Beth Bailey, Richard H. Immerman, eds.. Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and . New York: New York University Press, 2015. 368 pp. $89.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-4798-7143-8.

Reviewed by Nathaniel Moir

Published on H-War (December, 2016)

Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University)

On the recent ffteenth anniversary commem‐ that historical moment in which the choice for orating September 11, 2001, the pain of remem‐ war was decided, especially in the case of Iraq. bering the attacks, and the memory of avowals Untangling and assessing a multiplicity of knots for justice, converged with two, intractable, still on this complex set of subjects is the focus of this unfnished wars. Remnants of Al-Qaeda and its outstanding edited collection, Understanding the mutation into the Islamic State are major security U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. challenges and the Taliban, which protected Al- Beth Bailey (Kansas University) and Richard Qaeda within Afghanistan, continues to under‐ H. Immerman (Temple University and US Army mine stability in South Asia. In the , War College) manage an impressive set of schol‐ it is difcult to forget the societal shock of 9/11, ary contributions. In collective eforts, the con‐ which changed much of the world. Additionally, it tributors were typically given a series of argu‐ is perhaps more difcult to revisit the rationale ments, themes, or questions to consider when em‐ for war as a means to defeat terrorism, particular‐ barking on this project. Although it is highly un‐ ly as it relates to Iraq and eforts in the Global likely that George F. Kennan served as a source of War on Terror. How, if at all, did war in the early inspiration, Kennan’s analysis of “double-think”— twenty-frst century improve security for the Unit‐ in the conduct of war between the United States ed States? and Japan during World War II—might have po‐ Unquestionably, the memory of 9/11 deserves tentially, and relevantly, contributed as an appli‐ perpetuity in our national consciousness. Yet it cable starting point for Bailey and Immerman’s also requires, perhaps even demands, circum‐ collection. According to Kennan: “There is, let me spection concerning the United States’ response to assure you, nothing more egocentrical than an attacks by Al-Qaeda through military action. Addi‐ embattled democracy. It soon becomes the victim tionally, it is critical to reexamine the pathos of of its own war propaganda. It then tends to attach H-Net Reviews to its own cause an absolute value which distorts “collided with claims about the need to reign in its own vision on everything else. Its enemy be‐ government spending, to promote personal re‐ comes the embodiment of all evil. Its own side, on sponsibility, and to eradicate fraud” (p. 263). Kier‐ the other hand, is the center of all virtue.”[1] nan usefully suggests that wars force inconsisten‐ In many respects, Kennan’s point character‐ cies and paradox upon governments and con‐ izes how the United States responded to Al-Qaeda stituents alike: How does the government assist through the Global War on Terror. The studies deserving veterans with painful conditions while and debates surrounding the Iraq and obstructing attempts by fakers seeking to take ad‐ Afghanistan Wars historically echo an enduring vantage of the “system”? What about the docu‐ problem Kennan identifed in 1960. None of this is mentation and validity of invisible wounds, such to say that Al-Qaeda was and remains—along as posttraumatic stress and others? How can the with its spawn, ISIS—an embodiment of evil. Ken‐ government protect privacy—such as veteran nan’s statement, rather, is valuable as an assess‐ records—while also ensuring, or fxing, the com‐ ment concerning how the United States responds petence of such institutions as the Veterans’ Af‐ when confronted with radicalization, whether it fairs (VA) to administer its eforts efectively? Is it be the Rising Sun of Imperial Japan, communism, possible to tax the American people fairly for the or radicalized Islamic organizations. In their ex‐ cause of maintaining massive spending on de‐ cellent volume, Bailey and Immerman historicize fense while national infrastructure falls into dis‐ Kennan’s point—along with much else—as a re‐ repair and important social needs, such as educa‐ sult of the United States’ conduct of war in the tion and other sectors, deserve increased fund‐ Middle East and South Asia. ing? The book is organized into four thematic For his part, Kiernan sets an exacting and parts explored through a range of two to four es‐ readable benchmark in his essay, “Veterans’ Read‐ says each. The sections include the wars and their justment after the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.” As origins; explorations into the limits of American the editors apparently ensured, Kiernan’s solid ef‐ military and diplomatic strategy; the conduct of fort is matched by the thirteen other scholars in the wars and its many costs, both in human and the collection. Each essay is written with objective social terms; and lessons and legacies of the wars. balance while retaining awareness of the human If there is a single volume that cogently and con‐ costs associated with military service. Collectively, cisely addresses the multiplicity of issues concern‐ the authors demonstrate nonpartisan academic ing contemporary war in the countries assessed, critiques of American actions that are often as well as the intent behind choosing to go to war, provocative, and their essays contribute careful Understanding The U.S. Wars in Iraq and analysis to these long wars. Most usefully, the au‐ Afghanistan is it. thors’ arguments are amply and consistently sup‐ ported with evidence guided and driven by perti‐ For example, in examining veterans’ needs nent and often unsettling questions. and the United States’ obligation to meet them, David Kiernan identifes the contested legacy of None of this is to suggest that the book is a social policies and how they overlap with past pacifst platform or an opportunity to bash neo‐ wars. The G.I. Bill, created after World War II— conservatives cloaked as scholastic objectivity. one of the great government programs of the Rather, the book squarely examines facts and the twentieth century—sparked controversy in some United States’ relationship to war. For instance, an quarters at the time it was initiated. The program important and acknowledged factor in under‐ clearly helped millions of veterans, but it also standing the legacies of war in Iraq and

