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Home , Casus belli, Casus Belli (Homeland), Jordan River, Jordan Valley

TURNING WATER INTO FIRE: THE RIVER AS THE HIDDEN FACTOR IN THE SIX- DAY WAR By Ofira Seliktar*

The dispute over has been a feature of the Arab-Israeli conflict since its beginning, however the issue has been paid little attention in works on the Six-Day War. This neglect stems from the fact that research on water issues in the Jordan basin has often been highly technical and has been mostly overshadowed by the more dramatic diplomatic and strategic narrative.

Although the dispute over the water resources entire background of the Arab-Israeli water of the basin was not the dispute, an analysis of the renewed round of immediate casus belli, its ramifications water hostilities that began in 1960s is in provided both the rationale and the order. organizational framework for the Six-Day War. In a sense, these events served as a THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN WATER "dress rehearsal" for the war. Such a view is MEDIATION: FROM JOHNSTON PLAN consistent with theories of international TO OPERATION ROTEM relations which stipulate that water-related The pa th of the Jordan River and its outbreaks of armed conflicts are preceded by tributaries complicates the already highly a state's unilateral act in developing an charged relations between and its Arab international river. Such an act serves as a red neighbors. The pattern of riparian rights flag and, if not mediated by the international derives from the fact that and Lebanon community, can lead to a round of are upstream riparians vis-à-vis Israel and the increasingly belligerent actions by states Kingdom of Jordan with regard to two of the bordering the body of water (riparians). Jordan River springs–the Banyas and the Worse, because water is such a basic Hasbani. Israel is an upstream riparian on the necessity of life, such conflicts serve as Jordan River, which separates it from Jordan. potent vehicles for mobilizing public The Yarmuk River, a tributary of the Jordan sentiments on related issues and attract River, forms the between Syria and meddling by non-riparians, who use the Jordan (32 kilometers) and then becomes part resulting opportunity to further their own of the border between Israel and Jordan (14 interests. 1 kilometers). The outbreak of the Six-Day War is a The issue of sharing the waters of the classic illustration of this theory. 2 While this Jordan-Yarmuk system in an environment of work does not attempt to reconstruct the scarcity, suspicion, and hostility emerged as a

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 57 Ofira Seliktar major problem after the 1949 armistice and was expected to carry about 200 MCM, agreement. To avert a new war, the well within the Israeli quota. Washington's Eisenhower Administration became involved assumptions notwithstanding, the Israeli and, in 1955, mediated an agreement named Carrier elicited a strong response among the after the chief American negotiator, Eric Arab countries. In 1958, the president of Johnston. The accord provided an equitable , Abdul Gamal Nasser, negotiated an scheme for sharing the water backed up by agreement with Syria to create the United American diplomatic guarantees. Arab Republic, giving Egypt the status of a Under the terms of the final version of the riparian. Johnston plan, known as the Unified Revised Although the Egyptian-Syrian union Plan, Israel was allocated a total of 400 MCM subsequently broke down, the struggle for the of the water (31 percent), Jordan 720 MCM Jordan waters remained an important symbol (56 percent), Syria 132 MCM (10.3 percent), of Arab unity. The claimed that and Lebanon 35 MCM (2.7 percent). The utilizing the Jordan River water would help plan also envisaged a joint effort to develop Israel to increase its ability to absorb more the basin's water resources, but the Arabs immigrants, further ensuring that state's states refused to cooperate since this would survival. The involvement of the former have been perceived as recognition of the mufti of , Haj Amin al-Husseini, state of Israel. On October 11, 1955 the Arab gave the a high profile presence League officially rejected the Johnston in the 1959 debates about accord but refrained from torpedoing the methods of obstructing the Israeli plans. plan. John F. Dulles, the secretary of state in Husseini and the Nasserist wing of the Syrian the Eisenhower Administration, offered Ba'th party urged military action against verbal reassurances to Israel that the United Israel, while others advocated a plan to divert States would support its plan for a unilateral the Banyas and Hasbani springs to reduce diversion within the Johnston quota. It was Israel's water supply. also Washington's understanding that the Efforts to stop Israel were not limited to Arabs would accept the plan unofficially and debates. Syria, which became the lead actor abstain from any diversion which would in the struggle for water, heated up the border undermine the Israeli water quota. 3 in a series of shooting incidents. The close However, the tacit understanding behind relations between Syria, Egypt, and the the Johnston plan began to unravel in the late Soviet Union, which provided its Arab allies 1950s. Based on American guarantees, Israel with advanced military equipment, were an proceeded with a unilateral diversion scheme, apparent factor behind Syrian belligerence. the National Water Carrier (NWC). Indeed, When the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Washington guaranteed a $15 million loan in bolstered its defense along the northern early 1959 for the NWC, along with a grant border, the Soviet Union responded by to help Jordan build its diversion project spreading a rumor that Israel was about to known as the East Ghor Canal, another attack Syria. According to the Soviet media, unilateral development project. The NWC this was part of a coordinated "Zionist- was scheduled to become operational in 1964

