IIENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE"JUSTICE"

Holmes Rolston, IIIIII Colorado State UniversityUniversity

nvironmentalJustice is a welcome addition to the rapidly growing literature in envi­ A review of Peter S. Wenz's Environmental ronmental ethics. Two dozen titles are Justice, (Albany: State University of New York E currently in print or in press, and this Press, 1988).368 pages. $52.50 hardbound, book will hold its own in that vigorous discussion. Peter S. Wenz is Associate Professor of Philosophy $19.95 paper. and Legal Studies at Sangaman State University, Springfield, Illinois. His background in law as well as philosophy shapes his approach, which is from the perspective of justice. "Environmental Justice is primarily about theories of distributive justice, the­ ories concerning the manner in which benefits and burdens should be allocated when there is a scarcity of benefits (relative to people's wants or needs) and a surfeit of burdens" (pp. xi-xii). "The present book is largely devoted to examining com­ peting principles of distributive justice as they are, or may be used to make environmentally focused decisions" (p. 24). Wenz finds environmental justice of critical importance, both practically and theoretically. "I have argued that we live in an extremely unjust

world" (p. 338). "From the environmentalenvironmental justice

perspective, the world is a mess" (p. 339). In his

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search for justice, Wenz surveys available theories animal rights. Humans have a right to be rescued and tests them against cases real and imagined. He from wolves; wild sheep do not; humans have a particularly dislikes "the virtue theory" (Chapter right to decent housing; wolves do not. Humans 3), more cause than cure of, injustice. Justice with broken legs have a right to medical requires that persons get what they deserve, and treatment; ducks with broken wings do not. this theory holds that this is regularly now hap­ Positive rights are rights to be helped; negative pening. The rich are getting what they deserve, rights are rights to noninterference, rights to be the poor what they deserve. The virtue theory "is left alone (p. 110). When humans deal with other not rationally defensible" (p. 126), and Wenz is humans, all humans have both negative and pos­ perplexed that nevertheless many persons hold it. itive rights of equal strength (though see later). Certainly no one will argue that this theory is Animals do not have any negative (much less pos­ the whole truth. Many of the rich are dishonest, or itive) rights when dealing with each other; animals live on inherited wealth (assuming inherited do not have any positive rights when humans deal wealth is undeserved), or have their fortunes by with them. "The rights ofwild animals are entirely luck. Poverty sometimes is, and sometimes is not, negative" (p. 152). the fault of those who are poor. The determinants All the theories explored can in combination to of both wealth and poverty are complex. No one is some extent repair each other's defects, but they an island, every laborer builds on the labors of are all simultaneously defective in what they are others and suffers misfortunes at the hands of still able to count morally - only humans and higher others. But Wenz cannot seem to find even a half sentient animals. The theories are "insufficient truth in the virtue theory, though he later agrees even in combination with one another because with Rawls that persons in the original position none justifies direct concern for plants..., plant will agree that "the inequality of wealth in society species, animal species, mountain streams, oceans, is required as a spur to productivity" (p. 241). and wilderness areas" (p. 271). Before venturing Wenz holds that "people (in Western societies, at into the more difficult territory of theories that any rate) are largely motivated by the prospect of have such focus, Wenz pauses to regather per­ personal material gain. Their hard work can be spective. In a chapter about methods in ethical more reliably solicited by the prospect of personal inquiry, he softens the objectivity in science and ownership of property than by most other insists on hard ethical argument, thereby to con­ rewards" (p. 331). So far as that works, it would clude that "the basic structure of ethical inquiry is seem the virtue theory is partially true; those with identical to that in science." "Conclusions about property have it as a reward of work. What follows environmental justice can be as objective and about whether and how far the deservedly (or certain as conclusions in any other area of envi­ undeservedly) wealthy ought by duty of justice or ronmental studies" (p. 254). benevolence to share their wealth with the poor, Reassured, Wenz presses on to appraise ethical whether faulty or innocent, is a question that theories that are more distinctively environmental: requires more analysis. biocentric individualism and ecocentric holism. Continuing his critique of theories of justice, Although an ethic concerning the environment Wenz in successive chapters moves through liber­ has been at issue since the start, not until Chapter tarian theory, laissez faire economics, efficiency 13, four-fifths of the way through the book, do we theory, human rights, animal rights, utilitarian directly ask questions of environmental ethics. theory, cost-benefit analysis, and Rawls' theory of Earlier, the questions have been about how to dis­ justice. Most are found promising at points; all are tribute among humans the benefits and burdens found wanting as comprehensive theory. associated with the environment, or about the Following Tom Regan, Wenz defends animal rights and goods of higher animals in their envi­ rights, holding "that all subjects-of-a-life, human ronments, but not about flora, fauna, and natural and nonhuman alike, have rights, or at least that history in toto. we have obligations toward them" (p. 147). But Biocentric individualism comes in two forms. there is asymmetry between human rights and Egalitarian individualism holds that every living

