Surviving Austerity: Rape Crisis Centers and the Illinois State Budget Impasse
BY ANNE KIRKNER B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 2008 M.A., Colorado State University, 2012
DISSERTATION Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology, Law, and Justice in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Chicago, 2019
Chicago, Illinois
Defense Committee: Sarah E. Ullman, Criminology, Law, and Justice, Chair and Advisor Beth Richie, Criminology, Law, and Justice Edna Erez, Criminology, Law, and Justice Lisa Frohmann, Criminology, Law, and Justice LaDonna Long, Roosevelt University Megan Alderden, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority
This dissertation is dedicated to those who work to support survivors of sexual violence.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my dissertation committee- Dr. Sarah Ullman, Dr. Beth Richie, Dr.
Lisa Frohmann, Dr. LaDonna Long, Dr. Edna Erez, and Dr. Megan Alderden- for their generous and supportive guidance during this process. Through our meetings and classes you have each contributed to my growth as a scholar, researcher, and activist. I would not be completing this degree without your collective kindness. Special thanks to Dr. Ullman for her tireless work with me and the rest of the graduate students she mentors. You teach us every semester that rigorous research and publishing do not have to come at the expense of caring about people. Especially during this last semester in school, I cannot imagine a more supportive environment.
I also want to thank Dr. Alderden and the team at ICJIA’s Center for Victim Studies- Dr.
Jaclyn Houston-Kolnik, Jennifer Hiselman, and Amanda Vasquez. I have learned so much from working there and becoming familiar with the InfoNet database. Thank you for answering my questions and showing me how to work with the data. And thank you for teaching me how to engage in applied research that is accountable to agency partners. Your willingness to help me understand all the different funding and reporting processes and your patience has helped support me throughout the project and dissertation writing. Thank you for facilitating the data gathering and connecting me to agency partners.
This research also relies on the trust of the RCCs in Illinois and I am very grateful to all the organizations that shared their data in the form of numbers and stories. I have learned so much from everyone I met during this project. Your strength throughout the budget crisis is admirable- I hope this project does justice to your stories. And I hope this project is helpful to all the centers and sparks conversation.
iii Major thanks to my many colleagues and to the Executive Director, Dawn Tefft, of the
Graduate Employees Organization. We accomplished something great this semester that took several years of careful planning. I feel lucky to have been there from the beginning. I learned as much organizing with my union as I did from my graduate school classes. Solidarity forever.
Thank you to my parents, Rob and Ellen Kirkner, who are some of my dearest friends and closest confidants. Thank you for your endless support from 600 miles away. And thank you for raising me to be a pro-union feminist. Thanks to my loving partner, Ishmael Ali Zghoul, for supporting me in ways big and small. Thank you for always believing I would finish even when I did not. Thanks also to Erin O’Callaghan and Veronica Shepp for motivating me to keep going in our long work sessions at coffee shops, fun at happy hours and karaoke, and sticking it out together in long union meetings and during our epic strike. I am proud to call you friends and colleagues. I am looking forward to seeing all the great work you will continue to do in this field.
ACK
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 A. Dissertation Overview ...... 2 II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 3 A. Anti-Violence Organizations: History and Funding ...... 4 1. History of VAW organizations ...... 5 2. Current state of victim services ...... 13 B. Victims Seeking Help from Service Providers ...... 16 1. Sexual assault ...... 17 2. Domestic violence ...... 19 3. Demographic differences in help-seeking ...... 20 C. A Feminist Political Economy of Austerity ...... 21 1. Intersectional feminist political economy ...... 24 D. The Effects of Austerity on Victim Services ...... 25 E. Organizational Theories ...... 26 1. Feminist organizations ...... 27 2. Criminal justice organizational theories ...... 28 F. Study Rationale ...... 32 III. CURRENT STUDY...... 35 A. Understanding RCC Clients and Services in Illinois ...... 35 B. Research Questions & Hypotheses ...... 36 1. Effects on Total Monthly Service Hours ...... 37 2. Effects on Monthly Service Hours ...... 37 3. Effects of Budget Impasse on Agencies Serving Racial and Ethnic Minorities ...... 39 4. Differences Between Rural and Urban Agencies ...... 39 5. Effects on Agencies and Decision-Making ...... 39 IV. METHODS ...... 43 A. Mixed-method Approach: Concurrent Triangulation ...... 43 B. Quantitative Methods ...... 44 1. Sample...... 45 2. Interrupted Time Series Regression Analysis ...... 45 C. Qualitative Methods ...... 50 1. Sample...... 50 2. Data Cleaning and Analysis ...... 54
v TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) V. RESULTS ...... 57 A. Quantitative Results ...... 57 1. Dataset Descriptive Information ...... 57 2. Time Series Analysis ...... 57 B. Qualitative Results ...... 69 1. Interview Sample Descriptive Information ...... 69 2. Crisis Mitigation Strategies...... 71 3. Effects on staff and volunteers ...... 76 4. Effects on clients ...... 81 5. Collaboration...... 88 6. Talking to Legislators/Lobbying...... 90 7. Crisis Decision-making ...... 92 VI. DISCUSSION ...... 95 VII. CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH ...... 116 A. Contributions ...... 116 B. Limitations ...... 119 C. Practical Implications and Future Research ...... 122 VIII. CONCLUSION ...... 127 CITED LITERATURE ...... 128 APPENDICES ...... 143 APPENDIX A...... 143 APPENDIX B...... 146 APPENDIX C...... 150 VITA ...... 154
vi LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE Figure 1. Total staff hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 58
Figure 2. Criminal justice advocacy hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 59
Figure 3. Medical advocay hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 60
Figure 4. Other advocacy hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 60
Figure 5. Individual counseling hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 62
Figure 6. Telephone counseling hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 62
Figure 7. Group counseling hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 63
Figure 8. Hotline hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 64
Figure 9. Public education (elementary) hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 66
Figure 10. Public education (secondary) hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 67
Figure 11. New volunteer training hours by quarter 2013-2017...... 67
Figure 12. Rape crisis center locations in Illinois...... 70
vii LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE TABLE I. YEARLY TOTAL SERVICE HOURS FOR RCCS 2012-2016 ...... 36
TABLE II. HYPOTHESES FOR SERVICE HOUR CHANGES OVER 49 MONTHS ...... 38
TABLE III. RURAL RCC RELATIVE PERCENTAGE IN POST-CRISIS SERVICE HOURS
...... 65
TABLE IV. SUMMARY OF RELATIVE PERCENT CHANGE IN POST-CRISIS SERVICE
HOURS ...... 68
viii SUMMARY
Rape crisis centers (RCCs) represent one of the most tangible advances of the modern women’s movement. Their proliferation within all 50 states is largely due to the decision by early movement activists to accept and seek out more government funding (Freinkel & Smith,
1988; Johnston, 1981). While these decisions to more closely associate with government entities and take on more professionalized organizational characteristics were not made lightly by early organizers, they are the subject of much criticism among feminist scholars today (Rojas Durazo,
2007). Beyond the debate of whether or not RCCs have maintained their radical, grassroots perspectives (Campbell, Baker, & Mazurek, 1998) is the reality that RCCs serve thousands of survivors each year and remain the only societal institution that exists wholly in support of survivors and their loved ones. As RCCs have come to resemble non-profit social service organizations, they retain the unique characteristic of providing unconditional support for survivors and many are community-focused in their service provision (Baker & Bevaqua, 2017).
Given this unique societal position and their relatively recent historical turn from radical grassroots organization to professional social-service agencies, this study sought to understand how neoliberal austerity policies affect RCCs and how they deploy resources and make decisions in the face of extreme budgetary uncertainty. There has been little scholarly research on RCCs that takes into account both the radical history of RCCs and their current precarious position as social service providers in times of unprecedented neo-liberal reforms. However, such research is needed to truly understand the challenges and issues facing a vital resource for survivors.
ix SUMMARY (continued)
This study used a mixed-methods design of analyzing existing quantitative administrative data and qualitative interviews with agency directors to better understand how a de facto austerity policy such as the Illinois budget crisis (a two year period with no state funding) affected RCCs in their ability to provide comprehensive services to survivors of sexual violence throughout the state. Quantitative data empirically assessed the effect of the budget impasse on service hours delivered. Interview data explored themes of crisis decision-making, effects on
staff morale, and strategies for surviving the two-year period.
The quantitative sample included data from all 34 RCCs and their satellite agencies in
Illinois (for a total of 64 centers), using data collected from a centralized database called InfoNet
managed by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Twelve service categories were
analyzed from the aggregate dataset and then again for a separate rural dataset containing data
from 24 centers (satellite and main locations both included, depending on geographic area).
Qualitative interviews were conducted with 22 agency directors from all over the state of Illinois.
Two directors were from the same agency and provided information from different time periods,
but all other respondents represented independent, ‘parent’ RCCs (i.e., not satellite locations).
Quantitative results, using Interrupted Time Series (ITS) regression analysis, showed
significant decreases for criminal justice advocacy, individual counseling, and telephone counseling in the overall, aggregate dataset containing all 64 centers. The rural dataset revealed distinct findings, showing significant decreases in medical advocacy in addition to criminal justice advocacy and large, significant increases for telephone counseling. These results
x SUMMARY (continued) demonstrate the budget crisis had distinct effects on rural RCCs and overall led to decreased service hours for all centers.
Qualitative results revealed the ways in which agencies tried to survive the crisis through extreme cost-cutting on basic necessities such as electricity and toilet paper, reducing staff hours, and laying off a few staff members or shifting them to ‘volunteers’. These measures severely depressed staff morale, increased staff distress, and led to client perceptions of agencies as declining. Interview respondents also reported a shrinking of referral networks in their communities as other social service agencies struggled to keep their doors open. It is possible the smaller referral networks and perceptions of agencies in decline led to a decrease in advocacy, as many clients come through referrals.
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative results suggest RCCs and their clients were hit hard by the loss of 40-80% of their budgets. Organizational theories help illuminate the choices made by agency directors in funneling limited resources to core services and making decisions based on resource scarcity, but they do not fully account for the conditions of extreme resource deprivation under which RCCs were operating. Feminist economic frameworks for understanding neo-liberal austerity policies help broaden the understanding of RCC experiences by highlighting how financial risk under neo-liberalism is shifted away from corporations and those in power and onto vulnerable populations. The professionalization and subsequent de- politicization of RCCs over time reduced their ability to view the budget impasse as a shared crisis and form of economic violence in such a way that enabled them to engage in collective action beyond lobbying legislators. RCCs use of ‘unobtrusive mobilization’ (Katzenstein, 1990)
xi SUMMARY (continued) and empowerment framework (Batliwala, 2007) curtailed more confrontational or radical political activity. Instead, RCCs turned to financial strategies for survival such as using lines of credit, relying on reserves, and engaging in extreme agency-wide budget cuts. These strategies allowed the agencies to survive but leave many questions as to how RCCs would survive another budget crisis or sudden, severe loss of funding. Implications for practice and future research are discussed.
xii I. INTRODUCTION
Rape Crisis Centers (RCCs) were born out of the women’s liberation movement of the
1970s in the US. Though they have changed over the past 40 years and institutionalized into
more formal structures (Campbell et al., 1998), they retain a central importance in the struggle to
end sexual violence. RCCs are still the only organizations that exist solely in support of survivors
of sexual violence. The centers in Illinois operate with the mandate to provide services to
survivors that affirm their humanity, recognize their harm, and do not view them as irreparably
broken (ICASA, 2018). While sexual victimization remains at epidemic proportions (Black et al.,
2011) RCCs will remain a much-needed resource for all survivors but especially those who cannot afford mental health services or do not find mainstream services to be welcoming spaces.
Past research has demonstrated the importance of RCCs and advocacy work in improving survivors’ experiences within formal systems of reporting and help-seeking (Campbell, 2006).
Yet chronic underfunding of RCCs is a persistent problem and routinely acts as a barrier to
reaching more survivors (Ullman & Townsend, 2007). Writing on RCCs has primarily focused
on the tension between professionalization and grassroots work (Rojas Durazo, 2007) and the
difficulties of working in agencies with such limited means (Maier, 2011a). But this literature
has not captured the processes of decision-making under extreme funding deprivation and the
specific ways in which service delivery is interrupted. Evaluations and applied studies from the
UK have explored the impacts of severe budget cuts and austerity policies on women’s
organizations there, and these studies served as the inspiration for this one. Using the 2015
Illinois budget crisis as background, the following mixed-methods study fills the gaps in
knowledge of how RCCs make decisions with extremely limited funding in an environment of
1 fiscal uncertainty and how services are affected, along with staff and the working environment.
There are several contributions to be made from this study. First, the data will be shared with
Illinois RCCs to foster conversation and to be used in their funding endeavors. Second, this study expands what is known about RCC survival and mobilization strategies and can inform new ways of approaching how agencies attempt to shift policies.
A. Dissertation Overview
The dissertation begins with Chapter 2, a review of relevant literature beginning with a history of RCCs, followed by a review of research on who utilizes their services, and then an overview of useful feminist economic and organizational theories. The chapter ends with an explanation of how this study fills the gaps in the bodies of literature listed above. Chapter 3 presents the specific research questions and hypotheses that guided the study. Chapter 4 describes the methods used in this study and information about the administrative dataset
(InfoNet) and the development of the interview guide. It also provides an explanation of the interrupted time series regression used to analyze the quantitative data. Chapter 5 presents the results of the analysis, beginning with descriptions of each sample before detailing the quantitative findings and ending with qualitative interview themes. Chapter 6 includes a discussion of the quantitative and qualitative findings, including sections where the qualitative results help explain some of the quantitative results. Chapter 7 details the contributions of this study to existing bodies of literature, the limitations of this study, and practical implications and future avenues of research that could build on the results found in this research. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation.
2 II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Thousands of survivors of interpersonal violence seek help each year from rape crisis
centers in the US and in Illinois, specifically (Hiselman, 2016; Houston-Kolnik, Vasquez,
Alderden, & Hiselman, 2017). To date, Illinois has over 92 DV shelters and 63 RCCs. Not all
agencies receive funding through the statewide coalitions and ICJIA, but most do. As they have
grown bigger over time and changed from their grassroots beginnings in the 1970s to a more
professionalized model, these organizations have become increasingly dependent on federal and
state governments for their survival (Matthews, 1994). Funding shortages are a perennial
problem and remain a constant barrier to providing victim services (Maier, 2011a). However,
this problem may be exacerbated during times of budgetary crisis at the state level as providers
see their referral networks shrink and already burnt-out staff are pressed to do even more with even less (Houston-Kolnik et al., 2017).
Both domestic violence and RCC agencies are discussed throughout this chapter because
this study contains data from some dual-service agencies and because the historical development
of violence against women agencies and current US context is inextricably linked. However,
rape crisis centers are the main focus of this study. This literature review is divided into three
sections. The first section reviews the history and current operating concerns of RCCs and DV
agencies. The second section reviews research on who seeks help from anti-violence agencies in
order to further the understanding of which types of survivors/victims are most directly impacted
by reductions in services and not lose sight of the people most affected. The third section finds
theoretical grounding in a feminist economic framework, recognizing that, as with interpersonal
violence, economic policies are inherently gendered (Pearson & Elson, 2015). The fourth section
then highlights the small body of research studies from the UK and Canada specifically
3 examining the effects of austerity on anti-violence agencies. The fifth and last section highlights relevant organizational theory literature to help elucidate the various ways agencies respond to their environments before concluding with a discussion of notable gaps in the literature and the need for additional research specific to the US context.1
A. Anti-Violence Organizations: History and Funding
Rape crisis centers proliferated in the 1970’s as part of the women’s and civil rights movements. The history of this grassroots movement is important to understanding the evolving relationship between Violence Against Women (VAW) organizations and state institutions. This history is one of movement building and organizing while also marshaling funds and making decisions about institutional partnerships with state agencies and law enforcement. State agencies included health and human service departments and federal agencies such as the Department of
Justice and the Office on Violence Against Women, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Funding decisions have come with considerable benefits and costs. Decisions were initially made collectively by
1 Notes on concepts and terminology
The terms austerity policies and budget cuts are used interchangeably throughout this proposal to describe similar policies. Austerity in the context of this study and in recent years has come to mean a political economic ideology that gained popularity in Western Europe and North America after the 2007-2008 global financial disaster. Austerity policies are rooted within a framework that seeks to shift the crisis from the financial sector to the public sector- locating the root of large government deficits firmly in the political problem of an out of control welfare state rather than the reckless behavior of the financial sector (Clarke & Newman, 2012). Debates in the US and UK in particular have shifted from regulation of the financial industry to doing away with the perceived bloat of public sector programs such as social services and education (Clarke & Newman, 2012). I acknowledge that austerity policies can also often include short-term economic stimulus packages. However, there have been no short-term stimulus packages passed or even proposed in Illinois to help make up for the funding shortfalls that occurred with the budget impasse.
4 founding organizers and activists in the 1970s and 1980s, shifting over time to professional executive directors, boards of directors, financial officers and development directors as agencies became more professional. Taking government funding allowed for expansion while at the same time ceded the freedom to make decisions autonomously. Government funding also meant that agencies, on some level, had to accept an apolitical, public health approach to addressing interpersonal violence.
1. History of VAW organizations
Interpersonal violence and violence against women were not always considered social problems or even recognized as crimes. Its status as a social problem and as a specific form of oppression faced mostly but not exclusively by women and femme-identified people is a more recent development of the past forty years in the United States. The framing of interpersonal violence as a public problem is the result of many years of struggle on the part of feminists and marginalized groups of mostly women. Early activists and organizers were women from all segments of society, with strong representation from queer women, poor women, and women of color- many of whom first articulated critiques of hetero-patriarchal society as a direct result of their multiple marginalized identities (Johnston, 1981).
One of the earliest modern mainstream feminist texts to deal exclusively with the problem of sexual violence comes from Brownmiller’s Against Our Will (1976), though social movement leaders such as Ida B. Wells had been writing about sexual violence in the context of
African-American and poor people’s civil rights as early as the 1900’s (Davis, 1981).
Brownmiller initially approached the topic of sexual assault as a skeptic before she published her groundbreaking book- she did not believe it was a widespread problem until she attended a
‘speak-out’ and heard from hundreds of women about their experiences with sexual victimization
5 (1976). Witnessing the speak-out led Brownmiller (1976) to research the topic and consequently
write her groundbreaking book, Against Our Will. This ‘speak out’ format is still a common
feature of sexual assault advocacy group activities, where many victims of sexual violence come
together in a (usually) public space and share their stories (Bevacqua, 2000).
Brownmiller popularized the idea that rape and sexual violence were not about sex, though they were crimes of opportunity, but rather about power relations and men maintaining social control of women through the constant threat of rape (1976). She believed the high prevalence of sexual assault was the result of oppressive cultural and societal arrangements between women and men and that women’s sexual autonomy had to be respected and valued if society truly wanted to end the phenomenon of sexual violence. Ultimately, Brownmiller and others were in favor of legal reforms to help victims of sexual violence win better outcomes in the criminal justice system, but recognized that sexual assault could never be fully legislated into obscurity until there was widespread and corresponding cultural change (1976; Estrich, 1987).
Brownmiller advocated for women to come together across race and class barriers to unite under a shared political consciousness and fight back- physically (self-defense movement) and symbolically against a shared vulnerability
Predominantly white feminists like Brownmiller advocated a shared political consciousness for women to fight back against the shared oppression and ever-present threat of sexual violence, but Brownmiller’s work did not fully attend to the realities of mobilizing across race and class lines. Her work tended to appeal to universalist claims that if we could rid ourselves of gender, race, and class categories, liberation would follow. Brownmiller’s work includes a relatively thorough accounting of the history of race and sexual violence in the US with regard to lynching of Black men and the sexual victimization of Black women in the post-
6 slavery era, however she relegated this history to the past without accounting for how it affects
the present. After detailing the history of race and rape in the US, she resumed her call for
women to unite across the racial divide rather than examining how this history may structure and
impede the unification project she envisaged (1976). More insidious is Brownmiller’s suggestion
that Black men target White women for sexual assault by internalizing and acting out the
stereotype of the Black male rapist (1976). Her argument symbolizes a common problem with
many mainstream, liberal feminists of the 1970s- a failure to properly attend to structural inequality more broadly and racism and classism specifically.
In contrast to Brownmiller, Angela Davis (1981b) viewed sexual violence as evidence of the ‘social dysfunction’ inherent to a capitalist society. Davis’ (1981b) work represents a Black feminist and Marxist perspective on sexual violence, and was affirmed in a statement by the
Black Feminist Combahee River Collective (Combahee River Collective, 2014), that centered the combined set of oppressions experienced by Black women caught in the double bind of race and gender. She and other Marxist feminists linked the crisis of violence against women to the crisis of capitalism by calling attention to the reality that men of the middle and upper
‘professional’ classes routinely engage in sexual coercion against women considered to be their subordinates and that these instances are rarely reported or prosecuted (Davis, 1981b;
MacKinnon, 1982). For Black and Marxist feminists, the rampant sexual harassment of women, for example, is linked to workplaces where women are exploited as employees, especially places without labor unions (Davis, 1981b). Davis also warned the attacks on women, sexual harassment, and rising racism within the criminal justice system (writing from a time when mass incarceration was just beginning) were all due to the backlash from an embattled ‘capitalist class’ to organized resistance from workers, women, and people of color that characterized the social
7 movements of the previous decades. Marxist feminists argued that any attempt to eradicate interpersonal violence in isolation and without acknowledgement of the ways in which classism, racism, and heterosexism were also forms of violence was doomed to fail (Davis, 1981a, 1981b;
MacKinnon, 1982).
Black feminists writing about the anti-violence movement critiqued the “everywoman” analysis put forth by some mainstream feminists because it centered the needs of middle and upper class, professional White women at the expense of a truly ‘transgressive’ politics of sexual violence that included race and class analysis (Richie, 2000). Native feminist critiques of the mainstream anti-violence movement also point out the need for decolonization to be part of the struggle to end sexual violence, as many Native American societies had holistic ways of dealing with the rare incidents of violence against women and only experienced widespread violence as part of genocide and loss of land through White settler colonialism (Deer, 2015). Native feminists question the role of the criminal justice system in ending interpersonal violence when the state, at its inception, has been the main purveyor of violence and destruction to Native communities (Deer, 2015).
The inception and proliferation of rape crisis centers and domestic violence agencies were a tangible outcome of the women’s movements of the 1970’s. Black women had been organizing for decades around sexual violence, as part of a larger struggle to gain bodily autonomy from slavery through Jim Crow segregation, forming the basis of the modern Civil
Rights movement (McGuire, 2010). Given this history, it is not surprising that women of color and Black women in particular, were central actors in the early anti-violence movement.
8 a. Rape crisis centers
Anti-rape organizing began before the battered women’s and domestic violence shelter movement, though the two are closely linked, and anti-rape organizing has more in common with an anti-capitalist feminist framework as in the work of Angela Y. Davis. Women from feminist consciousness-raising groups that proliferated in the 1970’s women’s liberation movement were the first to organize and form collectives dedicated to eradicating sexual violence and providing mutual aid to survivors (Craft, 1981). Rape crisis centers (RCC’s) began as grassroots organizations without formal hierarchies. Their direct services- crisis hotlines and counseling- were developed directly by victims/survivors who met informally at first to establish more organized programs (Freinkel & Smith, 1988; Rape Crisis Center, Washington, D.C.,
1972). They also viewed their organizations as having social change missions, as they viewed gender inequality as the direct cause of sexual violence.
As their services grew, many RCC’s brought on paid staff. This was partly for efficiency but also to mitigate stratification among movement organizers. Typically, White, middle class women had the ability to serve as volunteers while many poor women and women of color could not do so as they were much more dependent on wages (Freinkel & Smith, 1988). Early RCC movement activists were more intersectional in their organizing than is often recognized, and providing wages to RCC staff was a way of sustaining the leadership contributions of poor women and women of color in movement and direct services work (Makers, 2010). Loretta Ross, an early organizer in the RCC movement, began her anti-violence work as an extension of her activism in the arena of housing rights in Washington, DC and she became a founding member of one of the nation’s first rape crisis centers (Makers, 2010).
9 b. Domestic violence shelters and agencies
Domestic violence shelters and agencies were organized within the same ad-hoc, mutual aid frameworks as RCCs. Many early domestic violence shelters were non-hierarchical- staff all earned the same wages and paid staff were recruited from the population who had utilized the shelter (after some training and mentoring) (Rodriguez, 1988). The equal power- sharing model was deliberate and meant to counteract patriarchal culture (Rodriguez, 1988).
Other projects started based on mutual aid, such as the Park Slope Safe Home Project Services
(Johnston, 1981). Grassroots DV services were also more intersectional in their organizing and the aforementioned project worked closely with the Third World Women’s Caucus of the
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, a working group started by women of color to advocate for the linkage of issues affecting communities of color with issues of violence against women (Arnold & Ake, 2013). These women of color caucuses and working groups helped pave the way for specialized agencies dedicated solely to groups such as Latinx survivors of IPV and other ethnic minority communities. As with the early history of anti-rape organizing, women of color, queer women, and white anti-racist feminists are often erased in the history of the first domestic violence shelters (Thompson, 2002).
There was an early intersectional feminist politics and movement at the forefront of the anti-violence movement, working in concert and separately on issues affecting communities of color (Thompson, 2002). The multi-racial groups of feminists were especially wary of federal and state funding of their efforts, while also recognizing the need for more sustainable funding streams, as the government was simply another arm of oppression in communities of color who were at the time experiencing the ramping up of mass incarceration (Thompson, 2002). One account from a battered women’s collective in Lawrence, KS details the investigation of the
10 shelter by state officials suspicious of a hotline advertised by the center on behalf of a lesbian
support group (Johnston, 1981). The collective was denied a community development grant as a
direct result of this investigation, which was eventually traced back to a conservative lobbyist
whose wife had stayed at a battered women’s shelter(Johnston, 1981). This story illustrates the
very real threat to local and community autonomy agencies faced when accepting state funding.
Susan Schechter’s keynote address to a VAW agencies conference in 1980 echoed this concern:
“It is our job to collectively on local, state, and national levels to develop these long- range plans now. One of the strengths of our movement []…has been the collectivity of planning and decision making based on local needs…” (Johnston, 1981)
Schechter also reminded the conference attendees of everything the movement had won; the very
existence of domestic violence shelters was a symbol of women’s progress and another crack in
the wall of patriarchy (Johnston, 1981).
c. Questions of funding
The movement for rape crisis centers and domestic violence agencies has always
contained a tension between maintaining a non-hierarchical, feminist political organizing ethos
and becoming professionalized in order to expand service capacity and find sustainable funding.