58 Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Turning water into fire imperialist" plot to undermine the cause had obvious domestic and regional revolutionary regimes in the Middle East. benefits. It cemented his position as the The Soviet assessment alarmed Syria and undisputed Arab leader and brought brought Nasser on an urgent visit to legitimacy to his regime at home. For the on January 14, 1960, to evaluate Syrian regime, which had little public support the situation. A day later, the Soviet embassy and presided over a fragmented country, in Cairo delivered an intelligence report raising the water issue was perceived as a warning of Israeli plans to attack Syria. Two short-cut to mobilizing popular backing. For days later, on January 17, Egypt notified the the Soviet Union, seeking a wedge issue to UN forces stationed in the of a promote Soviet interests in the Middle East, possible war with Israel. On January 19, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and his 1960, Egyptian armor and infantry forces Politburo threw their support behind the Arab began crossing the Suez Canal and massing League's water diversion scheme. In May in the Sinai Desert. 1961, soon after the Arab League endorsed The Egyptian action caught Israel by the water plan, Khrushchev visited Cairo, surprise and created deep concern in top assuring Nasser of Soviet support and signing echelons of the IDF. With few troops at its an agreement to cooperate on key disposal, the military could only hope that its international issues. limited deployment, code -named Rotem, would deter the and their Soviet LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A backers. Indeed, at the end of March, the WATER CONFRONTATION: 1960-1964 Egyptian forces returned west of the Suez The security implications of the water Canal. However, the Arab propaganda issue alarmed the Israeli government. depicted the events as a brilliant victory for Following Rotem, the IDF embarked on an the , claiming that it had accelerated plan to bolster both its offensive deterred an Israeli attack on Syria.4 and defensive capacity. , who This self-proclaimed victory emboldened served as the IDF chief of operations during Nasser to accelerate the Arabs' own water Rotem and was promoted to chief of staff in diversion plans. On August 28, 1960, the 1964, firmly believed that the Arab League League's expert committee unveiled a new would use the water issue to provoke a major plan that was finally approved by the conflict with Israel at some future time.5 His League's Political Committee in January civilian superiors in the Labor government of 1962. It was estimated that the project would Prime Minister Ben Gurion shared the cost an initial budget of some $17.5 million same misgiving but were not prepared to stop and ultimately anywhere between $166 and the work on the NWC. On the contrary, Levi $235 million. The League sought to Eshkol, the finance minister and an expert on implement the plan within eighteenth months. water, was extremely concerned about the For Nasser, the water diversion scheme looming water needs of Israel. Shmuel and the energetic embrace of the Palestinian Kantor, a former director of Mekorot, the

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Israeli water company, revealed that in 1961 Syrian violations, including kidnapping and Eshkol ordered a study of the projected water murder of Israeli farmers along the Sea of shortages and possible solutions, including . The UN Security Council approved a .6 mild Anglo-America resolution to condemn However, Israel was taken aback by the the murder of the farmers but the Arab– escalation of clashes with Syria in 1962. In Soviet bloc vetoed it. The Soviet Union was one especially intense period between also arming Syria and Egypt with the latest in February 1 and March 7 there were several its military arsenal, including long–range Syrian attacks followed by another round on Tupelov-16 airplanes. Following a Ba'thist March 15 and 16, which brought an Israeli coup in Iraq on February 8, 1963 and a retaliation on March 18, causing a large similar one in Syria in March, a plan for a number of Syrian casualties. Given American new United Arab Republic of Egypt, Syria, assurances dating to the Johnston plan, the and Iraq was announced whose manifesto Israeli Embassy in Washington sought called for the liberation of . There clarification from the Kennedy were pro-Nasser demonstrations in Jordan Administration. demanding that it join the union. Initially the Israelis approached the State The U.S. Sixth Fleet moved up to Israel's Department which in May 1962 offered to coastline to protect the Kingdom of Jordan, provide a written statement of support for and Ben Gurion also appealed to the United Israel's right to divert Jordan's water within States for protection. Ben Gurion strongly the quota allocated by the Revised Unified believed that the Arabs were planning an Plan. After Israel then directly appealed to attack on Israel built around the water crisis, the White House, President Kennedy sent a but the CIA held that Israel was exaggerating letter to Ben Gurion in November 1962.7 the threat. Indeed, plans for the new Arab Israel's water needs and worries were also union disintegrated in July amidst taken up by AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying acrimonious exchanges between Cairo and organization in Washington. In a series of Damascus. Kennedy saw this development as meetings with congressional leaders and State an opportunity to win over Nasser and was Department officials, I.L. Kenen, AIPAC's ready to offer him some of the benefits that creator and chairman, pressed for an Egypt had accrued from its strong alliance American response. Upset by the even- with the Soviet Union. Financial support was handed policy of the State Department, seen as urgent given the fact that Nasser's Kenan also urged the House of socialist policies had devastated the Egyptian Representatives to issue a declaration economy. American plans to sell Egypt deploring the continuing belligerence of Syria surplus food in exchange for Egyptian and urging direct negotiations between the pounds were raised to a total of $431.8 parties to resolve the issue.8 million in 1963. When the Israeli government Whether a different American policy and Kenan complained about the could have moderated the Arab water arrangement, they were told that Nasser had campaign is not clear. Between December categorically promised the State Department 1962 and August 21, 1963, Israel recorded 98 that he would not attack Israel. 9

