NOVEMBER 2019 Vol. 103 No. 11 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

9 Commandant’s 52 A 2025 Squad 75 We Should Study Birthday Firefi ght Tactical More Dead Russians “hot spot” Maj Alfred B. Ruggles Message Col Mike Fallon Gen David H. Berger 83 2018 National 59 The Resurrection of Defense Strategy O.P. Smith BGen J. Scott O’Meara Maj Ryan W. Pallas

A publication of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation HAPPY BIRTHDAY U.S. MARINE CORPS

Congratulations on your 244th anniversary

We salute you on this day of great celebration and remembrance. Thank you for your unwavering honor, courage and commitment in defense of our freedom by land, sea and air. Semper Fi!

L3Harris.com

The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement. November 2019 Volume 103 Number 11

IDEAS AND ISSUES Esprit 10 “Make Less the Depth of Grief” Col John McKay 12 The First of Many Capt Scott A. Holmes 17 The Professor in Korea 2ndLt Rykar B. Lewis 20 The OV-10 Mr. Jason Breidenbach & Mr. Wayne Breakfi eld History 26 Barriers to Interwar Innovation MAJ Ryan Dunbar 28 For Lack of Doctrine Mr. Justin Williamson 31 If Practicable? Exactly! LtCol Timothy E. Grebos Cover Happy 244th Birthday Marines! Operations (Photo by Cpl Brian Burdett.) 34 Getting Back Into the “Cold Weather Business” Ms. Zsofi a Budai 38 Arctic Riverine Operations LTC Lester W. Grau DEPARTMENTS 44 Team China, World Police 1stLt Ross W. Gilchriest 49 The 1stLt Woody Dewing 3 Editorial 52 A 2025 Squad Firefi ght Tactical “hot spot” Col Mike Fallon 6 Special Notices 56 Fighting Over Parsley? LCpl Armstead Liebl 7 Letters 9 CMC Birthday Message Leadership 59 The Resurrection of General O.P. Smith Maj Ryan W. Pallas 98 Observation Post 63 Warrior Scholarship for the Junior Offi cer LCDR Jonathan Lushenko 99 Books 104 Index to Advertisers Professional Military Education 66 104 Writers’ Guidelines Po River Valley Wargame Capt Matthew Tweedy 69 Memoir ‘44 2ndLt Jonathan Scott 72 A New, Old Kind of PME 1stLt Walker D. Mills 75 We Should Study More Dead Russians Maj Alfred B. Ruggles 78 Historiography for Marines Mr. Paul Westermeyer

Commentary 83 2018 National Defense Strategy BGen J. Scott O’Meara 87 On Mules and Mosaics Maj P. Gerbracht 90 The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook Capt Valerie J. Cranmer

Amphibious Operations 93 Operation FROM THE SEA Capt Daniel D. Phillips

99 Book Review

The Marine Corps Gazette (ISSN 0025–3170) is published monthly by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas that will ad- vance knowledge, interest, and esprit in the Marine Corps. Periodicals postage paid at Quantico, VA, USPS #329-340, and at additional mailing offi ces. • OPINIONS expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the attitude of the Department of Defense, Navy Department, or Headquarters Marine Corps. “Marine Corps” and the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor are trademarks of the U.S. Marine Corps, used with permission. • MEMBERSHIP RATE: Annual $42.00 • MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION: Contact Member Services, 1–866–622–1775. • ADVERTISING QUERIES: Defense Related Industries/Business: Contact LeeAnn Mitchell, Advertising@mca-marines. org 703-640-0174. All other Advertising Contact James G. Elliott Co. Inc., Phone New York: 212-588-9200 Chicago: 312-236-4900 Los Angeles: 213-624-0900. • COPY- RIGHT 2019 by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation. All reprint rights reserved. • EDITORIAL/BUSINESS OFFICES: All mail and other queries to Box 1775, Quan- tico, VA 22134. Phone 703–640–6161. Toll Free 800–336–0291. Fax 703–640-0140. Location: Bldg #715, Broadway St., Quantico, VA 22134. • E-MAIL ADDRESS: [email protected]. • WEB ADDRESS: www.mca-marines.org/gazette. • CHANGE OF ADDRESS: POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Marine Corps Gazette, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or e-mail: [email protected]. • For credit card orders, call 866-622-1775. PUBLISHER’S STATEMENT: Publication of advertisements does not constitute endorsements by MCA&F except for such products or services clearly offered under the MCA&F’s name. The publisher reserves the right to accept or reject any advertising order at his absolute discretion.   2          

Background The contest is named for Gen Robert E. Hogaboom, USMC(Ret), who served the Corps for 34 years. Upon graduating from the Naval Academy in 1925, Gen Hogaboom saw service in , Nicaragua, and China. Following action in a number of key Pacifi c battles in World War II, he later served fi rst as assistant division commander, then division commander, , in Korea in 1954–55. Gen Hogaboom retired in 1959 as a while serving as the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and was subsequently advanced to the rank of general. Prizes include $3,000 and an engraved plaque for fi rst place; $1,500 and an engraved plaque for second place; and $500 for honorable mention. All entries are eligible for publication.

Instructions The contest is open to all Marines on active duty and to members of the Marine Corps Reserve. Electronically submitted entries are preferred. Attach the entry as a fi le and send to gazette@mca-marines. org. A cover page should be included identifying the manuscript as a Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Gen Robert E. Hogaboom. Contest entry and include the title of the essay and the author’s name. Repeat title The Marine Corps Gazette is proud to announce the commencement of its on the fi rst page, but author’s name should annual Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest. The contest not appear anywhere but on the cover page. Manuscripts are acceptable, but honors the essay that is the most original in its approach to the various please include a disk in Microsoft Word aspects of leadership. Authors should not simply reiterate the 11 Principles format with the manuscript. The Gazette of Leadership or the 14 Leadership Traits of an NCO addressed in the Editorial Advisory Panel will judge the contest during February and notify Guidebook for Marines. Authors must be willing to take an honest, realistic all entrants as to the outcome shortly look at what leadership, either positive or negative, means to them and thereafter. Multiple entries are allowed; however, only one entry per author will then articulate ways and methods of being an effective leader of Marines. receive an award.

E-mail entries to: [email protected] Sponsored by: Mail entries to: Marine Corps Gazette DEADLINE: Hogaboom Writing Contest Box 1775 31 January Quantico, VA 22134 President & CEO LTGEN W. MARK FAULKNER, USMC(RET) www.mca-marines.org/gazette • 1–800–336–0291 Publisher, Editor, & Chairman, Ed. Adv. Panel C OL C H R IS TOPH E R WO ODBR I D G E , USMC ( R E T ) NOVEMBER 2019 [email protected] Ext. 163 Senior Editor Editorial: Happy Birthday Marines LTCOL KERRY A. KNOWLES, USMC(RET) First, everyone at the Gazette and the Marine Corps Association & [email protected] Ext. 109 Foundation wishes all Marines and friends of the Corps a happy 244th Layout/Editorial Production Coordinator birthday. Whether in plush ballrooms, on the mess decks of the fl eet, or CHARLENE K. MONROE in remote austere locations across the globe, we gather to celebrate the [email protected] Ext. 139 fellowship of our Corps, remember our fallen comrades, and rededicate Assistant Editors: ourselves to the ideals MajGen John A. Lejeune summed up as “military WILLIAM TREUTING effi ciency and soldierly virtue.” [email protected] Ext. 193 This month’s cover highlights the broad range of topics presented in LAUREN E. JETER the magazine. From history and esprit de Corps, to leadership, amphibious [email protected] operations, and an analysis of the National Defense Strategy, we offer a CARRIE EMERSON-COYLE range of content authored by Marines from the ranks of lance corporal [email protected] to brigadier general—and of course our 38th Commandant’s Birthday Administrative Assistant Message. HARLEY Q. PARKER-COLLINS In addition to all of the cover articles, I encourage a close reading of the [email protected] Ext. 180 following stand-out articles. First, on page 10 we have published a speech Advertising Queries: given by Col John McKay (Ret) at the Marines Memorial in San Francisco Defense-Related Industries/Business: about the life-altering loss of loved ones in war that is especially relevant Contact: LEEANN MITCHELL: 703-640-0174 [email protected] during this season that recognizes the history of the Corps. All Other Advertising Contact: Two articles this month are based on the life and service of Gen O.P. JAMES G. ELLIOTT CO. INC. Smith. In “The Professor in Korea,” by 2ndLt Rykar B. Lewis on page New York: 212-588-9200 17, the author describes the careful calculations, foresight, and personal Chicago: 312-236-4900 Los Angeles: 213-624-0900 ethics of this “professorial” man who led 1st Marine Division in the . In “Barriers to Interwar Innovation” on page 26, MAJ Ryan Dunbar, Editorial Advisory Panel U.S. Army, presents an essay examining the obstacles to innovative COL STAN S. COERR, USMCR(RET) thinking created by pre-conceived ideas and ambiguity about the next confl ict. “Fighting Over Parsley?” is a fairly obscure historical example of COL CRAIG WONSON expeditionary operations presented on page 56 in which LCpl Armstead COL MARIA J. PALLOTTA Liebl studies the Spanish interventions on Persil Island off in COL BRIAN E. RUSSELL 2002. Of note, LCpl Liebl is a third generation Marine carrying on the family tradition of dedication to the profession of arms. BZ, Marine. LTCOL HARRY P. WARD, USMC(RET) Several of our offerings this month present contrarian views and may LTCOL GARY W. THOMASON generate some controversy in our ongoing professional discussion. In “The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook” by Capt Valerie J Cranmer on page LTCOL AARON A. ANGELL 90, the author proposes a “checklist for success” through standardization of LTCOL SCOTT CUOMO every conceivable practice in the Marine Corps. Commander’s intent, “trust tactics,” and decentralization to the lowest capable level of leadership simply MAJ ANDREW B. WARREN, USMC(RET) cannot and do not work in the Information Age. Finally, in “Operation MAJ JONATHAN P. BURGESS FROM THE SEA” on page 93, Capt Daniel D. Phillips presents an imaginative vignette describing the failure of a future forced entry operation and the MAJ REID HOUCK “loss of the Pacifi c” because of improper implementation of our maneuver MAJ JEFFREY CUMMINGS warfare principles. Whether you agree or disagree with any of these authors’ positions, I encourage you to use all the resources available on the Gazette MAJ NATHAN FLEISCHAKER web page www.mca-marines.org/Gazette to share your thoughts. Be CAPT OLIVIA GARARD professional, be tactful, be fact-based, and let your voice be heard. SGTMAJ SCOTT BURTON Once again, Happy 244th Birthday. Semper Fidelis! Christopher Woodbridge 1STSGT FORREST ALLEN

MCA&F President and CEO, LtGen W. Mark Faulkner, USMC(Ret); Chief Operating Offi cer, Col Dan O’Brien, USMC(Ret); Director Foundation Operations, Col Tim Mundy, USMC(Ret); Director of Strategic Communications &Editor, Leatherneck magazine, Col Mary H. Reinwald, USMC(Ret); Member Services, Jaclyn Baird; Chief Financial Offi cer, Johnna Ebel.

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 3 HAPPY BIBIRTHDAY,RTHDAY, MAARINESRINES

1775-2019

Supporting the Marine Corps in every clime and place! ®

Semper Fidelis SPECIAL NOTICES

SgtMaj Troy E. Black New Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps

SgtMaj Troy E. Black received the Sword of Office from SgtMaj Ronald L. Green during a Relief and Appointment ceremony at Marine Barracks Washington, 26 July 2019, signifying his new position as the 19th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. SgtMaj Black, a 31-year Marine veteran, assumed responsibility as the Naval forces from Argentina, , Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, senior ranking enlisted Marine in the Peru, and the kicked off UNITAS LX (60), an annual multinational exercise in Corps. Rio de Janeiro, 19 August. Militaries from thirteen nations are taking part, including fourteen ships, one submarine, eight helicopters, and five aircraft. This year, in addition to the sea operation, there was an amphibious phase, which simulated coordinated humanitarian as- sistance delivery to Marambaia Island. (Photo by Sgt Daniel Barrios.) Reunions

Org: USMC Vietnam Tankers Association Reunion Dates: 31 October - 3 November Place: Seattle, WA POC: Bruce Van Apeldoorn MV-22 Completes Trans-Pacific Flight [email protected] Marines with Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) completed a trans-Pacific flight in MV-22 Ospreys, transiting from Darwin, Australia, to their home station at Marine Corps Base Hawaii on 19 September. The flight consisted of four MV-22 Correction Ospreys from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 363, reinforced, and was supported by two KC-130J Hercules from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152. It was In the article, “A Command Climate conducted to improve the Osprey trans-Pacific concept that was developed and refined Survey” (Oct19, p. 26), Dr. Fred Galloway’s over the past three MRF-D iterations. bio should have read that he is a distinguished For an aircraft that is accustomed to getting combat-loaded Marines in and out of professor at the University of San Diego. landing zones, the trans-Pacific flight demonstrated the tremendous breadth of capability The Gazette apologizes for the error. the Osprey brings to the table. (From www.marines.mil.)

Quote to Ponder: For years, Marine Corps combat histories have cited brilliant examples of physical courage in battle. The demands for moral courage are daily events in peacetime, as well as war. Any lack of honesty or complete moral integrity in all matters destroys the main fibers of the mili- tary profession. Any temptations to give our seniors reports that they would like to hear rather than what they should hear, to mislead, to misinform, to falsity performances or to exaggerate readiness status – does nothing but damage to the Corps and its character.

“The Old Gunny Says …” —Leatherneck Magazine, 1962

6 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 LETTERS

The Defense Industrial Base and the nothing in the Reserve Fleet by placing ment from the Marine Corps, I enjoyed Commandant's Planning Guidance mobile-swarm airborne launchers on Maj Bates’ article. Wake is a fascinating and Intent their decks. It would be cheaper and island and is heavily steeped in Marine 2 President Donald J. Trump issued easier to neutralize the threat by attack- Corps history. It was a favorite overnight an Executive Order 13806, which was ing it. stopover for Gen Carl Mundy when compiled and published in September In conclusion, the recruiting and he made his visits to WestPac as Com- 2018. How many members of Congress, retention issues can be handled by the mandant. One thing I wished Maj Bates secretaries in the cabinet, or chiefs of the Corps itself. But amphibs and spare parts included in his article is a mention of Services have read it? for our aircraft (the F-35 is an absolute the actions of Capt Henry “Hammerin’ How does this apply to all the tactical CAS necessity and it uses 130 Hank” Elrod, the first aviator to receive Services? It demonstrates how we as a pounds rare earth metals per aircraft) the Medal of Honor during World War Nation will fight and win wars we choose require multiple sources of supply and II. After all of VMF-211’s aircraft had to participate in, regardless of our Allies’ manufacturing! been destroyed, members of the squad- involvement. LtCol Mike Janay, USMC(Ret) ron continued the defense of the island, The Marine Corps’ future will de- fighting as infantry. Unfortunately, Capt pend upon how well we fare financially Elrod was killed on the final day of the with Congress, defense contractors, and Wake Island battle. Capt Elrod and LtCol Alfred A. lobbyists. These segments will help deter- 2 “Well Done” to Maj Bates for the Cunningham, the first Marine Corps mine the force design for our Marines, fine article published in the May 2019 aviator, are honored at the Georgia Avia- aircraft, and naval shipping. Among edition of the Gazette. Maj Devereux, tion Hall of Fame located at Robins Air the combat ships for the Navy, amphibs as accurately reported, made mistakes; Force Base, Georgia. are not a high priority. Specifically, the however, under the circumstances, he Ronald Wheeler CH-53 is the strategic workhorse for the surmounted the odds and made Marine GCE, ACE, and LCE. Corps history during this early stage of 2 Thanks to Maj Ralph S. Bates, Sr., for his reminder of the heroism of the Marines of 1st Defense Battalion and VMA-211 who fought bravely in the first The Marine Corps’ future will depend upon how well days of World War II to defend Wake we fare financially with Congress, defense contrac- Island, (MCG, May 2019). As a post- script to his fine review of the action, we tors, and lobbyists. These segments will help deter- should remember the defenders of Wake mine the force design for our Marines, aircraft, and naval shipping. Capt Elrod’s heroics were not known to Ma- Now for the “hard stuff.” First, the the war. Devereux’s leadership and tac- rine authorities until af- national pool for recruits is decreasing tics are further recorded in LtCol Walter because of obesity, drug abuse, and legal L.J. Bayler’s extraordinary 1943 publica- ter the war ... problems. The Marine Corps will have tion, “Last Man Off Wake Island.” Lt- to “compete” with the other Services. Col Bayler later served as Marine Air Second, the Navy-Marine Corps Team Group Communications Officer on desperately needs re-partnering to begin Guadalcanal ( w/Combat as the first organization to receive the to be perceived as a naval expeditionary “V”). Of note, Col Bayler was present at Navy-Marine Corps Presidential Unit force. Third, the Marine Corps is the the Japanese surrender of Wake Island Citation. Further, Capt Henry T. Elrod’s only Service with the MAGTF configu- on 4 September 1945. Col Devereux was heroic actions on Wake Island resulted ration which “teaches and trains” our released from brutal Japanese captivity as in him becoming the first Marine aviator commanding officers to control ground, POW on Hokkaido Island, Japan, on 15 to be awarded the Medal of Honor in aviation, and logistics elements concur- September 1945. World War II. Capt Elrod’s heroics were rently. No one else can do it! Finally, LtCol J.P. Leonard III, USMC(Ret) not known to Marine authorities until how to beat the enemy’s anti-access/area after the war when Wake’s defenders denial capabilities? We could resur- 2 Having lived and worked on Wake were repatriated from their POW camps. rect Navy ships rusting away and doing Island for eighteen years after my retire- Col Robert B. Newlin, USMC(Ret)

Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the Gazette. They should not exceed 300 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED. Letters may be e-mailed to [email protected]. Written letters are generally published 3 months after the article appeared. The entire Gazette is now online at www.mca-marines.org/gazette.

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 7 MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDANT

n the storied history of our Corps, certain unimpeachable images stand forth as unparalleled Iin capturing the tradition and ethos of what it means to be a United States Marine. Now we celebrate the 244th birthday of our Corps and recall the thoughts, reflections, and esprit that epitomize all Marines. The Gazette offers memoirs and heartfelt tributes as a salute to all Marines past and present, those still living, and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice in service to our great Nation.

8 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 10 NOVEMBER 2019

A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

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Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 9 IDEAS & ISSUES (ESPRIT) ”Make Less the Depth of Grief” A speech by Col John McKay

n 22 February, Col McKay, USMC(Ret), gave the following >Col McKay enlisted in the Marine Corps in early 1962. Commissioned in 1968, he speech at the Marines’ Memo- was twice combat wounded. As an Olmsted Scholar, he commanded 1/9 and JTF-160 rial Club in San Francisco, CA, and was intimately involved in crises in former Yugoslavia. Since retirement, he Oto the Annual California Gold Parents’ conducted counter drug operations in Perú, México, and Central America; worked Honor and Remembrance formal dinner. in West Africa; and trained Palestinian Security Forces under the 1993 Oslo Ac- Thank you, General Huly. Contrary cords. He holds MAs from Georgetown University and the National War College to what the General has just related, I and is currently an Adjunct Professor at California State University, Sacramento. was very kind to him when he visited me at HQMC. In point of fact, I was known ture and causes parents to inter their nor—trials and tribulations, more often as the “friendly infantry monitor!” children. the fumbling offerings of insensibilities General Myatt, your efforts and sig- We live in a society that skirts around that neither grasp nor can even begin nificance in making this all-important speaking of grief, even more so, of death. to appreciate your acute pain. These event possible are both recognized and All of you are poignantly enduring one gestures, well meaning in principle, deeply appreciated. Thank you, Sir, of the most tragic events in any person’s offer scant recognition that you, all of Gold Star Parents, I am humbled be- life. You are all in a dark, raw place. you, are in an unknown and terrible fore the magnificence of your courage The meaningless flutter of platitudes, twilight from which you will never en- and fortitude. You have done me a great the misplaced focus of awkward prof- tirely emerge. You are literally trans- honor. In peace, children inter their fering of condolences in the guise of formed, forever changed. And, let’s be parents; war violates the order of na- others’ own—almost universally mi- honest, the change is lifelong and not always propitious. It is true that some degree of redemption from, a coming to grips of sorts with, the mortality of your dearly beloved, and, yes, with your very own mortality, does occur. That is but meager comfort, much less any rec- ompense, for the irreplaceable losses you have suffered. You have an absolute right to whatever you are feeling and when- ever you are feeling those feelings. It is correctly said, “To weep is to make less the depth of grief.” Absolutely no one can, nor should they ever try to, deny you your departed loved ones. They are the children you lovingly brought into the world and unfailingly stood by, the loved ones you will forever cherish, and whom you so lovingly adored. Each and every one of them has been viciously ripped from your arms, violently torn LtGen Jan Huly, USMC(Ret), President & CEO of the Marines’ Memorial Association and Foun- from your sides, unforgivingly rendered dation, and Col John C. McKay, USMC(Ret), Guest of Honor, at the California Gold Star Parents’ from you forever, physically removed Honor and Remembance evening reception, 21 February 2019. (Photo courtesy of the Marines’ Memo- from your undying adoration, from rial Association and Foundation.) an indiscernible emotional and physi-

10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 YOUR LEGACY. THEIR FUTURE.

A small effort on your part can make a big difference to our mission of supporting Today’s Marines.

Including the Marine Corps Association Foundation in your will is a small step that ^VU»[THRLHKPќLYLUJLPU`V\Y lifestyle today, but will leave a lasting impact on Marines in the future.

Col John C. McKay delivering remarks at the closing dinner of the California Gold Star Par- ents’ Honor and Remembrance event on the evening of 22 February 2019, Marines’ Memorial Club, San Francisco. (Photo provided by author.) cal devotion of unfathomable depth. in our honeyed remembrances of the You are driven upon your knees by the so-called greatest generation. Your pres- overwhelming conviction that you have ence this evening puts a lie to that tale. nowhere to go. The heart of grief, its Perhaps more importantly, our gather- most diffi cult challenge, is not “letting ing together on this evening of honor go” of those who have died but, instead, and remembrance unapologetically and making the transition from loving in openly displays a collective embrace of the present to loving in separation. In the critically important sensitivity of being loved and always remembered, sharing that which all but defi es sharing. they are forever in your hearts. And, The very commemorating of your from your hearts, you will evermore loved ones’ lives provides a clear marker speak of them. of the signifi cance of each and every I am no stranger to the loss of loved one of their singular presences on this ones to abject violence. Nor will I ever earth. Though we walk together down be unburdened of grief. Grief is univer- an unpredictable, painful, draining, and sal. Yet, and yet, grief is so intimately exhausting path, we collectively seek personal. How we grieve is who we are. hope. And, as were your loved ones ... each and We seek the courage not to forsake every one of us present this evening is a hope. In loss, hope hides itself. Through unique individual. And, as individuals, our gathering together this evening, col- we grieve individually, uniquely, each lectively commemorating our losses, we within our own private solitude. That are challenging hope to once again show does not assuage the pain, the reality us the way forward. Allow strength of ultimate loss, but it does give due to from life’s surges of the cruelest kind, the fact we are each human individuals. {cast} light upon the darkness of de- The grave poignancy of the grief shared spair, through hope, faith, love, and the within this room puts on vivid display common bond of this shared evening. the increasingly rare type of individual I am privileged beyond description your loved ones embody and represent. to have shared a few moments with you. Yes, I intentionally use the present tense. Thank you. For they have done more, and paid the : ultimate price through their sacrifi ce, >Editor’s Note: The video of Col McKay’s For more information visit in upholding the universal legitimacy speech can be found at https://www.youtube. www.mca-marines.org/legacy-gift-planning of humanism. Individuals such as your com. sons, daughters, spouses, or siblings aren’t supposed to exist anymore, except

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 11 IDEAS & ISSUES (ESPRIT) The First of Many The Marines’ first amphibious assault on New Providence by Capt Scott A. Holmes

ithin his logbook, Lt what others did not: the logistical needs James Josiah wrote, “At >Capt Holmes is the Adjutant at 6th of the army as well as the importance 2 P.M. Cast off from Marine Corps District, Parris Island, of surprise and strategy. ye Warf In Company SC. Before the war, many American withW ye Ship Alfred, Co- Sailors had traveled throughout the lumbus & Cabot, Light airs from ye Caribbean for trading purposes when Westward & much Ice in ye River.”1 mation to Capt Nicholas. Hopkins was they were loyal to the British Crown. The date was 4 January 1776. The ordered by the Naval Committee to sail The Americans were familiar with the wharf that Lt Josiah was writing about down to . If he chose not to waters and knew the islands and their is located outside of Philadelphia, and do so, the Naval Committee and the inhabitants quite well. In fact, the is- he was on board the Continental Navy Continental Congress surely thought landers cared for the Americans more ship Andrew Doria. As Josiah looked Hopkins would sail to Georgia or South than the British because they benefited over the rails of the Andrew Doria, he Carolina as the possibility of a large more from their relationship; however, saw the newly formed Continental Ma- campaign in the South was becoming they generally cared for whichever deal rines board his ship and the surround- more real. However, Hopkins had a benefited them the most.5 ing Continental Navy vessels. Led by better idea. He was going to sail to the The logistics of the Continental Capt , over 200 Ma- Caribbean islands of the Bahamas. This Army were poor. There was a serious rines loaded aboard the ships. The Con- proved to be a wise decision because lack of heavy artillery and black powder. tinental Marines were not even three the British had just sent two frigates Over the years, the British had estab- months old, but they were embarking and two sloops-of-war to Virginia, and lished forts in the Bahamian capital city on what would be their first amphibious Hopkins’ fleet could very well have been of Nassau. These forts consisted of can- assault in a long and illustrious future destroyed. The same may have occured non and huge armories full of gunpow- that lay ahead. in Georgia and the Carolinas as the Brit- der. The British assigned a company of At this time of the year, the water was ish built up their military mass there for the 14th Regiment of Foot to protect frigid and many parts were frozen. This a southern campaign.4 The British Sail- these supplies and weapons. However, made movement difficult, delaying their ors hinted to their superiors the idea of the Americans found that this company departure date by a few days. Eight ships an American attack in the Bahamas, but of the 14th Regiment of Foot had been were in the fleet. The Alfred was the when Hopkins’ fleet eventually sailed, called to Boston to reinforce the British largest with multiple cannons. She had the British believed his destination to garrisons there. Additionally, the Brit- 20 nine-pounders and 10 six-pounders. be or Boston. In pick- ish sloop HMS Savage only visited the On her bow, she had an elaborate fig- ing the Bahamas, Hopkins understood harbor occasionally.6 While Hopkins’ urehead of a man in armor drawing his sword as if riding into battle.2 Most of the ships were top of the line, newly built by the Continental Navy. They were commanded by Commodore Esek Hopkins, who made his flagship the Al- fred. The other ships in the fleet were the Columbus, Cabot, Andrew Doria, Wasp, Hornet, Fly, and the Providence.3 Once on board, the Marines did not know where they were going or what their mis- sion would be. This was all to be briefed on the way down to their target. Commodore Hopkins was the only person who knew the destination and targets before he passed on the infor- Map of the island. (Image from NASA.)

12 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 orders were to sail down to Virginia as found its way onboard most of the ships. mission a successful one. Fort Nassau reinforcements, his decision to attack Smallpox was a huge concern; on 18 was built in 1697 and overlooked the the Bahamas was not totally against February 1776, it became a reality when western entrance to the harbor. It was the Continental Congress’ will. On the Alfred had to bury a man at sea who a fort of superior technology and heavy 29 November 1775, just nineteen days had succumbed to the disease. The next firepower. The fort was armed with after the creation of the Marine Corps, day, the Columbus did the same. Fear of cannon, including twelve-pounders, the Continental Congress realized the the disease spreading grew among the eighteen-pounders, eight-inch bronze Bahamas provided mass stores of gun men, lowering morale.12 In the days mortars, five and one-half inch how- powder and cannon, so they issued a following the deaths of the two Sailors, itzers, and bronze Coehorn mortars. resolution: storms appeared and the winds grew However, at the time of the attack, the heavy. The fleet had lost visual contact fort was falling apart. The local loyal- Information being given to Congress that there is a large quantity of powder of the Hornet and the Fly. In reality, ist militia thought the British infantry in the Island of Providence, Ordered the two ships had collided with each would kill themselves by simply firing that the foregoing Committee take other; the Hornet was forced to return to the guns because of how old the guns Measures for securing & bring[ing] port, the closest being Charleston, SC, were and because the walls were prob- away the said powder.7 to make repairs. However, the Fly made ably not sturdy enough to withstand repairs and rendezvoused with the fleet artillery fire. Hopkins saw the opportunity for glory on 1 March in the Caribbean.13 Two Fort Montagu was a different story. and was not going to let it slip away. more weeks went by and nothing hor- It was built between 1741 and 1742 and The fleet finally set sail in February rendous happened; the Sailors’ morale was located approximately one mile east after being stuck for six weeks behind was lifting, and they were only about of Fort Nassau. It was more simplistic the thick ice of the Delaware Bay. 8 one day of sailing from their anchor than Fort Nassau, but larger, and it While they waited in the ice, more guarded the vulnerable rear entrance reports came to Hopkins about how to Fort Nassau. Fort Montagu, at the desperate GEN George Washington time of the attack, maintained a strong was for gun powder. Hopkins wanted The assault on New defense, including eighteen-pounders, to take action. Nicholas was in com- twelve-pounders, nine pounders, and six mand of over 200 Marines with his two Providence had two ob- pounders. It also contained a large pow- main lieutenants: Matthew Parke and jective points ... der magazine, barracks, and a guard- John Fitzpatrick.9 As the fleet left the room. Fort Montagu was not falling Delaware Bay, the Marines still believed apart like Fort Nassau, but it did have they were heading to Virginia or fur- one major flaw: its simple square shape ther south. What the Marines did not point. Then tragedy struck again. On made it extremely vulnerable to any type know what Hopkins’ orders were after 1 March, the Columbus buried another of assault.17 dealing with Virginia. His orders ended sailor who died from smallpox. Hopkins The assault was scheduled for 2 with the phrase, “You are then to fol- reported in his logbook that four of his March. Hopkins knew the forts could low such course as your best judgment ships were infected with the disease.14 be easily taken because the British shall suggest to you as most useful to Later that same day, the fleet was failed to leave enough infantry to de- the American cause.”10 sailing down the coast and spotted two fend them, and the local loyalist militia As Hopkins sailed into the Atlantic, sloops from New Providence belong- was unprepared. The plan was to take the risk grew. This was the first fleet ing to the British Navy. The flagship the two sloops that had been captured that the Continental Navy had put to- quickly caught up to them and seized the day before and hide the Marines gether, and its destruction would surely them as the first prizes of the Conti- below deck. The ships were known to devastate the morale and future of the nental Navy.15 Later that afternoon, the the locals, so the Americans believed Continental Navy. The men were poorly fleet anchored on the southwest side they could come into port, unload the trained for maritime warfare as they had of Grand Abaco in twelve fathoms of Marines, and take their objectives. only been merchants and knew only the water.16 Once the sloops entered the sight of basics of sailing and little of fighting on The assault on New Providence had Fort Nassau, however, the plan fell the open ocean. The threat of a grow- two objective points: Fort Nassau and apart. There were warning shots fired, ing number of British warships in the Fort Montagu. Both had guns and and it was clear that the British knew area loomed. The British had already powder the Marines could take back the sloops had been captured and were deployed a 28-gun frigate, the HMS to the colonies for use in Washington’s not friendly. Hopkins’ fleet and the two Liverpool, and there was a good chance army only. Over the past few months, sloops fled, hoping to attack the next it could cross paths with the American the British had moved some of the day.18 That night, Hopkins called for fleet.11 guns and troops from the fort to help a council of war to figure out the next From the beginning, luck was not reinforce Boston, but there were still move. He wanted to go to the western on the side of the Americans. Disease enough guns and powder to make the side of the island to have the Marines

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 13 IDEAS & ISSUES (ESPRIT)

attack the town from the rear; however, sels, not having a convenience to either gustine, FL. This was Hopkins’ major there was no road for a march and no sleep or cook in.23 fault of the operation that later found water deep enough to make anchor. De- Hopkins knew he could now take Fort him in trouble with the Naval Com- spite these issues, a decision was finally Nassau, but to help save American lives mittee and in the likings of Congress. made. and show the courtesy of eighteenth He failed to use the other ships of his As the American fleet sailed over the century warfare, he sent a message to fleet to block the few lanes out of the horizon and into the view of the British the British: harbor. The powder escaped under the in the early morning of 3 March, the cover of darkness aboard the HMS St. alarm guns were sounded and troops If I am not Opposed in putting my Johns and made it to its destination were called to arms. The British gover- design in Execution the Persons and safely.25 Property of the Inhabitants Shall be nor, Montfort Browne, decided it was Safe, Neither shall they be Suffered The following day, Nicholas was met necessary to defend the powder and put to be hurt in Case they make no Re- with an invitation from Browne to take Fort Nassau’s commander, Maj Robert sistance.24 the city and Fort Nassau if he liked. Nicholas wrote in his journal, On our march I met an express from The raid was a huge success. The Americans did man- the Governor … The messenger then told me I might march into the town, age to capture some barrels of powder. The fleet then and if I thought proper, into the fort, 26 spent two weeks loading all of its captured prizes without interruption. Not a single shot was fired, and the Ma- onto it ships. rines took the city and the fort. Browne was arrested in chains and taken aboard the Alfred. Sterling, in charge.19 The Marines made Browne understood this and knew he The raid was a huge success. The an amphibious landing at a point called could not defend the city or the har- Americans did manage to capture some “The Creek,” which was located a mile bor from the outnumbering American barrels of powder. The fleet then spent and a half south of Fort Montagu. This force. Knowing the Americans wanted two weeks loading all of its captured was the first amphibious assault in the the powder he did what he knew best. prizes onto its ships. The prizes consist- history of the Marine Corps. The powder was the single most impor- ed of a city, two forts, 88 guns, and over Over 200 Marines and 50 Sailors tant item Browne possessed; thus, he 16,500 shells of shot.27 On the Andrew took the beach with the Wasp and Provi- loaded it all onto the HMS St. Johns. Doria alone, 38,240 pounds of round dence in support;20 they landed near a In total, there were over 100 barrels shot were loaded into her storage areas. group of free slaves, and the Marines of powder, and Browne sent them to Hopkins had to hire a private sloop to encountered no resistance. Capt Nicho- the British-occupied town of St. Au- carry some of the prizes back with him las made a report in his journal about the first amphibious landing: The inhabitants were very much alarmed at our appearance, and sup- posed us to be Spaniards, but were soon undeceived after our landing.21 The Marines under Nicholas formed into two columns and marched toward Fort Montagu. Despite being under cannon fire from 110 local militia under the command of Browne, not a single American casualty was taken. Browne then took his militia to Fort Nassau, and the Marines easily captured Fort Montagu. The militia tried to “spike” its artillery but failed to do so properly.22 Nicholas and his Marines were tired. Nicholas later wrote, I thought it necessary to stay all night, and refresh my men, who were fatigued, being on board the small ves- Fort Montagu today. Fort Nassau no longer stands. (Photo from http://www.thebahamasweekly.com.)

14 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019

IDEAS & ISSUES (ESPRIT)

7. Ibid.

8. Marines in the Revolution.

9. Ibid.

10. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

11. Marines in the Revolution.

12. “The New Providence Expedition.”

13. Marines in the Revolution.

14. “The New Providence Expedition.”

