus focused
some of its attention on the internally displaced. The Foundation’s objectives are
humanitarian and social in nature: it aimed at improving health consciousness in
displaced areas and communities; fighting poverty and sickness; establishing health care
461 contacted the Director on his cell phone to schedule a meeting. We met in an apartment turned office/library (a large meeting table in the middle with chairs, shelves filled with newspaper clippings, reports and books against the wall, and a couple of flipchart- each on either side of the table). The office was closed, no one to greet a visitor (I got there early for the meeting but had to wait so that he can come and let me in). There was no electricity and the only light in the room was that coming from the windows. He explained to me that they use this office for preparation and organizational meetings prior to a project.
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centers; providing relief to victims of wars and disasters; and protecting the environment.
(Farah Social Foundation, http://www.psp.org.lb/farah.htm)
Farah Foundation is also a voluntary organization that depends on funding from
organizations and individuals to implement its projects. Most of the volunteers are youth
familiar with the areas in which work is being done. It also stressed the role of the
community in determining its own needs (Interview, Director of the Foundation, Beirut,
June 18, 2003). It is important to note that the Foundation was and continues to be in
close contact with the MoD and it has maintained close relationships with Walid Jumblatt
and the PSP party. Such rapport facilitated the implementation projects and obtaining
certain funds.47
Farah Social Foundation cooperates with existing organizations, such as Caritas,
MoD, UNDP, FAO, and the Order of Malta to support the return process. It assisted with
reconstruction projects, provided (equipped) health centers, participated in agricultural
projects, and established mobile clinics (Interview, Director of the Foundation, Beirut,
June 18, 2003). With financial support from different sources, the Foundation provided
health guidance and food aid, sponsored youth meetings between residents and returnees,
organized youth camps and training sessions, and offered computer training and language
classes (Interview, Director of the Foundation, Beirut, June 18, 2003). In addition to these
social initiatives, it helped with monetary assistance for evictions and rehabilitation of
churches and sanctuaries. Aware of the harsh winter conditions in the villages, Farah
Foundation also provided nutrition support, diesel, and other necessities in order to
471 conducted the interview with the Director of the Foundation in the office of the Director of the MoD/UNDP project at the MoD.
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support resident and returnee families and ensure their stay (Interview, Director of the
Foundation, Beirut, June 18, 2003).
After acknowledging the organization’s difficulty in obtaining necessary funds for
projects, the director told me that they were working on their website which should be up
and functioning within few months (it has been more than 2 years since our conversation
and the website has not been launched).48 He also promised to provide me with additional
information and reports on their work; I followed up with him but was not given any
documents that would explain, in more detail, the ideology, scope, or size of the
organization.
Lebanese Non-Governmental Organization Forum (LNF)
The LNF was founded in 1991 and strove to coordinate “the activities of
Lebanese NGOs concerned primarily with relief and development issues and provide “a
framework to bridge the gap between communities and citizens separated by war”
(“Lebanese NGO Forum,” 2). The LNF received funds from its member associations or
organizations, from donations, and contributions by individuals and Lebanese or foreign
governmental and non-governmental organizations (“Lebanese NGO Forum,” 6). The
Forum is comprised of 10 non-governmental organizations,49 active in different sectors:
“each association involves a large number of programs and the annual budget for the
48 Little information about the organization can be found through the Progressive Socialist Party website: www.psp.org.lb/farah.htm 49 Some of those associations are umbrella organizations. The 10 members are :The Humanitarian Association of Dar El-Fatwa; The Humanitarian Association of the Higher Shiite Islamic Council; The Druze Foundation for Social Welfare; The Lebanese Federation for Child Care; Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA); Humanitarian Associations of Greek-Orthodox Arch-Bishopric o f Beirut; Humanitarian Associations o f Greek-Catholic Community Council; Humanitarian Institutions of the Evangelical Synod o f Syria and Lebanon; Humanitarian Institutions of the Lebanese Monastic Order; The Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped.
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overall Forum member associations is estimated at $50-60 million” (Lebanese Non
governmental Organization Forum, www.lnf.org.lb/member.html). It is important to note
that these organizations or associations do represent the different religious sects in
Lebanon.
The structure of the LNF includes a General Assembly that elects the six-member
Board of Administration every two years. The Board runs the administrative affairs of
LNF and is held responsible for the appropriate implementation of the programs and
activities (Lebanese Non-governmental Organization Forum,
www.lng.org.lb/admin.html). Through its Migration Unit Program (now known as the
Rights Program), the Forum closely worked with the displaced population and provided
them with information relating to their return, as well as legal advice and aid to solve
problems that resulted from their displacement. These sessions, each bringing together
about 40 displaced, were held in public places (schools, libraries, clubs, and religious
centers) (“Lebanese NGO Forum,”3).
LNF also trains NGO workers; organizes seminars; provides relief aid to victims
of violence in South Lebanon; and resettles those forced to evacuate their villages
(“Lebanese NGO Forum,” 3-4). More directly, through the “Resettlement Program
(1995-1997),” the LNF undertook several development initiatives in displaced areas,
targeting both people and infrastructure. However, its activities focused mostly on
workshops, conferences, and training seminars.
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Lebanese Institute for Economic and Social Development (ILDES)
The Institute has conducted a series of studies since the 1980s on the problem of
displacement and its serious problems and challenges. Along with facilitating the return
to areas of origin, ILDES’ main objective was to find solutions to the problems that
displaced faced to rehabilitate the infrastructures, houses and economic enterprises. In
cooperation with public authorities and private institutions concerned with the return,
ILDES put together a credit fund to help the displaced who wish to return and rehabilitate
their homes and launch economic activities (Abourjaili, 2004, 2).
People’s Rights Movement
The Movement was created in 1986 with the objective of diffusing consciousness
and resolving societal conflicts. It publishes a bimonthly magazine — Students Rights—
which is distributed at most Lebanese Universities. Its editorial board is comprised of
both volunteer and paid journalists (Abdel Hussain, 2002). According to the Movement’s
press officer, “the main objective of the magazine is to enhance the students’
understanding of democracy and institutional work” (Abdel Hussain, 2002). It has been
working with the Ministry of Displaced since 2000, specifically with the United Nations’
Program for return, within the framework of reconciliation between youth in the villages
and towns (Interview, Human Rights Movement, Youth Activities Coordinator,
Achrafieh, September 6, 2005). The Movement and the MoD/UNDP agreed upon a
division of labor in programs and meetings in return villages: while the MoD/UNDP
would focus on logistics (location, invitations, etc.), the Movement would prepare the
program of intervention after consultation with concerned officials. The organization has
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conducted several lectures, two 12-days youth camps, and a workshop with high school
professors, among others. The underlying foundation of these initiatives is the concept of
“the acceptance of the other” and the resolution of conflicts by nonviolent means
(Interview, Human Rights Movement, Youth Activities Coordinator, Achrafieh,
September 6, 2005)
Churches and Mosques Reconstruction Council (CMRC)
The Churches and Mosques Reconstruction Council was established in 1994 with
the objective to rebuild all churches, mosques and other sacred religious places destroyed
by the civil war. It currently consists of 11 members among them Christian and Muslim
religious leaders, the Minister of Displaced, the director of the Central Fund for
Displaced, deputies and civil engineers (Feghali, 1995). The Council’s objectives are
national, not religious, and are based on respecting all religions: the purpose of rebuilding
or restoring sanctuaries to demonstrate the desire for coexistence (or common existence)
and a reestablishing of bonds and relations between the different strata of the population.
Its projects are funded through external and internal donations and by contribution from
the CFD (Feghali, 1995).
In the first three years after its establishment, the Council oversaw the rebuilding
and rehabilitation of 180 sanctuaries in different areas of the country. These projects cost
a total of $2,985,039.15; of that amount, $2,478,272.65 was paid by the CFD and
$506,766.50 was contributed by the Council from donations (“The Achievements”, 1998,
102).
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The International Response
The international response to IDPs in Lebanon also represented an important
aspect of the return policy in the country, especially as it supported national initiatives to
reintegrate returnees in the towns and villages. While some organizations provided
funding for specific projects—their role ended when the funding ended—others have
remained involved in the process of return for numerous years and continue to find ways
to fund their programs in the country. These organizations primarily focused on
promoting socio-economic development, but a number soon shifted their attention to
human development through reconciliation efforts between the different communities
(UNDP, 2000; UNDP, 2002). Regrettably, since 2000, the international response has
been gradually diminishing in Mount Lebanon (which was the main area of interest for
those projects) due to lack of available funding, on the one hand, and because, according
to Caritas, this region “is no long considered a post-conflict one” (Caritas, 2004). The
Israeli withdrawal in 2000 redirected all attention to South Lebanon, where most of the
funds and efforts are now divested. Learning from their mistakes and experiences in
Mount Lebanon, most of those international organizations involved with return to the
South focused on the social and human development needs aspects of the process
(Interview, UNDP Project Director, Beirut, July 8, 2003). This section will present a
summary description of the size and scope of these organizations in the Lebanese context.
Bilateral Organizations/Assistance
Bilateral assistance has been a major support to the post-conflict reconstruction
process in Lebanon. Such funds were used for different purposes and in different sectors.
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The United Arab Emirates Fund, for example, was one of the most important donors for
landmine clearance in South Lebanon. It contributed $50 million for project Operation
Emirates Solidarity (OES); OES began in 2001, was completed in May 2004, and
resulted in the de-mining of 60,000 landmines. The Kuwait Fund also focused its
attention on South Lebanon and provided financial assistance to former residents of the
villages of Rashaf and Hanin who had lost their homes as a result of the war (MACC SL,
2004). The Saudi Development Fund loaned $5 million to the CDR for water projects in
different areas and villages around the country. The Government of Qatar donated $2
million do develop the city of Aley (“The Achievements,” 1998,154).
In addition to Arab support, Lebanon also attracted foreign attention. The United
States Agency for International Development (USAID)50 sponsored several programs in
Lebanon and employs nine individuals, eight foreign nationals and 1 U.S. Direct Hire.
Even though its work does not focus solely on assisting IDPs or the process of return, one
of the agency’s objectives is to expand economic opportunities in the areas of
displacement and return, which are mostly rural; by doing so, it was hoped that those
thinking of migrating to already overcrowded urban areas would be diverted, finding
return more appealing. USAID activities, aiming at human and social development,
included extending credit and small grants to women and farmers; providing technical
assistance; funding NGO’s work in rehabilitation of roads, schools, and clinics;
supporting agricultural projects; assisting in mines clearance in South Lebanon; etc. For
example, the Relief and Development Program supported community-level
50 A federal agency, the United States Agency for International Development was officially created by an executive order in 1961 even though its work dates back to the Marshall Plan which reconstructed Europe after WWII. It has presence in numerous countries recovering from disaster and/or engaging in democratic reforms where it implements economic and humanitarian assistance programs.
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reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in order to revitalize communities that were
either stricken by poverty and neglect or heavily affected by the war. Another project, the
Rural Community Development Program (RCDP) more directly targeted IDPs; a five
year project, ending in 2002, RCDP aimed to improve the quality of life in displaced
villages in order to encourage return (Interview, USAID Program Officers, Awkar, July
22,2003). Other projects funded in areas of displacement included community building
and ethnic tolerance (IWA project); agri-training (SRI project); development and
strengthening of local institutions (YMCA project); micro-financing (CHF project); and
landmine injury prevention and victims assistance (WRF project).
The budget of the USAID mission in Lebanon, decided upon by the US Congress,
has been constantly increasing since the 1990s—from $6 million a year to currently $40
million. These funds have been allocated to different programs, grouped under three main
headings: development assistance, democracy and good governance, and economic
support (USAID Lebanon, http://lebanon.usaid.gov/). They are used to fund programs by
U.S. and local NGOs; the latter include Mercy Corps International, Young Men Christian
Association (YMCA), Catholica Near East Welfare Agency (CNEWA), Cooperative
Housing Foundation (CHF), SRI International, World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF),
Catholic Relief Services, Pontifical Mission, Creative Associates, World Vision, Save the
Children, the Makhzoumi Foundation, and the Institute of World Affairs (IWA). The
work of these NGOs covers areas from the North (e.g. Tripoli and Akkar), the South (e.g.
Sidon), Bekaa (e.g. Baalbeck) and Mount Lebanon (e.g., the Shouf). Most of the funds
focused on “expanding the country’s economic opportunities by assisting in WTO
accession, income generation opportunities creation, light-agro industry, tourism,
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information technology, and support for landmine victims” (USAID Lebanon,
http://lebanon.usaid.gov/). In addition to these NGOs, USAID also cooperates with a
number of ministries including the Ministries of Displaced, Social Affairs, Agriculture,
and Environment.
The European Union (EU) also has played an important role in assisting the
country’s reconstruction and development process. Its assistance to IDPs in Lebanon did
not begin at the end of the war, in the early 1990s; the EU has been supporting this
uprooted population in Lebanon since 1978, by providing humanitarian assistance during
violent conflict to those displaced by the war. The EU thus helped to fill the gap resulting
from the inability of the weakened Lebanese government to provide these people with
shelter, security, food and/or medical care (Global IDP Database, 2004, 32). In the post
war era, its work with IDPs took a different turn and shifted from relief to socio
economic development (particularly in South Lebanon); democracy, human rights;
environment protection; and support to Palestinian refugees (Global IDP Database, 2004,
67). Most of the projects that directly targeted the return and reintegration of IDPs were
completed in 2003 (Global IDP Database, 2004, 68). However, a few programs continued
and in 2004, the EU launched had a micro-loan program to help returnees rebuild their
livelihoods (Shaya, 2004).
The collaboration between the EU and the MoD began in 1994 with an agreement
to carry out an agricultural program for a value of $1,200,000; this included the
“provision of assistance concerning agriculture and animal production in Ramliye and
Deir El-Qamar” (“The Achievements,” 1998, 148). The project involved the
establishment of a dairy, a cattle farm, and an olive press; the purchase of tractors for
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farmers; the construction of an irrigation duct; provision of loans to cattle farmers;
purchase of 60 cows; and the establishment of a nursery (“The Achievements,” 1998,
148). Following this project, another one, “The Project for the Economic Recovery of the
Displaced in the Agricultural and Agro-Industrial Sectors,” was initiated in 1996. This
project, with a budget of $6,196,064 over three years, worked to rehabilitate the
agricultural sector infrastructure and introduce new methods and techniques to improve
production. The objective was to increase profits and consequently, the income of
families in the region. The geographical focus of this project was El- Mnassef region in
the Shouf (“The Achievements,” 1998, 148).
The Order of Malta provided health services to returnees including a mobile
ambulatory medical center, an outpatient clinic, and a lab; it also offered medical services
such as checkups, tests, and medications. The organization further carried out a number
of health activities in displaced villages and helped in building and equipping the
Qabrechmoun Public Hospital (“The Achievements,” 1998, 153). However, such medical
services were provided during the civil war as well when the Order established a number
of outpatient clinics to assist people in need; these are now important aspects of the
country’s national health system (Order of Malta, Activity Report, 2005, 50). According
to the Order’s 2005 Activity Report, the 10 medical centers and dispensaries that it
helped establish “provide care for more than 200,000 people regardless of their cultural
or religious backgrounds” (Order of Malta, Activity Report, 2005, 47). All these
equipped care centers “are run by religious congregations and staffed by Lebanese
doctors” (Order of Malta, Activity Report, 2005, 51).
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The Twin City Program is another interesting bilateral response to the issue of
displaced. It resulted in the twinning of several displaced villages with villages and cities
in France, Italy, and Greece. Projects included developmental ones relating to health,
education, culture, economic, tourism, environmental protection, etc. (“The
Achievements,” 1998,157). Furthermore, such twinning encouraged craftsmen and
craftswomen from displaced villages to exhibit their artifacts in an exhibition the revenue
from which goes toward encouraging the return of those people to their home (“The
Achievements,” 1998,157).
Multilateral Organizations
The United Nations in Lebanon, through its different agencies, has done
tremendous work supporting post-conflict reconstruction and development in several
areas of the country, notably Mount Lebanon and South Lebanon. It cooperated closely
with the MoD in projects aiming at solving the IDP problem in Lebanon and returning
displaced to their homes of origin.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Even though it partnered with the MoD in return projects for Mount Lebanon,
UNDP had questioned the main assumption at the foundation of the government’s
response to internal displacement, namely that the return of the displaced to their villages
and the solution to the problem consists primarily of reversing the process of
displacement—the ‘as they went, they will return’ rhetoric. The principal problem with
such a theory, according to UNDP, lies in its naivety and ignorance of the complexity and
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profundity of the socio-economic changes that have taken place in the country during the
20 years or more since displacement first occurred. Furthermore, the government has
failed to take into account the fact that most displaced areas are rural and the migration
from rural to urban areas is a natural phenomenon that might have occurred even if not
induced by war and conflict; this, the UN points out, can limit possible responses (USCR
2002; Global IDP Database, 2004, 27). In addition, UNDP believes that the lack of
results from the government return policy lie in the “absence of a broader strategy to
promote sustainable development in areas where much of the displacement took place”
(USCR, 1999).
Despite reservations about the Ministry’s understanding of a solution to the
problem, UNDP has worked very closely with the MoD and has been one of the most
active organizations to assist IDPs in Lebanon since 1992. It most renowned programs
are A’idoun (which means returning or returnees in Arabic), implemented in 1992, and
the United Nations Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced
Programme, which was launched in July 1994 in cooperation with the Ministry for the
Displaced and other UN agencies (such as UNV and UNESCO). UNDP’s strategy is
characterized by its emphasis on “sustainable human development, grassroots
participation, and human rights,” all aspects reflected to a certain extent in its work in the
return process of IDPs in Lebanon (Stein, 1997, 171). It “assumed that effectively
reinserting uprooted populations into national economic and social life required creating
conditions conducive to sustainable development” (Sollis and Schultz, 1995; Stein, 1997,
171). UNDP’s work throughout the years evolved from a strictly socio-economic
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development focus to a human development focus, which is clear in its programs with
IDPs.
A’idoun
One of the toughest challenges facing the return process was how to make it
permanent, especially after the lengthy duration of displacement which has, in some
cases, lasted for more than twenty years. Moreover, such return would be entail migration
from urban areas where those displaced have settled to rural villages. Aware of the
difficulties facing the process, the Ministry of Displaced launched the A’idoun program
in cooperation with UNDP and UNESCO, which aimed “to meet the socio-economic
needs for the return of the displaced,” in order to promote favorable living conditions
which will encourage displaced to return home (Lebanese Non-Governmental
Organization Forum, www.lnf.org.lb/member.html). Reconstruction and rehabilitation of
houses occupied the biggest part of the program.
United Nations Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced Program (UNRSRD)
This program, an extension of the A’idoun program, was launched in July 1994,
in order to support the national program for the return of the displaced in different
sectors, including reconstruction, improving economic conditions, rehabilitating
infrastructure, and reviving social life and activities (Al- Awda, July 1994, 16). It
intended to “support the national program for the return of the displaced with special
focus on the social and economic issues related to the return process” (“Reintegration,”
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UNDP). Its main objective was not merely to return as many displaced as possible, but to
facilitate the resumption of normal life for returnees and residents in these areas (Al-
Awda, July 1994, 16). Its objectives were to assess and delineate the social and economic
needs of returnees, provide technical assistance to the Ministry, and activate funding
(“Summary of the UNDP program,” LEB 93/001). The program office at the Ministry of
Displaced, hired employees, and started conducting field visits to towns and villages that
had experienced return. At the completion of those on-ground assessments, about 156
villages in the Shouf, Aley and Baabda were chosen by the program staff and
representatives from the Ministry and the Fund (Al- Awda, July 1994, 16). The
program’s original completion date was set for 2002, but was extended by another 3
years.51
The 11-year project, which focused on Mount Lebanon, had a budget of
$4,450,000, contributed mainly by the Lebanese Government (40%) and UNDP (30%).
The remaining 30% came from other funder countries and funds. The intervention or
implementation stage focused on only 57 villages—divided into 5 pivots and included 17
‘reconciliation’ villages—in the Mount Lebanon region (Aley, El-Chouf and Baabda).
The objective was to provide the necessary conditions for long-term return through the
meeting of the social and economic needs of returnees and residents, as well as a
promotion of reconciliation to facilitate permanent repatriation (Global IDP Database,
2004, 58; UNDP HDR 2002, UNDP HDR2004).
51 Due to its failure to repatriate all IDPs, the UNRSRD was extended again for another two years until 2007, the date that the Ministry had set to close the internal displacement file. However, the deadline for completion o f the return process and the UNRSRD Program is most likely to be extended again.
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However, the developmental nature of the program led to an emphasis on
reconstruction and rehabilitation of houses and infrastructure, as this was the focus of the
first phase; such projects were allocated more than one third of the total resources
($1,700,000) (“Reintegration,” UNDP). This phase also included technical assistance to
the MoD and youth development (Lebanese Non-Governmental Organization Forum,
www.lnf.org.lb/member.html; Global IDP Database, 2004,62). At the end of the first
stage in 1996, an evaluation showed that the program was able to encourage the local
community to play a role in the return process; motivate youth to return; involve women
in return activities and revive their role in the economic activity for the family; assess the
needs and support public schools; support health centers; create job opportunities through
loans and training; training and guidance in the agricultural sector as well as providing
some encouraging services for agricultural production; encourage residents and Return
Committees to cooperate to provide the services that the municipality would have
provided (“Summary of the UNDP program,” LEB 93/001).
However, despite these improvements, the needs assessment that followed the
completion of the first phase attested to the UNDP’s failure to bring about the expected
results of sustainability and permanency of return. This led to a shift in focus and
activities in the second phase, which began in 1998 (“Summary of the UNDP program,”
LEB 93/001). This second phase, which focused on mixed villages located on the
Damascus and South roads, attempted to strengthen the return process by emphasizing
“interventions and projects that aim at reconciliation and reintegration between the
displaced/returnees and residents, especially focusing on the youth” Lebanese Non-
Governmental Organization Forum, www.lnf.org.lb/member.html). Moving beyond
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reconstruction, rehabilitation and relief, the second phase of the program focused on
socio-economic development factors and provided training for basic services such as
health and education, job creation and income generation activities, loans and credits,
agricultural production, social rehabilitation (of the health, education and nutrition
systems), community development and infrastructure which will benefit both residents
and returnees (Global IDP Database, 2004, 59). It also focused more on reconciliation
through participation in program implementation; training and workshops in civic
education and conflict resolution; sports and cultural activities; relationship building
activities; and camps (Global IDP Database, 2004, 60). An evaluation of the program for
the 2001-2002 period highlighted the necessity of a continued focus on reconciliation
activities and efforts via community youth clubs and capacity building at the local level.
This diversity of initiatives and the special attention given to understanding the local
needs by involving and empowering local communities in the projects has characterized
UNDP’s efforts in the return process (Global IDP Database, 2004, 61-62; Al- Awda, July
1994, 16).
The program resulted in different activities in the Mount Lebanon region,
including the establishment of 8 health clinics and centers, provision of medical and
laboratory equipment, and opening dental clinics; rehabilitating 48 public schools and
supplying them with audio-visual equipments; furnishing youth and sports clubs with the
necessary equipment, offices, and audio-visual systems; holding youth camps that
brought together members from the different communities to discuss issues, solve
differences, and reach agreement on basic points; holding trainings on reconciliation and
nonviolence techniques; establishing social organizations, cooperatives and clubs and
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helping in administering them; providing agricultural and technical training, as well as
micro-credit loans and small agricultural infrastructural plans; environmental training and
activities such as planting trees, cleaning roads, etc.; summer leisure activities and camps
to bring children together to learn to live with and respect one another; encouraging
handicrafts production by providing training and financial support; establishing a
vegetable market; supporting cooperatives with equipments and trainings; coordinating
with other civic organizations to avoid duplication of work; and advertisement campaigns
(“Summary of the UNDP program,” LEB 93/001).
Due to the continued occupation of South Lebanon and the fragile situation on the
border with Israel, most of the work on the IDP return process focused on the Mount
Lebanon region. With the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, however, all attention was shifted
to the South and funders showed more interest in supporting programs to rehabilitate and
develop the area and encourage IDP return. With those objectives in mind, the UNDP,
thus, began another project, the “Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of Demined Areas in
Lebanon 2004” (Global IDP Database, 2004, 61). As causes of displacement from the
South differed from those that led to displacement from Mount Lebanon, work in this
area remains mainly developmental in nature and the most critical activities are the
demining of the area, income generation, job creation, agricultural assistance, and
technical support (Global IDP Database, 2004, 67).