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Whatever agreement Nasser might have Palestinians only added legitimacy to had with the State Department, however, it Nasser's leadership of the Arab world. In any apparently did not include his water case, the Egyptian leader could not afford to activities. In anticipation of the completion of cede the water and Palestinian issues to his Israel's National Water Carrier, the Arab rivals in Syria. Syria was also active. In League met in Cairo in January 1964. The November 1964 the Syrian government thirteen Arab countries represented agreed to began implementing the Jordan diversion end their disputes and implement the Jordan project.11 There was a concomitant increase diversion project for which the initial sum of in the number of border violations and an $17.5 million was allocated. The Cairo upsurge of Palestinian terrorist activity from summit also approved a Unified Arab across the Syrian and Jordanian . Command (UAC) to fight an anticipated Israel's response to this development was Israeli reaction. An Egyptian general, Abd al- not long in coming. According to Rabin who Munim Riayd, was appointed as the chief of became the chief of staff around the time of staff with a mandate to make the UAC the Cairo summit, Moshe Dayan advocated operational by 1967. In making the diversion seizure of territory to fend off the diversion.12 project official, the Arab League argued that, However, Eshkol, who replaced Ben Gurion irrigated by the National Water Carrier, the as prime minister, argued for a more Negev would support an additional three measured response. Rabin, who backed million Jews, a demographic increase likely Eshkol, argued that a combination of tank to greatly jeopardize any chance of and air power would be sufficient to stop the eliminating Israel. Indeed, much of the debate diversion without causing a major at the conference was devoted to the conflagration. In fact, Eshkol was so cautious Palestinian issue, ending with a commitment that he had to be persuaded by the IDF to to create the Palestinian Liberation authorize air strikes against Syria. Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian The American response to the Cairo Liberation Army (PLA). summit was equally reticent in spite of its The water issue and the Palestinian prior commitment to Israel's National Water problem were skillfully used by Nasser to Carrier. Shortly after the summit, Deputy forge a new Arab unity under Egyptian Undersecretary of State Alexis Johnson told leadership. Although the Arabs spurned the Citizens Committee on American Policy efforts to create a cooperative development of in the Middle East, a newly organized pro- the Jordan-Yarmuk basin, they were deeply Arab lobbying organization, that U.S. policy outraged by Israel's diversion scheme. As one would be to refrain from taking sides in observer noted, "Nothing the Israelis had Middle East disputes, but that the United done since the Sinai war had more fiercely States, "would not stand idly if aggression is shamed the Arabs or more plainly exposed committed." In an address to the annual their importance than the diversion of the dinner of the American Committee for the Jordan waters."10 The defense of the Weizmann Institute of Science, President