Between the Species 148 Summer 1989

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EnvironmentalJustice

thing has the same inherent worth. Nonegalitarian includes what is worthwhile in the various theories individualism holds that every living thing has some, of what and how to count morally, arranging both though not necessarily the same inherent worth (p. objects and theories of moral concern in con­ 273). The fIrst form requires too much of us; if all centric circles. living organisms have equal inhereninherent t worth, I En route, Wenz distinguishes between a theory cannot taketake antibiotics to kill millions of bacteria to of ethics and a theory ofjustice. A theory of ethics speed my recovery from pneumonia (p. 284). asks what is ofdirect moral concern and how it is of "Biocentric egalitarianism is so confIning that even concern. A theory ofjustice asks what is a fair allo­ [Paul] Taylor, its foremostforemost proponent, refuses to cation of benefitsbenefIts and burdens among those beings apply it consistently" (p. 287). The nonnonegalitarianegalitarian who are of direct moral concern (p. 272). A theory formform requires too little. It posits infInitesimal of justice is a subset of a theory of ethics, since amounts of inherent worth in microorganisms and some moral questions are not about distributing mosquitoes; this worth, though present, is easily benefIts and costs. Nearing his conclusion, Wenz overridden by human interests (pp. 291-92). Wenz's might better have passed from the subdomain of critique of Taylor's principle ofrestitution (pp. 287­ justice to the comprehensive territory of ethics; 292) is a fIne example of the many careful argu­ nevertheless he wants to call the global theory the ments throughout these sections. "Concentric Circle of Environmental Justice." I Wenz fInds that ecocentric holism has much would have called it a theory of Environmental more merit than biocentric individualism, though it Ethics. Much of the behavior enjoined cannot be too fails as comprehensive theory. "The processes adequately thought ofas distributing costs and ben­ of biological evolution which result in increasing efIts fairly. Wenz's background in law, which often biotic diversity are among the good things of which serves him well, may also tempt him to stretch the we must take account" (p. 304). These processes do concept ofjustice into regions where it ceases to be not have value inherently, for what they are in the best category. Even in interhuman ethics the themselves, they have value instrumentally (for question of "getting fair shares ofwhat is scarce" (p. what they produce), but this is no ordinary instru­ 22) is not always the root moral question, for mental value. One important difference is that example in censuring adultery. these instrumental processes are nonanthro­ When humans deal with plants, endangered pocentric; they are instrumental to every living species, ecosystems, wildernesses, mountains, rivers, organism. A still more signifIcant difference is that or wildlife, justice is not the most useful category. If with evolutionary processes "means and ends are one presses the etymology of the term far enough, connected essentially, not accidentally" (p. 306). In justice is doing what is right, and so the term could human affairs the same end can be reached by be insisted upon. Nevertheless, justice in current various means, but in natural history the processes use is so entwined with courts of law, with issues of are essential for creating the products. The fair distribution of benefIts and burdens among· products result from the outplay of the processes, humans (as Wenz rightly claims), that one is better and value is smeared across the process-product dis­ advised to employ the more comprehensive term, tinction; it can no longer be parceled into instru­ ethics, and to speak of protecting values and goods, mental-inherent sectors. "Logic alone dictates that ofappropriate respect and behavior. these processes be viewed to some extent as ends­ Another legacy is that Wenz sees, at fIrstfirst at least, in-themselves" (p. 307). Wenz approaches here everything through a distributive justice fIlter. He what I have tried to call "systemic value.value."" characteristically pictures actors desiring to max­ At the close of the book Wenz presents his own imize their benefIts and minimize their costs, inter­inter­ theory, which, he claims, integrates - or at least acting with others who are doing the same. Nothing plurally arranges - all the preceding theories: the is said of benevolence or of love as springs of "Concen tric Circle Theory of Environmen tal ethical action. Love might be the better category Justice" (p. 311). This theory does include every­ forfor dealing with adultery, for instance.instance. And humans thing that counts morally, from humans through can lovelove nature as well as other humans. sentient animals, plants, and ecosystems, and itit also Appropriate respect for the lives ofjumping spiders