15. Ibid.

16. Marines in the Revolution.

17. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic The First Recruits, December 1775. (Painting by Col Charles Waterhouse, USMCR, from The U.S. Marine World. Corps: An Illustrated History, by Merrell L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001].) 18. “The New Providence Expedition.”

because there was not enough room on now forever paranoid. They knew they 19. Ibid. his own ships.28 However, sickness was had been vulnerable where they least still killing some of the men, and many expected it, and now they had to con- 20. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic took desertion on the island to get away centrate more naval powers in other ar- World from it.29 The fleet finally set sail on eas that held guns and powder. It also 16 March back toward Rhode Island, hurt the British because the guns and 21. Ibid. and along the way it captured four prize shot seized in the raid would be used ships. The Marines performed these against the British five years later at Fort 22. Ibid. captures with outstanding musket fire. Griswold and other battles.32 Over the They finally returned on 8 April with years, the Marines and the United States 23. Ibid. seven dead and four wounded from the took what they learned on the Raid of 24. Ibid. trip back. One of the dead included Lt Nassau and transformed it into an art Fitzpatrick, one of Nicholas’ personal form. 25. Ibid. friends.30 Upon return, individuals were both 26. Ibid. praised and reprimanded. Capt Nicholas Notes was promoted to major for his brave ac- 1. Charles Smith, Marines in the Revolution: A 27. United States Marine Corps History Divi- tions. Hopkins’ repution was tarnished History of the Continental Marines in the Ameri- sion, Marine Corps University, (Online), avail- for disobeying orders and attacking the can Revolution 1775-1783, (Washington, DC: able at https://www.usmcu.edu. Bahamas despite documentation stat- Library of Congress, 1975). 28. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic ing he could. He was also reprimanded World. for failing to secure the lanes of escape 2. Ibid. from the harbor and allowing the most 3. Ibid. 29. “The New Providence Expedition.” important asset, the powder, to escape.31 It was the first of many overseas at- 4. Staff, “The New Providence Expedition,” 30. Marine Corps University. tacks by the United States. It is astonish- American War at Sea, (Online: April 2012), ing that even though most of the Sailors available at http://www.awiatsea.com. 31. Ibid. and Marines were untrained, they per- formed as if they had been doing it for 5. John McCusker, Essays in the Economic History 32. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic years. The seized cannon greatly helped of the Atlantic World, (London, UK: Routledge, World. the artillery-starved Continental Army. 1997). The raid at Providence did have one major impact that was more important 6. Ibid. than guns or powder. The British were

16 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 The Professor in Korea MajGen Oliver P. Smith & the 1st Marine Division by 2ndLt Rykar B. Lewis

very war needs a hero. The Ko- Smith’s first challenge of the war rean War saw many brave men >2ndLt Lewis is an Air Traffic Con- was to see that the 1st Marine Division serve with outstanding distinc- trol Crew , Headquarters was ready for action in GEN Doug- tion; however, few equaled the and Headquarters Squadron, MCAS las MacArthur’s planned amphibious Eaccomplishments of MajGen Oliver P. Iwakuni, Japan. landing at Inchon. This was no small Smith. Gen Smith was assigned to com- task. The division had less than 3,500 mand the 1st Marine Division as it pre- men filling the ranks in July 1950. pared to deploy to Korea in July 1950. tered . But the war passed The Marine Corps overcame this His leadership skills were instrumental without Smith seeing combat. Neverthe- manpower shortage by mobilizing in preparing his division for the landing less, Smith was still in the Corps during the Reserves across the Nation. Gen at Inchon and ensuring the successful the outbreak of World War II. He saw Smith saw to it that another 13,000 conduct of the operation. During the combat at Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and Marines were added to the division remainder of his time in Korea, Gen Okinawa, earning multiple awards for within a month. By the first week of Smith led the 1st Marine Division in combat heroism. It was no shock that, August, the 1st Marine Division pos- the successful recapture of Seoul and as a , he was summoned sessed 17,000 Marines ready for action guaranteed the division’s survival in to command the 1st Marine Division in at Inchon.3 Gen Smith successfully the onslaught of Chinese forces at the July 1950, shortly after North Korean overcame the manpower shortage, but Changjin Reservoir. Gen Smith’s cal- forces invaded . Gen Smith there were many more obstacles to culated military maneuvers, foresight, retained this position until May 1951.2 face in Korea. leadership skills, and personal ethics He led the division during the roughest Under Gen Smith’s command, the earned him a place as one of the greatest fighting of the war and proved again to division executed a flawless amphibi- heroes of the Korean War. be a highly capable leader. ous landing at Inchon. But even then, Gen Smith was not the stereotypi- Smith began butting heads with MG cal Marine; nevertheless, his leadership Almond, the Commander of , abilities earned him the respect of the of which the 1st Marine Division was Marines under his command through- part of. Smith’s tactics, mannerisms, out the Korean War. He was well known and leadership skills were in stark op- for taking care of his men and was de- position to Almond. No sooner had termined never to waste a life if he could the Marines landed at Inchon before help it. Tall, thin, mild-mannered, and Almond began pressuring Smith to gray-haired, Gen Smith looked more like move quickly to recapture Seoul. Yet a professor than a Marine general. Even Smith moved with caution, knowing members of his command dubbed him his two-regiment division would be “the Professor” because of his love for fighting in an unknown urban area. studying military history. He was also He kept his men in good condition known to stand up for what he believed and his units in close proximity to to be right; his feuds with MG Edward one another.4 This action infuriated “Ned” Almond, USA, are ingrained in Almond, who placed speed of maneu- Marine Corps history.1 There was argu- ver above all else. ably not a better man to lead the Marine Regardless, Smith’s caution was Corps in Korea than Gen Smith. well founded. Enemy resistance across Gen Smith was commissioned as the Han River was intense and in- a second lieutenant in the Marines in creased as the Marines moved closer 1917, soon after the United States en- MajGen O.P. Smith. (DOD photo (USMC) A88898.) to Seoul. The North Koreans soon

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 17 IDEAS & ISSUES (ESPRIT)

switched from delaying tactics to de- fending to the last man. But Smith utilized close air support from two Marine F4U Corsair squadrons that arrived at the newly captured Kimpo Airfield to help dislodge the North Koreans.5 In spite of this support, the Marines had to fight fiercely just to make it to the streets of Seoul. After the 1st Marine Division and elements of the Army’s 7th Division recaptured Seoul, Gen Smith was still wary of bringing in the South Korean government officials so soon after the battle. Even as GEN Mac- Arthur brought President Syngman Rhee and his entourage back into Seoul, Gen Smith took safety precau- tions. He positioned two Marine bat- talions along the route the dignitaries would take and around the palace, although out of sight.6 Thankfully, the Marine units were not called upon to defend against an attack on the dignitaries. Yet, Gen Smith made sure his units were ready, just in MajGen Smith presented Col Edward W. Snedecker the Legion of Merit (2nd Award) in Janu- case. The caution and well-calculated ary 1951. (National Archives photo (USMC) 127-N-A5897.) moves of Gen Smith were a constant annoyance to Almond. Regardless, Gen Smith, however, did not share out of Yudam-ni the same day, bringing Smith’s actions saved the 1st Marine this mindset. His division moved the division’s equipment and wounded Division time and time again. northwest from Hungnam toward along. The Marines were heavily sup- Perhaps no other instance demon- the Changjin Reservoir, an area of ported by squadrons of the 1st MAW strated this fact more than the inci- land known for its harsh terrain and stationed on carriers in the Sea of Ja- dent at the Changjin Reservoir. As the weather. The Marines encountered pan. By 4 December, the 1st Marine X Corps moved from Seoul and raced small numbers of Chinese all along Division reached Hagaru-ri with 1,500 toward the Yalu River, the 1st Marine the way. Thus, Smith did not want casualties.10 However, the division was Division was assigned to spearhead his men to be strung out in such dan- still in good shape as the Marines re- the advance. Almond wanted to ad- gerous terrain while it was unknown mained in proper formation the entire vance as quickly as possible, but Gen whether larger Chinese units were way, concentrating in regimental or bat- Smith did not agree with the strategy. ahead.8 His caution was justified. On talion strength wherever possible. The He advanced with caution, wary of 27 November, lead elements of the 5th Marines had much experience fighting being ambushed while his units were and 7th Marine Regiments encoun- Asian armies in the Pacific and knew spread out. He kept them in close con- tered substantial Chinese units. Gen to keep their perimeters tight during tact with each other and proceeded, Smith pulled his division together and nighttime.11 Such tactics ultimately observing all the military principles formed a defensive position around preserved the division. of advance. This, of course, simply Yudam-ni, east of the reservoir. Soon, It was at Hagaru-ri where Gen Smith frustrated Almond. But Smith was six Chinese divisions slammed into the made a remark to correspondents that unsure of what lay ahead. Even after 1st Marine Division, launching unre- would go down in history: “Gentlemen Chinese units destroyed part of the mitting attacks for days.9 The Marines we are not retreating. We are merely at- Army’s 7th Division, Almond pres- were not the only ones attacked. All tacking in another direction.” In reality, sured the Marines to advance faster.7 across the front, Chinese units were the 1st Marine Division was attacking, It appeared that the X Corps’ com- surrounding and destroying American and it took the Marines two days to mander was turning a blind eye to the and United Nations units. travel the twelve miles to reach Koto- fact that the Chinese were entering the On 1 December, Almond ordered ri, arriving on 7 December. Even so, war. The only thing that seemed to the general withdrawal of X Corps. It Smith chose to fight his way out of matter to Almond was reaching the would be a fighting withdrawal the en- Koto-ri rather than be evacuated by Yalu River. tire way. Gen Smith moved his division Air Force squadrons. He was unwill-

18 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 ing to abandon his vehicles and equip- war’s end on 1 September 1955, he Without a doubt, “the Professor” ment to the Chinese. It was a bold retired from the Marine Corps as a proved to be among the greatest Ma- decision. Nevertheless, Gen Smith lieutenant general. In recognition of rines in all of history. Gen Smith’s at last led his division to Hungnam his numerous combat awards, LtGen outstanding leadership of the 1st after thirteen days of isolation. All the Smith was promoted to the rank of Marine Division in Korea should be division’s equipment and wounded four-star general,14 an honor that was remembered for the rest of time. were brought along, and the Marines— well deserved. though tired—were still in good fight- ing shape. 12 Such unit cohesion in Notes the face of disaster was remarkable. 1. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Over the Sea- Gen Smith deserves great credit for Gen O.P. Smith was one wall: U.S. Marines at Inchon, (Washington, the successful withdrawal of the 1st of the greatest heroes DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 2000). Marine Division. Gen Smith’s foresight and success- of the Korean War. 2. Ibid. ful leadership during the Changjin Reservoir Campaign earned him a 3. Ibid. place in Marine Corps legend. For Gen O.P. Smith was one of the 4. Col Joseph H. Alexander, Battle of the Bar- fighting over half-a-dozen Chinese greatest heroes of the Korean War. In ricades: U.S. Marines in the Recapture of Seoul, divisions while marching his Ma- July 1950, he successfully brought the (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical rines 70 miles in 13 days from the 1st Marine Division to full strength Center, 2000). Changjin Reservoir to Hungnam, so it could execute the Inchon Land- Gen Smith earned the Army Distin- ing on 15 September. His actions in 5. Ibid. guished Service Cross. Before the war the Inchon-Seoul Campaign created was over, Smith continued to lead the strife with the X Corps’ commander, 6. Ibid. 1st Marine Division in the first U.N. yet his caution and foresight earned counteroffensive and defend against him the respect and loyalty of his Ma- 7. James Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War, (New York, NY: William Mor- the Chinese Communist Spring Of- rines. Gen Smith’s leadership skills row and Company, 1988). fensive of 1951. For his heroism and at the Changjin Reservoir brought exceptional service in Korea, Gen the 1st Marine Division out of the 8. Theodore Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: Smith earned the Navy and Army disastrous situation intact and ready The Classic Korean War History, (Dulles, VA: Distinguished Service Medals as to continue fighting for the remainder Potomac Books, 2008). well as the .13 After the of the war. 9. A Short History of the Korean War.

10. Ibid.

11. This Kind of War.

12. A Short History of the Korean War.

13. Staff, “General Oliver P. Smith, USMC,” United States Marine Corps History Division, available at https://www.usmcu.edu.

14. Over the Seawall.

MG Edward M. Almond (center) briefs LtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, 31 October 1950. MajGen Smith is standing behind them. (DOD photo by Cpl Jack Nash, National Archives photo (USA) 111:SC351740.)

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 19 IDEAS & ISSUES (ESPRIT) The OV-10 Versatility personified by Jason Breidenbach & Wayne Breakfield

his picture of a daytime flight of an OV-10A maneuvering through the smoke-filled air >Mr. Breidenbach is an Artist living in Stafford, VA, with his wife, son, and two over Kuwait on 25 February boxers. Since 2005, Jason has developed paintings depicting historical military aviation scenes. Several of Jason’s paintings are included in the Marine Corps T1991 is an image I will never forget. Marine Corps Gazette art collection and have appeared on the covers of the and I saw something that resembled hell. Leatherneck Magazine. His artwork is the centerpiece of the Stafford Armed The flames were so hot I could actu- Services Memorial located at the Stafford County Courthouse. ally sense the heat as we flew by. The impaired visibility forced us to stay >>Mr. Breakfield served two tours with OV-10 Squadrons as an Aerial Observer under the smoke layer, flying closer to and a tour as a Naval Flight Officer with VMO-1 during Operation DESERT STORM. the ground and increasing the risk of He currently works as an Operations Research Analyst at the Operations Analysis being fired upon by Iraqi anti-aircraft Directorate, MCCDC and resides with his wife in Spotsylvania, VA. weapons. The air reeked of partially burned fuel and covered the airplane with a thin oily film as we flew our Roosevelt (CVN-71) en route to Saudi I was a member of the squadron when mission. On this day, just before we Arabia. The next few weeks were busy these orders were received, and it was a took off, we received a message that for the aviators, maintainers, and sup- remarkable time to see the Vietnam-era the aircraft we were to relieve on sta- port personnel. On 27 December, the designed aircraft return to flying combat tion had been shot down. As we flew OV-10s took off and landed in Rota, missions. The OV-10 supported Ma- toward Kuwait, we wondered what , where they began hopscotching rines for over two decades and created happened to our squadron mates who across the Mediterranean Sea with the memories that are worth sharing since had been flying the ill-fated aircraft. first OV-10 arriving in King Abdul Aziz this aircraft has been retired and will What was going on for our Marines airfield in Saudi Arabia on 17 January slowly fade into the distance of history. on the ground? This mission felt like 1991. Less than 48 hours later, VMO-1 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a blur as we coordinated support for flew its first mission in support of ODS. the United States Air Force and Marine the rapidly moving ground forces, let- ting them know what was ahead and making sure air support was available where and when needed. We watched for our fellow Marines and listened for a radio call from the downed crew that never came. We found out later one of our friends was been killed and another captured when they were shot down. It was a flight that still lives with me when I remember the Ma- rines with whom I was privileged to serve with during Operation DESERT STORM (ODS). In November 1990, Marine Observa- tion Squadron One (VMO-1) received orders to support Operation DESERT SHIELD, which meant preparing twelve OV-10 Bronco aircraft and their crews for a trip across the Atlantic. The squad- ron was to embark on the aircraft car- riers USS America (CV-66) and USS “War Horse” by Jason Breidenbach.

20 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 Corps began pressing for a simple and inexpensive fixed-wing aircraft to per- form the airborne forward air controller mission and support counterinsurgency operations. The OV-10A Bronco was the first aircraft specifically designed for counterinsurgency and limited war op- erations. It filled a gap left by jets, which were too fast for most aspects of coun- terinsurgency warfare. The Bronco was designed to be faster than helicopters that were too slow and vulnerable for many missions. This aircraft replaced the venerable but very vulnerable Cessna O-1 Bird Dog, an observation aircraft that had been serving the United States military since 1947. The OV-10A prom- ised to deliver exceptional performance and armament that would completely rewrite the forward air controller (FAC) mission. An Hoa: Capt Calvin A. Lloyd (New Berlin, NY) and 2ndLt Courtney C. Schron (Chagrin Falls, Two Marine Corps majors, K.P. Rice OH) (atop the aircraft) check their OV-10 Bronco Observation Aircraft for possible damage and William H. Beckett, first derived from enemy fire. (Photo by SSgt Bob Jordan, from the Jonathan Abel Collection (COLL/3611), the concept for the OV-10. They had Marine Corps Archives & Special Collections.) served together in a Corsair squadron in 1949 and later became neighbors in then used the mock-up to begin selling Development of the OV-10A offi- Santa Ana, CA, in 1961. The two often the concept to the Armed Forces. Ini- cially began in October 1964. A flying discussed modern aircraft design and tially, they encountered a lack of enthu- prototype was available by July 1965. the apparent trend toward sleek, com- siasm for the idea because their design The initial design was smaller than the plicated, and expensive jets. They sur- did not carry large numbers of weap- production OV-10A, and it had twin mised the military was forgetting that ons or bombs. However, adding that 660-horsepower Garrett-AiResearch tur- close air support was a job better suited kind of weight would have completely boprop engines as well as a one-man crew. for a more conventional aircraft that gone against their design concept of a The prototype carried several passengers could stay close to the troops, fly slowly light aircraft stationed with front-line in a cramped compartment behind the enough, and stay on station for a long troops. Eventually, interest in a light pilot. Following successful tests, require- period of time. They decided the air- combat aircraft arose for a variety of ments were added, including an observer craft needed to be a durable observation reasons. The Marine Corps wanted a as a second crewman, 300 pounds of plane that could find and destroy the small, fixed-wing aircraft for helicopter armor plate around the crew and engines, enemy. They envisioned an aircraft that escort rather than using Army helicopter an increased internal fuel capacity to 250 was faster than helicopters, but slower gunships because of their light weap- gallons, more communications equip- and more versatile than jets, featuring ons. The Air Force was interested in ment, and increased weapons carrying twin turboprop engines. They wanted short takeoff and landing aircraft that capacity to 2,000 pounds. Overall, the the aircraft designed to be simple and could be used for counterinsurgency empty weight of the aircraft increased by easy to maintain. Lastly, the aircraft operations. It also wanted an aircraft 29 percent. Because of the added weight, needed to be capable of operating from suitable for the FAC mission that was the wings were lengthened from 30 to unimproved landing surfaces, allowing less vulnerable and more capable than 40 feet to improve lift, and the engines it to be with troops in combat areas the O-1. Lastly, a need arose for an air- were increased to 715 horse power. After giving combat battalions access to their craft that could be cheaply produced incorporating the new design require- own air assets. for emerging nations. Robert S. McNa- ments, the first production OV-10A was After contemplating the design mara’s Department of Defense settled delivered in June 1967. Of the 271 OV- characteristics of the aircraft, the two on trying to fulfill all requirements 10As produced, 157 were delivered to men decided to build a fiberglass mock- with a single aircraft. In March 1963, the Air Force, and 114 were delivered up. They assembled a full-size mock-up eleven companies presented designs for a to the Marine Corps. The production as much as possible within the limita- light armed reconnaissance aircraft. The OV-10A was capable of being operated tions of the space provided by Rice’s North American Columbus Division from rough clearings, primitive roads garage, which prevented them from NA-300 won the contract with their and waterways, prepared runways, and attaching the wings. Rice and Beckett submission of the OV-10 Bronco. aircraft carriers.

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 21 IDEAS & ISSUES (ESPRIT)

The twin boom design of the easily rolled over the runway’s hills and Three Marine Corps VMOs flew OV-10A was reminiscent of the P-38 valleys. the OV-10A in Vietnam. VMO-2 was Lightning, with a large fuselage section Performance of the OV-10A was the first to receive the Bronco in July hanging from the main wing between outstanding. Rather than cruising at 1968 and operated the aircraft from the booms. The cockpit in the middle 1,000 feet like the O-1 Birdog, the OV- the Marble Mountain airstrip near Da fuselage section was set well ahead of 10A cruised out of the range of small Nang. VMO-1 began operating the air- the engines for superior visibility. Along arms at 3,500 feet.To get a closer look, craft in October 1968, and VMO-6 with the high horizontal stabilizer con- Bronco pilots dove to observe suspected operated the OV-10A from Quang-Tri necting the two booms, this section enemy locations and then used the air- but was soon withdrawn and eventually worked well for dropping cargo and craft’s power to return to 3,500 feet. disestablished in January 1977. During paratroopers from a removable hinged Maneuverability was also exceptional; the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps door in the rear. The twin boom de- pilots enjoyed a turn radius that was used the OV-10A Bronco to perform sign aligned the tail surfaces with the so tight a 360-degree turn could be almost every role for which it had been engine’s prop blast. This provided maxi- completed within the confines of a large designed, including as a FAC, radio re- mum directional control during takeoff sports stadium. In spite of the increased lay station, artillery spotter, helicopter from unimproved surfaces, even with level of complexity of the OV-10A in escort, visual reconnaissance, convoy only one engine. The OV-10A was suf- comparison to the O-1, the aircraft escort, and attack aircraft. It performed ficiently rugged and designed to with- did not present a serious increase to every aspect of its mission profile as well stand jet fighter load factors of eight overall maintenance needs. True to or better than anticipated. In addition to Gs. Cargo bay volume was 75 to 110 Beckett and Rice’s original concept, the four M60 machine guns, the normal cubic feet with a maximum weight of the OV-10A was designed to live with Marine Corps load out was four rocket 3,200 pounds. In addition to the 2,000 the troops. pods; two were filled with 5-inch Zuni pounds of external weapons carrying In 1968, when the United States was white phosphorus rockets for marking capacity, the aircraft was armed with heavily involved in Vietnam, the first targets and the other two with 2.75- four M60 7.62mm machine guns and Air Force Broncos arrived as part of inch, folding-fin, high-explosive rockets 500 rounds for each gun. Ordnance for an evaluation called Operation COM- for attacking targets. the OV-10A included bombs, 2.75-inch BAT BRONCO. After the evaluation was The Navy also had tremendous suc- and 5-inch rocket pods, heat-seeking completed, the OV-10A was deployed cess with the OV-10A. One of the more missiles, and 20mm gun pods. The to the 19th Tactical Air Support Squad- famous Navy squadrons to use the OV- landing gear also handled rugged ter- ron (TASS) at Ben Hoa and the 20th 10A was the Short/Vertical Takeoff and rain and enabled the aircraft to oper- TASS at Da Nang. The 23rd TASS per- Landing Light Attack Squadron Four ate from unimproved surfaces. To test formed special operations missions with (VAL-4). They became known as the that capability, a runway was built that the OV-10A from Nakhom Phanom, Black Ponies. VAL-4 began combat op- looked like curving waves. The OV-10A Thailand. erations on 19 April 1969, flying air sup- port for the mobile riverine force in the Mekong Delta and supporting the Navy SEALs. The squadron performed patrol, overhead air cover, scramble alert, and gunfire and artillery spotting. In Vietnam, the Bronco’s capabili- ties allowed it to do what the Services needed and thwarted enemy troops. The enemy in Vietnam learned it was a mis- take to open fire on an OV-10 because doing so would only bring bombs and rockets from an unseen fighter bomber waiting for a target. Pilots were pro- hibited from firing on targets unless the enemy fired first. To confront the frustration of not being able to shoot at the enemy, pilots sometimes went great lengths to get the enemy to shoot. Gordon Evans, a Marine first lieuten- ant in 1971, remembers flying a patrol twenty miles west of Da Nang when VMO-2, MAG-13 (Fwd) King Abdul Aziz Air Base, Saudi Arabia. The only Battle Broncos not he spotted a group of about ten North flying missions at the time, February 1991. (Photo by Capt W.L. Kramer, Aerial Observer.) Vietnamese soldiers lined up on a dike.

22 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 He made a close pass to get them to Gunship. The large cargo area proved crews, the OV-10s were there. When a fire—nothing. He went around again, ideal for carrying the ammunition for division command post exercise needed “They just didn’t pay me any mind,” the M-197. The underwing hard points an airborne radio relay, they called for Evans says, “They knew what was go- were also modified for carrying fuel. the OV-10. When a recon battalion or ing on. So I went around to make still The Marine Corps was satisfied with the ANGLICO needed to keep their jump another pass, real slow. My backseater new aircraft, but still sought improve- quals current, the OV-10 squadrons got agitated and said, ‘I don’t think this ments. The engines were upgraded to were called upon. When an infantry is a good idea. We’re gonna get hosed.’” Garrett T76-G-420/421s, each produc- battalion deployed to Twentynine Palms But there was still no fire from the men ing 1,040 shaft horse power. Improve- for a combined arms exercise (CAX), on the dike. “I was all of 24, bullet- ments to the electronics and avionics an OV-10 detachment was there to lead proof, and knew everything,” he says, were also made, and the gun turret was the way. The OV-10 squadrons sup- “I dropped my gear and my flaps, put eliminated because of budget limita- ported nine CAXs per year to include all the lights on in the airplane—this tions. In 1978, eighteen OV-10A’s were the Reserve CAX. The OV-10s even is daytime—and went by in a landing converted to the OV-10D. Eight aircraft embarked on LHAs to support amphibi- configuration” to make the best possible were delivered to VMO-1 and nine were ous operations on the West Coast and in target. Evans finally elicited a response, delivered to VMO-2. One aircraft re- Europe. If the Marines went, the VMO “Several guys on the dike pulled down mained with North American Rockwell squadrons were ready to go. In the early their trousers and mooned us.” Overall, for additional testing. The OV-10D gave 1980s, the VMOs started supporting pilots enjoyed the fact they could do a the Marine Corps a truly multi-role air- the counter-narcotics mission by work- significant amount of damage to a target craft. Primary missions included day or ing with law enforcement agencies to before the larger weapons, dropped by night visual/FLIR reconnaissance, FAC, intercept aircraft and maritime craft F-4 Phantoms or other aircraft, were tactical air controller, artillery and naval attempting to smuggle illegal drugs into available. gunfire air spot, helicopter escort, and the United States. The utility of design Two OV-10As from the Marine close-in fire suppression. of the OV-10 enabled it to remain useful Corps OV-10 Night Observation Gun- as the missions changed and the decades ship System program were modified wore on. to include a turreted forward-looking “I was all of 24, bullet- During ODS after flying that first infrared (FLIR) sensor with a co-bore combat mission, VMO-1 provided con- sighted laser target designator and tur- proof, and knew every- tinuous surveillance along the Kuwaiti- reted 20mm M197 gun slaved to the Saudi Arabia border in support of the FLIR aimpoint. The system was tested thing.” 1st and 2d Marine Divisions as well in the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam as other coalition forces. While con- quite effectively. It was able to identify ducting surveillance along the Saudi and successfully attack and sink boat Use in the 70s and 80s Arabian-Kuwaiti border on 29 January targets, taking away a safe haven for the Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 1991, VMO-1 aircraft provided the first Viet Cong in the region. Consequently, the VMO’s supported the three active warning of Iraqi forces massing on the the Vietnam War provided the impetus and one Reserve Marine divisions as border as the Battle of Khafji began. and the testing ground for the utility well as MAWs for a wide variety of ex- The squadron was instrumental in co- of the Bronco as a night observation ercises and operations. VMO-1 was part ordinating close air support for Wild aircraft, but it would be almost ten years of 2d MAW and operated from Marine Eagle—a Marine ground unit in close before the Marines developed the OV- Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, proximity to the Kuwaiti border—en- 10D. NC; VMO-2 operated from MCAS abling it to successfully disengage from Camp Pendleton, CA, as a member of the invading Iraqi force. Once again, OV-10D 3d MAW; and Headquarters and Main- the OV-10 helped Marines complete Working with the OV-10A as a tenance Squadron 36 operated OV-10s their mission. foundation, the Marine Corps sought for the 1st MAW at MCAS Futenma, Then, in late January 1991, Iraqi forc- to develop a relatively cheap night in- Okinawa, Japan. VMO-4 was part of es began igniting oil wells in Kuwait. By terdiction aircraft to spot enemy move- the 4th MAW operating from Naval the end of February, more than 700 oil ments. It started with two aircraft, but Air Station Atlanta, GA. well fires were burning throughout the more were converted in the late seven- The observation squadrons support- oil fields of Kuwait. On 24 February ties. North American Rockwell modi- ed Marines in every clime and place 1991, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions fied two OV-10As with a FLIR and a throughout the two decades between moved into Kuwait toward Kuwait City M-197 20mm gun turret under the Vietnam and ODS. If the helicopter to liberate the country and drive out the fuselage. The nose was lengthened by squadrons were conducting vertical as- Iraqi forces. VMO-1 aircraft continued 30 inches to accommodate the upgrade. saults, the OV-10s were there to provide to provide close support to the Marine The resulting aircraft was designated escort. If a fixed-wing squadron needed divisions, flying under the black smoke as the YOV-10D Night Observation airborne FAC support to train their air- layer generated by the hundreds of oil

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 23 IDEAS & ISSUES (ESPRIT)

liver precision ordnance and employ state-of-the-art technology including electro-optical and infrared sensors, laser-guided munitions (the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System [AP- KWS] II), and encrypted radios and night-vision gear.1 After a series of funding challenges and processing through several possible air- frame candidates, two of a dozen former Marine Corps OV-10D+ models that were previously operated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms were chosen for Operation DRAGON II. The aircraft, upgraded to include such features as glass cockpit, laser guided rockets, and connected to the battlefield network allowing them to acquire, accept, and transfer data, were re-designated as the OV-10G+. The The YOV-10D’s nose was extended 30 inches to accomodate the FLIR turret and its armament OV-10G+ featured the same Garrett sponson was replaced by the flexible 20mm cannon to form the NOGS configuration. (Photo by T76G-420/421 turboprop engines used Hughes Aircraft Company, January 1971.) on the OV-10D, but with four-bladed Hartzell propellers. The OV-10G+ also well fires. Some of the flames rose sev- the crew and are more maneuverable” used an off-the-shelf sensor turret. The eral hundred feet into the air and forced than previously used airframes. The two Bronco crews were able to eliminate aircrews to seek paths through the fires “greenhouse canopy” and the amazing targets through windows and in door- to find positions from which they could nimbleness of the OV-10 was exactly ways, as well as attack fighters taking accomplish the mission. After complet- why CAL FIRE wanted to use it as a cover under roofs and overhangs. The ing a mission in the area where the oil command and control center aircraft Broncos performed like in the wells were burning and returning to during wildland fire operations. The sky for special operations forces hunting King Abdul Aziz airfield, the aircraft OV-10 provides tactical coordination ISIS in . They observed the enemy was covered with a thin layer of oil and with the ground commander, provid- in great detail from altitude, collected fire residue. ing details such as location, movement, intelligence, and hunted the enemy. Al- While the OV-10 was upgraded and spread of the fire. They also direct though this operation was in no way over the years after its introduction in air tankers to their drop points. CAL an indication that the OV-10 would be Vietnam, it was retired shortly after FIRE’s OV-10s have been upgrad- returning to active duty in large num- ODS when the military Services went ed with the avionics and navigation- bers, it did prove the design that began through a force reduction process. This communications systems required to in the 1950s was still able to adapt and aircraft, and the Marines who flew and properly coordinate firefighting assets, perform with absolute relevance in the supported it, provided invaluable sup- and they can loiter over firefighting modern high-tech battlespace. port to the Marines in the two plus de- operations for up to five hours. cades from Vietnam to ODS and were In 2015, Special Operations Com- there to fly missions when the Marines mand brought the Bronco back to life to Notes needed them most. help in the fight against ISIS as part of 1. Robert Doff, “Combat Dragon II Demon- The OV-10, however, has continued an operation called COMBAT DRAGON strates OV-10G+ Bronco Capabilities,” Defense to serve with distinction in various roles, II. Marine Corps Gen James N. Mattis Media Network, (Online: June 2013), available but never far from danger. In California, expressed that using a complex weap- at https://www.defensemedianetwork.com. the OV-10 is being used to fight for- on system like the Air Force F-15E to est fires. The California Department support troops patrolling streets would of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL “amount to overkill.” A concept was FIRE) acquired fifteen OV-10As from developed to acquire the Department of Defense in 1993. an inexpensive, simple, nimble combat The OV-10As were converted to support aircraft capable of long loiter and on- firefighting and provide air crews with call reconnaissance and attack duty, a platform that is “newer, larger, fast- able to operate from austere airfields er, provide a larger field of vision for under primitive conditions and to de-

24 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019

IDEAS & ISSUES (HISTORY) Barriers to Interwar Innovation How to innovate during ambiguous times by MAJ Ryan Dunbar, USA

hen studying the history of warfare, it quickly >MAJ Dunbar is an Engineer Officer currently serving as the Operations Officer for becomes evident that the 20th Engineer Battalion, 36th Engineer Brigade. He deployed to Iraq in 2009, success is determinant in 2012, and most recently to Kuwait in 2017 as the CJTF-Operation uponW the ability to adapt and change INHERENT RESOLVE Engineer Planner. through innovation. This need to identify and exploit change through innovations—such as new technolo- man view of the next war demonstrates of the interwar period was the develop- gies, doctrine, organizations, tactics, that a blended approach, and avoiding ment of sonar, which gave navies the and strategies—gives rise to the idea the traps, leads to successful innovation apparent means of detecting submerged of military revolutions and the revolu- during an interwar period. vessels. This fit nicely into the theory of tions of military affairs. These changes Looking at the British attitude to- how the war would be conducted and confront militaries either during war or ward innovation and change during gave British naval theorist the false sense in peacetime when preparing for some the interwar period, it is evident that of security that no further innovation unknown future war. It is easy to see the they had a preconceived notion of how was required.2 Falling into this trap re- need for innovation and change when the next war would be fought. To that sulted in the lack of further innovation confronted with it directly. However, end, the British evaluated innovations toward submarine or anti-submarine the true difficulty arises when trying against their utility and significance warfare, paving the way for the rise of to innovate and change during the in- in fighting that war rather than their the U-boat threat again in World War terwar periods, when the next conflict utility and significance to warfare in II. is ambiguous and barriers to military general. Innovations in two significant When determining how they wanted innovation are higher. areas clearly fell into this trap: naval to organize to fight the next ground war, Innovation during an interwar period forces in relation to the prominence of the British opposed the employment of routinely falls into the trap of fitting the submarine warfare and the organization a large standing army on the continent innovation into a preconceived notion of of the army. of Europe. The belief was Britain’s allies how the next war will be fought. This would carry the weight of the conflict barrier comes in two forms: How does on the land, supporting the British pur- this innovation enable how I want to suit of a small infantry- and artillery- fight the next war? As well as how does These changes con- based military with the idea of limited this innovation fit into the last war? To front militaries either liability.3 Armored warfare did not fit break this barrier down, innovators need into the mold of limited liability. Since to show how the innovation changes during war or in peace- innovations in mechanization and ar- war rather than fitting it into a pre- mored warfare were dissident with the conceived notion of war. The interwar time when preparing conflict the British wanted to fight, both period between the world wars offers for some unknown fu- political and military channels prevent- examples of countries forced to inno- ed innovations in those fields. Politics vate. A study of the British view of the ture war. withheld the requisite funding to pursue next conflict highlights the dangers of modernization while the leadership in fitting innovations into a preconceived the military stifled the reports and ca- notion of how you want to fight the Broadly, the British view of naval reers of innovative thinkers.4 Because next war. A study of the French view warfare was that U-boat warfare would they ignored innovations that did not of the next conflict demonstrates the not occur because of provisions within fit the desired nature of war, the Brit- dangers of fitting innovation to fight the Treaty of Versailles.1 Additionally, ish faced a conflict they assumed they the last war. Finally, a study of the Ger- one of the relatively new innovations would not fight, were left as the only

26 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 opposition to Germany on the Euro- staff. These studies yielded the view of generally easier because of the lack of pean continent, and lacked the ground the future conflict based on the nature barriers to and appetite for innovation. forces to resist German forces on the of changes caused by innovation in war- It is the innovation during the interwar continent. fare: mobile offensive action supported periods that is truly difficult because While the British focused inno- by mechanized and armored forces.9 innovators find barriers focused on vations on the wrong next war, the The German pursuit of innova- preconceived notions of how the next French focused on innovations that tions in the armored force was not war should be conducted and often are supported winning the last war, fall- merely technological. Based on the ignored or poorly funded as a result. To ing into the second trap of innovating evaluation of the last conflict (static, effectively leverage innovation during during an interwar period. With their prolonged warfare) and the preferred these periods, innovators and militar- nation bearing the brunt of the con- future conflict (decisive, short warfare), ies must realize how the innovations flict in World War I, the French were they realized that technology provided change the nature of warfare and adjust sensitive to the security of their na- the means to conduct warfare the way their technology, doctrine, and orga- tion and adopted a defensive mindset they preferred. However, the decision nizations accordingly. Effective inno- focused on methodical battle to the still needed to be made on what in- vation during an interwar period has detriment of their mechanized and novations to prioritize because of the the potential to set the conditions for armored forces.5 increase in innovations within almost victory early in a conflict, but militar- The French view of a defensive war ies must realize that innovation must focused on how to best fight a defen- continue to occur during the conflict sive battle, similar to their experience in lest they lose those early advantages. World War I. Despite the rise of more The German pursuit of mobile platforms on the battlefield, they innovations in the ar- focused on the idea of static defenses, Notes which led to the rise of the Maginot mored force was not 1. Holger Herwig, “Innovation Ignored, The line.6 Since an armored force is primar- merely technological. Submarine Problem,” in Military Innovation ily an offensive weapon, it did not fit in the Interwar Period, edited by Williamson into the nature of the desired war. As Murray and Allen Millett, (New York, NY: a result, the French generally did not Cambridge University Press, 2009). pursue the development of the doctrine every field of warfare during the inter- for a modern armored and mechanized war period. This is where the analysis 2. Williamson Murray, “The World in Con- flict,” in The Cambridge History of Warfare, force to the extent they should have and of the innovations themselves, and the edited by Geoffrey Parker, (New York, NY: diverted funding and education toward impact those innovations have on the Cambridge University Press, 2005). a defensive strategy.7 While they did nature of warfare, becomes vital and not completely ignore the innovation overcomes the natural traps to innova- 3. Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare,” in of armor on the battlefield, the lack of tion. Based on observations and reports Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, edited funding and education resulted in the from British and Soviet experimenta- by Williamson Murray and Allen Millett, (New misunderstanding of how to best uti- tion with tanks, the Germans realized York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009). lize tanks.8 Because they ignored the the potential for not only maneuver but armored force’s potential for maneuver rapid penetrations and exploitations— 4. Brian Bond and Martin Alexander, “Liddell and the implications of increased ma- both of which were unattainable dur- Hart and De Gaulle: The Doctrines of Lim- 10 ited Liability and Mobile Defense,” in Makers neuver on the nature of warfare, the ing the First World War. This led to of Modern Strategy, From Machiavelli to the French began World War II with a thin both the pursuit of the technological Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, (Princeton, static defensive line and an inadequate innovation as well as the reorganiza- NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); see also maneuver force to react to penetrations. tion of forces and adapting of doctrine Murray, Military Innovation. As a result, they could not counter the and tactics to fit the changing nature of German advances and exploitations. war. As a result, the Germans were the 5. Military Innovation. The Germans evaluated the next best equipped, organized, and trained conflict, and the potential impact of force at the advent of World War II and 6. Makers. innovations on that conflict, entirely achieved sweeping successes in the early differently than the British and French. years of the war, even after the allies had 7. Ibid. Instead of focusing just on the last war time to respond to the surprise invasions 8. Ibid. or just on how they wanted to fight the by Germany. next one, they focused on both while Innovation with respect to warfare is 9. Military Innovation. also evaluating how current innovations necessary for the survival of militaries were changing the nature of warfare. and their countries. While innovation 10. Ibid. They did this through a series of delib- often occurs during conflicts, that in- erate studies conducted by the general novation is mostly reactionary and is

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 27 IDEAS & ISSUES (HISTORY) For Lack of Doctrine ’s failure to develop an amphibious doctrine and the survival of England in 1940 by Justin Williamson

he failure of the German Army to develop an amphibi- ous doctrine in the interwar >Mr. Williamson is a Diplomat with the Department of State and was attending years was a significant cause the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College when he wrote this article. Tof Germany’s defeat in World War II. He has served in Mexico, Spain, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Flush with victory from the subjugation of much of Europe in the summer of 1940, the German Armed Forces, the 13 July, Hitler issued Directive No. 15, about the prospect of a cross-channel in- , appeared to be more than ordering the to begin attacks vasion.4 Field Gerd von Rund- capable of easily conquering England against England.3 Finally, on 16 July, he stedt, Army Group A Commander, felt in 1940. Yet, despite tactical and stra- issued Directive No. 16, which stated it had to be a large bluff to pressure tegic breakthroughs in thinking during his intention to invade England under England into peace.5 the 1930s, the German military never the code name of “See Lowe” or “Sea In accordance with Directive No. 16, seriously considered or planned for a Lion.” None of the Services, especially for any invasion plan to succeed, the seaborne invasion of England prior to the Army and Navy, were enthusiastic Luftwaffe had to gain air superiority 1940. Germany’s failure to do so meant England survived to continue fighting. Despite enormous pressure on Eng- land following ’s surrender on 25 June 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill rallied the nation to fight on and reject ’s peace overtures. Germany, having almost no experi- ence in carrying a war overseas, was faced with the challenge of crossing the English Channel. In November 1939, when Grand , the commander of the , first ordered a study of invading England, the idea seemed preposterous for a land- centric power, and the study languished. When France fell, Germany was con- fronted with the reality that a seaborne invasion of England may be necessary. Originally, -General Alfred Jodl, Deputy Commander of the Weh- rmacht, drew up plans for a continued war with England which held a land- ing and occupation of England as the absolute last resort.1 On both 3 and 12 July, the German Chief of General Staff, General Franz Halder, proposed cross- ing the Channel as if it were a typical river operation, with the Air Force, the Luftwaffe, acting as artillery and the 2 Kriegsmarine acting as engineers. On A German bomber over London, 1940. (Photo by German Air Force.)