The current composition of most agencies as volunteer and professional staff is a reflection of
the historical public-private partnerships that helped provide early funding for these groups
(Freinkel & Smith, 1988). At the federal level, Congress began studying the problem of sexual
assault and providing grant funding for research and demonstration projects in the late 1970’s.
They did not want to fund direct services because most RCC’s explicit feminist ideology made
legislators uncomfortable at best and openly hostile to the cause at worst (Freinkel & Smith,
1988). Federal funding made it possible for more professionalized, hierarchical, apolitical groups of social service providers to benefit from the early labor of movement organizers and then
11 swiftly kick them out of the spaces they created; as was the case in Pittsburgh’s RCC (Johnston,
1981).
By the early 1980’s, the government was drastically cutting funding for all types of social
services and did not want to support new efforts. From their inception, the ability of VAW
agencies to survive under extreme financial hardship has obscured the deep need for sustainable
funding (Freinkel & Smith, 1988). RCCs who secured some federal and state funding in the
1980s received the money on the condition that local entities would take over the funding after
one year (Freinkel & Smith, 1988). Yet in many cases, the funding was quietly eliminated instead of being renewed locally and services were forced to go away or be taken over by volunteers. However, some funding streams of this nature did persist, especially for agencies that partnered with existing institutions such as hospitals and law enforcement agencies. In these cases, the RCC began to take on the instrumental aims of their partner agencies (e.g. forensic evidence collection, increased victim reporting to police) at the expense of fostering solidarity and peer support among victims/survivors (Freinkel & Smith, 1988). By the late 1980’s, the
CDC had taken over federal appropriations for VAW agencies but most were receiving $10,000
or less annually (Freinkel & Smith, 1988).
Domestic violence agencies incorporated more diverse funding streams early on, partially
due to taking note of the struggles of RCCs to secure funding (Freinkel & Smith, 1988). They
were also limited in their ability to use funds for direct services, an even greater difficulty than
for RCCs given the high cost of running a shelter (Freinkel & Smith, 1988). The historical record
of government funding for VAW agencies reveals that the state has always kept programs at less
than subsistence levels of funding, refusing to increase funds even when demand outpaced
capacity. Austerity policies toward VAW agencies may be an old story, but it is not without
12 struggle. Even with limited and uncertain funding, and amidst struggles within the feminist anti- violence movement against institutionalizing, VAW organizations have still managed to grow and influence the discourse around interpersonal violence. State budget crises are particularly disruptive to this on-going work and illuminate the ways in which VAW agencies still struggle with the state for legitimacy and survival.
2. Current state of victim services
Today RCC’s and DV agencies retain very little of the practical collectivist, radical intersectional feminism of the past. Most, if not all, have fully professionalized and focus the bulk of their services on legal and medical advocacy, which are often perceived by advocates and the public as more ‘legitimate’ (Kolb, 2014). There are problems with the highly medicalized model of care, for example forensic evidence collection can sometimes reproduce harm and violence if nurses are biased or pass extra-legal information such as victim drug use to police
(Mulla, 2014). Many VAW agencies operate using a business or service model (Finley, 2010).
Many RCCs have adopted what sociologist Mary Katzenstein (1990) termed ‘unobtrusive mobilization’, or the strategy of attempting to reform societal institutions from within rather than confronting them in an adversarial manner. Retaining at least a semblance of feminist critique, it is still common for most RCCs to conceptualize sexual violence in gendered terms that take into account patriarchal power (Martin, 2005). Mobilizing in less conspicuous ways means giving up some important political battles that challenge the overarching white hetero-patriarchal power structure, but it also affords VAW agencies greater access to victims/survivors and greater power to influence the policies and practices of law enforcement, medical personnel, mental health therapists, and the courts.
13 The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1995 funded services in all 50 US states
and the effect of this legislation has been tangible. The services funded by VAWA have had a
measurable impact on violent victimization in the US. The incidence of rape and aggravated
assault has dropped considerably over time and this is a direct result of the increased programs
and services funded by VAWA (Boba & Lilley, 2009). This drop in the two types of violent
crime, which was not observed for other types of UCR-index crimes and which was statistically
linked to VAWA funding, is likely due to the increase of enforcement and accountability of
offenders. In a 2000 report by Burt, et. al., on VAWA STOP
(Services*Training*Officers*Prosecutors) grants, state-level analysis for Illinois revealed the beginning of comprehensive planning and coordination across state-level coalitions (IL Coalition
Against Domestic Violence & IL Coalition Against Sexual Assault). Grant money was allocated from the national to the state level, and funds were shared out equally to both types of service providers (Burt, et. al., 2001). One of their main objectives across the state was to open up more service provider agencies in Illinois, and they had already begun to achieve that goal when the report was undertaken (Burt, et. al., 2001). They opened up agencies in rural parts of the state and opened an agency focused specifically on Latina women in response to the increasing Latina population in the state (Burt, et. al., 2001).
While the funding streams created by VAWA have had a clear impact on increasing the availability of services for victims and reducing the incidence of interpersonal violence, there remain large gaps in funding for providers that are often due to lack of adequate support at the state and regional levels. Now that the level of need for RCCs and DV agencies has been more clearly documented, it is clear that the levels of funding are nowhere near enough at both the federal and state levels. A study conducted in North Carolina of domestic violence and sexual
14 assault programs revealed the lack of consistent funding to be the most-identified challenge to providing services, with the issue creating problems such as inability to recruit and retain qualified staff (Macy, Giattina, Parish, & Crosby, 2010). Another study conducted in 4 states along the East Coast of the US (with only rape crisis centers) found similar results: funding cuts create problems that trickle down to staffing and programmatic decisions, which negatively affect the ability of the providers to reach out to communities and law enforcement (Maier,
2011). Nationally, funding for VAWA was at its highest level in 2010, with the US government spending over $625 million on VAWA programs while in 2015 the level of national spending dipped to the same levels of funding as 2000, or approximately $450 million (Aday, 2015).
Currently, domestic violence services are being funded at extremely low levels such that it is estimated they only serve about 10% of the population in need (Iyengar & Sabik, 2009). An agency’s staff size and budget size both positively predict more people served at an agency
(Iyengar & Sabik, 2009). For domestic violence in particular, there is evidence to suggest victim services should be thought of and managed as regional services rather than local services due to the high prevalence of mobility among victims seeking services in nearby towns rather than their home locations (Bowstead, 2015). Yet domestic violence services are often funded as local agencies, with little consideration for regional needs and contexts. The hard-won benefits created by expanding VAWA funding are precarious and in need of expansion given the still-high levels of sexual and domestic violence across the US.
15 B. Victims Seeking Help from Service Providers
Comprehensive services for victims of interpersonal violence have grown exponentially in the past thirty years. The passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1995 helped ensure a federal funding base for anti-violence agencies and has encouraged service providers to grow over time across the U.S. Services such as domestic violence shelters are becoming more abundant, yet compared to the magnitude of victimization in the US they reach only 15% of victims (Henning & Klesges, 2002). Given the magnitude of the scope of interpersonal violence, 15% is still a relatively high number of victims/survivors but the disproportionately low numbers of formal help-seekers shows the need for higher capacity agencies in more places.
With increased federal funding and public interest in the problem of interpersonal violence since the 1980’s, a remarkably detailed body of research has been brought forth by scholars and practitioners systematically examining the experiences of victims/survivors and the ways in which they seek out help from their loved ones, communities, and governments. Few sexual assaults, or about 35%, are reported to police while domestic violence is reported at a higher rate- about 57% (Truman & Langton, 2014). Most victims of interpersonal violence seek help from informal sources of support, such as friends, family, and non-offending partners.
Victims who disclose to the people in their lives are typically seeking supportive and non- blaming responses, though what victims consider to be positive social reactions varies according to the specific relationship context (Kirkner, Lorenz, Ullman, 2018). Greater levels of PTSD were associated with histories of trauma, perceived life threat during the assault, characterological self-blame, avoidance coping, and negative social reactions from others
(Ullman, Filipas, Townsend, & Starzynski, 2007). The harmful effects of receiving negative
16 social reactions from informal support providers can be addressed by therapists and crisis
counselors at rape crisis centers.
More formal sources of support include law enforcement, medical services, mental
health providers, clergy, and agencies specializing in victim services (domestic violence shelters,
rape crisis centers). Formal sources may provide orders of protection and shelter for victims of
domestic violence. They may also provide crisis counseling, legal advocacy, case management,
and on-going mental health counseling.
Victims are more likely to tell their informal support providers than formal ones
(Starzynski, Ullman, & Vasquez, 2017). When victims receive negative reactions such as blame
and minimization, they are more likely to discontinue help-seeking and disclosure behaviors
(Ahrens, 2006). Victims’ reasons for not disclosing to formal sources are enumerated below and
vary by type of victimization. To more fully understand the groups of people reached by VAW
agencies, research on interpersonal violence victims’ help seeking is briefly reviewed below.
1. Sexual assault
Sexual assault victims may seek help from a variety of sources and in myriad different
ways based on their sociocultural context (Liang, Goodman, Tummala-Narra, & Weintraub,
2005). Most sexual assault victims choose not to report to law enforcement, with an estimated
10% of victims seeking help from police (Rennison, 2002; Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2011). Those who do report to law enforcement tend to be older (Chen & Ullman, 2014). Black women have a lower rate of reporting sexual assault to law enforcement (Feldman-Summers & Ashowrth, 1981;
Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2011) likely due to the milieu of state violence in many Black communities and a deep distrust of police (Bryant-Davis, Ullman, Tsong, Tillman, & Smith,
2010). Latina women may have low rates of reporting to law enforcement due to cultural factors
17 such as internalized misogyny, fear of retaliation from offenders, and lack of community resources (Ahrens, Rios-Mandel, Isas, & del Carmen Lopez, 2010).
Sexual assault victims are more likely to report to police and continue to participate in investigations if their circumstances match the more traditional, stereotypical assault pattern that involves high levels of violence and a stranger assailant (Alderden & Long, 2016; Fisher, et. al.,
2003), suggesting the myth of ‘real’ victims continues to persist (Estrich, 1987). Violence and injury are strong predictors of victim reporting (Bachman, 1998; DuMont, Miller, & Myhr,
2003) and also influence whether a victim considers the incident to be sexual assault (Cohn,
Zinzow, Resnick, & Kilpatrick, 2013). Victims often choose not to seek services because they do not think the assault warrants formal help if the circumstances do not match stereotypes, and thus are afraid they will not be taken seriously by service providers (Patterson, Greeson, & Campbell,
2009).
Sexual assault crimes are underreported to law enforcement and sexual assault injuries are underreported to medical professionals (Rennison, 2002). Many victims of sexual assault do not report to police or medical professionals because they are afraid of retaliation from the offender, they believe they will not receive fair treatment from the police, and they believe the matter is personal and should not involve the police (Rennison, 2002). The last reason is particularly salient when the offender and victim are acquaintances or romantically involved, which is true for about 47% of cases (Breiding et al., 2014). Only 32% of victims of completed sexual assault and 32% of injured victims of attempted sexual assault were treated for their injuries- victims of completed sexual assault are automatically considered injured according to the National Crime Victimization Survey (Rennison, 2002). Of these victims, 17% were treated at hospitals whereas the remaining 15% were treated at doctor’s offices, clinics, or by medics
18 who arrived at the scene (Rennison, 2002). The majority of victims who reported their assault to
the police also sought medical attention, suggesting a convergence of medical and police
reporting (Rennison, 2002).
Mental health service usage is more common but still rather low among victims of sexual
assault, compared to police and medical help-seeking (Ullman, 2007). White women tend to use mental health services post-assault at higher rates than Black women (Lewis, et. al., 2005;
Ullman & Brecklin, 2002; Weist, et. al., 2014). However, Price, Davidson, Ruggiero, Acierno, and Resnick (2014) found no significant racial differences in service utilization in a prospective analysis of female rape victims. They suggested race may be a limited construct for predicting service utilization as it is often a proxy for other constructs related to inequality of access, such as disparities in resources due to geography and income (Price, et. al., 2014). Younger women were more likely to utilize mental health services after a sexual assault (Lewis, et. al., 2005) though some studies have shown no link between age and services use (Price, et. al., 2014) or showed the opposite effect with older women using more mental healthcare services (Starzynski, et. al., 2007). More education has been associated with greater service utilization (Ullman &
Filipas, 2001).
2. Domestic violence
While this study focuses primarily on victims of sexual violence, there is considerable
overlap between the experiences of DV and SA. Many of the agencies in this study provide
services for survivors of both types of violence, and victims often experience both types of
violence. Victims of domestic violence may seek help or not seek help due to a variety of individual
and contextual factors, similar to victims of sexual violence. Victims of domestic violence are
more likely to reach out to informal providers of support, such as friends and family, rather than
19 formal providers such as law enforcement or shelters (Fugate, Landis, Riordan, Naureckas, &
Engel, 2005). Approximately 50% of all domestic violence incidents are reported to law
enforcement and 34% of DV victims received medical care for their assault-related injuries
(Truman & Langont, 2014). Many victims do not feel they can access services due to their limited financial means, as leaving a household requires giving up resources such as shelter and access to money (Fugate, Landis, Riordan, Naureckas, & Engel, 2005). Even when victims are able to seek services from shelters and counseling centers, they often choose to do so in areas that are not located where they reside (Bowstead, 2015). Choosing to seek services outside of one’s home location is often strategic choice victims make out of consideration for their own safety and to manage stigma (Bowstead, 2015). Help-seeking is difficult for many victims of domestic violence due to the compounding effects of entrapment from their abusive partners and the inaccessibility of services that results in victims ceasing their help-seeking behaviors (Moe, 2007). When victims work with advocates they tend to be more cooperative and thus have better case outcomes, though this effect is strongest for White women (Camacho & Alarid, 2008).
3. Demographic differences in help-seeking
The rates of help-seeking from law enforcement and victim service providers (VSPs) are
not the same for all demographic groups. For example, a comprehensive study comparing African-
American and Euro-American victims of domestic violence found African-American victims utilized law enforcement more often than family violence centers while the reverse was true for their Euro-American counterparts (Hollenshead, Dai, Ragsdale, Massey, & Scott, 2006). This finding is puzzling given the contentious history between Black communities and law enforcement and the high rates of police violence against Black women (Ritchie, 2017). A study of Latina victims of domestic violence revealed specific barriers to accessing victim services for this
20 demographic group such as language barriers, cultural confusion regarding norms, lack of
knowledge about local services, and fear surrounding their immigration status (Reina, Loman, &
Maldonado, 2014).
Due to the violent, oppressive, and ever-present historical legacies of slavery and Jim
Crow, African-American women have struggled to be considered ‘true’ victims of interpersonal violence in a US legal system that does not afford people of color basic human rights (Bryant-
Davis et al., 2010). African-American women are at high risk of poverty, again due to persistent inequality (Davis, 1981a). Poverty and race intersect such that among African-American victims of sexual assault, poverty positively relates to more depression, PTSD, and substance abuse
(Bryant-Davis et al., 2010). Women of color have always been disproportionately affected by gendered violence in the US and therefore have also always been on the vanguard of anti violence against women struggles.
The next section explicates a feminist economic framework for understanding the recent turn toward austerity in Western countries. An intersectional analysis is then brought in to extend this framework in service of illuminating the multiple ways in which race, gender, and class hierarchies are reinforced through austerity ideology and policies.
C. A Feminist Political Economy of Austerity
A feminist economics framework is grounded in what is often termed the ‘capabilities
approach’ to understanding inequality of opportunity and wealth that is grounded in what people
are able to achieve instead of what is simply available to them in the form of opportunities (Sen,
1985). Sen placed great importance on understanding the social arrangements that will ultimately
enable or hinder any policies aimed at correcting inequality (Sen, 1992). Feminist scholar Martha
Nussbaum worked with and expanded Sen’s concepts by attempting to identify the set of
21 capabilities most foundational to just societies (Nussbaum, 2003). Nussbaum based her initial list
of ten capabilities on Marx’s 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, which emphasizes the central role of dignity in human life, beyond the mere ability to survive (Nussbaum, 2003).
The capabilities of bodily integrity and bodily health are most salient for the purposes of the proposed study. Bodily integrity is the ability to move about the world in safety, free from all forms of violence (especially interpersonal violence) while bodily health includes the ability to have good health overall (physical and mental) and also to have adequate shelter (Nussbaum,
2003). Taken together, bodily integrity and bodily health encompass the abilities to live free of violence, to seek help from violence, and to be supported in building a better life after violence.
VAW agencies aim to support all of these ends. Other scholars have expanded on the capabilities framework as a project and emphasize the importance of evaluating policies based upon whether or not they enhance the ability for humans to achieve well-being, with a focus on tangible outcomes rather than available opportunities (Berik, Rodgers, & Seguino, 2009). Assessing the effects of policies related to funding anti-violence work is therefore a fundamental part of evaluating the degree to which states are moving toward or away from gender equality.
Feminist economic thought recognizes the hierarchical and reductionist duality inherent in mainstream economics. This is often characterized as the hard vs. soft analysis of econometrics vs. sociology, with the ‘hard’ science of economics being presented as value- neutral and bias-free (Dolfsma & Hoppe, 2003). Feminist economists challenge this neutrality by asserting there is gender (and race and class and disability) bias driving the study of more traditional economists who strive to isolate, reduce, and decontextualize their objects of study in service to a rational ideal of describing the economic arrangements of the world (Dolfsma &
Hoppe, 2003).
22 Feminist economists have taken up analysis of austerity politics in recent years. Women have always fared badly under capitalism, and austerity policies are simply a ratcheting up of capitalism’s historical ill effects on disadvantaged groups (Evans, 2015). A feminist political economy of austerity does not simply point out the impact of economic policies on women, but views economic structures as fundamentally gendered (Pearson & Elson, 2015). Women are not equally distributed in decision-making positions throughout the spheres of finance, production, and reproduction, which immediately calls into question the justice of public policies (although this theoretical review is not arguing to simply put more women in positions of power). Pearson
& Elson (2015) argue that cuts in social services disproportionately affect poor women, who cannot usually afford to privately pay for services and may be forced to forfeit access to shelter, counseling, and legal services, which then deprives them of power in other spheres. They point out that it is most often women who step in to fill the ‘reproduction’ gaps when social services are cut, for example by providing support systems through kinship networks for services like childcare. Women are over-represented in the populations most dependent on government aid while also being over-represented in professions responsible for administering aid programs, such as social work and mental health (Rubery, 2015). Going beyond the gendered analysis of policy and the effects of policy, other feminist economists argue for an understanding of austerity as a ‘political strategy’ rather than a series of misguided policies that cut services and freeze wages (Adkins, 2015). Neo-liberal government policies during recent recessions include tax cuts for wealthy, cuts to social programs, financial deregulation, and ‘devolved’ federal responsibilities pushed onto state and local levels (Albelda, 2013). In the US in 2009 following the Great Recession, most states including Illinois cut their budgets by 4.2% and then 6.8% the following year on average (Albelda, 2013). Under austerity, women stand to lose many of the
23 gains they have won over the decades, such as an uncontested right to education and access to
public services, as well as the hard won gains of the feminist anti-violence movement, however imperfect and incomplete they may be (Rubery, 2013; Griffin, 2015). Some feminist economists believe women should organize and mobilize around redistributing monetized risk from the poor and most vulnerable back to the wealthy, as this is one of the main root causes of inequality that disproportionately harms women (Adkins, 2015).
1. Intersectional feminist political economy
Contemporary scholars of interpersonal violence cannot avoid grappling with the diverse
realities of victims/survivors. Multiple and overlapping identities structure people’s experiences
of the world. Risk of violence and its aftermath is contextual and historical. While Sen and
Nussbaum’s path-breaking work is often conceptualized as a universalist approach to equality
and justice, there is a more nuanced theoretical position that complements and extends the
capabilities approach: intersectionality. In contrast to the universalist project of freeing ourselves
from identity categories, the intersectional analysis first named by Crenshaw (1991) invites us to
attend to the disparate effects of policies and social arrangements on people in poverty, people of
color, immigrants, and people with disabilities (who often live across multiple categories at
once). Originally formulated as a way to understand violence against women of color,
intersectionality retains special relevance to the field of interpersonal violence as it provides
specific avenues of inquiry for addressing racism and sexism simultaneously and because the
anti-violence field still fails to address the problem of racial hierarchies within organizations,
communities, and society as a whole.
The US uses means testing for nearly all of its social programs aimed at helping people
meet their daily needs. This has the effect of winnowing down the numbers of people who
24 qualify for services and creating stratification among groups who rely on these services. High unemployment rates are disproportionately higher for young, unmarried, and Black women
(Albelda, 2013) - an effect of structural racism and systematic disinvestment of resources and aid in Black communities. The call to examine ‘multiple grounds of identity’ (i.e., class, race, gender, sexuality, gender identity, religion, nationality, disability) regarding the construction of social arrangements is particularly important to this study. There is a need for assessing the detrimental effects of austerity policies on VAW agencies, many of which specialize in serving communities at the margins and all of which try to be accessible to people with a diverse range of identity experiences.
The final section below reviews the literature specific to austerity policies and victim services, most of which comes from the United Kingdom. The second part reviews organizational theories germane to the study of agencies and their socio-political environments, with applications to the study of anti-violence agencies.
D. The Effects of Austerity on Victim Services
While there are few studies in the US that link service provision and state funding for
VSPs (and none that directly link them to budget cuts and austerity policies), scholars in the UK have begun to study the issue systematically. Their findings demonstrate the havoc that is wrought upon agencies when budgets are slashed and financial futures become uncertain.
Service providers in the UK experienced a round of deep budget cuts to social services following the 2008 global recession, with cuts estimated to be 31% between FY 2010/11 and 2011/12
(Coy, Kelly, & Foord, 2007). There was a shift in responsibility for services for Violence
Against Women (VAW) from the national to the local level, and at the discretion of regional officials, funding streams were drastically cut (Coy, Kelly, & Foord, 2007). Service providers
25 began to see shorter contract lengths with funding agreements that were in effect for only 3-6 months (Hirst & Rinne, 2012). Some agencies reported the costs to deliver a service exceeded the amount of funding provided by the government, and smaller agencies were forced to compete with larger agencies for the funding contracts (Hirst & Rinne, 2012).
The impact of national budget cuts and devolution of oversight to the local level in the
UK has increased uncertainty and instability for VAW service providers. This has led to a focus on more short-term services rather than long-term, coordinated community education and responses (Hirst & Rinne, 2012). The funding issues have also increased turn-away rates at
VAW shelters and resulted in the downsizing and even closure of agencies that work with historically underserved populations including Black, Asian, and other Minority Ethnic women in the UK (Walby & Towers, 2012). Finally, the budget cuts have hit geographic areas unevenly such that agencies providing services to smaller and lower-income communities experienced the most disruption (Coy, Kelly, & Foord, 2007). While the US and the UK have different systems of funding social services and widely different population sizes and compositions, the impact of budget cuts at the national and local levels in the UK may provide some important lessons for state-level analysis in the US.
E. Organizational Theories
This section engages the organizational literature to first explore the evolution and issues
facing feminist organizations before examining more traditional theories of organizations and
applying them to VAW agencies.
26 1. Feminist organizations
Research on feminist organizations has grown over the past three decades, as the
women’s movement has professionalized and calcified into institutions. Expanding beyond
Katzenstein’s (1990) definition of VAW agencies as ‘unobtrusive mobilizers’, it is important to
anchor an analysis of agency work and decision-making within an understanding of how feminist
organizations have shaped and are shaped by the state. I take up Reinelt’s (1995) conception of
the state as dynamic and mutable rather than as a static monolith, as conceived by many liberal
and Marxist feminists. Reinhelt (1995) noted that defining a ‘feminist politics of engagement’
was a more fruitful way to understand how feminists were able to mobilize collectively to wield
power to shape institutions and policies. Understood in this way, rather than viewing VAW agencies as either radical autonomous agencies or subsumed extensions of the state, opens up space to view agency decision-making, resource sharing, and collective mobilization as
responsive to environmental constraints. Statewide VAW coalitions (ICASA and ICADV in IL)
represent feminists mobilizing their collective power to be viewed as specialists and advocates
providing proper responses to the societal crisis of interpersonal violence, which has led to the
transformation of legislation and the redirection of state resources (Reinelt, 1995).
However, engagement with the state comes with costs and benefits, which are often
heavily weighed by VAW agencies (Matthews, 1995; Reinelt, 1995). And this engagement will inevitably open up opportunities for conflict, as relationships and conditions within and between state actors and agencies are ever-changing (Matthews, 1995). Within this site of struggle,
Matthews (1995) identified three tactical choices rape crisis centers engaged in when they came
in conflict with state actions: overt opposition, apparent accommodation, and active engagement.
These tactical strategies may have been used by the VAW agencies in IL during the budget
27 crisis, and thus merit attention. Overt opposition is simply a refusal to cooperate, as when RCCs in California refused to hand over their data to the state’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning after strict new guidelines were put into place (Matthews, 1995). Engaging in this strategy often means forgoing funding and therefore comes with high costs. A less risky strategy for weathering conflict with the state is to engage in apparent accommodation, where the agency appears to be following the rules or regulations while actually subverting them (Matthews,
1995). This practice constitutes a bending of the rules to meet certain requirements in order to obtain some kind of benefit (usually monetary) while also maintaining the agency’s preferred method of operating. Active engagement was a tactic identified in Matthews’ study (1995) that was employed by RCCs to lobby and exert pressure through coalitions to influence a policy or practice at the state level. Though this strategy requires time and resources, it is relatively low risk. These tactics may vary by local contexts and the demographic make-up of the organization staff and client-base. VAW agencies are tactical in their efforts to wield power in the arena of state politics, and these strategies may have been pursued by the agencies and coalitions in
Illinois during the budget crisis.
2. Criminal justice organizational theories
This section reviews contingency, institutional, and resource dependency theories and the small body of research that applies organizational theories to VAW agencies. There has been little application of organizational theories to VAW organizations. Acker’s (1990) seminal work on the gendered nature of institutions provides a basis for understanding how gendered hierarchies are reproduced within organizations and workplaces. VAW agencies now have more hierarchy and formal structure than ever before, yet there is very little research about how they make decisions given their existing resources and local contexts.