United Nations Volunteers in Lebanon (UNV)
The UNV began working in Lebanon in 1993 with different UN agencies,
government institutions, civil society, and the private sector. More than 70 volunteers—
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both national and international—were involved in community development, national
capacity building, and environmental rehabilitation (UNDP,
http://www.undp.org.lb/unv/). Since 1994, UNV has actively participated in the UNDP
program aiming at returning the displaced and supporting the reconciliation process.
Volunteers have been involved in an array of activities ranging from empowering clubs
and associations by providing them with necessary equipment and training, and
organizing reconciliation workshops, camps, meetings, and festivals (UNDP,
http://www.undp.org.lb/unv/). Such volunteer activities made it easier to build relations
and reconcile the interests of the residents and returnees in the region (UNDP,
http://www.undp.org.lb/unv/). In 2000, following the liberation of South Lebanon, UNV
became active in the area through the Post-conflict Socio-Economic Rehabilitation
Program coordinated and funded by UNDP and the government with the aim to
reconstruct the South. Volunteers’ work focused on activities targeting youth: their
mobilization, establishing networks between youth clubs, computer training, etc. The
objective was to encourage them to play an active and important role in the development
of their own communities and to encourage relationships between these youth (UNDP,
http://www.undp.org.lb/unv/).
UNIFIL
As was noted in chapter three, UNIFIL has been monitoring ceasefire and security
along the Blue Line area between Lebanon and Israel since the Israeli invasion of the
country in 1978. The peacekeeping mission remains in the country today, due to the
volatile situation on the borders. After the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in
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2000, UNIFIL extended its mission to include provision of assistance to the Lebanon
civilian population. Such assistance comprised medical care, water projects, social
services, equipment for schools and orphanages, de-mining activities, and development
projects in the region (Global IDP Database, 2004, 63).
Other UN Agencies
Other UN agencies also played important roles in supporting the IDP return
process by providing specialized assistance to displaced, residents and returnees. FAO,
for example, focused its attention on rehabilitating agricultural roads, strengthening
agricultural cooperatives, encouraging social development activities, providing food for
displaced families, supporting farmers by rehabilitating their lands, providing them with
seeds, providing technical support, and improving production, and planting trees in areas
of return (Taj Eddine, 1992, 9). UNICEF targeted assessing and meeting the basic needs
of children and mothers and played a role in helping returnees reintegrate into their
communities by rehabilitating water networks, securing sanitation and health education,
supporting social mobilization for improving the quality of life and living standards,
developing and improving the situation of mothers and children; and improving the
educational system to help the establishment of peace (Taj Eddine, 1992, 10). The WHO
participated in improving health services, developing programs for handicapped and
wounded people, and organizing health education and training programs (Taj Eddine,
1992, 10). The UNESCO focused on the educational aspect and worked on improving the
educational system, training teachers, and establishing technical centers in the areas of
return (Taj Eddine, 1992, 10). The process to solidify return and reintegrate returnees to
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their areas was supported by other agencies such as the UN-Habitat, UNEP, the World
Bank, and the IMF.
Non-Governmental Organizations
In addition to local NGOs, international non-governmental organizations have
also played a vital role in the process of return. I decided to include a separate category
for those NGOs rather than include them with local NGOs for several reasons: first, they
have larger structures and programs; second, they have offices internationally; third, they
have a paid staff (i.e. more permanency as staff is not dependent upon volunteerism); and
fifth, they have a much larger budget than local NGOs.
Middle East Council of Churches (MECC)
The MECC, established in 1974, is a “fellowship of churches relating itself to the
main stream of modem ecumenical movement—organized as a family of families—the
Eastern Orthodox, the Oriental Orthodox, the Catholic and Protestant families” (MECC,
http://www.mec-churches.org/). Its programs and activities in the region are characterized
by the following main themes: a commitment to strengthening unity between churches in
the region and installing confidence to encourage Christians to remain and contribute to
the future of the area; encouraging dialogue; building bridges of understanding and
mutual respect between people of different faiths; providing services to people suffering
from economic, political and violent conflict (i.e. the poor, deprived, exploited, sick, and
displaced); engendering justice and peace (MECC, http://www.mec-churches.org/).
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The MECC’s “Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program
(ERR)” provides assistance to marginalized groups in the Lebanese society through
services in the fields of health, income generation, education, and agriculture. One such
group, the displaced, were targeted by the program and encouraged to return to their
villages in Mount Lebanon. Due to the level of destruction and damage in those areas of
return, the initial emphasis was placed on the reconstruction process and providing
immediate basic needs to returnees. However, the exigencies of the return process
brought about a necessary shift in the MECC’s programs in 1997, when the emphasis
became, “developing and enabling communities through the support of programs that
have a sustainable impact on the lives of those communities” (MECC, ERR, Annual
Report, 1997, 1). Hence, more effort was put into sustainable development, rather than
mere relief, whereby MECC assumed the role of capacity builder rather than that of
implementer. Such capacity building is done through loans, vocational training, and
support for cooperative societies, among other activities (MECC, ERR Annual Report,
1996, 2). For example, ERR provided small business loans to returnees to help them
improve their economic and social conditions and promote reintegration of the displaced
by generating income and creating job opportunities (MECC, ERR Annual Report, 1997,
13).
In certain temporary situations, however, MECC continued its relief work. One
such example entailed assistance to the displaced from the South who were driven out by
the 1996 Israeli attacks. It provided health teams who went around displacement centers
with the aim of preventing the spread of disease. After return was achieved, it continued
to support those people through rehabilitation activities to provide the latter with better
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living conditions via distribution of seedlings, reviving cooperatives, rehabilitating the
association for the blind and the Lebanese red cross centers, providing grants to repair
irrigation pools and canals; reconstructing schools; building drinking water networks, etc.
(MECC, ERR Annual Report, 1996, 10).
An important aspect of MECC’s work is the empowerment and involvement of
local communities in the assessment of needs, as well as program planning,
implementation, and evaluation. MECC tries to work with local people not only to
provide a sense of program ownership in the community, but as a job creation strategy.
For example, in rehabilitation and reconstruction programs, they identify carpenters from
the local community to build windows, doors and fences for the houses they are funding.
“In order to avoid sensitivities, we used to depend on the local capacities and resources;
we used to find carpenters, aluminum providers, painters, etc. from the local community
and make them work in the reconstruction of the houses in their village” (Interview,
MECC, ERR Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003). Another important aspect of
involving the local community is bringing youth and inhabitants together in projects that
benefit and meet the needs of the community as a whole, such as reforestation (MECC,
ERR Annual Report, 1996, 15). It is an underlying belief in ERR’s programs that
enhancing “coexistence between the various religious sects in Lebanon” will “ultimately
lead to reconciliation and lasting peace” (MECC, ERR Annual Report, 1996,2). These
reconciliation and peacebuilding activities are necessary conditions for the return of
displaced to their homes.
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Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)
“The Mennonite Central Committee is a relief, development and peace agency of
North American Mennonite and Brethren in Christ churches in North America”
(Interview, MCC Director, Beirut, June 20, 2003). The organization was founded in the
1920s to help Mennonites persecuted by Stalin to escape Russia and find safe havens
elsewhere, particularly in North America. In addition to its programs in North America,
MCC works in over 50 countries and has about 15,000 personnel worldwide, most of
them volunteers. Its programs focus on development, agriculture, advocacy, peace,
connecting people, education, capacity building, relief work (after natural disasters like
hurricanes), etc. Most of its money comes from donations—either from a variety of
activities that it runs (like the fairly traded international crafts chain stores in North
America) or from individuals (Interview, MCC Director, Beirut, June 20, 2003).
The Mennonite Central Committee’s work in Lebanon dates back to 1950 when it
was involved in limited relief distribution to the Tyre area and eight years later in the
provision of relief supplies in Beirut during the 1958 civil unrest. The Committee
discontinued its work for almost twenty years after that period, resuming it again in 1977,
two years after the start of the civil war which would last for fifteen years (“MCC
Lebanon History”, 2001). MCC has maintained a program in Lebanon ever since and
mainly conducted relief type work. In the 1970s, it focused its efforts on South Lebanon
following the Israeli invasion, partnering with agricultural cooperatives and engineers in
agricultural projects (planting olive trees, building agricultural roads, and helping farmers
with alternative crops) (“MCC Lebanon History”, 2001). In addition to agricultural
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projects, MCC partnered with YMCA and established a vocational school for Palestinian
refugees in Ein el Helweh refugee camp in Sidon (“MCC Lebanon History”, 2001).
MCC soon shifted its focus from implementation to facilitation: in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, it began giving grants to help development projects sponsored by
existing NGOs. It partnered mostly with disability groups in the field of advocacy,
rehabilitation of homes, and education (“MCC Lebanon History”, 2001). In its work in
el-Shouf, it partnered with PPM, MECC, LCRN and the Ministry of Social Affairs; in the
South, its main partner was the Najda Sha’biyah (Interview, MCC Director, Beirut, June
20, 2003). MCC sponsored camps for residents, returnees, and displaced over a period of
2 years (Interview, MCC Director, Beirut, June 20, 2003). Following an internal
evaluation in 1995, the Central Committee decided to continue its facilitation role and a
diversification of its programs which focused on efforts to restore communities destroyed
by the war; promote non-violent methods of conflict resolution; and support local
capacities in all areas and in a non-sectarian way (“MCC Lebanon History”, 2001). MCC
hence started to work with several organizations and centered its efforts on the field of
education, conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities and training. With MCC’s
facilitation, two Lebanese activists attend the Eastern Mennonite University’s Summer
Peacebuilding Institute every year. The alumni of this program continue to act as
facilitators and partners in MCC’s programs in Lebanon. After yet another internal
evaluation of MCC’s core program initiatives in 2002, which commended the role of the
Committee and the work of its partners, it became clear that peacebuilding initiatives
should increase in order to “rebuild the social fabric of Lebanon” (“MCC Lebanon
History”, 2001).
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Caritas
Caritas’s assistance to IDPs began by providing temporary housing
accommodations to displaced families until they are able to return home. In his statement
to the National Congress for Displaced, the president of Caritas described his
organization’s work: providing shelters for over one thousand families displaced by war;
offering mobile houses for a number of others; granting loans; contributing to the
rehabilitation of schools and monasteries; and providing food aid to poor people in times
of war (El-Hajj, June 23, 1992). Caritas also rehabilitated damaged homes following the
Israeli attacks in 1982; it assisted displaced return to their homes in Akkar; it rebuilt the
foundations of 100 homes in the Jiyeh area; and gave $2000 to about 300 families to help
them find temporary housing in December 1991. (A1 Awda, March 1994, 11) Since
1985, Caritas has also been actively involved in the return of displaced to the area of East
Sidon through the reconstruction of villages and provided medical and social assistance
and credits so that IDPs are able to live and work in their areas of origin.
At the end of the war and after the launch of the official return policy, Caritas’s
work in the areas of displacement, with both residents and returnees, aligned with and
complimented the role of the state; its efforts mainly focused on Mount Lebanon. In
addition to housing assistance, Caritas provided professional training, developmental
projects, medical assistance, assistance to elderly, assistance to orphans and social
assistance (“The Achievements,” 1998, 152). Despite all this work, their office that dealt
specifically with the problem of internal displacement and the return of IDPs was not
officially created until 1998; since then, all efforts relating to IDPs have emanated from
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this office. In 2001, it carried out an extensive and sorely needed social mapping of IDPs
in 110 displaced villages. Such a survey was critical in the absence of official information
and statistics on this population. This study also painted a grim picture of the IDP
situation and the impact of the return plan, which had started in 1992; the study
advocated a change in programs of return. According to the study, out of the 78.40%
displaced in Aley, El Chouf and Baabda areas, 24.20% have returned and 75.80% remain
displaced. It further noted that, “the families were demoralized since their situation was
not properly looked into since 1991 and their issue has been dragging for the past 14
years. A lot of funding was allocated to the issue but the villages are still underdeveloped
and empty... All aspects are affecting return: social, economical, reconstruction, health,
education, etc.” (Caritas, 2004; Global IDP Database, 2004, 42).
Caritas currently supports a number of programs focusing on the IDP return
process in the country. They are of many types: health (clinics and mobile hospitals),
relief, social, reconstruction, habitat, development, handicrafts, economic (micro-loans,
income generation) and educational. Caritas’s work is based on the belief that rural areas
need to be developed by improving the residents’ living conditions; consequently,
individuals and families will be more likely to reside in those areas (An-Nahar, February
8, 2002). The organizations’ work for IDPs included various aspects of humanitarian
assistance (the provision of shelter, food, medicine, water, sanitation), and psychosocial
services to help people cope with the situation (Caritas, 1999, 70).
Throughout the years, Caritas was able, according to its president Dr. Fouad el-
Hajj, to move from a stage of individual relief aid to one of development; their
organizational credo became, “give the fisherman a rod and teach him how to fish and he
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will do the rest” (A1 Awda, March 1994, 11). In 2002, Fr. Elie Madi, president of Caritas-
Lebanon, emphasized the organization’s shift from humanitarian work, which responds to
emergency needs, to development work, which aims at raising the living standards of
those benefiting from the projects and helping the latter to achieve economic
independence (An-Nahar, February 8, 2002).
In 1995, Caritas decided to prioritize and integrate reconciliation initiatives in its
work and programs worldwide. This was considered a first step in the human
development and peacebuilding aspects of the organization’s work. Like UNDP and
MECC, Caritas strongly emphasized local participation and capacity building in its
projects. In addition to adopting a bottom-up approach to needs assessments, Caritas
called for proposals from local individuals and companies for plans to carry out its
projects, such as the building of a basketball team, or a library, or a computer center.
“When the project is decided in the workshop, we put together a plan and start looking
for bids and offers from contractors or companies that can build such a field or center,
etc. We make sure that contractors from the village are the ones who propose the offers
and we give the project to the best out of them” (Interview, Caritas IDP Project Director,
Beirut, August 4, 2003). Through its projects, Caritas emphasized the culture of
coexistence and common-living, interactions between youth, health and educational
assistance, and encouraging agricultural life (An Nahar, February 8, 2002).
The problem of funding, however, has become more acute and, according to the
director of the IDP program, very few sources are currently willing to give funds. She
predicts that in few years, nobody will be willing to pay money to cover the expenses of
projects in Mount Lebanon. Most of the attention has already been directed towards the
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South since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. However, as of 2004, Caritas has not been
directly involved with displacement in that region (Interview, Caritas IDP Project
Director, Beirut, August 4, 2003).
Institute of World Affairs (IWA)
The Institute of World Affairs, a Washington- based non-profit organization
founded in 1924, has been conducting post-conflict reconciliation programs in Lebanon
since November 1999 (IWA, http://www.iwa.org/. The Institute partnered with local and
international NGOs in a number of initiatives in order to bring youth of different
communities from all over Lebanon to meet and work together. One such example is the
Community Restoration through Environmental Action in Lebanon project, in
collaboration with the Lebanese Sustainable Democracy Center (SDC), funded by CIDA.
This year-long project brought together youth from different confessional background
and trained them on environmental issues. Participants also took part in joint
environmental and local community restoration projects (IWA, http://www.iwa.org/).
Another very important initiative was the multi-year Postwar Community
Building Project in Lebanon starting in March 2000 with the aim to advance post-conflict
peacebuilding, reconciliation, dialogue and understanding between the different
communities, and IDP repatriation in the country. It focused mainly on Christian and
Druze communities affected by forced migration in the Mount Lebanon region.
According to Rita Ayoub, local director of the program, “this project, funded by the US
State’s Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom and the Swiss
government, aims to promote communal tolerance in these [displaced] villages by
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initiating and encouraging local efforts in that direction” (Ibrahim, 2001). The USAID
granted IWA $180,000 for this project. Nevertheless, despite some success with breaking
the ice between community leaders, USAID did not find the work to be particularly
useful or productive and terminated the grant in December 2001 (Interview, USAID
Program Officers, Awkar, July 22,2003).
This project focused mainly on four villages Salima, Breeh, Kfarmatta and Ain
Anoub, where conditions for return were difficult due to massacres between the Christian
and Druze communities. It consisted mainly of community-level dialogue sessions and
workshops intended to foster trust, cooperation between the groups, and create a stable,
less conflicted environment in these villages. Such initiatives were believed to facilitate
the reconciliation process between residents, returnees and displaced in those villages.
Most meetings and workshops (intra and inter communal) were held at the IWA-
Lebanon’s office in Deir el Qamar and were organized and attended by the local staff.
The project included several components, “all based on local needs, traditions and
practices” of the different villages (“Community-Building,” IWA, 5). It aimed at
restoring the multi-ethnic character of these communities through intra-community
dialogue; inter-community dialogue; youth dialogues, training in a variety of topics,
technical assistance, infrastructure building, seminars and workshops, and community
building (“Community-Building,” IWA, 5).
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA)
The YMCA implemented projects in Mount Lebanon and South Lebanon aimed
at fortifying return and making it more permanent. For this reason, it undertook socio-
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economic initiatives that were believed to encourage the return process such as the
“rehabilitation of schools, installation of fresh water networks, rehabilitation of pipes,
installation of pumps, rehabilitation of ponds and artesian wells, building field roads,
maintenance of agricultural equipment, digging and installation of irrigation ducts,
building support walls, distribution of saplings and providing assistance to farmers in a
number of displaced villages and towns” (“The Achievements,” 1998,152).
In the first two years after the launching of the return process, the YMCA
contributed an amount of $175,286 for service and infrastructural projects as well as
social assistance in the Shouf, Aley, Metn, Saida and Jezzine (Feghali, 1995).
World Vision International (WV)
World Vision began its work in Lebanon in 1975 with emergency relief and
children’s education programs. It focused its activities mainly on children, youth, women,
farmers and refugees; it conducted transformational development activities which aimed
at empowering the communities and leaving long-term sustainable effects which will
persist even after the program ends. Such programs target an array of sectors such as
health, education, income generation, and agriculture (World Vision Lebanon,
http://lebanon.worldvision.org).
With 118 staff members and more than 40 projects in tens of communities, World
Vision Lebanon coordinates its efforts with other governmental agencies, non
governmental organizations and churches in order to have a wider impact and outreach in
the country. The organization began its work with IDPs in 1992. It focused on
reconstruction and socio-economic rehabilitation, where it contributed to the restoration
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of homes in different villages in the Chouf, Aley and East Sidon; it paid an amount
ranging between $1500 and $2000 per home. In the first three years (1992-1995), it had
contributed $1,821,500 for such rehabilitation efforts. In 1996, it also paid $400,000 for
rehabilitating 200 houses in Deir al Qamar (Feghali, 1995). Other contributions include
the restoration of power plants and water pipes in areas of return. It paid $35,000 for
water pipes in Souk Al-Ghareb, equipped a water well and Qmatiyyeh, and bought
$35,000 worth of cables and electric switches for Souk Al-Ghareb as well (Feghali,
1995). World Vision also repaired two schools in the two villages of Qmatiyyeh and
Bmekkeen and furnished them with all necessary equipments. It also provided
medications and medical supplies and products to most villages, and distributed
agricultural seeds in different areas of the country (“The Achievements”, 1998,152;
Farah, 78).
The Pontifical Mission: (the Catholic Near East Welfare Association/Pontifical Mission (CNEWA/Pontifical Mission)
The Pontifical Mission in the Middle East was founded in 1949, “as a temporary
emergency measure to feed, clothe, and educate Palestinian refugees. It has become a
permanent expression of the Holy See’s concern for all peoples in the region, regardless
of religion or national identity” (CNEWA, http://www.cnewa.org/generalpg-
verus.aspx?pageID=54). Its office in Beirut supports programs and activities of
emergency assistance and relief, rehabilitation, education and human development.
The Pontifical Mission has been actively involved in the rehabilitation and
reconstruction process in post-war Lebanon. Since the early 1990s, it has “worked closely
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with Christian, Druze, and Muslim leaders to determine community needs, build homes,
clinics and classrooms; restore village agricultural infrastructure; and provide
environment-friendly waste management and fresh water” (CNEWA,
http://www.cnewa.org/generalpg-verus.aspx?pageID=54). By the end of the 1990s, it had
spent around $12 million on projects in areas of return, namely on restoring and
reconstructing homes, churches and local roads; constructing support walls; securing
fresh water; providing home fittings and appliances, and taking part in production
activities (“The Achievements”, 1998, 152; Farah, 78).
Mercy Corps
Mercy Corps’ goal is “to increase sustainable economic-development activities,
foster greater societal participation—especially amongst youth and women—and protect
agricultural land by reducing liquid waste pollution and training farmers on
environmentally appropriate practices” (Mercy Corps Lebanon,
http://www.mercycorps.org/countries/lebanon). It mostly focused its work on agriculture
and infrastructure. It built and rehabilitated field roads, installed irrigation systems,
repaired water pipelines and water networks, and rehabilitated springs in villages in the
Chouf and Aley (“The Achievements”, 1998,152). In southern Lebanon, it helped towns
“bring about a vibrant and productive civil society that promotes sound economic and
environmental practices” (Mercy Corps Lebanon,
http ://www.mercycorps. org/countries/lebanon).
Examples of programs include the three-year USAID funded $3.5 million treatment
plants for wastewater; activities for $3.1 million, also funded by USAID to promote
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agribusiness development and improve production techniques; a $19 million, five-year
USDA program to address the needs of rural villages and enhance economic
opportunities to make it possible for the displaced from those areas to return home; and a
$50,000 youth leadership program that it privately funded.
Conclusion
Although this list included most of the actors in the IDP return process, it is not
exhaustive. Numerous other organizations like Catholic Relief Organization, Doctors
without Borders, Hariri Foundation, Save the Children, OXFAM, Lebanese Red Cross,
National Center for Development and Rehabilitation, and different political parties have
worked for the return of the displaced; the amount of money and time they spent on the
issue widely differ.
It is also important to note that the bulk of activities took place in the first years
after the launch of the return policy. Due to ‘donor fatigue’ and lack of funds, such efforts
started noticeably dissipating despite the persisting IDP problem. The situation worsened
even more after the summer of 2006 war, as those programs were put on hold and efforts
to meet the immediate recovery needs of the new wave of destruction and displacement
were prioritized. While this chapter detailed the types, scope, size, budget, objectives, and
rationale of the organizations most actively working with IDPs and their return, the next
chapter analyzes these activities and assesses them in term of the peacebuilding-
development nexus. The preceding review, thus, serves as a necessary background the
upcoming analysis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER SIX
PROJECT ANALYSIS: LINKING PEACEBUILDING
AND DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
The civil war led to the destruction and displacement of more than 1000 villages
throughout the country. The govemorate of Mount Lebanon was hardest hit, with 404
villages affected by displacement. Of those villages, 57 were estimated to be totally
destroyed and 69 partially destroyed. South Lebanon followed, with 274 displaced
villages—24 totally destroyed and 17 partially so. Since the early 1990s, Mount Lebanon,
considered the core area of displacement, occupied the center of the MoD, CFD, local
and international organizations’ efforts. For the first few years, and due to the increased
number of organizations assisting in the return process, the government was “playing the
role of coordinator for the local and international organizations, dividing roles, needs, and
villages so that there is no overlapping in the response” (Director of MoD/UNDP project,
Beirut, Interview, June 18, 2003). After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, most of the
attention and the funding shifted towards South Lebanon, which captured the interest of
the Council of the South and other organizations. Even though the respective conditions
in these two areas (i.e. Mount Lebanon and South Lebanon) required different responses
to the return process, the various activities by all involved agencies, as was noted in the
291
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preceding chapters and will be detailed further in this one, primarily promoted
development (“Executive Summary,” 31-2).
While at first glance the plan for IDP return seems to be comprehensive, covering
all aspects of the complex process of return in its formulation, its practical translation and
implementation turned out to be much different. The actual execution of the plan
reflected a segmented response, which placed more emphasis on “housing and
infrastructure reconstruction and on traditional approaches to economic development to
the detriment of building peace, reconciliation and human development” (Boyce, 2000,
370). Such disparity in the allocation of funds by the CFD was clear in the Ministry’s
Achievements 1993-1997 report (Table 12).
