Turning Water Into Fire: the Jordan River As the Hidden Factor in the Six-Day
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TURNING WATER INTO FIRE: THE JORDAN RIVER AS THE HIDDEN FACTOR IN THE SIX- DAY WAR By Ofira Seliktar* The dispute over water resources has been a feature of the Arab-Israeli conflict since its beginning, however the issue has been paid little attention in works on the Six-Day War. This neglect stems from the fact that research on water issues in the Jordan basin has often been highly technical and has been mostly overshadowed by the more dramatic diplomatic and strategic narrative. Although the dispute over the water resources entire background of the Arab-Israeli water of the Jordan River basin was not the dispute, an analysis of the renewed round of immediate casus belli, its ramifications water hostilities that began in 1960s is in provided both the rationale and the order. organizational framework for the Six-Day War. In a sense, these events served as a THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN WATER "dress rehearsal" for the war. Such a view is MEDIATION: FROM JOHNSTON PLAN consistent with theories of international TO OPERATION ROTEM relations which stipulate that water-related The pa th of the Jordan River and its outbreaks of armed conflicts are preceded by tributaries complicates the already highly a state's unilateral act in developing an charged relations between Israel and its Arab international river. Such an act serves as a red neighbors. The pattern of riparian rights flag and, if not mediated by the international derives from the fact that Syria and Lebanon community, can lead to a round of are upstream riparians vis-à-vis Israel and the increasingly belligerent actions by states Kingdom of Jordan with regard to two of the bordering the body of water (riparians). Jordan River springs–the Banyas and the Worse, because water is such a basic Hasbani. Israel is an upstream riparian on the necessity of life, such conflicts serve as Jordan River, which separates it from Jordan. potent vehicles for mobilizing public The Yarmuk River, a tributary of the Jordan sentiments on related issues and attract River, forms the border between Syria and meddling by non-riparians, who use the Jordan (32 kilometers) and then becomes part resulting opportunity to further their own of the border between Israel and Jordan (14 interests. 1 kilometers). The outbreak of the Six-Day War is a The issue of sharing the waters of the classic illustration of this theory. 2 While this Jordan-Yarmuk system in an environment of work does not attempt to reconstruct the scarcity, suspicion, and hostility emerged as a Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 57 Ofira Seliktar major problem after the 1949 armistice and was expected to carry about 200 MCM, agreement. To avert a new war, the well within the Israeli quota. Washington's Eisenhower Administration became involved assumptions notwithstanding, the Israeli and, in 1955, mediated an agreement named Carrier elicited a strong response among the after the chief American negotiator, Eric Arab countries. In 1958, the president of Johnston. The accord provided an equitable Egypt, Abdul Gamal Nasser, negotiated an scheme for sharing the water backed up by agreement with Syria to create the United American diplomatic guarantees. Arab Republic, giving Egypt the status of a Under the terms of the final version of the riparian. Johnston plan, known as the Unified Revised Although the Egyptian-Syrian union Plan, Israel was allocated a total of 400 MCM subsequently broke down, the struggle for the of the water (31 percent), Jordan 720 MCM Jordan waters remained an important symbol (56 percent), Syria 132 MCM (10.3 percent), of Arab unity. The Arabs claimed that and Lebanon 35 MCM (2.7 percent). The utilizing the Jordan River water would help plan also envisaged a joint effort to develop Israel to increase its ability to absorb more the basin's water resources, but the Arabs immigrants, further ensuring that state's states refused to cooperate since this would survival. The involvement of the former have been perceived as recognition of the mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, state of Israel. On October 11, 1955 the Arab gave the Palestinians a high profile presence League officially rejected the Johnston in the 1959 Arab League debates about accord but refrained from torpedoing the methods of obstructing the Israeli plans. plan. John F. Dulles, the secretary of state in Husseini and the Nasserist wing of the Syrian the Eisenhower Administration, offered Ba'th party urged military action against verbal reassurances to Israel that the United Israel, while others advocated a plan to divert States would support its plan for a unilateral the Banyas and Hasbani springs to reduce diversion within the Johnston quota. It was Israel's water supply. also Washington's understanding that the Efforts to stop Israel were not limited to Arabs would accept the plan unofficially and debates. Syria, which became the lead actor abstain from any diversion which would in the struggle for water, heated up the border undermine the Israeli water quota. 