28 Most VAW agencies do not function as extensions of the state, though they are much more linked to the state financially and instrumentally than they were thirty years prior. Power is much more contingent on partnerships, local political contexts, and the people who comprise agency staff. Simon argues there is nothing inherently ‘conservatizing’ in the process of institutionalization- that bureaucracy and formalized structures are necessary to effect long-term social change (Simon, 1982). A similar idea has been put forth by Jo Freeman (1972), in her essay, “The Tyranny of Structurelessness”, where she argues that lack of formal structures in a group only serve to mask power dynamics where only those who know and make the rules can make decisions for the organization. Still, anti-violence agencies are often agents of social change within their communities that benefit from partnerships with law enforcement, the latter of which is often a force of oppression within communities (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990).
Contingency theory posits that organizations are rational bodies created to achieve specific goals and undertake specific activities to bring about these goals. An organization that works well with its environment and uses resources efficiently to achieve its goals will be successful while those that do not will fail or potentially have to close down (Walker, 2013). The hallmark of contingency theory lies in its name- organizations survive when they can be adaptable to their circumstances and utilize resources most efficiently (Bradshaw, 2009). Factors that influence contingency include the external environment, agency size, organizational age, ideology, and strategy and structure (Bradshaw, 2009). The external environment includes federal and state funding, while strategy and structure refers to how non-profits make decisions and what they choose to emphasize, such as traditional services versus innovation (Bradshaw,
2009). Applied to VAW agencies, contingency theory allows us to take into account the external funding environments of agencies as well as their local-level structures and processes for
29 meeting their goals of service and advocacy. A feminist perspective would add that external
environments are inherently political and anti-violence organizations are always in a state of economic hardship as a result (Griffin, 2015).
Institutional theory views organizations, especially non-profits, as being value-rational
rather than means-rational (a term from Weber’s conceptualization of bureaucracies) (DiMaggio
& Anheier, 1990). Value-rational actions are undertaken to achieve moralistic or ethical goals, such as providing free support services to survivors of rape because an agency believes this is a morally just cause. Means-rational decisions are more utilitarian and focused on achieving a
goal, such as when organizations take needed contributions from donors who may have gotten
their fortunes from exploiting others. Institutional theory differs from contingency theory, the
latter of which views organizations as essentially rational entities. There is an emphasis on
achieving legitimacy within institutional environments- the city, state, and local sovereigns that
wield power over the organization (Walker, 2013). Institutions survive insofar as they are able to
match cultural values and secure “cultural support” from their institutional environments
(Walker, 2013). Empirically, the more institutional linkages, or formal partnership agreements and partnership practices an agency has with their institutional environments, the more likely
they are to survive as an independent organization. VAW agencies have linkages with other
institutions including formal agreements with law enforcement, district attorneys, social service
organizations, schools, and churches. Sexual Assault Response Teams (SARTS) are coordinated
community responses to sexual violence managed by RCCs and commonly include partnerships
among police, prosecutors, and medical examiners (Greeson & Campbell, 2015). DV agencies
have been effective in leading collaborative partnerships among stakeholders in the child welfare
system (Malik, Ward, & Janczewski, 2008). VAW agencies often start with a disadvantage in
30 their communities as their feminist ideology and emphasis on collective decision-making may be incongruent with local cultural values and power structures, thus impeding their ability to gain legitimacy (Malik et al., 2008; Riger, 1994).
To adapt to their environments better and project more legitimacy, organizations often orient their activities to seem more attractive to funding agencies. This behavior is congruent with resource dependency theory, which recognizes the primacy of resources to the lifespan of
organizations, and emphasizes the role of resource-giving organizations’ ability to influence the
structure and activities of resource-dependent organizations (Walker, 2013). Resource
dependence theory acknowledges the power dynamics among granting agencies and receiving
agencies, giving credence to the idea that non-profits are a mechanism by which elites in society can exert control over social policy and resources for marginalized groups (DiMaggio &
Anheier, 1990). Resource dependence theory explains why many non-profits alter their specialized activities to conform to the demands of funders, or develop new programs to bring in revenue even if the programs are somewhat outside their usual scope of activities.
Put another way, being resource dependent often tips the balance of market orientation toward donors and away from clients (Macedo & Pinho, 2006). This phenomenon has worried feminists in the anti-violence movement since its inception, even if they use different language to describe the constructs. Feminist anti-violence organizers have historically been concerned that being dependent on state funding has shifted the goals of VAW agencies toward the instrumental goals of the criminal justice system (Freinkel & Smith, 1988). This has in fact occurred, as the legal systems’ work of anti-violence organizations has assumed the most legitimacy and consequently, the most resources within anti-violence organizations (Corrigan, 2013; Kolb,
2011).
31 Organizational theories have much to offer an understanding of anti-violence agency
decision-making and resource allocation. Contingency theory stresses the importance of local
funding environments and agency responses to these environments as they try to meet their
service goals. Institutional theory also takes into account local environments, but additionally
focuses on partnerships and linkages to other agencies and to funders. This theory recognizes the
importance of linkages for agency survival. Resource dependency theory helps guide an
understanding of specific agency activities in relation to funders. Organizations will shift their
activities or services provided based on the orientations of certain donors. Taken together,
organizational theories help provide the background for an analysis of anti-violence agencies
decisions around service allocation within the context of their socio-political environments and responsibilities to funders.
F. Study Rationale
While the history of VAW agencies is well documented, there remains a dearth of current
research examining these agencies as sites of struggle over resources. Some critical feminist
literature writes off these agencies in their entirety, decrying them as an apparatus of state power.
This broad-brush critique misses the fact that RCCs largely function as social service agencies
today, and they fill a niche that would otherwise be empty by providing free or very low cost
mental health and advocacy services to survivors of sexual violence.
Funding has always been scarce and presented a barrier for anti-violence agencies in
deliver services, but recent austerity policies around the world have worsened this situation.
Studies from the UK demonstrate that austerity policies hit anti-violence agencies especially
hard. Researchers have not yet situated these agencies and their work within the framework of a
feminist political economy of austerity. Organizational theories leave out the issue of austerity
32 policies (a feature of capitalism) and offer sterile analysis devoid of any real understanding of the
resource environments in which organizations must operate.
This study aims to fill these gaps while remaining appreciative of critiques of the
professionalized, overwhelmingly white and mainstream leadership of RCCs today. I take
Katzenstein’s view of RCCs as ‘unobtrusive mobilizers’ occupying a space between the state and
the public, often moving toward the state and away from their radical grassroots in a quest for
legitimacy and resources. However, thousands of survivors per year rely on VAW agencies for their basic needs and safety. It is important to understand how these agencies function under extreme crisis conditions and how they perceive their role as public services in relation to state governments. VAW centers have a radical history that could inform the future choices they make in fighting economic violence.
Organizational theories help us understand the behavior of agencies with regard to resource distribution, but this study goes beyond those theories and incorporates feminist economics to understand economic violence as a shared crisis among social service providers in
capitalist societies. The foundation for shared struggle must be built on a common understanding
of experience. One goal of this study is to share back the data and stories with the RCCs in
Illinois. It is my hope that the shared experiences present in the data will aid not only in
organizational recovery but also critical reflection on how to move forward to a place of greater
access and more awareness of racialized economic precarity in the lives of survivors.
The next section outlines the study design, a mixed-methods project that examined
administrative RCC data and included nearly two dozen in-depth interviews with agency
directors. Basic information was collected regarding how resources were allocated and which
33 processes were employed. The interviews also revealed the ways in which the budget crisis as austerity policy created conditions that led to organizational trauma and other forms of violence.
34 III. CURRENT STUDY
A mixed-methods study was carried out to assess the effects of the state budget crisis on
RCCs in Illinois by quantitatively analyzing administrative data and collecting qualitative
interview data from service providers. Administrative data come from a database called InfoNet,
an online, centralized repository for all RCC data in Illinois managed by the Illinois Criminal
Justice Information Authority (see Sample section on page 44 for detailed description). The aim
of this study was to understand how agencies were affected by the crisis at the level of service
outcomes, staff/volunteers, clients, and communities and to understand their survival strategies
and decision-making processes. This study also sought to understand any disproportionate effects
on RCCs that served primarily women of color. Most VAW agencies in the US rely on funding
from state governments, in addition to federal and private funds, to sustain and expand their
services. Lack of funding is often cited as a major barrier to providing services to victims of
gendered violence yet the effects have rarely been systematically documented (Houston-Kolnik,
et. al., 2017; Maier, 2011; Ullman & Townsend, 2007). Research from other countries has found
large decreases in numbers of victims served and that the cuts disproportionally affect
organizations that focus on serving Black and ethnic minority women (Sanders-McDonagh,
Neville, & Nolas, 2016; Walby & Towers, 2012).
A. Understanding RCC Clients and Services in Illinois
One purpose of this study was to build on earlier analyses of sexual violence and service-
seeking trend data from RCCs to understand the specific time period of the budget impasse.
There is always a discrepancy between the number of reported sexual assaults and the number of
victims who seek RCC services each year. Between 2006 and 2015, according to the Illinois
Uniform Crime Index (I-UCR) data the number of sexual assaults reported to law enforcement
35 fluctuated slightly between 9,798 and 9,122 from 2006-2015, though this is likely an undercount as only approximately 33% of sexual assaults are reported to law enforcement (Houston-Kolnik et al., 2017). Aggregate yearly service hour totals show RCCs experienced a slight increase in total service hours provided between 2014 and 2015 after a sharp decrease in 2013 (see Table 1).
TABLE I. YEARLY TOTAL SERVICE HOURS FOR RCCS 2012-2016
Total Service Hours Year % Change Provided 2012 109918 ---- 2013 97090 -12% 2014 96354 -1% 2015 99403 +3% 2016 95795 -4% Data source: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, InfoNet database, 2017
Sexual violence victims did not see a decline in advocacy service hours over time, but rather a gradual increase. In-person counseling hours rose sharply after 2008, but declined sharply in 2011-2013 and 2015-2016. Telephone counseling remained steady over time.
B. Research Questions & Hypotheses
There is no research from the United States to my knowledge to date on the effects of budgeting issues at the state level on agencies that provide support for victims of interpersonal violence. This project was guided by several overarching research questions: 1) Were there measurable, quantitative effects of the budget impasse on agency victim service hours, staff hours, and client contacts (using each measurement category that is appropriate to the service
36 type being considered)? 2) Were there differences in budget effects between core services such as counseling, advocacy, and case management compared to more peripheral services such as transportation, childcare, parenting support, and community education (described below in more detail)? 3) Were there differences in effects on agencies that serve primarily women of color and/or other marginalized populations different compared to all other agencies? 4) How did service providers cope with the budget crisis, specifically related to making decisions with regard to resources for different service types?
1. Effects on Total Monthly Service Hours
VAW agencies in the US often cite budget issues as one of the largest barriers to providing services to victims/survivors (Macy, Ogbonnaya, & Martin, 2015; Maier, 2011a). A small body of research from the UK has begun to demonstrate the tangible effects of austerity policies on VAW agencies (Coy, Kelly, & Foord, 2007; Hirst & Rinne, 2012; Walby & Towers,
2012). This research will be summarized in more detail in the context of the forthcoming hypotheses. Taken together, there is strong evidence to expect that budget cuts have a measurable effect on overall levels of service delivery.
It was hypothesized that there are observable, statistically significant decreases in overall victim service hours due to the IL budget crisis.
2. Effects on Monthly Service Hours
a. Client services
One study of VAW agencies found that in response to severe budget cuts, agencies protected core services that were also less expensive while making reductions in
‘specialized’ services (Walby & Towers, 2012) . Preliminary analysis of InfoNet data conducted by the researcher in 2017 during her time as a research associate at ICJIA also partially
37 supported this idea, based on yearly trends that showed drops in some service hours after the
onset budget crisis. It was hypothesized that service providers would focus limited resources on
preserving core services, which would show non-significant changes.
Earlier analysis of InfoNet data provided some insight about trends in services. The
trends in ‘core services’ for sexual assault agencies’ three types of advocacy- criminal, medical, and other- did not show declines at key time points. In-person counseling declined from 2015-
2016 to levels close to the 10-year low. Telephone and family/group counseling started a steady decline in 2012, which may have accelerated during the years of the budget crisis. Therefore, it was hypothesized that counseling- individual, telephone, and family/group- was not a core service for SA agencies.
TABLE II. HYPOTHESES FOR SERVICE HOUR CHANGES OVER 49 MONTHS
Service Type Predicted Change
Criminal advocacy Non-significant change Medical advocacy Non-significant change Other advocacy Increase In-person counseling Decrease Family/group counseling Decrease Telephone counseling Non-significant change Hotline Non-significant change
b. Community services
The following community services were analyzed for any budget crisis effects:
public education directed to K-12 schools and new volunteers training. Based on anecdotes from
ICJIA staff who communicate with agency directors/managers and preliminary analysis of
victim services, it was hypothesized that community services overall would show significant
38 decline during the budget impasse but no hypotheses were made with regard to specific
community services as preliminary 5-year trends were not previously available before the study
(Jennifer Hiselman, personal email, September 28, 2017).
3. Effects of Budget Impasse on Agencies Serving Racial and Ethnic Minorities
Globally, the effects of economic downturns fall disproportionately on marginalized
people along hierarchies of race, class, and gender. Past research has found disparate effects of
budget cuts on agencies serving victims of violence who are racial and ethnic minorities,
particularly on agencies that focus on these groups. One study found significantly more
downsizing and closure of agencies dedicated solely to serving Black and Ethnic Minority
women in the U.K. (Walby & Towers, 2012). This disproportionate effect of austerity on racial
and ethnic minority victims of violence also relates to the previous finding that specialization is
reduced during times of fiscal cuts (Vacchelli, Kathrecha, & Gyte, 2015), as it is expensive to
hire workers who specialize in a specific language or culture.
Feminist VAW scholars and practitioners, mostly women of color, have long voiced
concern over the specific barriers to women of color and minority ethnic women in accessing
victim services as women of color, immigrant women, and queer and trans women are frequently
denied access or marginalized within mainstream anti-violence agencies (Koyama, 2006). Based on existing literature, it was hypothesized that agencies dedicated to serving racial and ethnic minority groups would be disproportionately affected by the budget crisis.
4. Differences between Rural and Urban Agencies
Research from the UK suggests smaller agencies within smaller communities are more
affected by cuts to funding (Coy, Kelly, & Foord, 2007). This is partially due to the increased
competition between small and large organizations that occurs when resources are scarce.
39 Smaller agencies typically lose out to larger ones (Hirst & Rinne, 2012). Anecdotally, one shelter in Illinois was in danger of closing due to the budget impasse and reported this would affect survivors in the entire county, for whom they were the only service provider (Conn, 2017). The agency eventually was able to survive by relying on community donations and lines of credit at the bank. Agencies located outside of major metropolitan areas IL may be less likely to obtain larger grants but more likely to be responsible for a large geographic area, and thus more susceptible to funding changes.
InfoNet data shows rural agencies account for a smaller proportion of client service hours. While there were only slight decreases for rural agencies in the descriptive 10-year trend data, the researcher thought a closer analysis might reveal rural agencies experienced more negative effects of the budget crisis. Therefore, it was hypothesized that rural agencies would show slightly greater negative effects from the budget crisis when compared with urban agencies.
5. Effects on Agencies and Decision-Making
The purpose of the semi-structured interview component of this study was to elucidate the decision-making processes of service providers and understand what the budget crisis meant to them, their agencies, coalitions, staff members, clients, and communities. The first part of each interview asked basic questions regarding the structures and processes of the agency. While specific hypotheses for the interview component were not advanced, several themes based on feminist economic theory and the extant literature informed the questions in the interview guide.
Preliminary analysis of 5-year trends in service provision from InfoNet suggested providers ‘protect’ their core services such as legal advocacy and counseling. While there is no official definition of core services, interview data were reviewed for this concept.
40 Feminist economists have argued that all financial policies are gendered because they
reflect the patriarchal structures of society and tend to over-distribute risk to people living in poverty, many of whom are women and people of color. Griffin (2015) argues a step beyond this, saying crisis governance is discursively gendered, meaning the gendered power relations of governance structures are produced again and again through social and cultural practices. She also argues that feminists are guilty of accepting the discourse of crisis governance as one-time,
‘time-bound’ events even though the effects of austerity policies are long-ranging (Griffin,
2015). One goal of the qualitative interview portion was to understand participant’s notions of time during the budget crisis by asking when did it begin for the agency and when, if ever, did it end.
One study from the UK highlights some practical and aspirational resilience strategies employed by VAW service providers (Vacchelli et al., 2015). First, agencies reported engaging in collaboration, information sharing, and public initiatives are around shared struggles. They also expressed the desire to be consulted by policy makers as experts, and pointed to lack of robust data as a barrier to realizing this goal (Vacchelli et al., 2015). Interview participants were asked about their own resilience strategies, with a focus on partnership and collaborative advocacy.
Another finding from Vacchelli, et. al. (2015) concerns the lack of specificity of services.
When downsizing occurs, services become less varied, more ‘generic’. The shift toward generic services is due to other shifts in funding- toward a more pay for performance model. Core services are more easily measured than others. The shift toward less specialized services is also likely due to the concentration of resources into what I am calling ‘core services’- or services that constitute the bulk of client service hours even when resources are reduced, as preliminary
41 yearly trend analysis from ICJIA (2017) has found. Interview questions were designed to elicit responses about the types of services receiving more resources, to draw out any preservation of resources strategies by service type and illuminate agency-level philosophies on how to prioritize scarce funding.
Other research on cuts to the VAW sector found increased levels of competition between agencies, with smaller agencies losing out to bigger ones (Hirst & Rinne, 2012). While the agencies in Illinois were all in similar budgetary circumstances, there may have been increased competition over funding from sources outside the state government such as private foundations or municipal funding sources. Service providers were asked in interviews about competition for other funding sources and how their referral networks were affected by the impasse.
Perhaps due to increased competition or the marginalization of minority racial and ethnic women, there is evidence from a study on the women’s voluntary sector in London that agencies serving primarily Black and Minority Ethnic women are hardest hit, leading to more downsizing and closures of these agencies compared to their counterparts (Walby & Towers, 2012).
Similarly, agencies in the UK providing services to smaller and lower-income communities experienced more disruption than larger, more urban agencies (Coy, Kelly, & Foord, 2007).
Participants from agencies serving primarily women of color were asked to reflect on how the crisis affected them specifically.
42 IV. METHODS
This is a mixed methods study designed to assess the effects of the budget impasse on
Illinois SA victim service providers and their strategies for surviving the 2015-2017-budget crisis. Two complementary parts make up this study: analysis of administrative data and service provider interviews. The interview data illuminates and expands on the quantitative results.
A. Mixed-method Approach: Concurrent Triangulation
This study employs mixed-method design, which include separate qualitative and
quantitative stages within the study design (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Combining two or
more methods allows researchers to engage in triangulation by facilitating the inspection of a
research question from multiple, and sometimes contradictory, angles (Bachman & Schutt,
2014). Triangulation is important to provide validity in research by mapping the boundaries and
incongruities within a research topic.
Interviews make it possible to generate knowledge that is situated in the context of
people’s lived experiences (Bletzer & Koss, 2004; Crenshaw, 1991). This also allows researchers
to demonstrate to readers how problems that appear personal or specific are connected with
larger political struggles (Reinharz & Davidman, 1992). Quantitative methods alone do not
guarantee the preservation of contextual factors, though there may be ways to provide some level
of context within a statistical model through the use of control variables. For example, it may be
well known that women of color are statistically at higher risk of sexual violence compared to
White women (Planty, Langton, Krebs, Berzofsky, & Smiley-McDonald, 2013) and this could be demonstrated by quantitatively analyzing national data on sexual violence (Loya, 2014). Hearing stories from survivors about intergenerational trauma in their families or living under the
43 constant threat of state violence can provide more depth than simple statistics and help explain
why women of color may have higher rates of sexual violence. Qualitative methods allow for the emergence of context and participant narratives and meanings, which cannot be captured by a statistical model. The incorporation of research participant perspectives is essential to a more
holistic understanding of complex research questions (Maruna, 2010). Thus, combining
qualitative and quantitative approaches is appealing to feminist and sexual violence researchers
committed to preserving participant’s context and symbolic meanings.
This section reviews the methods for the quantitative data, followed by those for the
qualitative interview portion. Data were collected and analyzed concurrently.
B. Quantitative Methods
This study used administrative data from rape crisis centers in the state of Illinois
collected by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, a state agency with the
following mandate (ICJIA, 2017):
“The Authority brings together key leaders from the justice system and the public to identify critical issues facing the criminal justice system in Illinois, and to propose and evaluate policies, programs, and legislation that address those issues. The agency also works to ensure the criminal justice system in Illinois is efficient and effective.”
The data analyzed in this study were aggregated from over 30 victim service providers in Illinois.
This type of aggregate data is often referred to in the literature as Integrated Administrative Data
(IAD) and it has several advantages. First, IAD allows researchers to overcome the silos that
occur in social services where agencies do not share data across agencies even when working on
the same issue (DeHart & Shapiro, 2017). Second, IAD that has been collected over many years
in a consistent manner lends itself to time series analysis and the study of policies over time.
There was no missing data in the entire dataset because users receive an error message if they do
44 not fill in certain required fields (though this of course does not preclude the possibility of human error during data entry). Third, use of IAD can enhance theoretical framing and theory development in the study and analysis of social policies because the design is not limited to data from a single agency (DeHart & Shapiro, 2017). Finally, using IAD is one of the few ways to quantitatively assess the impact of historical policy changes (Evans, Grella, Murphy, & Hser,
2010). Taking into account many factors such as community resources, policy changes, and geographic factors adds depth to understanding anti-violence theory, policy, and practice.
ICJIA’s data has been collected and stored in one centralized location for over 20 years, making the victim service provider database unique in the United States. Washington State (to my knowledge, to date) is the only other US state that collects and stores rape crisis center data in this manner, and ICJIA researchers helped design their system.
1. Sample
The quantitative data for this study came from ICJIA’s database called the Information
Network, or InfoNet. This database is an online data collection system maintained by the Illinois
Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA) utilized by 67 domestic violence centers and 34 sexual assault centers located in Illinois (Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, July
2017). The centers receive funding from the Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence
(ICADV), the Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault (ICASA) or the Illinois Department of
Human Services (DHS). The state granting agencies (ICADV, ICASA, DHS) require their grantees to enter client and service data into the system in order to simplify the grant reporting process and allow the 101 women’s anti-violence agencies to make data-informed decisions and apply for other funding from private foundations and other granting agencies in addition to
ICJIA.
45 InfoNet is designed to collect client demographics including gender, race and ethnicity, age at the time of first service contact, education, employment, and special client needs or disabilities requiring additional assistance. It also includes information about each client service contact and tracks which type of service was obtained by the client, including individual and group counseling, phone counseling, criminal and civil advocacy, transportation, and childcare.
Service hours are tracked by service type, so a client can have multiple service hours in any given month.
The final quantitative sample consists of data from the past 49 months from 34 sexual assault centers in IL and their satellites (for a total of 64 centers). The rural dataset includes 24
RCCs, including both satellite and main centers depending on geographic location type. The 49- month period includes data from each agency between the following dates: August 2013- August
2017. Only one agency did not agree to participate in the study, therefore 99% of the population of Illinois RCCs is represented in this sample.
a. Data procurement
A data request was made to ICJIA to procure 63 months of data. A data sharing agreement with ICJIA was entered into between the agency and the researcher’s home institution
(University of Illinois-Chicago). This agreement was included, as part of standard ICJIA/InfoNet procedures to contact partner agencies (RCCs) for permission anytime their data will be analyzed.
b. Categories of data
The final dataset included monthly hours from client, hotline, and community services and overall staff hours. Client services in this study included advocacy and counseling.
ICASA sets forth definitions of all services recorded in InfoNet and these are reported in the
46 following paragraphs (see Appendix A). Clients are defined as someone who has received an identification number from the agency (internally) because they have engaged with them for services beyond an initial crisis intervention incident. Clients can include direct victims of sexual violence or someone, of any age, who seeks assistance because they are dealing with the sexual assault of a loved one.
Advocacy was sub-divided into three categories: criminal justice, medical, and ‘other’ advocacy. Criminal justice advocacy is defined as ‘individual advocacy with police, sheriff, state’s attorney, judge, or anyone in the court system’. It can also include being present when reporting to law enforcement or following up. Medical advocacy refers to helping survivors with
‘individual advocacy related to medical procedures both at the hospital/medical care facility and during follow-up care’. Many hospitals connect survivors to rape crisis hotlines, who then send out advocates. ‘Other’ advocacy includes advocacy with third party agencies and other service providers, such as school personnel and social service agencies.
For the purpose of this study client services contain three categories: individual, group, and telephone counseling. In-person counseling is classified as ‘face-to-face verbal assistance intended to be helpful to and supportive of victims of sexual assault or the significant other(s)’.
Group counseling is defined as ‘counseling provided to more than two victims or significant others who meet together on a regular basis over a period of time. This includes support groups, counseling groups, therapy groups, psycho-educational groups. Telephone counseling is distinct from hotline services and refers to ‘time spent on the hotline or on another telephone line providing assistance to a center client who is dealing with sexual assault’. Hotline services represent crisis calls to the agency’s designated hotline number. Many RCCs in Illinois operate
47 hotlines specifically to connect survivors to hospitals, though some provide emotional support
during crisis.
Community services include elementary and secondary public education. Elementary
refers to students age 5-10 and secondary targets students age 14-18. These were chosen for
analysis because they were the two most-delivered educational programs. Public education is
typically a one-time presentation on the subject of sexual assault. New volunteer training is the
practice of ‘providing in-depth education, skill building and evaluation of skills to prepare
volunteers to provide services to victims and significant others’.
c. Data cleaning and analysis
The 49 months of quantitative data were cleaned prior to analysis. Outliers that
indicated human error in data entry were removed from the dataset. The data of interest was
received in the form of a spreadsheet containing client contacts, with a date and corresponding
number of hours for each contact. There was no missing data in the entire dataset because if a
staff member of an RCC enters the data, nearly all the categories of interest are required and the
user will receive an error message if they do not input a number. However, data could be missing
if it was not entered at all and it could be entered improperly due to human error. The data
collection with InfoNet is required for agencies to receive funding from ICJIA.
2. Interrupted time series regression analysis
Data was imported into the software program Statistical Package for the Social Science
(SPSS) version 25. Monthly totals for each of the service categories for each of the 49 months of
interest were calculated by using a filter variable for year, and then constructing crosstabs for
each month in that year by service category. The researcher chose to start the analysis two years prior to the budget crisis even though yearly trends showed a large increase in service hours
48 across all categories between the years 2012 and 2014. This time period also makes it possible to center the budget crisis event with nearly the same amount of before and after points. Therefore, the time period was limited to 2013-2017 to isolate the effect of the budget crisis and make comparisons using recent prior year totals as a basis for predicted outcomes. These intervals were then used to build a new dataset to test hypotheses for each broad service category: hotline hours, client services, and community services and staff hours. This intervention analysis methodology was recommended by the Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group, part of the Cochrane Review Group based at the University of Oxford (Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC), 2017).