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Afghanistan includes recognition of the US Army’s while also rereading William Lederer and Eugene aptitude and organizational design for long-term Burdick’s The Ugly American, originally published confict and recognition that this is a highly con‐ in 1958. As the United States absorbed the shock tested subject. Readiness was certainly an issue of the Korean War, while also peering into the un‐ early in the . For example, the late devel‐ knowns of Indochina, Lederer and Burdick pro‐ opment of Mine Resistant Armor Protected vehi‐ vided their perspective through lessons and warn‐ cles (MRAPs) was a critical efort in the attempt to ings: if you go to war, go with clear objectives, put replace insufciently armored vehicles, namely personnel in place who know the language in High Mobility Motor Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), which operations are conducted, meticulously dis‐ which were consistently targeted by insurgents cern military versus political objectives and en‐ using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Re‐ sure that the host nation or government the Unit‐ cruitment and retention of service personnel, ed States seeks to support is capable of gaining its such as the policy of stop/loss, also demonstrated population’s support and that the supported gov‐ many issues. In short, the US military does not get ernment is able to handle the weight of outside in‐ the wars it wants. Long wars, historically, have terference and assistance. Regrettably, in the case not been the forte of the United States Depart‐ of Vietnam, The Ugly American’s lessons fell by ment of Defense despite repeated experience con‐ the wayside. The analysis and critiques of many ducting them. astute scholars on Indochina—notably Bernard Additionally, the wars in Afghanistan and Fall, the subject of my academic work—were of‐ Iraq remind us that confict exemplifes complexi‐ ten ignored by policymakers. In an echo—perhaps ty—versus being complicated—in terms of vast this was the echo chamber Kennan identifed— social, political, religious, and geographical fac‐ the problem reverberated in 2003, particularly as tors. Fast-paced adaptation in social environ‐ the United States chose to go to war in Iraq. ments are difcult to penetrate through political- As far as The Ugly American is concerned, the military means. Assessments of war are elusive book was brought to the attention of my cohorts and solutions, even if they exist, which rarely is during my Captain’s Career course in military in‐ the case, are consistently untenable.[2] In one telligence at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The instruc‐ War on the Rocks analysis, contemporary confict tor rightfully—if not also righteously—told our often demands multi-year operations requiring class that we were stupid if we did not read Led‐ consistent presence with only very brief periods erer and Burdick’s book. As the son of a Vietnam of high intensity combat. In a study conducted at veteran, as well as a student of the French In‐ the Army War College, in a ratio of 18:1, the over‐ dochina and Vietnam War, the warning left me whelming majority of operations undertaken concerned over how much I had yet to learn. It since 1868 consists of long-term operations versus also reminded me of issues processing my own high-intensity, combined arms maneuver.[3] The past experience from a deployment in cost and challenges this ratio elicits is one of Afghanistan. What, if any, did my efort, let alone many problems explicated in Bailey and Immer‐ that of NATO, matter? On an even larger scale, af‐ man’s collection, and several essays address deep- ter the initial defeat of the Taliban, how would the rooted institutional challenges for the US military. United States fx Afghanistan, let alone Iraq? As The volume certainly hits multiple nerves, at Afghanistan War veteran and Naval Academy- least among veterans. In my case, as an ofcer in based scholar Aaron B. O’Connell asks in his chap‐ the US Army Reserve currently pursuing a PhD in ter, “The Lessons and Legacies of the War in history, I read Bailey and Immerman’s collection