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Johnson mentioned Israel's water needs and stating that "whoever does not like our promised a joint study on desalination conduct can go drink up the sea. If the techniques worth some $200 million, but was Mediterranean is not sufficient, there is the not specific on possible American steps to , too….We cannot tolerate any counter the Arab League diversion scheme. pressure or accept insolent words and The administration's difficulty in violence…we are a hot-tempered people." maneuvering between the Israeli and Arab Given that Egypt was then receiving water policies was made clear during the American aid, Nasser's belligerence made spring visit of King Hussein to Washington. Congress question the administration's The monarch denounced the "theft of Arab Middle East policy. As a result, the Israeli waters" and charged that the Israeli scheme lobby in Washington was able to exert more would cut into his kingdom's water supply pressure on the Johnson White House by and render the Jordan River "saline and mobilizing Congress against a plan to sell unusable." The statement was openly false, King Hussein arms, including tanks. The but the State Department refrained from Israelis and their supporters in Washington issuing a correction. After AIPAC lobbied argued that in case of a regional conflict such Congress, which in turn raised questions, the weapons would be used against the Jewish State Department subsequently issued a state. In stressing the danger of a statement that the Israeli project was conflagration, Jerusalem could point to the consistent with the Johnston plan. 13 escalation of border skirmishes with Syria The growing belligerence of President which intensified after the National Water Nasser following the Arab League conference Carrier became operational in the fall of made the administration's efforts to balance 1964. On January 22, 1965 Eshkol warned Israeli and Arab interests more difficult. In a that any diversion would be regarded as an number of highly publicized addresses, such "encroachment on our borders."14 as during the conference on non-aligned leaders in Cairo, Nasser attacked the United TURNING WATER INTO FLAMES States. In November 1964, Nasser's fiery 1965-1967 rhetoric prompted an Egyptian mob to attack The continued tensions over water the USIA library, and some 30,000 books promoted the administration to send two were destroyed by fire. Speaking in the envoys, Robert Komer and Averell Harriman, Egyptian National Assembly a few days later to Jerusalem in the beginning of 1965. They on November 30, Nasser criticized American assured Eshkol of continuing American and British intervention in the civil war in the commitment to the integrity of the Johnston Congo, calling it an "abominable crime." plan and asked Israel to call off its resistance Even the mild-mannered U.S. ambassador to to the proposed arms sale to Jordan. In return, the Adlai Stevenson the Israelis were promised more arms, but complained that he had never heard such were cautioned not to retaliate too harshly irrational, irresponsible, and repugnant against Syria. In fact, the administration felt language. Undeterred, Nasser openly insulted that the Israelis were exaggerating the Arab the United States in a December 23 speech,

62 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Turning water into fire threat in order to obtain a better arms deal the Palestinian . 17 Syria sought to from Washington. involve Egypt in a more ambitious regional Eager to receive the promised military conflict. As the Syrian president Dr. equipment, Israel did not quibble with the Nureddin al-Attasi stated in his May 22 talk administration's efforts to downplay the water to troops, "We want a full scale, popular war conflict. Eshkol actually assured the two of liberation… to destroy the Zionist envoys that Israel would retaliate against the enemy"18 Arab League diversion plan only if the Arabs Water was not emphasized but the took more than their share of water allotted humiliation suffered by the thwarting of the by Johnston. For his part, Rabin planned to diversion project was not forgotten. Both use the new weapons in a massive overhaul Syrian regular forces and Palestinian groups of the Israeli army for what he viewed as a continued to launch attacks against Israeli "presumable clash with our neighbors."15 targets, including water installations. In 1966, Meanwhile, the IDF used combined the IDF recorded some 93 border incidents, artillery and aerial strategy to reduce the Arab most initiated by Syria. In May, Syrian MIGs waterworks to rubble. By mid-1965, all flew over Israeli territory for the first time to efforts to divert the headwaters of the Jordan hamper an Israeli rescue effort of one of its River stopped, and there was a general boats stranded on the eastern shore of the Sea perception that the Arabs had lost interest in of Galilee; the Israeli air force shot down two it. This was despite the fact that at two Arab of the MIGs. Palestinian groups, often League summits in 1965, one in Alexandria sponsored by Syria, crossing either from and one in Casablanca, it was vowed to Syria or Jordan, also intensified their activity, "eliminate Israel's aggression" and pledged to killing and wounding dozens of Israeli tackle the water issue. Hoping to stimulate a civilians as far away as Jerusalem and new round of negotiations, Eshkol told the Beersheba. Knesset on May 17 that Israel was ready to Syrian's liberation struggle rhetoric had discuss cooperative schemes for developing been strongly supported by the Soviet Union. the Jordan basin system and desalination In line with its standard operating procedure, projects. 16 Moscow exploited the water dispute to Any such hopes were dashed when, in establish its credibility with the Arabs, February 1966, a coup in Syria brought a denouncing it as a "Zionist and imperialist" highly radical Ba'thist regime to power. plot. Although some observers have argued Containing many Alawite figures, including that Kremlin leaders opposed Syrian efforts Hafez al-Assad, the new regime suffered to divert the Jordan springs, there is evidence from lack of legitimacy which was to suggest that Moscow was eager to use the exacerbated by its highly Marxist and water-generated tensions to design a new secularist rhetoric. To bolster its popular structure of opportunity in the region. credentials, the new government announced a Success in the Middle East became more new campaign to eradicate Israel and redeem compelling in the face of a number of serious

