What Is Materialism?

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Call for Papers: What is Materialism? 8th Annual “What Is?” Conference Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon Saturday, May 10, 2014 - Knight Library Browsing Room Deadline for Submissions: Monday, March 31st, 2014, 5pm The Graduate Philosophy Club is accepting submissions for the Philosophy Department’s annual “What Is…?” conference. This year’s theme is “What is Materialism?” and we encourage any interested University of Oregon philosophy graduate or undergraduate students to apply. Materialism has achieved a resurgence in feminist philosophy, environmental philosophy, philosophy of mind, and American pragmatism, but also has a rich and continuing history in the context of social and political philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology. What continues to attract us to the study of matter, and how does incorporating matter into philosophy alter our ontological, ethical, and political commitments? What is the place of emerging materialisms in philosophical work, and how does the history of materialism continue to inform our philosophical practices? In the context of varying approaches to materialism, how do we define what materialism is, or how is a pluralism of materialisms possible? And why should matter continue to matter for philosophy? Submissions should be prepared as 500-word abstracts for a 20-30 minute presentation, excluding any identifying information. Please e-mail your submissions, along with a cover letter with your name, the title of your paper, and whether you are a graduate student or an undergraduate student to [email protected]. The deadline for the submission is 5pm, Monday, March 31st, 2014. Please direct any questions or concerns to Amy Billingsley ([email protected]), Lauren Eichler ([email protected]), or Billy Goehring ([email protected])..

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Pluralisms About Truth and Logic Nathan Kellen University of Connecticut - Storrs, [email protected]
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