IIENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE"JUSTICE" Holmes Rolston, IIIIII Colorado State UniversityUniversity nvironmentalJustice is a welcome addition to the rapidly growing literature in envi­ A review of Peter S. Wenz's Environmental ronmental ethics. Two dozen titles are Justice, (Albany: State University of New York E currently in print or in press, and this Press, 1988).368 pages. $52.50 hardbound, book will hold its own in that vigorous discussion. Peter S. Wenz is Associate Professor of Philosophy $19.95 paper. and Legal Studies at Sangaman State University, Springfield, Illinois. His background in law as well as philosophy shapes his approach, which is from the perspective of justice. "Environmental Justice is primarily about theories of distributive justice, the­ ories concerning the manner in which benefits and burdens should be allocated when there is a scarcity of benefits (relative to people's wants or needs) and a surfeit of burdens" (pp. xi-xii). "The present book is largely devoted to examining com­ peting principles of distributive justice as they are, or may be used to make environmentally focused decisions" (p. 24). Wenz finds environmental justice of critical importance, both practically and theoretically. "I have argued that we live in an extremely unjust world" (p. 338). "From the environmentalenvironmental justice perspective, the world is a mess" (p. 339). In his .~~., '~~''q ~ q'# REVIEW q'# Ii 1.L.)~ I!l~ Summer 1989 147 Between the Species '-"~.>j',,~ ..'?!l'{;-""'i,,)<,'i:*,'~"'., :c.."-." Environmenta1Jusnee search for justice, Wenz surveys available theories animal rights. Humans have a right to be rescued and tests them against cases real and imagined. He from wolves; wild sheep do not; humans have a particularly dislikes "the virtue theory" (Chapter right to decent housing; wolves do not. Humans 3), more cause than cure of, injustice. Justice with broken legs have a right to medical requires that persons get what they deserve, and treatment; ducks with broken wings do not. this theory holds that this is regularly now hap­ Positive rights are rights to be helped; negative pening. The rich are getting what they deserve, rights are rights to noninterference, rights to be the poor what they deserve. The virtue theory "is left alone (p. 110). When humans deal with other not rationally defensible" (p. 126), and Wenz is humans, all humans have both negative and pos­ perplexed that nevertheless many persons hold it. itive rights of equal strength (though see later). Certainly no one will argue that this theory is Animals do not have any negative (much less pos­ the whole truth. Many of the rich are dishonest, or itive) rights when dealing with each other; animals live on inherited wealth (assuming inherited do not have any positive rights when humans deal wealth is undeserved), or have their fortunes by with them. "The rights ofwild animals are entirely luck. Poverty sometimes is, and sometimes is not, negative" (p. 152). the fault of those who are poor. The determinants All the theories explored can in combination to of both wealth and poverty are complex. No one is some extent repair each other's defects, but they an island, every laborer builds on the labors of are all simultaneously defective in what they are others and suffers misfortunes at the hands of still able to count morally - only humans and higher others. But Wenz cannot seem to find even a half sentient animals. The theories are "insufficient truth in the virtue theory, though he later agrees even in combination with one another because with Rawls that persons in the original position none justifies direct concern for plants..., plant will agree that "the inequality of wealth in society species, animal species, mountain streams, oceans, is required as a spur to productivity" (p. 241). and wilderness areas" (p. 271). Before venturing Wenz holds that "people (in Western societies, at into the more difficult territory of theories that any rate) are largely motivated by the prospect of have such focus, Wenz pauses to regather per­ personal material gain. Their hard work can be spective. In a chapter about methods in ethical more reliably solicited by the prospect of personal inquiry, he softens the objectivity in science and ownership of property than by most other insists on hard ethical argument, thereby to con­ rewards" (p. 331). So far as that works, it would clude that "the basic structure of ethical inquiry is seem the virtue theory is partially true; those with identical to that in science." "Conclusions about property have it as a reward of work. What follows environmental justice can be as objective and about whether and how far the deservedly (or certain as conclusions in any other area of envi­ undeservedly) wealthy ought by duty of justice or ronmental studies" (p. 254). benevolence to share their wealth with the poor, Reassured, Wenz presses on to appraise ethical whether faulty or innocent, is a question that theories that are more distinctively environmental: requires more analysis. biocentric