28 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 over Southeast England. The Royal Air Force, if not destroyed, would wreak havoc upon any invasion fleet and any German forces that managed to make it ashore. However, from the beginning, the Luftwaffe cooperated very little with the Army, the Heer, or Kriegsmarine. Herman Goering, Reichsmarschall of the Luftwaffe, ignored the Heer and Kriegsmarine’s concerns over the inva- sion, convincing Hitler that his Luft- waffe could win the war alone.6 In devising the new doctrine from scratch, there is no indication that the Wehrmaht paid much attention to the development of amphibious doctrine by Japan or the United States before the war. The Japanese had been practic- ing amphibious operations as early as 1921 and had published their first of- ficial doctrine, Summary of Amphibious A Hawker Hurricane, Sanford, England 2014. (Photo by Adrean Pingstone.) Operations and Operations Defending Against Amphibious Attacks, in 1924.7 “suicidal” because he felt the actual in- ashore. One proposal called for a fleet In the United States, the Marine Corps vasion was “subordinate” to the air and of fast boats with aircraft engines for had also been actively practicing am- naval campaign.11 Next, the Heer called power, and another—fielded by Gott- phibious operations since the 1920s and for ten divisions to land from Rams- fried Feder, the State Secretary of Eco- published its doctrine, Tentative Manual gate to Brighton with a simultaneous nomics—called for a “war crocodile” for Landing Operations, in 1934.8 Previ- landing in Lyme Bay, but the Kriegs- that would be 90 feet long and creep ous German seaborne operations only marine convinced Hitler to cancel this along the sea-bed toward England from consisted of bringing naval troops di- plan.12 Eventually, the final plan called France.14 Scouring Europe for solutions, rectly into port for very limited objec- for eleven divisions in the first wave, Germany found that the large numbers tives. Even the near-disastrous invasion eight in the second wave, and six in of river barges, or phrams, that crowded of Norway in April 1940 failed European rivers would have to be to give the Wehrmacht any real used. These were hardly suitable experience to draw from. The for a seaborne invasion, being flat loss of 6,000 men, several cruis- bottomed, towed, and few having ers among many other ships, and the power necessary to make it many aircraft soured German across the channel. The Wehr - forces on large naval actions and macht needed to only look at the showed how daunting it would of 1915 to be to cross the English Channel see the folly of relying on towed under fire.9 barges moving back and forth to With no experience to draw troop ships; the barges were too upon, the Heer and the Kriegs- slow and often drifted off course, marine fought over the best and they allowed the enemy to course of action on everything 602 Squadron Spitfire 1940. (Official RAF photo.) cut down invaders faster than from night versus dawn landings they could be replaced.15 Plans to the sequence of troop landings. One the third wave. All told, the divisions were modified so the first waves would Heer plan called for a massive dawn were expected to cross the Channel in use self-propelled craft, and later waves assault on the south coast by 25 to 40 six weeks if the Luftwaffe and Kriegs- would rely on the towed phrams.16 The divisions between Dover and Lyme Bay marine could keep the Channel free of Wehrmacht eventually accumulated before then driving on London.10 Hav- interference from the Royal Navy and nearly 4,000 mixed craft of phrams, ing no means to transport that many Royal Air Force (RAF), which was an tugs, motorboats, and large transports.17 divisions nor protect them, the Kriegs- unlikely proposition.13 As planning continued, training marine insisted on a much narrower Without an established doctrine pamphlets were hurriedly written, front and a reduction of the invasion or specialized landing craft, the Weh- and the Heer began trying to devise force, which General Halder considered rmacht had to figure out how to get amphibious tactics. Commanders said

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 29 IDEAS & ISSUES (HISTORY)

they needed at least nine to ten weeks by mid-September.22 All the while, a 6. Peter Fleming, : The Pro- to prepare for an invasion, putting the fi erce air war raged over England as jected Invasion of England in 1940, (New York, earliest date for invasion at 20 Septem- the Luftwaffe attempted to destroy the NY: Simon and Schuster, 1957). ber 1940.18 Field commanders worked RAF as a precondition for invasion as out the precise details of the assault and outlined in Directive No. 16. With the 7. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, concluded that the troops needed to be Luftwaffe failing and a negligible inva- eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Pe- drilled on everything from loading and sion fl eet only slowly coming together, riod, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). unloading equipment to covering fi re, Hitler’s attention, in mid-September disembarking under fi re, a fl exible com- 1940, returned to planning for war 8. Ibid. mand system, and the organization and with Russia, and the invasion—for all expansion of the beachhead.19 Every- practical purposes—was soon called off. 9. Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, thing the Japanese and Americans had The Wehrmacht realized that trying (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1960). practiced in the 1930s, the Germans to develop and learn an amphibious were attempting to develop in weeks. doctrine at the last minute with only 10. Ronald Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion: Ger- Uncharacteristically ambivalent to war a few weeks of preparation was nearly man Plans for the Invasion of England, 1939– plans, some units did not begin train- impossible. 1942, (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1958). ing until mid-August.20 The Germans Without a history of amphibious op- succeeded in making one innovative erations nor an established doctrine, it is 11. Hitler. breakthrough in addressing the need for unsurprising that Germany fl oundered 12. F.H. Hinsley, Hitler’s Strategy, (Cambridge, tank support by developing modifi ed in devising a plan against England. Ger- UK: England University Press, 1951). Panzer IIIs to be lowered into the water many’s failure to recognize the need for close to the beach and crawl ashore for amphibious doctrine, even as war clouds 13. Ronald Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion, (Ox- the immediate support of the troops.21 gathered in the 1930s, allowed Eng- ford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1958). As troubles mounted in preparations, land to survive. Modern commanders the Kriegsmarine and Heer doubted and planners can look at this German 14. Michael Glover, Invasion Scare 1940, (Lon- they could meet their own deadlines experience and learn several lessons. don, UK: Pen and Sword Press, 1990). First, planners must always look at what potential military problems lie on the 15. William R. Griffi ths and Thomas E. Griess, ed., “The Dardanelles and Gallipoli” in The horizon and think about how to tackle GIFTS Great War: Strategies and Tactics of the First them. Second, commanders should not FOR World War, The West Point Military History be so myopic that they fool themselves Series, (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, HIM into thinking they will never have to Inc., 1986). face a scenario they have never faced before. Look at military problems, pos- 16. Taylor, The Breaking Wave, (New York, NY: sible solutions, and the political-military Granada Publishing, 1977). environment and coming up with new doctrines and innovations is essential 17. Robin Prior, When Britain Saved the West: for military leaders to be prepared to The Story of 1940, (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni- GIFTS versity Press, 2015). FOR fi ght the next war. HER 18. Fleming, Operation Sea Lion. Notes 19. The Breaking Wave. 1. Cajus Bekker, Hitler’s Naval War, (New York, NY: Kensington Publishing Corp, 1977). 20. Ibid.

2. Ibid. 21. Peter Chamberlain and Hilary Doyle, The GIFTS Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War 3. Ibid. Two, (New York, NY: Arco Publishing Com- FOR pany, 1978). KIDS 4. Basil Collier, The Defense of the United King- dom, (London, UK: Her Majesty’s Stationary 22. The Defense of the . Offi ce, 1957).

5. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, (New York, NY: Bantam, 1961). HOLIDAY GIFTS AT WWW.MARINESHOP.NET

30 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 If Practicable? Exactly! A leadership lesson from the Gettysburg battlefield by LtCol Timothy E. Grebos, USMCR

Gen Robert E. Lee. (Photo by Julian Vannerson.) Gen Richard S. Ewell. (Photo from National Ar- Gen George G. Meade. (Photo by Matthew Brady.) chives and Records.)

arly on the morning of 1 July sion to join the battle an easy one. Poor Hill, the high ground south of town, 1863, the Army of Northern execution initially blunted the effect of “if practicable.” According to Reardon Virginia began its day’s march, the attacks by Second Corps; however, and Vossler’s account in The Gettysburg continuing the invasion of by late afternoon, all of Lee’s Army was Campaign, June-July 1863, Ewell EPennsylvania. Learning of a fight brew- engaged and Ewell succeeded in driving performed a perfunctory reconnais- ing between LtGen A.P. Hill’s Third the Union and XI Corps back sance of the ground, saw the begin- Corps and what was believed to be a through Gettysburg toward the high nings of a stout defense, and received group of militia, LtGen Richard Ewell ground south of town. reports about possible Union activity steered his Second Corps toward the As the Union right flank fell back behind his left flank. Then, realizing town of Gettysburg. Approaching from through Gettysburg, Lee sent Ewell that he ‘could not bring artillery to the northeast and moving between the another order to attack Cemetery bear’ on the hill ‘and all the troops … Chambersburg Pike and Carlisle Road, Ewell’s corps entered the growing battle at Gettysburg from almost behind the Union line. Although Confederate com- >LtCol Grebos is a Reserve 0602 (Communications Officer) currently serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff-Communications for Headquarters, 4th Marine Logistics mander Gen Robert E. Lee’s orders were Group. He has attended the Advance Joint Professional Military Education course to avoid a general engagement until at the Joint Forces Staff College. He last deployed in 2005 to the Horn of Africa the entire Army could be brought up, in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. LtCol Grebos works full-time as the Ewell’s position on the battlefield—in Foreign Military Sales New Business Team Lead for the F/A-18 Program Office at relation to the ongoing skirmishes across Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD. McPherson’s Ridge—made his deci-

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 31 IDEAS & ISSUES (HISTORY)

were jaded by twelve hours marching of his corps commanders.4 I argue that all too aware men and materiel were in and fighting,’ he decided—against the neither of these views are entirely correct short supply for the Confederacy, and recommendations of his senior sub- and that almost all of the debate sur- conserving his force was certainly one ordinates—not to order an assault.1 rounding Lee’s “if practicable” remark of his top priorities. I argue Lee an- misses his true intent—providing an ticipated that Ewell and his corps were Ewell’s decision not to attack remains extremely important lesson to Marine needed for a future fight and wanted to controversial. Some historians fault leaders. In the context of the Gettysburg communicate to Ewell that he should the discretionary tone of Lee’s order battle, Lee’s order to Ewell is as clear and not expend every last effort in the at- and argue that Lee should have com- direct as any he issued: take the high tack; thus, he added the infamous, “if manded Ewell to attack without leav- ground south of the town. However, practicable,” remark to do so. Regardless ing any question to the order. Others looking at the order in the context of of what Ewell decided as his course of blame Ewell, arguing that Ewell should the overall Gettysburg campaign, Lee’s action, Marine leaders can learn from have recognized the situation and taken “if practicable” remark proves not to be Lee and Ewell the increasing value of the the high ground with or without clear a statement of discretion, but of guid- commander’s guidance on the dynamic orders to do so. Many historians agree ance. Having previously focused solely and fluid modern battlefield. Even with that if the venerable Gen Thomas on the battle, or more specifically on today’s technology, providing com- “Stonewall” Jackson was alive and in the first day of the battle, I too initially manders an unprecedented situational command at Gettysburg, he certainly interpreted Lee’s orders as one that gives awareness of actions at the lowest ech- would have seized the initiative and Ewell latitude—potentially too much elons in their formations, there is often the hill. During a battlefield study of latitude—to decide whether or not to no better person to make the decision Gettysburg Campaign, expertly guided attack the heights of Cemetery Hill. than the Marine in the fight. Leaders by Col Doug Douds, USMC(Ret), a Taking a broader view of the campaign, must give mission orders that clearly professor at the U.S. Army War Col- largely as a result of Col Douds’ unique define an end result desired and provide lege, I had the chance to consider Lee’s and extraordinary approach to under- broad guidance while giving freedom discretionary order to Ewell, the tyr- standing the Gettysburg battle as part of maneuver to the leader closest to the anny of time and distance affecting of Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania and action. Standing on Oak Ridge look- both Ewell and his Union adversaries the larger Confederate strategy, Lee’s “if ing southeast toward Ewell’s approach on Cemetery Hill, and whether another practicable” remark reveals itself as the to Gettysburg and the heights beyond, commander—such as Jackson—might commander’s guidance Lee intended. acutely aware of the early morning, long have made a different decision regarding Lee certainly expected his corps com- march, the hard day of fighting Ewell’s the attack.2 While we may never know manders to exert their discretion in the men had endured, and the uncertain the full effect of Lee’s orders, whether execution of their orders. Experienced enemy situation that lay in front of him, an attack by Ewell would have been leaders recognize that every order is dis- it is certainly easy to understand his successful, or if another commander cretionary to some extent, especially in tactical assessment of the situation and might have chosen a different course the face of the enemy, and Lee was no ultimate decision not to attack. of action than Ewell, there are several doubt an experienced leader. I argue When considering Ewell’s deci- vital lessons that today’s Marine leaders Lee’s “if practicable” comment was in- sion not to attack Cemetery Hill in can learn by critically examining Lee tended to give Ewell guidance regarding the dying light of 1 July, the Marine and Ewell’s dilemma. the extent to which he should expend leader can learn from both the truths Civil War historians have champi- effort and resources to take the heights, and uncertainties as Ewell understood oned a wide spectrum of interpretations given the unfolding circumstances and them. Specifically, modern Marine lead- regarding what Lee meant to communi- what Lee anticipated would happen in ers must remain keenly aware that the cate to Ewell by stating, “if practicable.” the future. forces affecting them on the battlefield, In Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee At the point in the battle, when Lee what Von Clausewitz called “friction,” and the Gettysburg Campaign, Bowden issued his infamous “if practicable” also affect the enemy.5 The unfavor- and Ward claim the phrase was simply order, neither he nor Ewell knew that able truths facing Ewell regarding his a part of Lee’s vernacular as a Southern the growing meeting engagement at own forces undoubtedly influenced his gentlemen, and the order he gave Ewell Gettysburg would be the culminating conclusion to attack Cemetery Hill was was every bit as direct as any order he event in the invasion of Pennsylvania or “not practicable.” His forces were tired issued.3 Conversely, Harry Pfanz argues the importance the heights surrounding after a long march and a day of fighting, in Gettysburg, The First Day, as does Cemetery Hill would be later in the bat- and Ewell knew he would not be able Edwin Coddington in Gettysburg: A tle. Lee wanted Ewell to take the high to get artillery into position to support Study in Command, that Lee’s order was ground, but he wanted Ewell to know it his attack. Ewell gave the Union forces indeed discretionary, and Ewell—as the was not to be taken “at all hazards,” as the benefit of the doubt when assessing man closest to the ground truth of the Col Strong Vincent purportedly ordered his enemy’s ability to reorganize follow- situation—was expected to apply his Col Joshua Chamberlain to hold the ing their chaotic retreat through town. judgment just as Lee expected from any ground at Little Round Top. Lee was While he remained acutely aware of

32 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 the obstacles his forces would have to drives home a final leadership lesson important lessons developing Marine overcome to mount an attack, Ewell from the battlefield at Gettysburg. leaders can take away from a study of conceded to the enemy every advan- In reply to the claim that the first Ewell’s dilemma. Mastering how to give tage in his estimates of their disposition day of Gettysburg would have seen the and receive guidance, how to remain and the status of their defenses. In a Confederates capture Cemetery Hill bold and decisive with the knowledge letter written in January 1878, Union had Jackson been alive and in com- that friction infects both sides of a bat- Gen Winfield Hancock recounts the mand, Col Douds responds, “Yes … but tle, and how to develop subordinates’ battle and paints a picture of chaos and why wasn’t he?” Col Douds’ pourpose understanding of what should be done confusion upon his arrival to Cemetery is not to question the circumstances and why it should be done will prepare Hill. By Hancock’s own admission, a around Jackson’s accidental shooting the Marine Corps leader to face any concerted effort by Ewell’s Confeder- by his own troops, but instead to ques- challenge, on any battlefield. ates at the decisive moment might have tion why Jackson failed to mentor Ewell carried the day. Whether Ewell could and foster in him the same aggressive- have organized an attack at the precise ness and boldness that were the trade- Notes hour that Hancock’s defense floundered marks of Jackson’s victories. Jackson was 1. Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, The Get- remains debatable. What remains cer- duty bound to professionally develop tysburg Campaign, June-July 1863, (Washington, tain—and is the important lesson for his subordinate commanders and had DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, the Marine leader to take away—is that ample opportunity to teach Ewell how 2013). any friction that friendly forces face is to interpret Lee’s orders, how to iden- also affecting the enemy. Recognizing tify and seize tactical advantages, and 2. Col Doug Douds, “MSTP IMA Detachment: that friction affects both friend and foe how to lead as he himself did. As stated Gettysburg Battle Field Tour,” (presentation, Gettysburg, PA, September 2016). provides the Marine leader an opportu- by Col Douds during his tour, there nity to seize the initiative and take bold, should have been nothing keeping Ewell 3. Scott Bowden and Bill Ward, Last Chance decisive action. Historians agree that from being Stonewall Jackson incarnate, for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg had it been the more aggressive Jackson, ready to exploit an earlier victory and Campaign, (El Dorado Hills, CA: Da Capo and not Ewell, in command of Second charge up Cemetery Hill. Marine lead- Press, 2003). Corps, he would have chosen the bold ers must understand the importance of course of action and carried the attack developing subordinates and mastering 4. Henry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg, The First Day, up Cemetery Hill. the techniques to do so. Developing (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Caro- One of the greatest criticisms of Marine leaders must not only learn what lina Press, 2001); and Hedwin B. Coddington, Ewell’s actions on the first day at Get- to do in given situations, but why; it is Gettysburg: A Study in Command, (New York, tysburg was that he did not display the responsibility of the seasoned leader NY: Touchstone, 1997). the initiative that was the hallmark to pass along the lesson. As the title of 5. Carl von Clauzwitz, On War, translation by of his predecessor, Stonewall Jackson. Nathan Fick’s Colby Award winning Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New York, James McPherson writes in Battle Cry autobiography so adroitly articulates, NY: Penguin Books, Inc., 1968). of Freedom, “Had Jackson still lived, he we as Marine leaders are all only one undoubtedly would have found it prac- bullet away from turning over our com- 6. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, ticable. But Ewell was not Jackson.”6 mand.8 We must take every opportunity (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003). Historians agree that Lee’s order to take to prepare our successors to carry on, the hill “if practicable” was well suited armed with the judgment and initiative 7. John C. Frederiksen, “Richard Stoddert to Jackson’s discretion and comfort in required of bold, decisive leadership. Ewell,” in The Encyclopedia of the American reacting to the conditions on the battle- Looking back in hindsight, it is easy Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military His- tory, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne field to achieve the desired result. Ewell, to interpret the events of the first day at T. Heidler, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & in contrast to Jackson, required more the Battle of Gettysburg as a turning Company, 2000). precise instructions than Lee was ac- point in the Civil War. It is equally as customed to issuing. Ewell served un- easy to point to Ewell’s failure to take 8. Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Mak- der Jackson from January 1862 until Cemetery Hill as the seminal event of ing of a Marine Officer, (Boston, MA: Mariner Jackson’s death in May 1863; yet, there the first day’s fighting and the cause of Books, September 2006). is little evidence that Jackson shaped the ultimate Confederate defeat. How- Ewell’s perspective as a commander. Ac- ever, a thorough analysis of the Gettys- cording to Frederiksen’s article on Ewell burg battle, the Gettysburg campaign, in The Encyclopedia of the American Civil and the Civil War presents a myriad of War: A Political, Social, and Military perspectives that counter this simplistic History, Ewell often complained about view of events. While the debate sur- Jackson keeping him uniformed about rounding Ewell’s failure to take Cem- his plans.7 In analyzing the relationship etery Hill will probably never be settled, between Jackson and Ewell, Col Douds there can be no debate regarding the

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 33 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS) Getting Back Into the “Cold Weather Business” How the Marine Corps can best prepare to fight and win in cold regions by Zsofia Budai

recognizes this as a problem and has taken significant steps to address the “The ascendant threats posed by revisionist powers issue. Nonetheless, more must be done and rogue states require change—we must become if the Corps is to succeed in a cold- weather conflict as part of the joint more lethal, resilient and as a consequence, a more force. As Gen David Berger, who re- capable deterrent.” cently assumed command as the 38th Commandant, continues to review his —Gen Robert Neller, priorities for the Corps, he must take 1 into consideration the kind of specific 37th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, 2018 climatic challenges that a conflict with Russia or even China would entail. The Marine Corps should re-evaluate its cold-weather training objectives and “Our goal [as the Marine Corps] will always be not practices, strengthen its presence in Europe, and better address cold-weather merely to meet new and emerging threats, but to capability gaps and shortfalls. maintain a margin of overmatch over potential adver- “Frozen Troops Can’t Fight”:4 The Im- saries.” portance of Cold-Weather Operations Operating in cold regions poses a —Gen David H. Berger, 5 2 unique challenge for the military. The 38th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, 2019 myriad of difficulties that arise when temperatures consistently dip (and stay) below freezing are well documented in s the Nation’s forward de- distinct from the one that conducted both historical context and contempo- ployed, rapid response force, counterinsurgency operations in Iraq rary cold-weather training. The cold, the Marine Corps must be and Afghanistan—not least because snow, and terrain hamper mechanized prepared to address any the former nations are characterized and armored vehicles; dismounted threatA to the security of the United by an entirely different climate and movement is slow and requires profi- States and its allies. The 2018 National topography. ciency on skis and snowshoes. Special- Defense Strategy clearly identifies Russia Today, the Marine Corps is still ized gear is necessary for both mobil- and China as “the central challenge[s] to inadequately organized, trained, and ity and basic survival, and practicing U.S. prosperity and security”3 and thus resourced to fight in cold-weather en- good cold-weather hygiene can mean provides the strategic-level guidance for vironments. However, its leadership the difference between life and death allocating resources and planning for the future. Deterring and, if necessary, defending against Russian or Chinese >Ms. Budai was a Department of State student at the Marine Corps Command aggression requires the Marine Corps and Staff College academic year 2018–19. She is currently serving in the Policy to develop a force that is significantly Section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

34 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 importance and difficulty of fighting in cold-weather and mountainous re- gions, warning that “much institutional knowledge has been lost.”13 Putting doctrine and directives into practice, the Marine Corps has renewed its focus on cold-weather training and exercises at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC) near Bridgeport, CA, which has an an- nual throughput of 6000-plus person- nel,14 and at other DOD installations, such as Exercise ULLR SHIELD in 2018, which allowed an aviation unit to test its aircraft in the extreme cold of Fort McCoy, WI.15 Perhaps even more sig- nificant, the Marine Corps deployed its first rotational unit to Norway in early 2017; Marine Rotational Force-Europe has subsequently grown to 700 Marines Marines from 1st Bn, 6th Marines during training at MCMWTC. (Photo by PFC Christy Yost.) and participates in a variety of training and exercises with NATO allies and (or at least frostbite) during extended has unfortunately deteriorated over partners. Indeed, the Marine Corps’ periods spent outside. Both the cold the years.9 Defending the American entire focus in Europe has shifted to the temperature and terrain significantly homeland and American allies requires Arctic and high north, with the termi- slow down all aspects of combat power, being able to operate effectively in cold- nation of the Black Sea Rotational Force including maneuver, fires, sustainment, weather, in both defensive and offensive in late 2018 and the progression of the and command and control. None of this positions. If an adversary knows that relationships the Corps has cultivated means that military operations in cold the United States and its allies are ill with the Norwegian Armed Forces since regions are impossible—indeed, coun- prepared to fight in cold-weather or on the 1960s.16 tries such as Norway have effectively mountainous terrain, it can (and will) used the climate and topography to their exploit this deficiency to its advantage. Building a Cold Weather–Capable advantage—but it does mean that the Fighting Force: Recommendations Marine Corps must train differently The “Cold Weather Business” for the Marine Corps than it has thus far in the post-Cold Early in 2018, Gen Neller acknowl- Despite these significant steps for- War era.6 edged, “We haven’t been in the cold- ward, the Marine Corps must continue The National Defense Strategy weather business for a while.”10 Fortu- to re-evaluate how it prepares to fight states, “The surest way to prevent war nately, under his leadership, the Marine and win in cold-weather environments, is to be prepared to win one.”7 Heeding Corps made significant progress toward including on the territory of allied na- this directive is especially critical when reintegrating cold-weather consider- tions. The recommendations below considering the capabilities of near-peer ations at the strategic, operational, and reinforce the former and current Com- adversaries. As Gen Berger put it in tactical levels. The Marine Corps Task mandant’s vision for a more lethal and his prepared statement for his Senate List emphasizes the need “to conduct resilient force, one that can credibly Armed Services Committee testimony, combat operations as a component of a deter and defend against adversaries Strategically our goal is to win before MAGTF or other task force in moun- in harsh climates. fighting—to conventionally deter our tainous, high altitude, and cold weather First, the Marine Corps should competitors from taking actions that environments,” arguing that such opera- reexamine its cold-weather training … threaten our national interests … tions “require specialized warfighting objectives and practices. Although the Because we cannot predict the nature doctrine, training, and equipment.”11 throughput of MCMWTC is impres- of that conflict or crisis, we must be Then-CMC Gen Neller directed the sive, the Marine Corps should reassess prepared to handle any threat, any- Marine Corps to maintain a number whether quantity or quality is the ulti- where, anytime.8 of cold weather–capable infantry bat- mate goal. The focus should be on the In order to maintain a credible deter- talions, and a Cold Weather Metrics latter. Maintaining cold weather–ca- rent force that will effectively dissuade Working Group was established to cre- pable units requires continuous train- potential enemies from initiating or es- ate unit readiness standards for cold- ing because the human body quickly calating conflict, the United States must weather operations.12 Recent doctrinal loses its ability to operate in the cold rebuild its military dominance, which publications also highlight both the and at high altitudes once removed

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 35 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS)

from that environment. Several cold weather–capable infantry battalions will be sufficient, as long as those bat- talions consistently train and exercise for the cold. The Marine Corps should also take greater advantage of the fa- cilities and expertise offered by other Services; fighting as a joint force in the cold requires training as a joint force in the cold. Alaska has a climate and topography similar to that of Scandi- navia, providing an excellent train- ing ground for exercises that involve amphibious landings to secure islands or beachheads during a winter storm. (Interestingly, Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska recently suggested that Gen Berger consider building up the Ma- rine Corps’ presence in his home state Marines from 8th Engineer Support Battalion conducted training at Skjold Leir, Norway, in in order to better prepare Marines for 2019. (Photo by LCpl Larisa Chavez.) cold-weather operations.)17 Second, the Marine Corps should high-altitude proficiency by working improvement often come from those strengthen its presence in Europe. together with these soldiers in their nations that have a long history of spe- The rotational unit in Norway should home countries, adapting both plan- cializing in cold-weather operations. include all elements of a MAGTF— ning and operational considerations for Fortunately, the Security of Supply command, ground, aviation, and lo- the benefit of the Marine Corps (and, Arrangements that the United States gistics—to provide for more effective indeed, the entire joint force). maintains with a number of allies and training based on real-life scenarios. If Third, the Marine Corps should bet- partners also provides for the mutual a crisis were to occur, having a MAGTF ter identify and address cold-weather supply of defense goods and services, al- in theater would allow for a much faster capability gaps and shortfalls. Cold- lowing the DOD to integrate technolo- and more effective response, as that weather equipment and gear must be gies produced abroad.20 The Marine particular unit would already be well constantly tested and re-evaluated; what Corps should take advantage of what integrated with host-nation and other works in wet cold does not necessar- countries such as Norway and Finland NATO forces. Overall, II MEF should ily work in extreme cold. Once again, have to offer for survivability and lethal- send more units to NATO and national cooperation with allies is critical: the ity in the cold. The defense acquisitions exercises in Europe to forge relationships best observations and suggestions for process is slow and cumbersome, but it and increase interoperability. This is critical because NATO members must be able to fight and win together de- spite differences in doctrine, equipment, and tactics. The Marine Corps should better integrate with the U.S. Army, which maintains a strong presence in Germany and Poland and exercises in these and other countries year-round. Sweden and Finland—key NATO partners—also offer opportunities for training.18 Marines have participated in their national exercises in recent years and should continue to do so, especially in the winter months.19 As is the case in Norway, these nations’ armed forces maintain a high degree of cold-weather readiness simply because they must; that is the environment in which they live and train. Consequently, Marines can 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Marines trained with the Norwegian Coastal Ranger Com- gain a great deal of cold-weather and mando in May 2019. (Photo by Sgt Tayler Schwamb.)

36 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 must be adapted to meet the needs of on Armed Services, (Washington, DC: April to Mountain Warfare Operations, (Washington, a Marine Corps ready to address 21st 2019). DC: April 2018); Headquarters Marine Corps, century security challenges. MCRP 12-10A.2/3-35.1B Mountain Leader’s 3. U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of Guide to Winter Operations, (Washington, Conclusion the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United DC: April 2018); Headquarters Marine Corps, States of America, (Washington, DC: 2018). MCRP 12-10A.3/3-35.1C Mountain Leader’s Preparing the Marine Corps for Guide to Mountain Warfare Operations, (Wash- cold-weather operations will be nei- 4. Jon T. Hoffman, Chesty: The Story of Lieuten- ington, DC: April 2018); Headquarters Marine ther cheap nor easy, but U.S. defense ant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC, (New York, Corps, Cold Region Operations; Headquarters priorities are clear: addressing the threat NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2001). Marine Corps, MCRP 12-10A.5/3-35.1E, Spe- from revisionist powers “requires both cial Forces Use of Pack Animals, (April 2018); increased and sustained investment.”21 5. Doctrinally defined as “any region where and Mountain-General Intelligence Requirements Conducting more cold-weather training cold temperatures, unique terrain, and snowfall Handbook. and procuring more gear and equipment significantly affect military operations for one will require cuts elsewhere, especially month or more each year.” See Headquarters, 14. Note that the figure includes personnel from in an uncertain budget environment. Department of the Army, and Headquarters sister Services and allied and partner nations. Fortunately, the European Deterrence Marine Corps, ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 12-10A, “Presentation for Command and Staff College.” Cold Region Operations, (Washington, DC: De- Initiative—which stands at $6.5 billion partment of the Army, January 2011). 15. Ken Chamberlain, “Fort McCoy Might Be for fiscal year 2019, with a request for Cold, but Training for These Marines Goes $5.9 billion for fiscal year 2020—is able 6. See, for example, UD6-81-1E, Instruction in On,” Marine Corps Times, (Arlington, VA: to support rotational forces and perhaps Winter Service, Winter Conditions, Leadership January 2018). more in the European Command area and Training, Norwegian Army Land Warfare of responsibility.22 The cost of failing Center, (Rena, NOR: October 2013). 16. Shawn Snow, “No More Marine Rotations to prepare for cold-weather conflict is to the Black Sea: The Corps is Focusing Here inexcusably high; adversaries will be 7. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy Instead,” Marine Corps Times, (Arlington, VA: ready to exploit these weaknesses to of the United States of America. November 2018). Note that the Marine Corps their advantage, especially if they are retains Special Purpose MAGTF–Crisis Re- 8. Statement of General Robert B. Neller, Com- sponse–Africa in Spain, but it is focused on well trained for the cold. mandant of the Marine Corps, before the House the African continent. The Marine Corps has been forced Appropriations Committee-Defense On the Posture to innovate and adapt to a changing of the United States Marine Corps, U.S. House of 17. Gina Harkins, “Senator Who Held Up threat environment many times over the Representatives Document Repository, (Online: Berger’s Confirmation Wants Marines Based course of its history; there is no doubt March 2018), available at docs.house.gov. in Alaska,” Military Times, (Online: July 2019), that it will be able to relearn how to fight available at https://www.military.com. and win in cold-weather environments. 9. Aaron Mehta, “A ‘Crisis of National Security’: By renewing its focus on cold-weather New Report to Congress Sounds Alarm,” De- 18. The U.S. Army rotational armored brigade training, deploying additional Marines fense News, (Washington, DC: November 2018). combat teams are headquartered in Poland; to northern Europe, participating in the Army also maintains a sizeable presence exercises with allies experienced with 10. Center for Strategic and International Stud- in Germany, including the U.S. Army Europe ies, “Discussion with Gen Robert B. Neller, headquarters in Wiesbaden and the 2nd Cavalry cold-weather, and procuring the neces- Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps,” You- Regiment in Vilseck. sary gear and equipment to succeed in Tube video, 1:03:52, (Online: January 2018), the cold, the Marine Corps will prove available at https://www.youtube.com. 19. Marines participated in Swedish Exercise once again that it is prepared to take AURORA in 2017 and Finnish Exercise ARROW on America’s adversaries as part of the 11. U.S. Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) in 2018. joint force. Branch, MCTL-2.0, Marine Corps Task List, (Quantico, VA: April 2017). 20. Jen Judson, “US, Norway Officially Enter Arrangement to Share Supplies for National Notes 12. Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Train- Security,” Defense News, (Washington, DC: ing Center, “Presentation for Command and April 2018). See also Department of Defense 1. Statement of General Robert B. Neller, Com- Staff College,” (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps (Industrial Policy), Security of Supply, (Wash- mandant of the Marine Corps, before the House University, January 2019). ington, DC: October 2018). Appropriations Committee-Defense On the Posture of the United States Marine Corps, U.S. House of 13. Cold Region Operations. Other doctrinal 21. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strat- Representatives Document Repository, (Online: publications that address cold-weather and/or egy of the United States of America. March 2018), available at docs.house.gov. mountain warfare operations include the fol- lowing: Headquarters Marine Corps, MCTP 22. Department of Defense, European Deter- 2. Senate Armed Services Committee Advance 12-10A/MCWP 3-35.1, Mountain Warfare rence Initiative, (Washington, DC: February Policy Questions for Lieutenant General David Operations, (Washington, DC: February 2018). Berger, USMC Nominee for Appointment to the 2014); Headquarters Marine Corps , MCRP Grade of General and to be Commandant of the 12-10A.1/3-35.1A, Small Unit Leaders Guide Marine Corps, United States Senate Committee

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 37 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS) Arctic Riverine Operations A skill the Russians are focused on by LTC Lester W. Grau, USA (Ret)

obility in the Arctic is ports east). Once there, the metals are frequently accomplished reloaded onto railroad cars and moved by tracked vehicle, hov- >Dr. Grau is the Research Director, to waiting factories throughout Russia ercraft, or boat. In the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort or sold to international customers. Mwinter, when the ground and lakes are Leavenworth, KS. frozen, vehicles with wide tracks and Protecting the Arctic high clearance are optimal for moving The Russian Federation recognizes over the terrain. In the summer, the arsenic, cadmium, lead, selenium, zinc, the importance of the Arctic and North- ground thaws, and tracked vehicles and coal. The Norilsk mines produce ern Sea Passage. The Northern Sea Fleet quickly tear up the fragile ground cover 17 percent of the world’s nickel and and its subordinate 14th Army Corps and create large mud scrapes and pits, 41 percent of the world’s palladium. and Aerospace Forces (air defense and hindering mobility. Consequently, in The production of Norilsk nickel alone air force) units are responsible for de- the summer, small and large vessels are provides two percent of Russia’s GDP.2 fending most of this vast area.3 Ground optimal for moving and maneuvering Norilsk smelters turn the ores into met- combat forces include the 200th Sepa- troops and supplies. The Russian Arctic als before shipment. rate Coastal Defense Motorized Rifle boundary is 24,140 kilometers long.1 Norilsk gets its goods to market by Brigade, the 80th Arctic Motorized The mighty rivers, the Northern Dvina, moving them over 80 kilometers of Rifle Brigade, and the 61st Naval In- Mezen’, Pechora, Ob’, Yenisei, Lena, single-track railroad to the all-weather fantry Brigade. Airborne units from Indigirka, and Kolyma, flow north- river port of Dudinka on the Yenisei the 98th Guards Airborne Division ward to empty into the Arctic Ocean. River. Cranes load the metals onboard and Northern Fleet Spetsnaz units are Economically, the most important of ships and barges, which sail north on the frequent participants in joint and com- these is the Yenisei. The Yenisei, the Yenisei to the Arctic Ocean, turn west, bined exercises. This time, however, a world’s sixth-largest river, flows some and then proceed to the major Arctic company from the 106th Guards Air- 100 kilometers to the west of the Rus- port of Murmansk (or international borne Division participated. sian industrial city of Norilsk. Norilsk is a large inland Arctic city, located 500 kilometers (310 miles) from the North Pole. Temperatures get down to -50 degrees Centigrade (-58 degrees Farenheit), and its average annual tem- perature is -10 Centigrade (14 degrees Fahrenheit). Polar nights extend for two months over the city. The cold period extends for some 280 days a year. Norilsk is also one of the most polluted spots on the planet. No roads or railroads join Norilsk to other cities, and the only way for people to travel to other cities is by aircraft. What keeps the 173,000 residents of Norilsk there? Norilsk is sitting on top of the planet’s largest known deposits of nickel, cop- per, and palladium and also has sig- nificant deposits of cobalt, platinum, Map 1. (Map by Charles K. Bartles, Foreign Military Studies Office.)