Table 13. Funds allocated according to sector
Sector Amount in billions of L.L/in $US Evacuation L.L395,218,660,000 ($263,479,106) Restoration L.L194,319,386,940 ($129,546,257) Reconstruction L.L. 87,176,300,000 ($58,117,533) Reconciliation L.L. 6,298,714,000 ($4,199,142) Removal o f rubble L.L. 11,620,128,600 ($7,746,752) Restoration of sanctuaries L.L. 1,027,408,975 ($684,939) Infrastructure L.L. 53,199,813,879 ($35,466,542) Total L.L. 748,860,412,394 ($499,240,271) Sources: Ministry o f Displaced
52 Note: These are sums allocated by the CFD for the period between 1993 and 1997. The amounts from Lebanese Lira or Pound to US Dollars were based on the exchange rate $1= L.L1500
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In a paper presented in 1998, Kamal Feghali, then coordinator of the MoD/UNDP
Program for the Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced also
highlighted the higher importance placed on reconstruction, rehabilitation and evacuation
relative to that of reconciliation. What is interesting in the presentation of financial needs
in this case is that reconciliation does not even occupy a category by itself but is lumped
under ‘divers’ with rehabilitation of sanctuaries, etc. According to the Ministry and Fund,
the estimated amounts necessary to accomplish return are as follows: (Table 12)
Table 14. Funds needed to achieve return according to sector
Sector Amount in billions of L.L/in $US Evacuation L.287,000,000,000 ($191,333,333) Physical Infrastructure L.300,000,000,000 ($200,000,000) Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and L.L. 1,211,000,000,000 removal of rubble ($807,333,333) Divers (reconciliation, sanctuaries, L.L. 20,000,000,000 etc.) ($13,333,333) Unidentified L.L. 70,000,000,000 ($46,666,666) Total L.L. 1,888,000,000,000 ($1,258,666,665)
Source: MoD, Central Fund, Feghali, 1998
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Synthesizing data from the various reports and sources, the tables below provide a
more detailed portrayal of the amounts dispensed for each sector, according to province53.
The numbers reflect the amounts spent during the period when funds were more available
and the process was more active (i.e. 1992- 2000). The disparity in the funds allocated to
reconciliation, relative to other sectors, remains noticeable.
Table 15. Funds allocated by sector in Beirut
Sector Amount in billions of L.L/in $US Evacuation L.L. 124,203,340,000 ($) 82,802,226.67 Physical Infrastructure — Rehabilitation L.L. 450,366,770,000 ($) 300,244,513.33 Reconstruction — Removal of rubble L.L 1,754,215,300 ($) 1,169,476.87 Reconciliation — Sanctuaries L.L 609,792,300,000 ($) 406,528,200.00 Total L.L. 1,186,116,625,300 ($) 790,744,416.87
Source: Ministry of Displaced, CFD
53 Lebanon is divided into six provinces (muhafazat) which are subdivided into 26 counties (cazas)
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Table 16. Funds allocated by sector in Mount Lebanon
Sector Amount in billions of
L.L/in $US
Evacuation L.L. 189,875,200,000
($) 126,583,466.67
Physical Infrastructure L.L. 30,102,809,745
($) 20,068,539.83
Rehabilitation L.L. 140,046,250,000
($) 93,364,166.67
Reconstruction L.L. 84,605,300,000
($) 56,403,533.33
Removal of rubble L.L 9,775,188,300
($) 6,516,792.20
Reconciliation L.L 6,298,714,000
($) 4,199,142.67
Sanctuaries L.L1,947,358,675
($) 1,298,239.12
Total L.L.462,650,820,720
($) 308,433,880.48
Source: MoD, CFD
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 17. Funds allocated by sector in North Lebanon
Sector Amount in billions of
L.L/in $US
Evacuation L.L. 86,894,000,000
($) 57,929,333.33
Physical Infrastructure L.L. 1,955,721,545
($) 1,303,814.36
Rehabilitation L.L. 5,596,200,000
($) 3,730,800.00
Reconstruction L.L. 2,301,000,000
($) 1,534,000.00
Removal of rubble --
Reconciliation --
Sanctuaries —
Total L.L.9,6746,921,545
($) 64,497,947.70
Source: MoD, CFD
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 18. Funds allocated by sector in Bekaa
Sector Amount in billions of
L.L/in $US
Evacuation L.L. 10,693,400,000
($) 7,128,933.33
Physical Infrastructure —
Rehabilitation L.L. 2,441,300,000
($) 1,627,533.33
Reconstruction L.L 260,000,000
($) 173,333.33
Removal of rubble L.L 64,925,000
($) 43,283.33
Reconciliation —
Sanctuaries L.L82,568,000
($) 55,045.33
Total L.L. 13,542,193,000
($) 9,028,128.67
Source: MoD, CFD
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 19. Funds allocated by sector in South Lebanon, Western Bekaa and Rashaya
Sector Amount in billions of
L.L/in $US
Evacuation L.L. 15,412,255,000
($) 10,274,836.67
Physical Infrastructure L.L. 121,130,624
($) 80,753.75
Rehabilitation L.L. 29,300,000
($) 19,533.33
Reconstruction —
Removal of rubble L.L 25,800,000
($) 17,200.00
Reconciliation ”
Sanctuaries —
Total L.L. 15,588,485,624
($) 10,392,323.75
Source: MoD, CFD
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Table 20. Funds allocated by sector- Total
Sector Amount in billions of
L.L/in $US
Evacuation L.L. 427,078,195,000
($) 284,718,796.67
Physical Infrastructure L.L. 32,179,661,914
($) 21,453,107.94
Rehabilitation L.L. 598,479,820,000
(S) 398,986,546.67
Reconstruction L.L. 87,166,300,000
($) 58,110,866.67
Removal of rubble L.L 11,620,128,600
($) 7,746,752.40
Reconciliation L.L. 6,298,714,000
($) 4,199,142.67
Sanctuaries L.L. 611,822,226,675
($) 407,881,484.45
Total L.L. 1,774,645,046,189
($) 1,183,096,697.46
Source: MoD, CFD
Hence as illustrated by the tables above, the destruction of villages, homes, and
infrastructure was considered the primary obstacle to return. Focusing on rehabilitation
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and reconstruction seemed like the most logical response in order to deal with such a
challenge and to promote livable conditions, which would encourage displaced to return
to their areas of origin. This was also apparent in non-governmental organization’s
agendas, where the bulk of the funds had been allocated to reconstruction. For example,
33% of the ERR’s expenditures were on reconstruction projects—followed by 18% on
relief; 14% on agriculture; 7% socio-economic; and only 2% on relations (MECC, ERR
Annual Report, 1996). However, as was repeatedly mentioned in the previous chapters,
and as will be analyzed in this chapter, such an approach did not help meet the main
objectives set forth by the policy—namely return IDPs to their homes, a reversal of the
confessional demographic divisions that have grown from long-term displacement, and
promotion of national reconciliation which has been closely linked to solving the problem
and closing the war file once and for all.
This chapter begins with an analysis of the impact of development projects on
return. It then examines the effect of peacebuilding projects on that process. The analysis
will be structured according to the operational framework and the set of mechanisms and
criteria put forward for development and peacebuilding in Chapter two. I reiterate the
difficulty of presenting a clear-cut distinction between each of these concepts, which can
and do overlap (as will be explained below). This analysis is followed by examples of
selected return areas, where I present the various pre-war conditions, the displacement
process, and the post-war reality in order to illustrate the need for a complex response to
the IDP problem and return. This leads to the last section, in which the nexus between
development and peacebuilding and the impact that of such binary projects on the ground
will be assessed.
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Development Initiatives and Return
Since the launch of the return policy in Lebanon, displacement and repatriation
have been closely linked to development. The National Congress in 1992 and the
subsequent government strategy of return emphasized the centrality of development and
its fundamental role in the repatriation process. According to the director of the
UNDP/MoD project, “development is a policy adopted by the government and the state”
(Interview, Beirut, June 18, 2003). As was illustrated above, most of the efforts and
funds, especially in the first phase of the program, were allocated to reconstruction and
rehabilitation of houses and infrastructure. According to a former Minister of Displaced,
“physical reconstruction by itself did not result in the expected levels of return; it became
clear that such an approach without other aspects of development—such as economic,
social, political and human—is inefficient to encourage return and sustain the process”
(Interview, Beirut, July,25, 2003). The inability of the weak government emerging from
war to meet all of those needs called for coordination and cooperation with different
parties involved in the process of return. This, in addition to the extensive levels of
destruction and devastation explains the long-term focus of phase one of the return plan.
Reconstruction
Even though the Ministry’s plan was created in the context of a comprehensive
development framework, most of its attention focused on the physical reconstruction
aspect. Most people who were displaced had lost their homes. Villages and towns in
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which displacement had occurred suffered extensive devastation and destruction, and this
made the return of displaced to their homes more challenging.
Table 21. Number and percentage of damaged villages in Mount Lebanon Cazas
Caza Number of Damaged Percentage Percentage
villages villages of Caza of all Cazas
Aley 68 48 71% 22%
Chouf 95 67 71% 31%
Baabda 56 10 18% 57%
Source: Ministry of Displaced
Table 22. Number and percentage of destroyed villages in Mount Lebanon Cazas
Caza Completely Partially Total Percentage
Destroyed/percentage Destroyed/percentage
Aley 13 (10%) 35 (28%) 48 38%
Chouf 24(19%) 43 (34%) 67 54%
Baabda 7 (6%) 3 (2%) 10 8%
Total 44 (35%) 81 (65%) 125 100%
Source: Ministry of Displaced
For this reason, most of the funds earmarked for solving the problem were spent
on reconstruction and rehabilitation of houses, infrastructure projects (roads, sewage,
electricity, water, and telecommunications), wreckage removal, and eviction
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compensations to those illegally occupying houses and buildings in the hope that such
initiatives will encourage people to return and resettle in their areas of origin (USCR,
1999). Even though no one I interviewed denied the necessity of such reconstruction,
many displaced and returnees refute the notion that such ‘development’ played a major
role or was the only factor in their choice to return. “Of course we will not return until we
have a ‘roof above our head’ and we appreciate the money they give us to build our
houses even though it does not cover all the costs but I will not go back until I have a job
and my children have schools to go to... until then we might go for visits during the
weekend to take a break from the city” (Displaced person at the CFD, Beirut, August 9,
2003).
According to the director of the MoD/UNDP project, the Ministry “covers the
‘dry’ infrastructural aspect of the process, which is the principal window by which it
oversees the social and economic aspects of those areas... The CFD also undertakes
different activities which falls in the infrastructural framework more than the socio
economic one” (Interview, Beirut, June 18, 2003). However, the large number of villages
affected by the plan of return made it impossible for the CFD and Ministry to assume
responsibility for all reconstruction and rehabilitation. This led to the division of villages
and towns into clusters; each assigned to an organization, such as MECC, Caritas, etc.
“Each organization got a cluster of 10-12 villages to work in, to reconstruct and
rehabilitate. The organization’s budget was divided into reconstruction of houses and
infrastructure as well as rehabilitation of the socio-economic sectors” (Interview, MECC,
ERR Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003).The ERR’s house reconstruction project had
three aspects: housing repairs, housing loans, housing grants. Its annual reports explain,
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“The villages in need of help were defined in coordination with the MoD and other
NGOs working in the area. The housing repairs project was implemented in the following
eleven villages witnessing the return of displaced families [...] whether partially or
totally destroyed, 555 were repaired securing a shelter of 1 or 2 rooms with basic kitchen
and toilet facilities to the returning families” (MECC, ERR, Annual Report 1996,16). In
addition to repairing houses, the ERR provided $100,000 in housing loans to 35 families;
these loans would be paid back within two years and at a half at a low interest rate
(MECC, ERR, Annual Report, 1996,16). It also allocated grants to 27 returning families
(MECC, ERR, Annual Report, 1997, 27). The Director of the Caritas IDP project also
noted that in the identified villages—also in the Shouf, Aley and Baabda areas—houses,
as well as basic infrastructure such as electric, water, and road systems, were rehabilitated
and reconstructed. Caritas, for example, is currently working on artesian wells in order to
secure water to villages and on water systems to get water to the houses (Interview,
Beirut, August 4, 2003). Such synchronization positively channeled capabilities and
efforts in areas of return but was short-lived. The ERR Director explains, “such
coordination was very good; it made it possible to target many villages at once without
fearing duplication in villages. However, this did not last for very long because of the
unavailability of funds” (Interview, Beirut, July 7, 2003).
The reconstruction process did not follow any set strategy to achieve specifically
reconciliation or substantial change in the existing structures that could encourage
violence. Everyone worker with whom I spoke said that they would go into the village,
assess the damage, and begin work: the aim was not to change structures but only to
rebuild. Also, some of the interviewees noted, mostly in heterogeneous villages, that
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there was a feeling of exclusion in the resident committee, with all the attention being
paid to returnees. The ERR adopted a plan in their targeted areas to encourage
community interaction and sustained return: “all building supplies used in reconstruction,
such as wooden and metal doors and windows, sanitary supplies, aluminum and glass
were made by local craftsmen who have lost their factories during the war—both those
who stayed in and those who have returned to the village” (MECC, ERR, Annual Report
1997, 27). According to ERR’s director, this not only empowers communities and
provides job opportunities, but also encourages interactions between them” (Interview,
Beirut, July 7, 2003). However, this MECC thinking was not adopted within the
approaches of the different governmental and non-governmental organizations involved
in the reconstruction and rehabilitation processes in those areas.
Economic Development
It soon became clear that fixing up houses and roads was not sufficient to ensure
the return of people who had been displaced for more than a decade. The billions of
dollars spent on reconstruction and rehabilitation of homes and infrastructure has led in
most cases to what became known as a ‘weekend or holiday return’; short-term visits to
the villages were frequently recorded. The needs of the displaced transcending merely
rebuilding, rehabilitating or vacating houses to include economic, social, educational, and
health issues which “need to be reestablished in the society in such a way that would
sustain the return” (“Government Policy and Achievements,”6).
The limitation of the initial projects and the increasing awareness to the need of
incorporating economic initiatives was clearly stated by then director general of the
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Ministry of Displaced Hisham Nasser Eddine. In a November 1998 interview with
USCR, he noted: “that the return of the displaced to their homes is not just about
rebuilding their homes. We need a development plan for the whole area. Infrastructure,
other facilities, jobs, and income are all important” (USCR, 1999, 3).
This is particularly important as return would, generally, occur from urban to rural
areas; this, of course, is contrary to the normal migratory trend in where people leave
rural areas to settle in cities where job opportunities are more prevalent. The importance
of standards of living and expectation was clearly illustrated by a displaced person from
Breeh with whom I met in his office in Beirut: “don’t be mistaken but people—especially
the middle-aged—are attached to Breeh from an emotional point of view, but Christians
refuse to return to the village and leave on the same level as the Druze are living...
poor... because of their economic development” (Interview, Non-returnee from Breeh,
Beirut, August 8, 2003).
The director of the Caritas IDP project reiterated the pressing needs for economic
development in areas that have witnessed some level of destruction and paralysis, for
more than a decade in some cases. She noted,
There is a need to create job opportunities so that returnees are able to settle permanently in their villages and the residents can improve their standards of living. These opportunities depend on the village: while in some areas you build factories, in others you have to encourage services, yet in other agricultural opportunities, and in some places even hotels and restaurants (Table 22). In some villages, the centers, sporting fields, and libraries that are built would also provide job opportunities for villages. For example, the library we built in one village needed a librarian and a computer technologist- here you created two job opportunities. Some other villages wanted day care centers, and hence, you will have demands and job opportunities for teachers or care takers” (Interview, Beirut, August 4, 2003).
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In other words, when we talk of economic development, it is important to devise plans
that answer to the need of each village itself, its residents and returnees, and the
possibilities it presents. From the interviews and document analysis, it seemed to me that
Caritas and other agencies have constantly tried, to the best of their abilities, to carry out
context-specific and context-sensitive projects. By generating new businesses in these
areas, the living standards for both residents and returnees improve.
Table 23. Economic activities in areas of return54
Province Industries Service Commercial Restaurants
and and Hotels
Artisanat
Mount 223 97 337 85
Lebanon
(Aley,
Baabda,
Shouf)
South 234 98 415 70
Lebanon
(Jezzine,
Sidon)
Total 457 195 752 155
Source: ILDES
54 The table shows the number of activities or enterprises that emerged since the launch of the return process in 1992 up until 2003
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That creating income-generating activities is a way to encourage sustainable
return has also been emphasized by the director of the UNDP program that reintegrates
IDPs in Lebanon. She noted that it was impossible “to be able to make [them] return to
their areas if there are no opportunities for economic prosperity” (Interview, UNDP
Project Director, Beirut, July 8, 2003). The development of the agricultural sector and the
activation of handicrafts in the areas of return is the most important source of livelihood.
The EU, for example, allocated a $1.2 million budget of assistance in the 1990s to the
productive agricultural sector—namely, activities aiming at rehabilitating it, such as the
establishment of dairy factories and farms and olive industrial plants (Farah, 1999, 76).
YMCA and Mercy Corps were also involved in the agricultural sector: these two NGOs
were active in rehabilitating agricultural roads and lands, providing necessary equipment,
creating irrigation tanks, and constructed internal water systems (Farah, 79). In South
Lebanon, USAID assisted in rehabilitating the agricultural sector and improving
economic conditions through its de-mining program in cooperation with the World
Rehabilitation Fund and the support of the Lebanese military. Such an initiative also
possesses an important social dimension: it increases awareness about mine locations in
order to prevent injuries and reduces the fear among those areas’ populations (USAID
Lebanon, http://www.usaid.gov/pop_health/dcofwvf/reports/evals/wvlebanonO 1 .html).
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Table 24. Villages that experienced rehabilitation of the agricultural sector
Province Villages that suffered Villages where
from agricultural agricultural
destruction rehabilitation
projects took place
Mount Lebanon (Aley, 126 116
Baabda, Shouf)
South Lebanon 67 64
(Jezzine and Sidon)
Total 193 180
Source: ILDES
Disseminating economic incentives for people to return, in the form of micro
loans, cash grants, and micro-enterprise credit programs, are also important for economic
development. For example, the EU, partnered with the MoD, launched a loan project to
provide the necessary economic conditions in order to revive, modernize, and supply the
agricultural infrastructure with new techniques and training farmers. It aimed to improve
production and increasing benefits (Interview, Director of MoD/UNDP project, Beirut,
June 18, 2003). In addition to those agricultural loans, other economic, handicrafts, and
services credits were offered through a project launched in 2004 (An-Nahar, January 21,
2004). One interviewee, talking about the increased attention such activities are getting in
his organization’s program, noted, “It became apparent after a while that rebuilding
houses and basic infrastructure is not enough... Homes remain in the most part empty...
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there is need to revive the economy and provide opportunities or incentives for those
displaced to return and be able to make a living and sustain themselves and their
families” (Interview, UNDP Project Director, Beirut, July 8, 2003).
USAID worked closely with women and youth and provided them with
vocational and technical training (sewing, tailoring, tapestry, pottery, computers,
mechanical, carpentry, etc.) that would enlarge job prospects and economic prosperity for
the villages and towns. “We make handicrafts that are sold in different fairs around the
country... we benefit from this not only in terms of the little income it generates, but also
in the fact that we get together twice or three times a week, the women of the village...
we get to know each other... and we feel we also can help our husbands by bringing in a
bit of money from the sale of our crafts” (A participant in USAID training, August 1,
2003). Its Rural Community Development clusters, a reconstruction and economic
growth program targeting villages in Mount Lebanon and the South, implemented
hundreds of activities in around 450 villages. These projects, aiming at enhancing local
capacity in community revitalization efforts, range from building up basic infrastructure
to income-generation and social rehabilitation (USAID Lebanon,
http://usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ane/lb/lebanon_ads.html). ERR also carried out about 10
vocational training sessions, helping more than 100 women integrate into society and
generate income to support themselves and their families (Interview, MECC, ERR
Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003).
While such a process does not occur overnight and requires long-term
commitment and work, there is increasing awareness for the need to build efficient
affordable modes of public transportation between those villages and towns and the cities
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or areas where displaced have resettled. An engineer, presenting at the National Congress
in 1992, voiced the need for such an effective modern transportation system which
constitutes an effective bridge between cities and villages to consolidate return (Fawaz,
June 23,1992). The ability to commute back and forth from Beirut (and other cities, like
Saida) for work and/or university was an important factor in the decision to return to
those villages.
One incentive to encourage displaced to go back to farther villages—especially
with the high price of fuel—was to have public transportation: a bus that runs between
6:00am and 8:00pm everyday, for a low fee (500L.L), to take people back and forth to
their work. As I was speaking to a supermarket owner with during a visit to the Mtoleh
village, approximately one hour away from Beirut, a bus passed by. He explained,
The Mayor has worked hard to get a bus system linking the villages together, as well as the village to Beirut... Such system will help a lot of people who were worried about coming back and loosing their job in Beirut to keep their jobs and resettle here. This need a bit of getting used to as we Lebanese are not a commuter population and we tend to live close to where we work.. .But I can see a change in attitude: even though the bus is still new, I can see it going down in the morning and coming back up this road in the early evening with passengers... Bus routes do not cover all towns and villages yet... You also need more people to return in order for such buses to function more frequently and cost efficiently.. .The problem continues to be the unavailability of money for people to rebuild their houses and resettle...” (Interview, Mtoleh, August 4, 2003).
Social Development
In addition to economic development, social development, which had taken a
back seat in the Lebanese response to the IDP problem, was seen as a necessary step in
the reintegration process—especially after decades of displacement where ties between
communities have been severed (Hines, 2001, 37; Global IDP Database, 2004, 44).
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Despite being criticized of acting to the contrary, the MoD has recognized the need to
provide social services to need the needs of those returnees in addition to restructuring
the economy (“The Achievements”, 1998, 143). Such needs include social services, such
as education and health and community services (libraries, clubs, and centers). The
amount of destruction in those villages has incapacitated those aspects of life; and there is
a shortage of opportunities where people can meet and build relationships for the hope of
a better, peaceful future. The Mayor of one ‘returning’ village, very critical of the policy
adopted by the government so far, cried out, “engineers are not the ones to solve the
problem by themselves; there is need for social workers. We need expertise to rebuild
human resources and not merely houses and stores” (Interview, July 18,2003).
Health
In my conversations with displaced people, the availability of health services,
such as hospitals, health centers, mobile clinics, doctors and nurses is of utmost
importance in their decision to return. According to the different sources reviewed, at
least 27 clinics, 9 hospitals, and 52 health centers or dispensaries were destroyed in
Mount Lebanon during the war.
We are from a remote area in the Mountain and my kid suffers from asthma, even though the quality of air might be better for him there, to breathe fresh air, we would not go back unless health services are available—what if God forbid—she had a severe attack and we had to run him to the hospital? The roads are tight village roads; the closest clinic or hospital is at least 30 minutes away. Also there is still no pharmacy there... just to get regular medicine” (Displaced working at a mini-market, Beirut, January 5, 2003).
The need for medical services in those villages is even more pressing where the
population is, in its majority, elderly.
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I will not return now, there is no job for me there, no schools for my children; we are used to it here... But my parents went back, and I am always worried about something happening to them; they are old people with no access to medical attention. I go up every weekend to check on them, get them their medications; make sure they are ok. My parents, like the majority of old people, were happy to return as soon as the conditions allowed... they have a connection to the village, to the land, and have always wanted to go back ‘and die in their house.’ The condition of the house is another issue... we tried to do the best with the money we got from the Fund; but they are happy... I believe that the return has in general appealed more to elderly people...” (Displaced 2 at the CFD, Beirut, August 9, 2003).