Summer 1989 149 Between thethe Species EnvironmentalJustice

or coyotes is a matter of delighting in alien forms natural systems, especially relict wildlands, which of life, recognizing what Wenz calls their inherent humans can learn to enjoy but should respect value - not an issue of fair distribution of benefits whether or not they are maximizing recreation and burdens. benefits. Morality is not finally a matter of each agent's An environmental ethics needs a theory for seeking to enjoy as much benefit as possible and to people - influential people like David Brower, avoid as much cost as possible, being fair in so AIdo Leopold, Rachel Carson, or those who forged doing. We do want to do that, ofcourse, butthat is the Wilderness and Endangered Species Acts ­ only enlightened prudence. Wenz begins with and who act on behalf of plants, animals, and places often returns to an episode when in childhood he and are not driven to maximize their personal shared a pizza with a friend. One cut it in half and benefits, or even humanistic benefits. When Peter the other chose first. The moral model reached in Singer or Tom Regan defend the rights of animals, that childish outlook is only the early stages of they are driven by love as well as by a sense of the moral development. As Wenz admits (p. 6), when just distribution of costs and benefits. Much humans negotiate each to protect his or her own environmental concern, often that on the cutting self-interest with a fair distribution of benefits and edge, is distorted when seen through the filter of burdens, we are only being prudential and not yet distributive justice. moral. It is not until the later portions of the book, Wenz's analytical work evaluating the insights after the category ofjustice ceases to be central, and inadequacies of various ethical theories that we reach deeper moral territory. occupies most of his book (Chapters 1-13). But this Hiking a wildland trail, I leave the flowers for is preface to his synthetic model, the concentric others to enjoy, hoping that they will do the same circle theory (Chapter 14), which is the most cre­ for me. I think this is fair, and we can all enjoy the ative part of the book. Richard Sylvan, Val flowers. It is a fair distribution of benefits. Later, Plumwood, Baird Callicott, and perhaps Peter shifting my ethical focus, I let the flowers live out of Singer have earlier suggested models of this kind, respect for what they inherently are - whether or but Wenz's model is the most elaborated.! It is not any humans should ever again pass that way. more self-consciously "pluralist" (p. xii). While Love, notjustice, seems the richer category for the Sylvan, Plumwood, and Callicott do not much maturing ethic. If one insists, the term justice can dwell on their pluralism, being more interested in again be forced to serve. "Justice is done when integrated theory, this is the third recent book people get what they deserve or what is due to especially to advocate pluralism in environmental them" (p. 22). Adapting the term to flowers, non­ ethics. Christopher Stone's Earth and Other Ethics'l. humans, having no merit, have nojust desserts, but makes moral pluralism his central theme, possibly flowers have something due: appropriate inveighing against moral monism. Andrew respect. Flowers get their poetic justice! But this is Brennan's Thinking About Nature: An Investigation of forcing words to do unfamiliar work. Nature, Value and Ecolog;jl insists on ethical polymor­ In Wenz's discussion of development versus the phism. Wenz is more alert than are Stone and preservation of parklands, one side wants to Brennan to the danger of pluralism: an "unprin­ develop and thereby "to maximize recreation in cipled alternation between theories." "We need a the stunningly beautiful settings." The other side principled justification for preferring the dictates prefers preservation, so that they and persons in of one theory in one situation and the dictates of the future may "enjoy the lands ... in their natural another theory in a different situation" (p. 313). It state" (p. 25). The issue is treated as a fair distri­ is too much to expect that the vanous theories can bution of scarce recreation benefits. No doubt be derived from a single master principle, but we these elements are present in such decisions, but will need - if we can find one - some theory that there is a deeper environmental ethics nowhere decides executive control when theories compete. reached in such discussion, one that Wenz himself Even while we yet grope for executive theory, reaches only late in the book. The preservationist Wenz encourages us to proceed undaunted. We may further be seeking appropriate respect for can operate with "good judgment" (p. 315), analo-