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Ofira Seliktar setbacks suffered by Moscow in which leftist with the help of the Soviet Union, had regimes were toppled in Ghana, Algeria, and developed a new defensive plan for invading Indonesia. the Sinai, called Qahir (the victor). Egyptian In 1966 an even more urgent regional military were likewise working hard to imperative arose for the Soviet leaders. The activate the united Arab command that was British were scheduled to give up their first discussed within the framework of the colony in Aden in 1968, and conservative and diversion project. The Soviet Union had also radical factions vied for power. King Faisal intensified its arms shipments and aid to of Saudi Arabia and the shah of Iran tried to Syria and Egypt. By the end of 1966, Syria mobilize the more conservative regimes alone received some $428 million in aid, and against Egypt's support for the radical Moscow was also busy refurbishing Syria's insurgency in Yemen. On February 22, infrastructure, including a dam on the Nasser accused the Saudis of financing a plot Euphrates which was even costlier than the by the Muslim Brotherhood against his Aswan Dam. 19 Emboldened by Soviet government, and hundreds of Islamic backing, Syria increased the provocation on activists were arrested. The Soviet Union its border, forcing Israel to consider a new sided with Nasser. On March 25, the Twenty- round of retaliatory measures. Third Congress of the Soviet Communist According to Eugene Rostow, then Party emphasized the theme of fighting undersecretary of state for political affairs imperialism and colonialism, followed by an and chair of the interagency control group official Soviet-Syrian communiqué against which dealt with the growing crisis, the , colonialism, and imperialism. On administration persuaded Israel to take its May 25, the Soviet deputy foreign minister complaint to the UN. The State Department called in Israeli ambassador to Moscow drafted a UN resolution which it negotiated Katriel Katz and read him an official with Moscow. Even this seriously diluted statement accusing the IDF of massing troops version was subsequently vetoed by the on the Syrian border as a prelude to an attack. Soviet Union, prompting Rostow to comment On October 12, the Soviet ambassador in that Moscow's behavior was a "salutary" and Israel delivered a similar note to Eshkol. "brutal" lesson. 20 Still, as he admitted, it did When the Israelis, in an effort to refute the not stop the administration from restraining charges, offered to escort him to inspect the Israel even when in the spring of 1967, Syrian border, the ambassador refused. The Nasser took a number of increasingly Israeli leaders made no headway in provocative steps. For instance, in an "urgent persuading the Soviets by using backchannels message" sent on May 17 by the State in Moscow, including a visit by the veteran Department, Secretary of State Dean Rusk leader of the Israeli Communist party, Moshe urged Eshkol not "to put a match to Sneh. this…fuse."21 While publicly accusing Israel of planning Washington also demanded that Israel an attack on Syria, Moscow quietly refrain from retaliation against Jordan, encouraged a military alliance between Egypt especially after the ill-fated Israeli raid into and Syria. It was during 1966 that Egypt, that country in November 1965, in which a

64 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Turning water into fire large number of Jordanian soldiers and CIA shared the belief that Egypt would not civilians were killed. The UN censured Israel, attack Israel in the foreseeable future.22 and Palestinian groups resumed attacks on a Ironically, it was also the conclusion reached variety of military and civilian targets. In by the Israeli political and military leadership what looked like a new round of action which believed that, as long as Nasser was against Israeli water installations, in the bogged down in Yemen, Egypt would not spring of 1967 they blew up a number of dare open a "second front." As Rabin noted, water pumps and destroyed irrigation the initial assumption in Jerusalem was that, equipment in the north of the country. at worst, Egypt would try to repeat the Rotem No comparable restrains were urged by maneuver. 23 The Johnson Administration was Moscow on its clients. On the contrary, by also banking on the fact that, in spite of their early 1967 the Soviet Union intensified its saber rattling, the Soviet leaders would not protest against the alleged Israeli give the Arabs a green light to start a war. mobilization. On April 18, Syrian leaders Again, Israeli intelligence concurred in this were flown to Moscow on a military plane assessment, arguing that the Soviet Union where, on May 2, they signed a military wanted to keep the Middle East on a "slow defense treaty. On his May 10-18 visit to burn. " This assessment prevailed in Cairo, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin Washington even though the American persuaded Nasser to sign a mutual defense ambassador to Moscow warned in his pact between Egypt and Syria that was dispatches that the Soviets did not want to guaranteed by Moscow. In his speech to settle the escalating conflict in a peaceful Egypt's National Assembly on Ma y 17, manner.24 His hunch was proven correct Kosygin lauded Egypt's important role in the when Moscow successfully torpedoed the UN Arab struggle against imperialism and for its proposals to solve the conflict, paving the support of a Palestinian liberation struggle. way for the war. Soviet officials also warned the Egyptians A large and growing body of writings on about alleged Israeli troop movements toward the Six-Day War has sought to explain how the Syrian border. Meanwhile in Israel, on the initial conflict over water turned into a May 27, Ambassador Chuvakhin handed full-fledged war. Ranging from serious Eshkol a message from Kosygin repeating the academic research to conspiracy theories, allegations about troop concentrations and most of this has focused on warning Israel against starting a conflict. explaining the behavior of Egypt, Syria, and Faced with Soviet efforts to increase the Soviet Union. The Soviets in particular tension in the region, the United States chose have been the subject of a number of analyses to adopt low-profile diplomacy. A U.S. envoy aimed at understanding the seemingly was sent to Cairo to bolster the efforts of the reckless act of manufacturing a false American Embassy to calm down Nasser. intelligence report and encouraging the Arabs However, there was no sense of urgency, to act upon it.25 While it is beyond the scope because both the State Department and the of this paper to review this vast literature, a