The different organizations and agencies working on return have participated in
different health projects in those villages. For example, Caritas and World Vision
International provided medical assistance and distributed medicine; Operation Mercy (or
Mercy Corps) restored a dispensary in Bhamdoun; and the Order of Malta secured health
services to returnees in Mount Lebanon by providing mobile ambulatory medical centers,
carrying out health activities in several villages, and assisting in the development of
Qabrechmoun Public Hospital through sophisticated equipment and operating rooms
(“The Achievements”, 1998, 152). The MoD/UNDP program carried out several health
awareness sessions attended by approximately 500 people; meeting topics included first
aid, breast cancer, and osteoporosis (“Reintegration,”MoD/UNDP). The ERR participated
in health rehabilitation by supporting health activities targeting women, health education,
community health programs, dispensaries, child health care centers. It also equipped
about 20 health centers in returnee villages in Mount Lebanon and the South (MECC,
ERR, Annual Report, 1997, 23; MECC, ERR, Annual Report, 1996, 13). According to
ILDES, by 2003, a total of 28 dispensaries, clinics and hospitals were equipped
(Abourjaili, 15). While these are important steps in the process, more work is needed to
revive and strengthen the devastated health sector in those areas
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Education
Another factor weighing heavily on the decision of families to return is the
availability of education. According to the different studies, more than 200 private, public
and vocational schools were destroyed or severely damaged, in Mount Lebanon alone,
during the war. Most of those displaced have school-aged children, some of whom were
born during displacement. “There are no educational opportunities for my children if we
went back... it will not be fair for them and they will resent us for the rest of their lives if
we detach them from their environment and friends... to tell you the truth, I experienced
such dislocation and confusion and don’t want them to go through the same” (Displaced
in Beirut, Beirut, June 18,2003). CDR and other government agencies, such as the
Ministry of Education, have worked on rehabilitating damaged schools in a number of
villages; the Ministry of Education brought some teachers together in training workshops
where they had sessions on peace and diversity education (Osseiran, 1995). The YMCA
and religious communities or congregations have also invested funds in restoring,
rehabilitating, and rebuilding public and private schools (“Women, Youth, Education,
etc.,” MoD). However, in some areas, such schools still do not exist and children are
forced to travel long distances in order to get an education (Abourjaili, 2004,13). A local
government official in one town that did not witness the reconstruction or rehabilitation
of any schools voiced his concern, “without these social structures, we will never be able
to consolidate return; we will continue facing trouble luring the new generation”
(Interview, Mayor of a returning village, Bhamdoun, July 18, 2003).
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Both for economic and social reasons, the need for such educational opportunities
were acknowledged by the different agencies and organizations working in areas of
return. World Vision International repaired and equipped two schools in Mount Lebanon
and the YMCA also rehabilitated a number of schools in different areas (“The
Achievements”, 1998,152). UNDP equipped 32 schools with computers and trained
teachers in their use (Interview, UNDP Project Director, Beirut, July 8, 2003). The ERR
helped establish daycare centers for disabled students, restored and purchased educational
materials, such as books and laboratory supplies for 14 educational institutions, and
supported vocational training institutions and students (Interview, MECC, ERR Project
Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003). According to an ILDES study, only 45 public and 26
private schools in Mount and South Lebanon were rehabilitated and equipped (Abourjaili,
2004, 15), which explains the low number of return.
Community Services. Sanctuaries, Stores, and Shops
“In order to come back, people need to have basic community services, you need
a grocery store, you have to have a pharmacy, a bank, maybe a library, a hair stylist, to
name a few... these exemplify normalization; that one is leading a normal life”
(Interview, Village Mayor, July 18,2003). Displaced areas have witnessed the loss of
thousands of stores, bakeries, butcheries, gas stations, and other stores. In addition to
bringing a feeling of normalcy to the community, such services also are a source of
employment and thus generate income. Organizations provided financial support to
investors in the form of micro-loans or grants; they also equipped bakeries, butcheries,
dry cleaners, etc. with modem machinery. More important than those services to most
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returnees, however, is the restoration of the hundreds of sanctuaries and religious sites
(Abourjaili, 2004,13). “The day I felt happiest and safest was the day I heard the
village’s church bells chiming after years of absence and silence... the church is once
again the place of meeting...” (Interview, Elderly woman returnee, August 8, 2005).
Agencies and organizations, such as the CFD, the Churches and Mosques Reconstruction
Council, and the Pontifical Mission have rebuilt and restored a number of convents,
sanctuaries, and religious sites in those areas.
Table 25. Sanctuaries (in 2003)
Caza Convents Rehabilitated Sanctuaries Destroyed
Sanctuaries under Sanctuaries
construction
Mount 16 78 64 11
Lebanon
(Aley, Baabda,
Shouf)
South 8 70 11 1
Lebanon
(Jezzine,
Sidon)
Total 24 148 75 12
Source: Ministry o f Displaced, ILDES
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Community and Sports Centers. Camps, and Associations
Community and sports centers, clubs and associations are also important aspects
of social development in that they provide spaces for people from the different
communities to come together and participate in activities. Such centers not only revive
social life in those areas (“Executive Summary,” 42), but also have a collaborative
feature: they bring people closer together in the revival of their village and help activate
the local community. UNDP, for example, had sponsored a number of activities including
festivals, conferences, workshops, volunteer camps, and sports events that all aimed at
involving the community (and especially the youth), in order to build relationships
between people from the same or neighboring villages (Farah, 1999, 62). The Ministry,
according to the MoD/UNDP project director, was also involved in such communal
activities; “the Ministry supported the construction and rehabilitation of centers’ and
clubs’ infrastructure so that to strengthen the cultural, social and sport activities in these
areas with the objective to encourage people, especially youth, to return. It also
encouraged and sponsored some children camps that brought together kids from the
different neighboring towns and villages” (Interview, Director of MoD/UNDP project,
Beirut, June 18, 2003).
Several projects focused on building and/or rehabilitating such meeting places in
areas of displacement. UNDP sponsored 5 public gardens projects, implemented several
youth training camps and children camps, rehabilitated and constructed about 12 sports
playgrounds, and equipped youth clubs with audio-visual instruments (Interview, UNDP
Project Director, Beirut, July 8, 2003). ERR also supported the rehabilitation of
recreational activities centers and youth work camps (Interview, MECC, ERR Project
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Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003). Caritas built sports facilities and community centers in
several villages (Interview, Caritas IDP Project Director, Beirut, August 4, 2003). While
some of those projects rehabilitated existing structures, others constructed facilities that
were non-existent in the pre-war period.
Table 26. Community, sports, and camping facilities or centers (in 2003)
Caza Community or Sports fields Camp sites
village centers and centers
Mount Lebanon 41 9 3
(Aley, Baabda,
Shouf)
South Lebanon 18 6 0
(Jezzine, Sidon)
Total 58 15 3
Source: ILDES
Political Development
The fifteen-year war has led to the paralysis of the government and the
destruction of public administrative offices in areas of displacement. Local authority was
totally absent; elections were not held. Developing the administrative and political
processes in areas of return was one of the post-war government’s objectives. Since the
end of the conflict, municipal, and mayoral elections took place in some of the areas of
return: “residents and returnees will feel safer and more stable if there are local
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governmental structures in place... how can we encourage return without the people’s
confidence in the state? How can we promote a sense of belongingness to those areas if
we don’t allow for residents and returnees to choose their own local representatives, have
a say in their administration, participate in elections?” (Interview, Former Minister of
Displaced, Beirut, July, 25, 2003).
In addition to local elections, residents and returnees want to participate in the
national parliamentary elections: “it is interesting to see how much people want to vote—
in the latest election in 2005, we saw voters who went back to their villages just to cast
their ballots even though they have not resettled in those areas... having a say in the
political processes in their villages is that important to those displaced, they feel
empowered” (Interview, Former Minister of Displaced, Beirut, July,25, 2003). During the
fieldwork, I spoke with a number of mayors and local officials in the areas I visited or in
Beirut. In some areas such officials seem to play an important role in the return process,
making sure residents and returnees have their needs met and that the groups are properly
reintegrated; in other areas, their role seems to be a bit more difficult due to a lack of
legitimacy (i.e. if the person elected to office is considered affiliated with one community
rather than the other) and/or funding for the development process. However, across
board, those local officials are the connecting point between the national government and
the villages.
Human Development
By providing for basic human needs, rights, and securities in those fields—such
as health security, education opportunities, economic prospects, and political freedoms—
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these projects are contributing to human development in those areas. To this list, we
should add physical security as an important factor of return. Understanding its
importance as a component in the decision to return, the government has been
enthusiastic to promote a sense of security and safety in those areas since the outset of the
return process. The Lebanese Army and Security Internal Forces have been deployed to
villages and towns to maintain the ‘peace’ and rule of law and prevent crimes or incidents
that might contribute to shaking the already fragile stability. The presence of legitimate
governmental armed forces engendered some sense of safety but still was not able to
contain all incidents targeting certain communities, crimes, and/or skirmishes between
those communities in areas of return. The LAF also assisted in removing rubble and other
cleaning activities in those areas, in order to instill a feeling of normality in people.
Caritas also became involved in human development by sponsoring several different
kinds of projects including providing assistance for the elderly and orphans (Farah, 1999,
77).
Peacebuilding Initiatives and Return
While the projects mentioned above provide necessary conditions for return, they
did not yield substantial results, especially in areas that were the scene of sectarian
massacres and bloody confrontations between residents in Mount Lebanon. Most of those
forced to flee continue to have strong feelings of animosity and hostility towards their
persecutors, in particular for people who knew the identity of the culprit (Galtung, 1997,
4). Despite the existence and acknowledged importance of practical measures to restore
civil peace and coexistence, such actions were not prioritized in the policy of return
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(Assaf and El-Fil, 2000, 32), being allocated the least amount of funds relative to
evacuations, wreckage removals, rehabilitations, reconstruction and infrastructure work
(Farah, 1999, 50). Highlighting the government’s position on peacebuilding, the director
of the MoD/UNDP project at the Ministry of Displaced said,
There is no need for peacebuilding... we are not two parties standing on opposite, conflicting sides and are working on building peace between each other, there was a general conflict as a result of internal and external conditions ... I do peacebuilding with someone I am in disagreement with.. .it is not an issue of peacemaking, that you have two... there are different social conditions and that’s why we prefer to use reintegration and reconciliation and coexistence or intermingling more than it is a peacebuilding operation...” (Interview, Beirut, June 18, 2003).
Taking into account the different activities lumped under the heading of
reintegration, reconciliation, and coexistence, and based on the operational framework for
peacebuilding presented in Chapter 2 ,1 detail below the several aspects of peacebuilding
initiatives.
Social
The impact of war on the social fabric of the country in general and those areas of
displacement in particular have been tremendous. As mentioned in chapter four, one of
the most devastating consequences of the civil conflict was the homogenization of
communities and the collapse—though some people might go as far as to say ‘demise’—
of coexistence. Therefore, peacebuilding activities aiming at restoring relationships
between these former neighbors and restoring inter-sectarian peace are, arguably, the
most important in the process of return. Different organizations and agencies have
promoted such peaceful attitudes through projects, such as curriculum reform, intended to
introduce peace and conflict resolution education programs in schools. Even though this
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program was country-wide and not restricted to areas of return in Mount and South
Lebanon, it had special connotations in those communities where co-ed55 schools would
bring students from different groups into an atmosphere where they could learn to
understand and respect the other; such a setting could act as the basis for rebuilding and
revitalizing amicable relations between communities and rebuilding coexistence. Schools
offer the space where strong ties and long-lasting relationships are built; therefore,
educational facilities are perfect targets for organizations whose focus is on the younger
generation. UNESCO played an important role in training teachers in peace and diversity
education (Interview, UNESCO Program Specialist Basic Education, Beirut, December
30, 2003) ERR was also active in providing educational programs that would encourage
reintegration into the society and understanding of responsibilities and rights (Interview,
MECC, ERR Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003).
A common point stated by the majority of those interviewees is that for the return
to be sustainable, the younger generation should be motivated to repatriate. Creative or
innovative strategies are needed to make this possible, as this generation has limited
connectivity with the village and its residents. Such activities have included summer
camps, which brought children and youth from the communities together for few days to
participate in recreational and educational activities. The ERR has targeted more than
1500 children and youth in its summer recreational and work camps; it also supported
efforts of the Arab Group for Muslim-Christian dialogue, co-sponsoring a youth work
camp that brought together participants from Lebanon and the Arab world to work in
those villages of return and discuss inter-religious dynamics locally, regionally, and
55 Co-ed here means open to boys and girls from all communities
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internationally. “These camps provide a space for those children to participate in fun
activities, something that they have lacked throughout the war. More importantly,
however, their main objective is to bring people from different communities and sects
together with the aim to promote unity, national pride, and peace” (Interview, MECC,
ERR Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003). These camps have been crucial in building
friendships in those villages. One young man I met in a village explained,
We did not know each other, we hated each other just by listening to stories and news... I went to a camp organized by the Council some years ago not knowing what to expect, to tell you the truth, I was afraid that someone will hurt or kill me... but I built many friendships from that camp... one of my Christian friends from the camp, his family has not returned to the village yet, but after the camp, we stayed in touch, he visits often and I go and visit him often... we are thinking of opening a billiard place here in the village together” (InterviewA resident in a village, September 23, 2005).
The MoD, in collaboration with other ministries and organizations, has also organized
and sponsored a number of youth and volunteer camps in all areas, bringing together
children and youth of all ages (Feghali, 1994, 32; Farah, 1999, 49).
Other strategies have included the revival of common spaces, such as community
centers and sports fields, in which members participate in a variety of events including
sport tournaments, holiday parties, etc. The generation of war was not able to experience
coexistence as their parents have: relationships between people from different
communities, a common reality arising from people being raised together, visiting each
other’s homes, playing and studying together. One elderly resident explains, “we used to
work together, visit each other regularly, share each other’s joys and sadness, work
together... it was normal, we did not know who was Druze, who was Christian... we
were all neighbors and friends...” (Btater, September 17, 2005). War and displacement
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have made such a reality impossible (i.e. inconceivable) for the new generation who grew
up separated from one another, and even, in some cases, were taught to hate each other.
This disconnect makes it imperative to undertake initiatives to create common spaces
where these alienated communities can get together to work or just meet.
Hence, Caritas and other organizations engaged in the rebuilding of youth cultural
and sports clubs, sports fields, computer centers, and playgrounds which attempt to
motivate displaced youth to return by providing them with a space to meet with residents
and with other returnees. Such initiatives fall within the peacebuilding realm as they
bring people together and help in building individual as well as communal relationships,
such as in the case of Mazraat al Dahr (Al-Hajj, 1995). Clubs have also provided youth in
Falougha opportunities to meet and get to know each other after long-term displacement
(Al Awda, October 1994, 7). “Such common spaces deal implicitly with the issue of
reconciliation without really making a big deal out of it. Like, for example, the pool we
built in one village brought together Druze, Muslims and Christians without really having
to directly deal with such sensitive an issue in dialogue meetings” (Interview, Caritas IDP
Project Director, Beirut, August 4, 2003). These common spaces not only encourage
youth to return to the villages by enhancing the quality of life in those villages and acting
as social places in urban centers where they had lived for decades; but also, such spaces
help in consolidating relationships and constructive interactions between the members of
the community. Even in villages that lacked such spaces prior to displacement, common
halls, sport clubs and fields, leisure clubs, libraries, public gardens and community
centers (where camps, conferences, celebrations, receptions, and funerals can be held) are
being built.
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Such initiatives have proven useful for developing communal life and
reestablishing the local social fabric that had frayed or split during the displacement
period (Abourjaili, 2004, 14). According to the director of the IDP project of Caritas,
such initiatives are designed in cooperation with the youth from the village, and differ
according to their needs. “We are working a lot with the youth, with that they want... We
hold workshops in with them to see what will attract those returnees back to the village
and what those already living there want... They want a club, a basketball field, a pool, a
public garden....” (Interview, Beirut, August 4, 2003). Of course, success will also
depend on the village resources: for example, “if the youth asked for a football field and
there is no space to build one in the village, we go with the second choice of project...”
(Interview, Caritas IDP Project Director, Beirut, August 4, 2003). Peacebuilding is
limited not only to providing common spaces, but can and should include the residents
and returnees in the decision making process, the actual construction and equipment of
such spaces, as well as job creation (i.e. librarians, coaches, computer specialists, etc.).
Socio-cultural activities and job opportunities help youth, who had adjusted to their new
place of settlement, build new ties to the village (“Executive Summary,” 34). IWA
acknowledged the challenges of elders and peers resisting such activities, as it made
participation in common projects difficult for some youth. Similar to the Institute’s firm
belief in the importance of joint projects and events to building peace and relationships in
the community, IWA also advocated youth sport tournaments as a means to bring
together different sports clubs for positive interaction, not only between the youth but
also their parents. “We at IWA supported such activities; we also supported inter-
communal festivals which we believe give both residents and returnees a sense of
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belonging, and returnees a sense of being welcomed into the community” (Interview,
IWA Program Coordinator, Beirut, January 3, 2004).
Local and international NGOs approached reconciliation between residents and
returnees in an active, less symbolic and materialistic way through coordination projects,
trainings, workshops, civil education, and cultural events (Farah, 1999, 71). Their focus
centered mostly on youth and involving them, developing their areas of interest, and
encouraging relationships with other youth and attachment to their new environment. The
organizations believed that youth are more open to interactions with the ‘other’ and, if
motivated to return, will ensure the success of the process in the long run. Hence, the
need to assemble them in various ways, including meeting parties, sports and cultural
events, workshops, and camps (Farah, 1999, 63). One project director explains, “these
youth, even though they do not know each other, have less ‘history’ than their parents
do... so it is easier to build relations between them than rebuild friendships that were
destroyed between members of the older generation. In our work, we look to indirectly or
implicitly restore those relationships through children’s interactions and participation”
(Interview, Beirut, August 4, 2003).
Economic
In addition to the social, peacebuilding has an important economic aspect as well.
Organizations such as MECC, UNDP, and Caritas encourage local participation by
inviting people to “be part of formulating and proposing development projects in their
given areas; assessing their own needs. We deal with people through cooperation and
mutual respect and do not impose on them projects. They know best what they need, we
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listen and we help them meet their objective” (Interview, MECC, ERR Project Director,
Beirut, July 7, 2003). This way, we are encouraging villagers to think of a common
future; a future beneficial to all regardless of affiliation (Interview, Caritas IDP Project
Director, Beirut, August 4, 2003).
Building ties between the different communities through income generating
activities is one example of peacebuilding.
We encourage farmers in the same village or neighboring villages to cooperate by establishing cooperatives. While agricultural cooperatives are important for those rural areas, we also support other types such as handicraft and industrial collectives... Furthermore, we sponsor a number of other projects that have both economic and environmental bearings such as reforestation initiatives by local parishes, municipalities, or youth clubs in the villages which bring together individuals from the different communities to plant trees (fruit, olive, or just for village beautification purposes) and scatter agricultural seeds” (Interview, MECC, ERR Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003).
Also, the revival of businesses, shops, and restaurants in these areas is one way by
which space for residents-returnees interactions is created. This NGO approach to
reconciliation is located in a wider context of peacebuilding; its aim was not to push
people to forget or suppress their feelings via compensations, but rather, to bring people
together in a more interactive environment through which they could work on common
interests and build their communities. Through joint programs and work, relationships are
built and reconciliation can be advanced. This, in a way, takes more time and money than
the Ministry’s approach, but is more likely to lead to sustainable results and relationships.
Political
Putting an end to illegitimate weapons, i.e. the disarmament of militias and
individuals and reintegrating them within the society is an important step in the
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peacebuilding process. The reform of the security sector is of utmost importance to
building peace in those societies emerging from conflict. In other words, it is crucial that
legitimate security forces replace militias and guerrilla groups. The government worked
on rehabilitating internal security and recruiting men from all communities for the
service. A town mayor highlighted the importance of such steps in building peace and
promoting safety and security in those devastated areas,
When I took on the mayor position, the internal security complex was empty and I only had a few guys in the gendarmerie who were not well equipped... People did not feel very secure... Now, I have about one hundred members... As you are walking in the street you see some at checkpoints, others regulating traffic, and others in the gendarmerie... They assure public order, maintain order, and protect people and their properties. I had a lot of help and support from the Ministry of Interior to reestablish such peace in the town (Interview, Mayor of a returning village, Bhamdoun, July 18, 2003).
Furthermore, assuring the integrity of the voting process during elections and the
safety of voters is also of utmost importance, especially so that residents, returnees, and
displaced who make their way from their areas of resettlement may return to the village
to cast their votes. “The latest parliamentary election witnessed a high rate of voters’
turnout in areas of displacement and return... The Municipal election also saw higher
voting rates in addition to a high number of candidates from the different communities...
Such political participation is a sign of change; an important step in building peace in
those communities” (An-Nahar, October 1, 2006). Peacebuilding also involves increasing
confidence in local representatives.
The absence of local authority during the war and the resulting chaos have led people to loose faith in the government... no one was there to help them save their houses, and their lives... You hear people, whether residents, returnees or displaced say: ‘the state couldn’t do anything... the municipality can’t do anything’... It is our job as local representatives to listen to and meet the needs of the people; to make them trust
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the system again, participate and feel secure” (Interview, Village Mayor, July 18, 2003).
Reconciliation
Even though the projects mentioned above are important tools of building trust
and relationships between communities, such initiatives should be supported by direct
face-to-face reconciliation efforts, where members of the different communities come
together to discuss the past, forgive each other, and decide to move towards a common
future. These initiatives are of particular importance in villages that experienced inter
and/or intra communal violence and massacres, for they function as a basic guarantee of
emotional, psychological stability and can be indispensable in reinforcing and
consolidating the reintegration process (Farah, 1999, 39). Several organizations have
planned meetings that brought together members of the different communities to help
humanize the ‘other’ and rebuild relations between individuals and neighbors.
NGOs like IWA, MECC, and others also sponsored reconciliation efforts through
dialogue meetings between members of the different communities, with a special focus
on youth. Their approach differed from that of the Ministry (which is detailed below) in a
number of aspects including the targeted individuals (youth rather than older Committee
representatives); the absence of monetary compensations; and their ‘neutral’ setting with
no governmental representation. In one of the most important reconciliation projects
implemented in areas of return, the Institute of World Affairs brought together Druze and
Christian youth from four of the most challenging and ‘difficult’ villages—Salima,
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Breeh, Kfarmatta, and Ain Anoub.56 Meetings, workshops and dialogue sessions focusing
on reconciliation and relationship building were carried out. According to IWA’s
website, “these meetings have the goal to build long-term community relationships that
encourage the emergence of local talent and leadership in an atmosphere of trust and
security” (IWA, www.iwa.org). However, due to the sensitivity of the subject matter,
those meetings took place either in a neutral area of the country (for example, residents
and displaced from the town of Salima met in Broumana—for the first time after twenty
years of separation resulting from the bloody history between the two communities in the
town); other workshops took place in IWA’s offices in Deir al Qamar—no meetings were
held in the towns themselves.
IWA’s approach is based on long-term commitment: for example, the ice-breaker
workshop entitled, “Communication towards the Construction of Salima the Human,”
which placed youth from both communities face-to-face, to work on communication,
confidence building, mutual respect through accepting differences, and recognizing
communalities, and grew from two-years of intensive intra-community dialogues (Al-
Anwar, November 13, 2001). The series of uni-communal dialogues held at the IWA-
Lebanon’s offices provided the space for each community to openly state their fears and
aspirations and for IWA staff to understand local concerns and needs. The Broumana
meeting was based on both sides’ belief in “reinforcement of trust and clarity of
56 Even though meetings between Salima communities took place, the IWA was not successful in bringing together individuals from Breeh or Kfarmatta. These areas have still not witnessed return or any breakthroughs between communities. However, in early October 2006, the Ministry of Displaced announced the ‘reconciliation of Kfarmatta’ where the village’s Residents and Home Return Committees shook hands under the auspices o f Walid Jumblatt in his residence in Mokhtara and the presence of government, ministry and local Druze and Christian leaders. However, return has not materialized yet as, according to the current Minister o f Displaced Nehme Tohme, it is awaiting availability of funds, which the government promised to dispense to the CFD this month.
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intentions, enhancement of the sense of belonging to the village, and continuous
dialogue” (“A Narrative,” IWA).
One woman I spoke to in Salima explained,
I would go to the meetings to Deir al-Qamar to talk about how we can meet with them [displaced]... I enjoyed going with my friends... But going to Broumana, I was very nervous... I did not know anyone from the other group... We all did not know how the meeting will turn out... I went anyway, despite my fear and my parents’ disapproval... I can now honestly say that it was the best decision I ever made... It was good to meet those people, to see that they are in many ways like us... Even though they are in many ways different... I felt that I made new friends, and that a burden was lifted off my heart and shoulder as we honestly discussed our fears and needs....” (Interview, Participant of the IWA workshop, Salima, January 4, 2004).