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EnvironmentalJustice

gously to the way scientists must evaluate com­ I turn now to the content of the synthetic peting theories without a calculus for doing so. theory. Who is at the center of the series of circles? Stone and Brennan likewise hope to give' general The individual moral agent. Others of moral guidance for alternating between theories, trusting concern are located on radiating circles by their the rest to rational argument in local contexts. I am "closeness" to the moral agent at the focus. not sure that any of the three yet have the needed "Closeness is defmed as the strength and number principled justifications for what theory to prefer of one's obligations to others" (p. 316). Who is in when. If no standards can be formulated for what the circles? In the innermost circles are humans, Wenz calls "good judgment," this will often be little who have rights, positive and negative, and who more than a euphemism for "muddling through." have preferences they wish satisfied, who have Where it celebrates richness, pluralism can be a environmental goods to be defended and costs virtue. Environmentalists often want to be holists. they must bear. "People are thought of as existing They soon discover more complex levels of ethical in concentric circles around me" (p. 317). They concern than in interhuman ethics. One will need are distributed near and far through moral ties, different theories, or subtheories, for dealing with linked with me by geography, family, employment, humans, future generations, animals, plants, or community. "As people are more remote from species, ecosystems. But pluralism can be extolled us (our interactions with them are less involved) as a virtue when it is tacitly a confession of igno­ we have diminished responsibilities for their rance and failure of nerve. One is confused by the welfare" (p. 326). "Our obligations to people theories with all their pros and cons and can find concerning their positive human rights diminish as no way to decide among them. So one becomes a those people are more remote from us" (p. 328). pluralist and calls it riches - when in truth one However, rights at a distance have more pull lacks what is most needed: an integrated theory. than mere preference satisfactions close by (p. 322). Location on the circles is related to positive human rights but not to negative human rights (p. 325), which have the same strength throughout the circles. This, I suppose, is consistent with Wenz's earlier claim that "the reasons for believing in the existence of positive and negative human rights are of equal strength" (p. 123), if one under­ stands that the reasons but not the rights are of equal strength. The outmost human-inhabited circle is that of future generations (p. 332). This seems partly right, although I might feel stronger ties to grand­ children yet unborn than to persons now living on the other side of the world. Still further out are circles inhabited by sentient animals. Domestic animals may have positive rights, but wild animals do not have any positive rights at all. Again, negative rights keep their strength. "The rule .,.... is that all subjects-of-a-life are equally entitled to relevant negative rights" (p. 328). This rule, however, is overridden more easily with animals than with humans. Chimps and humans have an equal right to life, but in a bind I should rescue humans rather than chimps (p. 328). Humans and seals have an equal right to life; still, Eskimos can hunt seals but not other humans