38 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 The 200th Separate Coastal De- fense Motorized Rifle Brigade is a vet- eran Arctic unit. It was formed from the 131st Motorized Rifle Division in 1997 and became a Coastal Defense unit of the Northern Fleet in 2012. It is headquartered in Pechenga and has a primary mission of defending the port of Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula. The 61st Naval Infantry Brigade has been stationed at the military garrison town of Sputnik since 1966 and upgraded from a regiment to a brigade over the past two years. It serves as an amphibi- ous assault force and a coastal defense force for the Northern Fleet, an opera- tional command on equal footing with Russia’s four military districts. The 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade is the newcomer. It was formed in 2015 and stationed at Alakurtii. Its mission Fire preparation from Severomorsk on the Yenisei River. (Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense/ is to control the territory between Mur- http://mil.ru/.) mansk and the New Siberian Island and cooperate in operations with units of warship (Udaloy-1 Destroyer Class) tactical exercise, we set about devising the Airborne Forces and Northern Fleet Severomorsk; landing ships (Ropucha the exercise scenario, which was sub- Naval Infantry.4 All three brigades are Class) Kondopoga, Aleksandr Otrakovs- sequently refined and clarified during located on the Kola Peninsula close to kiy, and Georgiy Pobedonosets; and sup- reconnaissance of the maneuver area. the Finnish and Norwegian borders. port vessels including the tanker Sergey We also conducted meticulous plan- In 2015, the 80th Separate Arctic Mo- Osipov, the rescue tug Pamir, and the ning for our operations in the river torized Rifle Brigade embarked on a mooring lighter KIL-164. These ships port of Dudinka and in the vicinity three-month Arctic Ocean cruise which and vessels sailed some 1,900 nautical of the Yergalakh Water Intake Station, included a riverine landing at Dudin- miles in transit from the Arctic port some 10 kilometers south of Noril’sk. ka, a movement to Norilisk, and three of Severomorsk. The Norilsk airport During this period the smallest details relating to collaboration were coordi- amphibious and air assault landings at runway was being renovated at the time, nated with the administration of the various Arctic islands. In August 2017, so all equipment and supplies arrived 5 Noril’sk Industrial Region, and all the Northern Fleet conducted another by maritime transport. issues relating to the preparation and Riverine exercise at Dudinka. The 14th Army Corps was responsi- equipping of the exercise areas were ble for preparing the force for the ground agreed upon. Schematics and drawings Preparation for the August 2017 Ex- portion of the exercise. The Army Corps of the facilities that were to be built ercise was organized in the spring of 2017. were made available to them.7 This exercise was larger than the Colonel Magomedali Magomedzhanov, 2015 exercise, involving almost twice Chief of the 14th Army Corps Com- In mid-July, a naval support team the number of personnel and combat bat Training Department, conducted sailed to Dudinka aboard the Russian equipment while—for the first time— extensive command and staff training Navy’s large maritime transport (Project employing self-propelled and rocket ar- exercises involving the Separate 200th 550M ice-class passenger/cargo ship) tillery. Northern Fleet ships and sup- and 80th Motorized Rifle Brigades and Yauza. The bulk freighter carried the port vessels, ground troops and naval participation in a performance-graded motor transport group’s equipment for infantry subunits, Northern Fleet Naval command staff training exercise for hauling gear, accessories, supplies and Aviation, and airborne subunits from Northern Fleet mixed forces.6 materiel, communications equipment, the Central Military District took part The bulk of the preparation for the and other facilities and equipment. Pas- in this exercise. Two thousand service- ground exercise fell on the command- sage to the exercise area took a week. men and 200 major military systems, er of the ground component, Colonel The Yauza delivered the rest of the gear including Su-24 bombers, wheeled and Aleksandr Bezborodov, Commander of on a second trip. The Northern Fleet tracked fighting vehicles, and the Grad the Northern Fleet’s 80th Separate Arc- Sailors and local workers constructed multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), tic Motorized Rifle Brigade. He noted, roads, earthworks, and structures in two deployed during the exercise. The naval On being instructed to prepare for sectors approximately 150 kilometers support included large antisubmarine an inter-service battalion task force apart. Local authorities from Dudinka,

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the city of Nikel, and the Norilsk Nikel sance airbase at Olenogorsk (about River beach. The exercise combat phase Mining and Metallurgical Complex re- 100 kilometers from Murmansk). The began on 21 August. According to exer- solved any arising problems. vehicles were moved by rail to the am- cise play, terrorists had mined the shore The result of all this effort was the phibious warfare ship’s embarkation in the vicinity of Dudinka and captured construction of an encampment accom- points. The paratroopers learned how an important industrial facility. A joint modating 1,000 men, a food and issue to load their vehicles for shipborne trans- force of Northern Fleet forces supported supply point, and a vehicle park. Exer- port and conduct a riverine assault as by aviation and Spetsnaz of the Cen- cise lanes for live fire tactical exercises they joined the assault task force before tral Joint Strategic Command was in- were completed on schedule both in the embarkation. An amphibious assault structed to retake the facility in order Dudinka port, where an amphibious company, reconnaissance platoon, and to support the amphibious assault force assault force landing was scheduled, and battery of BM-21 MLRS from the 61st landing and its subsequent advance into 10 kilometers from Nikel in the vicinity Naval Infantry Brigade joined the force the interior of the peninsula.14 of the Yergalakh Water Intake Station. in addition to elements of the Northern Combat began with the delivery of A full-scale mock-up of the Water In- Fleet Spetsnaz force.11 The assault force an airstrike against terrorist positions take Station was constructed 500 meters boarded the craft and set sail on 10 Au- and the infiltration of Spetsnaz teams from the actual station. It included the gust.12 The voyage lasted eight days. into their rear to adjust gunfire from the security barriers and defenses.8 Going against the Yenisei River’s ships. Upon receiving target coordinates, Overall commander of the exercise strong current was a bit of a challenge, gunners of the large antisubmarine war- was Nikolai Yevmenov, particularly because there is less ma- fare ship Severomorsk opened fire against the Commander of the Northern Joint neuver room in the Yenisei Estuary and reinforced enemy positions on shore.15 Strategic Command.9 The naval con- River than in the Kara Sea. The assault Ship-based helicopters then delivered tingent was led by the commander of force vessels split into two groups. The teams of military engineers to the beach. the Northern Fleet’s Kola mixed-force first group was the deep-draft Udaloy-1 The engineers cleared approaches to the flotilla VADM Oleg Golubev.10 The Class Severomorsk and Rapucha Class beach through the mines and prepared opposing forces consisted of Spetsnaz large landing ships Aleksandr Otrakovs- a beachhead unloading site, marking it troops from the Central District and kiy and Georgiy Pobedonosets. It took with signal flares. Naval infantrymen, Northern Fleet. The assault landing 38 hours to sail from the Kara Sea to who had disembarked onto fast boats force consisted of a battalion tactical Dudinka—some 370 nautical miles.13 carried aboard the Severomorsk, support- group from the 80th Arctic Motorized ed the engineers’ work. After preparing a Rifle Brigade as well as paratroopers Let the Games Begin position for the landing of the amphibi- and naval infantry. A company of air- The Northern Fleet ships arrived at ous assault force equipment, landing borne soldiers from the 106th Guards the river port of Dudinka on 18 August. ships Georgiy Pobedonosets, Kondopoga, Airborne Division (Tula), with vehicles, The amphibious assault landing was and Aleksandr Otrakovskiy approached was airlifted into the naval reconnais- conducted on an undeveloped Yenisei the shoreline one after the other. Thirty- one wheeled and tracked vehicles of the naval infantry, the Arctic Brigade, and the Airborne disembarked onto the un- improved beach.16 The landing force consisted of a battalion tactical group of the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade, a company of the 98th Guards Airborne Division, and a company of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade. They drove ashore on their BMD-3 Airborne Infantry Fighting Vehicles, MT-LBv (an MT-LB with an extended chassis) ar- mored tracked vehicles, and the new am- phibious TTM-4902PS-10 articulated all-terrain tracked carrier vehicles.17 The force moved through the lanes cleared by the engineers and secured the beachhead and directed facilities. With the port of Dudinka under control, the second phase of the exer- cise began. Additional vehicles, equip- Russian Airborne BMD-4 unloads from Ropucha Class amphibious landing ship on Yenisei ment, and supplies were offloaded. A River. (Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense/http://mil.ru/.) combat force now had to be moved

40 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 inland to protect facilities at Norlisk and nearby Nikel from foreign forces intent on disrupting or destroying vital economic facilities. The combat force needed to make a 100 kilometer move across the Taimir Peninsula. Tracked vehicles were loaded onto railroad flatcars and accompanied by security subunits formed from Northern Fleet naval infantry. Wheeled vehicles con- ducted a road march. Over 50 vehicles took part in the rail-and-road march, including Lynx armored paratrooper vehicles, MT-LBv armored personnel carriers, MLRSs on Ural truck chassis, 2S1 122mm self-propelled howitzers, and TTM-4902PS-10 articulated all- terrain tracked carrier vehicles.18 The force and vehicles closed in on their encampment and vehicle lager site. The next combat exercise began Russian Ropucha-class amphibious landing ship Kondopoga on the Yenisei River. Note tug- on 28 August in the northern part of boat keeping the craft’s nose to shore. (Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense/http://mil.ru/.) Krasnoyarskiy Kray within the vicinity of Chernaya Mountain and Yergalakh Arctic brigade, airborne troops, and icebreakers and is building more. It is Mountain in the foothills of the Plu- Spetznaz conducted a live fire drill with also fielding ice-class patrol boats and torana Plateau. The joint force mission their assault rifles, grenades, and heavy logistics ships that can handle up to was to protect the main industrial hub machine guns.22 five feet of pack ice. Icebreakers were of the Arctic region. The main fight- On 30 August, the force returned by not needed for this summer landing ing took place near the facilities of the conducting a short return road-and-rail but would be essential during winter. Norilsk Nikel enterprise, located a short march. Naval infantrymen, soldiers of Shipboard artillery and missiles are distance from the city in the estuary of the Arctic Brigade, and the paratroop- necessary, as are shipborne helicopters. the Medvezhka River. According to the er company began loading equipment Arctic tugs are essential. The current scenario, Northern Fleet reconnaissance onto the large landing ships moored at of the Yenisei is such that the large and assault landing personnel discov- Dudinka.23 During the return voyage, amphibious landing craft could not ered several teams of commandos. They the assault force conducted an amphibi- keep their bows to the shoreline with- called in an artillery strike on the enemy ous assault landing at Guba Belush’ya out an Arctic tug pushing against the concentrations. Grad MLRS batteries (Belush’ya Bay) on Yuzhnyy (Southern) vessels’ sides to counter the current. and 2S1 self-propelled howitzers moved Island in the Novaya Zemlya archipel- • The landing force must be mobile and up to the firing line.19 Unmanned aerial ago. The landing was conducted on 6 have its organic vehicles on shore in quick vehicle coverage identified additional September from the large amphibious order. The landing force is 100 per- targets for the artillery.20 Under cover warfare ship Georgiy Pobedonosets. The cent mechanized and task organized of artillery, Northern Fleet Arctic Bri- Northern Fleet naval infantry contingent with organic artillery, air defense, en- gade and airborne troops advanced to was onboard with its equipment. The gineers, and support troops. Russian the enemy positions, firing as they ad- amphibious warfare ship moved close to ground forces, airborne, and naval vanced. Their mission was to surround the shore and lowered its ramp directly infantry are all fully mechanized. and destroy the enemy commandos. onto an underdeveloped coastline, over • Smoke is essential to defend the Su-24 bombers and Northern Fleet Na- which troops and vehicles disembarked landing force from top attack. Russian val Aviation helicopters provided fire onto land. During the exercise, the naval ships are designed to generate their support from the air.21 Detachments infantry exercised procedures to seize a own smoke; however, getting smoke of Spetznaz and airborne troops rede- beachhead. The Georgiy Pobedonosets up to the water’s edge and inland is a ployed behind “enemy lines.” provided fire support for the assault problem. At the same time that this Later, the Northern Fleet Arctic force, simulating the engagement of exercise was underway, Northern Fleet Brigade and airborne troops traveled shore targets with its guns.24 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical by army vehicles to another exercise forces experimented with a concept area. Their mission was to encircle Observations to adapt a powerboat to lay smoke the sabotage groups and suppress their • Arctic riverine exercises require spe- screens. A landing craft provided by resistance. During the final stage, the cialized equipment. Russia has over 40 the Kola Flotilla’s assault ship forma-

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 41 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS)

tion was equipped with the newest model TDA-3 smoke generator, nor- mally mounted on a KAMAZ-truck chassis. This smoke generator can place a raised smoke screen without covering the speedboat itself, which allows the boat to maneuver safely. It was tested for the first time in the Gryaznaya Guba on 15 August 2017. It showed an exceptional efficiency in laying a smoke screen to the shore.25 The TDA-3 is a newer system that provides quicker and larger coverage than earlier systems. It uses an aircraft engine to disperse an aerosol fog in a horizontal or vertical pattern. The experimental combination of smoke generator and fast boat for laying smoke screens may become a regular feature of Arctic amphibious landings. • The sources do not indicate when the transfer of command from naval forces to ground forces took place for the assault Severomorsk landing forces. In decades past, this Russian antisubmarine warfare ship Udaloy-class Destroyer provided fire sup- was usually a function of the range port for riverine-opposed landing. (Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense/ http://mil.ru/.) of naval gunfire, but this transfer of Higher Command School, and senior are now the world’s most experienced command was probably determined by naval infantry posts are often held by force in this type of combat. the ground advance to a geographic airborne officers. feature or designated line. • Arctic riverine assaults are best con- • The assault landing force consisted of ducted during the summer; however, Notes a battalion tactical group from the 80th they may be required at any time of 1. Laura Neilson Bonikowsky, “The Arctic, Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade as well year. The river port of Dudinka is Country by Country,” Diplomat and Interna- as paratroopers and naval infantry. It an all-weather port, and the Yenisei tional Canada, (Online: October 2012), avail- utilized organic vehicles and weapons flows year around. However, there is able at http://diplomatonline.com. in an integrated battle plan. It would sometimes sea-ice buildup where the have been simpler to use a single mo- river enters into the Yenisei Estuary, 2. Caroline McGuire, “Life in the Freezer: In- torized rifle, paratrooper, or naval in- which floods the surrounding area and side the Northernmost City on Earth Whose Residents Endure - 55°C Temperatures and fantry unit, but the Russian military requires the services of icebreakers to Two Months of Total Darkness Every Year,” is intent on exposing all services to get transport moving again. The Daily Mail, (London, UK: January 2016). the conduct of the demanding mis- • Norilsk is clearly a major economic sion of Arctic riverine combat while facility, and Russia has now conduct- 3. The Eastern Military District has responsi- working at small unit integration and ed two riverine exercises to prepare to bility for the Chukotka Peninsula and eastern coordination between services (Rus- protect Norilsk should it be necessary. entrance to the Arctic passage. sian airborne is separate from Rus- The first exercise was an unopposed sian Ground Forces). This exposure landing followed by a rail-and-road 4. Staff, “Ministry of Defense: Arctic Motorized includes learning how to load and land march inland and a live fire exer- Rifle Brigade Participates in its First Combat various types of military vehicles on cise. The second exercise was more Readiness Test,” TASS, (Moscow, RUS: March the ’tween decks of the large amphibi- complex: a lightly opposed landing 2015). ous warfare ships. This type of inte- with a mined beachhead and artillery 5. Olga Chernysheva, “Battle in Medvezhka gration at this tactical level is difficult support. This involved a larger force Estuary: Northern Fleet Personnel Once Again for most national services; however, and was followed by a road and rail ‘Win Back’ the Heart of the Arctic–Taimir,” these three ground combat elements march, seizure and defense of a critical Red Star, (Moscow, RUS: September 2017). (ground forces, airborne forces, and facility, combat-employing aircraft, naval infantry) use similar equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles, artillery, 6. Vladimin Levchuk, “In the Thick of It— tactics, training, and doctrine. Some and ground maneuver. The Russians the Arctic Infantry: On Guard in the Arctic,” naval infantry officers are commis- are developing Arctic riverine combat Northern Fleet Press Service, (Murmansk, RUS: sioned from the Airborne Ryazan skills in digestible stages. Clearly they September 2017).

42 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 7. Ibid. 15. Ibid. The Severomorsk mounts two AK-100 21. “Battle in Medvezhka Estuary.” turreted 100mm guns. They fi re a 28.6 kilogram 8. Ibid. (63 pound) round at 50–60 rounds per minute. 22. “Northern Fleet Training to Defend Major There is an antiaircraft high-explosive fragmen- Arctic Industrial Facility.” 9. Olga Vorob’eva, “The Arctic is Closed to tation round and a variety of high-explosive frag Diversionary Forces: A Major Training Opera- rounds for ship or shore targets. The Severomorsk 23. “Battle in Medvezhka Estuary.” tion to Safeguard Important Industrial Site is is a Udaloy-class destroyer used primarily in Ongoing on the Tamir Peninsula,” Red Star, the antisubmarine role. If needed, additional 24. Staff, “Northern Fleet Naval Infantry Land (Moscow, RUS: August 2107). fi re support could also have been provided by on Novaya Zemlya,” Northern Fleet Press Service, the three landing ships which each mount two (Murmansk, RUS: September 2017). 10. Staff, “Northern Fleet Destroyer Sails up turrets of twin-barreled 57mm AK-257 guns, Yenisei from Kara Sea for First Time,” Interfax, two 122mm MLRS 30-rail launchers, and two 25. Staff, “The Northern Fleet’s NBC Protec- (Online: August 2017), available at http://www. AK-630 six-barreled 30mm Gatling guns. tion Specialists Have Won Prizes at Different interfax.com. All-Army Competitions,” Northern Fleet Press 16. Ibid. Service, (Murmansk, RUS: November 2017). 11. “In the Thick of It—the Arctic Infantry.” 17. “The Arctic is Closed to Diversionary 12. Olga Vorob’eva, “Along the Arctic Routes: Forces.” >Author’s Note: The author assumes respon- Northern Fleet Sailors Are Successfully Per- sibility for the veracity, accuracy, and source forming Missions in the High Latitudes,” Red 18. “Battle in Medvezhka Estuary.” documentation of the material, including no Star, (Moscow, RUS: September 2017). use of classifi ed material and conformity to 19. Ibid. copyright and usage permissions. The views 13. “Northern Fleet Destroyer Sails up Yenisei expressed are those of the author and do not from Kara Sea for First Time.” 20. Staff, “Northern Fleet Training to Defend necessarily represent the offi cial policy or posi- Major Arctic Industrial Facility,” Interfax, (On- 14. “Battle in Medvezhka Estuary.” line: August 2017), available at http://www. tion of the Department of the Army, Depart- interfax.com. ment of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 43 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS) Team China, World Police Let China fight banana wars, so we can win the next generation of warfare by 1stLt Ross W. Gilchriest

hroughout the early 20th century, the U.S. Govern- >1stLt Gilchriest graduated from the Naval Academy in May 2017. He earned a ment repeatedly used military master’s in Global Affairs at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China, as part of the force to intervene in foreign Schwarzman Scholars program. 1stLt Gilchriest graduated from , Tcountries to protect rapidly growing with Bravo Company, Class 2-19 in June 2019. He is currently attending class 1-20 American economic interests in the of the Infantry Officer Course. Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia with the so-called “Banana Wars.” The seeks to recreate the ancient Silk Road World War II totaled about $130 billion Marine Corps bore much of the burden by connecting the economies of Asia, in 2016, the projected total investment in these conflicts, and many of our or- Africa, and Europe using a network of for the BRI ranges from $4 trillion to ganizational heroes—such as Smedley Chinese-built infrastructure and tech- $8 trillion, dwarfing the Marshall Plan Butler and Chesty Puller—earned their nology (see Map 1 on next page). by at least a factor of three.2 fame during this period. As America’s Essentially, the BRI involves the As in the Banana Wars era, it appears interests expanded from the Halls of massive transfer of Chinese wealth, likely that direct Chinese involvement Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli, industrial capacity, and people which will follow the investment because many Marines went ashore to protect them. would cover “about 65 percent of the strategically important projects could China’s current regional situation world’s population, about one-third of be threatened by regional security and mirrors the United States during the the world’s GDP, and about a quarter governance concerns.3 For example, af- Banana Wars era. The best example of of all the goods and services the world” ter armed unrest in the state of Rakhine this growth is President Xi Jinping’s once completed.1 Consider this China’s during the spring of 2017 disrupted trade landmark foreign policy initiative, the Marshall Plan, but while American aid flows to the port of Kyaukphyu, Beijing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI and investments to Europe following became directly involved with the peace negotiations between the ethnic groups and government in Myanmar.4 Additionally, key Chinese citizens overseas and BRI projects have become targets in their own right. In August 2016, a suicide bomber attacked the Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan. The bomber was later identified as a Uighur Muslim, part of a minority ethnic group that lives in the western Chinese province of Xinjiang where China has imposed strict controls on its citizens in order to combat separatist terrorism.5 In neigh- boring Pakistan, the problem is especially acute. Despite the efforts of Pakistani forces, jihadist terrorists and Baloch nationalists have increasingly targeted Chinese projects.6 In December 2018, Soldiers from China’s PLANMC participate in a live fire exercise at a training base in South the Chinese Embassy issued an official China. (Photo provided by author from http://www.globaltimes.cn.) warning to all Chinese organizations and

44 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 Map 1. Regions and projects encompassed by the BRI. (Map provided by author from https://www.merics.org.) nationals to be on alert for imminent velopment have been proposed, it seems the idea of using its military for foreign terror attacks.7 Should violence against highly likely that Chinese military in- intervention.9 This represents a historic Chinese people and property escalate be- tervention will become necessary at shift in Chinese foreign policy, a shift yond Islamabad’s capability to respond, some point. Interestingly, Chinese films that will require the development of it would cripple the strategic value of such as Wolf Warrior 2 and the recently an expeditionary force characterized the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Cor- by global presence, rapid mobilization, ridor, which will protect China’s trade and operational flexibility—in short, a from an American naval blockade in the Marine Corps very similar to our own. Strait of Malacca. The corridor will allow ... Chinese military in- In the very near future, the Beijing to import and export goods from PLANMC will look remarkably similar the port of Gwadar. Additionally, the tervention will become to the U.S. Marine Corps in terms of Chinese have been developing a series of necessary at some equipment, size, and purpose. A 2016 ports with explicit or potential military National Interest article noted Chinese purpose in countries such as Djibouti, point. acquisitions of equipment capable of Sri Lanka, and most recently Cambo- conducting and supporting amphibious dia.8 Though Beijing prefers to rely on operations, such as dock-landing ships partner-nations’ security forces, how released Operation Red Sea—inspired with well decks and air-cushioned land- Chinese leaders respond to continued by the People’s Liberation Army Navy ing craft.10 In terms of personnel, the escalations of instability will determine Marine Corps (PLANMC) evacua- People’s Republic of China (PRC) plans the success or failure of the BRI. tions of Libya in 2011 and Yemen in to expand the PLANMC to well over While solutions from private mili- 2015—signal that, at least on some half the size of the active duty U.S. Ma- tary contractors to local economic de- level, Chinese society is acclimating to rine Corps in order to better protect its

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 45 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS)

Map 2. Fragile states index 2019. (Map provided by author from http://fundforpeace.org.)

increasing overseas commitments such primarily to be used as staging areas for 10,000 in Djibouti alone.12 In 2017, as the naval bases in Djibouti and Gwa- anti-piracy, humanitarian, and peace- the South China Morning Post reported dar.11 The Chinese Defense Ministry keeping missions; media reports are es- that the PLANMC doubled in size from acknowledges that these facilities are timating personnel capacity at around 10,000 to 20,000, with an ultimate goal of 100,000 in the near future.13 Ad- ditionally, military exercises have been increasing in both scope and size. The “Military Report” program of China Central Television reported that on 12 March 2018, the PLANMC conducted a “massive groundbreaking maneuver” of over 10,000 troops, or roughly half the total force, in the southwest prov- ince of Yunnan and the eastern prov- ince of Shandong—the “largest ever trans-regional training of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Marine Corps” to date.14 This is a significant increase from the first live fire exercise conducted in the Xinjiang Autonomous region in 2016, which included only a battalion-sized element and conducted limited operations.15 The March 2018 exercises also combined “diverse modes of transport including air, water, railway Chinese Marines cover each other as they clear wire-netting barriers. (Photo provided by author and motor,” each a crucial component from http://www.globaltimes.cn.) of Chinese infrastructure investment in

46 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 the BRI.16 Chinese officials commented that these exercises aimed to “increase combat capability” and prepare Chi- nese marines for their duties overseas. One anonymous Chinese expert stated bluntly, “Marines are frontline troops that seize beachheads in war time, and work as a rapid reaction force in peace- time ready to deal with emergencies.”17 Furthermore, admiral Wu Shengli—a commander of the PLA Navy who in- spected the event—said, “Marines must be trained in all geographic areas.”18 In every clime and place, America’s expe- ditionary force-in-readiness will soon be joined by the expeditionary forces of the PLA. From another perspective, this growth in the PLANMC aligns with escalating fears of a PRC attempt to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. In Chinese Marines descend from a tank after arriving at the designated battleground. (Photo fact, much of the evidence reveals that provided by author from http://globaltimes.cn.) this is the explicit purpose of the PRC’s ongoing military modernization.19 this reason, I am not convinced that Marine Corps to relieve pressure from Based on leaked PRC plans, some ob- an invasion is imminent. More than our limited resources and concentrate servers believe that a potential invasion likely, the PRC will attempt to pressure on winning the next fight. The end state could occur as early as 2020.20 In any Taiwan (and by extension, the United of such an effort is to create a smaller, case, the reunification of Taiwan is a States) into accepting a politically ex- better equipped force that specializes in defining issue for President Xi and his pedient solution, such as designating high-intensity missions such as raids, promise to rejuvenate the Chinese na- Taiwan as a “Special Administrative air assaults, and littoral reconnaissance, tion (known as the “China Dream”) by Region”—similar to Hong Kong or similar to our brethren in the Army the year 2049, especially after the 19th Macau—into perpetuity. Meanwhile, Rangers or the British Royal Marine Chinese Communist Party Congress in the BRI will continue to expand, draw- Commandos. Marines would con- October 2017.21 Such a prospect looms ing Chinese policymakers ever closer to tinue to operate from aboard forward over the security environment of the crises at flashpoints beyond the South deployed amphibious ships, allowing entire South China Sea region, with ac- China Sea. them to fulfill their statutory obliga- tions by the United States adding to the In response, we should allow the tion as experts in amphibious warfare tension. President Donald Trump signed PRC to bear the cost of a global po- without sequestering them into a “small the Taiwan Travel Act into law on 16 licing role while devoting more of our wars” force, as was suggested by the March 2018, allowing official visits be- own resources to developing next-gen- Senate Armed Services Committee tween the United States and Taiwan eration combat capabilities, pursuant in 2018.25 In the meantime, let the at all levels. In response, President Xi of the Marine Corps Operating Concept, Chinese commit resources in their at- warned that further “separatism” will be (Washington, DC: HQMC, Septem- tempt to be the world’s police while we met by the “punishment of history.”22 ber 2016). Our ability to win future focus on becoming the smartest, best At present, however, what is the likeli- near-peer conflicts, such as a battle for equipped, most agile, and most lethal hood that China could launch a suc- Taiwan, depends on achieving a success- fighting force history has ever known. cessful amphibious invasion of Taiwan? ful offset against present and emerging According to defense scholar Michael adversary capabilities. As noted by Gen Beckley, the PRC still lacks the neces- Neller in his 2018 “Posture Statement,” Notes sary capabilities to launch a successful the Marine Corps is not “organized, 1. Joe Ngai, Kevin Sneader, and Cecilia Ma invasion, even without the intervention trained, equipped, or postured to meet Zecha, “China’s One Belt, One Road: Will It of the United States.23 For President the demands of the rapidly evolving fu- Reshape Global Trade?,” McKinsey & Company, Xi, a failed invasion would be devas- ture operating environment” because (Online: July 2016), available at https://www. tating to his legitimacy and that of the of the financial constraints of the last mckinsey.com. entire Chinese Communist Party, not eight years and advances in adversary to mention the potential for escalation capabilities.24 Therefore, we should 2. Dan Steinbock, “Belt and Road vs Marshall Plan: Economics vs Politics,” The Telegraph, into a regional or global conflict. For reconsider the strategic purpose of our (London, UK: June 2017).

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 47 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS)

3. Henrik Hallgren and Richard Ghiasy, “Secu- bility” of the regions the PRC has “peacefully it is in Chinese. Coverage of the PLANMC rity and Economy on the Belt and Road: Three liberated.” I visited the cities of Urumqi and begins at 21:09: “20180314,” CCTV, (Online: Country Case Studies,” SIPRI Insights on Peace Kashgar in Xinjiang in May 2018. I witnessed March 2018), available at http://tv.cctv.com. and Security, (Solna, SE: December 2017). the repressive counterterrorism measures being taken by the Chinese government, as has been 15. Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s Marines Conduct 4. Ibid. widely reported on in the past six months: police First Military Exercises in the Gobi Desert,” checkpoints, the removal of Islamic symbols on The Diplomat, (, JPN: January 2016). 5. Olga Dzyubenko, “Kyrgyzstan Says Uighur buildings, re-education camps, and invasive Militant Groups behind Attack on China’s Em- electronic and biological surveillance using ar- 16. “PLA Marine Corps Conducts Massive bassy,” Reuters, (Online: September 2016), avail- tifi cial intelligence. Some estimates claim that Groundbreaking Maneuvers.” able at https://www.reuters.com. The reader over one million Uighurs have been sent to the may also be interested to know that the gov- “re-education” camps. 17. Ibid. ernment of China offi cially labels provinces with large non-Han ethnic groups and notable 6. Philip Dubow, “Is China’s Belt and Road 18. Ibid. separatist undercurrents as “autonomous re- Initiative Increasing Crime and Terrorism?,” gions.” When I visited Tibet in October 2017, The Diplomat, (Tokyo, JPN: November 2017). 19. Ian Easton, “Why China Plans to Invade I learned that my idea of autonomy is quite Taiwan,” The National Interest, (Online: De- different. For instance, at the Jokhang temple 7. Liu Zhen, Kinling Lo, and Mimi Lau, “Chi- cember 2017), available at https://nationalin- in Lhasa, considered the holiest and most sacred nese Embassy in Pakistan Warns of ‘Series of terest.org. temple in Tibet, guards armed with automatic Terror Attacks Soon,’” South China Morning weapons march in formation counter-clockwise Post, (Hong Kong: December 2017). 20. Deng Yuwen, “Is China Planning to Take around the square, ignoring the Tibetan Bud- Taiwan by Force in 2020?,” South China Morn- dhist tradition of navigating any holy place in 8. Jeremy Page, Gordon Lubold, and Rob ing Post, (Hong Kong: January 2018). See also a clockwise manner. Furthermore, the sentries Taylor, “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Sara Malm, “New Book: China ‘Has Drawn up on every roof and the armed personnel carri- Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network,” Secret Plans to Invade Taiwan by 2020,’” Daily ers staring down temple’s entrance suggested Wall Street Journal, (Online: July 2019), avail- Mail, (London, UK: October 2017). that Chinese authorities are vigilant in ensur- able at https://www.wsj.com. ing that “terrorists” do not threaten the “sta- 21. Richard C. Bush, “What Xi Jinping Said 9. I saw Operation Red Sea in a Beijing theatre about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress,” on 17 March 2018. It was not good—three Brookings, (Online: October 2017), available hours of melodramatic, Rambo-style action, at https://www.brookings.edu. propagandistic dialogue, and a weak plot that felt like an uncoordinated mash-up of Captain 22. Phillip Wen and Ben Blanchard, “Xi Warns Phillips, 13 Hours, and Blackhawk Down. Of Taiwan Will Face ‘Punishment of History’ for note, the movie ends with a totally superfl u- Separatism,” Reuters, (London, ENG: March ous scene of the Chinese Navy warning some 2018). unknown adversary in the South China Sea, “Marines, today we need you to bring “You are about to enter Chinese waters. Please 23. Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military your ideas to the Gazette in order to turn around immediately!” In my opinion, the Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors movie’s implicit message was much more inter- Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” Interna- refresh Marine Corps thinking. We esting than its content. tional Security, (Cambridge, MA: 2017). need the intellectual risk-takers, the ‘Mavericks’ whose critical thinking and 10. Koh Swee Lean Collin and Grant Newsham, 24. Gen Robert B. Neller, The Commandant’s creative problem-solving can disrupt the “Can China Copy the U.S. Marine Corps?,” Posture of the United States Marine Corps Presi- bureaucracy and challenge intellectual The National Interest, (Online: January 2016), dent’s Budget 2018, (Washington, DC: 2018). complacency. We need nonconformists available at https://nationalinterest.org. and innovators whose disciplined but 25. Barry Rosenberg, “SASC Seeks Sweeping 11. Minnie Chan, “As Overseas Ambitions Ex- ‘Roles & Missions’ Report: Wither The Ma- unregimented ideas can lead to solutions pand,” China Plans 400 percent increase to Ma- rines?,” Breaking Defense, (Online: June 2018), that outpace adaptive enemies and a rine Corps Numbers, sources say, South China available at https://breakingdefense.com. dynamically changing world.” Morning Post, (Hong Kong, ROV: March 2017). - General James N. Mattis, USMC (Ret) >Author’s Note: The views expressed in this 12. Minnie Chan, “China to Boost Marine article are the author’s own and in no way Corps by 400 percent as Overseas Interests represent the views of the U.S. Government, Grow,” South China Morning Post, (Hong Kong: the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Ma- March 2017). rine Corps.

13. Ibid. Read the Submission Guidelines at 14. Yan Li, “PLA Marine Corps Conducts Mas- mca-marines.org/wp-content sive Groundbreaking Maneuvers,” Global Times, /uploads/Observation-Post.pdf (Beijing, ROC: March 2018). The original video broadcast may be viewed here, though

48 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 The French Foreign Legion Lessons for the Marine Corps infantry by 1stLt Woody Dewing

he Marine Corps prides it- bling with the big Army, and that there self for being a lethal fighting is always someone in their government >1stLt Dewing is a Platoon Com- force with a unique esprit de mander with 3d Battalion, 6th Ma- trying to get rid of them permanently. corps and the ability to per- rine Regiment. He trained with the The Foreign Legion is known for its Tform in any clime and any place, despite high standards of discipline, challeng- 2nd Infantry Regiment of the French a dearth of funding. A 38-day train- Foreign Legion in Nimes, France, dur- ing recruit training, and respect for ing period in Nimes, France, with the ing May 2018. their history. For example, the Battle French Foreign Legion (FFL) afforded of Camerone is an 1863 battle in which me the opportunity to immerse in the the Foreign Legion, outnumbered 65 to culture of another NATO infantry tion and interpersonal communication a force of over 2,000, withheld Mexican outfit with an international reputation are effective routes to building esprit forces for over 10 hours in what the For- similar to that of the Marine Corps. de corps, and small cultural differences eign Legion refers to as its “baptismal This opportunity, particularly with as and approaches to training and tactics event.”1 The wooden hand of Captain unique a force as the Foreign Legion, can provide significantly different ap- Jean Danjou, the Commanding Officer provided several learning moments for proaches to problems in today’s combat at Camerone, remains in the Foreign me as a platoon commander that both environments. Legion base in Aubagne as a testament reinforced and provided new perspec- The similarities between the Foreign to the ultimate sacrifice in the name tives to my approach of the Marine Legion and the Marine Corps are sub- of the Legio Patria Nostra (Legion Our Corps infantry’s mission. The most stantial. For instance, Foreign Legion Country). There are placards in the salient points I took away from training officers routinely joked about the need town of Bouresches, outside Belleau with the Foreign Legion was that tradi- for more funding, their constant squab- Wood, which refer to Camerone as the equivalent of Belleau Wood for the Marine Corps. Celebrated on 30 April, Camerone Day is the most important day on the Foreign Legion’s calendar, and the events in its honor are reminis- cent of 10 November for the Marine Corps. Throughout my time with the Foreign Legion, the similarities between the two forces repeatedly appeared. Danjou is our Dan Daly, Camerone our Belleau Wood, and the challenges that face modern infantries in today’s operational environment are a shared challenge. Both the Foreign Legion and the Marine Corps strive to address small budgets and unknown threats with a combination of strict discipline, esprit de corps, and challenging training to prepare our infantry forces. Given these similarities, how does the Foreign Le- gion’s approach differ from ours, and A French Foreign Legion NCO shows a Marine from 3/6 how to operate the French Service how do these differences manifest them- Rifle, the FAMAS. (Photo by Foreign Legion photographer.) selves in the Foreign Legion’s training?