The interrupted time series regression analysis method is a versatile evaluation method.
In social science research, especially related to the measurement of policy interventions, randomization of data is not possible. Interrupted time series analysis (ITS) allows for non- randomized data to be analyzed (Bernal, Cummins, & Gasparrini, 2017). It is a parsimonious method for measuring the effects (magnitude and form) of large-scale change such as laws and policies on the behaviors of organizations and people (McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, & Hay,
1980). An advantage of the ITS analysis is the ability to control for seasonality, autocorrelation, and over-dispersion in the data. Three variables were used for the ITS analysis: time (month); the intervention, indicated as 0 or 1 (budget crisis month); and the outcome for that time period
(service category total for the month, the time variable). Data was then coded for analysis. Pre and post 3, 6, 12, and 24 month columns were added to center the time period of interest. Two other columns were added called Phase and Interact to indicate the onset of the ‘intervention’ to facilitate calculation of pre-slope equations to the time of interest (Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC), 2017).
49 Time series regression models were constructed for each variable of interest using the
SPSS Time Series Modeler, Expert Modeler function. This function tested for effects at 3, 6, 12,
and 24 months after the onset of the crisis in July 2015. This process finds the pre-intervention
slope of the regression line and calculates the level effect, p-value, and standard error for each
level effect. The modeler also calculates predicted values. Using these results and the predicted
values, relative effect percentages were calculated by hand using the following formula:
100*Level-effect co-efficient/Predicted outcome – (level-effect co-efficient).
Each service category of interest was tested for the appropriateness of fitting an ITS model using a process called autocorrelation function (ACF). The ACF tells us the correlations between the first time series and the second lag, the first time series and the third lag, and so on.
These correlation coefficients then indicate if the data is stationary or non-stationary. Stationary data essentially means the trends are statistical “white noise” (McDowall et al., 1980). Non- stationary data indicates the appropriateness of fitting an auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model.
For the comparison of urban and rural areas, the dataset was split into two smaller datasets separately containing rural and urban service providers. The urban-rural distinction was based on definition of a rural county used by the Office of Management and Budget as calculated by the USDA Economic Research Service (USDA Economic Research Service, n.d.). Analyses for each service category were run again with the rural and urban datasets and interpreted.
C. Qualitative Methods
1. Sample
The qualitative data sample contains interviews from 22 representatives of Illinois RCCs.
A geographically diverse sample was procured. Interview participants were recruited and
50 interviews were conducted until saturation of the topic was reached, or the point at which there were recurrent themes in the data absent the appearance of new themes (Charmaz, 2014). It was concluded that saturation was reached in discussion with the researcher’s PhD advisor after looking through several interview transcripts. The Results chapter reports descriptive characteristics of the interview participants.
a. Interview recruitment
Interview participants were staff members at the victim service agency with the power to make financial decisions. This could be the executive director or development officer, but it varied by agency. Participants for the interviews were contacted directly by the researcher via email and telephone. Jennifer Hiselman, manager of the InfoNet database, disseminated information to RCC directors about the interview component of the study when she solicited their permission to use their data for the quantitative portion. Agencies received emails and phone calls inviting them to participate in interviews to share their experiences with the budget crisis. They were also informed about data sharing through ICJIA (in the form of a final report and presentation open to all RCCs). Participants were screened by the researcher to ensure they had some control over financial decisions and to determine they were at the agency for at least the past three years (one exception was made where the current ED was interviewed and the staff member who had served as acting ED during the crisis- this was the only agency where 2 workers participated in the study).
b. Interview procedures
A service provider refers to a staff member at the victim service agency with the power to make financial decisions. This could be the executive director or development officer, but it varied by agency. The recruitment material for the interviews included information about
51 the nature and purpose of the study and how to contact the researcher for more information or to schedule an interview. Participants for the interviews were contacted directly by the researcher via email and telephone. Service providers who expressed interest in the study were screened by the researcher to ensure they had some control over financial decisions, and they were at the agency for at least the past three years. One exception was made where the current ED was interviewed and the staff member who had served as acting ED during the crisis- this was the only agency where 2 workers participated in the study. This was done because each respondent had a different piece of the story. The current ED had more information about the financial history of the agency that the staff member had not been given during her time as acting ED. But the staff member was able to discuss the decisions that were made and what it was like to work at the agency during the crisis.
With the exception of one director who was interviewed in person, interviews took place via Skype audio and were recorded. Interview participants were recruited and interviews were conducted from May through October 2018. Informed consent was obtained prior to each interview. Participants were informed that all identifying information was going to be scrubbed from the interview data and that their individual responses to questions were not going to be shared with ICJIA.
Participants were interviewed using an interview guide (see below for more information) with an accompanying information sheet to gather demographic information. The interviewer and her research assistant transcribed all audio-recorded interviews. Interviews lasted on average about one hour, however the researcher did not place artificial time constraints on the process.
52 c. Qualitative interview guide
Interviews began with the interviewer giving the interviewee the information
sheet to fill out regarding the interviewee and their agency. Some participants completed the
form before the interview and emailed it the researcher. Four participants did not complete or
declined the demographic information sheet. Interviewees were asked questions according to the
interview guide. After Section One introduced the study in more detail than the recruitment
materials, Section Two asked questions about agency history, funding and organizational
structure, and the degree of their agency’s feminist orientation. They were also asked about the
decision-making process under ‘normal’ (i.e., non fiscal crisis) conditions, including information
on who are the key decision-makers and the role of the Board of Directors. They were also asked
how funding and resources are allocated to satellite agencies (if applicable) and if survivors had
a voice in agency decisions. They were then asked about the financial history of their agency
before the budget crisis.
Section Three of the interview guide included the question, “When did the budget crisis first feel like a crisis to you and your agency? How did you know things were bad
(probe/clarification question)?” Participants were then asked questions about the financial impact on their agencies, followed by questions about the impact on staff and clients.
Section Four focused on community partnerships and activism/advocacy efforts while
Section Five centered on assessing the aftermath of the crisis on their agency (i.e. how difficult
was the recovery). In the Conclusion, participants were asked about whom they held responsible
for the budget impasse and what they saw as the role of government in funding services for
survivors. They were then encouraged to share any information I had not asked about and to ask
me any questions one final time before the interview concluded.
53 Participants were encouraged at the beginning of the interview to share only as much of their experience as they want. There was no monetary compensation for service providers who participate in the study. Participants were often eager to share their experiences, with one person sharing that there had been no other opportunity to reflect on the experience. The researcher built rapport with some respondents by sharing her history as a former RCC worker. This mostly took the form of simply mentioning her work history, but on a few occasions the researcher shared her experiences working at a center that almost closed due to financial mismanagement. The researcher discussed this experience with having to make difficult decisions about where to send clients who were not ready to end therapy. In some cases, sharing this information helped the researcher gain the trust of the participant. In other cases, it added to the already good rapport between researcher and participant.
2. Data Cleaning and Analysis
Interviews were transcribed using YouTube, where they were uploaded as private and locked audio files. Transcripts were obtained from YouTube and checked against the audio recordings by the researcher and her assistant. Errors in transcription were corrected and interviews were formatted. All audio-recordings were deleted after transcription. One-page reflections and notes were compiled for `each of the 22 interviews. Transcripts were uploaded into Atlas.ti for analysis. One interview was not a transcript and instead consisted of notes taken by the researcher because the respondent did not want the interview to be recorded. They cited an agency policy of never recording interviews. The respondent spoke candidly and did not appear to hold back, despite their not wanting to be recorded.
The codebook was developed through a process of examining the data along with the interview guide several times for emerging themes and patterns. First-impression codes were
54 gathered during transcript checking and upon re-reading of interview notes, where the researcher wrote memos and used some in vivo coding when appropriate to capture participant meanings
(Strauss & Corbin, 1997). Transcripts were then read again to identify emerging patterns and themes. The interview guide informed the development of the codebook. The preliminary codebook was kept in a Microsoft Word file before being entered into Atlas.ti. An outside coder helped ensure the reliability of the codebook by examining transcripts and comparing them to the codebook. The final codebook was entered into Atlas.ti and consisted of 38 codes. A final version of the codebook is available in Appendix B. The codebook was reviewed by the researcher’s dissertation chair in comparison with a sample of interview transcripts.
Line by line coding was performed on the 22 interviews using the codebook. Memo-ing and use of in vivo codes again occurred at this stage so that key concepts and variations within themes were preserved from the data (Charmaz, 2014). Simultaneous, or double, coding was also used as necessary to capture information that straddled more than one concept or theme
(Saldaña, 2009). Not every line received a code.
The goal of this coding practice was to capture data at the richest level of information to get the clearest picture of victim service provider experiences and coping strategies during the
Illinois budget crisis. The purpose of the interviews was to answer two broad research questions:
1) How did service providers cope with the budget crisis, specifically related to making decisions with regard to resources for different service types? and 2) Were agencies that serve primarily women of color affected differently compared to their counterparts? The codebook followed the interview guide but also included emergent themes that fell outside the scope of the guide. For example, many participants discussed using a line of credit to weather the crisis. This was not a coping strategy previously anticipated by the researcher and it became a theme under the larger
55 family of codes related to Crisis Mitigation Strategies. Close attention was paid to how the crisis affected clients, staff, and volunteers as this provided context for understanding the decisions made by directors during the crisis. The number of respondents who endorsed particular themes was recorded to demonstrate the prevalence of each theme, but this was the only quantification performed on the interview data. Given the homogeneity of the respondents (and RCC leadership in Illinois) it was not feasible to compute detailed cross-tabs with demographic information and interview themes.
56 V. RESULTS
A. Quantitative Results
1. Dataset Descriptive Information
The quantitative dataset constructed from the main InfoNet database housed at ICJIA
consisted of 35 Illinois rape crisis centers. Only one center did not sign the approval form to have
their data analyzed and thus were not included in the dataset. One of the RCCs served primarily
women of color from immigrant populations. Of the 35 centers, 40% (n=14) had satellite
locations. Half the centers with satellite locations had just one satellite center (n=7) and one
center had 6 satellite locations. There were a total of 28 satellite centers throughout the state. The
14 centers with satellite locations were in metropolitan areas (n=5), large rural counties (n=6),
with main offices in an urban area and satellite offices in surrounding rural towns in the same
county (n=3). About 34% (n=12) of the rape crisis centers were part of dual-service agencies,
offering services for victims of both domestic violence and sexual assault. About one third of the
centers (n=11) were part of large, multi-service agencies offering community mental health,
domestic violence, or other types of community services in addition to those for sexual assault
survivors.
2. Time Series Analysis
InfoNet for monthly service hours were included in the data set beginning with July 2013
and ending in July 2017 (the end of the crisis), for a total of 49 data points. Effects were then
calculated for 4 different time points: 3, 6, 12, and 24 months post-crisis. Trend lines are presented for the different service categories by quarter (for ease of interpretation), followed by results of the interrupted time series regression analysis (ITS). ITS measures the relative effects
57 using AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Averages (ARIMA) models that account for
correlations between the observations and trends over time (Cochrane Effective Practice and
Organisation of Care (EPOC), 2017). SPSS 25 was used for all quantitative analyses.
a. Research question 1: staff and service hours
Research Question 1 asked Were there measurable, quantitative effects of the
budget impasse on agency victim service hours and staff hours (using each measurement
category that is appropriate to the service type being considered)? A specific hypothesis for overall staff hours was not advanced. Staff conduct hours (hours where staff were delivering services) and staff travel hours across agencies fluctuate on a seasonal basis, decreasing over the summer months and increasing in the winter (Figure 1). The ARIMA models did not show any statistically significant change in aggregated, total staff hours due to the budget crisis.
Figure 1. Total staff hours by quarter 2013-2017. The purple line denotes the onset of the crisis.
Total Staff Hours 16000 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0
58 i. Hypothesis 1: advocacy services
It was predicted there would be no significant effect on medical and criminal justice advocacy and ‘other’ advocacy would show an increase in hours. This hypothesis was not supported. Instead, results showed an effect on criminal justice advocacy and no effects on medical and other advocacy. Before the budget impasse, there was an average monthly increase in criminal justice advocacy hours of 13 (p=.002) (Figure 2). At 3 and 6 months, there were no statistically significant effects. However, at 12 and 24 months there were significant decreases in hours of 14%(p<.05) and 25% (p<.01), respectively. There were no statistically significant effects at any of the post-crisis intervals for medical and other advocacy (Figures 3 and 4).
Figure 2. Criminal justice advocacy hours by quarter 2013-2017.
CJ Advocacy 5000 12 months 24 months 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0
59 Figure 3. Medical advocacy hours by quarter 2013-2017.
Medical Advocacy 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0
Figure 4. Other advocacy hours by quarter 2013-2017.
Other Advocacy Hours 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0
60 ii. Hypothesis 2: counseling service hours
It was hypothesized there would be a statistically significant decrease in
individual and group counseling service hours, and no change in telephone counseling. These
hypotheses were partially supported. Individual counseling hours were increasing by 21 hours on
average each month prior to the onset of the budget crisis in July 2015 (Figure 5). There were no
statistically significant effects at 3 and 6 months after the onset of the crisis. The effect at 12
months was a marginally significant decrease of nearly 17 %(p<.10) and the 24-month relative
effect was a decrease of 27% (p<.05).
Telephone counseling showed significant effects at 3, 6, and 12 months post-crisis
(Figure 6). At 3 months, telephone counseling decreased by 10.8% (p<.05) followed by 11.3%
(p<.05) at 6 months and 12.4% (p<.05) at 12 months. However these effects were not lasting and had dissipated by 24 months post-crisis.
Group counseling showed no significant effects from the budget crisis, with the hours staying relatively consistent over time (Figure 7).
61 Figure 5. Individual counseling hours by quarter 2013-2017.
Indv. Counseling Hours 12000
10000 12 months 24 months
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
Figure 6. Telephone counseling hours by quarter 2013-2017.
Telephone Counseling 2500 6 months
2000
1500 3 months 12 months 1000
500
0
62 Figure 7. Group counseling hours by quarter 2013-2017.
Group Counseling 3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
iii. Hypothesis 3: hotline hours
It was hypothesized that the budget crisis would not affect hotline hours. This was
confirmed as the ITS analysis showed no effect at any post-crisis intervals. Hotline hours were increasing an average of 6 hours per month prior to the crisis (Figure 8).
63 Figure 8. Hotline hours by quarter 2013-2017.
Hotline Hours 3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
iv. Hypothesis 4: differences between rural and urban agencies
It was hypothesized there would be differences between rural and urban agencies such that rural RCCs would show more negative effects of the crisis. This hypothesis was supported. When data was dis-aggregated and agencies in rural and urban counties were analyzed separately, several interesting findings were revealed. Urban counties did not show any new or different effects in service hours compared to the aggregated data. However, rural RCCs showed notable effects that were not present in the other datasets (in addition to the effects discussed above).
First, ITS regression with the rural dataset revealed no effects on Individual or Group
Counseling. There were significant increases in Telephone Counseling, however. Second,
Medical Advocacy hours showed significant decreases at 24 months post-crisis (Table__).
64 Finally, Criminal Justice Advocacy showed significant decreases at 6, 12, and 24 months post-
crisis, which differs from no effect found in the aggregated dataset. Finally, telephone counseling
for rural agencies showed significant increases in hours at 6, 12, and 24 months post-crisis.
TABLE III. RURAL RCC RELATIVE PERCENTAGE IN POST-CRISIS SERVICE HOURS
Level Effect Medical Criminal Justice Telephone Advocacy Advocacy Counseling 3-month n.s n.s. n.s. 6-month n.s. -11%* +21%* 12-month n.s. -33%*** +43%*** 24-month -32%** -71%*** +111%*** Equation for calculating % change = 100*Level-effect/Predicted outcome – (level-effect) Note. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; n.s.= not significant
b. Research question 2: core v. peripheral services
Research Question Two focused on comparing core services and more
‘peripheral’ activities. Core services are defined as the services required by the Illinois Coalition
Against Sexual Assault (ICASA) to retain membership and be eligible for grant money (ICASA,
2018). These include the 24-hour hotline, advocacy, and counseling services. ‘Peripheral’ services (the author’s term) consist of community and prevention education and volunteer training. Question Two asked Were there differences in budget effects between core services such as counseling, advocacy, and the hotline compared to more peripheral services such as community education and volunteer training? The working hypothesis for core and peripheral services was that peripheral services would be affected by the budget crisis while core services
65 remained relatively intact. As results above demonstrated, criminal justice advocacy and hotline
hours both showed significantly decreased services at all post-crisis intervals.
Surprisingly, prevention education services showed no significant effects from the budget crisis. Elementary and secondary education hours were both assessed using the ITS models.
Elementary refers to students age 5-10 while secondary refers to students age 14-18. Neither
category showed significant effects from the budget crisis. Trend lines show an almost even
seasonal pattern over the three-year period (Figures 9 & 10).
The same holds true for New Volunteer Training hours. The overall trend line does not indicate any significant shifts due to the budget crisis but shows a similar pattern over time starting in 2013 (Figure 11).
Taken together, it is clear that peripheral service hours were not affected by the budget crisis while several core services were affected.
Figure 9. Public education (elementary) hours by quarter 2013-2017.
Public Ed: Elementary 2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
66 Figure 10. Public education (secondary) hours by quarter 2013-2017.
Public Ed: Secondary 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
Figure 11. New volunteer training hours by quarter 2013-2017.
New Volunteer Training 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0
67 c. Summary of quantitative results
Most hypotheses were not supported. Criminal justice advocacy, individual counseling, and telephone counseling were the only services that showed significant effects from the budget crisis ‘intervention’ (see Table IV for summary). Telephone counseling was only impacted in the short term and resumed a normal pattern after 12 months of the budget crisis.
Interview data revealed a significant impact on agency’s referral networks, and this might help explain why criminal justice advocacy, and counseling were affected. Referral networks would be most likely to impact advocacy services as they receive the most inquiries from people in the community. The connection between referral networks and affected services will be described further in the Discussion chapter.
TABLE IV. SUMMARY OF RELATIVE PERCENT CHANGE IN POST-CRISIS SERVICE HOURS
Level Effect CJ Advocacy Individual Telephone Counseling Counseling 3-month n.s. n.s. -10.8%* 6-month n.s. n.s. -11.2%* 12-month -14%* -16.6% -12.4%* 24-month - 25%** -26.9%** n.s. Equation for calculating % change = 100*Level-effect/Predicted outcome – (level-effect) Note. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.000; n.s.= not significant
The hypothesis regarding rural RCCs was broad, simply predicting there would be notable differences in effects from the crisis that would fall disproportionately on rural agencies.
This broad hypothesis was born out. Group counseling hours were significantly negatively affected at 12 and 24 months post-crisis. Medical advocacy showed a significant decrease at 24 months. Telephone counseling showed significant increases at 6, 12, and 24 months post-crisis.
68 It is not surprising that rural RCCs, for whom transportation is a perennial barrier to reaching
clients, would increase their telephone counseling hours while decreasing their in-person
counseling. This finding is underscored in the qualitative data below.
B. Qualitative Results
1. Interview Sample Descriptive Information
Interview participants were recruited from a list of agencies that signed formal
agreements to have their InfoNet data analyzed for the quantitative portion of this study. A total
of 22 interviews were conducted over the phone, with the exception of one in-person interview.
The use of phone interviews will be discussed further in the limitations section. Participants were invited from 34 centers total, indicating a 65% response rate. Interviews occurred over the course of several months in the spring and summer of 2018. A deliberate effort was made to interview at least one agency representative with the power to make financial decisions from each part of the state, including rural counties, Chicago suburbs, and agencies working along state lines to the east and west of Illinois (Figure 12). Agencies are required by the Illinois Coalition Against
Sexual Assault (ICASA) to provide basic services including a 24-hour rape crisis hotline, victim advocacy at hospitals, and counseling (ICASA, 2018).
69 Figure 12. Rape crisis center locations in Illinois.
Screen shot of Illinois RCC locations retrieved from http://icasa.org/crisis-centers
Of the 22 interviewees, 18 completed demographic data information sheets. Participants
ranged in age from 31 to 69 years, with an average age of 51.7 years. Only 2 participants
identified their gender as Male (18 Female). Race was assessed with the open-ended question:
How do you define your racial/ethnic identity? Nearly all participants self-identified their race as
White (N=15) while one respondent identified as Latina, one as Black, and one as Mixed Race
(White and South Asian). The average annual salary reported was $71,000, with a range from
$39,000 to $125,000. All respondents had financial decision-making power except for one, though that person made programmatic decisions during the budget crisis. Their titles included
Executive Director, Program Director, CEO, and Director of Victim Services. Directors oversaw
70 an average of 8 employees (range of 1-16). Thirteen respondents held previous roles at their
agency before moving into the director position. On average, respondents worked at their
agencies for 13.9 years spanning a range of 2-31 years overall. All respondents had at least 5
years of experience in the anti-violence field (M=20.1; range=5-36). Finally, 14 interviewees
held Masters degrees and 14 had either the 40-hour Domestic Violence advocate training, Sexual
Assault training, or both. The sample was geographically diverse and consisted of representatives from agencies who served the Chicago Metropolitan area, rural counties throughout Central,
Western, and Southern Illinois, larger cities in other parts of the state, and agencies that worked across state lines. Frequencies for these regions are not reported due to the small population of
Illinois rape crisis centers and the need for confidentiality of responses.
Qualitative interview data provides answers to Research Questions 3 and 4. Question 3 asked: Were agencies that serve primarily women of color affected differently compared to their counterparts? Research Question 4 asked How did service providers cope with the budget crisis, specifically related to making decisions with regard to resources for different service types?
Interview respondents discussed how their staff and clients were affected by the budget crisis and the decisions they made regarding resources, with the goal of surviving the crisis.
Themes and representative quotes are presented and discussed in the sections below.
2. Crisis Mitigation Strategies
Interview respondents reflected on their first steps and on-going strategies to help manage
some of the effects of the budget impasse. Interviewees reported they were missing between 40%
and 80% of their funding starting in July 2015 when legislators did not pass a budget and no
money was allocated for social services. Agencies that were not part of larger organizations
71 and/or had little to no money in reserves had to immediately begin thinking of ways to stretch existing funds and trim back expenses.
A note on abbreviations for respondents (below): R= Rural; U= Urban; S= Suburban; M=
Mix of urban and rural.
a. Cutting back on expenses
Nine respondents talked about cutting what they called ‘extra’ expenses. For these respondents, ‘extras’ included professional development and training, office supplies, janitorial services, travel reimbursement, and building maintenance and upkeep (if they owned the building).
Then I had to stop paying people for doing on call but we still had to do on call. And I stopped paying people travel but we still had to travel. And we were walking into a building that was dark the majority of the day because we weren't turning on lights. Like hey guys you need Kleenex in your office you better grab a box from home. And everybody was 100% on board. Like at no point did any of my staff say you know what I'm scared I'm out, I can't do this I have a family to support. (11, R)
Sometimes I’d go in the workroom and we would have two packages of paper left. (9, R)
Obviously you have to reach your clients but if you guys [staff] can carpool…so it was the little things like that, make sure to turn off the lights if you're not in the room and we usually set the air to this but now we're going to set it to this and the same with the heat so just kind of little things like that. (11, R)
Staff at smaller or less financially secure agencies were immediately asked to go without luxuries, sharing the cleaning duties, and bringing supplies (tissue and toilet paper) from home.
Eventually, some of the larger agencies had to take on these localized austerity measures as well.
The quote above illustrates the willingness of most staff to join in the money-saving efforts.
72 b. Dipping into reserves and using lines of credit
Some agencies had money in reserve when the budget crisis began (n= 6).
Several agencies began using their reserve money right away, while others employed other cost- saving measures first before turning to reserves.
As soon as it didn't pass [the state budget] there's two things I'm watching: what's going on in Springfield and what's my bank balance because I know how much it takes to run this place and I know what I've got in reserve and when it dips below a certain point then you know if you don't take action you're going to lose everything… (6, S)
We didn't dip too far into them [reserves]. We made the strategic decision to let some people go and cut some expenses instead of digging too deep into our reserves because we didn't want to deplete them. It’s just too important not to deplete them for the long term of the organization- we wanted to make sure that we were stainable for long term so we had to take that position. (1, S)
The quotes above illustrate how keenly some directors were aware of their financial situations, nervously watching their bank balances while knowing a significant portion of funding would not be coming soon. The second quote shows the belief of some directors that reserves should not be entirely depleted because this can jeopardize the long-term viability of an organization.
Over half of all organizations reported using a line of credit to fill the massive funding holes left by the lack of state money (n= 12). Those agencies that did not use a line of credit often could not qualify for one because they did not have collateral. Agencies with collateral owned their buildings. Interest rates tended to be 10% or lower, but all agencies that used lines of credit eventually had to allocate money for debt service in addition to the salaries and expenses they were struggling to pay. Directors mostly agreed that lines of credit were a good tool for non- profits if they could access them.
It was helpful to get us by and then you get nervous because you know line of credit it's fine to manage cash flow but when you're in a situation like a budget impasse where you don't know what they're going to decide to pay, you that's a whole different situation because you’re responsible for that line. (5, R)
73
There's certain times of the year where we get these really big donations from these local places, and so for a while those really big donations were going to the line of credit. (11, R)
I believe in line of credit. I believe in making that commitment and using their money. It's a matter of business and I don't think it's a bad thing for not for profits to treat themselves as a legitimate business. You don't need special consideration all the time sometimes you can you know put your big girl pants on and go out there in the world and get it. I think they should give us extra consideration but you can't always expect it and it's happening less and less yeah well that's my view of the world unfortunately. (17, U)
We don't have any reserves but we do have a line of credit because we own our buildings- we have about $190,000- that's how we survived basically with the line of credit. (18, R)
We have to come up with revenue to pay the interest. (18, R)
At least one agency was denied a line of credit, but the budget impasse made them high risk because the state was shirking its fiscal obligations. They said, “We talked about opening a line of credit but the bank that we use here said if the person who's supposed to pay us back is the state they would not give it to us.” (R19)
While directors were not happy about paying interest on top of existing expenses, the credit lines sometimes made the difference between closing and staying open during the budget impasse.