Another participant I spoke with in Beirut told me that he also benefited a lot from the
workshop “just by seeing who these people are, how they act, what they think.... Even
though it did not materialize in return yet, I think that more meetings like this should take
place; this is the way by which we can change the existing negative collective memory. I
know that it is difficult and might take more time—I went to the meetings and workshop
without my parents knowing because I don’t think they will ever accept it” (Interview,
Participant in the IWA workshop, Beirut, January 3, 2004).
IWA generally conceptualized its work and projects, which aim at reconstituting
the social tissue in post-war communities, as being complementary to existing
reconstruction and rehabilitation projects and “parallel with the Government and relevant
community and national leaders from all sectors of the society” (“A Narrative,” IWA, 1).
The Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network also approached reconciliation from
the perspective of building peace between the communities in Mount Lebanon. It is
responsible for numerous efforts that brought Druze and Christian youth in face-to-face
meetings since 1998. The LCRN based its work on the belief that the fighting, “which
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was still in the heads and hearts” of people was the reason for the slow rate of return to
the villages; it identified areas that experienced massacres during the war and worked
with communities in those locations to reestablish coexistence, ties, and harmony.
Our main concern was that the government’s approach to reconciliation would not work. We do not believe that paying for victims is reconciliation... It might be important, but it is not reconciliation. We also do not believe that limiting the process to community leaders or family representatives will have substantial results. Families can take the compensation and buy a house elsewhere without even going back or really dealing with the ‘other’” (Interview, LCRN Executive Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003).
In its peacebuilding reconciliation efforts, the Network “was looking for something more
sustainable; a true felt reconciliation between at least the youth in those communities...
We believe that it is through the youth that we can rebuild coexistence” (Interview,
LCRN Executive Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003). LCRN’s first intervention was in two
villages, Majd Al-M’oush (Christian area) and Ramlieh (Druze area), where Christians
have returned to M’oush but have maintained no relations whatsoever with their Druze
neighbors. Similar to the IWA approach, the Network conducted extensive fieldwork,
interviews, conflict resolution training, and meetings separately in the two communities
before bringing them together in joint workshops in a neutral area where “they talked
about their past and identified possible areas of future cooperation” (Interview, LCRN
Executive Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003). A participant a joint workshop noted, “I was
nervous to meet the participants from the other village. I have heard a lot of stories about
the war and what happened between the communities... my parents still tell me things. I
was surprised to see that those people were similar to me, they were nervous as well...
we were able to work together, communicate and listen to each other... We have similar
needs” (Interview, Participant in a LCRN workshop, Ramlieh, July 5, 2003).
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An interesting feature of the LCRN approach, which was also adopted by other
organizations like PPM and UNDP, was the move beyond face-to-face meetings to actual
involvement in rebuilding the community.
We knew the challenges when we started working on those areas... there is just so much history, violent history, between the communities... We thought that whereas bringing the two sides together in reconciliation meetings and workshops is an important breakthrough, each side will go back about its regular business without maintaining these connections... So, in order to build trust and fortify friendships and reconciliation, we have to translate the vision for a ‘common future and needs’ to practical responses- which we envisioned as being cooperative/collaborative projects. These projects took many forms depending on the needs of the communities involved; some were educational, others environmental, and yet others were cultural and social” (Interview, LCRN Executive Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003).
The UNDP in its United Nations Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the
Displaced Program also recognized the need to use different developmental activities
tools to establish and solidify reconciliation between the different parties and groups.
These activities, whether economic, environmental, social or cultural in nature, formed
the basis for the Program’s peacebuilding initiatives in the areas of return. According to
its director, “following an internal evaluation of the program, there was the need to move
away from infrastructure—both physical and social—which was the focus of our work, to
sectors that have to do more with relationships, social reintegration, and peace
consolidation” (Interview, UNDP Project Director, Beirut, July 8, 2003).
According to a LCRN workshop participant from M’oush, “All the past was
invoked and remembered before and during the meetings, but during the training and
workshop we did not remember anything.., the notion of ‘us’ vs. ‘you’ became obsolete.
The challenge is to maintain this new relationship outside the workshop... I hope that this
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cooperation will continue with stable projects” (Interview, Participant in a LCRN
workshop, M’oush, July 5, 2003). Another participant noted,
I came here to hear what others have to say, to tell them what I think... I was a bit scared and nervous to share some emotions and feelings. We are not used to it. But I came, met new people... I was shocked at how fast we blended together.. .It was even easier when we worked together without having to talk directly about those emotions. LCRN helped us open the door to cooperation and friendships, we should continue to work together to keep that door open, to bring opportunities... I think that with time, the door will be completely destroyed and relations will be more direct, even with between our parents (Interview, Participant in a LCRN workshop, Ramlieh, July 5, 2003).
A local leader in M’oush praised the initiatives by LCRN,
I would have never thought I will see such engagement and cooperation between different communities in my times; things are still heated, feelings are still strong... But it was great to see young people from the two villages plant trees together; it was more emotional to see communities (young and old) come together for a seminar on fire and fire-fighting in a church undergoing rehabilitation after it was burnt down during the war. These projects are not only engines of reconciliation; some have social, economic and political implications as well (Interview, Participant in a LCRN workshop, M’oush, July 5, 2003).
It is also important to detail the government’s response to reconciliation, which
was different and reflected the narrow understanding of the concept as a series of
meetings that eventually lead to agreements between the parties in conflict. According to
the MoD, reconciliations first and foremost aim at the creation of “a favorable social
climate for successful return in areas that witnessed fierce fighting” (“The
Achievements,” 1998, 25). Reconciliation meetings between the parties are a way to
reconcile old hatreds and differences, “to bury the hatchet, work for peace, abandon
selfishness, and secure a better future for the new generations” (“The Achievements”,
1998, 25). The Ministry held several meetings, which brought families of offenders and
families of victims together, with mediators present, in a process based on rituals of sulh
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(settlement) and musalaha (reconciliation). These meetings took place at the Ministry
offices and resulted in acceptable settlement in the form of monetary compensations
(Irani, 2000), paid by the CFD to families of victims and dispensed according to
availability of funds; the compensation was set at LL30 million ($20,000) per victim
(“Executive Summary,” 41).
Despite the increased criticisms on the handling of the matter in such a
materialistic manner, a former Minister of Displaced noted that those “monetary
compensations to the families of victims are helpful in solving conflicts and relieving
hostilities between the two communities” (Feghali, 1994, 35). An official in the CFD, did
not go as far as to say that such compensations solve the problem, but noted that “money
consoles a bit because of the harsh economic situation in the country... because some
will criticize the approach and say, it is not fair to pay for the dead wondering how people
accept.... They will never forget those who died... but they take the money because of
the economic conditions” (Interview, CFD Director General, Beirut, August 9, 2003).
Criticizing compensations, a displaced we spoke with noted that “reconciliation does not
happen with money... but when both parties get what they want” (Interview, Displaced
man at the CFD, Beirut, August 9, 2003). However, the Ministry continues to sponsor
such meetings and claims success every time such agreement is signed.
In addition to these individual reconciliations, the Ministry has also sponsored
collective reconciliations, which involves each community as a whole. Such larger scale
reconciliations are spearheaded by the formation of committees representing the
displaced and residents in the villages. According to a ministerial decision by then
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Minister of Displaced, Walid Jumblatt, on January 13, 1993, there would be two types of
committees were: Home Return and Resident committees each have the duties to
Help create a restful political situation for successful return; resolve local disputes through meetings between the displaced and residents; create a serene social climate for return; help carry out and promote reconciliations; establish the common existence concept; provide assistance to displaced that cover all that is required for the consolidation of their home return and making them established in their villages and areas; participate substantially and effectively in the execution of the home return operation (“The Achievements”, 1998, 20).
Table 27. Number of Home Return and Residents Committees according to provinces57
Caza Home Return Residents Total
Committees Committees
Beirut 2 — 2
Mount Lebanon 139 56 195
North Lebanon 2 — 2
Bekaa 6 — 6
South Lebanon, 19 17 36
West Bekaa,
and Rashaya
Total 168 73 241
Source: Ministry of Displaced
57 While in some villages either Home Return or Residents Committees were formed, in most of the villages two Committees were formed.
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In addition to preparing the necessary conditions for return and opening the way
for reconciliation, these committees offer a way by which people could become involved
in their own process of return by assessing their own needs, planning and implementing
projects for their villages, and monitoring the process of return (’’The Achievements”,
1998, 20; As-Safir, January 16, 1993). As shown in Table 26, several such committees
were formed throughout the years; some led to ‘reconciliation’ (which usually were
crowned by public festivals), but others failed to result in any agreement or common
ground between the communities. While some Committees continue to exist and are still
involved in the process of reconciling the communities, others were dissolved or
dismantled following Municipal elections; at that point, the Ministry began to coordinate
its reconciliation directly with the newly elected bodies (Interview, Director of
MoD/UNDP project, Beirut, June 18, 2003). One must acknowledge the important role
that these committees played in the return process throughout the years in diffusing
hostilities, building trust between residents and returnees, and fostering local conflict
resolution mechanisms. However, the extent to which those committees were
representative of the population (of the displaced, returnees, and residents) remains
dubious and was, in fact, an obstacle to reconciliation in a number of villages (Chmouny,
1992; Caritas, 1999, 87).
Despite calls for wide representation of the major families in the village
committees, some of them were and continue to be limited to community leaders and
influential people and, thus, fall short of representing all views. Another concern
regarding those committees was voiced by late State Minister Hobeika, during the
National Congress; he warned of the negative role that such Committees could play in the
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process, as they could transform the problem of displaced from one which concerned the
whole population to one which concerned only certain factions by some committees,
based on their political or religious status (Hobeika, June 25, 1992). While those
Committees were mainly created for reconciliation purposes, they also served, in some
cases, as the point of contact for agencies and organizations involved in development
initiatives in order for the latter to learn about local needs.
Reconciliations sponsored by the Ministry followed the same process: they began
with separate meetings between representatives from the MoD and each of the sides, in
order to discuss problems and prepare an atmosphere for a face-to-face meeting between
the parties. The parties would continue to meet until a tentative agreement is reached in
which common principles are declared, and a work plan to secure return to the village is
proposed. These reconciliations involved both secular and religious leaders and officials
who, the Ministry believes, could positively influence reconciliation by building
confidence and trust in the process among people (Feghali, 1994, 34). Throughout the
process, follow-up meetings between the two committees and between the Ministry and
each of the committees took place in order to try and solve problems that would
potentially arise. While in some cases, certain challenges might stand in the way of
constructive dialogue, in others, committees decide to create one committee representing
both sides and entrust it with the responsibility of implementing the agreed upon plan
(Feghali, 1994, 28).
The Ministry’s enthusiasm regarding these reconciliations, however, was not
shared by the people. According to a displaced from Bhamdoun-Station, the main
problem with these meetings was their “absolute silence on the circumstances of events
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that hit each of the villages and which led to the displacement to start with... The
condition is that we do not talk of the causes of what happened in Bhamdoun, for
example, and that we demand reconciliation without evoking the real number of victims
and displaced, the circumstances and the causes” (Interview, Hotel owner and former
President of the Council for Displaced in the Mountain, Bhamdoun, September 22,2004).
Another problem with this type of government-sponsored reconciliation was its
‘superficiality,’ in that it was mostly confined to leaders or za’ims. “Leaders reconciled
with each other, the symbolic visit of Jumblatt to the Patriarch and vice versa were
considered positive signs.. .signs that reconciliation is possible and is starting to take
place....However, we have not seen its effects triggering down to the populace yet”
(Interview, Hotel owner and Former President of the Council for Displaced in the
Mountain, Bhamdoun, September 22, 2004).
A former Christian militia member was also skeptical about such a process and
did not believe that any reconciliation had actually taken place through such government
sponsored efforts.
What happened is an agreement between politicians which did not include all Lebanese individuals... What they called reconciliation in Mount Lebanon was nothing more than a financial competition between the occupying squats and the displaced. They were not reconciled on what happened during the war. The equation was: X dollars for leaving seized houses, X dollars for rebuilding, etc. Nothing was done at the level of the people... In some regions nothing was done. There are some NGOs that work on this subject, but the successive governments since the end of the war did not undertake anything is this respect (Interview, Former Christian Militia Member, Beirut, September 15, 2005).
He continued, “Nobody has really worked on a true reconciliation for these past events...
nobody truly treated the pains and rifts of the mountain. There needs to be some kind of
memorial for those who fell during the war and as a consequence of the massacres to both
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Druze and Christians. They may return to live side by side but not with one another if this
way of dealing with the issue continues” (Interview, Former Christian Militia Member,
Beirut, September 15,2005).
The time required to achieve a successful reconciliation depended on the
situation, individuals, conditions, history, psychological state, memories and trauma
involved in the process of displacement (Feghali, 1994, 31). The peculiarities of each
village explained why some reconciliation efforts were concluded in the early 1990s in
certain villages and led to return, while others are still ongoing and have not shown any
sign of agreement or return process (Deir el Qamar Magazine, September 5, 2001).
However, despite the challenges, the Ministry continues to believe that the
‘reconciliations file’ is the cornerstone for return and its consolidation. Furthermore,
despite the rhetoric employed by the government on reconciliation, in practice, this
process has not been prioritized and, as mentioned above, the extent to which the role of
leaders is truly positive and effective or merely symbolic is a matter of debate.
In addition to the personal character of the reconciliation process advocated by the
government, i.e. the private meetings with individuals and committees in closed settings,
it later takes on a more public character; this later phase entails a symbolic reconciliation
and key distribution ceremony, often sponsored by the President of the Republic and
attended by officials from the government (deputies and ministers), the MoD, the CFD,
politicians, religious figures, civil groups, and local leaders. These ceremonies or
festivals bring together people from both communities in the village court to listen to
speeches by public and community officials on the importance of coexistence, return, and
the revival of communities (Irani, 2000; “Executive summary,” 41-42).
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All those officials come up to the village for few hours, make speeches, talk about coexistence and reconciliation, give out ‘fake’ house keys, there are a lot of hugs and kisses with the media taking pictures and doing interviews... and then, everyone leaves, residents stay in their homes and displaced go back to their areas of resettlement. Nothing really happens... (Resident, Shouf, September 7, 2004).
One Approach does not Fit All: Selected Examples of Diverse Areas of Return
The above sections present an overview of the development and peacebuilding
activities that took or still take place in the areas of return in order to encourage
resettlement and reintegration. While it is impossible to detail all projects that are taking
place due to the large number of organizations and initiatives, the above presents a
general depiction of the most important types of activities within those fields. An
important point mentioned in the analysis is the need for different approaches depending
on the needs and history of each particular village and its people. While it is unfeasible to
analyze each and every village of the hundreds of towns targeted by the repatriation
process, this section presents a selected number of them. In order to emphasize that while
in some villages, one or the other of those approaches (i.e. development and
peacebuilding) might work by itself to encourage return, in most of the cases, it is more
complicated and both approaches are required in order to achieve substantial results; i.e.
revival of and return to the villages.
It is beyond the scope of this study to provide an in-depth study of each of those
targeted areas. However, for purposes of analysis and assessment, it is important to
highlight some characteristics which explain the different responses in the policy of
return: while some villages experienced return directly after the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of homes and infrastructure, others, to this day, have seen no such
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movement. The few examples below were chosen due to their centrality in the
repatriation policy (they have received tremendous attention from the government and
non-governmental organizations); availability of data (they are villages that I visited and
in which I conducted interviews); and for their ability to highlight the differences and
peculiarities facing activists in the field. While these examples do not attempt to propose
solutions, they reveal the dynamics at play in the different areas in order to highlight
major difficulties, as well as the reactions to the initiatives. They provide an idea about
the work, successes, challenges, limitations, and impact of existing responses and thus
open way to the analysis and evaluation sections below. For purpose of manageability,
the discussion is divided according to pertinent characteristics of those selected areas.
Homogeneous Villages
Homogeneous villages, or what is literary known in Arabic as villages ‘of one
color,’ are towns whose pre-war population was either Christian or Muslim. These rural
communities did not experience any form of intra-communal violence. Ras el-Harf is an
example of a town that was displaced in 1983 due to total destruction resulting from war.
Other homogeneous villages, however, were totally displaced and destroyed as a result of
inter-communal violence, i.e. aggression by neighboring villages in which residents of a
different sect comprised the majority of the population. Ain Alhour, for example, a
Christian area in Iqlim al-Kharoub, was emptied from its residents following a 1984
battle with Druze residents of neighboring Bourjain. While both villages were similar in
their pre-war makeup, and while both required intensive reconstruction efforts, the causes
that led to their displacement and their locations necessitated different approaches in
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order to achieve return. Nevertheless, the actual response to both Ras el-Harf and Ain
Alhour was similar: the different agencies and organizations (CDR, Pontifical Mission,
World Vision, Caritas, and YMCA) concentrated their efforts on evictions; wreckage
removal; reconstruction of destroyed houses; rehabilitating economic and social
infrastructure such as agricultural lands (which were burnt), schools, community centers,
and health centers; rehabilitating the municipalities; rebuilding of churches; and
modernizing industry (“Program of Return,” MoD). The work was coordinated among
those agencies, whereby each focused on one sector.
With such a focus on restoring all aspects of life to make it viable for displaced to
repatriate, displaced from both villages reacted differently. By 2003, Ras el-Harf
experienced more return (70 families out of 346) than Ain Alhour (11 families out of
C O 360) . “Even though the two villages are homogeneous—and Christian—there remains a
feeling of mistrust and insecurity among displaced from Ain Alhour: what if we went
back and were attacked by our neighbors again? What would guarantee my safety and
security? My livelihood and that of my children? Reconstruction alone would take me
back” (Interview, Conversation with a displaced man from the village who was following
up on his application at the CFD, Beirut, August 9, 2003). In fact, until a reconciliation
meeting between representatives from Ain Alhour and Bourjain took place under the
58 These numbers are based on the ILDES field investigation from 1991 until 2003. There hasn’t been a more recent detailed study or survey after that and I was not able to obtain any new numbers since. However, these figures are reflective of the situation in those villages today as no additional compensations were paid by the CFD since due to lack of funding. Furthermore, it is important to note that those numbers of return do not detail the demographics of the returnees, i.e. whether they are older people or younger generation. However, during my fieldwork I noticed that most of those permanent returnees were elderly people.
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auspices of Minister Jumblatt and in which compensations for families of victims were
paid (Feghali, 1994, 113), there was no sign of return to Ain Alhour.
Heterogeneous Villages
Heterogeneous villages, or mixed areas, also suffered from displacement. These
are towns where different communities—Christian and Druze—lived together for
centuries before the war. Reinstating such heterogeneity in a post-conflict environment
makes the process more challenging; especially in that most of the displacement was the
result of inter-communal massacres and violence. The Barouk, for example, equally
divided between Christian and Druze, witnessed the exodus of its Christian population as
a result of acts of retaliation by the Druze community to the assassination of Kamal
Jumblatt in 1977.
The Barouk is a peculiar example: there continued to be open communication between residents and displaced as well as frequent visits by the latter throughout the years following the displacement. This might be due to the strong communal relationships that existed prior to the war or to the strong condemnation by the majority of the Druze population of such acts of violence... but was is different from the other cases is that the Christian community knew that small factions of young Druze were behind such atrocities and not all the Druze in the town” (Interview, Resident in Barouk, Barouk, September 25, 2005).
Despite such a dynamic, however, in 2003 only three out of the 290 displaced families
had returned to the town.
Sofar is also another example of a village in which lines of communications
remained open between the residents and displaced despite the violent incidents and the
sense of fear that pushed the Christian community to leave initially. According to an
elderly Druze resident of Sofar, “The Christian inhabitants of Sofar started returning,
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even during the war; they did not stop calling and they participated in the municipal
elections and reconstructed a few churches” (Interview, Resident, Sofar, September 23,
2005). However, despite the continued interaction between the two communities and the
positive representation articulated by the resident with whom we spoke, permanent return
of Christians to the town did not take place after reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts
got underway; as of 2003, none of the 35 displaced families had come back to settle. This
led to the creation of a Committee of Return, comprised of both residents and displaced,
to meet and agree on issues, most importantly the compensations for rehabilitation,
properties, and victims (Feghali, 1994, 102).
Another case of heterogeneous village, Maasser Chouf, whose population was
displaced in two waves—one in 1977 and one in 1983, each time following violent
massacres—further illustrates the dangers associated with lack of proper reconciliation in
these areas and also the pressing need for such a process to take place before or in
parallel with reconstruction and rehabilitation in order for sustainable and permanent
return to be possible (Feghali, 1994, 106). In contrast to the Barouk and Sofar cases,
communications between residents and displaced from Maaseer Chouf were totally cut
off following the atrocities. Hatred between communities was very much alive: in 1991,
Shawkat Shakr, whose family was killed in the massacres, went back to the village and
murdered a number of Druze residents. This incident made the idea of return for
Christians even less appealing and spread fear among Druze residents. This horrendous
act of revenge drew the attention of the Ministry and other organizations in the field to
the necessity of appeasing feelings and reuniting between people in a controlled
environment, before pushing for return (Feghali, 1994, 106); however, the absence of
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practical implementation (i.e. prioritizing reconciliations instead of material
reconstruction) raises questions as to the extent to which such areas can truly experience
sustainable, peaceful return. Illustrating the fear in the resident community, a Druze
woman asked whether “it will ever be possible to trust each other or want to live with
each other again without thinking of each other as potential murderers?” (Interview,
Resident, Maasser Chouf, August 4, 2003) As of 2003, only one of the 475 displaced
families returned.
Inter-Communal Violence
The intensity of violence in various villages differed from one case to the next.
While some areas witnessed waves of attacks where tens of people were killed, others
saw sporadic incidents, which targeted few people, but aimed at evoking fear in the
community. The wave of displacement of the minority Christian population of Hasrout, a
predominantly Muslim village in the Shouf, was instigated by the murder of one
Christian man in 1983; the subsequent fear within the community resulted in similar
murderous acts. The town was not totally emptied of its Christian population, until two
elderly women who remained were murdered in their home. As of 2003, only one of the
70 displaced families have returned. In Kfarnabrakh, another predominantly Druze
village, displacement of Christians was triggered by a 1983 shooting incident during
funeral services for a Christian resident which claimed the lives of 22. However, the
village was not totally emptied of its Christian population: three families did not join the
exodus wave. As of 2003, only 27 of the 232 displaced families had gone back.
Following rehabilitation campaigns—that did not lead to return in both villages—
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Committees of returnees and residents were formed and in which discussion was limited
to evacuation of illegally occupied houses and agricultural lands with no serious
discussion of dealing with the past. These were toasted by a 1995 festival of return or
reconciliation, but were not followed by signs of any such movement. The MoD argued
that the main reason for the lack of return was a lack of funds to pay the necessary
compensations (Feghali, 1994, 114).
One elderly returnee from Kfarnabrakh told his story:
We went to Beirut before 1977. During the 1977 events in the village, our house was destroyed and occupied by the Druze... We returned to our home in 1995 after it was evicted. Reconciliation was not an individual one, it was collective and took place in the village court where the reconciliation committee gave us back the keys for our house and paid us to rehabilitate it... My nephew was killed during the events years ago, but everything with the Druze is back to normal now; there is no hatred and there are visits between the two communities (Interview, Returnee, Kfarnabrakh, September 8, 2004).
However, he continued,
This is my story... not everyone forgave... there was no effort by the Committees to promote forgiveness, just to help forget the past... this is a problem facing total return... Also, there is a social and economic problem that no one dealt with: some Christian families come for the weekend to visit their parents and grandparents because there are no schools to which they can send their children... mostly old people like me came back to live the last years of our lives in our village and on our land... but I can tell you there are no than 15 Christian houses that are inhabited currently almost ten years since the festival of return or reconciliation took place (Interview, Returnee, Kfarnabrakh, September 8, 2004).