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 49 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS)

First, unique daily traditions and the first opportunity of the day, usually dur- does not necessarily equate to more lethal process of recruit training in the Foreign ing coffee in the company club or foyer infantry platoons. Over the course of Legion create a different environment prior to morning formation. Daily noon the training period, I witnessed mili- than most Marine Corps garrison bases. meals in garrison are also deliberate af- tary operations on urbanized terrain The recruit training and indoctrination fairs. 1200 to 1400 was reserved time for and marksmanship training that was process for Legionnaires is an entirely garrison lunches each day. After a short achieved with few resources; on several different path from a Marine Corps speech from the regimental commander, occasions, they used iron sights due to Recruit Depot. The Foreign Legion the separate ranks then traveled to their insufficient numbers of EOTech sights accepts recruits from across the globe own dining areas for lunch. The lieu- for the entire party of tireurs. It did not as long as they can make it to a Foreign tenant’s eating area, formally titled the seem to detract from the enthusiasm Legion recruiting station in France and Ksar (North African term for fort), was or proficiency of the Legionnaires who pass initial interviews, screening, and littered with trinkets and memorabilia did not throw up their hands in despair background checks. Over the course of from old training exercises and cam- and say, “How could I possibly shoot basic training, and once in the regular paigns spanning the globe. The lieuten- without an RCO?” Half marathon regiments of the Foreign Legion, the ant’s lunch is a highly structured event runs and six-plus mile pack runs were FFL maintains strict adherence to sev- that includes an elected president and a conducted without time occupying red eral traditions that turn recruits from all over the globe with “not the slightest thing in common” into a cohesive fight- ing force of Legionnaires.2 The Legion ... the training methodology, creativity, and approach mandates that French must be spoken to risk mitigation in the Foreign Legion employs pro- at all times during working hours with French language training during the vide good lessons learned for the Marine Corps. initial stages of training. Legionnaires are expected to memorize the Legion’s Code of Honor and dozens of chants— popotier, which was essentially a speaker tape that often discourages units from with verses in French, German, and of the mess. I found the emphasis that planning such events during garrison in English—that were created and sung Foreign Legion customs and courtesies the Marine Corps. The Foreign Legion’s by Legionnaires on campaign in Indo- placed on face-to-face interaction, as emphasis on combat conditioning and China, Algeria, Morocco, and beyond. well as the ability to interface with peers endurance, as opposed to the, “Who For the first five years of a Legionnaire’s across the regiment as a way to both cor- cares if I run a 25:00 PFT, I can bench enlistment, they are given a new identity rect each other and build camaraderie, 275 pounds” mentality that is all too and not permitted to return home or to be very appealing. It did not have a pervasive in the infantry community live off-base. Legionnaires at the 2nd forced nature whatsoever and, even with today, resulted in fit and impressive pla- Regiment live in four-man squad bay the language barrier, it was clear that toons. A climbing certified lieutenant style rooms, and town liberty is depen- the time the lieutenants had built into took us up to a ravine in the Valligui- dent on performance and inspections the day to formally interact with each eres training area, secured the harnesses conducted by SNCOs. Many forms of other paid dividends in their working himself while showing his platoon, and punishment that are no longer available relationships. As I think about the num- then conducted a day-long rappelling to NCOs in the Marine Corps remain ber of times I ate a lunch in between exercise—again without undue plan- available to their peers in the Foreign staring at a computer roster with my ning difficulty. I can say confidently Legion. During formal ceremonies for platoon sergeant, driving back and forth that event would not happen in the events such as Bastille Day, the Foreign across the expanse of Camp Lejeune’s Marine Corps today without a signifi- Legion never separates its ranks when main side, and observing endless lines at cant paradigm shift in our approach to marching as a symbol of the brother- Taco Bell back home, I could not help safety precautions. The Foreign Legion’s hood of the force. but feel that the Foreign Legion had emphasis on planning creativity, aus- This strict adherence to traditions a leg up on cultivating esprit de corps tere training environments, entrusting and Foreign Legion culture is integrat- than the daily battle routine in garrison officers to make proper safety judg- ed into the daily battle rhythm in the provides the average rifle platoon. ments without hindering their ability Deuxieme Regiment Infanterie. Each day, Second, the training methodology, to execute the training, and on combat all NCOs and above within a company creativity, and approach to risk mitiga- conditioning fitness were all positive make a point of shaking hands and for- tion in the Foreign Legion employs pro- reinforcements of the proper philosophy mally greeting each other. They come vide good lessons learned for the Marine the Marine Corps infantry must have to attention with the customary French Corps. I observed roughly two weeks of toward training. open palms and then greet each other. Foreign Legion training that reinforced The final point of interest I noted It is unacceptable to not formally greet my idea that less red tape is better for was from discussion and comparison all other members of the company at the platoon training and increased funding of different sources of literature on the

50 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 infantry units was a rewarding exercise for me. It led me to the ultimate con- clusion that most professional infantry units in the world probably have many more similarities than differences. It is the small differences though, doctrin- ally and culturally, that define the ef- fectiveness of units. Do we truly adhere to and cultivate the sense of esprit de corps that the Marine Corps possesses, or simply pay it lip service on social media? Do we build the relationships on a daily basis within our units that best build pride in our Corps, or do too many talented junior NCOs sit behind computers or in the exchange without a training plan while not receiving the daily handshake their counterparts in the Foreign Legion get from their com- manders? Do we truly set up our NCOs French counterinsurgency tactics remain useful to study. (Photo by LCpl Roxanna Ortiz.) and junior Marines with the most tough and austere training possible, or does topic of French tactics, particularly in does not favor heavily fortified forward the Marine Corps’ current approach counterinsurgency. The Foreign Legion operating bases and combat outposts. to risk mitigation improperly weigh the has a long history of counterinsurgency Instead, the Legion emphasizes patrol- important factors of Marine safety and having fought in Indo-China and the ling that cordons entire towns and cities Marine training? Algerian War. MCWP 3-33.5, Coun- to force insurgents into the mountains I present this article in order to pose terinsurgency, partially relies on source while also conducting “close proximity” the question: What differences do we material from the French-Algerian War patrols to reassure but not disturb the value about the Marine Corps as leaders, and French military thinkers such as local populace.5 Ultimately, Foreign Le- and what do we do daily and in training David Galula.3 Some of the basic tenets gion doctrine consists of many similari- to reinforce those differences? of current and historical anecdotes of ties with that of Marine Corps forces; French counterinsurgency tactics re- main useful to study. Similar to Jean Notes Larteguy’s Centurions and Simon Mur- 1. Robert Johnson, Outnumbered, Outgunned, ray’s Foreign Legion platoon staying Being able to take an Undeterred: Twenty Battles Against All Odds, light and mobile to force the fellagha impartial perspective at (London, UK: Thames & Hudson, 2011). into the hills, current French doctrine calls for implementing the “oil spot” assessing another na- 2. Simon Murray, Legionnaire: Five Years in the principle, isolating the enemy from the tion’s infantry units was French Foreign Legion, (New York, NY: Random general population and blocking them House Publishing Group, 1978). from movement and access to resourc- a rewarding exercise 4 3. Geoff Demarest, “Let’s Take the French Ex- es. Modern Foreign Legion units also for me. perience in Algeria Out of U.S. Counterinsur- have the advantage of having a multilin- gency Doctrine,” (, KS: Army gual force at all levels, particularly when Combined Arms Center, Defense Technical it comes to operating in Francophone Information Center, 2010). nations in Africa. No longer attempt- however, the differences in counterin- ing to assert French sovereignty from surgency doctrine and extensive history 4. Headquarters French Army, Doctrine for across the Mediterranean, the Foreign conducting counterinsurgency make Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, ( Legion is well suited as a light, mobile them an ally worth studying. While I FR: 2010). force that can interact easily with civil- did not have the opportunity to observe ians and conduct cooperative patrols the Foreign Legion in action in Mali, I 5. Ibid. and persons of interest handovers with am confident from my observations that national security forces in Francophone there is likely something worth learning nations. French counterinsurgency to- from their actions in Africa today. day, according to conversations with Being able to take an impartial per- officers at the Legion and their doctrine, spective at assessing another nation’s

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 51 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS)

2018 LtGen Bernard E. “Mick” Trainor Military Writing Award: Honorable Mention A 2025 Squad Firefight Tactical “hot spot” Adapting to the situation by Col Mike Fallon, USMC(Ret)

his article is informed by and expands on the “Squad level” >Col Fallon served 33 years as an Infantry, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence of Maj Chad A. Buckel’s ar- Officer. He commanded in combat at every level from Recon Team leader thru ticle, “The Enhanced Infantry Task Force. He has directly supported Marines as a defense contractor for the TBattalion,” published in the July 2018 past 20 years in command and control. Currently, he is a Consultant with Presley edition of the Marine Corps Gazette. O’Bannon Grayback Consulting [POG] and Deep Water Point. He is an Archer in the Order of St. Crispin. Scenario In a distributed operation, a rein- like it, something was wrong. No birds, sion fire. Infrastructure up brought forced Rifle Squad of Marines is on no chickens, no dogs barking, no kids, the infrastructure Marine forward. As patrol in the year 2025. The 3d Squad and no locals, just stink! This all adds the infrastructure Marine arrived, Sgt (Rein), 1st Platoon, Company Landing up to an ambush. Franklin’s attention turned to this ju- Team Alpha, Battalion Landing Team The squad leader moved up, “Fisher nior Marine of the three-man commu- 1st Battalion/1st Marines (1/1), 15th what’s the issue?” Fisher replied that he nications and electronic warfare team MEU and Belleau Wood ARG are op- didn’t like it. The Squad Leader said the (CEWT) which was now an organic erating in the South-Western Pacific, quad-copter flying ahead of them, now fire team within the 2025 squad. This conducting an expeditionary advanced over the village’s dirt center, is showing team may be the most important asym- base operation (EABO) on a jungle ar- nothing unusual. The UAS operator metric enabling capability in his squad, chipelago against Chinese mercenaries chimed in, “Yea, nothing. Nothing in as Sgt Franklin had realized previously, with peer capabilities. the market center, no people, no ani- because he was operating in a distribut- mals …” ed operation while physically separated Firefight 2025 The first crack was a single AK-47 from the platoon in what had become The point man stopped on the side round. It must have been the signal to SOP. Third Squad was 13 kilometers of the trash infested gully, in actuality a trigger the ambush as 4 RPGs flew over and one valley away from the platoon small stream. They had been patrolling their heads and impacted 50 meters to headquarters, currently located on the up the stream for three hours. A con- their south. The defilade of the gulley next valley floor, and on the move to the cealed avenue of approach, the stream they were in saved the entire squad, but Sandpiper River. Franklin told Infra- was leading into the outskirts of another it also had them pinned down without structure to fire two rounds of“hockey thatched-roof village. He smelled rotten communications—another sierra sand- pucks”, one each onto the two over- fish and nuoc mam of the village first! wich! looking hills to their South, Hill 118 At least the stream they were walking The squad leader, Sgt Franklin, and Hill 62. He had earlier lazed both in, with its alternative use as trash pit called “Guns Up,” followed by “In- hills with his LA-22U Laser and knew and sewer, was deep and wide. LCpl frastructure Up.” Guns up brought they were within range. Infrastructure Fisher knelt on one knee and scanned forward the attached machine gun took his converted old M-79 grenade 180 degrees to the front using his old team, who arrived first, as he gave launcher and breach loaded a 40-mm VorTex21’s 10x binoculars. He didn’t them a direction to provide suppres- sized “eNodeB/Wi-Fi-7” cylinder into

52 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 the tube followed by a 40mm charging was off to the left, so they adjusted, and mandant had made the institutional round. He fired the M-79e (enhanced) he told them to put six rounds in the decision to embed EW capabilities at and blooped what the Marines called cave entrance. The six-round fire for squad, platoon, company, and battalion a communications hockey puck onto effect impacted the cave entrance. The at the cost of riflemen. Meanwhile, the Hill 118 and followed with a second jamming ceased! JFO had passed the request for fire and shot to Hill 62. Immediately, his comm The squads’ automatic response with- his location. At eleven minutes into the team chief yelled over that they had re- out being instructed and the Chinese firefight and nine minutes after the net- established communications and were tactical EW jamming proved to the work had been enabled by the hockey back in the game. squad leader that the new EW effects puck re-establishing communication Franklin knew from previous fire- week—ATX on Range 438 at Twenty- within the self-forming, self-healing fights that the network was not only nine Palms added by the Tactical Ex- tactical 5G LTE network, the flight his lifeline but also his asymmetrical advantage to defeat the Chinese volun- teers and insurgents. Franklin grabbed the joint fires observer (JFO), Corporal Franklin knew from previous firefights that the net- Pullie, and told him he wanted anything work was not only his lifeline but also his asymmetri- Pullie could get on the Northern ridge- line 400 meters north of their stream- cal advantage to defeat the Chinese volunteers and bed. Pullie tried to get the joint tacti- insurgents. cal air controller (JTAC), GySgt Ski, who was collocated with the company commander somewhere on the island, hopefully on high ground, which was ercise and Evaluation Control Group, of two AH-1Z Vipers was on station the plan. The JFO yelled, “I’m being which his squad had been thru last and carrying a wall to wall load of the jammed.” The organic CEWT carried year—was worth its training time in laser guided rockets of the APKWS- an electronic warfare (EW) sensor that gold. It also validated to the Marines II’s (Advanced Precision Kill Weapons scanned frequencies and also converted of the squad the extra weight and in- System). With the arrival of the flight to an in-extremis jammer. creased training of putting up with the and their employment, the firefight was Without being told, Infrastructure new organic CEWT team now part of virtually over. The squad’s JFO, under went to his antenna bag and pulled out his squad. They had countered the jam- the networked-in supervision of the re- two thick telescoping antennas and ming and shut it down in fewer than 90 mote JTAC, had passed the nine-line to ran back down the gully 10 meters to seconds, automatically earning the instant the Vipers who peppered the ridgeline a doglegged turn in the stream where respect that combat competence brings with the 2.75-inch rockets, which were he placed one antenna on each side of within a squad of Marines. The squad precision weapons with the applicate of the gully 40 meters apart and reeled out leader now understood why the Com- the APWKS. The fight was over! The the cable directly in the curve’s defile. The EW Marine of the CEWT was plugging the cables into the tactical electronic warfare targeting (TEWT) box; within twenty seconds, they had DF’ed (direction found) the Chinese jammer and had solid grid coordinates. The grid coordinates were passed to the JFO and squad leader. The squad leader told the JFO to continue to work up his nine-line digital CAS brief for the RPG location, their biggest immediate threat, in order to pass it via a burst transmis- sion which he knew from the active threat eXercise (ATX) at Twentynine Palms was the surest way to get through the jamming and that the squad leader would deal with the enemy jammer. At that point, he grabbed the 60mm mortar team and laid in a direct fire 60 mortar round to the cave entrance, the location of the jammer. The first round The squad on the move again. (Photo by Sgt Jesus Sepulveda Torres.)

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 53 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS)

Chinese volunteers and indigenous force dispersed in multiple directions. The squad noted the jamming cave for fu- ture efforts and moved on to continue with their designated mission to meet with the village elders. The squad goes on the move again and continued to the village center as the village elders and dogs re-emerged out of nowhere. After an uneventful hour long dialog with village elders, the squad moved two kilometers to a hill that overlooked the village in the center of the small valley and called for their pre-arranged extract. Twenty- four minutes later, a flight of 2 MV-22s emerged flying low up the valley from the south. One took the high covering position and covered with its organic guns and rockets while Dash-2 came into the LZ and picked up the squad. The squad’s ability to communicate was the key to their successful completion of the mis- After one mid-air refueling from an- sion. (Photo by Sgt Jesus Sepulveda Torres.) other MV-22 with an internal gas bag, the squad was deposited back on the As they discussed the ambush, and LCpl Infrastructure had ideas to Belleau Wood. there was a clear agreement they had insure network availability. He told two deficiencies. First, their very lim- them to write them up and provide Hot Wash and De-Brief ited line of sight surveillance ring a diagram that he could use tonight. The squad moved off the flight deck on the terrain they worked. Second, Sgt Franklin knew the 5G LTE, 3 immediately to turn in ammunition the valley-to-valley communications Tier (squad local net, platoon area net, and proceeded directly to the company with higher echelons, which was both and company high net) network, each debriefing spaces. Each Marine received their lifeline and their asymmetrical worked independently and together two ice-cold beers as the company intel- advantage, was extremely limited due based on geography. He would bring ligence chief began his debrief where to the disconnected, intermittent, and Sgt ‘Sparks’ with him tonight and let the Marines provided insights into what latency communications environment him explain the new ideas. The first they observed during the patrol. The coupled with their desire to protect idea was to simply bring three or four assistant squad leader was compiling their electronic signature to avoid de- additional Wi-Fi hockey pucks to es- their patrol route from the insert LZ tection. Sgt Franklin wanted concrete tablish the “on call” tactical hot spot. to extract LZ on his patrol tablet while recommendations he and the assistant They had only brought three H-Pucks, getting coordinates from both the JFO squad leader could make to the “Old per their SOP, and used all three in on his fire missions and Infrastructure Man” in the formal battalion de-brief today’s ambush. The recommenda- on where they put up the tactical hot that evening. What the squad came tion was to change to six pucks and spots. The assistant squad leader’s re- up with was not new, but Franklin distribute the added weight among port would be added to the company wanted to document and make his the patrol members. The second was intelligence chief’s debrief. Then, the point since they had been surprised to experiment by putting a hot spot squad leader led a hot wash-up discus- and ambushed. For surveillance, he hockey puck in the quad-copter even sion which dissected the firefight—the wanted two quad-copters per patrol if it meant duct taping it to the belly. good, the bad, and the ugly. The good and his UAS operator assured him he The theory, which had been talked was they took no causalities, gained could run both simultaneously. That about for years (or as long as the squad fire superiority, and shut down and would double the coverage area of sur- could remember), was to extend the dispersed the Chinese mercenaries. veillance and let one quad run in front communications reach by using the The bad was they were out of com- of them while the second took a higher quad-copter as communications relay. munications for a period of time in the orbit and covered the flanking valley They wanted that option on patrol streambed until they established the ridge lines. It also gave them a backup. to be able to slap in an H-puck and tactical hot spot. The ugly was they Franklin had been in the Corps long launch the quad from their position. were surprised. The Squad Leader was enough to understand why the master Their request was for battalion to get not pleased and asked for recommenda- sergeant always said, “It takes two to permission from the ship for time and tions from his squad. get one.” The communication team airspace off the ship’s fantail to launch

54 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 and recover the quad-copter with duct supporting arms which was his asym- Communications Summary tape hot spot and determine feasibility metrical advantage. The communications within the of transmitting to another ship and de- This reinforced squad patrol of 21 squad (squad member to squad mem- termining what communications range Marines and Corpsmen* was on a dis- ber) was via wave hopping and forming they could get from what altitude as tributed operation with planned and line of sight low frequency squad net. well as learn and refine their concept. assured support from company and Control of the line of sight UAS was The Squad Leader was optimistic as external supporting arms, giving them a dedicated narrow beam low detect he and the assistant squad leader headed an asymmetrical advantage that had frequency. External operational com- to “officers’ country” for the battalion been enabled by the squad local net- munications was a combination of 5G de-brief. He knew the Old Man had work interfaced with a mid-tier reach LTE bridged over from squad net to fought in Afghanistan as a young cor- back network—squad controlled and external operational level via bridge to poral and later captain, and that he built. The squad knew they had been MUOS SatComm radio transceiver understood no comm zones in valley detected somewhere along their five- system. floors will become kill zones. Now hour patrol before the ambush was Innovation. What enabled the local that they were in the Pacific jungles in initiated. The question was where and communication and bridging to ex- stream beds, he felt that the battalion ternal communications was the tacti- commander would understand and sup- cal infrastructure deployed by the squad port both recommendations for squad leader to establish his own local, low innovations. After they had proved and The squad knew they detect hot spot network. This was done incorporated those innovations into had been detected by the Infrastructure Marine shooting their squad and battalion’s SOPs, Sgt two hockey pucks from his M-79E up Franklin thought he might even write somewhere along their to the adjacent hills that flanked the it up and try for that cash award from five-hour patrol. creek. The hockey pucks could be set the Marine Corps Gazette. for 6-, 12- or 24-hours duration, had a As Sgt Franklin dissected this simple timed disablement, and an additional firefight, he uncovered the key enablers on command self-destruct capability. to the success of this distributed opera- how? After the hard lessons learned in The Wi-Fi enablers were line-of-sight to tions of his squad operating indepen- 2019 fights in Western Syria, where the a gateway bridge carried in Infrastruc- dently to be the three Marines of his Wagner Group of Russian mercenar- ture’s backpack that had direct capable CEWT, which had been added in 2021 ies had the electronic warfare initiative option to radio’s/LTE or Wi-Fi Bridge. bringing his organic squad from twelve (EW), the Marine Corps realized that Lesson Learned. To receive support- to fifteen Marines.* The increased struc- EW capabilities and structure needed to ing arms and to coordinate internally, a ture and capabilities they brought had be organic at the lowest unit operating squad operating in a distributed EABO enabled the squad to operate in a distrib- in a distributed battle. This was mainly must have communications. In the ci- uted operation against a peer adversary because there simply is not sufficient vilian world we assume and forget the with electronic capabilities and win. Sgt time to collect EW, process it, and dis- annual billion dollar infrastructure in- Franklin now knew that he could main- seminate it in a distributed operations vestment made by the large cell phone tain and fight his network to his squad’s environment. The straight forward so- carriers. In a firefight, without civilian advantage. The low detectable network lution was to embed the EW capability infrastructure, this 2025 squad had its operating allowed him to employ the within the rifle squad. Early in 2021, own tactical hot spot. the Marine Corps added the organic Battalion Commander. At the end of CEWT to every rifle squad: composed the de-brief, the battalion commander *2018 Squad Composition: Twelve Marines of a SatComm/radio team lead (carried concurred with Sgt Franklin and issued consisting of 3 three-man fire teams and a MOUS SatComm transceiver) and two instructions to his S-3 and S-6 to im- three Marine headquarters team composed EW Marines that had the capability to mediately incorporate the two recom- of squad leader, assistant squad leader/ DF, collect, and jam. One Marine car- mendations into the battalions tactics, JFO, and UAS/systems operator. ried the backpack TEWT and a second techniques, and procedures. He then 2021 Squad: Fifteen Marines: Twelve-man Marine humped a kit bag of multiple ordered Sgt Franklin to prepare a PME 2018 squad plus organic three-Marine antennas for the TEWT and the rebuilt class for all squad leaders, SNCOs, and CEWT (one SatComm/radio operator; EW/ M-79 for the hockey puck self-forming, officers to receive prior to future dis- TEWT operator; and one network Infra- self-healing Wi-Fi enablers. This junior tributed operations. The sergeant major structure operator). Marine packhorse—carrying a bag of authorized an additional beer ration for The 2025 Firefight Squad (Rein): T/O 2021 antennas, a bag of hockey pucks to the 3d Squad! squad of fifteen plus attachments of a two enable Wi-Fi, and his M-79E—was man machine gun team, two-man 60 mortar dubbed by the squad as Infrastructure team, and two Navy corpsmen. for his ability to enable communica- tions infrastructure.

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 55 IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATIONS) Fighting Over Parsley? Perejil Island case study by LCpl Armstead Liebl

n the morning 18 July 2002, 28 Spanish Commandos of the elite Grupo de Opera- ciones Especiales III inserted Oby 4 Eurocopter Cougar helicopters of the and stormed the islet of Perejil. They quickly captured the Moroccan occupying force of six Moroccan naval cadets before trium- phantly raising the Spanish flag. Perejil Island, only 37 acres in size just off the mainland of Morocco, was well within Morocco’s territorial waters but had been a Spanish possession since 1580. Later in the day, having secured the island, troops of the landed and replaced the commandos. The Legionnaires fortified the island to repel any potential Moroccan counter- attack. Morocco, presented with a fait The islet of Perejil. (Photo by common.wikimedia.org.) accompli, announced to the world that the Spanish “invasion” amounted to a Marinids, and were Moroccan Arabs Spanish landing numerous troops and “declaration of war.” claiming descent from the Hejaz). The establishing protectorates over Alaouite Perejil Island is a small island located Saadi were vassals, albeit very loosely, of Moroccan territory before claiming 250 meters off the coast of Morocco. It the distant (the Otto- them as colonies a decade later. North- is known in Spanish as Isla de Perejil, mans were themselves enmeshed in the ern Morocco and the or Parsley Island, and is mainly used “revolts and revivals” period, which last- was controlled by Spain, while France by local Moroccan shepherds to graze ed from 1566 to 1683, and essentially controlled the rest of Morocco. These livestock. The island is fairly barren let Morocco make its own way against regions remained under colonial control except for the wild parsley growing on the Spanish and Portuguese); however, until Morocco, still under the Alaouite the island, hence the name. Originally they ruled mainly interior Morocco, dynasty, regained its independence in occupied in 1415 by Portugal (when leaving the Spanish enclaves alone. This 1956. However, Spain continued to King John I also took from the policy was also maintained by the suc- retain control of several enclaves, in- disintegrating Marinid Berber dynasty), ceeding Alaouite dynasty, which came cluding Perejil Island. This presumably the island came under the control of to power in 1666 and remains in power set the stage for a future action against Spain in 1580 during the reign of Philip to this day. Spain by the Moroccans. I of Portuga— also known as Philip II In the 1890s, Europe again intrud- On 11 July 2002, a squad of frontier of Spain—under the . ed into Morocco with the French and guards from the Moroccan Auxiliary When the Union split in 1640, Perejil Forces (a paramilitary force from the Island and Ceuta remained under Span- Ministry of Interior that can supple- ish sovereignty, while the majority of ment the national Gendarmerie, the Morocco remained under Saadi Sultan- >LCpl Liebl is assigned to 2d Bat- Army, or—more usually—the Mo- ate control (the Saadi were successors talion, 2d Marines, Camp Lejeune. roccan Customs and the Brigade of to the Wattasids, who had defeated the Forests and Water as firefighters) called

56 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 mokhaznis, equipped with small arms, The news was greeted with outrage should recognize Moroccan sovereignty two flags, and a radio, landed on Perejil by the Spanish people, who likened it over Perejil Island. In the Arab league, Island. This was the first amphibious to the Falklands War (the Spanish did every member supported Morocco ex- landing conducted on “European soil” not call that conflict by the Argentin- cept for Algeria, which reaffirmed their since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in ian name but always used the British recognition of Spanish sovereignty over 1974 (Operation YILDIZ ATMA-4, in term of the “Falklands”). The Span- the Exclaves of Ceuta, , and most English Operation STAR DROP-4). The ish government rejected the premise specifically, Perejil Island. mokhaznis, usually colloquially called that the occupation of Perejil was to After receiving protests from the mroud (Berber for a type of grasshop- monitor illegal immigration and sent Spanish government, Morocco rapidly per) by Moroccans, raised the red and three patrol boats to the island that replaced the original mokhaznis with green flag of Morocco over the island, were then confronted by two Moroccan naval cadets to set up a permanent base set up camp, and scanned the horizon fishing boats “protecting” the Island. on the island. Spanish officers from the for any Spanish reaction force. Mean- Other Moroccan naval vessels were Guardia Civil police force arrived on a while, the Moroccan people were not “coincidentally” conducting maneu- small patrol boat a few days after the informed of the event, and the King vers nearby as well. Neither side was Moroccan occupation but were “per- was unavailable for comment. Senior apparently willing to yield, and the suaded” to leave at gunpoint. This in- Moroccan officials, in response to stage was set—if pursued by both—for cident combined with the “naval force” Spanish protests about the landing, war. guarding the island indicated that stated that Morocco had no intention International reactions to this debacle Morocco clearly had no intention of of removing the “frontier guards” from were mixed. In the European Union, leaving Perejil. Spanish radio stations the island. To support this, Morocco every member nation except for France were being overwhelmed by callers de- stated they needed the island to aid and Portugal denounced Morocco’s ac- manding the invaders be driven back in monitoring illegal immigration and tions, issuing a “statement of regret” for to the Moroccan mainland. Clearly, the that the island was located well within the situation but in support of Spain. Spanish people demanded that Spain Moroccan territorial waters. France and Portugal stated that Spain act—and act they did.

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The Spanish response after the initial rebuff was swift. First, Spanish forces reinforced the other enclaves they con- trolled in Africa, Ceuta, and Melilla to deter any further Moroccan aggression. Spain dispatched patrol boats and other naval craft to observe the island and monitor all Moroccan military activi- ties in the area. Then, on the morning of 18 July, Spain launched Operation ROMEO-SIERRA, a helicopter-borne as- sault on Perejil Island. The operation was executed in less than an hour, re- sulting in a bloodless victory for Spanish forces, the Moroccan garrison captured, and the island returned to Spanish con- trol. The prisoners were then transferred via helicopter to Ceuta and kept in the headquarters of the Guardia Civil. Later that same day, the Spanish commandos were replaced by the Spanish Legion The Spanish Eurocopter Cougar during bilateral training with the Marine Corps. (Photo by Sgt who fortified the island and remained to Kassie McDole.) garrison the island against any further Moroccan aggression. Spanish control of Perejil Island. Sub- Morocco announced its outrage, de- sequently, the Spanish Legionnaires oc- manding the Spanish leave Perejil Island cupying Perejil Island were withdrawn. immediately and accusing Spain of de- Currently, the island is This little-known episode, fortu- claring war on Morocco. Spain refused again deserted but re- nately bloodless, does give pause for to withdraw, stating that Perejil Island reflection. First, why did Morocco em- was an integral part of Spain. With war mains under Spanish ploy Ministry of Interior forces to seize threatening, talks were begun between the island only to then replace them the two nations with the United States control ... with naval cadets? Why did Morocco mediating. Morocco eventually agreed use fishing boats, presumably lightly to return to the status quo that existed armed as they deterred the initial Span- before the events of 11 July, namely ish patrol boat response, instead of real naval combatants (which they had)? It almost seemed as if Morocco wanted to have its forces defeated on the island, assuming Spain would respond with overwhelming military force. Is it pos- sible that Morocco was playing a deeper game, one in which it instigated a situ- ation in which Spanish Commandoes killed naval cadets (“children” would be the outraged cry), resulting in a global moral condemnation that would force Spain to hand over Perejil Island? For- tunately, the highly-disciplined Spanish troops averted that situation, so we will never know. Currently, the island is again deserted but remains under Spanish control, pre- sumably with Moroccan goat herders once again stealing over to graze their goats upon the wild parsley.

Marines train with Spanish forces. (Photo by SSgt Vitaliy Rusavokiy.)

58 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 IDEAS & ISSUES (LEADERSHIP) The Resurrection of General O.P. Smith Historic reflection and the future of naval expeditionary power and the future operating environment by Maj Ryan W. Pallas

his is a work of historical fic- great organization confronts the latter tion. The date is 25 April more than the former. This will not be 2039, and the location is >Maj Pallas is the Operations Officer, a sea story of times long ago where I Quantico, VA. The 41st Com- HMH-463. reflect on my time in uniform; rather, Tmandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Mc- after my recent briefing, three topics Dermott, has invited Gen O.P. Smith, the have emerged as actionable items for all historic leader in the battle of the Pacific levels within our Corps to keep it the and iconic mind who successfully execut- to better equip you for what you may most lethal fighting force in the DOD. ed a fighting withdraw from the Chosin face tomorrow. Although things have After I review these three points, I Reservoir with First Marine Division, to dramatically changed with regard to was asked by Gen McDermott to field speak to the students in Quantico. This training, technology, budgeting, and questions, and I greatly look forward to is a speech given to the students of Com- equipment, our Corps has withstood the dialogue which is to follow. Without mand and Staff and the War College by cyclical turbulence—preserving the further ado, let’s begin. Gen O.P. Smith, tying historic principles sacrosanct ideals which are the back- to the modern battlefield.1 bone of our Corps both on and off the Communications “Good morning Marines, Sailors, battlefield. Throughout the past few weeks, I soldiers, airmen, allies, and partners. I The next 30 or so minutes will ad- have received numerous briefs from the want to thank General McDermott for dress the good as well as the bad. Any DOD and was astonished at the tech- bestowing this privilege to allow me, for the first time in fact, to share my experi- ences with you in an attempt to bridge past to present as well as marry tried and tested principles with the rapidly evolving battlefield of tomorrow. As one of the few Marine generals to face the Chinese on the battlefield, it seems some of my lessons learned are still applicable today with the current National Defense Strategy. I’ve spent the past two weeks around Washington, receiving numerous briefs and reviewing policy and concepts from some of the most senior members of the DOD down to the most junior Sailors and Marines within our ranks. Many things have changed over a century, but the same principles that made our Corps great during my time in uniform remain intact today. What I intend to provide today is a glimpse into my experiences in the Pacific and Korea to try and correlate those experiences Gen Smith presenting an award following his retirement. (Photo by Sgt A.O. Flagg.)

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nology given to the youngest Marines the bugle calls cut through the howling on the battlefield. I was given a tour of winds and reduced visibility that our the watch facility at the Pentagon and Marines endured. was told many other operational control Our signal communication was centers have similar technologies. I was not up to standard. For example, it in awe at the amount of televisions on took more than two days to receive the walls. In my day, a family was lucky instructions from higher-level units. to have one television, something I did Rapid changes of the enemy’s situa- not imagine to be so applicable today tion and the slow motion of our signal in a watch center, but something that communications caused us to lose our seems very useful. opportunities in combat and rendered This increased flow of information the instructions of the higher-level units to the highest levels of command must ineffective.3 While it appears the Ma- greatly enhance the common operation- rine Corps has taken steps to remediate al picture, something I am envious of. the lack of information flow, I must cau- During the island hopping campaign tion that an overcorrection is equally in the Pacific, as the Assistant Division debilitating. When speaking with some Commander, I am reminded of a time of the junior Marines, they articulated when LtCol Puller—name may ring a a requirement for information to higher bell to most of you here—went ashore headquarters which would impede their during an amphibious landing where BGen Oliver P. Smith. (Photo from Defense Dept progress on the battlefield and during I was unable to contact him because A401792.) training. some communications equipment was A lack of information is equally as destroyed during the landing. I had suc- Lack of communications wasn’t an dangerous as an overflow of informa- cessfully established communications isolated event as I experienced the same tion. Commanders at every level must with 5th and 7th Marines, but 1st Ma- problem while in Korea as the com- distinguish what required information rines to the north only sent fragmentary mander of 1st Marine Division. Be- must be shared to higher headquarters, news. tween the severe cold, wintry storms, while higher headquarters must distin- This did not concern me as I knew distance, and terrain, the battlefield guish what is an actual requirement LtCol Puller was a talented warfighter, wreaked havoc on our communica- from subordinate elements. This is and I had spent time with each of the tions Marines. This wasn’t a division- just as important in garrison as it is in regimental commanders before going specific problem either; other units combat. We must all be cognizant of the ashore to review the plan. Each com- from X Corps, under the command requirements we set for our subordinates mander ensured me they understood the of MG Edward Almond, USA, were as well as the second and third order commander’s intent and would be able dispersed up to one hundred miles effects these requirements have on their daily operations and ability to succeed. We must take into account the habits we perpetuate in garrison will ultimately A clearly articulated commander’s intent will always transfer to a combat environment. Are serve you well—simple and executable down to the these the habits we want to bestow to our units to enable them to fight and lowest levels. win? Communications between ground units was important, but during our to execute despite our severely degraded with little to no communications at time in Korea, our communications communications. A clearly articulated times. This is not only a Marine Corps had to bridge the gap between air-to- commander’s intent will always serve problem, but one that faced our ad- ground as well. The concept you call you well—simple and executable down versaries as well. the “MAGTF,” didn’t exist during my to the lowest levels. Two questions to The Chinese were a tough, deter- time, but it seems as great an acronym as reflect upon: First, are we as leaders mined, ill-equipped, but capable ad- any to capture the abilities of a Marine comfortable with being uncomfortable versary. Their communications and unit. For the first time on the battle- with the lack of information flow that equipment were rudimentary at best. field, Marine aviation supported the will ultimately arise from a combat en- Below the battalion level, communica- men on the ground with great success. vironment? Second, are our Marines tions was by runner supplemented with My counterpart as the wing commander trained well enough to succeed over a bugles, whistles, flares, and flashlights.2 was an indispensable ally in our fight on period of days or weeks without guid- Through the vast darkness, when they the ground, and those heroic souls of the ance from higher? launched most of their offensive attacks, sky provided the requisite support, sup-

60 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 plies, ordnance, and casualty evacuation Naval Shipping and Gunfire driving troop transport trucks up and through some of the most tumultuous Our Service was born a sea-based down the streets of Camp Pendleton of weather conditions. I guess looking organization from our inception, and look for volunteers but also through back on it, the Marines in Korea gave I am glad to see our ties with the working side-by-side with military and birth to the MAGTF concept which Navy remain strong today. Gen Mc- civilian workers to expedite shipping still thrives today. Dermott gave me the great honor to our vehicles, equipment, and Marines Technology has taken this commu- dine with him and the Chief of Naval across the Pacific Ocean. Some words nications between air-to-ground units Operations, ADM Stewart: a thinker of wisdom: a talented Marine can talk to the next level, which I applaud but and true warrior in the art of the sea. tactics, but an expert will always speak warily approach because of signature ADM Stewart inquired about my big- logistics. management. Our counter-signals intel- gest concerns as a commander, and The division lacked shipping and ligence was always behind in accurately two factors came to mind which were heavily depended on commercial sup- tracking the Chinese forces because of directly correlated to our Navy at the port; however, we ran into friction when their lack of emissions. I never thought time of my service. the city of San Diego banned military a cymbal had any place on the battle- First, when I left my post as Assistant vehicles from utilizing civilian roadways field, but when used by the approach- Commandant of the Marine Corps to to get to the port. As Marines, we found ing enemy, it not only commanded in- take over as 1st Marine Division Com- a way, but this was not without the help stant action by the Chinese forces but mander, I arrived in San Diego, CA, of our Navy brothers-in-arms. The lo- evoked a psychological factor on some with no notice that the 1st Marine Di- gistics support provided by military and of the men over time. We must think vision had been ordered to Korea. My commercial vessels seems to be an on- something as simple and effective as a chief of staff rang me late in the evening going dialogue today and must remain musical instrument commanding men at the hotel to inform me the division so because our effectiveness as Marines on the battlefield seems worth looking would depart in a matter of days. From hinges upon this. A lack of adequate at for the future with respect to noise that notification, we turned to and not shipping, both commercial and military, signature. only started recruiting Marines by will only delay our ability to mass fire

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power and close with and destroy an personal and professional—outside of correlate to warfighting. Perhaps Gen enemy force. The Marine Corps will these walls. McDermott could consolidate these remain the first to fight, and shipping It seems the information requirement requirements in the future. I was also is a critical enabler. to be a Marine is no longer linear. I very pleased to see the Commandant’s The second piece to naval shipping thought I served with some of the most Reading List bolstering self-paced study, is armament and fire power. During the intellectually developed warriors of our providing a starting point for all Ma- battles I saw from ship-to-shore, both Corps, but after some of my interactions rines of every rank. in the Pacific and Korean peninsula, this week, it seems the sergeants of our I do not envy the tasks that lay ahead we depended greatly on the firepower Corps will quickly surpass this metric. for you; in fact, your tasks are infinitely brought to bear on our adversaries by This is a great problem to have. Young more challenging than the tasks I faced naval gunfire. The integration of Ma- Marines should push their leaders to with my Marines almost a century ago. rine aviation and naval gunfire seems to learn as much as imaginably possible What I can tell you is the technology and have made leaps and bounds in progress because there will always be another principles we so greatly depended upon to support the warrior on the ground. I conflict we must prepare for that cur- are as applicable today as they were then, ask that you continue to look for unique regardless of the advances made since. and innovative ways to arm, not only The Marine Corps no longer requires naval ships, but implement weapons linear thinkers, but exponential. The systems on ships that historically were It seems the informa- pace at which information flows and viewed as troop transport. I was briefed the global landscape shifts moves at an this week that the Marine Corps has tion requirement to be alarming rate which requires the most launched artillery from the sea. I would a Marine is no longer prepared warriors our Corps has ever pay good money to see that firsthand. produced. I find it no coincidence the We must continue to find innovative linear. adversary I met almost a century ago ways to arm naval ships. just south of the Yalu River is the same Two points must remain in the fore- one you must prepare to meet tomorrow. front of your planning when weaponiz- rently seems improbable. We are lucky Thank you all for your time, your ing the naval fleet: First, with a fanatical to have such educated men and women service, and God bless the United States enemy, the main job still has to be done in our NCO ranks today; our success and the Marine Corps. Gen McDer- by the infantry. Second, there is nothing as a Corps hinges upon them. mott, I will turn it over for you to start which will pave the way so infantry may I mentioned earlier I was driving the questions.” walk unmolested—this includes mov- cross-country with my family and ar- ing by sea lanes from port to port. Our rived in San Diego when the call came new National Defense Strategy talks in that the 1st Marine Division would Notes about the different layers of fighting go to Korea to fight a determined and 1. The concept for this article was derived from forces, and it seems only natural you capable enemy. I did not have time to multiple sources: Hampton Sides, On Desper- will be required in a future conflict to study because my time needed to be ate Ground: The Marines at The Reservoir, the fight ship-to-shore as we did then, but spent with my staff and Marines to Korean War’s Greatest Battle, (New York, NY: this time against a much more capable ensure we had what was required for Doubleday, October 2018); Gail Shisler, For and developed peer adversary. the upcoming battle. My mind was Country and Corps: The Life of General Oliver consumed with requirements, equip- P. Smith, (Anapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, October 2009); Gen Holland M. Smith and Education ment, manpower, and very little time Percy Finch, Coral and Brass, (New York, NY: I was given the gift of education remained to study an enemy we would Charles Scribner’s and Sons, 1949); and BGen throughout my life and career as a Ma- soon meet in hand-to-hand combat. My Edwin H. Simmons, Frozen Chosin: U.S. Ma- rine. I was the benefactor of being the preparation was done earlier for a battle rines at the Changjin Resevoir, (Scott’s Valley, first Marine to graduate from France’s I never knew I would fight. What does CA: CreateSpace Publishing, May 2014). “Ecole de Guerre,” a two-year school that mean for all of you? of war games and training. A very dif- Every second counts. From the min- 2. Frozen Chosin. ficult course to navigate as I imagine ute you wake up in the morning un- the current seats you fill today are very til your head hits the pillow at night, 3. Ibid. similar. we—as leaders—can always be learning. My last point is for the requirement I mentioned to Gen McDermott that for every leader, both officer and en- providing time back to the individual listed, to continue to learn throughout Marine is a prerequisite to ensure we their time in uniform. My estimate is an have the thinkers on the battlefield to easily achievable goal when in a school ensure our success. I was surprised at the environment, but probably somewhat amount of training you all must do on problematic with responsibilities—both an annual basis that does not directly

62 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 Warrior Scholarship for the Junior Officer Understanding leadership development through history, philosophy, and literature by LCDR Jonathan “Shank” Lushenko

he memory of remarkable miracle.”3 Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary leadership is forever etched of State, William Seward,4 best summa- in the annals of history by >LCDR Lushenko is the Maintenance rized Clay’s demeanor when he recalled the deeds of great men and Officer, HSM-51. how his “conversation, his gesture, his Twomen whom, with fastidious prepara- very look, was persuasive, seductive, tion and wisdom, seized a moment in irresistible.”5 history at the intersection of opportu- Tangible results of leadership are nity and duty. Henry Clay, declared by only eclipsed by the routinely intangible as a man “too great Tangible results of lead- qualities of transforming leadership de- to be president,”1 is the quintessential ership are only eclipsed scribed by Burns in his landmark book, example of this enduring leadership. Leadership.6 Indeed, Clay’s reputation Clay’s unbridled devotion to the United by the routinely intan- as a man of impeccable integrity and States throughout his more than fifty gible qualities of trans- tireless labor converted many followers years in public service and five unsuc- and contemporaries into moral agents, cessful attempts at the presidency was forming leadership ... resulting in unprecedented household admired by all Americans of his era, familiarity with his dauntless patriotic including President Abraham Lincoln.2 deeds.7 The ironclad leadership qualities Despite never befriending his political mystic, Lincoln stated, “The spell—the espoused by Clay are resident within idol, Lincoln fortuitously eulogized him long-enduring spell—with which the many other great American leaders. as a young lawyer in 1852. Of Clay’s souls of men were bound to him, is a Presidents John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Har- ry Truman; ADMs William Halsey, Chester Nimitz, and George Dewey; and Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee are prime examples of celebrated leaders who are prominent signposts on the journey to reaching transformational leadership.8 Steadfast intellectual endeavors and practical ap- plication of theorized leadership strate- gies shape a firm, but pliable, leadership philosophy defined by three axioms that can help influence the next generation of military officers with a strong interest in leadership development. In Marcus Cicero’s timeless classic, On a Life Well Spent, the legendary Roman orator and author beautifully defended the prospect of old age and introduced the first axiom vital in lead- ership development: virtue.9 Famously, Our Marines require education and experience. (Photo by Cpl Margaret Gale.) Cicero stated,

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The best Armour of Old Age is a well Combining the three axioms of lead- virtuous intentions. Modeling the way spent Life preceeding it; a Life em- ership development yields a definition of and championing a sense of pride in ployed in the Pursuit of useful Knowl- leadership that grows from a product of morally intrinsic values of leadership edge, in honourable Actions and the effective intuitive practices into a phi- will produce leaders and followers who Practice of Virtue … a Conscience losophy that is rooted in the research of view singular reliance upon transac- bearing Witness that our life was well leadership scholars and philosophers: tional leadership in which the “I say, spent, together with the Remembrance you do” mentality is viewed as a feeble of past good Actions, yields an un- Leadership is a consequence of virtu- 10 approach to leadership. Leading by ex- speakable Comfort to the Soul. ous duty obligations and unfaltering ample to inspire followers into agents Indeed, living in a virtuous manner is behavioral integrity that inspiration- of moral accomplishment may include something officers are expected to as- ally transforms followers from mutu- the risk of physical harm and career pire toward. Although certainly not as ally understood transactional roles into immobility when holding firm to prin- scholarly as the previously mentioned intrinsically motivated agents of moral ciples of right and wrong; however, it accomplishment. work, Frank Sinatra’s 1969 hit song, My is critical to achieving excellence and Way, is a good colloquial description of Virtuous duty obligations are clearly ev- reaching transformational leadership. this understanding of a successful life. ident in the history of the United States To that end, officers should study scho- Woven into the fabric of the song is the and the world. Henry Clay is one ex- lastically celebrated leadership models notion of living one’s life in a worthy ample of a citizen-solider who virtuously and associated literature. manner. served the American citizenry out of a Introduced by Bolman and Deal, the The implicit notion of a dignified sense of duty. Other examples abound; four-frame approach—structural, sym- life suggested in Sinatra’s My Way sum- Ghandi, Nelson Mandela, Marquis de bolic, human resources, political—is mons reference to behavioral integrity. Lafayette, and Abraham Lincoln are important for newly commissioned of- Defined by Tony Simons, behavioral world-renowned examples of leaders ficers to consider because this approach integrity is the who leveraged leadership mandates to is closely related to situational leadership inspirationally transform followers into and path-goal theory described by Nort- perceived pattern of alignment be- morally accomplished agents of change. house.15 Since, human personalities are tween an actor’s words and deeds … Likewise, military officers have a a function of behavior and environment, In other words, behavioral integrity is profound influence on those they lead leadership interactions and teachable the extent to which [followers] perceive and through whom they impart per- moments may vary remarkably between that their [leaders] tend to represent themselves and their motivating val- sonally attainable qualities of charac- Sailors or Marines of the same divi- ues.11 ter and leadership. Officers have a duty sion or platoon and demand officers obligation to present followers with a treat all followers with equal respect.16 This second axiom is inherent to a suc- leadership model that promotes un- Situational imperatives often dictate cessful leadership philosophy—lead- faltering behavioral integrity through a multi-pronged, dynamic approach ing by example—and is synonymous with behavioral integrity which, upon reflection, is critical in leadership de- velopment. The third axiom that is imperative in leadership development is a blend of three elements taken from three stal- warts of leadership theory: the influ- ence component of Rost’s definition of leadership;12 the morally contagious leadership outcome espoused by trans- forming leadership but which is tem- pered by the more achievable concept of transformational leadership;13 and the incentive-based element of transactional leadership.14 In other words, leadership is an influential relationship between leaders and followers that may, or may not, reach morally replicated outcomes among followers but is generally the result of a mutually understood trans- actional relationship that exists in the A solid foundation of values and maximizing talents through training helps leaders at all lev- leader-follower relationship. els within the Marine Corps. (Photo by LCpl Jose Gonzalez.)