I know 2 executive directors who had lines of credit based on buildings that they owned, in other words they were remortgaging their property. And it was really scary for both of them because they saw the end coming from no assurance from the state that they were going to get repaid. I had a discussion with one executive director who runs a mandated agency for the aged who told me that in February of 2016 they had almost completely run out of money, they had used up their line of credit. (14, R)
It comes down to not having any services for clients. That might be something that you have to do- you might have to have that risk if you can't find other funding. Even if it's just a little bit to have at least one staff available, but the clients come first and if you have to do something to keep your doors open that's your last [option], but I think the issue is if you did the line of credit and then that budget never got passed and the next year doesn't get passed -that’s the fear- then you don't have any money to reimburse that... (22, R reflecting on other agencies that relied on credit lines)
Other directors expressed caution around using credit lines, but still understood credit to be a solution for agencies operating in dire circumstances, especially for agencies operating without
74 reserves. Nearly all directors sought to expand their credit lines at the onset of the budget crisis,
though not all had to use the entire line.
c. Finding new funding or modifying existing funding
Several agencies (n= 6) reported securing new funding sources or making changes
to existing funding to cover their large budgetary shortfalls. One agency reported starting a
crowd-funding campaign that ultimately did little to help them. Two agencies talked about
getting extra funding from donors for a short period of time and putting out calls on social media
and newspapers. One agency asked their funders if they could change the contract to allow them
to use the funds for other programs not in the original agreement. This money helped them for a
few months.
d. Staffing
The most common staffing strategy during the budget crisis was to reduce staff
hours and make use of furlough days, where staff was told not to come in and would not be paid
for that day (n= 6). The next most common strategy was to simply not rehire for vacant
positions, or instituting a hiring freeze (n= 5). Five directors explicitly talked about layoffs as a
strategy, though surprisingly few agencies had to let go of their staff.
One of the first measures we took was to ask all the staff to take a 10% salary cut and I thought that was the only fair thing to do was do it across board… (6, S)
I went from a forty-hour week counselor my hours only got cut down to 36 hours a week, but some people got cut down to 24, 20 hours a week. (11, R)
Layoffs ranged from nearly the entire agency staff to case managers to advocates and counselors.
One agency offered optional furloughs, which most of the staff ended up taking. All of the staff members came back to work at their regular hours when the budget was finally passed in 2017.
One director disclosed that after they had depleted their reserves and maxed out their credit, the
75 final plan they made was when and how to close their doors. The budget was finally passed in
2017 before they had to implement this plan.
3. Effects on staff and volunteers
Directors discussed the logistics and planning that went into averting the worst-case scenarios during the budget crisis (agency closings). While they focused on the day-to-day financial concerns of bringing in enough money to fund operations, they also had major concerns about how this crisis affected staff, volunteers, and clients. This section focuses on directors’ perceptions of the budget impasse’s human costs.
a. Staff morale and distress
The previous section detailed the survival strategies of cutting staff hours,
trimming down on basic supplies, furloughs, hiring freezes, and lay-offs. All of these strategies
had a significant emotional cost for the staff that remained in their positions. Nearly every
director interviewed (n= 20) reported very low staff morale during the impasse. Directors were
also under a high amount of stress, facing the uncertainty of operating their agencies coupled
with having to worry about their staff being able to do their jobs. Still, every director mentioned
feeling concerned for the emotional well being of staff and volunteers who were undertaking
difficult work with survivors of sexual violence even during times of financial insecurity.
It was the darkest time. They see sexual assault survivors and kids that have been raped and there was, it did not compare to the morale around here, not knowing if you're going to have a job the following week. (21, R)
I think that made it very hard on me and definitely on the staff because you don't know if you know you're going to have a job or if your hours are going to be reduced. (5, R)
I mean having people with high levels of pain [staff] and those are the people that are providing the service with the community. (3, U)
76 I definitely think that people were really in a state of panic. But I think that staff was really scared and [had] anxiety within...you know what if we don't end up getting this money? What is going to happen? (13, U)
Financial insecurity for staff led to a considerable amount of distress. This precariousness as workers compounded the secondary trauma faced by those who work with survivors of trauma and their family members.
b. Concern for clients
Several directors thought the staff turmoil may have affected the clients’ quality
of service. They discussed this not to malign workers- they universally held their staff members
in very high regard- but to point out the incredible strain on people’s mental ‘bandwidth’ needed
to do these jobs.
Also we had less people doing more work and so people were feeling frustrated with that and wiped out. You know, this work is not easy and then we start getting these wait lists and turning people away and that's really hard because we want to help as many people as we can. So it was it was a rough time for all. (1, S)
Not only have a waiting list but when you have staff that are fearful of losing their jobs and don't have any kind of stability they're not working at their best. So I'm sure that the clients could feel it too. (1, S)
I think one of the hardest things was if someone is calling needing something like a protective order for themselves or their child to have to say we can't help you . . . like that really sucks. (10, S)
Staff were fearful of what was going to happen not only to them but to our clients. I mean if we're not here they would be like ‘who is going to be here for them’ ‘who will they go to? How will they get the help that they need when we don't have these funds? (22, U)
Yet many workers hung on even as the crisis worsened, out of concern for their clients. The
budget crisis had a feedback effect, whereby the staff was experiencing strain from their working
conditions on one side, which was connected to the strain of worrying about their clients on the
other side.
77 Staff members recognized they were often the only free resource specializing in sexual
assault trauma, as most survivors did not have access to any other mental health service.
It's heartbreaking to see services disappear and to have that stress. I think about our counselors, for example, who kept working with folks for as long as they could and then when it came down to it, having to try to figure out where all of their clients were going to go. There are going to be folks who couldn’t receive services anymore because you know our counseling services are free and that's pretty unusual you know so I think in addition to you know the impact on our clients like I said this is work that people really believe in. (10, S)
Directors acknowledged the pain they saw at their agencies from staff members who felt they had no choice but to leave and recognized the toll of the cuts on clients.
Some programs, like prevention education, acted as a conduit for survivors to get connected to services. Eliminating or scaling back these programs was another source of concern for staff members who worried they would not be reaching everyone who needed them.
The advocates still want to continue providing services at the same level that we were, so it's just ensuring that we're working within the hours that we’re scheduled to work or working within those hours per week and also taking time to practice self care. (2, M)
What happened we were able to pay the staff only three days a week for five months. It was very difficult period of time. A lot of the time folks volunteered to do that- it was very difficult and it's a lot of pressure. (3, U)
I learned about staff saying how difficult it was for them to get up in the morning and come to work and with expectation of somehow putting? in more hours but not getting paid. (3, U)
I mean the pain that you feel from workers not wanting to leave and crying- coming to this office and crying. ‘Look I have my student loan and I got the mortgage and I have to continue to pay childcare so I wish it was different; I want to be here’. (3, U)
You know we were short one advocate and two educators and so the others just kind of had to absorb the work, which says a lot for staff that are willing to do that. (9, R)
Staff was being overworked but many felt they did not want to decrease the level of services they were providing. They wanted to serve the save amount of people and work hard. This left them
78 feeling they had no good choices (a feeling that flowed downstream from management to staff).
Yet some agency directors were aware that some staff had to seek other employment because of their personal financial and familial obligations. The staff members were afraid for the future.
c. Staff and ‘self-care’
Directors talked about their efforts to prioritize ‘self-care’ for their staff, through pep-talks and providing tangible services such as free massages and counseling from local mental health agencies. Some directors recognized the limits of this approach for staff members unsure about their ability to keep providing for families.
It was a hard time definitely so we talked a lot about self care and what we can do. Our agency is great in that we offer mental health services. They also have a contact with what's called ___ where all the staff can go for five free visits and get massages for free or acupuncture or reflexology- just different things like that to help so they can practice some self-care. (2, M)
We have to keep toilet paper in an office. We reached a point where staff was bringing things in and that’s ridiculous in my opinion, but it happened. We always had our office building clean, [people shared] the responsibility of the cleaning of the facilities and no one griped, no one complained. Did they like doing it? Probably not. A master’s degree therapist is not hired to clean toilet. (9, R)
The idea of ‘self-care’ is a ever-present in RCCs and an important part of advocates’ ability to do their jobs (Wasco, Campbell, & Clark, 2002). The need for self-care was magnified during the severe austerity of the impasse.
d. Organizational trauma
Nearly every agency director talked about the persistent low morale among staff members during the impasse. For some, the low morale began to look like what one director called ‘organizational trauma’ (n= 3). Several respondents exhibited emotional distress during the interviews as they recounted their concern for staff and clients.
79 I mean there's definitely been some organizational trauma. I mean there there's concerns that are we going to get funding this year are we going to get paid... (2, M)
There's still a lot of healing that people are working on obviously. Look at me breaking down crying for what was impacted. (10, S)
And this is what I couldn't say kind of in public, they [staff] were all traumatized...I'm a social worker, I can diagnose people the organization has PTSD I mean literally they were exhibiting collectively a trauma response. (12, S)
And I mean there were days that we sat as directors in the roundtable crying that we're going to have to let people go the month of Christmas and like how do we do this. (22, R)
This organizational trauma stayed with some agencies after the crisis ended. Staff morale did not immediately return to normal, though nearly every director said their full staff returned to work and had not sought out other employment. One staff member momentarily panicked when I contacted their agency for an interview about the budget crisis. Thinking they were being asked about a new budget crisis, I had to reassure them that I was indeed asking about their experiences from 2015-2017.
e. Camaraderie and resilience
Finally, there are often positive growth experiences following extreme hardship.
One agency director noted how people within the agency came together to keep providing services.
Everybody was having to sacrifice on some level so everybody was contributing and I think that created an ‘espirit de corps’. So there was an awful lot of support here at the agency in managing this. (6, S)
Staff came together under a feeling of fellowship and loyalty to the organization and the work.
This is typical of workers in mission-driven non-profit and social service agencies, but also of people who survive trauma. They find a way to make meaning out of the experience.
80 4. Effects on clients
Staff and volunteers worried about their ability to provide consistent, high-quality services to survivors. These fears were not unwarranted, as directors reported many direct effects on clients resulting from how agencies responded to the impasse with reduced staff hours, lay-
offs, and furloughs.
a. Disruptions in counseling services
As a consequence of severely decreased funding, many agencies (n= 7) had to
create wait lists or add to existing ones. This was often due to loss of counseling staff and/or case
managers. Some agencies referred clients on waitlists to their crisis hotline.
All we can do is offer them our crisis line for assistance and I have no way of knowing really if any of them were ever using that. (6, S)
Then we start getting these wait lists that are forming and turning people away and that's really hard because we want to help as many people as we can it was a rough time for all. (1, S)
When you finally make the decision that you're going to get help and you go to a domestic violence or sexual assault organization and you’re put on a waiting list...I can't imagine how that must feel because making that decision is so hard and so brave in the first place then being told okay well we're really glad that you’re making a decision to get help but we can't see you for three weeks or whatever and it was just it was terrible. (1, S)
Sometimes people will come in at more of a crisis point, if they wait too long and the crisis passes and then they don’t want the counseling. But we saw a little bit more of that- people not following through because the time had been extended. So that was probably the primary reason, they couldn’t get services. (20, U)
This specific effect was impossible for directors to quantify (as no one was tracking how many people simply dropped off the waiting lists or why). But several directors expressed the view that being placed on a waitlist would serve as a roadblock to getting help for many survivors. Agency
81 directors reported how hard it was to know clients were on wait lists after taking the difficult first
step of reaching out for help. Many survivors must overcome self-blame and fear to reach out to
crisis centers, only to be told to wait for long-term counseling.
One agency started a separate, short-term program to help people on the waitlist. It was
designed to help survivors cope in the interim between calling the crisis line and entering formal
therapy services.
Our waiting list for services grew but even then staff came up with some interesting ideas to deal with a waiting list and developed a program for people on the waiting list that was like a three session cycle- educational sessions- on how to cope while they're waiting for counseling to start. (6, S)
Dedicated staff members who were also distressed at the long wait lists started this effort.
However, even this stopgap program was limited to only three sessions and focused on very
short-term coping skills.
Another director talked about how her clients experienced disruptions in their counseling when they were shifted from their regular therapist to the waitlist, essentially re-starting at the beginning of the process of obtaining help.
R: We had to lay off two counselors and that clearly affected those clients. A: so their caseloads got moved over to someone else? R: No, I mean they were added to the waiting list. (6, S)
While going from regular therapy to being on the waitlist again was a rare occurrence, it illustrates the budget crisis’ direct impact on survivors’ recovery.
Other directors reported shifting their clients to less frequent therapy schedules (n= 4), as agencies struggled to adapt to staff shortages and shortened work hours.
We would do crisis counseling but then maybe not be able to see someone two or three weeks out and then some of our clients we did have to go to seeing them every other week. (5, R)
82 We have been told we are going to have to really rely on crisis services only, so how about if we cut it down to a once a month check in... (11, R)
They could call the hotline and they could visit with somebody and help them get through the immediate crisis but for some of them it was an ongoing kind of thing and they were not able to talk to the regular person that they had built a rapport with weekly, because she couldn't see them weekly. (19, R)
Clients who had to see their counselors less often were directed to the crisis hotline to help them cope with reduced services, similar to those clients who were placed on waitlists either before starting counseling or as a result of having their services cut.
Only two respondents said they had clients who had to stop counseling altogether at some point during the impasse (due to staff lay-offs and severe furloughs).
There are people who, even if it's not a high cost, can't afford counseling services or will get kicked out after a certain number of sessions [at other centers], so there just really isn't another service like what we offered for free. (10, S)
For the clients at the agency discussed in the quote above, they lost the only free mental health counseling they had been able to access. To provide some context, one-third of Illinois residents experiencing mental health problems cannot access treatment due to lack of insurance and no community-based centers to obtain free services (O’Donnell, 2018). Community-based mental health centers, if they are available, do not specialize in treating sexual assault trauma.
b. Loss of state support
Three directors discussed their concern that survivors would feel that their status as victims of sexual violence was not taken seriously by the state of Illinois. They worried that survivors would interpret the lack of resources as an indication that no one cared about sexual assault victims.
I don't know for sure but I would just imagine if I was going through sexual assault or domestic violence and I had to go to an organization that I knew (because it was all over
83 the press) the state was not paying it would make me feel like these issues are not serious. (1, S)
Basically the impression they were getting from all the media and everything that we were doing and saying...they already feel like there's no reason to disclose the sexual assault or to come forward if it's a domestic violence situation, because [they feel like] it's not going to go anywhere, but now on top of that they're getting that they're not important enough even to put money into the organizations that do help them. So they felt very unworthy that nobody really cared you know whether they healed or not or whether somebody was there with them in the hospital. (21, R)
These quotes demonstrate several directors’ perceptions of lack of funding as a lack of social
support from the state. They perceived a lack of formal acknowledgement of the importance of
supporting sexual assault victims at the highest levels of government and raised concerns their
clients would feel this, too.
c. Community perception of declining services
Many agencies publicized their budget crisis-induced financial troubles. Agencies had to reach out to their communities to ask for more funding and communicate to their clients about reduced services (n= 4). Both actions had de-stabilizing effects on survivors who might be looking for services and existing clients worried about losing their counseling resource.
I think there's anxiety there and you know we tried to of course to minimize that as much as we could but they were hearing in the community about all sorts of social service agencies closing and being affected…they definitely knew that we were reduced staff. (5, R)
Our clients were a little fearful. We discussed this more than anywhere in group therapy and that’s because it was a little more of an open forum...how’s that gonna affect them. Does that mean I’m not going to have a counselor, does that mean that the group is going to have to stop meeting... And so we explain in those situations that we are planning on maintaining what we're doing, we won’t necessarily take on anything new, meaning a new program or new schools but we will maintain what we have and we were able to do that. (9, R)
But you know of course it's the process...to get folks trust back to to make sure that people know we are open- we never actually closed. That these services are here and that we're not going to have to pull them out from under people again. (10, S)
84
We were mainly concerned that when the word got out we were in trouble that people wouldn't feel able to call us, which is a big one that I don't think is talked about too much [yeah] They're already having their financial issues themselves and so do they feel like they can have counseling? (17, U)
The quotes above illustrate the effects of the budget crisis on potential clients (survivors looking
for help) and the addition of new worries to existing clients. Even when agencies did not have to
reduce services, the perception that they may eventually have to make cuts was de-stabilizing for clients. This persisted even after the budget crisis had passed.
d. Cuts to prevention programs
InfoNet data did not reveal significant quantitative effects on prevention program
numbers. However, three agencies reported having to cut their prevention programs almost
entirely.
But our prevention education program completely went away too, so in terms of providing support and information in the schools, which left schools trying to either figure out how to do programming themselves or I see there are a lot of schools who just didn't do anything which means that there are kids who may be at risk or may have experienced sexual violence who aren't being talked to about it in an age-appropriate way. We did get a lot of disclosures when we would go in and work with folks in the schools so that's basically two years because it's taken a while to get back on track where kids aren’t getting any programming in schools. (10, S)
While one agency was able to ‘re-home’ their youth program, the other two agencies were not able to do that. They expressed concern that when the programs were cut, so was a pathway for youth to disclose and seek support for sexual assault.
e. Asking clients to advocate with legislators while in crisis
Agencies had to engage in lobbying and interfacing with their legislators more
frequently during the two-year budget crisis. Several directors (n= 4) also reported asking clients
to engage in lobbying and advocating to legislators for funds.
85 I think they were mostly upset so we were communicating with our clients, if you're upset about this call the governor's office, call your representatives. (15, R)
If the client didn't want to go talk to them [legislators]- we would say would you at least write a statement that we can give to them...you do not have to sign your real name, just say a survivor receiving services at. (19, R)
Clients engaged in advocacy and made sacrifices to support agencies by lobbying politicians, donating money, and freeing up a therapy slot for someone else. These efforts demonstrate the burden placed on survivors of sexual violence during the budget crisis in addition to the hardship of recovering from trauma.
f. Effects on clients from marginalized groups
Several directors spoke about marginalized groups of survivors being more
adversely affected by the budget impasse. One agency worked primarily with Spanish-speaking
immigrant communities. The director of that agency described the challenges the primarily
immigrant survivors at her agency faced.
Then we start hearing from our participants that I'm not going to go there [the courthouse] and I heard that immigration is there, that ICE is in that courtroom, so I will not go there. Can you provide me counseling over the phone? So we start having workshops about know your rights so if the immigration [authorities] stop you what are your rights, this your card, these are the things that are important for your to remember. (3, U)
The fear of immigration officials being present in courtrooms was already an issue when the
budget impasse began. The director went on to discuss how the plethora of issues was
compounded by the impasse.
We look at ourselves as a comprehensive service...It would be very easy to say I'm not in a position [that is] funded or they are delaying payment or I'm cutting the entire program. We don't work that way- we really see the interconnected[ness] of the issues that we work with. (3, U)
Now if you were culturally specific it's another layer because you don't know even if they're just going to be part of the budget because they might provide a service for
86 supporting domestic violence but specialized services for special populations, it's probably the first one to go. It's just another layer... (3, U)
Another service provider echoed the above director’s statement about the difficulty of funding specialized services such as bilingual therapy.
It took us a long time to hire the bilingual...therapist and she’s been here a couple years so probably...during that time we sometimes have a waiting list. (16, S)
The directors of two agencies that work with diverse communities of survivors reflected on how the budget crisis was harder on communities of color and those who depended on other state services.
I want to make sure people understand that the impact of this crisis was not shared equally. I think communities of color took the brunt of this impact and it's not because communities of color have a higher percentage of unemployed, it’s just because we have a higher percentage of the underemployed. And in courting corporations to come to Illinois they’re paying low wages [which] does not help the state. (4, U)
There’s this real possibility that our government doesn't see the need [for] these services. I might be living somewhere that’s just letting victims down and without much care, and it obviously was really impactful to me in what was going on with rape crisis service and all kinds of service across the state. We were letting our seniors down, we were letting kids with disabilities down- we were just working funding from all sorts of places, and it just felt like a real lack of humanity to me and that was hard. (7, U)
I think that there are still going to be agencies and services that just don't exist anymore. We saw that in our local communities with certain services being bought out by larger organizations, some of they're not specifically rooted in their community, but sometimes when those mergers happen some of those programs disappear and sometimes there isn't a good way to make those services come back. I see that especially around homeless services in our community they're just very few resources for folks who are homeless. I think it's that impact is still ongoing. There are going to be folks who might be in very different places in their lives if they have had services cut off from them who may not trust the process of starting that service again. (10, S)
87 Communities of color, immigrant, and very rural communities especially often have high rates of poverty in Illinois. The budget impasse effectively blocked people from much-needed social welfare in the state for a period of two years, including therapy in a survivor’s native language.
Several agencies (n= 6) cover large geographic areas and serve rural counties of Illinois.
They spoke of specific challenges related to lack of funding for transportation.
You know we'll never know those people who couldn't get services but we did have some people making much longer travel to get to us and we know that's not an option for everybody. So for every one person that we were able to serve how many were going unserved? (7, U)
In that period I can tell you…we could not help them with transportation. We did not have money to buy the bus pass. (3, U)
Lack of transportation was a persistent problem made worse by the budget crisis. Few agencies had extra money for transportation assistance such as bus passes or taxi vouchers.
5. Collaboration
Agency directors spoke of their collaboration with other social service and anti-violence agencies in relation to the budget crisis. Agencies shared concerns over referral networks, engaged in joint media blitzes and lobbying efforts, and met with one another to vent and share advice.
a. Smaller referral networks
The most prevalent theme regarding collaboration centered on concern over their referral networks getting smaller as partner agencies cut services or shut their doors (n= 10).
Referral networks include agencies to which RCC’s referred their clients such as food pantries, homeless shelters, housing services, employment services, and other mental health resources.
RCC’s also receive referrals as part of these informal community networks and they were able to take on fewer referred clients as a result of their own financial struggles.
88 Our other social service agencies that we refer to for mental health and drug and alcohol and all those other services were also being impacted by the state budget so it was hard on all of us because we didn't have a lot of places to refer to because they all had waiting lists too. (1, S)
We were getting some of those calls because the services weren't available in people's communities, and doing what we could over the phone but there were absolutely survivors that probably were not able to link up with somebody the way they should have been able to. (13, U)
If they need housing assistance we send them here, if they need food stamps we send them here, if they need bus passes we send them here, and those places were experiencing the same financial crisis that we were. So overall, we were in much worse shape. (14, R)
Even when other agencies did not have to close their doors, they often placed people on waiting lists. The waiting lists were a problem at all community agencies that struggled financially during the crisis.
b. Mutual support
While one agency reported having to cut back on meetings with other agencies because they did not have enough staff to attend, many other agencies (n= 8) came together to share advice, support, and sometimes resources during the budget crisis.
We used to give money to our local food pantry and then they would have a certain day during the week that they would open up specifically for our clients to get food on a day that wasn't a normal day so that the people in line weren’t standing there with their abuser. We had to tell them we can't give you this money every month anymore and they still kept that program going without that. (1, S)
We had to be understanding and empathetic that there were a lot of organizations that just did the best they could. If they couldn’t provide the service, instead of [saying] it’s not our problem that the state didn’t pay you to provide the service, you had to be empathetic about this. Like okay your organization's making these decisions, it's impacting your service delivery in this way. We were trying to be supportive. (4, U)
Agencies were all struggling together. The above quotes illustrate how they honored past commitments to one another (with the special food pantry day) regardless of the anti-violence
89 agency’s ability to pay. Simply being empathetic was another way they could provide support to one another.
Other agencies shared money or helped one another in larger, tangible ways. They shared funding and in some cases, absorbed programs that would otherwise be cut.
One of the organizations has their focus on children in youth, in education. So actually they hired two of our staff and 75% of the youth that was involved in that program went to that organization with the focus. (3, U)
Part of what helped us keep going for our particular agency...United Way stepped up to make sure that volunteer supervision piece was covered. (10, S)
The clinical director left and we had six counseling staff who all needed supervision. I worked out an arrangement [for] a couple of their people to supervise our counseling staff…They had to go off site to get supervision but it was better than nothing and so we did that for a while. I think it caused a lot of damage to the programming because domestic violence shelters don’t work exactly the same way community mental health does and so they were wanting to impose all kind of like rules on clients, like stuff that isn't really appropriate for a shelter. (18, R)
Several agencies recounted the tangible ways they received support from other agencies. In one instance (R3) an agency had to cut their youth program entirely in order to patch their budget shortfall from the state. A larger partner agency completely absorbed this program, even hiring two of the previous agency staff. Another mentioned how their local United Way, a nation-wide coalition of charities with chapters all over the US, extended funding for volunteer supervision to continue. A third agency (combined rape crisis and domestic violence) arranged to have a local mental health agency supervise their counseling staff after they lost their clinical director. While this arrangement led to some conflict, it did ensure the survival of the agency.
6. Talking to Legislators/Lobbying
Rape crisis centers in Illinois, along with many social service agencies, engaged in concerted lobbying and advocacy efforts during the crisis. The Illinois Coalition Against Sexual
90 Assault (ICASA) hired a lobbyist to work on behalf of the 34 agencies in the coalition.
Respondents regularly mentioned this effort and ICASA’s work to help agencies secure lines of credit and stay informed about the budget negotiations.
In addition to joining the lobbying efforts with ICASA, most directors (n= 21) reported speaking with their legislators on a regular basis during the budget crisis. They perceived varying levels of support or empathy from local politicians, and expressed an overall feeling that their legislators felt powerless to help them.
I think it was very much out of their hands. They were probably doing what they could- they're both very reasonable people and were very concerned and very frustrated with the situation…after a while I got the feeling that I could talk to them on a daily basis and it was beyond them. They were just fighting a battle that other people were fighting. (5, R)
Talking to a legislator was comparable to talking to a colleague who felt powerless to do anything about it. (6, S)
I think that that sometimes we're talking to politicians and we think they're not listening but they're just trying to maintain their own . . . they have a group that they...are beholden to, and I think sometimes they’re trying not to give away what they’re thinking. (7, U)
You know we went to Springfield multiple times- one of our local representatives invited us to come and acknowledge some of our staff from the floor- and while we're sitting there we saw people on their cell phones, we saw them throwing garbage at each other like candy wrappers while there were people talking about the importance of social services. I was talking about their child’s safety and health and I think it’s just heartbreaking that there was a lot of kind of callous, just lack of ...willpower, caring...to make something happen whether it was politically expedient or not. The reality is that the folks they were supposed to be serving were being hurt by their inability to get stuff done. (10, S)
Directors saw their legislators as hamstrung at best and callously detached at worst. One respondent likened their phone calls with politicians to ‘talking to a brick wall’. Party affiliation did not appear to be salient for most directors, though several noted they felt more empathy from
Democrats compared to Republicans. All agreed there were feelings of widespread frustration
91 with the governor and party leadership and a feeling that the people of Illinois were being held hostage.
