A Chinese Position from the Perspectives of “Écart” and “Polarity”

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A Chinese Position from the Perspectives of “Écart” and “Polarity” SHARED VALUES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE GLOBAL COEXISTENCE: A CHINESE POSITION FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF “ÉCART” AND “POLARITY” Prepared for the Asia Society and the FutureWorld Foundation YANG Huilin and ZHANG Jing Renmin University of China In its ultimate sense, “value” has nothing to do with a relative balance between varied interests but must be something related to absolute ideals. It is for this reason that ever since ancient Greece, the quest for “universality” has been a fundamental issue in Western philosophy. Today, when the subversion of traditional metaphysics1 and the “colonization” of “systems” into “life-world”2 have challenged the legitimacy and effectiveness of value, some contemporary thinkers have restarted reflection on “the foundation of universalism.”3 For ancient Chinese sages, value lies in “the ultimate goodness” (zhi yu zhi shan 止 于至善). However, in a manner similar to trying to answer the question “What is universality?” it is easier to name but more difficult to prove what ultimate goodness is. In this case, just as “beauty” is “difficult” in the dialogues of Socrates because nobody can truly experience perfection, Confucius does not define the meaning of “ultimate goodness”; but by referring to “zhong yong 中庸”4 (the course of the Mean, the doctrine of the Mean), another important but elusive concept, he sighs at the difficulty of practicing such a kind of value and claims that “The kingdom, its states, and its families, may be perfectly ruled; dignities and emoluments may be declined; naked weapons may be trampled under the feet; but the course of the Mean cannot be attained to.”5 What needs to happen in a discussion of “shared values,” therefore, is that first of all we should not be content with a summary of the values or ideals each tradition holds 1 LI Bingquan, Marion, Zizioulas and the Overcoming of Onto-Theology (Hong Kong: Institute of Sino-Christian Studies Ltd., 2015). 2 For the distinction between “life-world” and “system,” please see Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, chapter 6, trans. by T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984). 3 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 4 Here, in a reference to one book in Liji 礼记, the first letter will be capitalized. When the reference is to the concept, it is lowercase. 5 Zhong Yong (The Doctrine of The Mean), chapter IX. Please see James Legge, The Chinese Classics, with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes, vol. I (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 2001), 389. 1 to,6 or with a list of similar concepts that each civilization shares, but insist on making an effort to understand the differences and reasons behind these similar concepts. Otherwise, we cannot explain the paradoxes we are confronted with. For instance, all people everywhere agree with the notion of world peace, so why are the tools with which we keep world peace never peaceful? All people seem to agree with the concept of forgiveness, but why can we not forgive or tolerate those who disagree with us? Why do similar or even identical values and ideals lead to irreconcilable conflicts? Why are crimes and holocausts too often carried out in the name of God, Heaven, or justice? In short, it is true that “constructive global coexistence” should be based on shared values; however, if we cannot realize that none of us are “the only tent in town,” value is not value per se any more but has been replaced by our own identity, position, or context. If we foolishly assume that we can represent the shared values of all human beings, we are even farther away from the genuine meaning of “value.” The effectiveness of value does not depend on nouns that can be interpreted or endowed with meaning randomly and arbitrarily, but on the verbal process that generates the value. In other words, this process is not just sharing values as nouns, but a mutual participation in the sharing, and in making them “sharable.” The fundamental logic to this process is probably a kind of “impossible possibility”: because when value itself is defined as an absolute ideal, we have been relativized by this definition and thus become the impossible. Because value cannot be replaced or internalized by “us,” our impossibility brings out the possibility of value, which enables value to surpass any kind of “centralized discourse” or “politics of identity” and become the foundation of values supporting such a global coexistence. Abundant resources in Chinese culture can certainly be shared by any other tradition. In fact, in 2012, at the 18th CPC National Congress, a set of Core Socialist Values was proposed in 12 phrases,7 which were supposed to be regarded as a concentrated extraction of many common values, with the intention of sharing, but which also led to much conjecture and interpretation. On the other hand, regardless of the varied interpretations and guesses, if we compare the Chinese traditional ethos – ren 仁 (kindness), yi 义 (righteousness), li 礼 (propriety), zhi 智 (wisdom), xin 6 Many discussions between cultures and interfaith dialogues in the world today have stopped at this stage, which deserves our reflections: if human beings do not lack shared values and resources; then why have these values never worked out? 7 These 12 phrases are in three groups: prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony; freedom, equality, justice, rule of law; patriotism, dedication, integrity, friendship. 