64 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 to task-oriented outcomes. In other ous approaches to leadership may even- Adams, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, words, any given leadership scenario tually necessitate change. One way to 2001); Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore may necessitate a directive, supportive, avoid stagnant growth and development Roosevelt, (New York, NY: The Modern Li- participative, or achievement-oriented as a leader is through fastidious intel- brary, 2001); Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex, approach.17 lectual activity and critical reflection on (New York, NY: 2002); Joseph Thomas, editor, Leadership Embodied: The Secrets to Success of the Most Effective Navy and Marine Corps Leaders, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005); Joseph Thomas, “Bet You Never Heard of This Leadership Trait,” Journal of Leadership Educa- For what is a man, what has he got, if not for himself, tion, (2010); and J.F.C Fuller, Grant and Lee: A then he has naught, to say the things he truly feels, and Study in Personality and Generalship, (Bloom- ington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1957). not the words of one who kneels, the record shows I 9. Cicero, On a Life Well Spent, (Delray Beach, took the blows, and did it my way. FL: Levenger Press, 2006). —Frank Sinatra 21 10. Ibid.

11. Tony Simons, “Behavioral Integrity: The Recently resurging from the clutches past great leaders such as Henry Clay. Perceived Alignment between Managers’ Words of academic criticism, trait theory is a Ultimately, military officers who are and Deeds as a Research Focus,” (Ithara, NY: solid foundation for leadership devel- serious about the scholarship of lead- Cornell University School of Hotel Administra- opment. Many leadership philosophers ership development will gain pride in tion, February 2002). and researchers identified by Northouse knowing, have proven that leaders generally vary those who spend their Time in im- 12. Joseph Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, (New York, NY: Praeger, 1991). from followers in terms of “intelligence, proving others in Knowledge, and self-confidence, determination, integrity teaching the nobler Arts, when their 18 13. Bernard Bass, “From Transaction to Trans- and sociability.” An under-educated natural Strength of Body fails them, formation Leadership: Learning to Share the officer may discount the potential of a are intituled [entitled] to our highest Vision,” Organizational Dynamics, (Amsterdam, 20 Sailor or Marine who does not demon- Regard and Esteem. NL: Elsevier, 1990). See also Richard Couto, strate one or all of these traits. However, “The Transformation of Transforming Leader- Thomas best describes a modern ap- ship,” (Washington, DC: American Political plication of trait theory when he states: Science Association, 1993). Notes Leadership is largely about maximizing 1. David Heidler and Jeanne Heidler, Henry 14. Leadership. inherent talents and then combining Clay: The Essential American, (New York, NY: those talents with experience and edu- Random House, 2010). 15. Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard, “Life-Cycle cation. By applying this combination Theory of Leadership,” Training and Develop- of inherent traits and developed abili- 2. Ibid. ment Journal, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1969); ties in accordance with a foundation of and Peter Northouse, Leadership: Theory and values, we all have the opportunity to 3. Ibid. Practice, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2007). fulfill our potential as effective lead- See also Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal, Re- ers.19 4. Doris Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political framing Organizations, (fourth edition), (San Genius of Abraham Lincoln, (New York, NY: Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2008). Adopting this outlook will help junior Simon & Schuster Paperback, 2005); see also officers develop subordinates of diverse Henry Clay: The Essential America. 16. Kurt Lewin, Principles of Topological Psy- backgrounds through empathy and chology, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1936). strong emotional intelligence. 5. Ibid. The integration of proven leader- 17. Leadership: Theory and Practice. 6. James Burns, Leadership, (New York, NY: ship concepts into a personal leader- 18. Ibid. ship philosophy is important to grow Harper & Row, 1978). and mature as a leader. Like education, 7. Henry Clay: The Essential American. 19. “Bet You Never Heard of this Leadership leadership is a life-long endeavor that Trait.” continually challenges our character 8. Nancy Arbuthonot, Guiding Lights: United and is the result of experiential learn- States Naval Academy Monuments and Memo- 20. On a Life Well Spent. ing. Officers with established leadership rials, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, philosophies should remain cognizant 2009). See also: Team of Rivals; David Mc- 21. Frank Sinatra, My Way, Reprise Records, of the ever-changing environments in Cullogh, Truman, (New York, NY: Simon 1969. which they work and realize that previ- & Schuster, 1992); David McCullogh, John

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 65 IDEAS & ISSUES (PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION) Po River Valley Wargame The after-action report by Capt Matthew Tweedy

n 31 March 2017, instruc- tegic alliances or rivalries. Some play- tors from The Basic School ers are the sole commander for their (TBS) and Infantry Offi- >Capt Tweedy is a Rifle Company nation-state, while others employ their cer Course participated in Commander in 2d Marine Division. forces cooperatively with other players. Oa series of table-top wargames in the During each turn, players constantly Vandergrift Conference Room. The make decisions based on initiative (who event was facilitated by LtCol Timothy strikes first), weather, supply routes, Powledge from the Naval War College from the Naval War College that simu- road conditions, and battlefield capa- and Maj Jake Clayton from Advanced lates a campaign from the Napoleonic bilities related to combined arms, siege Infantry Training Battalion-West. Wars in southern Italy from 1796 to tactics, supply trains, and reconnais- The purpose was to introduce table- 1797. Players act as generals fighting for sance. top wargaming to the TBS instructor either Austria, France, or the Piedmont. The Vandegrift room was divided staff in order to apply maneuver warfare One particular iteration of the Po River between four tables with four separate concepts and tactical planning methods Valley game requires 3-4 players and game boards. TBS played three games. in a time competitive, decision-forcing lasts between 30-120 minutes. Players Upon the conclusion of each game, exercise against a thinking enemy. can choose from multiple scenarios for participants rotated their national al- any given iteration of the game; each legiance, role, and opponents. At the The Game scenario offering unique objectives and conclusion of the event, each participant Po River Valley is a turn-based constraints. Players command armies had both played alone and cooperatively. wargame designed by Dr. Nick Murray of various sizes, capabilities, and stra- Event Summary The event lasted from 0730-1700 with a 30-minute break for lunch. The day was divided between an event intro- duction, a review of the board game’s rules, three iterations of game play, and a debrief. LtCol Powledge introduced table-top wargaming as a “lost method” in an officer’s training. Wargaming demands time-competitive decision- making against an opposing force while under the influence of battlefield dy- namics—all essential for the cultiva- tion of judgment and effective decision making. He framed the event as both a training opportunity and a mirror to evaluate individual tactical planning and decision-making capabilities. An hour of rules and gameplay re- view followed. At 1000, the facilitators supervised a “beta” game. The focus of the beta game was to solidify gameplay, develop hands on understanding, and The map utilized during the wargame. (Map provided by author.) work through game mechanics. By the

66 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 end of the beta game, players grasped the concepts, understood the restraints and constraints of the game, and were prepared for competitive gameplay. Two competitive games were con- ducted between 1100 and 1700. Games lasted 90 minutes and were preceded by 25 minutes of dedicated tactical planning time and after-action review (AAR) discussions internal to each table upon completion of play. The first sce- nario pitted the invading French against a small Piedmont army and a larger Austrian force. Piedmont and Austria had the choice to strike an alliance—in- creasing the likelihood of repelling the French—or act independently. France had significant advantages in material, command and control, and initiative but risked overextension and the com- promise of supply routes. Any clear ad- vantages based upon initial force layout were muted by the decisions of each player. Of the four tables, each outcome was distinct to the commanders (play- ers). For the final game, all participants rotated tables and nation-states. The four tables were reduced to three. Each game had a sole French commander de- fending against (three) Austrian armies invading south through the Italian Alps. LtCol Powledge wrapped up the event with a 45 minute AAR/debrief. The ensuing discussion focused entirely on battlefield dynamics and opposing wills. It was a discussion about deci- Players assessing and discussing their next move. (Photo provided by author.) sion making with little reference to the mechanics of gameplay. is what makes this type of training so • “Based on the limited resource re- much more effective.” quirements to actually execute this Player Feedback • “The opposing will—playing across event, there is no excuse not to incor- None of the twelve participants had the table from a thinking enemy— porate it into any institution or unit experience with wargames prior to this enhanced the experience. Executing that purports to develop tac planning event. Each participant left recognizing in an uncertain competitive environ- process and DM [decision-making] that, as a tool to enhance decision mak- ment develops tactical planning and ability.” ing, wargaming is superior to tactical decision-making experiences.” • “The added consideration of enemy decision games, sand table exercises, and • “This event was eye-opening.” response to my actions/decision add- decision forcing case studies. Below is • “The fluidity of the wargame and ed a heretofore little addressed aspect selected feedback from individual AARs interconnectedness of events forces of decision-making in my professional which reflect trends across all partici- players to push their planning horizon development.” pants: farther than in any other method or • “[The game] allowed me to see • “Table-Top wargaming is the most technique I have been exposed to.” that my tactical planning process engaging method for developing de- • “[The] event served as an oppor- has become very intuitive but that is cision-making.” tunity to test the effectiveness of my not necessarily a good thing. I need • “The wargame was much better tactical planning process and deter- to continue to challenge myself with [than tactical decision games, case mine areas of my analysis and plan- these situations and improve how I studies, sand table exercises]. Fight- ning I may be more deficient in than approach [the planning/DM pro- ing another human being in real-time I thought.” cess].”

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 67 IDEAS & ISSUES (PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION)

• “One of the most effective meth- • “This event highlighted how woe- main effort, and battlefield dynamics ods [to develop decision making] be- fully inadequate my skillful applica- enhanced the decision-making cycle of cause it provides a thinking opponent, tion of tac planning was. After three players. Those who understood how to provides a problem to be solved, gives years as a Bullpen, Staff Platoon Com- “attack the enemy’s strategy” rather than immediate feedback WRT [with re- mander, and Infantry Officer Course clash game pieces were more adept at spect to] plan, and after the fact I was instructor, the components of tac plan- imposing their will. finding myself evaluating my SOM ning are second nature. However, I [scheme of maneuver], asking ‘what found that after my planning time Recommendations if,’ and going through the other COAs was up I had applied nothing from • The Basic School should incorporate I had in my mind. No other method it and had allowed myself to become wargaming as an instructor develop- accomplishes these things.” swamped by the uncertainty, mak- ment tool. Instruction will be en- • “Playing across from another live, ing me miss several key factors that I hanced if assistant instructors, SPCs, thinking human being over a board would criticize a student for any day and IOC instructors are regularly en- changes the emotional salience of win- of the week.” gaging in decision-making exercises. ning and losing. Competition takes • “The wargame was able to bring the Experiencing battlefield dynamics and on an entirely different psychological doctrine contained within MDCP 1 an opposing will positively impacts an frame.” [Warfighting] and MCDP 1-3 [Tac- instructor’s approach to instructing • “A welcome and rare opportunity tics] to life [and] to a greater extent and evaluating student officers. for me as an instructor to turn the than anything I had yet experienced • TBS has an established relationship map around, attempt to predict how in training. The nature of war was with LtCol Powledge at the Naval War a couple of ‘enemy’ captains will fight omnipresent. As a player, I experienced College, and he has expressed the me, and see immediately where I am uncertainty, friction, fluidity, com- willingness to return for subsequent wrong and where I am right.” plexity, disorder, and the human di- wargame events. TBS should schedule • “The risk of public failure (in front mension by playing against a thinking another event as early as possible to of my peers) added a valuable layer opponent(s). The science of war was maintain momentum. to every decision that is lacking most brought forth in the constraints and • TBS should purchase multiple cop- other realms of my day-to-day work.” restraints of the game rules, the game ies of the Po River Valley Wargame • “I learned a lot about myself—mo- mechanics, and the forces the player and look to incorporate wargame ments where I was completely ‘inter- commanded that were grounded in events as PME and for formal instruc- nal’ in deep focus on a problem, mo- the realism of the late 18th century. tor development. If TBS had possessed ments where I agonized in uncertainty, The art of war was present as it was a copy of this game, it would be played or felt comfortable taking risks, etc.” the player’s responsibility to achieve now. • “I look at this like high altitude a decision within the constraints of • TBS should explore other wargam- training for elite endurance athletes the scenario. Being cunning, decep- ing opportunities and resources in the or mountaineers. We should be train- tive, bold, and creative while exer- National Capitol Region. ing high and living high wherever cising sound judgment were critical possible to acclimatize. In high al- components to the eventual outcome. >Authors’ Note: Participants in the Po titude, oxygen is limited. Combat is Additionally, the maneuver warfare River Wargame included: Capt Tweedy our high-altitude environment. Time concepts of orienting on the enemy, 0302 (IEP), Capt Berg 0302 (Warfighting and information are limited. We must COG [center of gravity] and CV [criti- Instructor), Capt Bird 0302 (Warfighting force ourselves to perform and make cal vulnerability] analysis, combined Instructor), Capt Anderson 0302 (War- decisions there despite uncertainty and arms, surfaces and gaps, main effort, fighting Instructor), Capt Mortenson 0302 an opposing will.” and determining an overall intent to (IOC), Capt Gliwa 0302 (IOC), Capt No- • “The game not only created an en- your assigned mission were all pres- lan 0302 (IOC), Capt Albano 0302 (IOC), vironment that isolated the relevant ent. I found as the player that when I Capt Long 0302 (IOC), Capt Kasmer 0302 factors in tactical planning in a time ignored the tents of maneuver warfare, (IOC Deputy Director), Capt Milroy 0302 condensed situation, but it allowed I struggled to find success and when I (IOC), Major Holland 0302 (WFIC CO), the player to experience the external applied them success was with reach.” Capt Toomey 0302 (Warfighting Instructor) and internal factors presented when ** Observer only. facing an opponent.” The success of the 31 March wargame The Basic School and Advanced Infantry • “This event highlighted some short- hinged upon each participants will- Training Battalion-West purchased multiple falls I have with orienting on the entire ingness to commit to the experience. copies of Po River Valley in the spring of 2017 problem.” Preparation yielded distinct advantages. for use as instructor development tools. • “Gives instructors an opportunity to Experience as an instructor seemed to put their own skills to the test rather matter very little. Understanding of than only evaluate students. Should be maneuver warfare concepts such as a PME event for bullpen instructors.” center of gravity/critical vulnerability,

68 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 Memoir ‘44 After-action report/review by 2ndLt Jonathan Scott

articipants Over 30 Marines played Mem- oir ‘44, including squad lead- ers, team leaders, and platoon Psergeants. The Game Memoir ‘44 is a turn-based board game designed by Richard Borg and published by Days of Wonder, Inc. In the game, players act as German, Amer- ican, British, or French commanders during historic World War II battles, all of which are set in 1944. The game features sixteen scenarios, including D-Day, Pegasus Bridge, and Toulon, each with unique terrain, distribution of forces, obstacles, and missions. The game board is divided into thirds— left, middle, and right—that dictate the movement of pieces on the board. Players are dealt a predetermined num- ber of cards that allow the execution of offensive and defensive actions such as probing attacks, close air support, and indirect fire. These cards are often limited to certain units or areas of the board, forcing players to make decisions on the utilization of limited resources. Once players maneuver within range of their opponent, they can engage with any combination of infantry, armor, or artillery attacks. Battles are resolved by rolling dice, with the number of dice the The game is on. (Photo provided by Capt Matthew D. Tweedy.) attacker can roll—and thus his combat of cover and terrain, tactical tasks, at- power—decided by terrain, weapons trition versus maneuver warfare, com- systems, and range from target. Players >2ndLt Scott is an Infantry Officer bined arms, and flexible planning. The win the game by accumulating a prede- assigned to 2d Battalion, 2d Marines. players explained their decision-making termined number of medals, which are processes and how they changed based earned by destroying enemy units and on the continuously updating enemy securing key terrain and objectives. games, players could ask questions as situation. Once squad leaders showed they learned, and the proctor guided an understanding of how to play and Application conversations around decision making debrief, they led a similar process with In between garrison training blocks, and tactics. At the end of each game, team leaders and junior Marines. Dur- a proctor—in this case platoon lead- the proctor led a guided discussion over ing this process, roughly twenty Ma- ership—facilitated practice games for principles such as concentration and rines were given brief instructions of squad leaders. During the practice distribution of fire, massing forces, use the game with four Marines conducting

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 69 IDEAS & ISSUES (PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION)

a practice game observed the leader and the mission by the others. Each game relied on you.” concluded with a guided Compared to the comput- discussion led by the er-operated Tactical Deci- proctor and squad leader. sion Kit, “The table-top During this time, players wargame was easier to shared their decision- set up, faster to use, more making process while accessible, and simpler to the spectating Marines operate.” shared their perspective. • “Playing against an- This process was replicat- other Marine caused me ed multiple times through to take the game more se- the work week in intervals riously, we both have the of two hours. Each itera- same knowledge of 0311 tion, lasting roughly 30 tactics.” minutes, was impromptu and conducted as time be- Conclusion came available. Wargames provide leaders with a unique op- Player Feedback portunity to apply doctri- After playing, Marines nal concepts to a tactile completed a questionnaire experience. The imple- regarding their experi- mentation of wargames ence. Only two Marines is cost effective and re- reported experience play- quires minimal time or ing a tabletop wargame, resources. By placing Ma- while the remainder rines in a competitive en- had no prior experience. vironment, proctors can Highlights of their feed- observe Marines making back include: real time decisions against • “Being that there are a thinking enemy. Play- consequences that you ers with flexible plans, see and knowing that Marines completed a questionnaire following the game’s completion. (Photo aggressive moves, and provided by Capt Matthew D. Tweedy.) you could lose against an clear understanding of actual opponent makes different advantages affects unit in their mission proved to be you pay more attention to your deci- combat.” more successful at playing. Memoir ‘44 sion-making process.” • “It makes you more involved, and I facilitates critical thinking, discussions • “You had to think through problems feel like it really shows the individual of tactics, and numerous opportunities that you haven’t thought of.” thinking process.” for PME and leadership development. • “Playing against a person caused me • “The fact of distributing forces and Placing this resource in the hands of to think more of, ‘if I was him, what taking into consideration of holding squad leaders will pay dividends in the would I do?’” out and fi guring out the enemy’s ca- development of small units across the • “This is very helpful because it pabilities.” force. opens your mind and eyes on what • “I feel like it defi nitely would be a damage you can cause the enemy and very useful training aid in evaluating Recommendations what they can do. Viewing the enemy’s individual’s tactical thinking process.” • 2d Bn, 2d Marines should incor- point of view was very helpful.” • “It added that more realistic factor porate table-top wargames to compli- • “So that guys understand how cru- to it because we are both trained in ment education and training. cial any decision made can affect the the fi eld and going up against someone • 2d Bn, 2d Marines should host a battlefi eld.” with advanced schooling. ... You can wargame event for all Offi cers, SN- • “It made me really think about every pick their brain while evolving your COs, and squad leaders in order to decision I made and how that deci- tactics.” train the trainers in the implementa- sion would affect my next two or three • “The game will open Marines’ tion of wargames. moves after.” minds to more tactical tasks.” • 2d Bn, 2d Marines should purchase • “[The game] gives you a better un- • “Playing against another Marine multiple copies of Memoir ‘44 and ex- derstanding of why certain historical made it more competitive and realistic pansions to provide the companies a battles were won and how having the to the point where you were actually resource to train Marines.

70 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 • Table-top wargames, implemented by company and platoon leadership, should target the squad level and be- low to facilitate small unit training and education. • Leaders should use the scenarios provided by Memoir ‘44 to be a gate- way to historical case studies and pro- fessional military education. While these recommendations are for 2d Bn, 2d Marines, ground com- bat units should consider investing in Memoir ‘44 as a means of training unit leaders.

Using Memoir ‘44 can prove to be a gateway to wider historical case studies. (Photo provided by Capt Matthew D. Tweedy.)

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Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 71 IDEAS & ISSUES (PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION) A New, Old Kind of PME Another vehicle for education of the fighting force by 1stLt Walker D. Mills

ust over 50 years ago, a young captain named Francis West was tasked with compiling a >1stLt Mills is forward deployed as a Rifle Platoon Commander with 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment. 1stLt Mills is currently pursuing a master’s degree in Inter- timely series of short, factual nar- national Relations and Contemporary War at King’s College London. Jratives of small unit action, stories which would have lessons learned as an essential part. The stories would have to be both highly readable and historically accurate.1

His report went straight to MajGen William R. Collins, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, III Marine Amphibious Force. Entitled Small Unit Action in Vietnam: Summer 1966, the final re- port was so well-written that Arno Press published it for commercial distribution shortly after it was finished in 1967. It became a best seller. Capt Francis West, better known as “Bing,” has continued to write several books about the com- bat he experienced as a participant and an observer on the front line over the next half century, including The Village, No True Glory, and One Million Steps. These books should be on the shelves of every Marine. The success of Small Unit Action in Vietnam was twofold. First, it was readable. West was able to narrate nine combat actions in only 139 pages. The language was easy to understand, seeded with ample dialogue, and contained plenty of hand drawn maps and pho- tos. Any Marine could read it, most in a single sitting. Each vignette was only 10–20 pages long, an appropriate length to read on a trip to the head or while waiting for the deuce and a half. Second, the content was current and relevant. West recounted squad- and platoon-level combat actions. He created portraits of individual leaders Marines need to be able to think critically. (Photo by Cpl Alexandra Amor Santosarambulo.)

72 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 and men whose small unit actions influ- enced the events described. Occasion- ally, West narrated tactical failure at the small unit level or mistakes made by the leadership—this is acceptable, in fact, it is essential. Marines read about their contemporary environment, enemies, and tactics, techniques, and procedures they faced or used themselves. Small Unit Action was not a revolu- tionary publication. During the Second World War and in the period immedi- ately after, the Military Intelligence Ser- vice published the monthly Intelligence Bulletin, which was designed “primarily for the use of junior officers and enlisted men. It is a vehicle for the dissemina- tion to them of the latest information received from Military Intelligence sources.”2 The contents included both friendly and enemy tactics, techniques, Small unit action is not a new concept. (Photo by LCpl Tyler Solak.) and procedures, description of combat actions, and new weapons systems. bat so they are not informed primarily sible with a copy in the inbox of every Tactical Trends was also published by movies and video games, provide a infantry leader at the company level and by the Military Intelligence Service on ready supply of training scenarios to below and a stack of copies in every a bi-weekly basis and was later discon- implement at the small unit level, and command post. We can supplement tinued in June 1945. It was “derived a professional military education source print issues with an online publication. from official sources” and consisted they enjoy and seek out. Most of the To be ready to “fight tonight,” our lead- principally of extracts from reports by available current publications are inap- ers need to know what to prepare for American military personnel and ob- propriate for squad leaders and platoon and the timeliness of their knowledge is servers in the field.3 Broken down by commanders because they are either too critical. The writing needs to be simple branch and combat arm, Tactical Trends overly analytical for abstraction and full and plain, readable at the high school focused on ground combat. of jargon or focused at higher echelons. level, include dialogue, and be free Infantry in Battle, a voluminous pub- To be useful, accounts of combat need of jargon. It should include as many lication for Army unit leaders first pub- to be as unfiltered as possible. Battal- pictures and drawings as necessary to lished in 1934, was “designed to give the ion- and regimental-level after-action supplement the writing. The content ex- peace-trained officer something of the reviews rarely deal with issues below the ists already, it just needs to be compiled viewpoint of the veteran.”4 This was a company level. Analyses by the Marine and edited. goal inline with Tactical Trends and the Corps Intelligence Agency, the Marine Current operations in Syria, Afghani- Intelligence Bulletin, albeit with a dif- Corps Center for Lessons Learned, and stan, and Iraq should be the focus, but ferent, more comprehensive approach. the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group it would include our shaping, security These were publications created to are also too far from the raw product cooperation, and humanitarian opera- improve the situational awareness of the to be of much value to a squad leader. tions worldwide. We can interview our troops. They were successful because Publications that come out months or brothers in the Army, Navy, and Air they had an extremely short observa- years after the conflicts they describe Force for descriptions of their current tion-publication cycle to facilitate mass are not always as helpful to an NCO experiences. We can work with Special circulation, allowing for maximum who wants to train his Marines for the Operations Command, enhancing our readership. Discontinued shortly after most current threats. Our Marines do publication and working in line with the war, they are a great example of not need outside agencies to help them the recent guidance to “improve insti- what a publication for the small unit understand small unit tactics; we need tutional and operational cooperation” leader looks like. to provide them the reports in a usable issued by the Commandant.5 By also Today, the Marine Corps needs to manner and then let them think criti- soliciting submissions from our NATO develop a periodical publication similar cally about it themselves. allies and partners around the globe, to Small Unit Action, Tactical Trends, Ideally, the new publication should we can also bring together a collection and Intelligence Bulletin. The goal is be published monthly, or quarterly at of diverse combat experiences ranging threefold: to give junior leadership ac- the very least, and distributed in both from a platoon outside Luhansk, a squad curate and current depiction of com- print and digital forms as widely as pos- in Marawi, a company in Sangin, or a

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 73 IDEAS & ISSUES (PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION)

istic training” is drilled into us at The Basic School and the Infantry Officer Course. A periodical targeted at our NCOs and junior officers that is filled with clear, concise depictions of con- temporary combat keeps our Marines aware of the evolving nature of combat around the globe and gives them anoth- er tool to help them train and prepare their Marines to fight. We are nearing a time when there will be no more combat veterans in infantry companies besides the company gunnery sergeant.6 This is not something to fear in and of itself. But we need to recognize these changes in the makeup of our force and adjust our training and professional military education appropriately. The creation of this periodical will help address this gap by providing another vehicle for A small section of Marines could conduct combat observations and collect reports as a base- our corporals, sergeants, and lieutenants line for a “FOUO” publication. (Photo by LCpl Phuchung Nguyen.) to understand combat and small unit action. MARSOC detachment in Africa. The familiar with the Leatherneck and the content must be as raw as possible, ex- Marine Corps Gazette might ask why cluding only what is necessary to meet those publications cannot meet this Notes operational security requirements and need. These magazines provide an 1. Francis J. West, Small Unit Action in Vietnam: protect friendly tactics, techniques, and invaluable resource for our Corps but Summer 1966, (New York, NY: Arno Press, procedures. Real names would be used cover a myriad of topics and require a 1967). as much as possible, and glorification of combat or tidying up of the narrative 2. War Department, Intelligence Bulletin, will not be tolerated. (Washington, DC: Military Intelligence Ser- This “For Official Use Only” pub- “Keep your Marines in- vice, 1943). lication can be created and sustained formed” is one of our 3. War Department, Tactical Trends, (Washing- with minimal resources. The project ton, DC: Military Intelligence Service, 1942). could be started at the division or MEF eleven leadership prin- level or even lower, managed by a small 4. War Department, Infantry in Battle, (Wash- section with a few Marines from the ciples. ington, DC: The Infantry Journal Incorporated, infantry company level on a B-billet 1934). tour at either the School of Infantry or the Infantry Officer Course. West was subscription for the print or online ver- 5. Headquarters Marine Corps and Headquar- able to create Small Unit Action by him- sions. Also, many parts of combat, espe- ters, U.S. Special Operations Command, United self with only his camera, notebooks, cially in the lesser known battlegrounds States Marine Corps and United States Special Operations Command Concept for Integration, and tape recorder. In the beginning, our Nation finds itself engaged, are clas- Interdependence, and Interoperability, (Wash- the section needs to conduct combat sified or, at a minimum, classified as ington, DC: 2017). observations and collect combat reports “For Official Use Only” because of the themselves to create a baseline for the units, tactics, and technology involved. 6. Jeff Schogol, “Where Have All the Combat publication. However, once established, Thus, even if we tried to put the ac- Vets Gone?,” Marine Corps Times, (Arlington, the Marine or Marines’ role will shift counts in a publication like Leatherneck VA: August 2017). to editing, archiving, and solicitation. or the Gazette, we would be fighting a Units will begin to recognize the value constant battle to ensure the details were of the publication and submit their own unclassified while publishing as much vignettes that only require editing, com- detail as possible without putting our pilation, and distribution. forces at risk. Resistance to this new kind of profes- “Keep your Marines informed” is one sional military education could perhaps of our eleven leadership principles. As come on several fronts. Marines more officers, the necessity for “tough, real-

74 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 We Should Study More Dead Russians And spend less time studying the German way of war by Maj Alfred B. Ruggles

n U.S. military academic circles, it win significant strategic exchanges with is commonplace to study the feats the West. of 20th century German contri- >Maj Ruggles is assigned to the 12th butions to tactics and combined Marine Corps District, San Diego, CA. German Contributions Iarms warfare; however, this fixation Before proceeding, it is important with the accomplishments of “dead to understand widely accepted German Germans” is misplaced. While perhaps contributions to modern Western mili- overly simplistic, the reality is the Ger- to modern maneuver warfare. This tary doctrine. Firstly, in the early 20th mans lost the two major wars of the article argues that U.S. PME acad- century, the German military was the 20th century, suffered the death of mil- emies should place a higher emphasis first to develop the contemporary idea lions of their soldiers and civilians, and on examining Russian military ac- of mission command—the concept lost their sovereignty for approximately complishments and contributions to that subordinate commanders should 44 years following World War II. In military doctrine to better understand accomplish their objective in line with essence, U.S. military academics fo- a relevant and formidable adversary. their higher commander’s intent, thus cus an inordinate amount of time on Furthermore, the examination of Rus- providing tactical commanders the losers, which is akin to studying the sian contributions should be greater ability to maneuver more rapidly than 1990s-era New York Knicks instead than that of German contributions for their micromanaged adversaries.1 This of the Chicago Bulls. Meanwhile, the many reasons; however, none are more concept was codified in MCDP 1, War- United States and NATO allies, after important than the fact that while Ger- fighting, in 1989. Secondly, the German nearly 100 years of almost continuous many was utterly destroyed over 70 Blitzkrieg, at the onset of World War II, conflict with the Russian Empire, are years ago, Russia proved geopolitically massed mechanized assaults, at decisive still confounded by Russian military victorious in the 20th century and is points and were augmented with tactical practices, doctrine, and contributions a regional hegemon that continues to air support from the Luftwaffe to cre-

Georgy Zhukov. (Photo by Grigory Vayl.) Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov. (Photo by Mil.ru.) Mikhail Tukhachevsky. (Photo unknown 1937.)

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 75 IDEAS & ISSUES (PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION)

ate a rapidly maneuverable combined situation with which the enemy can- ing one-tenth of what the U.S. spends arms force.2 Employing these tactics, not cope.6 on defense,9 occupies vast portions of the German military devastated Poland Georgia and Ukraine, while western and France in less than two months, While volumes of literature have been forces are helpless to counter its ef- respectively. However, it is important written about the eastern theater of forts. Russia is currently promoting the to remember despite these accomplish- World War II, the Battle for Stalingrad militarization of the Artic, exploiting ments, Germany also found itself mired captures the essence of the Russians’ op- Syria’s civil war for strategic gain, and in attrition-based trench warfare in erational ability to maneuver cognitively surreptitiously violating the integrity World War I and ultimately emerged on land, in air, below the earth’s surface, of national elections in several nations. as a defeated nation. Furthermore, recall and in cyberspace. By the end of this Ultimately, the Russian military and that Germany executed the Blitzkrieg monumental battle, the Soviets had con- political apparatus is extremely effective against vastly outmatched Polish Forces ducted several unexpected operational at operational maneuver in all domains, simultaneously besieged by a Soviet in- turning movements against German especially while conducting irregular vasion. In France, the Germans succeed- forces. Soviet Forces also used the city’s warfare and cyberwarfare operations. ed against a socioeconomically unstable vast sewer systems to maneuver beneath Meanwhile, American military scholars nation that was politically irresolute and behind German soldiers, who were and future leaders continue to study to fight another war.3 In other words, unwilling to condescend to maneuver the Blitzkrieg that Germans conducted while Germany should be given credit in the sewers. Russian snipers wreaked against the Polish military 70 years ago. for having the foresight to modernize psychological havoc on German forces. and mechanize its forces in the 1930s, it Solutions: Understanding Our Ad- employed these forces against frail and versary pacifistic adversaries in Europe. When From an outside perspective, Rus- the Germans finally met fully mobilized ... Russia seems politi- sia seems politically and economically British, American, and Russian forces cally and economically fragile; nevertheless, the 2017 National in 1943, they lost all of their territory Security Strategy still described Russia and were destroyed as a nation state fragile ... as a near-peer adversary—one of four in less than two years. Moreover, the in the world.10 Additionally, top-level German experience in Russia can be political and military leaders opine that prudently described as one of the most Also, Soviet radio operators jammed, Russia presents the single greatest threat disastrous military endeavors in history. interfered, or intercepted a significant to the United States today.11 The Rus- While many apologists claim tactical- quantity of German radio transmissions sians have a long and rich history of mili- and operational-level commanders were during the battle.7 This battle repre- tary conquest spanning a millennium. hindered by an increasingly unhinged sents a turning point in World War II, The fact that Russia suffered so many, Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s mismanagement a decisive shift of operational expertise oftentimes self-induced, disasters during of his armed forces paled in comparison from Germany to Russia and the mod- the 20th century and still emerged as to Josef Stalin’s terrible treatment of his ern genesis of Russia as an operational a regional hegemon with global influ- military forces.4 Clausewitz, you say? and strategic powerhouse in military ence is all the more reason to study its Recall that while educated in modern- affairs. tactical and operational military feats day Germany, he spent formative years Following World War II, and despite more seriously. While the Germans gal- in Russia, observing their use of uncon- incessant economic mismanagement by vanized tactical brilliance, the Russians ventional tactics to defeat Napoleon’s political leaders, the Russian military exploited German contributions and cre- 1812 offensive.5 Yes, Germans formu- occupied all of Eastern Europe, waged ated the modern concept of operational- lated the modern concept of mission viscerally effective regional and global level maneuver and the “deep fight.”12 command and employed combined information warfare, and fielded armies Because of their operational approach arms during two world wars; however, unmatched by Western powers. While toward achieving strategic ends, Russia they failed to exploit their tactical vic- mindful of the Russian failure in Af- completely vanquished German forces tories for any strategic gain. To this day, ghanistan, fast forward to the 21st cen- in World War II, helped turn the tide Germany is a woefully circumscribed tury and we see a resurgent Russia that of the Korean War against the United military power. continues to confound western leaders. States, facilitated a strategic defeat of the Its conduct of irregular and information United States in Vietnam, operationally Russian Contributions warfare in Georgia was highly effective seized portions of Georgia and Ukraine, MCDP 1 describes maneuver warfare in using social media to target mili- and still actively exploits the Syrian civil as a philosophy that tary forces and denying its opponent’s war and seriously threatens European 13 seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion ability to conduct basic command and sovereignty to this day. through a variety of rapid, focused, control with denial of service attacks Effective immediately, resident PME and unexpected actions which create on information technology networks.8 curriculums should begin examining a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating As we speak, Russia, although spend- 20th century Russian military ac-

76 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 CYBER

complishments, theory, and doctrine. From an Individualist to a Collectivist Model,” A good place to start is the body of Parameters, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2017). MONDAY Russian military theorists purged by Stalin in the 1930s. They are the intel- 2. Bruce W. Menning, “Operational Art’s Ori- lectuals who synthesized an operational gins,” Military Review, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: approach to war.14 A case study of the September–October 1997). Battle for Stalingrad presents an op- 3. Joseph David Connors, “Paul Reynaud and portunity to examine Russian maneuver French National Defense: 1933–1939,” (Chi- warfare as the country fully mobilized cago. IL: Loyola University Chicago, 1977). in World War II and exploited all pos- sible avenues to operationally shock the 4. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revo- Germans. Russian efforts against the lution from Above, 1928–1941, (New York, NY: United States in the Korean and Viet- W.W. Norton & Company, 1992). nam War present an early case study of unconventional warfare.15 Russian 5. Marine Corps University, Theory and Nature successes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria of War, (Quantico, VA). all present relevant examples of their 6. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, War- successful implementation of conven- fi g h t i n g, (Washington, DC: June 1997). tional and unconventional operations to achieve strategic aims. 7. Edwin P. Hoyt, 199 Days: The Battle for Stalingrad, (New York, NY: Tom Doherty As- Conclusion sociates, Inc., 1993). Every day spent focusing on “dead www.marineshop.net Germans” is one more day that could 8. David Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia be better used to study “dead Russians” 2008,” Small Wars Journal, (Online: 2010), and Russians who are still alive and available at http://smallwarsjournal.com. achieving operational victories. While early 20th century Germans provided 9. Staff, “The World Factbook,” Central Intel- ligence Agency, (Online), available at https:// novel building blocks for tactical excel- www.cia.gov. lence, they utterly failed to gain any strategic victories from their efforts. 10. The White House, National Security Strategy Meanwhile, the Russians present a of the United States of America, (Washington, force that predates Germany, have a DC: December 2017). long and illustrious military history, crushed German forces in World War 11. Sofi a Lotto Persio, “Russia, Not North Ko- II, built substantially upon basic Ger- rea, Greatest Threat to U.S., Says Pentagon’s man military tenets, codifi ed operation- Top Military Offi cer,” Newsweek, (Online: July al maneuver, continue to gain geopo- 2017), available at https://www.newsweek.com. litical momentum, and will likely pose 12. “Operational Art’s Origins.” a formidable challenge to the United States and its allies for the foreseeable 13. John Grady, “EUCOM Commander: Mos- future. American military professionals cow Targeting Balkans with Misinformation must divest themselves of an incessant Campaigns,” USNI News, (Online: March fi xation on western, namely European, 2018), available at https://news.usni.org. military accomplishments over the past two centuries and focus more on ex- 14. “Operational Art’s Origins.” istential adversaries—adversaries that match or overmatch western forces in 15. Zhang Xiaoming, “China, the Soviet Union, 30% OFF many warfi ghting domains. Failing to and the Korean War: From an Abortive Air War Plan to a Wartime Relationship,” The Journal do so will continue to cultivate leaders of Confl ict Studies, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, SITEWIDE unfamiliar with the most signifi cant 2002). See also Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union modern threats to the United States. and the Vietnam War, (Lanham, MD: I.R. Dee, December 1996).