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Ofira Seliktar closer look at the evolution of the water issue cooperative outcomes, a posture also may provide some insights into the dynamics explained by fear that cooperation might give which led to the war. a prospective partner a larger relative gain. The liberals and their philosophical soul WATER AND INTERNATIONAL mates--the functionalists and liberal- CONFLICT: PARADIGMATIC institutionalists--claim that cooperation could INSIGHTS INTO THE ORIGINS OF and should become a norm in international THE WAR relations. To facilitate cooperation, the liberal Well before the emergence of independent paradigm in general and the liberal- states in the Middle East, it was recognized institutional in particular, favor an activist that an optimal utilization of water resources role for international mediation and other of the Jordan-Yarmuk basin required a international institutional intervention. The rational cooperative approach by riparian paradigm postulates that small, but states. The 1938 Lowdermilk plan, which cumulative "confidence-building measures" sought to create a Authority would increase the overall propensity to along the Tennessee Valley Authority model, cooperate over water.26 was only one in a series of ambitious Both paradigms fail to capture the very cooperative solutions proposed over the complex web of motivations that dictated the years. behavior of the regional actors and their Due to the intense hostility between the superpower patrons. The actions of the Arab Arabs states and Israel following the 1948 countries could be construed as classically war, none of the cooperative utilization realist or neo-realist in the sense that they schemes were adopted. What is worse, feared that cooperating over the Jordan- optimal water-resource development of Yarmuk water resources would give Israel surface flows gave way to unilateral water legitimacy and increase its absorption projects by Israel, Jordan, and Syria. As capacity, leading to a better Jewish noted, the American-mediated Johnston plan demographic balance vis-à-vis the Arabs and sought to address the raising tensions the Palestinians. resulting from such practices. But these Syria, which had alternative water efforts ran into a roadblock which becomes resources, felt no compulsion to share and the apparent when analyzed through the prism of non-riparian Egypt paid no penalties for international theory paradigms. refusing to cooperate. Moreover, both Nasser The realist and neo-realistic paradigm and a succession of Syrian leaders turned the postulates that under conditions of political- highly symbolic issue of water into a rallying structural anarchy prevalent in international cry for a campaign to destroy the Jewish relations, states are motivated by fear and state. Turning water and the equally symbolic distrust, which leads to competition and Palestinian issues into a banner was also conflict over resources. In the absence of an viewed as a sure substitute for lack of internal enforceable world order, states become legitimacy, especially in Syria's case. It is preoccupied with autonomy, security, and interesting that only Jordan among the Arab power. As a result, they tend to shun states, despite its overburdened water

66 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Turning water into fire demands, stayed within the quotas proposed cooperation is preferred. However, when by the Johnston plan. actors are somewhat hostile or competitive, On its face, Israel's eagerness to cooperate the preferred choice is called the Prisoners bears out the assumptions of the liberal- Dilemma where each player's rational interest institutional paradigm. However, it can be would be to defect, that is, to engage in a claimed that it was in Israel's interest as non-cooperative, but not necessarily hostile, defined by the realistic paradigm to achieve a posture. When hostilities are very high, the cooperative solution. Not only was such a game of chicken would be pursued, with each solution optimal from the perspective of riparian trying to preempt his opponent by water management in the basin, but it would diverting the maximum amount of water.27 have accorded the Jewish state a modicum of Even by the rationality standard of the recognition and legitimacy. Indeed, Ben chicken model, the Arab League's decision to Gurion and especially Eshkol made a major divert the Jordan springs is puzzling. Not effort to use water as part of the confidence- only were the Arabs ready to accept a building measures in Israel's dealing with the suboptimal utilizing of the water, but the hostile Arab states. Only when rebuffed by its technologically daunting diversion project neighbors did Israel proceed with the carried extremely high economic costs. unilateral National Water Carrier, although According to one study, it represented "a not before obtaining America's blessing. As clear demonstration of the triumph of noted, Rotem taught the Israeli leadership to irrational ideology over rational prepare for the worst, thus persuading Rabin considerations in international relations."28 to launch the IDF on an ambitious Soviet efforts to use the water problem are reorganization plan that bolstered Israel's clearly envisaged in the Chicken model. It resolve to go to war in June 1967. Still, Rabin was a long-standing practice of Soviet leaders was too much of a rationalist to believe that to seize upon local conflicts to further their Nasser would decide to launch a war while interests, often using brinkmanship as the still involved in Yemen. This view was Cuban missile case indicates. Indeed, the widely shared by the Israeli intelligence Soviet Union, buoyed by its Aswan Dam community and virtually everyone else. success, sought to utilize the Jordan River The Arab League's renunciation of the dispute to bolster its standing in the Middle Johnston plan and its diversion decision East. Clearly, Stag Hunt or even Prisoners raises another paradigmatic issue. Both the Dilemma would have been counterproductive realistic and the liberal-institutional paradigm to such efforts. A careful reading of the imply that the actors involved are rational Politburo utterances, let alone its actions, decision makers, an assumption colored by reveals that the Soviet leaders used the water Western notions of rationality which assume dispute as a backdrop for orchestrating their conventional notions of cost-benefit. In terms ever growing presence in the region. of rational choice literature, such an outcome As noted, Moscow played a pivotal role in is known as Stag Hunt where mutual the Rotem episode, which was lauded