Summer 1989 151 Between the Species

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(p. 327). It seems then, in effect, that animals do overrode concern for the goats. It is hard to see have reduced negative rights in these circles how Wenz's circles would handle this case. Since further out. the goats were degrading the ecosystem, as well as One problem is that there is .little guidance for endangering rare plant species, perhaps Wenz what animals get located where in the circles of would remove them on this account. sentient life. Since the capacity for experience (the Wenz embraces all with an ecological holism. At degree to which an animal is a subject-of-a-life) the outermost concentric circle, we would think of varies widely, one might expect this to affect their "evolutionary processes as 'inhabiting' a relatively locations. If fish are less intensively subjects-of-a-life remote circle of moral concern" (p. 329). In this than are seals, fishing might be recommended to circle we operate with the "principle of process­ the Eskimos over seal hunting. Or, other things harm" (p. 300), which forbids us to harm evolu­ being equal, one might prefer an experiment on tionary and ecosysternic processes. Although this is rodents over one on chimpanzees. The strengths of the most remote circle from the moral agent, Wenz obligations within the human circles is determined assures us that this does not mean that human or by biographical details; one has obligations to a animal goods routinely override these system-wide brother that he does not to a distant Ethiopian. Is processes. there any analogue with animals? Does one have Much of Wenz's analysis turns on the varying more obligations to endangered grizzlies in one's strengths of rights over the domains of the inner home state than to elephants in Kenya? If there are concentric circles that persons and sentient animals graded strengths of obligation in these areas, we occupy. These circles are the domain of rights hear nothing about it. theory, as well as domains inhabited by persons and One might have expected plants to show up next sentient animals. Where does utilitarian theory in the widening circles, perhaps species after that, operate? Presumably over the same domain, and last ecosystems. But Wenz jumps from circles coming into play after rights theory has done its of sentient animals to ecosystems in the outmost job. Once we have satisfied rights criteria, we there­ circle. Earlier, he has generally been careful to say after invoke utilitarian theory for further decision­ that inherent value attaches to plants and species, making. Remembering all the theories surveyed in and he does not think plants or species unim­ earlier chapters, now promised to be integrated portant (Chapter 13). His trouble, apparently, is into the concentric circle theory, we will sometimes that he finds no available theories about how to need efficiency theory or cost benefit analysis, or handle either. Individualist biocentrism is of little Rawls's concept ofjustice. Wenz has a discussion of practical use in dealing with plants. Although "we how efficiency limits property rights, but we are not have direct duties to protect and preserve species" told much further about when and how to use (p. 296), Wenz has no theory that locates them which theories. That is a matter ofwhat Wenz terms appropriately in the concentric circles. As a result, "good judgment" (p. 315), which is what we use the model inadequately addresses endangered when we have no theory to help us choose. species. Since my Self is at the center of my concentric Rarity might make more difference in an envi­ circles, your Self at your center, and his Self at his, ronmental ethic than "closeness." We might prefer and since we have different careers, locations in the plants at the species level to sentient animals at the world, family ties, and so on, the strengths of our individual level. On San Clemente Island, the V.S. ties will differ. Each carries about a personal set of Fish and Wildlife Service and the California concentric circles - so far as humans are placed Department of Fish and Game asked the V.S. Navy therein at least, and perhaps animal ties, too, differ to shoot 2000 feral goats to save three endangered in strength with the biographies of the central plant species. In the resulting dispute, including a agents. My judgments will not be your judgments. lawsuit on behalf of the goats by The Fund for Could this mean that at the same event in Earth Animals, the Court ordered the goats removed history, intersected differently by our concentric from the island. Some goats were trapped and frameworks, I operate pulled by positive rights removed, others killed. Concern for the plants theory while you feel no such pull but operate with