Notes 1. Anthony C. King, “Mission Command 2.0:

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 77 IDEAS & ISSUES (PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION) Historiography for Marines How Marines should read and understand histories by Paul Westermeyer

he Marine Corps is devoted to its history. Classes of the >Mr. Westermeyer is a historian with the History Division, Marine Corps University. history and legends of the The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily Marine Corps are taught to reflect the official policy or views of any U.S. Government organization, including Tthose aspiring to be Marinesduring re- the History Division and Marine Corps University. cruit training and Officer Candidate School. The Marine Corps celebrates its birthday every year with a ceremony and ball. In the Making Marines Gal- lery at the National Museum of the Historiography, noun Marine Corps, a panel puts a twist on 1 a: the writing of history; b: the principles, theory, and the Corps’ hoary, “Every Marine a Rifle- man,” shibboleth and declares, “Every history of historical writing. Marine a Historian,” as it describes the classes taught at recruit training. 1 Of course, the concept of “Every 2: the product of historical writing. Marine a Rifleman” does not suggest all Marines carry rifles, it means all Marines are trained in basic marks- value, to study history; additionally, did he employ poetic license; rather, he manship as well as infantry tactics and how is history different from legend, based his work on the facts as he could techniques, and they must complete an- mythology, or fiction? best ascertain them. nual rifle marksmanship qualifications. Primarily, the difference lies in the This is the basic form of the historical Similarly, “Every Marine a Historian” methodology and intent. Historians method; as Herodotus of Halicarnas- should go beyond merely providing Ma- base their interpretations on carefully sus—the Father of History—wrote, “I rines with a list of books to read; they collected historical facts with the in- am bound to tell what I am told, but not should also develop the skills and tools tent to illuminate the past, not invent in every case to believe it.”4 Historians required to evaluate and comprehend it. Thucydides—whose work on the examine a great many sources, compare historical works. The intent is not to Peloponnesian War is one of the old- them to each other, and then from these create professional historians but rather est histories—stated, they tease the truth or come as close as to improve basic historical literacy. To On the whole, however, the conclu- they can to it. Thucydides explained in understand history, Marines must have sions I have drawn from the proofs more detail: a basic understanding of historiography quoted may, I believe, be safely re- With reference to the narrative of because “when you study ‘historiogra- lied on. Assuredly they will not be events, far from permitting myself to phy’ you do not study the events of the disturbed either by the lays of a poet derive it from the first source that came past directly, but the changing interpre- displaying the exaggerations of his to hand, I did not even trust my own tations of those events in the works of craft, or by the compositions of the impressions, but it rests partly on what individual historians.”2 chroniclers that are attractive at truth’s I saw myself, partly on what others The first question that historiography expense; the subjects they treat of be- saw for me, the accuracy of the report asks is the same question Marines need ing out of reach of evidence, and time being always tried by the most severe to ask when looking at any given his- having robbed most of them of histori- and detailed tests possible. My conclu- torical work: What is history? At first it cal value by enthroning them in the sions have cost me some labor from the may seem obvious—history is the story region of legend.3 want of coincidence between accounts of mankind’s past. Why then do we In other words, Thucydides claims he of the same occurrences by different bother, beyond mere entertainment neither based his work on legend nor eyewitnesses, arising sometimes from

78 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 imperfect memory, sometimes from to do business, especially in our line undue partiality for one side or the of work where the consequences of other. The absence of romance in my incompetence are so final for young history will, I fear, detract somewhat men.11 from its interest; but I shall be content if it is judged useful by those inquir- Indeed, when he founded the Marine ers who desire an exact knowledge of Corps University, Gen Alfred M. Gray the past as an aid to the interpretation Jr., said, “History should be used to of the future, which in the course of teach officers military judgment, not human things must resemble if it does to make academic historians or simply not reflect it. My history has been com- teach facts.”12 posed to be an everlasting possession, Gray, Mahan, and Mattis make a not the showpiece of an hour.5 sound plea for studying military history as a practical measure to learn lessons Historians classify sources as second- from history. The wisdom of such an ary and primary. Secondary sources are approach is apparent on its face, but less histories themselves, they do not purport apparent are the dangers of studying to be current with the event; they ana- history, which are quite real—especially lyze and interpret historical data. These for the unwary. History lends itself to are often used to place a work in con- trite sayings and shibboleths which in text by providing background. Primary turn lead to dogmatic thinking and rote, sources have direct knowledge of the Thucydides, Greek general and historian. uncritical analysis; the only antidote event, unfiltered by others. These can (Marble bust J. Paul Getty Museum.) for these is careful, critical study. For be contemporary documents, memoirs, example, many have heard that those oral history interviews, newspaper inter- as articulated in What is History? by who do not study history are doomed views, photographs, or even archaeologi- Edward Hallett Carr, history is “a con- to repeat it. But history cannot repeat cal finds.6 Moreover, the viewpoint and tinuous process of interaction between itself as each event is unique, spring- limits of the source must be considered. the historian and his facts, an unending ing from individuals and specific con- For example, Col Gregory Boyington’s dialogue between the past and present.”9 ditions; therefore, the study of history memoir, Baa Baa Black Sheep, presents In other words, historians should accept cannot prevent mistakes. As Dr. Geof- his view of World War II, but it was pub- the past on its own terms and judge it frey Megargee explains, lished a decade after the war ended. It is as well, constantly reconsidering their To look back at one historical develop- only one man’s viewpoint; a more com- conclusions about the past. ment and try to draw specific policy plete understanding of Marine Fighter conclusions from it is misguided. Such Squadron 214’s war comes from com- an approach is a leap of faith; it de- paring his memoir with interviews and pends on the belief that the historical memoirs from the rest of his squadron The study of history lies account is absolutely accurate, and that and commanders, as well as the official present circumstances mirror the past records produced during the war itself.7 at the foundation of all exactly.13 Drawing conclusions from these facts sound military conclu- Moreover, there is a natural tendency is the primary task of the historian, and for historians to divide and categorize historians differ over how they should sions and practice. history into different subfields or cat- do this, whether they should accept the egories. While understandable, these past on its own terms or judge it ac- are essentially false: cording to present values and mores. The next question is why do Marines There is no military history, political One of the pioneers of modern critical study history? Most famous military history, social history, African Ameri- history, Leopold von Ranke, famously thinkers have espoused the need for can history, Scots Irish American his- rejected the idea that history’s job is to professional soldiers to study the past. tory, or Women’s history. While those judge the past, stating, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote in The are useful categories for use in studying Influence of Sea Power Upon History, ourselves through specific lenses, and History has had assigned to it the office for planning conferences, they are, of judging the past and of instructing The study of history lies at the founda- when all is said and done, all history the present for the benefit of future tion of all sound military conclusions and should be taught as such.14 ages. To such high offices the present 10 and practice. Excessive focus on subfields of historical work does not presume; it seeks only Gen James N. Mattis laid it out more to show the past as it actually was.8 study creates artificial barriers, compart- plainly in an email defending the value mentalizing historical thought limiting Other historians concluded that his- of intense reading to Marine officers: context, and resulting in reduce produc- tory is memory of a particular kind; By reading, you learn through oth- tive study of history. ers’ experiences, generally a better way

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Leaving the broader dangers of us- ing history behind, the history of the Marine Corps specifically has been told in ways that require careful study by the reader. In his seminal work, Sem- per Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, Allan R. Millet presented an essay on his sources that adroitly summarizes works on Marine Corps history to date: For more than a hundred years, the writing of Marine Corps history has been shaped by internal organizational interest, political controversy, and a perceived public interest in the Corps, the last normally coinciding with the heroics of Marines in wartime. Like most of the writing on military insti- tutions, Marine Corps histories have BGen Edwin H. Simmons was the Director, Marine Corps History and Museum Division from improved in their scholarly quality, 1971–1996. Gen Simmons served in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. (Official but reflect a bias toward operational Marine Corps photo.) narratives and a distaste for either First to Fight, LtGen Victor H. Krulak tent makes it clear it is a journalistic external relationships or internal dif- tells the reader bluntly that his book polemic, advocating policy for the Af- ficulties. Marine Corps historical writ- is “a series of simple vignettes, part ghan conflict. It is well worth reading, ing, which has been largely dominated history, part legend, and part opin- but not as a history.17 by Marine enthusiasts in and out of ion.”16 Do not stretch a work beyond Earlier, the danger of subdividing his- uniform, has had a distinct utilitar- its author’s intent. Other works make tory into different fields was mentioned. ian quality, that is, to build loyalty the task more difficult, as the author For our purposes, these topical subdi- and dedication on the part of serving intentionally or unintentionally leaves visions remain useful; when you have Marines, create public sympathy and the book’s category unclear. For ex- identified that a given work lies within support, present Corps’ perspectives ample, Bing West’s The Wrong War one of these categories, it helps to iden- on policy issues past and present, and honor the service of former Marines. superficially has the look of a history, tify the viewpoint of the author and These characteristics are not unique describing the war in Afghanistan; provides useful information for analyz- to the Corps.15 however, the methodology and in- ing the work. Beyond topical fields (i.e., French, Nineteenth, military, women’s, Not every work telling a story from or labor histories), however, histories the past is a history, which is based on also can be divided by the author’s ana- interpretations of facts from multiple lytical method and focus. Some his- sources. It is important to know when torians view history as objective while one is reading history and when one is acknowledging that the sources, and reading something else. Many works the historians themselves, are inher- look like a history but actually fit more ently biased and thus subjective. They readily into other disciplines, such as argue the historian’s duty is to strive political science or journalism. More to be objective while acknowledging commonly, memoirs or autobiographies bias. Others view this as an impossible are mistaken for history; rather, they task, arguing that history is inherently serve rather as sources that historians subjective and that historians have no work from. Such first-person accounts duty to objectivity. Some go so far as have value, but the reader should un- to argue that historians should be ac- derstand their provenance and intent tivists, writing histories that support and not accept them as history. their cause. Not all activist historians The Commandant’s Professional openly acknowledge their subjectivity, Reading List, for example, includes indeed many reject the label, claiming memoirs, biographies, polemics, mili- to be objective while presenting a sub- tary fiction, and histories. The easi- jective historical viewpoint. The his- est way to distinguish between these 1875 Leopold von Ranke. (Copy of Julius Schrader tory’s structure is also important for works is to take them at their word. In original by Adolf Jebens.) evaluating the reliability and value of

80 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 the text. Is it a narrative, tracing the de- • Inspirational. ond World War, which further proves velopment of the story within a conven- • Nationalistic. that nationalistic military history can tional, chronological framework? Or is • Antiquarian/hobby. be quite eloquently written.20 Other it thematic, covering different concepts • Military utilitarian. examples include Hans Delbrück’s His- in a non-chronological manner? Is the • Civilian utilitarian.18 tory of the Art of War (1920) or R. Ernest topic institutional or cultural? Or, if it Inspirational military histories are Dupuy and Trevor N. Depuy’s Military is a military history, is it operational? designed to highlight military virtues, Heritage of America (1956). In the last Historians whose work shares an especially heroism, and for specific century, much of the history taught in analytical method and focus, as well military units. Many biographies and American high schools fell within this as structure, are generally grouped into unit histories fall into this category. type. schools of historical thought. Identify- The Lineage and Honors and Com- Antiquarian military history is fo- ing which school of thought a particular memorative Naming programs, run by cused on historical minutia, such as uni- work falls into is a useful shorthand for form details or weapon statistics. This evaluating a work. type of military history is concerned Examining a small sample of various with the color of a man’s jackboots or schools of historical thought illustrates the type of rivets used on a Panzer VI how an author’s identification with these Tiger tank, but less concerned with the schools aids the reader’s understanding. whys and wherefores of warfare and its Marxist historians posit that all history causes. Model builders, war gamers, and is economically driven; the most rigid reenactors are typically considered an- Marxist historians present a determinis- tiquarians and are often the primary tic view of history that explains the past target audience of museums and authors and predicts the future. They write from for specialist publishers. The works pro- a relativist, often activist, point of view. duced by enthusiastic antiquarians far People’s history is a school that generally exceeds the output of other types of looks at history from below, attempting military historians; the massive amount to give voice to the voiceless. Because of data they accumulate is a great boon it seeks to examine the history of those for historians producing other types of who left relatively little in the historical Simmons’ Bullseye. (Photo by BGen Simmons.) military history. record, people’s history is seldom narra- Military utilitarian histories are tive driven and usually focuses on cul- the Marine Corps History Division’s usually written by and for professional tural and institutional topics. Military Historical Reference Branch, fall under militaries to educate policy makers and history tends toward the “great man” this category in addition to many of the military officers. The primary function historical school of thought. Often con- exhibits and programs at the National of the Marine Corps History Division sidered old-fashioned and rejected by Museum of the Marine Corps. Most or the U.S. Army Center of Military modern scholars, it focuses attention of what is taught in the history classes History, for example, is to produce mili- on the decisions and actions of a few at Recruit Training and Officer Can- tary utilitarian histories. The Army’s influential individuals and focuses on didates School fits neatly in this type famous Green Books and the Corps’ a narrative view. The French Annales as well. General Sir William Francis Red Books produced on World War II school focused on long-term change Patrick Napier, who wrote a massive his- represent these types of history.21 This and social history rather than political tory of the (1808–14), style is most often narrative, operational themes. It made great use of quantifica- believed all military history should fall history that establishes the basic facts tion and geographic evidence to exam- within this category: and chronology of an event. The key ine history from different directions. It is the business of the historian … point is facts not models. Though most Recognizing when a given work falls to bring the exploits of the hero into government historians are trained pro- under these schools helps the reader broad daylight … The multitude must fessionals, these programs are closely correct for the biases and viewpoints be told where to stop and wonder and associated with military officers who are each brings to history. to make them do so, the historian usually devoted to one type of military The sub-category of military history must have recourse to all the power doctrine or another. Government his- can be further divided into differing of words.19 torians have to be particularly vigilant types. Since at least 1979, Allan Millett Nationalistic military history is very against institutional forces that strive has categorized military history into similar to inspirational but is focused on to fit historical events into preferred five distinct types. Since most of the patriotic or nationalistic themes rather doctrinal models. history a Marine will read in his career than individual or unit heroism. Perhaps Gen Edwin Simmons often used is military history, learning to recognize the most widely known example of this a bull’s-eye diagram to explain the these five types is an important part of type of history is Winston S. Churchill’s intended audience for History Divi- historical literacy: multivolume magnum opus, The Sec- sion’s work. Replace “Marine Corps”

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with “military” and this diagram also The Marine Corps determined long 11. Jill R. Russell, “With Rifle and Bibliogra- neatly illustrates the intended audience ago that Marines must study military phy: General Mattis on Professional Reading,” of military utilitarian history works. history, their own most especially, in Strife, (Online: May 20), available at https:// Many academic historians view all order to function more efficiently and www.strifeblog.org. official history (the most common form effectively. It is not enough to simply of military utilitarian history) as inher- read history books, they must be edu- 12. Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr., letter to Command- 22 ing General, Marine Corps Combat Command, ently biased, activist history. Concern- cated readers, understanding the fun- “Training and Education,” July 1989. ing this, BGen Edwin H. Simmons, damentals of historical method and able who led the Marine Corps History to identify different schools of historical 13. Statement to the author, December 2013. Division for more than two decades, thought, as outlined above. By attaining once said: this basic historical literacy and under- 14. Dr. Glenn T. Johnson, “Subcategories of I frequently use the word ‘advocacy’ standing historiography, Marines will History,” Facebook, (Online: July 2016), avail- and that sometimes puts the academic get the most out of their historical stud- able at https://www.facebook.com. person’s teeth on edge. My point is that ies. anyone working for the Marine Corps 15. Allan R. Millet, Semper Fidelis: The His- Historical Program should believe in tory of the United States Marine Corps, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991). Millet’s summary of the Marine Corps. By the same token, Notes Marine Corps historiography remains essentially anyone working for the Army, Navy, or 1. Merriam–Webster, s.v. “historiography (n.),” true 25 years later, though many fine historical Air Force historical programs should accessed 5 January 2018. works on the Corps have been published since. be advocates of their respective ser- vices. Advocacy does not mean bias, 2. Conal Furay and Michael J. Salevouris, The 16. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC(Ret), First prejudice, or distortion. An advocate Methods and Skills of History: A Practical Guide, to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine can still write objective history. I would (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1988). Corps, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, indeed argue that official history can 1984). be more accurate and objective than 3. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans- that of an independent scholar. The lated by Richard Crawley, (New York, NY: 17. Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit Strategy, independent scholar is able to first Random House, 1982). and the Way out of Afghanistan, (New York, NY: form his hypothesis or premise and Random House, 2011). then marshal his facts selectively to 4. Herodotus, The History, translated by David support that hypothesis or premise. Grene, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 18. Mark Grimsley, “The Types of Military We are not permitted this degree of Press, 1987). History,” WarHistorian.org, (Online: January latitude. We must tell the whole story 2012), available at http://warhistorian.blogspot. 5. The Peloponnesian War. as best and as completely as we can.23 com. Civilian utilitarian is the final type, 6. But always consider photographs with cau- 19. John Keegan, The Face of Battle, (New York, tion. Photographs provide an illusion of objec- NY: Penguin Books, 1976). which is defined as academic military tive reality, but they are in truth composed and history written to help the educated filtered recordings of the past. A photograph citizen understand war and conflict. It 20. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World often obscures as much about an event as it War, (London, UK: Reprint Society, 1948–53). is studied by civilian academics for the reveals. same reasons any other historical field is 21. The Green Books are the U.S. Army in studied—to illuminate our understand- 7. Col Gregory Boyington, USMC(Ret), Baa World War II, 78 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. ing of mankind. John Keegan’s The Face Baa Black Sheep, (New York, NY: Bantam Army Center of Military History, 1946–92); the of Battle is one example, as is Gerhard L. Books, 1958). Red Books are the History of U.S. Marine Corps Weinberg’s A World at Arms: A Global Operations in World War II, 5 vols. (Wash- History of World War II (1994). Many 8. Leopold von Ranke, History of the Latin and ington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, of these works examine military institu- Teutonic Nations from 1494 to 1514, (Leipzig, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1958–68). DE: Duncker & Humblot, 1824); and Ernst tions, including Millett’s Semper Fidelis Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, 22. The term official history refers to a work and Aaron B. O’Connell’s Underdogs: and Modern, (Chicago, IL: University of Chi- The Making of the Modern Marine Corps of history that is sponsored, authorized, or cago Press, 2007). endorsed by its subject. For example, Marine (2012). Corps History Division, as a function of higher All of these types of history can 9. Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History?, (New headquarters, writes and publishes the official merge into one another; for example, York, NY: Random House, 1961). history of the U.S. Marine Corps. when a work that is military utilitarian in overall intent includes a sidebar that 10. Capt A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Pow- 23. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, as quoted by is clearly antiquarian or inspirational. er upon History, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, Charles R. Smith, group email to Col Nathan Furthermore, the same historian can 1890). S. Lowrey, Wanda J. Renfrow, and the author, produce during their lifetime works of May 2007. different types.

82 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 IDEAS & ISSUES (COMMENTARY) 2018 National Defense Strategy What does it mean for the future of the Marine Corps? by BGen J. Scott O’Meara

s the post-Cold War inter- resources. Operations conducted below national order continues to >BGen O’Meara was the Assistant the level of armed conflict, exploiting a weaken under the pressure Deputy Commandant, Plans, Poli- blend of competitive actions, challenge presented by an increasingly cies, and Operations, HQMC when the American traditional view of war competitiveA and multipolar world, the he wrote this article. and peace, becoming the “new normal.” United States finds itself at a strategic, Secretary Mattis’ concept of “ex- inflective point. Former Secretary of panding the competitive space” is a Defense James Mattis publicly released Putin. Competitive actions of China maneuverist approach to compete and a new National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Russia challenge the post-World win within the space this great power in January 2018. Directed by Congress, War II international order, causing it competition takes place. Temporally, the NDS replaced the former Quadren- to wane. Although not mirror image expanding the competitive space incor- nial Defense Review. Unlike previous threats, both China and Russia are ac- porates activities across the continuum Quadrennial Defense Review reports, the 2018 NDS was published as a classi- fied document with a releasable version distributed for public consumption. A threat-based strategy, the NDS frames the current and near-future strategic and operational environment, identifies the central problem, recognizes meth- ods and means to address this central problem, provides risk mitigation guid- ance, and delivers direction to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Ser- vices relating to joint force readiness, modernization, and force management. Defense strategy is the linkage between operational capabilities and political objectives. Aligning with the National Security Strategy, the NDS defines the central problem as erosion of the United States’ “competitive military advantage” within key regions gener- ated from the rise of China and the Force readiness will be one issue that needs to be addressed under the NDS. (Photo by LCpl Scott re-emergence of Russia. Return of great Jenkins.) power competition—likely to evolve along a nonlinear, reciprocal projec- tivity employing grand strategies de- of competition, traversing all domains tion—will continue to transform the signed to exploit opportunities along the and elements of national power. This strategic landscape. continuum of cooperation, competition, design is intended to generate increasing The NDS articulates the central chal- and conflict. This “new great game” is dilemmas to complicate the adversary’s lenge as the altering of balance of power broadly defined by Russia and China’s strategy, resulting in the United States within key regions created by the rise desire to seek right-of-entry and influ- setting the tempo and regaining the ini- of China over the past decade and the ence, control of strategically important tiative. In short, this is the convergence re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir geographical areas, and access to critical of statecraft and warfighting.

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 83 IDEAS & ISSUES (COMMENTARY)

To enable and assist with expanding the competitive space, the 2018 NDS elevates the importance on increasing and deepening interoperability with allies and partners. Extending global reach with a strong network of allies and partners will provide access, capa- bilities, and capacity while increasing legitimacy. The central logic of the NDS is that a more lethal, capable, and modern- ized joint force that is supported by a healthy network of allies and partners will enable the United States to establish a favorable balance of power: “Compete, deter, and win.” This modernized force, supported by a network of allies and partners, will provide a credible and conventional deterrence. In coordina- tion with and support of other elements of national power, the joint force pro- Our forces will have to be more lethal and capable. (Photo by LCpl Christine Phelps.) vides an escalation lever. A sense of urgency for significant leaders skills and intuition required to are intended to optimally manage and change runs through the language of meet rapidly emerging 21st century integrate joint resources, operations, the NDS. The intent is to prioritize and challenges. Secondly, and linked to and forward posture. The 2018 NDS focus DOD on the question, “ready for modernization, the NDS correctly iden- introduces two new operational con- what?” The “what” being high-end, tifies the need to enable and enhance a cepts: Dynamic Force Employment contested domains warfighting against culture of innovation within DOD so and Global Operating Model (GOM). peer competitors. Shifting focus toward material and non-material solutions are Presently, both concepts require fur- China and Russia while maintaining at- generated and acquired at the speed of ther development and refinement by the tention on rogue states Iran and North relevance. Joint Staff. The GOM consists of four Korea, the NDS articulates a desired Bridging the strategic to the opera- joint force employment layers: contact, end-state, establishes prioritization, and tional, the NDS postulates a new way blunt, surge, and homeland. Integrating sets a way forward to dynamically deploy the joint force. globally, the GOM is envisioned as a To transition strategy into execution, From a global perspective, new ways new design for posturing and employ- the Secretary’s Fiscal Year 20-24 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) provided specific programmatic guidance as well as detailed implementation direction to DOD enterprise. The Deputy Secretary of Defense assumed the role as the lead change agent for implementation. What does this mean for the Marine Corps? Programmatically, a shift to procuring next generation capabilities which can be employed and effectively operate as an inside force will be prioritized. Sustainment and divestment decisions concerning legacy capabilities will need to be made. Training, education, and the doctrine guiding how we deploy and fight will need to adapt. Posture and deployment cycle planning will very likely require adjustment. Importantly, the NDS addresses the requirement to transform professional military education to produce future We will be required to deploy the joint force under two emerging concepts. (Photo by LCpl Kyle Bunyi.)

84 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 ing combat power. Activities intended states no. The time to avoid cognitive future? How will we deploy and fight to expand the competitive space will be bias is now. the MAGTF within a contested domain employed within the contact layer. As a The intent for the remainder of this environment? How will the MAGTF global, forward deployed, naval expedi- article is to generate intuitional-level re- employ manned-unmanned teams to tionary force, Marine Corps capabilities flection, spark critical thinking and de- create situational understanding asym- align well with intended operational bate, and accelerate innovation. Marine metry to enable tactical engagement and tactical actions envisioned within leaders should ask: Are we innovating? overmatch? Is naval integration on a the contact, blunt, and surge layers. Are we thinking about future threats? track to enable seamless maneuver and MEUs and Special Purpose MAGTFs Will we have the right leaders, doctrine, warfighting at and from the sea? complement the contact layer concept and material capabilities to overmatch Fires. Does Marine Corps Force 2025 by providing flexible deterrence and optimize the MAGTF to fight effec- response options while building situ- tively within the information domain? ational awareness, conducting influence Are the current target development pro- and shaping operations, and maturing The time to avoid cogni- cesses optimized to seamlessly converge relationships with allies and partners effects, kinetic and non-kinetic, across on a daily basis. tive bias is now. all domains? Will future MAGTF long- The 2018 NDS establishes the intent range, precision fires enable the joint to inject prioritization and a sense of force to overmatch peer long-range, urgency within the DOD, shifting focus opponents within all domains? In lever- anti-access/aerial denial capabilities? to rapidly closing joint force warfight- aging warfighting functions, along with Intelligence. Will there be sufficient, ing gaps. This will have programmatic, training and education, force design, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and force development, and force manage- force structure, force posture, and in- reconnaissance capacity and capabili- ment implications. novation, the following section provides ties? Will fussed information be dis- questions to initiate a broader discus- seminated down through the battalion Implications sion. to the squad level to enable time critical At this current inflection point, hard Command and control (C2). Will targeting? Will indications and warn- questions must be asked. National re- the future C2 architecture possess net- ings distribution remain pace with hy- sources are finite, the United States’ work resilience to defend against peer pervelocity weapons? fiscal burden is daunting, and priori- cyber, jamming, and electronic war- Logistics. How will the supporting tization is a must. Innovation at the fare threats? Will the C2 network “plug logistics enterprise sustain a force op- speed of relevance is essential. Deep and play” with higher joint and coali- erating inside integrated anti-access/ questions will need to be asked at the tion networks? Will the Navy-Marine aerial denial environments? Will the enterprise be able to support distributed operations over extended distances? The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, Does current doctrine address combat refit and replacement? Will the medical and equipped to meet the demands of a future oper- enterprise capacity be robust enough to meet for high-end warfighting require- ating environment characterized by complex terrain, ments? technology proliferation, information warfare, the Force protection. Has sufficient ca- pability and capacity to defend against need to shield and exploit signatures, and an increas- long-range, hypervelocity, and precision ing nonpermissive maritime domain. weapons been programmed? What new —Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) means of deception and decoying can be employed to complicate our adversary’s understanding and targeting solutions? institutional level. Is the Corps ready Corps network grids be integrated? Will Will programmed air, surface, and for the high-end warfighting, regard- bandwidth meet need? Will amphibi- ground mobility platforms be surviv- less if it is against a peer competitor ous shipping C2 capabilities meet the able? or proxy employing peer-competitor demand requirements of multi-domain Information. What role will the MEF capabilities? Are the right capabilities, battle? How will signature control be information group play within the larger force design, and warfighting doctrine managed? Are component headquar- interagency, joint, and coalition effort? in place? As Marines, maneuver war- ters designed and structured to support What does it mean to maneuver within fare is our warfighting philosophy—our multi-domain operations? the electronic spectrum? mindset. However, do we know how Maneuver. Will the MAGTF deploy- Training and education. Are train- we will deploy into and fight within ment and employment strategy of the ing requirements and annual plans de- a contested environment? The MOC past meet the demands of today and the signed to meet high-end warfighting

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 85 IDEAS & ISSUES (COMMENTARY)

thermore, it clearly shifts the Depart- ment to prepare for peer competition and confl ict. This is a direct response to the rise of China and the re-emergence of Russia. However, a note of caution: since the beginning of the post-World War II era, the track record for pre- dicting where and with whom the next confl ict will be fought is not a record to be proud of. History teaches that pru- dence is a virtue. History also teaches that the nature of and the motivation behind war remain unchanging. The current instability within the Middle East, Levant, and Africa will not soon change. Rogue nations Iran and will continue their disruptive ac- tivities. Simmering confl icts in Eastern Europe remain. Violent extremist and organized criminal threats will persist We will also be required to plan, coordinate, and grow our partner-nation relationships. (Photo for the foreseeable future. Poor gover- by Sgt Jonathan LopezCrue.) nance, demographic shifts, megacities, strained resources, and climate change challenges? If yes, how often is training will continue to impact regional stabil- taking place? Are MEF/MEB head- ity. The likelihood of confronting proxy quarters operationally ready to deploy and surrogate forces of peer competitors on short notice to command and control remains high. The pace of technological a MAGTF fi ghting against a peer? Is advances will accelerate. Convergence of the education system focused on build- artifi cial intelligence, machine learning, ing future leaders with the knowledge autonomy, advanced manufacturing, required to meet future challenges while nanotechnology, biotechnology, and remaining warfi ghting subject matter many other technological advances may experts? likely generate disruptive changes to the A Virtual Force design, structure, and posture. character of warfare. Ultimately, trends Is the current MEF force structure op- indicate continued instability, competi- Mentoring Podcast timized to enable rapid, effective, and tion, and the likelihood of nation-state effi cient deployment of combat credit- armed confl ict. As the force-in-readi- able MAGTFs? Relative to the Indo- ness, MAGTFs of today and tomorrow Pacifi c-Asia region, is the MAGTF the must possess capabilities that address Featured Episodes ideal force design? What is the most primary threats while remaining fl exible Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr. optimal and sustainable Service end and adaptable to meet the unpredictable Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift strength? Is the current Marine Corps and the unknowns. LtGen Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller global posture designed to address fu- ture threats? Innovation. Is the Corps innovating Notes as the speed of relevance? How will the 1. Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 likely convergence of artifi cial intelli- National Defense Strategy of the United States gence, autonomy, and robotics be lever- of America, (Washington, DC: January 2018). aged? 2. Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine www.mca-marines.org Conclusion Corps Operation Concept, (Washington, DC: /mcu_history The NDS shifts the DOD away from September 2016). low-end stability operations and directs the DOD to identify cost effective ways and means to address challenges presented within regions where vital national interests are not at risk. Fur-

86 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 On Mules and Mosaics Imagining a Corps without a MAGTF by Maj Robert P. Gerbracht

t is time for the MAGTF to die. methodology. When faced with such a The MAGTF is one of many novel choice between institutional routine and ideas that came out of the World >Maj Gerbracht is a Combat Engineer ideally posturing toward future threats, War II peace dividend and our and MAGTF Planner. we need to choose the latter and not the Imythic legacy of amphibious opera- former—our doctrine gives no signs and 1 tions. It remains not only because of sisting of ground, aviation, combat ser- indicators of sacred cows. its continued utility but as a result of vice support, and command elements.3 The Marine Corps needs to be realis- the institutional difficulty inherent to tic not only about the battles we expect reshaping it in any real sense. The pur- Still, later in the text, MCDP 1 reminds to fight but also the battles we have pose of this article is to discuss why the us, “In general, the organization for fought and are currently fighting. The MAGTF in its current state must either combat should also be the organiza- 2016 Marine Corps Operating Concept evolve or die in order to support the tion for training.”4 Consequently, our (MOC), envisioning the Corps of 2025, threats we will face for the remainder of own doctrine is telling us to operate describes a suite of threats we need not the 21st century. In short, the Marine as MAGTFs both in garrison and at wait until 2025 to see because we are Corps needs to think beyond the exist- war while simultaneously stating that already fighting them today.5 Non- ing structural boundaries imposed by it is not the MAGTF that matters but state and quasi-state threats continue the MAGTF, and we need to do it now. the situation at hand. Rather than to proliferate across all domains, yet we embrace this doctrinal sound of one continue to apply a cognitive model— Defining the Challenge hand clapping, and despite the gravity the MAGTF—that is bounded by only The ostensible strength of the well of institutional habit and structure three of them: land, sea, and air. MAGTF model is its flexibility to task pulling us away, common sense tells us Critical thinking supposes that if organize, limited only by (physical) sys- the situation should be what guides our our current model is inadequate, we tems interoperability, command and control (C2) fluidity, time, and space. Or, as MCDP 1 succinctly states: [MAGTFs] have no standard struc- ture, but rather are constituted as ap- propriate for the specific situation. The MAGTF provides a single commander a combined arms force that can be tailored to the situation faced. As the situation changes, it may of course be necessary to restructure the MAGTF.2 The real problem with this definition is not the inherent descriptive latitude it offers, rather, it is the overarching institutional caveat that bounds it. If you look back one sentence on the same page: For operations and training, Marine forces will be formed into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). MAGTFs are task organizations con- Is the sun setting on the MAGTF? (Photo by Cpl Brennan Priest.)