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Ofira Seliktar throughout the region as a success of the symmetry and balance in policy and progressive camp against the "Zionists and attributes a transforming efficacy to imperialists." Given the Byzantine structure negations, all the while counting on an of decision making in the Politburo and its inherent harmony of interests between human penchant for reckless decisions even after the groups. Since liberalism-rationalism involves removal of Nikita Khrushchev, these a high degree of self-projection, it was hard "exploitation politics" had created a dynamic for the administration and especially the State which could not be easily arrested. 29 While Department to realize that the Arabs would the traditional view holds that Moscow follow the logic of Chicken rather than that of simply stumbled into its catalytic role in Stag Hunt or Prisoners Dilemma. precipitating the war, recent disclosures American misperceptions of the Soviet indicate that Soviet leadership at the highest Union were even more glaring. In line with levels deliberately used misinformation about the then prevalent view that the Brezhnev Israel.30 Although it is impossible to prove leadership represented an embrace of a more whether Moscow tried to apply the so-called cautious and "rational" foreign policy in "Cuban model" of brinksmanship--as Meir Moscow, the Johnson White House had a Amit, a former head of the Mossad asserted-- hard time envisioning that Moscow could or actually hoped that Arabs could fight and engage in a reckless game of Chicken of its win a brief war that would rearrange the own, the dispatches from its own embassy in political landscape of the Middle East to their Moscow notwithstanding. Indeed, Under advantage, manipulating the water issue put Secretary of State Walt Rostow urged that both the Soviets and the region on a sliding Moscow be approached in view of the fact slope toward war. that "the Soviets have in past attempted Standing in an antithetical paradigmatic exercise restraining influence on position to the Soviet Union was the United Damascus."31 States. Guided by a mix of realist and liberal- The Israeli diplomat Ephraim Evron noted institutional considerations, American that the United States had no credible administrations since Eisenhower sought to response to Soviet brinkmanship and no facilitate a cooperative solution in the Jordan- contingency plan beyond urging restraint on Yarmuk basin, as epitomized in the Johnston Israel and appeals to the United Nations, an plan. American self-interest in a cooperative observation confirmed by Mordechai Gazit.32 outcome was quite obvious. In addition to Such misperceptions have been part of the securing Israel's water rights, such a solution larger revisionist paradigm in American would have calmed regional tensions and foreign policy which came to view the Soviet denied the Soviets a platform. Defusing Union as a responsible member of the tensions in the Middle East was at a premium international community rather than as an because the Johnson Administration faced ideologically motivated player out to export increasing difficulties in the . At the communist revolution around the world. a more basic level though, American foreign In this sense, the water dispute was seen by policy culture was suffused with liberal- Brezhnev's Politburo as an effort to improve rationalistic thinking. Such thinking values the "correlation of forces" which was