7. Crisis Decision-making
Directors reflected on how they approached decision-making during the budget crisis. It was difficult to make decisions during this time due to the high degree of uncertainty during this time. There was no indication of when the impasse would be resolved.
When thinking about how to cut large portions of their expenses, staff salaries were the first place they looked. Five directors resorted to significantly reducing their own hours.
Even I went to part-time, people went to part-time and things like that and I remember being like ‘I just won’t take a salary, I just won’t’ and I remember our treasurer saying ‘Well who will run the circus’ and I’m like I know but how are we going to do this because my salary is the largest so if we can get rid of my salary... But all the staff, their hours were reduced they all stayed. (15, R)
It just made sense. I thought I could afford to volunteer for a while. The work I do needed to get done and since I carry the biggest salary it would be the biggest savings so it was okay. (6, S)
My husband is well compensated and when I was talking with him about taking this job I said I may not be able to get a paycheck either for years or until the states under budget, and my husband said that's fine you know you could volunteer if you want, we'll be fine.(12, S)
Two directors were ready to work without a salary, though only one director interviewed actually had to do this. These decisions highlight the nature of rape crisis center funding. Administrator salaries and overhead expenses are not eligible for reimbursement under federal grants. Portions of state funding can be used for these expenditures, thus directors were forced to evaluate how long they could continue to draw a salary.
92 One director candidly shared how they approached decision-making during the budget
impasse. They were the only respondent who reported exactly how they considered which staff
members to lay off and which ones to keep on.
The executive director and I sat down the staff and said okay, we're looking at what other agencies are doing and a lot of them were making people take a day off and because the majority of my staff are either single moms or one married person but their spouse was on disability and they really needed the salary. So we talked to them about what we potentially could do that would keep everybody on at a reduced salary. What we ended up deciding doing [was laying off] a woman she was married and had a husband who had an excellent job. We said we hope it will be done shortly but if you decide you don't want to return and you want to look for another job, we will gladly give you recommendations. (19, R)
This example was unique as the majority of directors reported making across the board cuts and did not take into account the relative privilege of their staff. However, this director’s decision-
making approach illustrates the precarity of many workers at rape crisis centers. Directors make
the highest salaries at RCC’s and the average director salary in this sample was $71,000 (ranging
from $39,000-$125,000). Most staff members were women and many supported families on their
salaries and benefits packages (most received benefits only if they were employed full-time).
Several directors reported making a conscious decision to rely more heavily on volunteers to do the work of paid staff (n= 5).
We have a very small volunteer pool and all of them either work full-time or are students and so getting somebody to come in all day to answer phones so they [other staff] could still go out and do what they needed like advocacy or was difficult and sometimes they had to put clients off you know in order to stay in the office and they took turns in staying in the office and answering phones. (19, R)
Volunteers were not always available during the hours needed by agencies to answer the phones or greet walk-in clients. However, some agencies were able to use volunteers who were retired or working part-time.
93 Transparency with staff was another common decision-making theme (n= 8). Directors
indicated the importance of having open communication with their staff members around
difficult decisions. Open communication did not guarantee decisions would be well received.
There were people that were upset by the decision. I myself was upset by some decisions so yes it wasn't well received but what you could say at the same time? I think people understood that unfortunately we had to make the tough decisions and so I don't know how else to explain that- it is just what we had to do at the time. (1, S)
Our administration kind of did a good job of saying you know, while yes this is going on in the state if we get to the point that we feel like your jobs are in danger we will talk to you, if we have to make those tough decisions we will come to you. (7, U)
When I laid people off, obviously I talked to the people I laid off first. I called them into my office and explained to them like, hey I’m so sorry but here's where we’re at. Love you, we’ll call you back as soon as I can. (11, R)
Many directors made deliberate efforts to communicate thoroughly with their workers during the
budget crisis. The burden of having to make decisions about lay-offs, reduced hours, and cuts to
programming weighed heavily on administrators. They tried to communicate how they felt about the situation and ensure their employees that they would give them as much warning as possible if they needed to make personnel cuts.
94 VI. DISCUSSION
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) estimates approximately 18% of women and 5% of men have been sexually assaulted in their lifetimes (Black et al., 2011). Estimates for the state of Illinois suggest about 37% of women and 25% of men at some point in their lives have been victims of rape, physical violence, or stalking by an intimate partner (Black, et. al., 2011). The majority of these survivors will experience symptoms of PTSD and other adverse mental health, medical, and socio-economic effects, which can be mitigated by seeking services from rape crisis centers. While RCCs have proliferated in the past thirty years and developed more formalized institutional structures and relationships with state agencies, funding has not kept pace with demands for service. Organizational theories do not account for austerity conditions such as budget crises when explaining the behavior of non-profits. Feminist studies of RCCs rightly critique the problems with formalized state partnerships, but often treat these agencies as extensions of the state and in so doing, grossly over-estimate their power. Some scholars such as
Katzenstein (1990) provide a helpful framework for understanding how RCCs wield power, but this has not been applied to studies of how RCCs operate within current funding environments.
The UK has produced a small body of scholarship dedicated to studying the effects of austerity on women’s agencies, and this study aims to extend that literature to a US context. Extending the study of RCCs and austerity yielded insights that add to our understanding of secondary trauma, organizational trauma, and the barriers survivors of sexual violence face when seeking services.
This study also revealed important findings related to social solidarity and support for victims in society.
This study sought to understand how RCCs function under conditions of extreme deprivation in the form of budget crises, or lack of nearly all state allocated funds for nearly two
95 years as was the case in Illinois. The state budget crises acted as a de facto austerity policy for
Illinois. Austerity policies are neo-liberal in nature and concentrate the effects of budget cuts on
the most vulnerable groups in a society. I argue that these policies constitute a form of economic
violence, and this discussion unfolds within the framework. The main objectives of this project
were first to quantify the impact of the budget crisis using interrupted time series regression
analysis, treating the onset of the budget crisis as an ‘intervention’. The second aim of the study
was to develop a deeper understanding of how staff, volunteers, and clients were affected by the
crisis conditions and how agency directors approached decision-making. A third aim of the study was to understand disparity of effects on marginalized communities by examining the effects on agencies that serve primarily women of color and agencies that operate in rural areas. The results show the budget crisis did indeed have disparate, negative effects on marginalized communities.
The study was conducted as two separate parts (quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis) but the discussion will weave together the data where doing so provides more explanatory power. Some of the interview data helps contextualize the quantitative findings.
The interrupted time series regressions revealed an overall relative decrease of 25% at 24 months post-crisis for criminal justice advocacy hours and for individual counseling (using aggregated agency data). A small decrease of 12% was also observed at 12 months (but not 24 months) for monthly telephone counseling hours. The findings for telephone counseling went against expectations for the aggregate dataset, as it was previously thought these numbers would increase as agencies were able to see fewer people in person and would turn to the telephone instead. Rural RCCs did see a significant increase in their telephone counseling hours, which makes sense given that the budget crisis exacerbated their issues with providing travel support to
96 clients. The quantitative findings did not show a significant decrease in staff conduct hours or
staff travel hours, though there were decreases in some forms of advocacy and counseling (for
rural centers). It is possible the quantitative data reflect small shifts in staff conduct hours while
the qualitative data more adequately captures the emotions and morale of the agency. If each
agency only reduced paid staff hours or laid off one or two paid positions, it is possible there
were few reductions in actual service hours delivered. If agencies also came up with creative
solutions to the crisis (as many directors reported in interviews), this would further mitigate large reductions in service hours. So while the quantitative effects may not empirically point to
‘devastation’, the qualitative effects of the crisis that came from some lay-offs, furloughs, and general atmosphere of extreme cost-cutting and uncertainty were magnified in how agencies
‘felt’ with regard to their morale. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that no agencies closed their doors during the crisis and only a few agencies came close to doing so.
The quantitative data did not show significant effects on prevention education and new volunteer training. While three directors indicated they cut their prevention programs during the budget crisis, this was not an overall trend in the larger qualitative data. This suggests perhaps agencies relied on volunteers for these programs or were somehow able to continue providing programming with other staff members. It is also possible the prevention education data was not ideal for ITS regression analysis, an idea that is discussed in more depth in the Limitations section that follows.
While many agency directors reported in their interviews making staffing cuts and reducing staff hours, they also reported finding creative solutions to the problem of staff shortages by using more volunteers and outsourcing therapist supervision to other agencies (and occasionally outsourcing their services, but this was rare). Directors also reported hearing from
97 staff that they wanted to continue providing the same level of services even though their capacity was diminished and their mental stress was increased. It seems, however, that they largely accomplished the goal of retaining their core counseling and advocacy services. This finding can be understood within the longer history of RCCs, whereby they grew and professionalized during a period of devolution and economic downturn in the 1980’s. RCCs have weathered different levels of funding (nationally and at the state and local level) but they have never experienced an abundance of funding (Freinkel & Smith, 1988). RCCs are familiar with performing minor miracles when it comes to providing services to victims on very small and unpredictable budgets
(Maier, 2011a).
The qualitative data provides more insight into the results. Telephone and in-person counseling were likely affected by cuts to staffing via layoffs, furloughs, and reduced hours. The criminal justice advocacy reductions may be explained through a finding from the qualitative data regarding the reduced capacity of partner organizations. Agency directors all discussed the problem of shrinking referral networks and a general perception of agencies being on the decline in their communities. This was a problem regardless of agency precarity, as one director of a large and stable agency mentioned. They found other agencies were not taking on clients, had longer waiting lists, or in some cases had to close their doors. RCC directors reported their most common referrals were to mental health, drug treatment, housing, food, and employment agencies. It is likely these places act as referrals to RCCs and were thus part of an overall decline in people reaching out through the usual avenues. This would explain why criminal justice advocacy was affected but not medical advocacy, where the referral source is most commonly a hospital. Hospitals by and large operated as usual during the budget crisis. Additionally, a handful of agencies reported having to handle the perception that their services were in decline
98 because they had to publicize their urgent funding needs in media and throughout their
communities as part of their crisis-mitigation strategies to fill the funding gap with donations.
This also meant publicizing staff reductions or other cost-cutting measures and may have led to fewer clients reaching out for services. Directors also reported having to engage clients in difficult conversations around moving them back to a waiting list or reducing the frequency of their services, or even just preparing them for the possibility of such changes. This likely contributed to the perception of services in decline.
Agencies engaged in several interesting strategies to protect their core services. One was to use more volunteers to fill gaps in services. Another strategy was to collaborate with other agencies. One agency re-homed their prevention education program and was able to keep the program mostly intact (including employing the same staff). Some agencies reported working with larger mental health agencies to provide supervision for their counseling staff and sending clients to more mainstream providers. This tactic likely preserved the core counseling and advocacy services from more severe decreases in hours but not without several trade-offs. The staff members receiving supervision encountered some conflict with the mental health agency when they disagreed on the kinds of rules to impose on clients. Linking up with mainstream mental health agencies makes it more likely clients will not be treated with specialized care from counselors who understand the trauma of sexual violence. While there are no studies to my knowledge to date assessing the differences in outcomes between survivors who seek specialized versus non-specialized counseling, there is evidence demonstrating survivors who use sexual assault advocates report better outcomes engaging with the medical and legal systems
(Campbell, 2006).
99 Analyzing the rural agencies separately yielded interesting results. RCCs were designated as rural if they served a mostly rural county or had rural satellites (and in those cases, urban parent centers were not included in the rural dataset). Rural centers experienced a 70% drop in criminal justice advocacy hours by 24 months after the crisis set in, which is much larger than the 25% drop found in the aggregate dataset. They also experienced a significant decrease in medical advocacy hours (32%), which was not something that showed up in the larger, aggregate dataset. Rural RCCs experienced an incredible 111% increase in telephone counseling hours by the 24-month mark. These findings provide evidence to suggest rural RCCs were more negatively affected by the budget crisis and less able to protect their core advocacy services compared to urban agencies. Here again the qualitative interview data provides more context as six directors spoke about the problem of providing transportation to their clients. They discussed the need for transportation as urgent when there was not a budget crisis, and simply dire when the crisis was on going. One director thought the budget impasse led to a decline in people seeking services, but stated this would be difficult to know because she was talking about people who simply did not come to their center. Other directors spoke about cutting travel costs for staff. They would ask staff to travel to see clients or engage in advocacy but were unable to reimburse them for those costs. This qualitative finding helps explain the quantitative increase in telephone counseling. Telephone counseling functions more as case management than therapy, although it is possible this changed during the budget crisis. One provider talked about how they tried to do more over the phone to get people services even if they could not meet them in person. Survivors in rural areas report transportation as a significant barrier to accessing services, especially in places where there is one service provider for a large geographic region (Logan,
Evans, Stevenson, & Jordan, 2005). Rural agencies also operate with smaller budgets compared
100 to urban RCCs, and one study found they were more likely to be dependent on state agency funding compared to urban agencies (Edmond, Voth Schrag, & Bender, 2019). While all RCCs must make do with small budgets, this is compounded for rural agencies who have even smaller budgets than their urban counterparts yet often provide the same level and capacity of services
(Edmond et al., 2019).
Not surprisingly, most directors reported making cuts to staffing through reductions in staff hours, layoffs, and hiring freezes. They reported needing to find large chunks of money in their budget and staffing cuts were always the largest expense. They also made cuts to smaller expenses such as transportation for clients and travel for staff (discussed above re: rural agencies). Many directors reported cutting expenses for basic necessities such as toilet paper, tissues, heat, electricity, and program supplies. One director shared their cost-saving strategy,
“…And we were walking into a building that was dark the majority of the day because we weren't turning on lights.”
The interview participants relayed this extreme cost-cutting information in a straightforward manner, but it is worth investigating further. In no other professional sector would this sort of deprivation be treated as the norm. In other literature and in this study, it is evident that RCCs have normalized austerity and figured out ways to stretch incredibly small budgets. This is perhaps why there were few decreases in service hours and virtually no agencies closed their doors despite going without 40-80% of their budgets for nearly two years. RCCs were founded on the principle of mutual aid and from their inception eschewed a fee-for-service model (Craft,
1981). Even with the professionalization of these centers, nearly all RCCs to this day do not charge for their services (and ICASA strictly prohibits the fee-for-service model). This commitment to free services for survivors explains the approach RCCs have to their operations-
101 they look for grants and government funding, in addition to donations, because they do not and
probably will never view their clients as a revenue source.
Another strategy for survival was to engage a line of credit. Over half of all agency
directors interviewed either used all their reserve money (i.e., savings) or did not want to deplete
it due to the uncertainty of when the budget crisis would end. Agencies that used their lines of
credit were able to do so because they had collateral in the form of property. Several directors
reported trying to open a line of credit but being denied by banks because they did not have
collateral or the banks did not trust the state of Illinois to repay the agencies. As an
organizational strategy, the use of credit lines contributed to RCCs’ long-term sustainability.
Directors universally viewed using credit as a smart strategy if it was available to an agency. One director even characterized using credit as a moral act (the researcher’s characterization) because it allowed agencies to deliver on their promises to survivors.
While using credit lines prevented many RCCs from closing, they also required the agencies to pay interest. This arrangement warrants closer inspection. First, the state failed to honor their contracts with RCCs and did not remit payment for two years while also not communicating to agencies when payments will start again. Next, agencies were forced to either deplete their savings or borrow against their assets to make up for the shortfall. Then, when they engaged lines of credit they were obligated to pay interest on this money (there was a small subset of agencies that secured no interest loans from larger non-profits, though this was rare).
Funding levels were eventually restored and sometimes even exceeded prior amounts, but the interest payments were not directly reimbursed to agencies. A feminist economic framework helps us recognize this process as a form of economic violence (M. Evans, 2015; Pearson &
Elson, 2015). This study shows how the state of Illinois manufactured a budget crisis, starved
102 social service agencies, and then made it possible for large banks to profit off of the crisis at the
expense of survivors of sexual assault by collecting interest. One of the primary causes of the
crisis was the toxic swaps of bonds owned by the state of Illinois, which ended up costing over
$600 million in swap payments to some of the largest banks in the country (Bhatti & Sloan,
2016). Beyond simply harming the mostly women survivors of sexual violence and the mostly
women workers at RCCs, as a feminist economic framework helps elucidate, credit use by RCCs
demonstrates how this neo-liberal policy went a step beyond de-funding to create profit-making opportunities on the backs of survivors and those who serve them. This suggests the budget crisis in Illinois was part of a neo-liberal political strategy that shifted the risks of austerity to vulnerable populations while simultaneously shifting the rewards to corporate entities (Adkins,
2015).
The reduction of staff hours and the use of hiring freezes were characterized by directors as necessary for the agency’s survival. They also acknowledged the severe toll these measures took on staff morale. Every director reported low morale, even if the agency was not in danger of closing and did not have to lay off staff. The environment of uncertainty seemed to be distressing for all agencies, and was worse for agencies that had fewer resources. The results of this study demonstrate the compounding effect of the budget crisis on workers already experiencing secondary trauma, or experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress as the result of working
with traumatized populations. Previous research has shown secondary trauma to be exacerbated
among workers at RCCs with less supervision and higher case loads (Dworkin, Sorell, & Allen,
2016). The budget crisis likely created these conditions or worsened them, depending on the
agency.
103 Concern for their clients was also a source of distress for staff members, in addition to
worrying about keeping their jobs and salaries. This was a very real fear as layoffs did occur and
clients got sent to the back of the line for counseling via waiting lists, after having already spent
time on the waiting list to get into counseling the first time. Directors reported that RCC workers
experienced secondary trauma from having to worry about clients who were displaying
symptoms of post-traumatic stress such as depression, suicidal ideation, intrusive thoughts, and
other adverse mental health outcomes. Several directors spoke about this specifically, detailing
how they would have to support emotionally distraught RCC workers who would talk to them
about where their clients would go if they got laid off or if the agency had to close. Despite the
stress on workers from financial uncertainty and concern for their clients, the quantitative
analysis shows they did not scale back their capacity for most services (and when they did, it was
likely not under their control). Continuing to work above their capacity coupled with the added
stress of the crisis most certainly contributed to the low staff morale and high levels of distress
reported by RCC directors.
Directors talked about focusing on self-care with their staff to try and mitigate some of
the added stress associated with the crisis. Most recognized that this was inadequate in the face
of massive budget cuts and potential layoffs but it was one of the few strategies over which they
could have some degree of control. One director organized a partnership with local businesses to
get her staff reduced pricing on massage therapy and mental health counseling (a certain number
of free sessions). This result was unsurprising because the discourse of self-care is well known in
feminist and anti-violence organizations (Wasco et al., 2002).
The language of self-care can be traced back to empowerment feminism, which became popular in the 1980s and 1990s and is still used as a model in many RCCs. In this study, many
104 directors responded that they used a feminist and empowerment approach at their agencies. A
cultural critique of the empowerment model of feminism links the phenomenon to neoliberal
strategies for solving inequality. Though women’s empowerment came out of more critical
analyses of gender, race, and class in ways that challenged the structure of white supremacist
patriarchal capitalism, once the term was mainstreamed it began to lose its original more
powerful meaning (Batliwala, 2007). Responsibility for one’s well-being in the workplace
becomes a private, individual concern rather than a site for shared struggle to challenge the social
conditions that might lead to burnout, exhaustion, or poverty (Michaeli, 2017).
Directors reported trauma at the organizational level. Organizational trauma was not discussed prior to analyzing the qualitative data in this study, but the concept has practical application here. The definition of organizational trauma is that it can occur when an event completely overwhelms an organization in such a way that their normal structures and processes are no longer adequate to handle most situations (Hormann & Vivian, 2017). The organization no longer operates in a way that is healthy and it may succumb to pathologies. The budget crisis represented two types and sources of trauma: a single devastating external event and an on-going external wounding (Hormann & Vivian, 2017). The on-going wounding can lead to ‘collective psychology injury’ according to Hormann & Vivian (2017). The budget crisis had no pre- determined end-date and as such acted as an on-going wounding event. During the study, which took place nearly a year after the budget crisis had ended, workers were still worried about funding and regular payments. One director reported their agency had a group crying session to release some of the distressing emotions being experienced collectively. Organizational trauma theory does not account for budget crises as traumatic events, instead focusing on vandalism or physical attacks on agencies. I argue that a budget crisis serves as a form of violent attack and
105 has a similar psychological effect on organizations. Some directors reported engaging in
therapeutic circles with staff to help lower the distress levels at their agencies.
Economic justice for RCC workers goes beyond the issues of secondary and
organizational trauma, though both are important when thinking about the working conditions at
RCCs. The payment of salaries was integral to early RCC movement leaders. Some of the first
RCC movement leaders were poor women engaged in anti-poverty and housing justice activism.
They believed RCC workers should be compensated for their labor, lest the unpaid work become
the purview of only wealthy women who could afford to volunteer (Makers, 2010). The ability to
receive wages for working at RCCs guaranteed representation within the movement. Current
leadership in Illinois is now mostly white, as reflected in this study, and all the interview
participants made over $35,000 annually (with some making in the low six figures). While
leadership is not diverse (75% of directors in this study were White), RCC staff is predominantly
women who support families and is more likely to include women of color and non-English
speaking women. This fact was acknowledged by several RCC directors in this study. One
director even discussed making staffing decisions based on which of her staff was least likely to
need their salary. In the end, she laid off a worker who had a wealthy spouse and did not need to
work rather than laying off staff members who were the sole provider for their families. This
decision-making strategy was a rare example of a director making a class-conscious decision rather than being class-blind with regard to her employees. Cuts to staffing and salaries at RCCs become questions of economic justice because women are over-represented as workers in the non-profit sector and especially within the RCC field. Here again the feminist economic framework is helpful. Women at the RCCs in this study were disproportionately on the receiving
106 end of RCC budget cuts, making this budget crisis an inherently gendered phenomenon (Rubery,
2015).
Survivors experienced tangible, detrimental effects during the budget crisis including disruptions in treatment, increased barriers to services, and being made to seek help from non- specialists. The quantitative data showed a decrease in service hours for individual and telephone counseling, which is evidence of layoffs and reduced hours. Rural RCCs in particular reported shifting in-person clients to telephone services and that was also reflected in the quantitative data where telephone counseling increased for rural centers. RCCs also reported shifting clients to different therapists and sending them back to waitlists. ICASA’s service standards specify the importance of survivors directing their own recovery processes (ICASA, 2018). The practice of restoring power and agency to victims of sexual assault is integral to supporting recovery; the more perceived control survivors have over the recovery process, the more they will recover
(Frazier, 2000). Suddenly altering one’s formal treatment may disrupt the recovery process. At the very least, it erodes the control survivors have in the process.
Being put back on a wait list or being added to a wait list in times of crisis represents barriers to services for survivors. Survivors already under-utilize RCCs (Campbell, Wasco,
Ahrens, Sefl, & Barnes, 2001). Even without a budget crisis, RCCs operate with low funds and cannot always engage in community outreach or other activities that would bring in more survivors (Ullman & Townsend, 2007). These barriers are compounded during severe budget cuts. RCCs in this study were creative in approaching this problem and tried hard to minimize these effects. One director reported bringing in volunteer therapists while another talked about starting a psycho-educational group for people on the waitlist. This speaks to the dedication of
RCCs and their collective (and grassroots-based) respect for peer counselors and
107 paraprofessionals rather than a strict preference for clinicians (ICASA, 2018). However, a
disruption in service or long wait time does not actively support survivors’ recovery and
constitutes at worst a form of harm and at best a barrier to entry.
Some survivors went to agencies that did not specialize in sexual assault. ICASA
agencies work under an explicitly feminist framework that strikes a balance between viewing
sexual assault as an egregious harm, with roots in structural oppression, while recognizing that
people can and do recover from their assaults (ICASA, 2018). They also work within a framework that places blame on those who commit sexual violence and uplift those who are survivors. The long-term recovery benefits of survivors’ receiving affirming, non-blaming
positive social reactions are numerous and well documented (Ahrens, 2006; Orchowski, Untied,
& Gidycz, 2013; Ullman, 2010). So, too are the benefits of working with advocates (Campbell,
2006). Denying survivors access to specialized care furthers their victimization and prolongs
their recovery process. In this way, the budget crisis represents a form of violence against
survivors.
One director reported speaking with several clients who voluntarily gave up their therapy
slots for new clients on the lengthened waitlists. While this kind of act represents altruism on the
part of survivors, it also constitutes an ethical gray area. RCCs committed to functioning as
spaces of unconditional support for survivors had to make choices that potentially compromised
that position. Therapists and service providers are in positions of power relative to their clients,
underscoring the importance of autonomy with regard to any therapeutic decisions related to the
survivor’s recovery process and treatment plan.
Interview respondents spoke about their fear that victims of sexual assault in Illinois
would interpret the budget crisis and scaling back of services as an indication the state did not
108 care about victims and that nothing would be done if they were to come forward. Whether or not survivors actually felt this is speculative on the part of RCC directors, however it represents the issue of social solidarity. Social solidarity occurs for victims of crime when the state formally acknowledges the harm that was done to someone and provides formal assistance in the form of money, access to mental health services, or other resources (Miers, 2016).