2 信 (trustworthiness) – with the Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces8 proposed by Chinese leadership in 2006, we can find some changes. The greatest change in these Core Socialist Values is their shareability. These are common values that can be shared by all cultures, and we can confidently claim that there is no single concept in these values that can be exclusively possessed by the Chinese culture or any other culture. Furthermore, in the “clarification of four points (making clear four points)”9 proposed by President XI Jinping in 2014 when he talked about Chinese traditional culture, a more crucial basis for constructive global coexistence can be found. The four points President XI hoped to clarify are as follows: the historical evidence for the “Chinese mode,” the cultural foundation of “Chinese characteristics,” the syncretic and inclusive features of the Chinese people as a nation, and the modern transition of Chinese tradition. The key element in these four points is how we can contribute more to the global family instead of taking a defensive posture, or a position of refusal or withdrawal. American theologian Jaroslav Pelikan once quoted an anonymous saying: “Tradition is the living faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.”10 What President XI implies in his four points might also be that the real vital and living tradition can be reactivated and modernized, and the real Chinese culture should be able to be integrated into the world culture and so be internationalized or universalized. To advocate and develop tradition is therefore to transform our own tradition so that it may be able to interpret, and be adapted to, this plural and diverse world. This is exactly what constructive global coexistence means. If we follow this line of reasoning, questions related to the Chinese concepts of shared global norms and values and how to integrate the interests and priorities of Chinese people should not be explained as a temporary expedient or “benefit balance.” As to questions concerning “How might international actors proceed to promote and advance the development of shared global norms and values within China?” it is better to find resources in specific Chinese texts to formulate an answer. In this paper, based on specific texts, we first address these questions through 8 “Eight Honors, Eight Disgraces” is the abbreviation for “Socialist Perspectives on Honors and Disgraces” proposed by President HU Jintao in 2006. The details are as follows: “Love the country; do it no harm./Serve the people; do no disservice./Follow science; discard ignorance./Be diligent; not indolent./Be united, help each other; make no gains at other's expense./Be honest and trustworthy; do not spend ethics for profits./Be disciplined and law-abiding; not chaotic and lawless./Live plainly, struggle hard; do not wallow in luxuries and pleasures.” 9 NI Guanghui, “XI Jinping Stresses the Need to be Open Minded in Order That the Propaganda Work Can Be Improved at the National Conference on Propaganda,” People’s Daily, August 21, 2013. See also http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0821/c64094-22636876.html. 10 Jaroslav Pelikan, Jidu jiao chuan tong: da gong jiao chuan tong de xing cheng (The Christian Tradition 1: The Emergence of Catholic Tradition 100–600), trans. WENG Shaojun, CHEN Zuoren (Hong Kong: Institute of Sino-Christian Studies Ltd., 2002), xix, xxxii. 3 discussion of two commonly accepted shared values: the “zhong yong 中庸” and the Golden Rule, which have been treated as some sort of salvific antidote whenever there is a crisis or confrontation in current world (i.e., whenever there is a crisis in interfaith dialogue, people like to quote the zhong yong or the Golden Rule). We believe that no matter whether in the Western or Chinese context, it is of little or no help to remain at the level of making some moral appeal. What we should do, instead, is highlight once again the unique logic contained in the zhong yong and the Golden Rule through the inter-interpretation of Chinese and Western ideas. The paper then proceeds to compare the translations of some key terms in Chinese tradition and culture such as “ren 仁” and “shu 恕.” We understand that it is easy and natural to create barriers in the exchange of ideas between China and the West when we transfer and shift between languages and conceptual tools.
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