"FRONT and REAR in WAR of the FUTURE"· Reappraisal of the Question of the Role and Importance of the Rear in the Gene

APPENDIX 1 "FRONT AND REAR IN WAR OF THE FUTURE"· Reappraisal of the question of the role and importance of the rear in the general course of military operations is a basic and most important con clusion from the experience of the past imperialist war of 1914-1918. The thesis that states that "the outcome of war will be decided not only directly on the battle front but also on those lines where the civil forces of the country are located" has now become the current axiom. The experi ences of the war show that the attainment of the goals of war under con temporary conditions has become a matter which is significantly more com plicated than it formerly was. Contemporary armies possess a colossal vi tality. Even the achievement of the utter defeat of the opponent at a definite moment does not assure the final victory so long as there is, behind the defeated units, a rear which is economically and morally strong. Given the presence of time and space which permit a new mobilization of hwnan and material resources which are needed for the restoration of the fighting capacity of the army, such defeated units may easily reestablish the front and carry the struggle forward with hope of success. On the other hand, difficulties of guaranteeing the mobilizational readi ness of the army have grown to incredible dimensions. The means need~ for this are not hundreds of millions, but rather billions of rubles. Such figures, it goes without saying, can not be maintained by any budget, even that of the richest country. Finally, the rapid progress of contemporary military technology also operates in the same direction. That which is, today, the most absolute will, tomorrow, become obsolete and will not provide success. Hence, the in expedience and real danger of colossal financial expenditures for the ready- • Translated from the text which appeared in M. V. Frunze, lzbrannye proizve deniia (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1957), II, pp. 133-143. with footnotes by the editors of that collection. This essay first a,ppeared as the introduction to P. Karatygin, Obshchie osnovy mobilitzatsii promyshlennosti dlia nuzhd voiny (Moscow: Voenny vestnik, 1925). 168 APPENDICES ing of mobilizational expenses. The center of gravity is transferred to the corresponding organization of industry and, most of all, of the economy of the country. The inevitability of a review of the very principles of strategy flows from what has been set out here. In clashes between first-rate opponents, the decision will not be achieved by a single blow. War will assume the char acter of a protracted and severe contest which puts all the economic and political foundations of the fighting sides to the test. Expressed in the language of strategy, this signifies the transition from the strategy of light ning, decisive blows to the strategy of attrition.1 This basically correct conclusion must be supplemented by an amend ment which flows from the class character of future wars. The essence of this amendment is contained in the fact that, with the acute exacerbation of class contradictions, the moral steadfastness of a certain fighting side may prove to be very weak and may not withstand the operations of the first serious military blow. The circumstance of fighting sides with contrasting types of class systems will be especially characteristic in this respect. For example, the clash of a bourgeois country with our Soviet Union. It is obvious that a strong military blow from our side might result in giving full scope to elements of the proletarian class movement within the opposing side and the seizure of power by the working class, which would signify the automatic cessation of war, might become possible. Without doubt, reasoning of this sort is also applicable to us so long as internal enemies of the workers' and peasants' state system are able to raise their heads. This accounts, by the way, for the fact that remnants of the old armed White Guards (Wrangel) and others continue, up to the present, to 1 At the basis of the concept of the "strategy of attrition" as applied by M. V. Fnmze lies the idea that contemporary war between powerful opponents can not be concluded by one battle or in a short period. Contemporary wars, M. V. Frunze stressed, stretch into protracted contests which demand the thorough effort of the strength of the people and the state. Victory can be achieved only by active combat actions in which maneuver plays a great role. In the course of these actions, the anny of the qpponent must be destroyed and the economic and moral basis of his resistance must be undermined. This concept of M. V. Frunze has nothing in common with the far-fetched "strategy of starvation" of Delbriick. By the "strategy of starvation." the latter under stood those actions which resulted in the seizure of territory of the opponent by means of maneuver without the destruction of his vital forces and combat technology. Delbrllck did not consider tIm fabricated "strategy" suitable to the conditions of the war of 1914-1918, although it allegedly had application to past wars; he justified the theory of "lightning war" which the German General Staff followed in the First World War. APPENDICES 169 profit by the notorious patronage of the government of the bourgeois coun tries.2 It, thus, by no means follows from the reasoning which has been set out above that there is a necessity for us absolutely to reject the strategy of lightning blows (this strategy, by the way, is not rejected by the bourgeois states). On the contrary, the stronger the exacerbation of class contradic tions in the camp of the enemy becomes, the greater are the chances and essential qualities for the success and advantageousness of just this strategy. With all this, however, the necessity of the preparation for protracted and stubborn war always remains compulsory for us. In so far as it is a matter of clashes of two different worlds, this signifies a fight to the death. The workers' and peasants' republic has many enemies and, therefore, the struggle under any conditions will be protracted. Thus, in our time, the union of the front with the rear must become much closer, more direct and decisive. The life and work of the front at any given moment is conditioned by the work and condition of the rear. And, in this sense, the center of gravity in the waging of war has moved back from the front - to the rear. Another force which is connected with the development of military tech nology and the perfection of the means of destruction also acts in this di rection. The transformation of aviation into a decisive arm of the fighting services, the perfection of means of chemical warfare, the possible use of infectious microbes,3 and so forth and so on - all this, in essence, overturns the very notion of "front" and "rear" in the old sense of these words. ! After the defeat of Wrangel, about 100,000 White Guarc:i!, of which not less than 50,000 were combat personnel, were evacuated (or rather, fled) from the Crimea. In accordance with an agreement concluded in November, 1920. between Wrangel and the French Supreme Commander, de Martel, and the Commander of the French Squadron in the Black Sea. Admiral Liumenil [sic - "Dumesnil" is probably what is intended, WOJ], all those White Guards were evacuated from the Crimea under the patronage of France. In 1921, Wrangel's entire evacuated army (about 45,000 men) was formed into three corps - The First Army, the Don, and the Kuban. In May of that year, remnants of the Wrangel army began to settle in the Balkan countries but parts of the army were sent to the French colonies. By the time of the appearance of the article by Mikai! Vasil'evich Frunze, groups of Wrangelians who remained in a series of countries played an unportant role, helping the bourgeois countries in their capacity as military-political forces to suppress the workers' movement. In this manner, the national uprising in Bulgaria in 1923 was suppressed by the Bulgarian government with the assitance of the Wrangeiians. a The question of the possibility of the use of infectious microbes for military purposes was openly discussed in the pamphlet of the French military doctor Georges Louis, L'armee bacteriologique, published in Paris in 1922. This pamphlet attracted the attention of M. V. Frunze and he was compelled to draw the attention of the military community to the possibility of the use of infectious microbes as a means of 170 APPENDICES The front, in the sense of a region directly comprehended by military activities, loses the character of the previous vital barrier which blocks the enemy's access to the "rear." The rear is now united with the front, if not completely, then, in any case, in a significant part of it (depending mainly on the dimensions of the territory of a given country). From this it follows that there are new tasks and new methods of the preparation of the coun try's defenses and, in particular, a new role of the rear itself as a direct participant in the struggle. Once the direct burden of waging war falls on the entire people, on the whole country, once the rear acquires such im portance in the general course of military operations, then, naturally, the task of its thorough and systematic preparation in time of peace appears in the premier place. This preparation should have the goal, in the first place, of the uninter rupted supply of the front with everything necessary for the conduct of com bat operations, and, in the second place, the providing to the rear itself of all that is needed for the maintenance of its working energy and moral stead fastness at the proper level.

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