Directors were asked about their advocacy and lobbying activities. This line of conversation also included questions about their perceptions of who was to blame for the crisis and what the role of the state should be in providing services to survivors. Nearly every director interviewed had engaged in some form of lobbying or talking to their legislators (n=21) to end the budget stalemate and restore funding. Sometimes RCCs lobbied collectively through ICASA or other coalitions such as the Responsible Budget Coalition (2017), made up of other service providers and concerned citizens. Most reported receiving empathetic responses from legislators, but ultimately felt the legislators were powerless to end the crisis. Directors expressed universal frustration over the stalemate. Some even expressed anger at the constant need to ask for funding from legislators year after year, calling it a ‘song and dance’ where they appear at the state capitol and repeat their same talking points. Hearing the stories from directors further underscored the loss of social solidarity they felt from the state. These experiences are indicative of the low priority placed on victim services in the US. The anti-violence movement has made inroads in their struggle to influence policy and garner more financial support, often at the expense of more radical social change agendas. Yet RCCs still do not wield considerable power to influence policy decisions, a situation which explains their preferred method of ‘unobtrusive mobilization’ or working within existing power structures to influence change (Katzenstein,
1990). Even during the budget crisis when the state had effectively cut the majority of RCC
109 budgets, directors maintained this political strategy and opted to pursue formal paths of lobbying
via phone calls, meetings, and letters with their representatives. They also participated in
formally organized lobbying days put on by the various coalitions. The budget crisis did not spur
agencies to engage in more militant strategies, such as occupying the state capitol for days on end as citizens did who participated in the Wisconsin Uprising, a massive protest in response to the historic rollback of labor protections (McChesney, 2012). Rather than engage in mass revolt,
radical protests were small and diffuse (In These Times, 2017). RCCs did not report engaging in
protests or mass action that went outside the bounds of traditional lobbying. There are major
differences between Illinois and Wisconsin of course. While Chicago has a deep tradition of
militant unionism, Wisconsin has a very high percentage of unionized workers throughout the
state (Collins, 2012). The protests in Wisconsin were waged specifically to defend union rights,
while the budget crisis in Illinois affected the most marginalized groups in the state who were not
formally organized in such a way that facilitated the collective action of unionized workers. Even
the massive protests known as the Uprising failed in overturning the anti-union laws passed in
2011. However, it is important to think about why RCC and other non-profit workers did not engage in more radical forms of struggle. The professionalization (and shift away from grassroots orientations) of non-profit work coupled with the lack of organizing structures such as labor unions in this sector are important factors when considering the lack of mass radical action in Illinois. Additionally, the most affected groups were also those living in isolation and without political power such as children, the elderly, people with disabilities, and people with mental health needs.
In addition to engaging in lobbying and talking to legislators individually and through coalition, directors reported getting clients involved in these efforts as well. A small of directors
110 endorsed this them (n=4) but it raises questions about the ethics of asking something from survivors. Directors asked clients to write and call their legislators, doing so anonymously if a client did not want to sign their name. While no clients were pressured to participate in advocacy
(to the researcher’s knowledge), this practice still raises questions about asking clients who are not in a position of power to take an action they may feel obligated to take in order to continue receiving services or stay in the good graces of their therapist. Again, there is no evidence any quid pro quo occurred but the appearance of influence raises ethical questions. The lack of funding pushed many directors to think of creative ways to engage legislators, and hearing from clients was a logical choice. This constitutes an added burden for those who need services but may not be ready to engage in advocacy.
The budget crisis fell unequally on different groups of people in Illinois. Rural RCCs were harder hit than their urban counterparts (discussed above). The crisis also negatively affected survivors from marginalized groups. One group that specialized in working with
Spanish-speaking immigrants reported being concerned about losing any part of their comprehensive services, citing the imperative to serve their clients’ interconnected issues. The director did not have the luxury to separate out the issue of immigration status from the issue of safety from violence, reporting that if one service was cut it would severely harm their ability to deliver other services. For example, providing assistance in courtrooms to watch for Immigration
Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials increased the feeling of safety for clients to engage with other services such as counseling and family assistance. Cutting one service would also detract from the other services in ways that were not as salient for other agencies. Specialized language services were also harder to fund under normal circumstances, making the funding gap that much more acute for agencies.
111 Two directors reflected on how the crisis hit women of color hardest. One described how communities of color bore the brunt of the fiscal crisis because people in these communities were already under-employed (paying people just at the poverty line by keeping their hours low enough to not provide benefits and wage increases). This director also alluded to the connection between the corporations responsible for rampant under-employment and their responsibility in creating the fiscal crisis in the first place, saying, “And in courting corporations to come to
Illinois they’re paying low wages [which] does not help the state.” The disproportionate effects on communities of color can be partly traced to cuts in programs and services for neighborhoods already living in poverty conditions brought about by historic dis-investment and predatory lending (In These Times, 2017). On top of this, Illinois continued to make payments on their toxic swaps while refusing to fund programs for the homeless, services for the disabled and the elderly, often including life-saving services (Bhatti & Sloan, 2016). One agency director noted this, reflecting how, “We were letting our seniors down, we were letting kids with disabilities down- we were just working funding from all sorts of places, and it just felt like a real lack of humanity to me and that was hard.”
The budget crisis was not an equal opportunity phenomenon among other agencies. This study demonstrated the unequal effects on rural agencies, and other kinds of service providers likely experienced similar negative effects. One director noted how many agencies closed down and it was unlikely they would ever re-open. Other smaller agencies were bought out or absorbed by larger agencies, erasing the small grass-roots nature of the services.
These findings reaffirm the literature from the UK which found budget cuts landed disproportionately on agencies that served Black and Minority Ethnic women (a UK term)
(Kalwinder Sandhu, Stephenson, & Harrison, 2013). This report from the UK detailed the ways
112 in which a series of spending cuts to social services in 2010 disproportionately affected BME
women, who were over-represented within welfare services and VAW agencies as clients and
workers. The outsized effects of austerity on vulnerable populations are a global phenomenon,
and the US is no exception.
Turning to decision-making processes during the crisis, it was demonstrated they
struggled with this task due to the high level of uncertainty. While directors could speak about
and name the decisions they made, they reported never feeling completely certain these were the
best decisions because they had no idea when the budget crisis would end. From start to finish,
the crisis lasted for nearly two years. During that time the hardships worsened the longer the
crisis went on. Despite not knowing the exact time frame, directors still engaged in decision-
making that protected their core services (counseling and advocacy) while also cutting enough
money to help soften the blow of a 40-80% budgetary reduction. Salaries were always the
highest expense and therefore no agency that struggled to stay afloat reported keeping their staff
hours and numbers completely intact. Several directors in this study reported cutting their own
salaries because they were the biggest expense. One director did not receive wages for a year,
others went to part time, and still others were temporarily laid off. Agencies still had to cut
counselors and full-time staff devoted to the core services, but they made efforts to fill in service gaps with volunteers, scheduling changes, and collaboration with other agencies.
Organization contingency theory posits that successful agencies will respond to their environments (including funding) by focusing on traditional services and being innovative with their resources to meet specific historical demands (in this case, severe funding cuts) (Bradshaw,
2009; Walker, 2013). RCCs in this study can be considered successful by this metric because they stayed open and kept providing services.
113 RCC directors chose to make staffing cuts and hold on to core services because they were part of value-rational organizations, meaning RCCs take action based on a specific set of guiding principles such as unconditional and cost-free support for all survivors of sexual assault (ICASA,
2018). This corresponds to institutional theory, which views organizations as value-rational rather than means-rational (Walker, 2013). Institutional theory also accounts for the embedded- ness of organizations within their communities and the importance of linkages to other institutions and agencies. The more linked and embedded an agency is with other groups, the more successful they will be, according to the theory. This study found limited support for institutional theory because agencies reported engaging in collaborations that guaranteed their survival which were only possible because the agencies had strong community linkages.
However, these linkages were not enough to save some of their partner agencies and the crisis resulted in a downsizing of their social service networks and partners.
Resource dependency theory is another organizational theory relevant to this study. It posits non-profits are beholden to funding and granting entities and may even alter their activities in such a way to make themselves more appealing to the funder, even if it means shifting from their core mission (Macedo & Pinho, 2006). RCCs may engage in some of this mission shifting during normal economic times, but it was virtually impossible to attract more funding at the level it was needed to cover a two-year budget gap. Agency directors reported changing the terms of some of their grants, asking for more money from donors, and putting out appeals to the public.
Yet they all shared the worry these activities would make them less attractive to funders because they had to advertise their financial problems. Most social service agencies and non-profits in
Illinois faced the same conundrum, however this phenomenon might privilege larger, more financially secure agencies at the expense of smaller ones.
114 Organizational theories provide some explanatory power for understanding the decisions
of RCC directors during the budget crisis. However, they do not account for funding
environments of extreme and prolonged deprivation. They do not account for the level of
uncertainty experienced by RCC directors during a budget crisis that seemingly had no end.
The directors in this study focused on cutting the biggest expenses (i.e., staff salaries)
while focusing on keeping their doors open to provide services according to their values and
mission, supporting survivors of sexual assault without asking anything of them in return. These
represent institutional, values-rational decisions for contingent agencies. But the directors went
beyond what might be considered rational decision-making out of necessity. For instance, taking
on debt during an economic downturn may not make the agency more attractive to funders
(resource contingency theory) but it does ensure survival. Working with a competitor may also
not seem rational, but it guarantees the values-rational delivery of services can continue.
Directors sometimes also made decisions according to a feminist ethos. As discussed above, one director made class-conscious choices regarding which of her staff could afford to live on their spouse’s salary. Many more directors reported sharing information with their staff in ways that fostered trust and transparency. Even though being honest with their staff could jeopardize the stability of the organization (by staff members looking for work elsewhere), most directors agreed it was best to be forthcoming about the agency’s financial worries. Only one director reported that her agency did not do this and she believed morale suffered as a result.
While RCCs function as more formal agencies compared to their early grassroots beginnings, they are almost entirely value-rational in their decision-making and these values extend not only to the clients but also to the workers.
115 VII. CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This mixed methods study of Illinois RCCs weathering the budget crisis has important contributions to several bodies of existing literature and implications for future research.
However, contributions and implications must be balanced with the limitations of a study. This section describes the contributions of this research to the study of feminist organizations, policy evaluation, and organizational theories. The study’s various methodological and practical limitations are then enumerated. Finally, lines of future inquiry are described including how to bring in the voices and experiences of RCC workers and clients.
A. Contributions
One purpose of this study was to provide an analysis of sexual assault victims’ services in
Illinois during the two years of the budget crisis. Previous studies have examined trends using
InfoNet data (Hiselman, 2016), but none have looked specifically at this time period on a granular level by service category. This study extends prior research conducted with the InfoNet database and furthers our knowledge of victim services in Illinois beyond previous studies that interviewed a smaller number of service providers about a broad range of topics (Houston-
Kolnik et al., 2017). This study used a novel approach of collecting data with qualitative and quantitative samples to understand how agencies were affected by and operated during the budget impasse. Twenty-two directors were interviewed throughout the state of Illinois, which has a total population of 34 main RCCs in Illinois (not counting the satellite offices). All RCC data was used for the quantitative dataset except for one agency. Few studies are able to comprehensively examine all service providers in a single state, making this research one of the only studies of its kind.
116 This study is also the first of its kind to examine the effects of an austerity policy on
feminist organizations within the US context. Similar studies have been conducted in the UK and
all have found a deleterious effect of extreme budget cuts on women’s organizations. As Walby
& Towers (2012) found agencies protected core services, the interview data in this study
revealed a similar phenomenon. However, the quantitative data showed the limits of RCC’s
abilities to protect core services when the budget cuts are so severe they must be offset with large
cuts to staffing. The findings here echo the findings in UK literature regarding disproportionate
effects of cuts on rural communities and communities of color.
This study also extends the literature on feminist organizations in general and RCCs in particular. While much of the literature on RCCs as organizations focuses on their negotiated relationships with the state, this study demonstrated the extent to which feminist organizations are not able to exert power over state governing bodies and how this renders them similar to
every other social service agency during times of fiscal austerity. Past research has focused on
the ability of RCCs to engage in social change and remain true to their radical grassroots
(Campbell et al., 1998; Rojas Durazo, 2007) but analysis must move past these questions when thinking about austerity and neo-liberal governance. All RCCs in this study operate within an explicitly feminist framework as laid out by the Illinois coalition guidelines (ICASA, 2018).
ICASA also led statewide mobilization efforts. Yet these efforts were unsuccessful for several reasons. The fruits of ‘unobtrusive mobilization’ (Katzenstein, 1990) as a political strategy were
borne out during the budget crisis as agencies were unable to succeed in garnering any funding.
The data showed the limits of collective advocacy. Though directors tirelessly advocated through
coalition work and individually to their legislators, a legislative solution was slow to come. This
failure of advocacy is less of a reflection on RCCs and more a sign of the breakdown of the
117 social contract between the state government and its citizens. However, the lack of radical, direct
action during the budget crisis can also be traced back to the professionalization and de- radicalization of feminist organizations currently (Knight & Rodgers, 2012). While past literature has critiqued the mainstreaming of RCCs and subsequent de-politicization, few studies have applied this analysis to a specific political event. The Illinois budget crisis demonstrated social service agencies and RCCs specifically could not mount a successful challenge to the austerity policy through sustained collective action.
Past literature has focused on funding scarcity as a barrier to service delivery with little attention to how RCCs operate and distribute their limited funds. Most research focuses on challenges or problems with RCCs without examining their practices and workarounds to address the issue of limited funding (Maier, 2008, 2011b). This study fills the gap by showing the places where agencies will make cuts when faced with extreme budgetary constraints for an indeterminate period of time. Survival strategies uncovered in this study included shifting clients to less frequent service arrangements, partnering with other agencies to fill service gaps, relying more on telephone counseling for rural areas, leveraging partnerships to find creative solutions to staff shortages, relying on volunteers with specialized knowledge, cutting back on basic resources such as toilet paper and electricity, using lines of credit to pay bills, and undertaking staffing cuts in a caring and transparent way that ensured staff returned whenever possible (after furloughs or temporary layoffs).
The data in this study also show the limits to these survival strategies and crisis decisions.
Many directors relayed their relief that the crisis ended after two years, saying they were not sure they could have lasted more than a few months longer. Even the most well situated agencies
118 were running out of options. Lines of credit eventually have to be repaid. Waitlists would
continue to grow if more staff could not be hired.
Finally, this study is the first of its kind to my knowledge to date that uses the methodology of interrupted time series regression to evaluate the effects of a state budget crisis.
Budget crises are rare events but they may become more common as states head into another economic downturn and default on toxic swaps (Bhatti & Sloan, 2016). The ITS methodology is a flexible quasi-parametric tool that allows researchers to account for the effects of an external policy on outcomes that are easily quantifiable. It is well suited for the analysis of data that is already being collected administratively. This method has broad application for analyzing other fiscal policies with definitive beginnings and endings.
B. Limitations
This study included several limitations. Making use of administrative data via the InfoNet
database was advantageous because there was virtually no missing data. Additionally, it was a
completely representative sample as it included data from all but one RCC in the state of Illinois.
However, the data was limited in what it captured. There were no variables related to recovery
outcomes or improvement in symptoms for survivors. There was also no way to check for human
error outside of checking for outliers (because the database returns an error message to users who
leave certain categories blank, there was no missing data). Additionally, the outcome of ‘service
hour’ can be affected by myriad factors related to level of need in communities that could not be
controlled for in this study. There may be fluctuations in demand for services that lead to fewer
service hours delivered that may not be related to funding trends. The service hour outcome is an
imperfect unit of analysis.
119 The InfoNet data also made it difficult to hone in on the best time point for gathering
‘before’ data points for the ITS regressions. Ultimately it was decided to include 2013 data for
the sake of having a more accurate pre-slope calculation. However, the data showed significant
increases across all service categories starting in 2012, perhaps due to funding and capacity
increases. This means the data is somewhat volatile. While ITS modeling controls for volatility
and autocorrelation were assessed for each model, there is still a trade-off here. Starting the
analysis in 2014 ensures fewer swings in the pre-intervention data. Including 2013 data provides more historical information for the pre-slope equations.
A similar issue is at work with the elementary and secondary education data. These data are extremely seasonal, making it difficult to assess trend lines accurately. One possibility around this problem is to take only school-year time points and re-analyze the data and to go back further in time so there are more data points (perhaps going back to 2010). While that was not possible for this study, it could be worth investigating in a future study.
While data completeness was high (meaning there was no missing data) with this dataset due to the funding and system requirements of data entry, the reliability of the InfoNet data must also be taken into account. Staff hours included service hours delivered by individual staff members. If two staff members facilitated a group counseling session, they would each mark one staff hour for a total of two staff hours recorded. The service category ‘group counseling’ would only reflect one service hour, because it captured the service hour and not the staff time.
This issue is not inherently problematic, but it does indicate a mismatch between staff hours and service hours that must be taken into consideration when interpreting the quantitative results.
Qualitative interviews were administered mostly over the phone. One interview in the
Chicago metro area was conducted in-person, but the researcher did not have funding to travel
120 throughout the state of Illinois to conduct more in-person interviews. While geographic diversity
is a strength of the study, this came at the expense of in-person data collection. Establishing
rapport and building a trusted connection is harder to do over the phone (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).
Telephone interviewing can be very useful when talking to people facing stigma or who wish to
conceal their identities, but this study did not have those particular concerns and thus face-to-
face interviews would have been more appropriate to the topic. The researcher met some
interview participants face-to-face during a summer conference while data collection was on-
going. This helped mitigate some apprehension among interviewees and led to a few personal
connections that yielded interviews later on.
It is possible the researcher’s connection to ICJIA led some participants to hold back in
their interviews. ICJIA manages grant money in conjunction with ICASA, who disburses the
money to grantees. While ICJIA is considered an agency through which the funds simply pass-
through (and not a decision-maker), they also conduct data analysis and are sometimes perceived
to be a key player in funding decisions. This position may have influenced interview participants, though no one explicitly discussed whether this was occurring. A more independent study would have made it slightly more difficult to recruit interview respondents but could have also yielded more candid answers to questions.
While RCCs were well represented in this study, the researcher did not distinguish
between satellite and main centers. The nature of this study was such that those making financial
decisions were of primary interest and these decisions were centralized to the flagship or main
RCC location. Limited time and resources made it impossible to visit each site, where it would
have been easier to understand the nature of the relationship between the satellite location and
the main site. Some degrees of autonomy may exist among satellite locations but this was not
121 captured in the data. Similarly, worker and volunteer perspectives are missing from the study and would have been helpful to triangulate the responses of directors and add another layer to the study.
The perspectives of agency partners and board members are also missing in the data.
Board members are particularly important as they oversee the decisions of the directors. Board members also range widely on how much oversight they provide. Some directors characterize their boards as intrusive and micro-management on one end of the spectrum, while other boards function as a rubber stamp on leadership decisions on the other end of the spectrum.
The qualitative interview sample was not diverse, though it reflected the homogeneity
(White, women, older, middle class) of statewide RCC leadership. Diversity of respondents would be another advantage to interviewing RCC workers and volunteers.
C. Practical Implications and Future Research
One primary objective of this research is to share the data collected in this study with all research participants and RCCs in Illinois. As part of the data sharing agreement between the researcher and ICJIA, the researcher has agreed to publish an executive summary for RCCs
(though they may also read the full dissertation if desired) and to present main findings at an
ICJIA-sponsored event that will be webcast for RCCs outside Chicago. This piece of the study is important not only to ensure collaboration in good faith, but also to help spark conversation among RCC directors and staff. During the interviews and at the summer 2018 conference where some recruitment occurred, directors shared their wish to have a formal reflection space to discuss how they coped with the budget crisis. One director reported that after the crisis, everyone simply carried on with business as usual even though organizations and workers were still feeling traumatized from the experience. Another director described the group processing
122 she led at her organization. It is my hope that sharing back the data with RCC members can
spark reflexive conversation and open up space to share stories that might involve organizational
trauma. It is also my hope that there might be more conversation where people can work through
their organizational trauma, which would have application for future fiscal crises but also for the
general state of low funding in which RCCs operate. This could also function as a conversation
on recovery where agencies share how they worked through their organizational trauma and how
they approach their work differently (if applicable).
Fostering shared understanding of a painful experience may also spur conversations
related to collective action, which could help people think through the issue of collective efficacy
for future budget crises or severe cuts. Agencies may start to think about where and how they can
leverage power to demand stable funding from the state. This might take the shape of more
coordinated activism that mounts more of a direct challenge to state power.
Agencies may find this study valuable to communicate to donors and funders. RCCs should not feel they failed because statistical analyses revealed tangible effects on service delivery. Decreases in service hours for some categories were unavoidable in the face of the
extreme budget cuts that resulted from the impasse. RCCs could take the results of this study to
show how they made difficult choices and ultimately protected their organizations from closing
down. Their strategies for surviving the crisis show ingenuity and creativity- qualities that should
impress any funder. The stories in the data represent resilience and strategic thinking in the face
of incredible uncertainty. These stories should be conveyed to state and private funders and
donors to remind them that investing in RCCs is a sound decision because these agencies can
handle long-term sustainability under extreme duress.
123 Two very practical survival strategies emerged from the data that could be of use to agencies weathering future budget crises or severe budget cuts: using reserves and lines of credit.
However, both of these resources require years of planning and, often, a string of good luck with regard to expenses and funding (e.g., having a few months or years where budgeting is on target and funding is steady). All the directors in this study knew they should build up reserves so they have a cushion during times of economic downturn. Opinions among directors were more divided on owning collateral in the form of property so it could be used to open a line of credit.
Many directors did not want the added expense of maintaining a building, as most grants already do not cover overhead costs such as building maintenance. However, lines of credit played a major role in the survival of RCCs and in this study the benefits outweighed the costs. RCCs could look into forming relationships with locally owned banks (though these are decreasing in number as large national banks take over the market) to negotiate low interest rates. One director in this study explained that waiting to have these conversations until an agency is struggling financially often means the RCC is negotiating from a position of weakness rather than one of strength.
This study can also be used to demonstrate the need for more unrestricted funding.
Directors stated a preference for state funding over federal because it came with fewer restrictions. Federal funding is often only available for direct service, whereas state funding can be used to pay for prevention programs, overhead expenses, and transportation costs. There is now clear evidence showing what happens when state funding is eliminated- we see reductions in service hours and negative effects on staff morale and client recovery processes. Agencies can make the case that they need unrestricted funds in order to function and serve victims.
124 Poor working conditions such as high caseloads and low salaries are common features of
RCC work (Ullman & Townsend, 2007). This study demonstrates the extreme effects of resource
deprivation on worker’s psychological and material wellbeing. The results of this study could be
used to advocate for better working conditions at RCCs. While the struggle for better working
conditions must necessarily include a struggle for better state support of programs, it is important
for RCCs to actively work on keeping caseloads down, allowing workers to have flexible hours,
and supplying workers with good salaries and benefits packages. These are the conditions that
prevent burnout among advocates and other frontline workers. The non-profit sector would do
well to reconsider the discourse of self-care and work on reforming the social structures that keep organizations in a perpetual state of fiscal emergency.
There are several fruitful lines of inquiry to consider that would build on this study. First and foremost, future studies on RCCs and budget crises should include the perspectives of frontline workers and survivors. A study focused on how frontline workers weather severe budget cuts is feasible and could include a survey and interview component. The interviews could also consist of focus groups to facilitate sharing and reflecting among front line workers and allow for comparisons to be made in real-time rather than after the fact and by a researcher analyzing transcripts.
Other studies could use online surveys to reach out to survivors who used RCCs during the budget crisis in order to understand how seeking services during the budget crisis affected survivor’s recovery processes. It is always difficult to connect with survivors in ways that do not expose them to risk and that respect their rights to receive services without giving something back in return (even their data). However, the survivor perspective would help connect austerity conditions to recovery processes, a large gap in the RCC literature. Studies have demonstrated
125 the importance of advocates and RCCs (Campbell, 2006). There is a strong need to connect the funding conditions of RCCs to the recovery process among survivors who use their services.
Similar to studies on survivor recovery outcomes, there is a need for studies that compare the recovery outcomes of survivors who sought help from specialized RCCs with survivors who utilized non-specialized mental health services. A clinical study demonstrating the benefits of receiving specialized services would help bolster the case for continued funding.
Severe funding cuts such as budget crises should be added to the literature on organizational trauma. This study demonstrated how the fiscal crisis constituted a shared crisis and resulted in prolonged distress and signs of trauma among RCC staff. The organizational trauma literature accounts for traumatic, single events (Hormann & Vivian, 2017) in their typology of traumatic events, but they do not include fiscal crises or austerity policies. More studies on the effects of extreme funding deprivation on agency wellbeing should be brought forth in this literature, as these policies are likely to proliferate.
126 VIII. CONCLUSION
Victims of sexual violence face stigma and blame from society, and are often re-
victimized when they seek help from formal systems such as law enforcement. Rape crisis
centers fill a vital role in society by offering unconditional support and advocacy to survivors.
RCCs grew as organizations during the rise of neoliberal policies in the 1980s. Their
organizational DNA contains the ability to survive on very little stable funding. This study
demonstrates how this history of scarcity made it possible for Illinois RCCs to survive the budget
crisis without having any agencies close their doors and with minor decreases to some advocacy
and counseling services. Yet RCCs still suffered lasting organizational trauma as staff morale
dipped, client services were disrupted (especially in rural areas), and their calls for legislative
action to end the crisis went unheeded. The findings show there is much to learn from RCC
budget crisis experiences, particularly an understanding of the role of credit lines and flexibility
in working with agency partners. Overall, this research shows RCCs in Illinois remain resilient,
value-rational organizations. This study also offers a methodological roadmap for evaluating the effects of fiscal policies on survivors of sexual violence.
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142 APPENDICES
APPENDIX A.
INFONET SERVICE DEFINITIONS
See ICASA Policy & Procedures for more detailed service descriptions.
1. Non-Client Crisis Intervention – Non-client crisis intervention is crisis intervention counseling provided to someone who is not assigned a client identification number because s/he does not give a name/identifying information and/or does not wish to become a client of the center or have their case re-opened. This service is usually provided via hotline but may occur in person, such as when someone discloses and receives crisis intervention services after an education presentation).
In most cases, this will be a victim-initiated call. In some cases, the call may be from a parent, other family member or friend who requests assistance in handling their emotions regarding the sexual assault or sexual abuse of a child, partner, family member, or friend.
2. Client – In the case of counseling, a person generally becomes a client when the center has gathered enough information to assign a client identification number or the person seeks additional services from the program subsequent to crisis intervention services.
In the case of advocacy, a person generally becomes a client when the center provides telephone or in-person advocacy services related to medical care or reporting to law enforcement.
A. Victim – Any person of any age who seeks assistance after being sexually assaulted.
B. Significant Other – Any person of any age who seeks assistance in dealing with their own crisis/feelings as a result of the sexual assault of a loved one. If contact with a significant other is solely focused on services provided to a victim who is a center client, this is Parent/Guardian Consultation (see #4 below) and the significant other does not become a client.
3. Counseling – Verbal assistance intended to be helpful to and supportive of victims of sexual assault or their significant others.
A. In-Person Counseling – Face-to-face verbal assistance intended to be helpful to and supportive of victims of sexual assault or the significant other(s).
B. Telephone Counseling – Time spent on the hotline or on another telephone line providing assistance to a center client who is dealing with sexual assault.
143 ICASA SERVICE DEFINITIONS, APPENDIX A (continued)
C. Family Counseling – Counseling provided to two or more victims or significant others who define themselves as a family unit.
D. Group Counseling – Counseling provided to more than two victims or significant others who meet together on a regular basis over a period of time. This includes support groups, counseling groups, therapy groups, psycho-educational groups.