The village of Bmariam is also an example of a town where pre-war coexistence
was shattered by the massacre in August 1982; 31 Christian residents were killed and the
houses of displaced were either destroyed or occupied. Until this day, the town has
experienced little substantial reconstruction and no return (none of the 307 displaced
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families have returned as of 2003). One displaced from the village, who I met in the MoD
in Beirut, explained:
We Christian displaced took the initiative to form committees of returnees and residents in 1995... we had meetings in the presence of representatives from the Ministry... we still have issues that need more time but most importantly, we have files at the MoD and the CFD on hold for years now awaiting funds.. I am still waiting for my money to rehabilitate my house and return to the village... to make a livelihood for my family instead of the dire conditions we live in today... applicants from other villages have been paid... why not us? Why this mismanagement of funds? (Interview, Displaced from Bmariam, Beirut, July 3, 2003).
Inter and Intra Communal Violence
There are a number of villages that experienced total displacement of both their
Christian and Druze communities following bloody destructive fighting between
residents. Tarchich is an example where the conflict resulted in deaths on both sides and a
tremendous amount of destruction. Throughout the years, attempts at reconciling
communities and rebuilding the town have failed. Tensions have been so high that a civil
organization working on rebuilding houses in the village came under attack. Committees
of Christians and Muslims were formed and their meetings were dominated by mutual
accusations and confessions. Even though such meetings could be seen as symbolic of a
new relationship between the communities and the first, necessary step towards
forgiveness, the murder of the Muslim Committee’s president by another Muslim in the
village increased mistrust and negatively impacted the whole process (Feghali, 1994, 43-
44). Over the years, the town witnessed the return of only 10 of the 280 displaced
families.
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Salima, located in Baabda, was equally divided between Christians and Muslims,
surrounded by mostly Christian towns, and was considered a ‘difficult village.’ It was
also an example of inter- and intra-communal violence which have tom the village since
1975. Displacement from Salima was a result of violent massacre against both
communities, though affecting the Christians and Druze populations at different periods.
For both communities, though, series of explosions, targeting cars and houses, murders
and massacres, armed violence, armed violence, and destruction all resulted in mass
exodus. The lack of funding has resulted in the inability to reconstruct the village and
attempts at reconciliation have not yet resulted in return. IWA worked closely with
Salima youth, bringing them together in an inter-communal dialogue. However, even
today, Salima has not witnessed substantial movement of return; only 10 of the 180
families displaced are said to have returned (Feghali, 1994,124-5).
Another village that needed substantial comprehensive response was Breeh—
where neither an agreement has been reached nor a return has taken place. Attempts by
the Ministry, IWA, and other organizations have not amounted to any form of
rehabilitation, reconstruction, agreement or return; none of the 270 displaced families has
gone back. A major issue of contention continues to be the Village Center which the
Druze built on Christian property: while the Druze community wants to keep the center
and has stated its willingness to offer other pieces of land in exchange, the Christians
want the center destroyed—as they perceive it as a reminder of war and aggression and a
reason for continued conflict between the two communities. The numerous attempts at
reconciling the differences have not yielded any results and the village remains at a
standstill, with the communities unwilling to engage in dialogue before this issue is
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resolved. Governmental and non-governmental agencies have failed to form
representative reconciliation committees in order for both communities to meet.
During my visit to Breeh, where no more than 1500 residents (of the original
3000) live year round, all of the discussions referred to the tensions caused by Bayt A1
Day’a or the Village Center. A woman with whom I spoke, however, noted that the issue
of the Center is an important hurdle, but “there are other major problems hindering
return, such as the lack of economic opportunities, the unavailability of universities and
high schools (students have to go to nearby villages to continue their education—and yet
there are no mixed schools in those villages either to teach on coexistence and encourage
diversity); and the lack of public transportation to name a few” (Interview, Woman
resident of Breeh, Breeh, July 21, 2003). She continued, “relations between Druze and
Christians before the war were great, we used to eat, study, do everything together...
some Christians still come in their cars to see their houses—most of which are
destroyed... but it is important to keep in mind that there were no massacres between the
communities in Breeh and that the problem now is only over the piece of land”
(Interview, Woman 2 resident of Breeh, Breeh, July 21, 2003). However, a displaced
person who did not return to Breeh recalls that in 1977
A person entered a church and killed everyone there; this led to the death of 50 people from each side—there is a violent past which we need to come to term with and one of the problems for not making any breakthroughs is the denial of such massacres. We have to confront our past to be able to live together in the future... without honestly dealing with our violent history nothing will be solved (Interview, Displaced man from Breeh, Beirut, July 20, 2003).
These examples show the different area conditions and the challenges that face
the return process. It illustrates that despite the ubiquitous reconstruction and
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rehabilitation carried out by all villages, only a few individuals and families would return
after such efforts were completed or funds were made available. In most of the areas that
experienced massacres, such events have deeply affected the social fabric and destroyed
coexistence and friendship between people. What these examples primarily demonstrate,
therefore, is the need for approaches that integrate both development and peacebuilding
activities; that build physical, material, and emotional structures. The extent to which this
has taken place and the way by which such integration could be applied are the focus of
this following section.
Assessment: Importance and Wavs of Linking Peacebuilding and Development
As is clear from the above review and analysis, most of the programs already in
place to deal with IDPs in Lebanon were developmental in nature; this made it difficult to
explicitly integrate or connect peacebuilding work into the existing projects. However,
the approach adopted by organizations such as Caritas, UNDP, and MECC (portrayed
earlier), made some headway in putting relationships and reconciliation—which are the
basis of the peacebuilding process—at the center of development and reconstruction
work. It is through such activities, which are more ‘measurable’ (in agency vocabulary)
and less intimidating for most people (as some interviewees have mentioned, sharing
emotions and feelings is not a Lebanese strong trait), that agencies are attempting to
achieve lasting social change. This, it is argued, will act as the basis of a permanent
return to those devastated areas.
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In order to accurately examine the response to IDP in Lebanon, one has to look at
the impact that programs are having, not only on the so-called ‘easy’ villages (according
to Ministry terminology), but also on ‘difficult’ areas; the latter characterize the reality of
most post-conflict situations in divided, multi-sectarian or multi-ethnic countries. In her
statement to the National Congress, Nayla Moawad, the founder of the Rene Moawad
Foundation, noted that the role of non-governmental charity institutions in the
repatriation process was not and should not be limited to the preparation of a suitable
ambiance for the return. According to her, “the role of such organizations went beyond
that, if they were to play an effective role in helping people hold dialogue among
themselves, and eventually reconcile with each other” (Moawad, June 25, 1992).59
Analyzing the projects of return, years after they were initiated in 1992, it is clear
that the increasing recognition of the link between development (physical, economic,
social, and/or human) and peacebuilding/reconciliation has led to some changes in
program design and implementation. In a training workshop held in Beirut for Ministry
and organizations’ staff working with IDPs in the country, Johann Galtung clearly stated
that, “reconstruction and reconciliation have to go hand in hand and should be based on
the notion of conviviality between Lebanese” (Galtung, 1997). An approach that
combines these two processes is difficult, but necessary in countries emerging from years
of wars and destructions (An Nahar, May 29, 1997). One participant in the National
Congress introduced this notion by stating that increased attention should be given to
39 Nayla Moawad is the widow of Rene Moawad who was assassinated 17 days after he became the first president of a post-war Lebanon in 1989. She founded the Rene Moawad Foundation in 1990, which works for social justice and economic development in Lebanon and the Arab World as a way to perpetuate her slain husband’s legacy. She had served as a member of the Lebanese Parliament since 1991 and is currently the only woman with a ministerial seat, serving as the Minister of Social Affairs in the government.
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activities that would create solidarity and cohesion among people in areas of
displacement. This could include: reinforcing the role of public schools; paying special
attention to those who lost family members and help them become self-dependable;
introducing cultural programs in areas where ideological differences were wide in an
attempt to minimize them; and supporting non-governmental organizations to reactivate
their role in those areas (Osseyran, June 25,1992).
Organizations, such as IWA, UNDP and LCRN, have increasingly acknowledged
the importance of such an approach to an effective return of IDPs, “social fissures caused
by the cycles of violence and forced displacement are not easily repaired, for this reason,
projects that help to advance inter-ethnic reconciliation, trust building, and cooperation,
must figure prominently in any comprehensive national recovery program”
(“Community- Building,” IWA, 2). As the focus of the programs was mostly
developmental in nature, the organizations active in the field started to consider a new
methodology through which they could place a new lens on development—one that did
not merely focus on the materialistic aspects of the projects or their short term impacts
and results; instead, it would place greater emphasis on relationships, sustainability, and
local community participation (Lederach, 1996, 2001). This methodology should
accentuate the peacebuilding potential that already exists in development programs and
projects, by underscoring ‘connectors’ between people, such as shared values, interests,
experiences, occasions, etc., rather than dividers—as the latter had ignited the
displacement problem and also prolonged it for decades (Anderson, 1999). Examples of
such projects include the building of community centers and the creation of different
types of cooperatives.
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/ MoD l.Ar /\ MoD cm fsk 4 ' A ppm IC S LN1 / v*\ FSl Development ' CDR C MRC -[C R N ’ MCC 1 Peacebuildin« I Arab Countr\ hinds . IWA I 111 is\ii) -rfpcr i I Order of Malta mantas /1 M CC YML A Wot Id Vision Pontifical Mission w '/ . Mercy Corps '
Figure 1. Organizations’ projects: development and peacebuilding
Hence, as seen above, developmental organizations, already structured for such
types of work, adopted a new, additional lens for development in order to meet the needs
of the communities they were targeting. Dubbed transformational development, such an
approach, as described by World Vision, had “a bias for peace and reconciliation and
employs processes and actions that reduce risks and enhance capacities of families and
communities to cope, mitigate and respond to conflicts and disasters” (World Vision,
Strategic Processes/Indicators/Tools, 2002). It was also more comprehensive in that it
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dealt with social, cultural, spiritual, economic, political and environmental aspects.
However, this approach, as was reflected in World Vision’s work in Lebanon, mainly
related to development (in all its types) and failed to take the next step to include building
peace and reconciliation.
Other organizations, such as Caritas and UNDP, were more ‘successful’ in this
regard mainly because the aim of reconciling communities implicitly underlined their
projects starting in the late 1990s. There are strategic processes for integrating
peacebuilding and transformational development programs and shifts toward that are
becoming clearer in the projects of certain organizations. Examples include creating a
culture of good governance; transforming persons; working in coalitions; enhancing
community capacities; and developing sustainable livelihoods. Indicators for these
processes are the formation of community based organizations; enhancing local
capacities to deal with conflict; resolve conflict in a non-violent way; building local
capacities for peace; building relationships; facilitating participation; economic
development; and civil society (World Vision, Strategic Processes/Indicators/Tools,
2002). Moves toward linking peacebuilding and development have been made and
benchmarks were attained, as was exemplified above and will further be elaborated on
below; however, numerous challenges still stand in the way of a full integration, as will
also been detailed following a discussion of achievements.
Achievements
In my conversations with program directors, the shift from mainly focusing on
infrastructural and house rehabilitation projects to focusing on practical reconciliation
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and peacebuilding through joint initiatives—i.e. initiatives that brought residents and
displaced/returnees together—has occurred as early as the late 1990s. Primarily, this was
the result of the slow rate of return recorded following years of work and efforts in
displaced areas, which portrayed the need of such cooperative programs. Despite their
relatively recent materialization, the impact of such projects has proven to be more
positive and sustainable than merely holding meetings and dialogues between the two
sides or providing them with funds and loans to rebuild their homes and develop their
economic capabilities individually. Projects that directly involve people in socio
economic development indirectly assist in building relationships between them
(Interview, MECC, ERR Project Director, Beirut, July 7,2003). These initiatives have
manifested in different forms, but all could be considered achievements in the process of
linking development and peacebuilding.
Reconstruction
Reconstruction in which “people try to rebuild together the villages that were
destroyed and in some cases that they destroyed themselves” together, is a good step in
linking peacebuilding and development (Smyth, 1997). The basic idea is that such joint
reconstruction projects not only contribute to reconciliation but make “the insanity of
violence” more obvious to people, as “they start building and restoring” and the problem
of blame—“who destroyed this, you or we?—becomes less important” (Galtung, 1997).
The importance of such activities in changing the dynamic between residents and
returnees, from one of blame to one of common vision for the future, was emphasized by
the director of the UNDP project who spoke of the agency’s successes in rebuilding the
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physical and human aspects of the villages in which it was involved (Interview, UNDP
Project Director, Beirut, July 8,2003). In post-war situations, and especially following
devastating destruction, there is always ample work that requires joint efforts towards
common goals—such as building houses, schools, hospitals, etc. Involving people in
activities to rebuild and rehabilitate their homes, schools, clinics, etc. is an important
aspect of peacebuilding activities (Hines, 2001, 37). Moreover, “the agency decides its
projects in consultation with villagers (residents and returnees) and depends on their
expertise to implement them” (Interview, UNDP Project Director, Beirut, July 8,2003).
According to the ERR director,
The program makes sure to use the capabilities of the residents and returnees in order to provide them with livelihoods and a feeling of attachment and belonging to their villages... All materials used in the reconstruction and rebuilding of houses and infrastructure are locally purchased or provided; I mean we do not go to other areas or villages to get the material available in the village itself- like for example windows, fences, doors, etc. This way we are involving everyone in the process of reconstruction... without anyone feeling left behind or prejudiced against. This allows for the emergence of relationships between villagers on the different levels and will bring them together in a process of common future for their town (Interview, Beirut, July 7,2003).
Youth Camps
The emphasis on peacebuilding and reconciliation has translated into an array of
emerging youth activities, which are, in general, another important form of initiatives that
integrate development and peacebuilding. While they contribute to relationship building
between participants, these initiatives can be (and have been) utilized to meet the
developmental needs of the community. The objective of these projects, as described by
the MoD, is to “deepen the relationship between the youth (residents and returnees) and
translate it into a joint effort toward a successful home return and new social bonds so as
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to increase cooperation in future projects which will be beneficial regarding their region
and common existence” (“The Achievements”, 1998,150). These initiatives include:
volunteer labor camps; youth and children camps that bring together the young
generation from the two communities to participate in team-building activities;
reconciliation and encounter meetings to get to know, understand and respect each other;
seminars on an array of issues, ranging from peaceful settlement of disputes to health and
environment; ports and other cultural and recreational activities; cleaning up streets in the
villages; building agricultural roads; wreckage removal; construction of playgrounds;
construction of support walls in agricultural fields; specialized training; and other
development projects and services. Even though they have not resulted in the ideal
articulated above, in some areas, they have contributed to relationship building and more
stable development. Ministries and organizations have planned, and are still planning,
such projects in different areas; they have brought together hundreds of young men,
women, and children (Daou, 1993). According to the Ministry of Social Affairs, the
volunteer work camps strengthen the spirit of friendship, create an atmosphere of
cooperation and volunteerism among citizens of the displaced areas, and confirm the
Lebanese’s will of common living through participation in development and
reconstruction through volunteer activities (A1 Liwa’, August 12, 1993).
The positive aspects of such work and its implications on building friendly and
sustainable relationships between members of warring communities have dramatically
risen to the attention of agencies involved in the return process in the late 1990s. These
initiatives have become more organized and more publicized, bringing together larger
numbers of participants, and are no longer held solely by or with the support of the
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Ministry or other governmental agencies; now, they have also taken on a larger role in the
programs of the non-governmental organizations. All our interviewees have mentioned
camps as an important aspect of their work (even though looking more closely at the
issue reveals that such efforts were not really prioritized).
Youth and Community
One achievement in the process of return, as mentioned above, is the recognition
of the important role of youth. This stratum of the population has suffered tremendously
from the experience of displacement; youth have lost all feelings of security and safety
and a stable environment in which to experience childhood. The negative impacts of such
experiences persist and express themselves in different forms—including violence,
committing crimes, sexual deviations, drug additions, etc. In order to deal with the
psychological suffering, it is important to provide better and stable living environments
for those youths, revive social and religious norms, and introduce cultural programs that
will help them develop good morale (Slim, June 22, 1992). Various organizations have
resorted to different types of projects in order to interconnect the youth of the
communities together, as well as with the rest of their villages. Such projects have
included volunteer work, camps, sports activities, and events. Caritas’ project director put
it perfectly well: “in addition to contributing to the improvement of the village and the
social development of the community, such projects motivate the younger generation
who adapted to the urban areas of resettlement, to return and hence enhance the social
fabric in these areas. They further involve the community both in the needs assessment
stage (where the community decides on what kind of club, sports arena, etc. it wants) and
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the implementation stage (where the organization contracts people from the community
to build such spaces, maintain, and administer them)” (Interview, Caritas IDP Project
Director, Beirut, August 4,2003). She continued, “These activities have proven to be
very successful in providing “an outlet for tension by bringing together different groups
on the sports field, and providing an opportunity for recreational activities between
opposing groups” (Interview, Caritas IDP Project Director, Beirut, August 4,2003).
Kimberly Maynard emphasized the importance of such sports activities in promoting
understanding and reconciliation between communities, as they bring them together and
help them develop trust after years of mutual suspicions (Maynard, 1999, 184).
Sports clubs and tournaments have not been the only way to bring people from the
community together. The types of community centers and meeting places in a village
depend on the needs of the people themselves, as well as the capacity of the village. In
some cases, there was a construction or rehabilitation of sports clubs, while in other
villages, computer and language skills centers, libraries, aerobics classes and handicrafts
workshops for young girls and women, commercial centers with movie theatres,
restaurants and parks were set up. These projects were to act as incentives in order to
attract displaced who had become used to living in an urban setting; these projects were
attempts at recreating similar living standards.
Sanctuaries
Even though they could be included under the general reconstruction subheading,
it is important to highlight the rebuilding and rehabilitation of religious sites or
sanctuaries as an accomplishment in villages of return. In addition to a development
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aspect, such projects acted as vehicles by which post-conflict reconciliation and
peacebuilding could emerge in a community. According to a former CFD director, such
cultural religious structures have been particularly important for IDP return in Lebanon as
“they are a symbol of confidence for returnees and provide spaces where meetings,
reconciliations, and events that bring communities together take place- especially that
displacement had taken a sectarian character” (Interview, Beirut, June 17, 2003). As was
noted above, the issue of sanctuaries is very important to the returnees themselves and
their successful reintegration. Aware of the symbolism of sanctuaries, LCRN sponsored a
lecture on firefighting in the church, which was burnt down by Druze in Majd Al-
M’oush; it brought together the Christian villagers and 63 Druze from neighboring
villages (Interview, LCRN Executive Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003). In some villages,
the tolling of a church bell for the first time after a long time of absence, in celebration of
religious holidays, reflected reconciliation and return.
Education
In areas of return, education, as mentioned above, is an important condition for
reintegration and settlement. As was articulated by the many interviewees, a vital factor
in their decision to return to the villages is the existence of schools. Accomplishments in
the field of education, which include not only the rebuilding or rehabilitation of schools,
but also training teachers and promoting peace education, are therefore critical.
Governmental agencies and other non-governmental organizations have launched
initiatives to reconstruct destroyed and damaged schools in those areas; even though
some schools have been re-opened, many remain non-functional and a number of villages
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have not yet witnessed the revival of those important social structures. Throughout the
country, educational or schooling systems suffered drastically: many schools were
severely damaged (either partially destroyed or totally collapsed)—over 500 public and
private elementary and intermediary schools were forced to shut down in the South,
Mount Lebanon and Bekaa (Abou Rjeily, June 22, 1992). Another participant in the
National Congress noted that 90% of schools in areas of displacement had been damaged;
rebuilding them of course is one requirement, but filling them with qualified teachers is
another (Abu Rjeyly, June 24, 1992). Other suggestions put forth, to improve this sector,
included opening new branches of the Lebanese University in those areas—i.e. establish
schools and colleges in rural areas, which will pave the way for every student to enjoy
higher education (Abu Ghanem, June 24,1992).
The importance of peace education to the whole country, let alone the areas of
displacement, is clear: such reforms teach the students to learn about and respect
differences as well as accept one another. Such calls for change began with the Taif
Agreement, as it called for the development of school curricula “in a manner which
strengthens national cohesiveness and fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and
introduces unified textbooks in the history and civil education courses” (Taif Agreement).
In the past years, a lot of work was done on that front: the communities themselves have
been engaged in the process of rebuilding or rehabilitating schools, both through
volunteer work camps and several training sessions for teachers in peace education and
conflict resolution were held. However, such a move away from a system characterized
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by the lack of common history, deep religious segmentation, and ignorance of the other
has so far proven to be difficult.60
Speaking of the importance of schools as an engine of social change, the director
of Farah Foundation noted,
Mixed schools are considered meeting places for children from the different communities and an important space in which they can build friendships and reconcile differences. Schools are places where communities meet and interact, something much needed when such interactions have not existed for decades. Guaranteeing education is thus not only an aspect of development, but one of building peace; this can be done through encouraging extra-curriculum activities, parent/student events, etc.” (Interview, Beirut, June 18,2003).
Non-governmental organizations, like governmental ones, have put forth efforts in this
sector, which according to the different project directors and IDPs with whom I spoke, is
the most reliable means by which to encourage sustainable return and relationships.
Environmental
The devastation from the war impacted the villages profoundly. Another
achievement in bridging peacebuilding and development occurred through environmental
projects, which brought members of different communities together to revive the towns.
LCRN, for example, organized a tree planting project in Ramlieh and Rashmaya where
neighboring Christian and Druze communities worked together to beautify their villages
(Interview, LCRN Executive Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003). Other such projects included
campaigns against littering, reforestation, etc.
60 For more information, see Munir Bashshur, “The Deepening Cleavage in the Educational System,” in Lebanon in Limbo, eds. Theodor Hanf and Nawaf Salam (Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003)
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Agricultural and Other Economic Activities
As mentioned above, agriculture is an important source of income to these
families and should be revitalized. According to a participant in the national congress,
this could be done in several steps: granting long-term loans to reconstruct devastated
agricultural land; establishing water networks and depots; granting soft loans to establish
agricultural cooperatives; and granting short range term loans to farmers to help them
establish green houses (Raad, June 24,1992). The European Union and the USAID, inter
alia, have provided such grants and loans to help boost the agricultural sector; they have
also granted loans to encourage small businesses and encourage handicrafts. As the
director of the ERR program at the MECC, the director of the UNDP program, and the
director of the Caritas have clearly stated, organizations have encouraged group work and
have attempted to reunite people rather than work on an individual basis with the
displaced and returnee population. For example, the Director of the ERR program
described the success of bringing displaced and returnees together in the agricultural
sector, as their initiative has led to the formation of farmers’ cooperatives that later
became permanent agricultural cooperative societies.
In involving the local community in its own needs assessment, we are automatically building relations... it is an achievement when, in two neighboring villages where the two communities do not even visit each other, but farmers from both tell you that an agricultural road that passes in both villages will be beneficial to all and will increase production and decrease cost” (Interview, MECC, ERR Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003).
The main argument for such programs, as articulated by my interviewees, was
that in addition to their contribution to economic development, such projects and address
and promote ties between the different communities. Everyone we interviewed noted that
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people are mostly willing to work together and cooperate in projects for the common
interests and good of the communities and village and that the organizations are making
sure to provide such cooperative opportunities.
Empowering people and involving them in the process of change and
development fortifies relationships and respect between conflicting parties. While a lot
has been said about the importance of meetings and dialogues to reach agreements and
promote change, hands-on work is more likely to represent the different views and
involve different levels of the community. That is not to say that dialogue and meetings
are not important, as they provide the needed space for people to meet and start building
trust and relationships. However, as was illustrated above, participants in inter
community dialogues and meetings face rejection and opposition by their peers, parents
and elders and might not be willing to attend meetings or talk openly and frankly about
his/her views. “There were people from both sides with parents pressuring their children
not to go to the workshops. We do these workshops in neutral villages and take
participants by bus—some parents from both sides would even come and take their
children off the bus. The feelings were strong and these initiatives were rather new”
(Interview, LCRN Executive Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003). “In a country like Lebanon,
where tensions are high, it is often better to convene groups and involve them in building
and development projects than discuss tense issues” (Interview, Caritas IDP Project
Director, Beirut, August 4, 2003).
By participating and cooperating in the rebuilding of physical, economic, and
social structures of their villages, and directing this process, residents and returnees are
far more likely to reconnect and reintegrate into the community after decades of
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separation and detachment. Such activities indirectly work on building relationships
between participants and the community generally, by emphasizing the inevitable
interdependence between people; promoting cooperation; and indirectly training people
on problem-solving and conflict resolution techniques. Such empowering begins by
involving the local community in the identification and assessment of its own needs and
proposing projects that would help the communities (Interview, MECC, ERR Project
Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003).