Between the Species 152 Summer 1989 EnvironmentalEnvironmentalJusticeJustice

utilitarian theory? Sam operates on the basis of neg­ Notes ative rights; Susan, located so that the counter­ 1 Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood develop "an annular vailing rights claims are in equilibrium, operates picture ... with nested zones." Richard and Val Routley (now with cost/benefit analysis. Could this be like the Sylvan and Plumwood), "Human Chauvinism and politician in Christopher Stone's Earth and Other Environmental Ethics," in Environmental Philosophy, eds. D.S. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley (Canberra: Ethics, who operates with his family using rights Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, theory and with his constituency as a utilitarian? Australian National University, 1980), pp. 96-189 (on pp. 107­ Wenz is right that the strengths of our personal 108). CallicottCal1icott integrates classical ethics and environmental ethical obligations (though perhaps not our ethical ethics with a "tree ring" model with "inner social circles" and animals, plants, and a "land ethic" in circles further out.]. Baird criteria) differ with our biographies. But when the Callicott, 'The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic," in concentric circles are simultaneously biographically Companion to a Sand County Almanac, ed. CallicottCal1icott (Madison: and biologically formed, some boundaries deter­ University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), pp. 186-217 (on pp. 207­ mined by natural kinds, some boundaries deter­ 208). He uses "the image of annular tree rings in which social structures and their correlative ethics are nested in a graded, dif­ mined by personal histories, the result is no clear ferential system" with the '1and ethic" the most comprehensive decision rules for persons jointly making contested circle. J. Baird Callicott, "The Search for an Environmental decisions. Environmental ethics mostly reverts to Ethic," in Matters ofLife and Death, 2nd ed., ed. Tom Regan (New muddling through, alternately known as good York: Random House, 1986), pp. 381-424 (on pp. 410-411). Peter Singer pictures ethics as "an expanding circle." Peter judgment. Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology (New York: Wenz argues well. His book is clear and engag­ Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1982). Unfortunately, Wenz does not ingly written, reminding me of the style ofJohn relate his work to these previous efforts. Hospers. He successfully illustrates the good 2 Christopher Stone, Earth and OtherEthics (New York: Harper judgment in which he trusts, even when we grope and Row, 1987). for arguments. One important feature is his use of :s3 Andrew Brennan, ThinltingThinlring About Natu",,:Natum: An Investigation of legal examples, which add relevance. Philosophers Nature, Value and Ecology (London: Routledge, 1988). will enjoy the debate even when others may think Wenz has become irrelevant, e.g., thought experi­ [!l[!) ~[!l[!)

ments computing utility on a metric system of win­ THE SOULS OF ANIMALS

somes (1000 = one wholesome) and irksomes (1000 ~ ~

1 gruesome) (p. 156, p. 182), applied in imagi­ Conference

= 1 gruesome) (p. 156, p. 182), applied in imagi­ ~ ~

nation to .5 billion possible people (distinct from

-~ ~

future people) in India in generations to corne ­ - The University ofEssex

only to conclude that no such calculations can really ~ Colchester, England ~

June 25, 19901990

be performed anyway. So what was accomplished by ~ ~

thinking through what is actually quite impossible? I Black Forest, Germany Wenz can have a strong sense of urgency and rele­ ;~ June 29-30, 1990 ~

vance, but, in other moods, sometimes one gets the ;~ I~

impression that Wenz just enjoys argument. He ~ && ~

"likes clever paradoxes" (p. 227). In result, the I

~ WALK TO ROME FOR ANlMAL RIGHTS ~

reader has to be prepared for full-scale, detailed ; Ii

argument, mixed with concrete ethical injunctions. ~ & TIlEDIE SOUlS OF ANIMALS ;~

There is little here that is terse or compact, though ~ Summer 1990 ~

often in the midst of heavy argument, there is cornie

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relief. He first greets utilitarian theory as the "best I -

thing since indoor plumbing" (p. 181). ~ l1iformation:["'ormation: ~

In sum, this is a major work in the field, and the Schweitzer Center ;~

criticisms I register are evidence that I found it P.O. Box 254

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thought-provoking. Environmental philosophy is i- Berkeley, California 94701, USA -

alive and well. ~ ;~ I I~I§J ~ til ~[!l[!)

Summer 1989 153 Between the Species