4. Parent/Guardian Consultation - Contact with a parent/guardian of a minor client or client with a disability regarding counseling services at the center. The purpose of this service is to monitor the client’s progress and provide and/or receive feedback regarding client’s status pertaining to counseling services provided at the center. In order to preserve client’s absolute privilege, the parent/guardian must be the custodial parent and/or legal guardian of a minor client or the court-appointed guardian of the person (for health care purposes) of a client with a disability. The rape crisis center will not engage in parent/guardian consultation with a parent/guardian whose interests are adverse to those of the client receiving counseling services at the center. Parent/guardian consultation is documented in the client’s file; the parent/guardian does not become a client as a result of this service.
Contact with the parent/guardian in the course of providing advocacy services is recorded as advocacy, not as parent/guardian consultation.
5. Individual Advocacy – Providing assistance in the company of or on behalf of a specific victim or significant other intervention on the victim’s behalf, during proceedings affecting the victim (e.g., accompanying victim to hospital or state’s attorney’s office).
A. Medical Advocacy – Individual advocacy related to medical procedures both at the hospital/medical care facility and during follow-up care.
B. Criminal Justice Advocacy – Individual advocacy with police, sheriff, state’s attorney, judge, court system.
C. Other Advocacy – Individual advocacy on behalf of victim/significant other(s) with school personnel, social service agencies, etc.
6. Information/Referral – Responding to telephone or in-person requests for information about sexual assault, location of additional resources on the subject of sexual assault or location/explanation of other resources and services which may be helpful to a victim or significant other.
7. Institutional Advocacy – Affecting change in the policies and procedures of an agency or institution in order to insure more sensitive, responsible treatment of sexual assault victims. This may be done in-person, on the telephone, or in written communication.
144 ICASA SERVICE DEFINITIONS, APPENDIX A (continued)
InfoNet lists a variety of institutions with whom center staff may advocate, such as law enforcement, medical and hospital, school, etc.
8. Professional Training – Providing in-depth education, skills building, and evaluation of skills to prepare others to helpfully and effectively intervene on a victim’s behalf. This is usually offered to groups of people, although an individual may receive a one-to-one training session. InfoNet lists a variety of training audiences including law enforcement medical and hospital, clergy, etc.
9. Public Education – A presentation to groups of people (perhaps an individual) on the subject of sexual assault, the myths associated with its origins and perpetration, the effect of sexual assault on the victim, the characteristics of an offender, etc., that is designed primarily to inform an audience (as contrasted to imparting skills and evaluating use of skills which transpires in training). InfoNet lists a variety of public education audiences including school age audiences, civic organizations, and others.
10. Volunteer Training – Providing in-depth education, skill building and evaluation of skills to prepare volunteers to provide services to victims and significant others.
11. Volunteer In-service Training – Additional training provided to expand volunteer skills.
12. Media Contacts – Time spent contacting print, radio, television, or Internet media outlets regarding sexual assault and related issues.
13. Awareness Promotion – Awareness promotion includes a broad spectrum of activities aimed at the community in general rather than a particular audience gathered for a presentation. Such activities may include: community health and resource fairs, distribution of flyers/leaflets in public venues, (media activities, radio, television, Internet and other strategies designed to reach the community at large with messages directed at increasing awareness of sexual violence and rape crisis services. Messages focus on sexual violence topics ranging from primary prevention to specific aspects of sexual violence or sexual violence services.
14. Social Justice Activism – Social justice activism includes a variety of strategies directed at social change. Strategies may be directed specifically at sexual violence or at the broad spectrum of oppressions that contribute to the perpetration of sexual violence. Strategies may include protests and rallies (e.g., Take Back the Night), task forces to engage the community in challenging oppression (e.g., community task force on racism) media activity (e.g., letters to the editor, opinion columns, press conferences) and other activist efforts to prevent and end sexual violence and oppression through changes in institutions, the community and the broader culture.
145 APPENDIX B.
INTERVIEW CODEBOOK
Group: Agency Characteristics
Board of Directors Anytime the respondent discusses their BOD- usually responding to follow-up questions from me about how engaged the BOD is, whether they are fundraisers. Can also include anytime the BOD is mentioned with regard to mitigating the effects of the impasse
Decision-making Information pertaining to how the agency structured and performed decision-making about resources, hiring, expanding programs, etc. BEFORE the budget crisis hit
DV and SA- dual agency Dual-service agency (but different from Multi-Service below)
Feminist Agency Current Respondent describes the agency as feminist or not feminist (for example, humanist) and gives example. Usually in response to prompting from interviewer
Feminist History Respondent describes history of agency as explicitly feminist or not feminist or not sure
Financial Pre-Impasse Captures the financial state going into the budget crisis as well as any previous fiscal problems or crises (for example, 2008/2009).
Multi-Service Agency Denotes an agency that is not only possibly DV and SA but also does community mental health services and/or is part of a larger organization
Reserves The agency had built up reserves prior to the budget crisis, or notably did not have reserves. May be double-coded with financials pre-impasse
Rural Respondent describes the geographic area served as rural, talks about long drives for clients, and/or describes multiple rural counties in service area
SA Only Agency only does services for SA survivors
146 INTERVIEW CODEBOOK, APPENDIX B (continued) Satellite Locations Respondent talks about multiple service locations and offices and how decisions are made around distribution of resources to the multiple offices
Services Provided Description of services (asked specifically about transportation but also includes hotline, advocacy, etc.)
Survivor Input Agency has some kind of mechanism to get feedback from survivors or does not have this
Two States Agency works across state lines (Missouri and Illinois, for example)
Urban Service area is located in a large urban area and respondent brings this up in interview
Women of Color Code capturing agency that primarily serves women of color but also includes respondent commentary on how women of color were affected by the budget crisis. Not limited to agency characteristics
Group: Apportioning Responsibility
Government Role Response to questions about the government’s role in funding victim services and the social safety net
Responsible for Crisis Who the respondent thinks is responsible for the crisis.
Group: Beginning of Budget Crisis
First Steps to Mitigate Crisis Initial steps taken by agencies to cope with the financial crisis (for example, cutting back on expenses, laying off workers)
Talking to Legislators/Lobbying Describes any efforts of calling, writing, or meeting with elected officials as a standalone agency or part of coalition work. And their feelings about these efforts
When it Felt Like Crisis Usually refers to a time period when the crisis first “hit” the agency but could also be an event (for example, when we couldn’t pay a specific bill)
147 INTERVIEW CODEBOOK, APPENDIX B (continued)
Group: Deepening Crisis
Coalitions Refers to ICASA work and involvement (at any point) and specifically to working with other agencies in coalition, such as the responsible budget coalition or other networks in their region
Collaborations with Other Agencies Not a formal coalition but anytime the respondent discusses working with other agencies or how other agencies were affected (for example, referral networks shrinking or agencies closing around them). Can also include how they worked with other agencies before and after the crisis
Community Support Support from community members including donors, volunteers, and other community groups (but not agencies, that would go above)
Crisis Decision-making Specific examples of how decisions were made during the budget crisis and who was involved (for example, the ED and clinical director sat down with BOD) and what was taken into consideration
Effects on Clients Discussions about effects on clients including tangible effects (like loss of counselor) and emotional effects (like fear the center will close) and tertiary effects (clients were more unemployed or not receiving services from other agencies who were struggling)
Effects on Staff/Volunteers Any tangible and/or non-tangible effects on workers such as lost hours and wages and low morale
Emotions of On-going Crisis Specific only to emotions and mostly refers to effects of continued uncertainty; also specific to director and not just staff/volunteers
On-going Mitigation Secondary strategies (refers to time-order) where the first step might have been cutting expenses or doing one or two lay-offs and the secondary strategy was to lay off people or lay off more people, etc.
Strategies How directors tried to be strategic about their efforts to stay open and continue employing staff and providing services (if at all, many were simply reacting)
148 INTERVIEW CODEBOOK, APPENDIX B (continued)
Group: Recovery/Aftermath
Coping Forward Ways in which the agency has been moving forward with their work, what their current status is, if they are “back to normal” and what that looks like
Finances Recovery specific to finances- state of affairs and how the agency is doing financially, identifying new revenue streams
Line of Credit Whether or not the agency had to use a line of credit or wanted to during the crisis (belongs to group Deepening Crisis) and their general thoughts about non-profits using lines of credit (usually in response to interviewer questions)
MeToo Movement Reflections on how the movement has affected their agency or not and if they have done any programming or awareness campaigns
Programming Recovery efforts specific to adding new programming or shoring up existing programs
Recommendations for Surviving Reflections from respondents on how they would change things if happened again or not and what advice they have for people
Staffing Recovery of staffing- hiring new or more staff; hiring back staff who were let go during the crisis
149 APPENDIX C.
Approval Notice Initial Review (Response To Modifications)
April 20, 2018
Anne Kirkner, MA Criminology, Law, and Justice 3059 W. Palmer Square, Chicago IL 60647 Phone: (717) 372-6637 / Fax: (312) 413-5893
RE: Protocol # 2018-0194 “Surviving & Thriving under Austerity: Violence Against Women Agencies & the Illinois State Budget Impasse”
Dear Ms. Kirkner:
Please remember to submit a copy of finalized data use/user agreement(s) with ICJIA, once it is obtained, as a separate Amendment via OPRS Live, and before obtaining, collecting, and analyzing secondary data collected under ICJIA IRB approval.
Please note that the following consent document was revised administratively by OPRS staff to bring it into compliance with approved protocol reported in the Initial Review Application dated 4/20/18: Consent Document, v5, 4-20-2019. Please remember to use only the documents approved and stamped by UIC IRB in conduct of this research study.
Please note that all UIC personnel must list and utilize their UIC email address for all research related correspondence and documents.
Please note that stamped .pdfs of all approved recruitment and consent documents have been uploaded to OPRSLive, and can be accessed under “Approved Documents” tab. Please remember to use only those approved documents to recruit and enroll subjects into this research project. OPRS/IRB no longer issues paper letters or stamped/approved documents.
Your Initial Review (Response To Modifications) was reviewed and approved by the Expedited review process on April 17, 2018. You may now begin your research
Please note the following information about your approved research protocol:
Protocol Approval Period: April 17, 2018 - April 16, 2021 Approved Subject Enrollment #: 40 Additional Determinations for Research Involving Minors: These determinations have not been made for this study since it has not been approved for enrollment of minors.
150 IRB APPROVAL, APPENDIX C (continued)
Performance Sites: UIC
Research Protocol(s): a) IRA: Surviving Under Austerity: Rape Crisis Centers & the Illinois State Budget Impasse, 04/20/2018
Recruitment Material(s): a) Interview Explanation, Version 2, 03/07/2018 b) ICJIA Agency Authorization email, Version 2, 03/07/2018 c) Interview Invitation Email, Version 3, 04/02/2018 d) Telephone message script, Version 2, 04/19/2018 e) Telephone Script (includes screener), Version 4, 04/19/2018 f) Scheduling Email, Version 2, 04/19/2018 g) Follow Up Email (includes email self-screener), Version 4, 04/19/2018 h) Confirmation Email, Version 3, 04/20/2018
Informed Consent(s): a) Consent Document, Version 5, 04/20/2018 b) A waiver of documentation and an alteration of consent have been granted only for eligibility screening under 45 CFR 46.117(c)(2) and 45 CFR 46.116(d) (minimal risk; either verbal consent will be obtained from potential subjects or subjects will agree to self-screen for eligibility via an email; information from subjects who decline or who are ineligible will be destroyed immediately; written consent will be obtained from subjects at enrollment). c) A waiver of informed consent has been granted for recruitment under 45 CFR 46.116(d) for ICJIA to provide investigator with the executive directors’ contact information (minimal risk; subjects may decline to participate when contacted by the investigator; contact information of declining or ineligible subjects will be destroyed immediately).
Your research meets the criteria for expedited review as defined in 45 CFR 46.110(b)(1) under the following specific category(ies):
(6) Collection of data from voice, video, digital, or image recordings made for research purposes., (7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including but not limited to research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.
151 IRB APPROVAL, APPENDIX C (continued)
Please note the Review History of this submission:
Receipt Date Submission Type Review Process Review Date Review Action 02/13/2018 Initial Review Expedited 02/23/2018 Modifications Required 03/08/2018 Response To Expedited 03/26/2018 Modifications Modifications Required 04/02/2018 Response To Expedited 04/17/2018 Approved Modifications
Please remember to:
Use your research protocol number (2018-0194) on any documents or correspondence with the IRB concerning your research protocol.
Review and comply with all requirements on the guidance, "UIC Investigator Responsibilities, Protection of Human Research Subjects" (http://research.uic.edu/irb/investigators-research-staff/investigator-responsibilities).
Please note that the UIC IRB has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent process.
Please be aware that if the scope of work in the grant/project changes, the protocol must be amended and approved by the UIC IRB before the initiation of the change.
We wish you the best as you conduct your research. If you have any questions or need further help, please contact OPRS at (312) 996-1711 or me at (312) 413-1518. Please send any correspondence about this protocol to OPRS at 203 AOB, M/C 672.
Sincerely,
Alma Milat, BS IRB Coordinator, IRB # 2 Office for the Protection of Research Subjects
Enclosure(s): Following approved recruitment and consent documents have been uploaded under “approved documents” tab in OPRSLive:
1. Informed Consent Document(s): a) Consent Document, Version 5, 04/20/2018
152 IRB APPROVAL, APPENDIX C (continued)
2. Recruiting Material(s): a) Interview Explanation, Version 2, 03/07/2018 b) ICJIA Agency Authorization email, Version 2, 03/07/2018 c) Interview Invitation Email, Version 3, 04/02/2018 d) Telephone message script, Version 2, 04/19/2018 e) Telephone Script (includes screener), Version 4, 04/19/2018 f) Scheduling Email, Version 2, 04/19/2018 g) Follow Up Email (includes email self-screener), Version 4, 04/19/2018 h) Confirmation Email, Version 3, 04/20/2018 cc: Beth Richie, Criminology, Law, and Justice, M/C 141 Sarah Ullman, Faculty Sponsor, Criminology, Law, and Justice, M/C 141
153 VITA
EDUCATION
University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) Ph.D. Criminology, Law, & Justice, August 2019 Dissertation Title: Surviving Austerity: The Effects of the IL Budget Impasse on Rape Crisis Centers Dissertation Chair: Dr. Sarah E. Ullman, UIC
Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO M.A. Sociology, Women’s Studies Certificate, May 2012 Thesis Title: Collaborative Research on Native Women and Sexual Assault
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA B.A. Sociology, May 2008
RESEARCH INTERESTS AND SPECIALIZATIONS
Violence Against Women Sexual Assault- System & Society Response Sexual Assault Program Evaluation Feminist Criminology Sexual Assault Prevention Race, Gender, & IPV Violence Against Women Policy
AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS
2019 Michael D. Maltz Distinguished Graduate Student Award
2019 UIC Criminology Dept. Service to University Award
2014- 2018 University Fellow, University of Illinois at Chicago
2018 UIC Criminology Dept. Service to University Award
2017 UIC Chancellor’s Graduate Internship Award
2017 American Psychological Assoc. International Conference Registration Award
2017 UIC Criminology Department Publishing Award
2016 UIC Graduate Student Council Conference Travel Award
154 TEACHING EXPERIENCE
2018-2019 Instructor, CLJ, University of Illinois at Chicago, CLJ 240: Criminal Justice Organizations
2017 Teaching Assistant, Criminology, Law, & Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 400-Level Psychology of Torture & Terrorism; Comparative Crim
2016 -2017 Teaching Assistant, Criminology, Law, & Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 101-Level Introduction to Criminological Theory
2015 Teaching Assistant, Criminology, Law, & Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 200- Level Introduction to Criminological Theory
2012 -2014 Regular Invited Lecturer, “Sexual Assault and the Pyramid of Violence.” Human Sexualities Course, Front Range Community College, Fort Collins, CO
2009-2011 Teaching Assistant, Department of Sociology, Colorado State University
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
2015-2019 Research Assistant, Women’s Social Support Study Under the direction of Dr. Sarah Ullman- NIH grant to study disclosure and social support of female adult rape victims analyzing qualitative interview and quantitative survey data
2018-2019 Research Associate, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority Working in the research & analysis department for the Center for Victim Studies conducting research on the Illinois Crime Victim Compensation Fund, LGBTQ survivors of violence, and assisting with other short-term research projects related to survivors of violence as needed
2014-Pres. Research Assistant, UIC Interdisciplinary Center for Research on Violence Under the direction of Dr. Paul Schewe- Bad Breakups study on teen dating relationships and violence; Safe from the Start Grant from the Illinois Violence Prevention Authority, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority
2017 Research & Analysis Intern, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority Working in the research & analysis department for the Center for Victim Studies conducting research on LGBTQ survivors of violence and analyzing the effects of the IL state budget crisis on domestic violence and sexual assault victim services
2014-2015 Policy Associate, Open Road Policy, Chicago, IL Project assistance related to juvenile justice and rape kit backlog research
155 2009- 2010 Research Assistant, Violence Against Native Women Study, Colorado State University Project assistance coding qualitative and quantitative sexual assault data- under the direction of Roe Bubar, JD
PUBLICATIONS
Peer-Reviewed Articles
Lorenz, K., Kirkner, A., & Ullman, S.E. (2019). A Qualitative Study of Sexual Assault Survivors’ Post-Assault Legal System Experiences. Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, Special Issue, 20(3) 263-287. doi: 10.1080/15299732.2019.1592643
O’Callaghan, E., Lorenz, K., Ullman, S., & Kirkner, A. (2018). A Dyadic Study of Effects of Sexual Assault Disclosure on Survivors’ Close Relationships. Journal of Interpersonal Violence (Online first). doi: 10.1177/0886260518795506
O’Callaghan, E., Shepp, V., Kirkner, A., & Ullman, S. (201) Navigating Sex & Sexuality after Sexual Assault: A Qualitative Dyadic Study of Survivors & Informal Support Providers. Journal of Sex Research (Online first), doi: 10.1080/00224499.2018.1506731
Lorenz, K., Kirkner, A., & Mazar, L. Graduate Student Experiences with Sexual Harassment & Social Disengagement in Higher Education. NASPA Journal about Women in Higher Education (Accepted for publication in annual 2019 issue).
Ullman, S.E., Lorenz, K., Kirkner, A., O’Callaghan, E. (2018) Post-Assault Substance Use and Coping: A Qualitative Study of Sexual Assault Survivors and Informal Support Providers. Alcoholism Treatment Quarterly, 36(3), 330-353, doi: 10.1080/07347324.2018.1465807
Kirkner, A., Lorenz, K., Ullman, S.E., & Mandala, R. (2018) A Qualitative Study of Sexual Assault Disclosure Impact and Help-Seeking on Support Providers. Violence & Victims, 33(4), 721-738, doi: 10.1891/0886-6708.VV-D-17-00059
Kirkner, A., Relyea, M. & Ullman, S.E.. (2018). PTSD, Problem Drinking, and Substance Use Treatment Seeking among Sexual Assault Survivors. Traumatology, 24(1), 1-7, doi:10.1037/trm0000126
Lorenz, K., Ullman, S. Kirkner, A., Mandala, R., Vasquez, A., & Sigurvinsdottir, R. (2018) Social Reactions to Sexual Assault Disclosure: A Qualitative Study of Informal Support Dyads. Violence Against Women, 24(12), 1497-1520, doi: 10.1177/1077801217732428
Kirkner, A., Lorenz, K., Ullman, S. (2017). Recommendations for Responding to Survivors of Sexual Assault: A Qualitative Study of Survivors and Support Providers. Journal of
156 Interpersonal Violence. (Online first) https://doiorg.proxy.cc.uic.edu/10.1177/0886260517739285
Ullman, S., Lorenz, K., Kirkner, A., Mandala, R., Vasquez, A., & Sigurvinsdottir, R. (2017) Alcohol’s role in social reactions to sexual assault disclosures: a qualitative study of informal support dyads. Journal of Interpersonal Violence. (Online first) https://doi-org.proxy.cc.uic.edu/10.1177/0886260517721172
Harper, S., Maskaly, J., Kirkner, A., & Lorenz, K. (2017). Enhancing Title IX Due Process Standards in Campus Sexual Assault Investigations: Considering the Role for Distributive and Procedural Justice. Journal of School Violence, Special Issue, 16(3), 302-316 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15388220.2017.1318578
Mazar, L. & Kirkner, A. (2016). Fraternities and campus sexual violence: risk, protection, and prevention. Violence and Gender,3(3), 132-138 doi: 0.1089/vio.2015.0034
Kirkner, A., Relyea, M., & Ullman, S. (2016). Predicting the effects of sexual assault research participation: reactions, insight, and help-seeking. Journal of Interpersonal Violence. doi: 10.1177/0886260516670882
Kirkner, A., Bowser, M., & Ashby, K. (2014). Speak Up: Engaging Youth in School-Based Primary Prevention of Sexual Violence. Children, Youthand Environments, 24(1): 173-182. doi: 10.7721/chilyoutenvi.24.1.0173
Articles in Progress
Kirkner, A., Mazar, L., & Lorenz, K. Faculty and Staff Reporting & Disclosing of Sexual Harassment in Higher Education. (In progress).
Kirkner, A. & Ullman, S. Sexual Assault Survivors Post-traumatic Growth: Individual & Community-level Differences. Violence Against Women. (Revise & resubmit).
Other Reports
Schewe, P.A, Chehade, S., Campbell, L., DeLong, C., Devaney, K., Dougherty, A. Felner, J., Harper, S., Heilman, C., Kirkner, A. (2015). Safe from the Start, Year 13 Report: 2001-2014. Chicago, IL: Interdisciplinary Center for Research on Violence at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
157 CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS AND INVITED TALKS
Kirkner, A. & Ullman, S. “Sexual Assault Survivors’ Post Traumatic Growth: Differences across the Social Ecology.” Complete Thematic Panel, American Society of Criminology, Atlanta: Nov 2018.
Kirkner, A. “Rape Crisis Centers & the Illinois Budget Impasse.” Individual Session, Building a Trauma Informed Illinois (VOCA), Springfield, IL: August 22, 2018.
Kirkner, A., Ullman, S.E., Lorenz, K., & O’Callaghan, E. “Sexual Assault’s Impact on Sexual Behavior: A Dyadic Perspective.” Thematic panel presentation, International Family Violence Conference, Portsmouth, NH: July 16, 2018.
Kirkner, A., Lorenz, K., Harper, S., & Schewe, P. “Bad Breakups: Results from a Teen Dating Violence Survey.” Presented to The Federal Interagency Workgroup on Teen Dating Violence, NIJ, Web-conference: December 4, 2017.
Ullman, S., Lorenz, K., & Kirkner, A. “Reactions to Survivors and the Impact of Disclosure on Informal Support Providers from a Dyadic Interview Study.” Complete Thematic Panel, American Society of Criminology, Philadelphia: Nov 2017.
Kirkner, A., Relyea, M., & Ullman, S. “Co-Morbidity and Mental Health Help-seeking Among Sexual Assault Survivors.” Individual Presentation, International Association of Law & Mental Health, Charles University, Prague: July 2017.
Kirkner, A., Lorenz, K., Harper, S., & Schewe, P. “Exploring Adolescent Breakup Experiences in Preventing Teen Dating Violence.” Video podcast presented to PreventConnect, CALCASA, University of Illinois at Chicago: May 2017. http://www.preventconnect.org/2017/05/exploring- adolescent-breakup-experiences-in- preventing-teen-dating-violence/
Kirkner, A., Relyea, M., & Ullman, S. “Predicting the Effects of Sexual Assault Research Participation: Reactions, Perceived Insight, and Help-seeking.” Poster Presentation, Women’s Health Research Forum, University of Illinois at Chicago: April 2017.
Panelist, Women and Labor Union Organizing. Graduate Women Across Northwestern, Northwestern University Women’s Center. April 19, 2017.
Kirkner, A. (2017). “Assessing The Medical Forensic Exam: The Ethics Of Medico- Legal Advocacy.” Feminisms Lunch Lecture Series, Women’s Leadership & Resource Center/Campus Advocacy Network, University of Illinois at Chicago.
158 Vasquez, A., Lorenz, K., Kirkner, A. & Ullman, S. (2016), “Using Dyadic Interviews to Examine Social Support in Female Sexual Assault Survivors.” Roundtable, American Society of Criminology, New Orleans, LA: November 2016.
Kirkner, A., Relyea, M., & Ullman, S. (2016). “Predicting the Effects of Sexual Assault Research Participation.” Paper presentation, International Family Violence Conference, Portsmouth, NH: July, 2016.
Kirkner, Anne (2015). “Factors Associated with Rape Kit Submission.” Poster presentation, American Society of Criminology, Washington, D.C.: November, 2015.
Swenson, Audrey & Kirkner, Anne (2013). “Youth Addressing Sexual Violence with SART.” Public Health in the Rockies, Breckenridge, CO: September, 2013.
McDermott, Larry & Kirkner, Anne (2012). “Project Illumination: Sexual Violence and People with Cognitive Disabilities.” National Association for Retarded Citizens Webinar, May, 2012.
Bubar, Roe & Kirkner, Anne (2010). “Intersectionality and Violence Against Native Women.” 11th Annual National Indian Nations Conference, Palm Springs, CA: December, 2010.
SERVICE TO THE DISCIPLINE
On-going Peer Reviewer, Violence Against Women; Trauma, Violence, & Abuse; Journal of Interpersonal Violence
Spring 2018 Guest Editor, DWC Spring 2018 Newsletter, Graduate Student Corner
Aug. 2017 Grant Reviewer, ICJIA Community-Based Violence Intervention & Prevention, $7 million available in funds
SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY
2018-Pres. Co-President, UIC Graduate Employees Organization (GEO), Labor union at UIC representing over 1,500 graduate and teaching assistants
2016- 2018 Organizing Chair & Departmental Steward, UIC GEO
2015 Volunteer Outreach Worker, Sex Worker Outreach Project (SWOP), Chicago, IL
159 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
2013-2014 Director of Prevention Education & Community Outreach, Sexual Assault Victim Advocate Center, Fort Collins, CO
2011-2013 Community Outreach Coordinator, Sexual Assault Victim Advocate Center, Fort Collins, CO
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
American Society of Criminology National Women’s Studies Association Penn State Alumni Association American Sociological Association
REFERENCES
Sarah Ullman, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Criminology, Law, & Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 312-996-6679, [email protected]
Megan Alderden, Ph.D., Research Director, Illinois Criminal Justice Authority, 312-793-8550, [email protected]
Lisa Frohmann, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, Law, & Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 312-413-2477, [email protected]
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