Limitations
Reform and Lack of Funding
The first limitation facing this methodology of assimilating peacebuilding and
development is a required change in priorities, which even though it has begun to take
place, it has not yet fully materialize. Two major challenges stood in the way of full
reform of programs and structure. The first has been the lack of funding for such ‘non-
conventional, non-measurable’ projects. The director of the Caritas IDP program
explained,
We are having difficulties getting funding for programs that show results in the short term, such as building an artesian well or rehabilitating homes... programs and projects that have measurable results... we will never get funding for something that relates to the relationship aspect and which results would not really show until years or decades down the line and cannot be measured by a number...that is why we talk implicitly about building relations and reconciling between people through building physical structures such as community centers and sports fields” (Interview, Beirut, August 4, 2003).
The second limitation is the extent to which the needed ‘operational reform’ could
be implemented; this would require, “must be more listening and discussion and less
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imposition, more facilitation and empowerment and less control, more sensitivity to
intangible processes and less emphasis on output and measurable results” (Stiefel, 2001,
270). The ERR program director explains that such restructuring requires a shift in the
role played by the agency: from implementation to enabling (Interview, Beirut, July 7,
2003). “We have introduced such change in our program since the late 1990s, however,
all our structure and capacities are still designed according to support our role as
implementers more... it will take time, however, it is our goal” (Interview, MECC, ERR
Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003). Some signs of this shift in responsibility can be
seen, i.e. the inclusion of more people in the identification of their own needs. However,
this has not been reflected properly in the program budget yet, where the peacebuilding
aspect is still allotted minimal funds relative to other aspects of the program.
Priorities. Hesitancies, and Limited Reach
Another limitation is the secondary status that initiatives such as camps get in the
return process. Although the importance of such camps is increasingly acknowledged,
they have not been prioritized in the agencies’ programs. One problem has been that they
have failed to include everyone in the community; the majority of those I interviewed
acknowledged the difficulties in recruiting people for such initiatives—either as
participants or as volunteer trainers. Reasons articulated to explain such difficulty
include: parents’ hesitance about sending their children to spend days with others from
different communities; lack of reliable data about displaced and returnees, which thus
obliges community leaders to choose participants (their choices are confined and limited
to certain people). However, the government and organizations have recognized the
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crucial role that such programs play in the process of return. It is both logical and
obligatory then that they give such programs increased attention and funds in the overall
repatriation plan.
Severed Relationships and Connections: Youth
As mentioned above, youth are very important for the sustainability of the return
process. One major limitation presents itself when dealing with displaced villages: the
lack of attachment that the population feels toward the village and villagers versus the
strong relationship they have built with the areas where they resettled and adjusted. As
mentioned above, in the majority of villages, most of those displaced at a young age have
not been able to preserve any relation to or connections with their homes of origin or their
neighbors. “This presents such a challenge that any sign of interaction between
communities, even if just invitation to a wedding or paying respect in the event of a
death, is of utmost importance” (Interview, Former CFD Director, Beirut, June 17, 2003).
LCRN’s director notes that in such conditions, which characterize most of the towns of
return, any sign of rapprochement between two totally disconnected, estranged
communities is a positive step in the peacebuilding process. In short, socialization
between communities is as important as forgiveness.
It is a sign of success when people we worked with are now friends, they go and visit each other; there are families who maimed, raped or kidnapped and killed each other but they go to each other’s houses. The Druze visit Christians in Christmas and Christians visit Druze in Ramadan .. .They organize summer camps together... And fhe best part is that they don’t need us anymore to maintain these relations... We are just visitors, invitees; we just go and watch” (Interview, LCRN Executive Director, Beirut, July 4, 2003).
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However, such results, of which the Director of LCRN spoke, are not common to all
villages and require different lengths of time and types of efforts in order to lead to such
open normalized relations.
Inter-Communal Violence and Massacres
Furthermore, because alienation was the result of inter-communal massacres and
aggressions, memories of suffering and humiliation have not been easily overcome or
forgotten (Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1995,151-155). People with whom we spoke so
vividly recounted their displacement experiences; it was as if the latter had occurred only
yesterday. A mother told the story of her family’s hasty and immediate flight from their
village; how having to leave all their belongings and valuables behind, her family lived in
dire conditions, moving from one lodging to another; and how her husband fell sick
during that period and they barely were able to feed their children or buy medications.
Another man spoke about his family’s experience, living in a van, after being scared out
of their home and away from the village. The program director of IWA noted that
despite the positive results of their reconciliation work with communities, the “process is
still long-term, it is still slow... maybe because we are working with people, with
individuals, with memory, with history...” (Interview, Beirut, January 3, 2004).
Program Design. Evaluation and Assessment
Another difficulty voiced by all those interviewed was that of evaluation: while
everyone referred to the positive impacts of such integrative approach, as was described
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above, the challenges of assessing these initiatives’ long-term impacts remains relevant.
One program director explained,
In order to rightfully assess these projects, we cannot only count the number of schools, houses or centers that were built; assessment should include the changes taking place in people’s relations and attitudes, i.e. whether they return permanently, how they interact with their neighbors, whether they share in each other’s happiness and sorrow (attend each other’s weddings and funerals, wish each other well on religious holidays, etc.). Even though such transformations might require decades and generations, certain occurrences as the ones mentioned can give an idea about the direction of the projects and their ‘success’ in rebuilding friendships and relations. It is now well accepted among the organizations community that the amount of allocated funds, the number of beneficiaries, the number of reconstructed houses, schools, hospitals, roads, churches, and the number of roads, phone systems, water system, etc., are not by themselves efficient indicators of the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the process of return” (Interview, UNDP Project Director, Beirut, July 8, 2003).
However, such awareness has not translated into effective evaluation criteria.
Another limitation is the fact that in most of the organizations working on IDPs in
Lebanon, evaluation is done internally, i.e. by the organization itself. An inability to self-
criticize is an obstacle to substantial change and re-adaptation. However, some
organizations, such as the PPM, have participants assess their experiences, by filling out
questionnaires at the end of a project. “We use these questionnaires not only to see who is
interested in longer workshops, but also to adjust our sessions according to participants’
expectations” (Interview, Founder and Director of PPM, Beirut, June 17, 2003).
Additionally, most organizations’ evaluation does not occur frequently; often it is carried
only out every 2 to 5 years. The UNDP project director explains that the difficulty in
evaluating the impact of such projects arises from the fact that peacebuilding is a long
term process, so impact evaluation should be done 3 to 5 years after the end of the
program: “we cannot keep a budget open for 5 years without doing anything; this is our
problem, but we have to find a way” (Interview, Beirut, July 8, 2003).
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Planning, like assessing projects, to change human and communal relations and
feelings is a challenging endeavor. It is important in the process, as presented by the
Community Based Local Capacities for Peace Assessment, to appropriately analyze the
context in which the project is being implemented so as to be able to respond to the
specificities on the ground (Carrillo et. al., 2005, 10). Every village, as noted above,
requires a specific program that takes into consideration the dynamics of the community,
the reasons for displacement, the conditions upon return, etc. Moreover, it is critical to
identify all the various groups and views in the community and involve them in the
planning, design, and implementation stages of the project (Carrillo et al., 2005, 11). The
IWA’s stance, for example, led them to cancel the dialogue meetings when they learned
that that the committees of residents and return from Breeh were not representative; they
decided to wait to get a more accurate representation instead of continuing the process
which would likely have led to a bias response. Properly isolating connectors and
dividers among those communities is a third precondition of a successful formulation of a
project (Carrillo et. al, 2005, 11). As Mary Anderson and the Local Capacities for Peace
aptly noted, in programs that aims at bringing conflicting parties to live together
peacefully, knowing the common interests and building upon them will reduce conflicts
and promote coexistence. Meeting separately with each community and listening to their
needs and concerns gives the organizations an idea of what to include and promote and
what to avoid when designing the projects.
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Follow-up
In addition to the difficulty of evaluating these projects and initiatives, the
absence of systematic follow-up is a major obstacle to sustained results or successes. Two
main factors have contributed to the absence of follow-up: the lack of funding, as
mentioned above, and the size of the problem. The numerous civil society, governmental
and non-governmental local and international organizations have failed to systematically
follow-up on the participants and their relationships after the workshops and camps
between residents and returnees. Such a follow up would allow them to better assess the
result of their work, whether it has proven sustained or whether, as in most cases due to
community pressures, each group goes back to their respective village without
maintaining contact. The PPM director spoke of the lack of a structured framework by
which the success of their training and workshop sessions could be ‘measured,’ but noted
that they did employ a less formal mechanism.
After two years of work, our sessions were able to build relations between participants, who, contrary to their parents, do not have the same opportunities to mingle with each other, do not share joys and sorrows with each other... our training provided the needed space to bring them together and some years later, these friendships still exist between them as well as with us. Not one week passes by without me going to some village to pay respects and condolences in funerals or to share in happiness in weddings... this is how we do the follow-up... our contacts with them are open, we know that every month they have a regional meetings... (Interview, Beirut, June 17,2003)
Volunteerism and Lack of Knowledge
Furthermore, since most of the work takes place on voluntary basis, the lack of
sustainability is a major problem facing organizations’ work in the process. “Such
volunteer work, even though it has its benefits by bringing in new, creative, energetic and
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different views, has its limitations, most importantly of which is ‘the continuity and
persistence’” (Interview, Founder and Director of PPM, Beirut, June 17,2003). The lack
of funding, which led to a dependency on volunteers rather than paid staff, has led to less
regular efforts in those areas. Furthermore, volunteers, as well as the staff of those
organizations do not have appropriate training or knowledge in the field of development
and peacebuilding. During my fieldwork, I rarely found a project director or fieldworker
with a background in conflict resolution. Most of those working or volunteering had
various degrees, ranging from social work, to medical lab technicians, to other
professions that did not necessarily provide the person with the necessary tools and
training for such development-peacebuilding work. Recognizing the need for such skills,
a few of those active in the field have attended workshops and institutes, either in
Lebanon and abroad, on conflict resolution, peacebuilding and development. However,
those remain a minority.
Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the development and peacebuilding projects taking place in the
areas of displacement and return. It further examined the growing recognition for the
need of linking peacebuilding/reconciliation efforts with those of development in projects
aiming to return displaced people to their original homes. While such initiatives have
proliferated in the past few years, and while several achievements can be noted, this
approach still suffers from several limitations, including structural adjustment and a lack
of funding, and the tardy realization of such integration. Those and other challenges
presented above explain why these projects have not hitherto yielded the expected or
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necessary results. Several distinct factors have led to displacement from those villages, as
demonstrated by the stories of our interviews and visits to several towns. It has become
clear that where peacebuilding and development programs (or development projects with
peacebuilding aspects of peacebuilding programs with development aspects) were
applied concurrently, more return and sustainability has been achieved.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
“Hearts should again beat with love, the love o f land and the love o f others ” Rafik El-Khour
A headline in a Lebanese daily newspaper published on October 17, 2006 reveals
a lot about the situation of IDPs in Lebanon, fourteen years after the launch of the return
policy: mainly, that we have not come very far with regard to repatriation process started.
The title, “Jumblatt vows ‘church bells will ring again’ in villages of Chouf,” is
reminiscent of his speech before a crowd of residents, displaced and returnees in a village
in the Chouf in the early 1990s. This article also highlights the importance of this study
and the need to enlighten governments and organizations on social policy issues relating
to post-conflict, such as the issue of internal displacement.
Responding to the ever-growing and challenging problem of international
displacement is a difficult task regardless of the country. Effective responses are even
more critical, however, in post-conflict situations like Lebanon, where such displacement
was the result of internal bloodshed between communities that previously coexisted
peacefully with one another. The rising number of IDPs and the increasing concern with
the proliferation of this political, social, economic, and humanitarian problem is reflected
on a global scale. The former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, noted
in a 1992 lecture that despite the absence of reliable figures on the number of displaced,
375
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“at the start of 2005, the number of people of concern rose from 17 million to 19.2
million, an increase of 13 percent” (“Refugees by Number”, 2005).61 The issue, then, is
of great importance to Lebanon and its ability to emerge as a viable, nationally reconciled
nation.
In a small country, such as Lebanon, repatriation seems to be the ideal and most
obvious solution to displacement even though, in practice, it is marred with
complications. As was illustrated in this study, IDPs are confronted with very harsh
realities when they return home, and it is only through a comprehensive approach to the
problem—which entails both development and peacebuilding—that such a return
movement will become easier, more popular, and more sustainable.
Findings and Conclusions
I began this research with the objective of answering one central question: how
can Lebanon overcome its bloody divisive past and regain its reputable coexistence?
While answers could be prescribed on several levels and through analyzing several
issues, I chose to focus my attention on a pressing, yet understudied issue in post-conflict
societies, that of internal displacement; specifically, IDPs remain a challenge to national
reconciliation and community coexistence in a country torn by years of violence. The
assumption underlying my study was that development and peacebuilding need to be
integrated in order to answer efficiently the challenges of a country emerging from war. I
presented the literature on development and conflict resolution and pointed out the
61 The difficulty to pin down the exact numbers o f refugees and IDPs can be attributed to a number of factors among them: the lack of existing registration mechanisms in the concerned countries; the fact that IDPs in some countries do not live in specific areas or camps but mingle with the population; and the lack of willingness from some people to register as refugees or IDPs for fear of persecution.
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limitations inherent in the existing scholarly work, as well as the practice reflected in the
responses, programs and projects of agencies dealing with the issue. This research
answered to those limitations, not only by highlighting the need for more comprehensive
approaches to both development and peacebuilding and by not only considering the
economic and political aspects; rather, the more important focus becomes the social,
cultural and human facets of the process. The study has supported this main assumption
about the link between the two processes by assessing the different projects implemented
in areas of return in Lebanon.
Did the Organizations in Lebanon Case Connect Peacebuilding and Development?
The policy of return in Lebanon was predominantly developmental in nature:
when it was first launched, the main aim was to rebuild destroyed structures, homes and
infrastructure in order to erase the memory of war. Such a band-aid approach was at the
basis of the country’s response to post-conflict, state-building and reconstruction, in
general. As the data in previous chapters showed, most of the funds allocated to solving
the IDP problem in Lebanon—i.e. more than $450 million went to house restorations and
rebuilding, removal of rubbles, infrastructure, and evictions. Soon, however, agencies
acknowledged the need for economic development in order for return to take place and,
contrary to common belief; such development was not directly triggered by
reconstructing houses and securing shelter. The first period of displacement witnessed a
return primarily of the elderly; this posed a challenge to the revival of those towns in
particular, and the area in general. Economically-oriented programs included, but were
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not constrained to agricultural initiatives, which are important in the predominantly rural
areas targeted by the projects of return.
All of the following contributed to the reluctance of families who had school-aged
children and youth, who comprised the majority of displace: the extent of the devastation
in those areas; the lack of funds to enable timely payments from the CFD for
rehabilitation and reconstruction of homes; and the micro-economic projects posed
challenges to an overall response to return, the lack of social development. Most of our
interviewees pointed to the need for schools, colleges, technical colleges, hospitals,
clinics, and sanctuaries as necessary factors for a decision to return.
Such an approach was dominant until the late 1990s, when agencies involved in
the process became more aware of the need to integrate a human relational aspect to the
projects. Building homes and providing economic and social incentives for return to an
area where relationships had been shattered due to inter- and intra-communal violence is
not sufficient. The objective of ‘return’ is not enough for sustainability: the case of
Lebanon demonstrates that some people would return home only on the weekends and for
short visits. What is needed is reintegration, and this requires projects directly targeting
individuals and their relations. Consequently, in the late 1990s, existing development
projects began to embrace human relationship components; attention was paid to the
construction of community centers, sports fields, libraries, and other communal
structures, as they all work to bring community members together and help in rebuilding
relationships between members. Hence, integrating such programs with a ‘human’ face
into development-objective programs has become more popular, especially amongst non
governmental organizations such as MECC, UNDP, LCRN. Several other organizations
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involved the people in the needs assessment phase, as well as used their abilities (and
professions) to rebuild their communities. For example, local architects, engineers,
carpenters, etc. would be asked to provide their know-how as well as their material (i.e.
windows, doors, fences) for rebuilding their own villages.
In addition to such projects, other non-governmental organizations have put their
efforts toward reconciliation efforts. These resulted in the face-to-face meetings between
community members, lectures, and training workshops that took place in several villages;
the target group of those ‘get togethers’ was mostly youth. In those meetings, sides were
expected to voice their fears, concerns, and feelings. The ultimate aim of those types of
efforts was to push participants beyond focusing on differences in order to find
commonalities, as well as ways to work together toward a shared future and a rebuilding
of friendships that had been destroyed by the violence. Those reconciliation efforts were
sometimes translated into hands-on projects, which involved the participants in the
process of reconstruction and rebuilding of their communities.
Despite a noticeable shift, traditional development programs still occupied the
center stage of a local, national, and international responses. This was due mainly to two
reasons. First, such traditional programs are measurable in the short term, which leads to
more funds. Many of the project directors interviewed noted that there is a steady
decrease in the availability of funds for initiatives aimed at repatriation and that most of
those funds are usually allocated to projects that can be quantitatively measured; for
example, how many houses could be rebuilt. Second, traditional development programs
have prevailed due to constraints on duration. Programs mostly are oriented toward the
short-term rather than the long-term; the latter, of course, is more closely related to
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human relationships. As one interviewee mentioned, the organizations’ mentalities are
still dominated by short-term thinking: they want to see results directly. A more long
term vision requires a change in the structure of the organizations and programs; such
restructuring is still a remote possibility today, especially with the lack of expertise of the
staff.
While a major finding in this study is the apparent shift in some projects’ focus
toward including relational aspects, it is clear that the process of return in Lebanon is still
faced with numerous challenges on political, economic, and social levels. The different
governmental and non-governmental agencies active in the repatriation process are
desperately trying to overcome the difficulties they face in areas of return, so as to
promote coexistence and assist returnees to reintegrate into their societies. Despite
awareness that the problem of IDPs in Lebanon is closely linked to the destiny of the
country, the response to the internal displacement predicament has not yet been
proportionate to the seriousness of the problem.
The research has also made significant contributions to the literature on
development and conflict resolution, particularly with regard to its dearth of
understanding and answering to the challenges of post-conflict situations. On the one
hand, this study added to the understanding of development and peacebuilding by
operationalizing the concepts; on the other hand, it confirmed the need to look at them in
an integrative way if post-war, state-building is to be sustained. In addition to the
theoretical understanding of the concepts and their convergence, it explored ways in
which development programs and projects could be crafted in order to contribute to non
violent sustainable development by minimizing the chance of violent conflict.
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Lessons and Recommendations
While one should be aware of the limited generalizability of the Lebanese case to
other post-conflict areas because of each country’s specificities and idiosyncrasies, it is
still possible for one to draw some lessons and recommendations from the preceding
analysis that could help countries emerging from conflict deal with the challenges of re
stabilization.
Data
To begin, it is important to have a system of data gathering that will provide
accurate information on the numbers of IDPs and their condition. A major obstacle to an
effective response to the problem of a disposed population is not knowing the extent of
the problem or the numbers of those displaced. Weakened institutions and political
sensitivity (people are afraid to register) clearly make it more difficult to obtain estimates
on such a population. Another serious problem, as demonstrated by this case study, is the
absence of camps in which these displaced live. IDPs in Lebanon settled in different
areas around the country, some illegally occupying residences or rooms, others staying
with family members and relatives.
Local Participation and Needs
One important lesson from this study is that a successful implementation of the
return process requires the participation of the population, both in the design and
implementation of the projects. Such an approach was exemplified by the different
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organizations like MECC and Caritas that convened consultations and provided space for
those residents, returnees, and displaced to set their own needs and priorities. According
to one project director, no one knows more what those people want than they do
themselves. Hence, organizations would implement different projects in the different
villages according to needs: when in one village they might build a library, in another
they would erect a gym or sports field, etc.
In addition to setting the agenda for projects and efforts in particular villages,
these people continued to be involved in the process, as the organizations depended on
their know-how and capabilities. Engineers and architects from the population were
asked to draw plans for the sports field in their own villages; local carpenters were the
source for housing reconstruction materials; etc. Such empowerment fulfills a dual role:
on the one hand, it involves the residents and returnees in the development own process
and they feel more invested in it; on the other hand, it relieves agencies from some
responsibilities and costs.
A serious consideration, however, must be to ensure that everyone from the
community is involved in the process in order to prevent stigmatization and resentment.
Involving only some members to the detriment of others will be more harmful than not
involving any locals at all. Organizations have to be aware of this challenge and attempt
to include everyone in the process before making decisions.
Joint Projects, Meetings and Workshops
While the study recognizes the importance of dialogue meetings, workshops, and
training programs that bring members of the different communities together and open up
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channels of communication between residents and returnees, it also recognizes the
difficulty of such efforts in certain context, like that of Lebanon. While there were a few
successful reconciliation meetings between youth from the different villages, such
initiatives were marred with difficulties. Difficulties included the cultural characteristics
of Lebanese—they are not comfortable expressing their feelings openly—and the
generational gap—the older generation objected to its children participating in such
efforts. For this reason, the joint projects, which had a developmental aspect to them, and
in which communities participated for a common good, had very positive impacts; they
bolstered the relationships between those communities without the need for face-to-face
dialogue encounters. These projects have proved to be more effective than dialogue
meetings in building relationships and sustaining them, as the former involve common
goals and allow people to engage together without direct reference to their backgrounds.
It is also easier to assemble more participants in such projects than it is to put them in a
round table setting where they feel scrutinized.
Rather than pure development or pure peacebuilding/reconciliation processes,
these efforts present a way in which peacebuilding and development can converge to
respond to the needs of IDPs. They promote trust and cooperation and ease tensions and
violence between former warring parties. Such cooperative projects can also be of
economic nature: agricultural and industrial cooperatives are such examples as, in
addition to providing for better living standards, they encourage collaboration between
community members. Such projects could be applied in repatriation policies in different
post-conflict areas.
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Coordination
It is important for organizations working in areas of return to cooperate and
coordinate activities in order to reach the largest number of villages and towns, while
avoiding any concentration of efforts or duplication of work. Such coordination was
incredibly valuable in Lebanon when, a few years after the launch of the policy of return,
villages had been divided into clusters; each organization was then responsible for a
cluster. Such coordination is also important in that it allows for a more comprehensive
approach, whereby organizations can share each other’s expertise through joint activities.
Coordination between all agencies and programs concerned is the best way to solve
displaced persons problem.
Reconciliation and Dialogue Meetings
In addition to joint projects and workshops, there is also need for reconciliation
and dialogue meetings between members of the communities. Even though in some
contexts, such gatherings could be difficult to convene, attempts to hold such dialogue
are important as they not only bring people together, but allow for a ‘neutral’ space in
which stereotypes could be disregarded. A Muslim participant in one such meeting
explained its benefits when she noted how “the imagery of Christians that was reinforced
negatively in my family and social environment only changed when I met and dealt with
Christians. The prejudices I had were a result of ignorance of the other and the lack of
encounter for more than 17 years.”
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Education
One of the challenges to coexistence is divided societies is the increased rift
between communities presented by the educational system. There is a need for co-ed
schools in order to bring students from the different communities together in classrooms
settings. There is also a need for peace education programs in order to create the
necessary ideological conditions for coexistence, beginning with the re-humanizing and
respecting of ‘the other’; then, accepting differences and yet acknowledging similarities.
This is particularly challenging in those villages where students were expected to love the
‘other’ or their neighbors who massacred them.
Youth
As mentioned repeatedly throughout the research, initiatives should not be limited
to community leaders and officials. They should grow from the grassroots level. Most
importantly, projects should target the youth, as the future lies in their hand and they are
more tolerant and open to change as, in most cases, they have not experienced first-hand
the pains that their parents had.
Flexibility and Adaptability
As the study clearly demonstrated, it is important for agencies involved in the
process of return to constantly monitor the effectiveness and impact of the activities
undertaken. Moreover, they must be open to make changes in order to increase the
chances of success. While the structures remained the same in practice, some new
initiatives were introduced which implicitly called for relationship-building within the
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development projects framework. These changes were considered necessary, especially
after years of projects and work that had not yet yield to the expected return.
