Jordan Valley Settlements

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MA'AN Development Center Mini Factsheet on Jordan Valley Settlements he Palestinian Jordan Valley is the eastern Although there are currently over 58,000 Palesti- Tsection of the West Bank, running adjacent nians and only 11,679 Israeli settlers in the Jordan to the Jordan River. Starting at the Dead Sea and Valley, the living standards of the latter group are extending approximately 70 km north to the bor- vastly superior. While the Israeli settlers benefit der with Israel, the Jordan Valley is approximately from generous aid from the Israeli government, 15-20 kilometers wide and, at 1,700 square kilo- Palestinians are nearly completely prevented from meters, covers around 28.5% of the West Bank. any sort of development in 95% of the Jordan The rich agricultural land, temperate climate, and Valley. Consequently, neighboring Palestinian and abundant water resources offer enormous agri- Israeli settler communities provide a stark and tel- cultural, economic and political potential for the ling juxtaposition that demonstrates the racial dis- Palestinian people. crimination that guides Israeli policy in the Jordan Valley. By directly subsidizing settlements’ growth, However, this potential has been denied to the expansion, and development while completely Palestinian citizens of the Jordan Valley by the prohibiting even the most basic of services to Pa- policies of the Israeli military occupation and the lestinians, Israel has ensured that Palestinians can- continuing illegal expansion of Israel’s civilian not overcome the discriminatory gap in the quality settlements. In fact, the first civilian settlements of life between the two populations. In addition, in the West Bank were built in the Jordan Valley. the fact remains that maintaining settlements and Throughout the years of occupation, the Israeli settlers’ luxurious lifestyles comes at the cost of government began actively promoting the sett- the most basic human rights of Palestinians in the lement enterprise by offering a number of far- occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). reaching economic and social benefits to those Israelis that emigrated to the illegal settlements. The settlements in the Jordan Valley are unique Consequently, Jordan Valley settlements have in certain aspects. First, they are agriculturally grown at a steady rate, aided by governmental aid based and in most cases employ a plurality or that expanded important settlement infrastructu- even a majority of the settlers. However, most of re and enriched many individual settlers. In 1993, the settlers in the West Bank are commuters and the implementation of the Oslo Accords allowed very few actually work in their own settlement. Israel to strengthen its means of oppression in the Second, the settlements in the Jordan Valley have region; the Oslo Accords designated 95% of the the highest per capita water usage of any of the Jordan Valley as Area C, temporarily legitimizing Israeli settlements in the oPt. Third, these settle- full Israeli military and civil control for the inhabi- ments, geographically speaking, are the furthest tants of the region. away from the Green Line. Fourth, the number of settlers per settlement is lowest in the oPt. Fifth, Jordan Valley Settlements by the Numbers: the majority of these settlements were esta- blished as Nahal military camps built by the La- 31: Number of settlements in the Jordan Valley bor party, and are still politically associated with 7: Number of outposts in the Jordan Valley the Labor party. Sixth, the Jordan Valley settle- 11,679: Number of settlers1 in the Jordan Valley ments have the highest per capita land access 2 and usage rate of settlements. Seventh, these 487: Daily per capita water usage, in liters settlements rely heavily on Palestinian labor for >250 million: Amount in dollars of agricultural agriculture, in addition to construction in and goods exported to the EU from Jordan Valley sett- around the settlement. Lastly, although they are lements3 dependent on subsidies for their existence, the >1,500,000: Number of dunums in the Jordan Val- settlements actually produce economic output, ley under the direct control of settlements or the specifically agricultural produce and agriculture Israeli army4 related products. 