3 in a series of shooting incidents. The close However, the tacit understanding behind relations between Syria, Egypt, and the the Johnston plan began to unravel in the late Soviet Union, which provided its Arab allies 1950s. Based on American guarantees, Israel with advanced military equipment, were an proceeded with a unilateral diversion scheme, apparent factor behind Syrian belligerence. the National Water Carrier (NWC). Indeed, When the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Washington guaranteed a $15 million loan in bolstered its defense along the northern early 1959 for the NWC, along with a grant border, the Soviet Union responded by to help Jordan build its diversion project spreading a rumor that Israel was about to known as the East Ghor Canal, another attack Syria. According to the Soviet media, unilateral development project. The NWC this was part of a coordinated "Zionist- was scheduled to become operational in 1964 58 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Turning water into fire imperialist" plot to undermine the cause had obvious domestic and regional revolutionary regimes in the Middle East. benefits. It cemented his position as the The Soviet assessment alarmed Syria and undisputed Arab leader and brought brought Nasser on an urgent visit to legitimacy to his regime at home. For the Damascus on January 14, 1960, to evaluate Syrian regime, which had little public support the situation. A day later, the Soviet embassy and presided over a fragmented country, in Cairo delivered an intelligence report raising the water issue was perceived as a warning of Israeli plans to attack Syria. Two short-cut to mobilizing popular backing. For days later, on January 17, Egypt notified the the Soviet Union, seeking a wedge issue to UN forces stationed in the Gaza Strip of a promote Soviet interests in the Middle East, possible war with Israel. On January 19, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and his 1960, Egyptian armor and infantry forces Politburo threw their support behind the Arab began crossing the Suez Canal and massing League's water diversion scheme. In May in the Sinai Desert. 1961, soon after the Arab League endorsed The Egyptian action caught Israel by the water plan, Khrushchev visited Cairo, surprise and created deep concern in top assuring Nasser of Soviet support and signing echelons of the IDF. With few troops at its an agreement to cooperate on key disposal, the military could only hope that its international issues. limited deployment, code -named Rotem, would deter the Egyptians and their Soviet LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A backers. Indeed, at the end of March, the WATER CONFRONTATION: 1960-1964 Egyptian forces returned west of the Suez The security implications of the water Canal. However, the Arab propaganda issue alarmed the Israeli government. depicted the events as a brilliant victory for Following Rotem, the IDF embarked on an the Egyptian Army, claiming that it had accelerated plan to bolster both its offensive deterred an Israeli attack on Syria.4 and defensive capacity. Yitzhak Rabin, who This self-proclaimed victory emboldened served as the IDF chief of operations during Nasser to accelerate the Arabs' own water Rotem and was promoted to chief of staff in diversion plans. On August 28, 1960, the 1964, firmly believed that the Arab League League's expert committee unveiled a new would use the water issue to provoke a major plan that was finally approved by the conflict with Israel at some future time.5 His League's Political Committee in January civilian superiors in the Labor government of 1962. It was estimated that the project would Prime Minister David Ben Gurion shared the cost an initial budget of some $17.5 million same misgiving but were not prepared to stop and ultimately anywhere between $166 and the work on the NWC. On the contrary, Levi $235 million. The League sought to Eshkol, the finance minister and an expert on implement the plan within eighteenth months. water, was extremely concerned about the For Nasser, the water diversion scheme looming water needs of Israel. Shmuel and the energetic embrace of the Palestinian Kantor, a former director of Mekorot, the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 59 Ofira Seliktar Israeli water company, revealed that in 1961 Syrian violations, including kidnapping and Eshkol ordered a study of the projected water murder of Israeli farmers along the Sea of shortages and possible solutions, including Galilee. The UN Security Council approved a desalination.6 mild Anglo-America resolution to condemn However, Israel was taken aback by the the murder of the farmers but the Arab– escalation of clashes with Syria in 1962.