This research aimed at highlighting the importance of analyzing the issue of
forced migration in all its aspects—social, economic, political, cultural, personal—and
not merely regarding it as a humanitarian issue that could be solved through short-term
assistance. It became clear that “meeting the needs of IDPs is much more complex than
simply providing short-term security and assistance: it is about addressing the conflict
which brought about displacement in the first place”; it is about physical, economic,
social, political, and emotional reconstruction (UNHCR, 2000, 285-7). Such
reconstruction is best reflected through the integration of development and peacebuilding.
These lessons and recommendations will help in building stronger structures and
conditions, which will result in sustainable return, rather than “castles in the sand.”
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POSTSCRIPT
As of this writing, the issue of internal displacement remains a pertinent challenge
to the country’s emergence from post-war status to a viable, stable, peaceful state. The
new completion date for the policy of return, still set to 2007, is most likely to be
deferred once again. As years passed, efforts substantially decreased—with the highest
numbers of initiatives towards the end of the 1990s. In the past few years, the Ministry
and CFD have been idle—the reason provided for such inactivity has been the lack of
funding, making it difficult to accomplish anything, whether reconstruction to
reconciliation.
It is only of late, in the past few months, that the issue of displacement has
resurfaced in news coverage. Such media coverage did not aim to present a positive
outlook on the problem or investigate its solution, but rather portrayed a bleaker picture,
as the country had witnessed a month-long war between Israel and Hezbollah in July
2006, leading to the displacement of another million Lebanese. Most of those displaced
were from South Lebanon and the South suburbs of Beirut. These waves of displacement
differed from the ones under study in numerous ways, most importantly, by virtue of the
fact that these current IDPs did not seek refuge in commercial centers and did not
illegally occupy houses. They were confined to public schools and parks, which the
387
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government has arranged for them. These displaced were provided with sheets,
mattresses, food, medications, and cloths; such goods were distributed by the government
as well as international and local organizations or agencies. Another major difference
between this displacement and previous ones was that those IDPs returned home as soon
as a cease fire was declared.
However, one commonality this latest wave shares with previous ones is the
political character that displacement assumed. Those who had been displaced for decades
accused the government of ‘preferential treatment,’ with regard to the new wave of
displaced: not only were they provided with places to stay and their basic needs fulfilled
during displacement, but they also were paid more money to fix their houses when they
returned. Each family was paid L.L. 50 million compared to the maximum of L.L. 30
million available to those displaced during the war. Furthermore, payments were made
immediately, as soon as the war ended; with the previous waves of IDPs during the civil
war, most of the victims have not yet been reimbursed although fourteen years have
passed since the conflict ended and the return policy was launched. Such disillusion,
anger, and resentment soon took on a sectarian character, building on the exasperation
people have felt toward the government over the past decades. Even political leaders,
such as Druze za’im, Walid Jumblatt, demanded equal rights and treatment from the
government and asked for the remaining L.L.550 billion needed to close the file of
displacement. On October 1, 2006, Christian leader, Michel Aoun sponsored a
conference entitled “The Just Return” in which he criticized the government’s dealings
on the issue of the displaced, ever since the June 1992 National Congress for Displaced
People conference. He also accused the government of corruption, theft, and favoritism.
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While the money for the first wave of displaced was allocated by the CFD and the
Council of the South, the government set up a different temporary agency to disperse the
money and make sure that everybody returns.
The latest wave of displacement brought the issue of displacement back into the
headlines and re-invigorated initiatives to ensure return. The latest effort was a
reconciliation program that took place in Moukhtara between the Committees of
Kfarmatta. The current Minister of Displaced Nehme Tohme announced that the
government promised the allocation of funds for the completion of the process. As of this
writing, such funds have not been reimbursed.
With the present increased attention to the issue of displaced in the country, we
will have to wait to see the effect that the current wave of IDPs will have on the processes
of return, reintegration, and coexistence in the country. This will be an interesting topic
for future study.
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Questions for interview with Project Directors
1. The issue of the displaced and their voluntary repatriation has been placed high on the national agenda since the signing of the Taef Agreement in 1989. What is your understanding of this issue? And of the efforts that have been taken so far to ensure the return of the displaced to their villages? 2. How do you place your work in regards of these efforts? 3. What are the guiding principles for your work? 4. What types of projects, or what services and activities do you provide? 5. How are the projects organized? 6. Who is employed in these projects? 7. When are decisions made and who makes them? 8. What are the objectives of your work? What would you like to accomplish by it? 9. What are some examples of activities you undertake to meet these objectives? 10. Are these activities focused more on peacebuilding? On Development? Or on both? 11. Who is your target group? Who participates in the projects and activities? How are the participants selected? 12. How are the projects devised? Is there needs assessment that takes place before? Who does it and how? 13. What is a successful project according to you? How do you measure or evaluate it? 14. What are the major obstacles that face your work? How do you overcome such obstacles? 15. What other practical steps did you take to help the displaced and work on guaranteeing their return? 16. What are some of your recommendations for future work?
Questions for Project Staff (these questions in addition to the above) 1. What is your professional background? 2. How would you describe the current situation and conditions in the village (in terms of peacebuilding, development, return, etc.) 3. How are these projects implemented in the villages? 4. What are their obj ectives? 5. How is the support for the projects among people in the village? 390
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Questions for interview with Returnees
1. When did you return to the village? What motivated your return to the village? 2. What, in your opinion, is the current situation in the village? (in terms of peacebuilding, development, and return) 3. What are some of the activities (peacebuilding, development) that you are involved in?
4. Do you actively participate in any decision making in the projects that are implemented in the village? 5. Why are you involved in such activities? What motivates you? 6. Do you think that these activities are successful? What would you like to see accomplished in these activities? 7. What is your role in these activities or projects? 8. How do these projects affect your life? 9. Does violence erupt frequently in the community after the return? 10. How do you solve problems that arise in the community? 11 . Do you visit each other on holidays, for weddings, funerals? Do you have any activities that you do in common? (i.e., go to clubs, sports activities or tournaments, etc.) 12. How long after your return did it take you to find a job? What kind of work do you do? Who helped you find the job? 13. How do you describe the infrastructure in the village? (i.e., roads, sewage, electricity, water, rebuilding of homes, hospitals, schools, etc.) 14. Do you feel secure in the village? 15. What recommendations do you have for the future? (to improve status of returnees, projects, village, etc.)
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Weber, Max. 1949. Methodology o f the Social Sciences: Critical Studies in the logic o f the cultural sciences. Glencoe: Free Press.
Yin, Robert K.1993. Applications o f Case Study Research. London: Sage Publications
______. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Second Edition. London: Sage Publications.
Zartman, William I. 1985. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
______. 1995. Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
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______, ed. 2000. Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
Zartman, William I. and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds. 1997. Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques. Washington, DC: USIP Press.
Institutional Publications and Reports
Annan, Kofi. 1998. The Causes o f Conflict and the Promotion o f Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Report of the Secretary General to the United Nations Security Council. New York: United Nations.
Bannon, Ian et. al. 2004. “The Role o f the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda. ”The Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit in the Social Development Department of the World Bank.
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1992. “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping.” New York: UN Department of Public Information. [UN doc A/47/277- S/24111]
______. 1995. “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper o f the Secretary-General on the Occasion o f the Fiftieth Anniversary o f the United Nations. ”New York: UN Department of Public Information. [UN doc A/50/60- 1995/1]
Caritas. 1999. Working for Reconciliation: A Caritas Handbook. Vatican City: Caritas Intemationalis.
Carrillo, H. et. al. 2005. “Facilitation Manual for Community-Based Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) Assessment.” Community-Based TCP Assessment Manual, version 3. January 10. World Vision.
Global IDP Database. 2004. “ Profile o f Internal Displacement: Lebanon.” Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council.
IWA. Community-Building in Post-War Lebanon: A Project to Enhance Ethnic Tolerance and Civil Identity.
. A Narrative from March- August 2000.
Lebanese NGO Forum, organization’s brochure.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 413
Lebanon Conflict Resolution Newsletter (LCRN), 2001. E-Newsletter.
Mine Action Coordination Centre Southern Lebanon (MACC SL). 2004. Post Clearance Review o f Operation Emirates.
Middle East Council of Churches. 1996. “Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Annual Report.”
______. 1997. “Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Annual Report.”
Mountain, Ross. 1997. “Forward.” ^ Profile o f Sustainable Human Development in Lebanon. UNDP.
OECD. 1986. Methods and Procedures in Aid Evaluation. Paris: DAC.
OHCHR, 1998. “The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. ” E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2
Order of Malta. Activity Report 2005. Accessed August 1, 2006. http://www.orderofmalta.org/pdf/pub/ODM-Report2005.pdf
UNDP and MoD. “United Nations Programme for the Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced.”
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Human Development Reports. http ://hdr.undp.org/hd/
UNDP. “Summary of the UNDP program,” LEB 93/001.
______. 1990. Human Development Report 1990: Concept and Measurement o f Human Development. http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1990/en/
______. 1992. Human Development Report 1992: Global Dimensions o f Human Development. New York: Oxford University Press. http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1992/en/
______. 2000. Sharing New Ground in Post-Conflict Situations: The Role o f UNDP in Reintegration Programmes. UNDP: Evaluation Office. Accessed June 1, 2003 http: //www. undp. org/ dpa/publications/pdffinal .pdf
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______. 2002. Displaced Project: Resource Mobilization Fact Sheet. Accessed June 1, 2003 http://www.undp.org.lb/programme/balanced/displaced/resourcemobilization.htm
______. 2002. Second Country Cooperation Framework for Lebanon (2002-2006). Accessed June 1, 2003 http://www.undp.org.lb/programme/general/CCF2002-2006.pdf
______. 2002. Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world. New York: Oxford University Press, http: //hdr. undp. org/reports/global/2002/en/
______. 2004. Human Development Report 2004 Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. New York: Oxford University Press. http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/?CFID=3224403&CFTOKEN=84069781
______. 2005. Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World. http ://hdr .undp. org/reports/global/2005/
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 1993. UNHCR’s Role in Protecting and Assisting Internally Displaced People. Central Evaluation Section Discussion Paper.
UNDP and MoD. United Nations Programme for the Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced.
United Nations Refugee Agency. 2005. “Refugees by Number.” http://www.irnhcr.Org/basics/BASICS/416e3eb24.pdf
U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR). 1999. Lebanon: Country Report. Accessed May 1, 2004. http://www.uscr.org/countryreports.aspx? VIEWSTATE=dDwxMTA10TA4MT YwOztsPENvdW50cnlERDpHbOJldHRvbjs%2BPrImhOOqDI29eBMz8b04PTi8x j W2&cid=625&subm= 19&ssm=29&map=&_ctl0%3 ASearchInput=+KEYWORD +SEARCH&CountryDD%3ALocationList=
______. 2002. Lebanon 2001. Accessed June 18, 2003. http://www.uscr.org/countryreports.aspx? VIEWSTATE=dDwxMTA10TA4M T Y wOztsPENvd W 5 OcnlERDpHbO J1 dHRvbj s%2BPrImhOOqDI29eBMz8b04PTi 8xj W2&cid=497&subm= 19&ssm=29&map=&_ctl0%3 ASearchInput=+KEYWO RD+SEARCH&CountryDD%3ALocationList=
World Vision. 2002. “Strategic Processes/Indicators/Tools.”
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Government Publications
Abou Rjeily, Khalil. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 22. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Abu Ghanem, Nabil. 1992“Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 24. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Abu Rjeyly, Khelil. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.”The National Congress for Displaced People. June 24. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
El-Daher, Mikhael. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 20. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
El-Hajj, Fouad. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 23. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
El-Husseini, Hussein. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 19. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
El-Muhtar, Khaled. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 23. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
“Executive Summary: Returning Lebanon’s War-Time Displaced to their Homes and Villages.” Unpublished Report.
Faour, Ali. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 21. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Farah, Rima. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Fares, Marwan. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 27. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 416
Fawaz, Mohammed. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 23. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Feghali, Kamal. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 27. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
______. 1993. Briefing on the Meetings in New York between the Representative of the Minister for Internally Displaced and the Responsibles for Agencies and International Organizations Concerning their Assistance in the Return o f the Displaced, [in Arabic] Damour: Ministry of Displaced.
______. 1994. Civic Reconciliations in the Framework o f Solving the Problem o f Displaced. [In Arabic] Lecture at the Beirut University College.
______.1995. The Government Policy to Solve the Issue o f the Internally Displaced. [In Arabic] Beirut: Ministry of Displaced.
Galtung, Johan. 1997. Transformation o f Conflict with Peaceful Means: The Transcend Method. Workshop: May 26-28, 1997. Dekwane: Ministry of Displaced.
Hobeika, Elias. 1992a. The Issue o f Displacement in Lebanon: 1975-1990: Primary Results o f the Field Study. [In Arabic] Bureau of the Displaced File.
______. 1992b. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 19. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
______. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 25. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
______. 1992b. The Plan o f the Proposed First Phase to Begin Executing the Return o f Lebanese IDPs. Beirut: Ministry of Displaced. [In Arabic]
Hrawi, Elias. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 19. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Jumblatt, Walid. 1993. Executive Program for the First Phase o f the IDP Return: First Step. Part I and II. Dekwane: Ministry of Displaced.
Kandeel, Ghaleb. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 21. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 417
Kweiter, George Bishop. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 27. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Ministry of Displaced, “Government Policy and Achievements: Houses and Housing, Renovation, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, Returnees.”
Ministry of Displaced, “Women, Youth, Education, Health, Vulnerable Groups, Income Generating, Agriculture, Handicrafts, Environment, Rural Planning.”
Ministry of Displaced. 1995. “Program of Return to Ras al-Harf-Baabda.”
Ministry of Displaced. 1998. The Achievements from November 1st, 1992 to December 31st, 1997 and the Requirements for the Completion and Consolidation o f the Home Return o f the Displaced. Damour: Arab Printing.
Moawad, Nayla. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 25. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Mroueh, Karim. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 20. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Osseyran, Toufic. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 25. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Raad, Daoud. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 24. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Saad, Antoine. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 22. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Shehab, Tareq. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 21. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
Slim, Meriam. 1992. “Displaced People Stands and Causes: Daily Bulletins.” The National Congress for Displaced People. June 22. Beirut: The Congress Press Bureau.
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Taj Eddine, Mustapha. 1992. The Role of UN in the Return and Reintegration of Lebanese Displaced. [In Arabic] Beirut: Bureau of the Displaced File.
Newspaper and Magazine Articles
Lebanese
Abdel Hussain, Hussain. 2002. “More Funds Needed to Speed Return of Displaced.” Daily Star. May 23.
Al-Hajj, Manghana. 1995. “Mazraat Al-Dahr: Artistic Masterpiece Ruined Beyond Rehabilitation.” Ad-Diyar, June 20.
“A Meeting in Dar al-Nadwa with Professor Galtung.” 1997. An- Nahar. May 29.
“A Seminar in Broummana for Salima Youths, Residents and Returnees.” 2001. Al- Anwar, November 13.
“Caritas-Lebanon President: The Return of the Displaced is the Ultimate Solution to the Issue of Lebanon.” 1994. Al-Awda, March. 1:16
Chmouny, Amal and Marah Haddad. 1992. “The Return of Displaced was a Dream... Hopefully it will not Change into a Nightmare.” Al Anwar, August 5.
Daou, Anwar. 1993. “Bhamdoum Market: Launching of Reconstruction Project. Hopes of Prosperity Despite Major Obstacles.” As-Safir, October 2.
“Falougha- Komayel-Al-Shabaniya: Returnees and Residents Aim to Revive their Towns.” 1994 .Al-Awda, October. 8:6-8.
“Hobeika Informed the Cabinet of the Achievements in the Return of Displaced.” 1992. An-Nahar, September 24.
Ibrahim, Alia. 2001. “The Dialogue that Leads to Community Reconciliation.” Daily Star. February 19.
Interview with Minister of Displaced Marwan Hamadeh. 2001. Deir el Qamar Magazine. September 5.
“In Suport of the Return of the Displaced and in Compensation to the Government’s Shortcomings: Caritas Creates a Clinic in Deir al-Qamar.” 2002. An-Nahar, February 8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 419
“Interview with Minister Abdallah Farhat: Launching a Development Plan to Sustain Return.” 2004. An-Nahar. January 21.
Interview with Minister of Displaced Marwan Hamadeh. 2001. Deir el Qamar Magazine. September 5.
“Jumblatt Creates Committees in Displaced Villages to Mature the Conditions for Return and Resume Reconciliations.” 1993. As-Safir, January 16.
Shaya, Manal. 2004. “Farhat: Money Remains our Permanent Demand to Sustain Return and We will not be Silent until we Get the Rights of the Displaced.” An-Nahar, July 8.
Smyth, Gareth. 1997. “Lebanon Must Face Up to its Past before It Can Face its Future.” Daily Star. June 3.
“The UNDP Project Takes Action to Support the Return of the Displaced and their Reintegration.” 1994 .Al-Awda, July. 5:16.
“Voluntary Work Camps Begin the Rehabilitation Work.” 1993. Al-Liwa’, August 12.
International
Boustany, Nora. 2003. “Pursuing Mideast Peace with the Next Generation.” Washington Post, January 31.
Hockstaher, Lee. 1999. “Lebanon's Forgotten Civil War.” Washington Post Foreign Service. December 20: A24.
Syeed, Nofeesa. 2002. “Making Peace Personal: Jews, Muslims and Christians Reach Out and Discover ‘The Enemy Has a Face.” USA Today, October 9.
Interviews
Most of the interviewees chose to remain anonymous because of the political tensions and environment surrounding the issue of IDPs in Lebanon. The list includes both formal and informal interviews.
A displaced man from the village who was following up on his application at the CFD, Beirut, August 9, 2003
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 420
A participant in USAID training, August 1, 2003
Author and poet who wrote on displacement, Beirut, July 17, 2003
Bus Commuter, Mtoleh, August 4, 2003
Butcher and ex-architect, Bhamdoun, September 11, 2005
Caritas IDP Project Director, Beirut, August 4, 2003
CDR Senior Program Specialist, Beirut, June 11, 2003
CFD Director General, Beirut, December 27, 2002
CFD Director General, Beirut, August 9, 2003
CFD Employee, Beirut, August 9, 2003
Director of MoD/UNDP project, Beirut, June 18, 2003
Displaced 2 at the CFD, Beirut, August 9, 2003
Displaced from Bmariam, Beirut, July 3, 2003
Displaced in Beirut, Beirut, June 18, 2003
Displaced man at the CFD, Beirut, August 9, 2003
Displaced man from Breeh, Beirut, July 20, 2003
Displaced person at the CFD, Beirut, August 9, 2003
Displaced working at a mini-market, Beirut, January 5, 2003
Elderly man in Bhamdoun, September 22, 2005
Elderly Resident, Btater, September 17, 2005
Elderly woman returnee, August 8, 2005
Employee, MoD, Beirut, July 3, 2003
Farah Foundation Director, Beirut, June 18, 2003
Former CFD Director, Beirut, June 17, 2003
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Former CFD Director, Beirut, September 22,2004
Former Christian Militia Member, Beirut, September 15, 2005
Former Minister of Displaced, Beirut, January 7, 2003
Former Minister of Displaced, Beirut, June 19, 2003
Former Minister of Displaced, Beirut, July 25, 2003
Former MoD/UNDP Project Director, Beirut, June 19, 2003
Founder and Director of PPM, Beirut, June 17, 2003
Fund beneficiaries, Beirut Fund offices, August 9, 2003
Hotel owner and Former President of the Council for Displaced in the Mountain, Bhamdoun, September 22, 2004
Human Rights Movement, Youth Activities Coordinator, Achrafieh, September 6, 2005
IWA Program Coordinator, Beirut, January 3, 2004
LCRN Executive Director, Beirut, July 4,2003
Lebanon-Creative Associates Director, Beirut, June 23, 2003
LNF Office Manager, Beirut, December 31, 2002
Mayor Mtoleh, Beirut, July 17, 2003
Mayor of a returning village, Bhamdoun, July 18, 2003
MCC Director, Beirut, June 20, 2003
MECC, ERR Project Director, Beirut, July 7, 2003
Mini market owner, Mtoleh, August 4, 2003
Non-Returnee woman, Hazmiyeh, September 22, 2005
Old man, Aley, September 8, 2004
Participant in a LCRN workshop, M’oush, July 5, 2003
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Participant in a LCRN workshop, Ramlieh, July 5, 2003
Participant in the IWA workshop, Beirut, January 3,2004
Participant of the IWA workshop, Salima, January 4, 2004
Resident in a village, September 23, 2005
Resident in Barouk, Barouk, September 25, 2005
Resident Balchmieh, September 7, 2005
Resident, Bkhechtei, September 8, 2004
Returnee, Kfamabrakh, September 8,2004
Resident, Maasser Chouf, August 4, 2003
Resident, Shouf, September 7,2004
Resident, Sofar, September 23,2005
Returnee from Breeh, Beirut, August 8, 2003
School teacher returnee, September 9,2005
Taxi driver, Beirut, August 9, 2003
UNDP Project Director, Beirut, July 8, 2003
UNESCO Program Specialist Basic Education, Beirut, December 30, 2003
USAID Program Officer, Beirut, December 24, 2002
USAID Program Officers, Awkar, July 22, 2003
Weekend returnee, Beirut, July 21, 2003
Woman 2 resident of Breeh, Breeh, July 21, 2003
Woman resident of Breeh, Breeh, July 21, 2003
YMCA Lebanon Program Specialist, Beirut, January 4, 2003.
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Websites
Caritas, 2004. Caritas Activities in Lebanon. Accessed July 26,2004. http://www.caritas.org.lb/champ/developpement/developpement_e.asp#Zones%2 0de%20Retour%20des%20deplaces
CNEWA. Accessed August 1, 2006 http://www.cnewa.org/generalpg-verus.aspx?pageID=54
Farah Social Foundation. Accessed M y i , 2006. http://www.psp.org.lb/farah.htm
Human Security Center. Accessed July 10, 2006. http://www.humansecuritycentre.org/index.php?option=content&task==view&id=l 09
Institute of World Affairs. Accessed May 2, 2006. http://www.iwa.org/.
Lebanese Army. Accessed September 9, 2003. http ://lebarmy. gov. lb/
Lebanese Non-Governmental Organization Forum (LNF). Accessed August 1, 2006. www.lnf.org.lb
Mercy Corps. Accessed August 4, 2006. http://www.mercycorps.org/countries/lebanon
Middle Eat Council of Churches (MECC). Accessed July 30, 2006. http://www.mec-churches.org/
Permanent Peace Movement. Accessed July 6, 2006. http://www.arabinfomall.org/en/Index.aspx?orgid=77§ionid:=:l-
UNDP in Lebanon. Accessed May 15, 2006. www.undp.org.lb
UNDP in Lebanon, NHDR 1997. Accessed May 15, 2006 http://www.undp.org.lb/programme/govemance/advocacy/nhdr/nhdr97/index.htm 1
UNDP in Lebanon, NHDR 1998. Accessed May 15, 2006.
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http://www.undp.org.lb/programme/govemance/advocacy/nhdr/nhdr98/index.htm 1
UNDP Development Reports. Accessed May 15,2006. http://hdr.undp.org/hd
UNIFIL Lebanon. Accessed June 15, 2006 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/
UNHCHR. Human Rights in Development. Accessed June 1, 2004. http ://www.unhchr. ch/development/approaches-04 .html
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Human Security. Accessed June 25, 2006. http://www.unidir.org/html/en/human_security.html
United Nations Volunteers in Lebanon. Accessed October 16, 2002. http://www.undp.org.lb/unv/
USAID, Displaced Children and Orphans Fund and Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund- Project fact sheet: Lebanon/ Lebanon/Review of the World Rehabilitation Fund Proposal for Income-Generating Activities in Jizzine, Lebanon. Accessed April 23,2002 http://www.usaid.gov/pop_health dcofwvf/reports/evals/wvlebanonO 1 .html
USAID, FY 2001 Program Description and Activity Data Sheet. Accessed April 23, 2002 http://usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ane/lb/lebanon_ads.html
USAID Lebanon Mission. Accessed July 15, 2006. http://lebanon.usaid.gov/
World Vision- Lebanon. Accessed August 1, 2006. http://lebanon.worldvision.org
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.