100 million: Number of dollars invested in Jordan The settlements designated as part of the Jor- Valley settlements by the World Zionist Organiza- dan Valley fall under the jurisdiction of three tion between 2000 and 20025 regional councils and two local councils. The 80: Initial number of dunums given to settlers free regional councils are Jordan Valley, Megilot, of charge6 and Mateh Binyamin, and the local councils 30: Percentage discount received by Jordan Valley are Ma’ale Ephraim and Ma’ale Adumim. These settlers for attending Ariel University7 regional councils are the acting governmental body for Israeli settlers. They are in charge of 0.9: Percentage of settler income dedicated to 8 the distribution of incentives, benefits, and paying the water bill services for those living in the Jordan Valley. They work closely with settlers to maximize the (Endnotes) amount of resources and land used by settlers, 1. MA’AN Development Center Cultivating Dispossession to the detriment of Palestinians in the Jordan 2013 for number of settlements, outposts, and settlers Valley in particular and in the oPt as a whole. 2. B’tselem Dispossession and Exploitation 2011 pg. 24 The regional councils also serve as a lobbying 3. Israeli Foreign Ministry: http://siteresources.worldbank. body with influence in the Israeli Knesset to org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCReportFinal. push forward initiatives that benefit settlers. In pdf, p. 13 a number of cases, specific settlements or out- 4. B’tselem Dispossession and Exploitation 2011 pg. 10 posts have been built with the active support 5. Human Rights Watch Separate and Unequal 2010 pg. 55 6. Jerusalem Post State Gives More Land to Settler Farms in and funding from the various councils, thus Jordan Valley 29 June 2011 confirming their complicity in violating interna- 7. MA’AN Development Center Parallel Realities 2012 pg. 18 tional law.. 8. B’tselem Dispossession and Exploitation 2011 pg. 40 Ü Bisan UV90 Givat Sa'alit UV60 Mechola The Occupied Shadmot Mehola Jordan Valley Rotem Tayasir (Northern Area) Occupied Palestine (West Bank) Maskiot Hemdat Ro'i Beka'ot UV57 UV90 Hamra Overview Hamra Jordan Valley Area 1948 Armatice Line Palestinian Communities UV57 Main & Bypass road Argaman Regional road Mechora Jk Crossing Points Israeli Settlements Built up area (Closed by Israel in 2000) Permeter Cultivated land UV60 Municipal boundries UV57 Massu'a Israeli Administrative Restrictions Damiya Gittit Interim Agreement Areas Area A Ma'ale Efrayim Jordan Area B Area C Closed Military Areas Ma'ale Efraim UV60 Yafit Israeli Physical Access Restrictions Ç !¬ Green Line checkpoint Ç !¬ Checkpoint Petza'el !Ǭ Partial Checkpoint ") Roadblock # Earthmound GÌ Road gate - closed GÌ Road gate - open Tomer D D D D D D Road barrier D D D D D D D D D D Earthwall Trench Gilgal Israeli Segregation Barrier Netiv Hagedud Constructed Under Construction Projected Niran Kochav Hashachar Ahavat Hayim Mitzpe Keramim Ma'ale Shlomo Yitav Rimmonim Jenin Yitav ( Al Auja) Tubas Omer Farm Tulkarm Nablus Mevo'ot Jericho Na'ama Tel Aviv-Yaffo Salfit Allenby / King Hussein Ramallah UV60 Jericho Jericho East Jerusalem Jericho Bethlehem Hebron UV90 Vered Yericho Givat Barkay Beit Holga - Mul Nevo Mitzpe Yericho Beit Ha`arava Kilometers 0 1 2 4 6 8 Dead Sea Ü UV90 Allenby / King Hussein Jericho UV90 The Occupied Jordan Valley Vered Yericho Givat Barkay Beit Holga - Mul Nevo (Southern Area) Occupied Palestine Mitzpe Yericho (West Bank) UV90 Beit Ha`arava Dead Sea Almog Qalia Overview 1948 Armatice Line Palestinian Communities Main & Bypass road Regional road Jk Crossing Points Israeli Settlements Ovanat Built up area (Closed by Israel in 2000) Permeter Cultivated land Municipal boundries Israeli Administrative Restrictions UV90 Interim Agreement Areas Area A Jordan Area B Area C Closed Military Areas Israeli Physical Access Restrictions Ç !¬ Green Line checkpoint Ç !¬ Checkpoint !Ǭ Partial Checkpoint ") Roadblock # Earthmound GÌ Road gate - closed GÌ Road gate - open D D D D D D Road barrier D D D D D D D D D D Earthwall Trench Dead sea Mitzpe Shalem Israeli Segregation Barrier Constructed Under Construction Projected Jenin Tubas Tulkarm Nablus Tel Aviv-Yaffo Salfit Ramallah Jericho East Jerusalem Bethlehem Hebron Kilometers 0 0.5 1 2 3 4.
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