individualism and ecocentric holism. Continuing his critique of theories of justice, Although an ethic concerning the environment Wenz in successive chapters moves through liber­ has been at issue since the start, not until Chapter tarian theory, laissez faire economics, efficiency 13, four-fifths of the way through the book, do we theory, human rights, animal rights, utilitarian directly ask questions of environmental ethics. theory, cost-benefit analysis, and Rawls' theory of Earlier, the questions have been about how to dis­ justice. Most are found promising at points; all are tribute among humans the benefits and burdens found wanting as comprehensive theory. associated with the environment, or about the Following Tom Regan, Wenz defends animal rights and goods of higher animals in their envi­ rights, holding "that all subjects-of-a-life, human ronments, but not about flora, fauna, and natural and nonhuman alike, have rights, or at least that history in toto. we have obligations toward them" (p. 147). But Biocentric individualism comes in two forms. there is asymmetry between human rights and Egalitarian individualism holds that every living Between the Species 148 Summer 1989 ---------~----------_._-----------_... .- __ """ .~ EnvironmentalJustice thing has the same inherent worth. Nonegalitarian includes what is worthwhile in the various theories individualism holds that every living thing has some, of what and how to count morally, arranging both though not necessarily the same inherent worth (p. objects and theories of moral concern in con­ 273). The fIrst form requires too much of us; if all centric circles. living organisms have equal inhereninherent t worth, I En route, Wenz distinguishes between a theory cannot taketake antibiotics to kill millions of bacteria to of ethics and a theory ofjustice. A theory of ethics speed my recovery from pneumonia (p. 284). asks what is ofdirect moral concern and how it is of "Biocentric egalitarianism is so confIning that even concern. A theory ofjustice asks what is a fair allo­ [Paul] Taylor, its foremostforemost proponent, refuses to cation of benefitsbenefIts and burdens among those beings apply it consistently" (p. 287). The nonnonegalitarianegalitarian who are of direct moral concern (p. 272). A theory formform requires too little. It posits infInitesimal of justice is a subset of a theory of ethics, since amounts of inherent worth in microorganisms and some moral questions are not about distributing mosquitoes; this worth, though present, is easily benefIts and costs. Nearing his conclusion, Wenz overridden by human interests (pp. 291-92). Wenz's might better have passed from the subdomain of critique of Taylor's principle ofrestitution (pp. 287­ justice to the comprehensive territory of ethics; 292) is a fIne example of the many careful argu­ nevertheless he wants to call the global theory the ments throughout these sections. "Concentric Circle of Environmental Justice." I Wenz fInds that ecocentric holism has much would have called it a theory of Environmental more merit than biocentric individualism, though it Ethics. Much of the behavior enjoined cannot be too fails as comprehensive theory. "The processes adequately thought ofas distributing costs and ben­ of biological evolution which result in increasing efIts fairly. Wenz's background in law, which often biotic diversity are among the good things of which serves him well, may also tempt him to stretch the we must take account" (p. 304). These processes do concept ofjustice into regions where it ceases to be not have value inherently, for what they are in the best category. Even in interhuman ethics the themselves, they have value instrumentally (for question of "getting fair shares ofwhat is scarce" (p. what they produce), but this is no ordinary instru­ 22) is not always the root moral question, for mental value. One important difference is that example in censuring adultery. these instrumental processes are nonanthro­ When humans deal with plants, endangered pocentric; they are instrumental to every living species, ecosystems, wildernesses, mountains, rivers, organism. A still more signifIcant difference is that or wildlife, justice is not the most useful category. If with evolutionary processes "means and ends are one presses the etymology of the term far enough, connected essentially, not accidentally" (p. 306). In justice is doing what is right, and so the term could human affairs the same end can be reached by be insisted upon. Nevertheless, justice in current various means, but in natural history the processes use is so entwined with courts of law, with issues of are essential for creating the products. The fair distribution of benefIts and burdens among· products result from the outplay of the processes, humans (as Wenz rightly claims), that one is better and value is smeared across the process-product dis­ advised to employ the more comprehensive term, tinction; it can no longer be parceled into instru­ ethics, and to speak of protecting values and goods, mental-inherent sectors.