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Afghanistan”: at what point was the job done, if choice to select only scholars, or veteran scholars, ever? (p. 326). for individual essays is understandable but weak‐ In terms of the US Army Counterinsurgency ens the book’s potential breadth. This is an issue Field Manual (FM 3-24) (2007), for example, most noticeable in essays refecting on the experi‐ O’Connell assesses that the lessons and legacies of ence of combatants’ and veterans’ postwar strug‐ war in Afghanistan must be based on understand‐ gles. For instance, although Lisa Mundey’s essay, ing the importance of the supported state’s per‐ “The Combatants’ Experiences,” is highly com‐ ceived legitimacy among local citizens and inter‐ mendable, Mundey did not—as far as I know— national audiences. This frst principle of coun‐ fght in Afghanistan or Iraq, nor did she cover terinsurgency gaining governmental legitimacy is events in these countries frst-hand as a journal‐ a challenge that is notoriously difcult to estab‐ ist. While this is no indictment on Mundey’s lish through external support. In O’Connell’s con‐ strong scholarship, one wonders why authors vincing assessment, it is not possible for “foreign with frst-hand and formidable experience, such security forces and advisers, speaking foreign lan‐ as Sebastian Unger (War [2011]), Dexter Filkins guages and carrying with them both guns and for‐ (Forever War [2009]), David Finkel (Thank You for eign cultures,” to establish sustainable legitimacy. Your Service [2014]), or another author-veteran Indeed, the notion that the United States could such as Nathaniel Fick (One Bullet Away: The somehow shore up the legitimacy of a govern‐ Making of Marine Officer [2006]), were not select‐ ment from the outside, a concept the United States ed to compose on the topic. demonstrably failed to learn in Vietnam, let alone These concerns aside, Bailey and Immerman’s Iraq or Afghanistan, “lacks a foundation in history collection nears the categorization of indispens‐ and logic” (p. 322). O’Connell, like his counterpart able. Understanding the US wars in Iraq and Robert K. Brigham in chapter 12, “Lessons and Afghanistan, at this historical point, is the best Legacies of the War in Iraq,” demonstrates that single volume for both students, service person‐ such misconceptions on the fundamental nature nel, and serious readers, on the subject of these of supporting a partnered nation through coun‐ contentious wars. Gaining a more informed sense terinsurgency “refect a failure of imagination of what these wars accomplished in the past that stems from the common human habit of as‐ decade is a critical step toward doing better, a suming one’s own values are universal truths goal the United States sorely needs to attain, in rather than locally constructed norms” (p. 322). the decades ahead. Understandably, this demonstrates one facet of Notes the many problems associated with the employ‐ [1]. George F. Kennan, quoted in Edmund Wil‐ ment of counterinsurgency doctrine. In context of son, The Bit between My Teeth (New York: Farrar, these observations, O’Connell and Brigham pro‐ Straus and Giroux, 1965), 510. vide pithy analysis that helps readers gain better perspectives in forming interpretations, if not [2]. See Leo Blanken and Hy Rothstein, As‐ conclusions, regarding war in Afghanistan and sessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success Iraq. and Failure (Washington DC: Georgetown Univer‐ sity Press, 2015). Out of fairness, Bailey and Immerman’s vol‐ ume cannot get to everything. In some respects, [3]. James King, “Why Unloading Wide Area there are several gaps deserving further explo‐ Security on the Reserve Component Will Not ration, and this highly readable and outstanding Work,” War on the Rocks, May 18, 2016, http:// collection is not without issues. The editorial warontherocks.com/2016/05/why-unloading-wide-

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Citation: Nathaniel Moir. Review of Bailey, Beth; Immerman, Richard H., eds. Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. H-War, H-Net Reviews. December, 2016.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=46330

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