117 David Bloch This Book Succeeds in Revealing How Limited Have

BOOK REVIEWS 117 David Bloch John of Salisbury on Aristotelian Science (Disputatio, 8). Brepols, Turnhout 2012, xi + 241 pp. isbn 9782503540993. This book succeeds in revealing how limited have been so many claims tradi- tionally made about the so-called ‘Aristotelianism’ of John of Salisbury, and by implication of the Parisian schools more generally in the twelfth century. Twentieth-century historians of logic have often been so pre-occupied with the issue of universal terms, as if all medieval logic stands or falls around this particular topic and the various doctrines (nominalist and realist) it gener- ated, that they have often mined only a single chapter of the Metalogicon, for information on the solution taken by individual masters in the twelfth century. Bloch’s book is concerned not with universals, but with John’s understanding of logic as demonstrative science—how we arrive at what we know. There are a number of assertions made in this book formulated in a provocative way. The author does not shy away from using the first person to reflect on his mode of inquiry, or from challenging positions attributed to ‘other scholars’ in sometimes too formulaic a fashion. Perhaps more important, however, is his broader insight that just because John of Salisbury admires Aristotle (and indeed many other ancient authors) does not mean that his understanding of Aristotle is the same as ours. Perhaps his use of the phrase ‘Aristotelian Science’ in his title reflects his initial concern, to trace the influence of the Posterior Analytics in the twelfth century. It might have been more accurate to simply speak of ‘demonstrative science’ not just in the Metalogicon, but also among his contemporaries. In concluding that John of Salisbury’s understanding of the Posterior Analytics was very limited, Bloch might seem to be adopt- ing a dismissive attitude towards his subject. The merit of his approach is that he recognises that John’s approach to the process of drawing conclusions was as much shaped by Boethius and Cicero as Aristotle. The phrase ‘Aristotelian science’ is thus itself problematic when dealing with the twelfth century, when awareness of the Posterior Analytics was as limited as has been the case among contemporary philosophers, whose interest in Aristotle can sometimes be just as uneven as has been the case with scholars in the past. The book proceeds in four chapters, of uneven length. Thus after two initial chapters, more historically inclined, on John’s studies and literary sources, there is another (20-page) chapter on twelfth-century logic and science, fol- lowed by a much larger (100-page) chapter on John’s understanding of demonstrative science. After a brief conclusion, there follow two appendices on Adam of Balsham and the identity of Cornificius (arguing that he was a disciple of Adam) and another, more descriptive study of Thierry of Chartres’s © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi �0.��63/�5685349-��34��84 118 BOOK REVIEWS Heptateuchon. Bloch does not get involved in the debated issue of whether or not John pursued his grammatical and humanistic studies at Chartres or (as some claim) at Paris, but he does trace the evolution of John’s exposure to the newly translated or rediscovered works of Aristotle, above all the Prior and Posterior Analytics. In some ways, his third chapter, on the background to twelfth-century logic, might have been more helpful as an opening chapter. Bloch does well to expose the fundamental importance of the theory of topics, as formulated both by Boethius and by Cicero, in the early twelfth century, as well as of the syllogism. The implication of his argument is that John’s appre- ciation of both the Topics and Posterior Analytics of Aristotle was profoundly influenced by his exposure (and more generally by that of his own teachers) to what Cicero and Boethius had to say about the process of argument. Much of Abelard’s Dialectica is concerned, not with the issue of universals (in fact a topic missing from the surviving manuscript of that work), but with the process of argument, as formulated by Cicero and Boethius. John of Salisbury belonged to a generation that was excited, but also confused by the recent translation of works of Aristotle that did not fit in with these accepted authors. The merit of Bloch’s study is to show how John of Salisbury’s thinking was shaped by a fusion of intellectual influences, not just by the ideas of Aristotle. Bloch is rightly aware that Abelard might have been excited by the idea of Aristotle’s teaching, but was even less informed than John about the range of its content. Possibly Bloch approaches the period with continuing awareness that only with the commentary of Robert Grosseteste on the Posterior Analytics, written in around 1230, would that work become more fully understood— although even then Augustine’s ideas would continue to be debated alongside those of Aristotle. Perhaps in focusing so much on the limitations of John’s understanding of the Posterior Analytics, not enough attention is given to why John and his contemporaries continued to value what Cicero and Boethius had to say about topics in formulating argument. When John was studying in Paris in the late 1130s, the translation made by James of Venice was not yet widely known. Little wonder that John had only limited awareness of its significance by the time he was formulating his own synthesis of logic in the 1160s. Bloch considers (in an appendix) that John of Salisbury’s polemic against Cornificius as someone who misuses the tools of logic was directed against a specific individual, namely a disciple of Adam of Balsham. This section might more natu- rally have fitted into an opening discussion of why John wrote the Metalogicon. Unlike so many critics of the schools, John was familiar with the potentially destructive arguments of individuals like Adam, and wanted to show that logic did have a place, but within a broader conception of wisdom, such as main- tained by those masters he admired, such as William of Conches. Vivarium 53 (2015) 114-131.

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