68 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Turning water into fire expected to give the Communists a victory hostage to a wider array of interests that over capitalism. 33 These views have even transcended the narrow confines of rational survived the collapse of the Soviet empire. management of water resources. For instance, Ambassador Richard B. Parker To the extent that this study offers more confessed that he had been troubled by general insights into the predictive failures allegations of Soviet recklessness because "it which lead to war, the conclusions are would have been extremely 'imprudent' of sobering. A successful effort to prevent an them to do this."34 escalation of a conflict over resources requires the international community to step CONCLUSIONS: REFLECTIONS ON in and mediate the dispute. This model was THE WATER CONFLICT AND successfully implemented in the Johnston PREDICTIVE FAILURES BEFORE THE phase of the conflict, but could not be WAR duplicated after Rotem because the structure Attempts to understand the dynamics of opportunity had changed. Preoccupied which lead to the Six-Day War have with the Vietnam War, Washington was preoccupied scholars, foreign policy anxious to avoid another regional practitioners, and intelligence officials. As confrontation. The result was a major always, implied in this type of endeavor is an regional war which reshaped the political effort to discern the policy choices of the landscape of the Middle East forever. actors, assess the degree of misperceptions which underpinned these choices, and *Ofira Seliktar is a Professor of Israel speculate whether different choices could Studies at the Harry Stern Institute for Israel have averted the war. This paper argues that Studies, Gratz College. She was previously a the decision of the Arabs and the Soviet fellow-in-residence at the Middle East Union to engage in a game of Chicken over Research Institute where she worked on the Jordan waters created the dynamics which water resource issues. Her books on led to the war. Israel's relative restraint and problems of prediction and American foreign American misperceptions, combined with the policy include Failing the Crystal Ball Test: burden of the conflict in Vietnam, fueled this The Carter Administration and the dynamic. Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran; Politics, Both the Kennedy and Johnson Paradigms and Intelligence Failures: Why So Administrations disregarded the red flags Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet posed by Rotem, the Arab League diversion plan, and repeated Syrian violations. Union and Politics of Prediction; and the Distracted by the conflict in Southeast Asia War in Iraq: Who Said What Why and When. and beholden to the liberal-structuralism In October 2005 Ofira Seliktar will be a paradigm embedded in the Johnston accord, visiting professor in the Securities Studies the Johnson White House was late in Program at where she realizing that the water issue had become plans to write a book on whether it was

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Ofira Seliktar possible to predict the failure of the Oslo Agreement. behind the Arab-Israeli conflict, (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 144. An earlier version of this article was 11 presented at the U.S. Department of State's Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 conference "The United States, the Middle and the Making of Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.20. East, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," held 12 on January 12 and 13, 2004. Rabin, The Memoirs of Yitzhak Rabin, p. 62.

13 Kenan, Israel's Defense, p. 175; Kenan

interview, op. cit. NOTES 14 T. Prittie, Eshkol: The Man and the Nation 1 (New York: Pittman, 1969), p. 236. S.L. Postel and A. T. Wolfe, "Dehydrating 15 Conflict," Foreign Policy (September – Ibid., p. 236; Rabin, The Memoirs of October 2001), pp. 2-9. Yitzhak Rabin, p. 66. 2 16 Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 20 and 237. L. C. Brown, "The Origins of the Crisis," in 17 R. Parker (ed.), The Six-Day War: A G. W. Gawrych, The Albatross of Decisive Retrospective (Gainsville: University Press of Victory: War and Policy between Egypt Florida, 1996). and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab- 3 Ofira Seliktar, "Water in the Arab-Israeli Israeli Wars (Westport: Greenwood Press, Conflict: Conflict or Cooperation," in W. P. 2000), p. 4. 18 Oren, Six Days of War, p. 28. Zenner and K. Avruch (eds.), Critical 19 Essays on Israeli Society, Religion, and I. Ginor, "The Cold War Longest Cover- Government (Albany, N.Y.: State University up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the of New York Press, 1997), pp. 12-13; 1967 War," MERIA Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003). Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's 20 Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Eugene Rostow, "Comments," in. Parker, The Six Day War, p. 199 Press, 1975, pp. 173-224. 21 4 Yitzhak Rabin, The Memoirs of Yitzhak D. H. Schwar, (ed.) Arab-Israeli Crisis and Rabin (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp. 57- War, 1967. (Washington: Office of the 58. Historian, U.S. State Department, 2004), p. 5 9. Ibid., pp. 61-62. 22 6 Oren, Six Days of War, p. 30. S. Kantor, Interview, January 1994. 23 7 Interview with M.Gazit, November 2003. Rabin, The Memoirs of Yitzhak Rabin, p. 8 I.L., Kenan, Israel's Defense: Her Friends 55. 24 Ginor, The Cold War Longest Cover-up. and Foes in Washington. (Buffalo, N.Y. 25 Prometheus Books, 1981), pp. 162-163. Richard Parker, The Politics of Interview with I.L. Kenan, 1982. Miscalculation in the Middle East 9 Ibid., p. 169. (Bloomington: 10 Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 11. Winston Burdett, Encounter with the 26 Middle East: An intimate report on what lies M.R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River

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Basin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 4-5. 27 Seliktar, "Water in the Arab-Israeli Conflict"; T. Wolf and Dinar, Middle East Hydropolitics and Equality Measures for Water-Sharing Agreements,"Journal of Social and Economic Studies, 19 (Spring 1994), pp. 69-93. . cit. 28 N. Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 173; N. Beschorner, Water and Instability in the Middle East (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 70; E. Kally and G. Fishelson, Water and Peace: Water Resources and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), p. 32. 29 Seliktar, "Water in the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Chapter 3. 30 Ginor, The Cold War Longest Co ver-up, op. cit. 31 Schwar, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, p. 4. 32 Ephraim Evron, Gazit, op. cit, (2003), p. 129. 33 Seliktar, "Water in the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Chapter 3. 34 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, p. 12.

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