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may need a new model. There are per- become more fluid and dynamic, using world described by the MOC, then we haps two main ways to approach this. tables of organization and equipment need to take such external ideas as seri- First, we can do what we are doing now, not as answers to operational dilemmas ously as we might take our own. which is to glacially change the existing but as points of creative departure for Mosaic warfare is clearly as aspira- MAGTF with a sprinkling of informa- agile-thinking commanders. In the fu- tional a concept as a world without a tion warfare here, a drone or two there, ture, this will need to happen not at the MAGTF, but it presents a compelling intellectual model because it is not at all that dissimilar from our core doctrine of maneuver warfare; it is, to paraphrase We need a way ahead not for modification of the Generals Alfred M. Gray and Charles MAGTF but for development of a Marine All-Domain C. Krulak, a “philosophy” and a “way of thinking,” respectively.8 Put more Task Force (MADTF) ... succinctly, mosaic warfare is a prescient methodology by which we might shuffle the complex burden of the future bat- and ask our Marines to be as agile and current MAGTF speed of hours, days, tlespace on our enemies—a burden that innovative as their enemies—even if our and weeks but at the machine speed of a creaky MAGTF may not be able to organizations are not. The second is to seconds, minutes, and hours. handle in the future. develop a completely new methodology There are some intriguing conceptual While it is a fair assessment that that accounts for the way the world is as approaches available to help us in this ef- the MAGTF provides an exceptional much as the way we prefer it to be. Our fort, to include “mosaic warfare,” recent- suite of capabilities to execute a host of enemies will not wait for us to decide. ly proposed by the Defense Advanced missions, it is currently inhibited by the Research Project Agency (DARPA).6 speed at which these capabilities can The All-Domain Threat: An Argu- Mosaic warfare proposes a model for be brought to bear, the pace at which ment for a Mosaic Methodology rapid and complex task organization we can command and control them, As the MOC rightly intimates, fu- and C2 that occurs at machine speed or the degree to which they can integrate, ture operating environments will not what might easily be described as “high and our traditional parochialism in of- be neatly delineated by the air, space, fidelity maneuver warfare.” Effectively, fering them to the joint force. Bringing and land domains because they are it is a methodology that addresses the the MAGTF to a future fight might be already made exceedingly complex by 2025 “future” articulated in the MOC: like a kid bringing toy dinosaurs to a cross-domain threats that promulgate a future we ironically are already living friend’s sandbox and finding out they through electromagnetic, space, infor- in.* Or to quote Tom Burns, director at are playing with toy soldiers. (The sce- mational, and even subterranean means. DARPA’s Strategic Technology Office, nario may work, but it will take some Though the MAGTF model is taking effort, time, and creativity—maybe too steps to address this with the inclusion The goal [of mosaic warfare] is to much for a “friend” to wait for.) We of information warfare structure (to wit: fight as a network to create a chain of need less exquisite, less expensive, and effects—or, more accurately because the MIG, or MEF Information Group), these effects are not linear, ‘effects more universal “pieces,” enabling us to these efforts do not fully encompass webs’—to deter and defeat adversar- build our future forces not from the a the multidimensionality of the future ies across multiple scales of conflict MAGTF model kit but from a meta- threats we are likely to face and remain intensity.7 phorical mosaic pile of Lego bricks. bounded by the current MAGTF con- struct. We need a way ahead not for While DARPA’s concept for mosaic Machine Speed Maneuver and Fred- modification of the MAGTF but for warfare is well-suited to work with the erick’s Mules development of a Marine All-Domain MAGTF as it exists, it may be even The greatest challenge to high fidelity Task Force (MADTF), a structure un- more ideal for whatever may come next. maneuver warfare is not our physical bound by the typology of the “Combat If we are looking for the solution to the systems but our lithified perception of Element.” command and control. On this, we can While the idea of a MADTF may *The methodology of “mosaic warfare” pos- learn a great deal from the opponents we seem heretical, comical, or some combi- its a force that can internally reorganize and have faced in the last few years. Violent nation of the two, it is certainly not one recompose itself so quickly that an enemy is extremist organizations (ISIS in par- outpaced by such surprise and flexibility. Our that is mired in an almost 60-year-old current model for MAGTF employment relies ticular) have proven to be unexpectedly concept that continues to bound our heavily on expensive, exquisite systems to worthy adversaries, often characterized thinking. If we are sincerely interested leverage effects on the enemy. These “puzzle less by convention and more by unfet- in defeating ruthlessly innovative and pieces” are often limited in their interoper- tered innovation. Their command and constantly evolving opponents, we must ability, and largely incapable of being mixed feedback models shift and reconsolidate and matched in a way that matches the more be willing and capable to evolve quicker mosaic effects produced by our adversaries. rapidly at the tactical and operational than they can. Our unit structures must level, employing a model more akin to

88 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 special operations forces than conven- telligent.10 Giving our Marines baskets We do not have the luxury of making tional troops. While the Marine Corps of new technology without buckets of evolutionary choices about our war- is rightfully constrained by its Title 10 more education is to assume they are gfighting methods when the world de- authorities—having clear lateral lim- much like “Frederick’s Mules.” mands of us a revolutionary approach. its in this regard—the advent of next The MAGTF way of thinking needs generation digital technologies can help Conclusion: Educating for a Revolu- to die, Frederick’s mules need to be bridge this gap. tion turned to glue, and the frog needs to Before we start embracing the The all-domain task force is clearly swim in the ocean so the philosophies right technology, we must embrace an aspirational concept, as is that of a of high-fidelity maneuver that brought the right methodology. The Oprah mosaic Marine force that can achieve the MAGTF to life in the first place audience approach of “everyone gets warfighting dominance across all do- can thrive anew. a drone swarm” rightly aims to put mains simultaneously while reshaping innovation in the hands of every ju- itself in realtime. The greatest limit nior Marine but, if divorced from a to their realization is our own lack of Notes more institutional approach to our imagination and the magnetic attrac- 1. Jacob McFerren, “The Myth of the MAGTF,” philosophy, it risks placing another tion we often have to things that have (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and unused item in the rifleman’s pack. been done before, as we choose to walk Staff College, 1991). Corps-wide investments in “beeps and in the beaten tracks of a mule. There squeaks” will make us only as lethal as are momentous challenges to tearing 2. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, War- our Marines are, and in an age where down the MAGTF and rebuilding fighting, (Washington, DC: 1997). sergeants and lieutenants could become something new, but they are not impos- 3. Ibid. mini-MAGTF commanders, we owe it sible unless we as Marines decide they to the Corps to make better sergeants are impossible. The world described 4. Ibid. and lieutenants. Commensurate with by the MOC should already cause us any technological investment in our to think far outside of the MAGTF 5. Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Marines and the commensurate train- paradigm because it certainly sounds Operating Concept, (Washington, DC: Septem- ing for these technologies, we need to like a world that is going to break that ber 2016). invest in the education of our junior paradigm. Perhaps we are too limited leaders in preparation for the increased by our own perspective to be revolu- 6. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, cognitive loads and authoritative tionary, or as the Japanese idiom says, “Mosaic Warfare,” (Washington, DC: Strategic weight that will accompany greater, Technology Office, August 2017). “high fidelity” lethality. Reliance on 7. Ibid. the status quo will not take us the full distance—or as Frederick the Great The all-domain task 8. MCDP 1, Warfighting. once opined: force is clearly an aspi- Thought … the faculty of combining 9. Thomas Holcroft, Posthumous Works of Fred- ideas, is what distinguishes man from rational concept ... erick II, King of Prussia, (London, UK: G.G. J. beasts of burden. A mule, though he and J. Robinson, 1789). should have made ten campaigns … would not have improved in his tac- 10. Matthew Cancian and Michael Klein, tics. And to the shame of humanity it “The frog in the well cannot compre- Military Officer Quality in the All -Volunteer must be confessed that, with respect to hend the ocean.”11 It is an uncomfort- Force, (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015). this kind of indolent stupidity, many able metaphor, but the world can look old officers are not superior to such a lot like a well from the inside of a 9 11. Donald Keene, Frog in the Well, (New York, a mule. MAGTF. NY: Columbia University Press, 2006). Societally, we face a technological The innovations that will pave the cascade that is already transforming way for future Marine commands— the character of the wars we fight. Our machine-augmented decision making, non-state adversaries have already ben- persistent sensors, digitally enhanced efited from this and have transformed battlespace awareness, wearable com- the way they man, equip, and train mand, control, communications, com- their forces. Should peer and near-peer puters, and intelligence suites and be- adversaries follow suit, we may find yond—either already exist or will be ourselves on the steep side of the inno- within the Marine Corps’ grasp in a vation curve and on the wrong side of matter of years. They will be within our history—all while research has shown enemies’ hands, if they are not already, our officers are not getting any more in- within that same time frame or earlier.

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 89 IDEAS & ISSUES (COMMENTARY) The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook

A checklist for success by Capt Valerie J. Cranmer

tandardization is the unsung value of military thinking. There is a palpable feeling that anything and everything is run Sbetter, smoother even, if there is a stan- dardized process. Deviation from the process breeds unfamiliar results, slows the decision-making process, and com- pounds the effects of the “fog of war.” The proven results of standardization are evident when one looks at such systems as the American education system in which national standardized tests have significantly improved the quality of education among children, reflected in America’s worldwide educational stand- ing. With such an effective system based on the improvement of the individual, it only makes sense to integrate stan- dardization to greater degrees into the monolithic military bureaucratic system. While standardization does exist in We set standards for a reason. (Photo by SSgt Donald Holbert.) many fashions throughout the Marine Corps already, it must be fully realized ing system currently in place with the and integrated into day-to-day opera- >Capt Cranmer is an Intelligence Of- grading scale. In fact, when the Section tions. Even standard practices, codi- ficer. She has spent most of her ca- I comments and grades do not seem to fied in checklists and SOPs, are often reer in the Pacific area. Most recently match up, the grading takes precedence. ignored in lieu of the status quo. This is she was the Deputy Plans Officer, III Then why bother with Section I at all? reasonable especially considering how MEF G-2. By removing subjectivity from award double checking all procedures against and fitness reports, we no longer harm the millions of pages of reference ma- check the list to ensure every wicket is Marines because an officer “don’t write terials (be it orders, directives, instruc- hit without subjective reasoning) rather too good.” tions, policies, regulations, etc.) wastes than the inordinate number of “award Arguably, the greatest advantage needless time. However, the benefits boards” left to debate grammar and of standardization is that we can hold from standardization far out-weigh the determine if the Marine actually de- Marines accountable to that standard, current system of allowing junior of- serves the award, ultimately resulting which is undeniably the correct way. ficers and NCOs the latitude to make in Marines receiving awards months There is no room for creative thought subjective decisions. With a standard after they execute a permanent change or deviations. More accurately, the stan- format for every conceivable practice, of station or even expiration of active dard—as the most efficient and cost-ef- we effectively eliminate redundancy and service. Similarly, fitness reports cur- fective means—requires no capitulation diminish the amount of time spent on rently have a series of metrics; they still on over-spending or time management. time-consuming tasks. provide a space to “paint a word pic- Sure, there are many ways to complete Awards, for example, can be pro- ture.” These Section I comments have the same task (and we pay lip service cessed quicker and without delay (just little to do with the standard measur- to that idea), but the standard way is

90 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 simple, and it works. Trying to disavow Marines from a “checklist mentality” is ridiculous because the checklist encom- passes ideas the inexperienced Marine does not think to take into consider- ation. Consequently, the mistakes the Marine might have made are avoided, and the subsequent cost of righting the wrong can be better utilized elsewhere. Additionally, when Marines rigidly adhere to the standard, it allows the higher ups to exercise better command and control. We have already begun utilizing this mindset in regard to exer- cises and wargames. Every year, exercise problems are the same, and the actual execution of the exercise just serves to reinforce the standard procedure. In- consistencies and problems that deviate from the standard are willed away to provide a good-looking picture to the commander so that they might have their endstate: victory. In maneuver warfare, there is talk about the smallest unit leader (the We normally begin COIN with a show of force. (Photo by LCpl Israel Chincio.) corporal) taking the initiative to make decisions that can, in our modern age of wins hearts and minds? Freedom and guiding the Marine Corps developed media and immediate connectivity, have security. To bring freedom and security, through the thousands of after-action ramifications at the strategic levels; and we must embolden local leaders by help- reports produced following every de- talk is where this concept stops. Do we ing finance their freedom of (insert ap- ployment. really trust that nineteen-year-old who propriate freedom) and provide security The standard process for COIN is is not responsible enough to buy liquor through giving the indigenous people as follows. First, we must begin with (but was caught with such libations thus jobs as the military, police, or constabu- a show of force. Since COIN usually proving he does not make the correct lary force. occurs in third world countries, seeing decisions when unsupervised) to make such technology brought to the scene a decision affecting national strategy? of turmoil will shock the natives into Of course not! It is merely sufficient to a fear-induced stupor; only the most say we do. COIN’s center of gravity fanatical native would dare to stand At this juncture, some who disagree and critical vulnerabil- against such might. After our show with my statements might bring up of force, we systematically root out the necessity of non-standardization ity is the population. the enemy through the destruction of in operations such as humanitarian their safe havens. Safe haven destruc- assistance/disaster relief or counterin- tion accomplishes two important tasks. surgency (COIN). Such operations are History demonstrates how utilizing Again, it shows the complete superiority characterized by their fluid battlespaces this standard creates a strong military we possess in technology, proving to and unique terrain (human and physi- in such countries as Haiti and the Do- the people the benefits of freedom. It cal); to impose a standard would be minican Republic. Any such failures also demonstrates to the people that preposterous. But of course we can (such as the collapse of the South Viet- we bring security. At this point, we apply a standard! In fact, we already namese Army) only highlights that it begin addressing the people’s needs. treat COIN within a standard; we just was a lack of personal conviction on the The basic necessities, security, and a change the words from the conventional part of the natives to take freedom and solid government will need to be set warfare context to fit our COIN doc- security seriously. The basic premise up. Building roads, creating schools, trine. COIN’s center of gravity and criti- behind our reasoning is functionally and digging wells will help secure the cal vulnerability is the population. To sound. Rather than re-assess our cur- favorable attitudes of the populace since exploit the center of gravity, we hit the rent standards of COIN, we need to it will supply their basic needs. critical vulnerability by winning the do a better job of inculcating small In conjunction with providing free- hearts and minds of the people. What unit leaders to the standard processes dom and security, the onus to train

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 91 IDEAS & ISSUES (COMMENTARY)

the native forces will fall upon the est levels, and the military becomes ers), “Independent thinking must take military. Since most servicemembers compelled to hastily cauterize the na- second place to a uniform solution.”1 have had years of training on cultural tive forces, leaving them with enough developments and an anthropological training to handle all their countries’ understanding of interdependence of issues. It is no different than if America Note economic, political, and social struc- had to be run by its military forces. 1. Adolf Von Schell, Battle Leadership, (Fort tures, working to build a native force in By standardizing the entirety of the Benning, GA: The Benning Herald, 1933). the image of the United States military Marine Corps way of life, we eliminate should be easy. The biggest hurdle to the need to re-develop already estab- >Author’s Note: This article is submitted on overcome is the fact that many of the lished procedures, increase the reaction behalf of 1stLt J.J. Buckle. 1stLt Buckle is native forces do not go through an in- time of units (since they know how the an 8006 Marine in the Fleet Marine Force, doctrination process such as boot camp. fl ow of events will go), and control reck- serving as a platoon commander. He wrote this However, since they live brutal, lawless lessness. If every offi cer and SNCO has article while on deployment in Afghanistan. lives in a third world country, inducing been schooled in the proper standards, them to work in support of freedom and victory should be self-assured. Proven security will always be effective (and a results in combat are replicated and little extra cash does not hurt as well). perpetuated in any type of environ- At this point, history demonstrates ment. Plus, there is no longer room for that Americans will begin to clamor a defi cient writer the stress over things against the United States’ involvement like awards and fi tness reports. Every- in the foreign country—investing more thing within the Marine Corps fl ows money, time, and military lives than is as a well-oiled machine. In the words acceptable (shows of force are not cheap, of a dead German military thinker (in in either taxpayer dollars or American obligation to the standard process of lives). This clamor resonates at the high- revering dead German military think-

92 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 IDEAS & ISSUES (AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS) Operation FROM THE SEA Where are the advantages? by Capt Daniel D. Phillips

he Marine Corps is taking a Vignette deliberate approach to how >Capt Phillips wrote this article Interviewer: Col Fullman, in your it develops the ability to while he was a Student at Expedi- own words, please describe to me your fi ght peer adversaries in the tionary Warfare School. opinions on how America lost the Pa- Tfuture. The method by which the Ma- cifi c. Specifi cally, touch on your in- rine Corps is instructing maneuver war- volvement with the failed forced entry fare will lead to an attritionist mindset ters of gravity and critical vulnerabilities operation, Operation FROM THE SEA and a misunderstanding of the proper are being identifi ed with no analysis or (Operation FTS), into the South China implementation of maneuver warfare identifi cation of enemy networks. Sea and the domino effect it had on the among its future leaders. If it is properly The subsequent fi ctional vignette rest of the region. taught and understood throughout the is set in the year 2030, and the con- Col Fullman: A large portion of poli- Corps, a new offset could be reached sequences of the Marine Corps’ shift cymakers in Washington and military that adversarial peer actors cannot at- from maneuver warfare are made evi- leadership at the Pentagon believe tain. MCDP 1, Warfi ghting, currently dent. It demonstrates the futility of the the Chinese occupation of Okinawa, defi nes maneuver warfare as arms race between the United States , Hawaii, and the Kwajalein Atoll a warfi ghting philosophy that seeks to and its peer competitors—China, Rus- is a direct result of the failure of Op- shatter the enemy’s cohesion through sia, and Iran. Superior technology and eration FTS. It does play a large role a variety of rapid, focused, and unex- increased force preservation, although in the loss of American dominance in pected actions which create a turbu- helpful, does not necessarily serve as the Pacifi c Ocean; however, the decline lent and rapidly deteriorating situation an asymmetric advantage. Without an started much earlier. with which the enemy cannot cope.1 indomitable national will, an attritionist Look back to 2004 and the emer- will never win a war. gence of the IED during Operation This defi nition only describes what maneuver warfare may look like to en- tities observing a specifi c action. The defi nition of maneuver warfare should read as follows: Maneuver warfare is a method of warfi ghting that seeks to analyze an enemy network, identify actionable fo- cal points that are critical to the enemy, then action the focal points through a combination of speed, surprise and violence. The embracement of MCDP 1’s defi nition has resulted in several sec- ond- and third-order effects regarding the Marine Corps’ quality of education on maneuver warfare. It is ingrained at all levels if commanders exercise speed, focus, and surprise against the enemy, they are exercising maneuver warfare. This misunderstanding has led to the conduction of attrition warfare. Cen- We need to change defi nitions and reforms on maneuver warfare. (Photo by LCpl Kyle Bunyi.)

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 93 IDEAS & ISSUES (AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS)

IRAQI FREEDOM. Prior to the prolif- cal points that overlap and target them. MAGTF commanders to integrate and eration of the IED across the battlefield, When the Marine Corps left Iraq, it leverage warfighting functions across America had executed one of the quick- left with a new mindset: you must be the domains and target specific critical est, most effective displays of maneuver able to kill the most enemies, and you vulnerabilities. warfare during Operation IRAQI FREE- must do it with the most technologically The Marine Corps Operating Concept DOM. Through a thorough analysis of advanced gear while keeping all of your also served to reinforce the marriage of the Iraqi Army’s network, the Marine personnel alive. the Navy and Marine Corps.2 It empha- Corps was able to conduct a swift and Take this attrionist attitude and sized the Marine Corps would primar- decisive offensive action that struck fo- then apply it to America’s peer adver- ily fight from ships—which had always cal points and bypassed military targets saries—who have the money, technol- been the case. This bold focus stated, of little significance. ogy sectors, and willpower to compete to the enemies of the Marine Corps, After the Bathe Party lost power, with America—and you have an arms that the battlefield had already been the Iraqi Army was dismantled and race. America would develop a new chosen. All the enemy had to do was no effective government structure was technology, and a few days, months, shape that battlefield to its advantage, left. The Marine Corps no longer had or years later, each peer would have which is exactly what it ended up doing during Operation FTS. The final seed of disaster sown by the Marine Corps was an idea originally America was no longer the preeminent leader of the published in 2012 and fully ingrained world ... into company-level leadership in 2017. It was the idea that the method paragraph in operation orders was not needed. The Marine Corps had determined, because a true objective besides a vague tasking a similar, or better, counter develop- of a lack of understanding about how to build a nation. This left the Corps ment. The Marine Corps believed if it to identify an enemy’s center of gravity with no enemy course of action to focus had a superior technology for one day, and critical vulnerability, it would only on and analyze. Because of the lack of then during that day, it would have an define them without explaining how to focus, the Marine Corps was forced to asymmetric advantage. What it did not identify and exploit them. fight an enemy who was elusive, had factor in was America was no longer The Marine Corps’ removal of the minimal command structure, and the preeminent leader of the world, method paragraph essentially ended the maintained a purely attritionist mind- and anything it could produce would officer corps’ entry-level education on set. Counterinsurgency operations were almost immediately be replicated. Also, maneuver warfare. The method para- conducted, and key players in the insur- if you have superpowers with similar graph was the only portion of any units’ gent network were neutralized. What technology going toe to toe, then the order where the commander justified was different from past wars was the victor will be the participant that has his understanding of maneuver war- enemy’s ability to replace neutralized the most firepower, manpower, and fare. Without the method paragraph, leadership, operate with minimal infra- national will. the commander and his subordinate are structure, and have limited identifiable As a result of this warfighting phi- left with only offensive forms of ma- tactical goals. losophy flaw, in September 2016, the neuver to rely on. The lieutenants from Take an enemy who cannot be ana- Marine Corps produced guidance that The Basic School’s classes of 2017 were lyzed, then add the new dimension of ultimately resulted in the disaster of our company commanders and most the IED. The Marines were forced into Operation FTS. The guidance came essential levels of leadership in 2025 a situation where their best hope was to in the form of a document called the during Operation FTS. kill more of the enemy than the enemy Marine Corps Operating Concept. It ex- Interviewer: Sir, would you please could kill of them. They had to develop plained that to win a fight, the Marine expound upon how this history lesson superior means of force preservation and Corps must be able to fight in the five affected the failure of Operation FTS? hope that the enemy’s will faded before domains that had been identified at the Col Fullman: Yes. Since the 2000s, their nation’s did, all while a new na- time of publication: land, sea, air, cy- China focused on developing existing tional government in Iraq attempted to ber, and space. This idea—in itself—is reefs and small islands in and around get on its feet. true, but the idea of how to achieve this the South China Sea with the intent The “kill more enemies and preserve was flawed. It focused on the techno- to influence shipping channels. The more friendlies” strategy did not work logical and doctrinal advancement of Navy and Marine Corps’ original plan in Iraq; but it did set in motion the each individual domain. This guidance was to conduct freedom of navigation idea the war was lost because of a lack did great things for the Marine Corps patrols through the area to demonstrate of host-nation will. Not that it didn’t on a face-value level; it bought new they would not be challenged by the succeed; to win a war, you must identify weapons, better computers, and better Chinese. The freedom of navigation what the enemy wants and then find fo- ships. What it failed to do was train patrols had a limited effect, at first when

94 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 the Chinese islands were merely sev- nese implanted viruses in companies’ floor in the South China Sea that, when eral square acres of sand and concrete. systems that made simple changes to activated, would rise to the surface and They had no effect once the islands serial numbers and modified financial loiter in a certain area. These sensors increased by several square miles, the tracking algorithms in accounting de- would launch mini drones that could largest of which was Mischief Reef. In partments by one thousandth of a per- mark targets for our tomahawk missiles. the 1990s, it was only dry during low cent, which went unnoticed and crashed Unfortunately, most of the sensors did tide; however, by 2025, it was nearly several companies. not activate, and those that did had a 50 feet above sea level and 10 square The combination of these attacks very limited effect. I believe the mini kilometers. across the warfighting domains forced drones played a part in the Chinese see- In 2024, China moved an entire fleet America to answer hostility with lethal- ing us coming. We launched missiles at of ships, to include a force that looked ity. In 2025, the Marine Corps stood the targets we could identify and ones largely similar to a Marine Corps MEF, up a task force comprised of the 31st we had reasonable assumptions about. into the South China Sea. Initial re- The missiles were the only shaping ports indicated that the Chinese MEF fires our landing force had. All of our and fleet were conducting a large-scale close air support platforms were caught exercise to serve as a proof of concept The missiles were the in a battle of attrition with Chinese for their ability to operate across war- only shaping fires our fighters. The LCSTVs were not able fighting domains. Initial reports were to get close to any landing points be- wrong. The Chinese did demonstrate landing force had. cause of their captains’ reasonable fear their ability to operate across the do- of the Chinese’s anti-area/access denial mains by shutting down shipping cor- rail-gun systems. ridors with their ships and submarines. MEU and the 15th MEU. I served We disembarked the LCSTVs in They ceased air traffic with their expe- as the GCE commander for the 31st rubber craft and high-speed AAVs at a ditionary air element. They destroyed MEU. In basic terms, the task force was range that far exceeded what the naval orbiting satellites by launching missiles to seize Mischief Reef and establish a surface fires could provide. We knew into orbit with tons of metal dust in- forward base from which the Marine something was wrong after about twen- stead of explosives. The dust hit inter- Corps could conduct future offensive ty minutes, when we heard several loud national satellites at such a speed that it missions. Operation FTS was launched. explosions. Apparently, the LCSTVs’ destroyed all of them. Yes, every one of The 31st MEU loaded onto littoral anti-radar shape worked; unfortunately, them. However, Chinese satellites had combat ships–troop transport variant the Chinese had mined the waters with magnets that were able to collect the (LCSTV), new ships with a limited mines that would release from the sea dust prior to impact. Finally, Chinese signature on radar, and headed toward floor when they picked up certain fre- cyber war elements were able to access the objective. quencies from propellers. In a matter of publicly-owned shipping companies and Years earlier, the National Security minutes, all three of our LCSTVs were international companies, and the Chi- Agency embedded sensors into the sea sunk or sinking. We continued on, guided in by beacons that recon placed at landing points. At around one kilometer from landing, the Chinese began to fire on our landing party with shore guns. Their initial effect was devastating. We were able to attempt to suppress with the stabilized 25mm cannons on our AAVs. While we moderately silenced the guns on the shore, we failed to no- tice the Chinese patrol boats that had materialized to our rear. I am certain the only reason I was not killed with the rest of the landing party was because my AAV had both a weapon and engine malfunction. Our failed landing and destroyed task force was one of three failed forced entries that day. That was exactly what the Chinese had planned on. They had already maneuvered their fleet to seize We may not be the preeminent world provider. (Photo by LCpl Scott Jenkins.) American holdings in the Pacific prior

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 95 IDEAS & ISSUES (AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS)

to our failure. America had no forces in the region remaining to counter them.

Operation FTS After-Action Report • New technology does not neces- sarily constitute an offset in warfare. n Without technology that rivals that of our enemy, the Marine Corps will be at a disadvantage. The current operating environment consists of numerous peer rivals to the Marine Corps and America. The key word is “peer.” Peer meaning they have the means to match America regard- ing economic growth, industry, and development. n In an operating environment where We did get troops on the ground—at great expense. (Photo by LCpl Scott Jenkins.) each nation has similar capabilities, new developments can expect to be bined arms but also understand that n The Marine Corps needs to culti- replicated or surpassed by each re- attacking a component of cyber may vate innovation with regard to new spective actor immediately or quickly. facilitate maneuver in the air. means of entry for large-scale units n In prior wars and circumstances • We cannot allow the enemy to ei- from the land, sea, air, and space. throughout history, technological ther choose or know the battlefield on • A lack of maneuverist, small unit developments created an asymmet- which they will fight. leadership leads to a lack of maneu- ric advantage for generations. These n When the Marine Corps re-de- verist senior leadership. advancements include ships, nuclear voted itself to the Navy for a fight- • The Basic School’s lieutenants of to- weapons, and precision guided mu- ing platform, it announced to the day are the generals of tomorrow. If the nitions. world the battlefield on which it Marine Corps fails them at entry-level n America cannot develop weapons would fight. training, it will start a cycle that may quickly enough or advanced enough n The Marine Corps is at a criti- never be reversed. Had the leadership for technology to set it apart in the cal junction in its history, similar during Operation FTS understood future. The only thing that can to the 1800s when senior leadership how to write a method paragraph, or change is a cultural shift in the Ma- refused to leave guard duty on ships. expected to see one from their com- rine Corps from attrition warfare to Had the Marine Corps not shifted mander, they could have seen what maneuver warfare. from ships’ guards to primarily expe- they were doing was pure attrition and • Each domain needs to be housed ditionary duty, it would have become the same tactics had been executed for under the umbrella of a universal do- obsolete. the previous several decades. main. n Fighting from only ships is ob- • Without an indomitable national n The issue the Marine Corps has solete. The Marine Corps needs to will, an attritionist will never win a with its understanding of maneuver make the tough decision and take war. warfare is it looks at warfighting do- action now and leave ships as only mains in a linear way, meaning that one of a litany of options. the Corps attempts to isolate each n The answer may not be embrac- Notes domain—land, air, sea, space and ing land, sea, or air for means of 1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, War- cyber—and to superior in each in- forced entry. If the Marine Corps is fighting, (Washington, DC: 1997). dividually. The Marine Corps needs focused on only being prepared to to look at the enemy holistically and be expeditionary from one domain, 2. Headquarters Marine Corps, The Marine attempt to identify what the enemy’s it will fail. Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century, (Washington, most likely course of action will be. n Any enemy that wants to protect It then needs to see how the domains its coast from the Marine Corps has DC: September 2016). are being leveraged to attain that already developed means to do so. goal. Once this has been completed, n If the Marine Corps continues to the Marine Corps can do a network attempt to justify the sea-based en- analysis on each domain. try, it will lose its chance to develop n If Marine Corps understands the other methods for larger forces. This enemy’s network, we will not only will lead to a strategic failure and have indirect fires to execute com- thousands of lost lives.

96 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 INTRODUCING The Observation Post

Based on guidance from General James N. Mattis, USMC (Retired) we are re-establishing a department that appeared in the Gazette from 1956 to 1963. Professional debate during that interwar inflection point between the peer-on-peer war of fire and maneuver in Korea and the yet-to-come Guerilla war in Vietnam prompted creation of a feature dedicated to short articles that presented “new, constructive and often controversial ideas.” An example of a classic OP article follows on page #: “A Modest Proposal” by (then) 1st Lt A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard originally published in May 1962. Today we will re-establish The Observation Post.

A CALL TO ACTION “Marines, today we need you to bring your ideas to the Gazette in order to refresh Marine Corps thinking. We need the intellectual risk-takers, the ‘Mavericks’ whose critical thinking and creative problem-solving can disrupt the bureaucracy and challenge intellectual complacency. We need nonconformists and innovators whose disciplined but unregimented ideas can lead to solutions that outpace adaptive enemies and a dynamically changing world.”

- General James N. Mattis, USMC (Retired)

Submission Guidelines Frank opinions, rebuttals to published articles, and imaginative ideas are all welcome. Subject matter is unconstrained and may be controversial, but the article must be short. Submit essays of 800-1000 words to mailto:[email protected]. MS Word documents are preferred. No pictures or charts. Author biographies are limited to rank, full name and MOS. The authors of OP articles selected for publication will receive an award of $50.00 courtesy of the donors of MCAF. OBSERVATION POST The Old Gunny Says ...

by Anonymous

en, before you shove off for this Birthday So you gotta prepare yourself, study your job, plan for the future celebration I wanta call something to your and be ready to step up when the opportunity comes. attention. You’re gonna hear a lotta fi ne Much of the Corps’ readiness depends on having the gear in words about the history shape and ready to move. That goes for you too. “Mof the Corps, old battles, honors won by fi ghtin’ Keep all your personal gear ship-shape and ready Marines who have grown grey in wars carrying to pack in a few hours notice. Keep your boots in our standards and wearing the emblem all over the shape, your uniform ready and your fi eld gear in world. Year after year, the old Corps keeps adding condition. Have plans for disposing of your car or to its fi ne reputation whether it’s the result of a big shipping and storing civilian clothes. You married battle we’ve won or just the snappy performance men should have plans and written directions for of a young Marine sentry at a Stateside base it’s all your dependents concerning the handling of your part of our traditions that we all pass along from property if you have to move out in a hurry. year to year. The planning you have done for your Now, much of this distinction and fi ne dependents has a lot to do with the readiness of tradition is based upon one of the Corps’ special you married Marines. Do you know where your characteristics I wanna mention for a minute. That family will live? Do they know what to do about characteristic is readiness. I’m not gonna tell you moving household effects? Do they know who to about the big picture, how the Marine Corps is turn to in emergencies? You gotta plan all these the Force-in-Readiness for emergency situations. things. Write them out. Arrange joint bank Everyone knows that. I’m gonna talk about how accounts, check on your allotments and insurance. you, the individual Marine, fi t into this ready outfi t. Give the wife a schedule of payments for your time You men should be able to see much of our purchases. Square away your car payments and ability to move out to any trouble spot depends on insurance. Don’t leave the little wife holding a more than just having the combat gear, the supplies fouled up fi nancial bag. and the organization ready. It also depends on When you have properly taken care of these every man-jack and offi cer being ready too. personal readiness items; your physical fi tness, There are many ways each of us has to keep your professional preparation, your personal gear ready: we have gotta take care of our health and and plans for dependents, then you will be mentally fi tness. Every campaign we go into always catches ready. You can shove off with the confi dence that some people with their muscles down. From the all is squared away on the home front and with the jungles of Guadalcanal to the hills of Korea, we’ve freedom to concentrate on handling your duties in heard and learned about the need for being in top the manner the Corps expects of you. physical shape in order to be a hard-charger. It’s too Well, men, shove off and enjoy the Birthday, late to start getting in shape after the ‘incoming’ but when you are reminded of the Marine Corps’ starts to whistle. So, as I’ve said before, keep them past accomplishments, remember that our great feet and leg muscles in shape. Watch your health record has been made by Marines who were ‘ready’ habits. Stay in shape and be ready for any kind of at all times to go any place any time and do the job. contest. Remember we play for keeps. Another way we all gotta keep ready is professionally. This business is getting more complicated all the time and the competition is getting rougher. We’ve recently >Editor’s Note: This article originally appeared in the Leath- seen that ‘rice burning’ peasants make pretty smart soldiers. So erneck magazine in November 1953. we have gotta be even smarter. We have to know a lot in this business because when the chips start fl ying many of you will fi nd yourselves doing jobs one or two ranks ahead of you. I mean by that, you gotta be ready to do a bigger job and to lead other men. Sometimes promotions come fast. Some of you will fi nd yourselves wearing brass bars before you know what’s happened.

98 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 BOOKS Call Sign Chaos

reviewed by Col Chris Woodbridge, USMC(Ret)

n his novel, El Club Dumas,1 Spanish author Arturo Perez-Re- >Col Woodbridge is the Publisher, verte observes, “There are no in- Editor, and Chairman of the Edito- nocent readers anymore ... To the rial Advisory Panel of the Marine Iinformation the author provides he’ll Corps Gazette . Unless otherwise always add his own.” To be honest, noted, all quotations are from Call I am not an innocent reader of Call Sign Chaos. Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead. During my 30 years in the Marine Corps, I CALL SIGN CHAOS: Learning to served directly under Gen James N. and entertaining leadership manual Lead. By and Bing Mattis’ command three times, always for executives, managers, and military West. New York, NY: Random two echelons down the chain of com- officers. Mattis is a gifted storyteller, House, 2019. mand: for example, me at platoon, and his advice will be useful to any- ISBN: 978-0812996838, 320 pp. him at battalion; me at battalion, him one who runs anything. The book is not, however, an account of his time in at division; and so forth. This is also 2 the first time I reviewed a book that I service to the 45th president. appear in, however briefly. This is rel- So if you expect a “tell-all expose” evant only in that I was close to some about the Office of the Secretary uncovers the General’s “origin sto- of the events and many of the Marines of Defense in President Donald J. ry” from youth in Washington State mentioned in the book, and I bring Trump’s administration, you will be through early ship-board deployments my own views to the reading. What disappointed. As the General explains to the Western Pacific and subsequent follows is not “the rest of the story,” in his introduction, his resignation “is recruiting duty. This part continues but my opinions of the book shaped how my public service ended; now I through his first combat experiences by my personal experiences. will tell you how it began.” as a lieutenant colonel while com- I also need to add that writing this Furthermore, if you expect deeply manding a battalion in Operation review has been challenging since a touching insights into the character of DESERT STORM and concludes with minor print and television media fren- Jim Mattis the man, you will also be his command of Task Force 58, the zy has grown around the General’s disappointed by the book. Likewise, if first American and allied “brigade” first interviews since his resignation you expect a chest-thumping first-per- into Afghanistan after the terrorist as Secretary of Defense. The ques- son battle narrative from “Mad Dog attacks of 11 September 2001. This tions and discussion in these public Mattis,” you truly do not know who first part demonstrates the General’s interviews have all seemed to focus the General is. However, if you expect grounding in personal leadership on everything but the book. A situa- a collection of carefully curated bio- at the tactical level where personal tion perhaps best illustrated by Jeffrey graphical vignettes that carry funda- preparation—mental, physical, and Goldberg in his article for the October mental lessons on leadership, then you spiritual—and immediate presence edition of The Atlantic, wherein he de- will be pleased with this book. Above in the lives of the Marines you lead scribes the General’s departure from all, this work is worth every Marine’s are crucial to success. As a lieutenant the current administration: time to read. Call Sign Chaos will also serving as a platoon commander in Here is where I am compelled to note be of particular value to all who serve his battalion, we all learned from him that I did not learn any of these de- in the joint force, the Defense estab- the moral imperatives of leadership tails from Mattis himself. Nor did I lishment, as well as students of na- in war—lessons many of us took into learn them from his new book, Call tional defense, strategy, history, and our own commands in the sequels to Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead, which he military affairs. the so-called First Gulf War. wrote with the former Marine officer The book is organized into three The second part, “Executive Lead- Bing West. The book is an instructive parts. The first, “Direct Leadership,” ership,” begins by following General

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 99 BOOKS

Mattis in combat again, covering his keep fi ghting for those who are still First, I reassured our traditional friends time in command of the First Marine with you. that we stood with them in defend- Division during the initial invasion of ing their security against the terrorist Iraq and early stability and counter- The third part, entitled “Strategic threat. Second, I made it clear that insurgency operations through his as- Leadership,” deals exclusively with we would not tolerate Iranian incur- signments at MCCDC, I MEF, U.S. the General’s time commanding U.S. sion violating their territorial integrity. Joint Forces Command, and NA- CENTCOM. Since the establishment Third, I reinforced our ambassadors’ TOs’ Supreme Allied Command for of CENTCOM in 1983, only four- efforts and encouraged regional leaders Transformation. Among this part’s teen men have served as the geograph- to be responsive to and inclusive of all vignettes are the details of an incident ic combatant commander for this their people. I saw this all as buying that has not appeared in the offi cial complex, dynamic, and volatile area of time for them to make reforms aligned with their societies’ carrying capacity. histories of Operation IRAQI FREE- responsibility. This period of the Gen- DOM. Shocking and controversial at eral’s service is probably the least re- The book further illustrates this the time was the decision to relieve latable for even the most experienced, point regarding “carrying capacity” for Col Joe D. Dowdy from command mature, and well-read military reader. change by drawing the stark contrasts of RCT 1 during the “march up” to The book does a credible job of break- between Egypt and Syria: Baghdad. The General’s decision is ing down this barrier to understand- described over three pages and it is ing by detailing the daily routine, or To see what might have happened had clear he neither took the action lightly personal battle rhythm, the General the Egyptian military not acquiesced to the will of millions of Egyptians in nor second-guessed his choice once demanded of himself and his staff. the streets, we need only look to Syria. made. Although General Mattis’ stat- The sheer intellectual stamina and ed intent “involved speed as the top personal discipline required to oper- Here again, the theme of strategic in- priority,” the commander of RCT 1 ate at this level is a testament to the coherence at the national level plays “expressed his heartfelt reluctance to exceptional character of such leaders. out through the period of “red lines” lose any of his men by pushing at what Sadly, much of this section describes and inaction. The horrifi c civil war in might seem to be a reckless pace.” Col the friction and frustration born from Syria continues to destabilize the re- Dowdy was relieved immediately and failures to frame and articulate a co- gion and “America lives today with the replaced by one of the General’s most herent national strategy for the region. consequences of emboldened adversar- trusted subordinate leaders, then-Col In addition to the precipitous with- ies and shaken allies.” John Toolan. As a lieutenant colonel, drawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and General Mattis took command Toolan had served as the Operations restrictions on “boots on the ground” of CENTCOM with two threats in Offi cer, 7th Marines, when then-Col- troop strength in Afghanistan, this mind: “stateless Sunni Islamist ter- onel Mattis commanded the 7th Ma- period was marked by the wave of rorists, and the revolutionary Shiite rine Regiment and was responsible for popular uprisings across North Africa regime in Iran. By the end of Strategic the “Chaos” call sign. and the Middle East that came to be Leadership, it was the situation with A second vignette continues a known as the “Arab Spring.” Although Iran that eroded the General’s trust theme that resonates throughout the heralded by some as the ushering in and “traction” within the Obama ad- book: the frustration and squandered liberal democracy in the Arab world, ministration. In December 2012, the lives, resources, and opportunities for the General and others such as Secre- General departed CENTCOM “a re- victory that attend upon political and tary of Defense Robert Gates were gion afl ame and in disarray. The lack strategic incoherence at the national of integrated regional strategy had left level. Not unlike the missed opportu- wary about the consequences of the us adrift and our friends confused. We nity to trap Osama Bin Laden and his uprising … Democracy was not pre- were offering no leadership or direc- ordained to emerge from what was Al Qaeda forces at Tora Bora in 2002, unfolding, I didn’t have a crystal ball tion.” described at the end of “Direct Lead- but a quick glance at history reminded The book closes with a section ership,” what the General refers to as me that every society has its own car- titled, “Refl ections.” This section is his worst day in the Marine Corps rying capacity for making change. I close to a tutorial on national defense came in 2004 during the abortive fi rst was concerned that if traditional Arab and military science. The fi rst part, battle of Fallujah: societies proved unable to assimilate “Lethality as a Metric,” is based on a I believed I had let my men down, sudden political change, something deep understanding of the unchang- having failed to prevent the attack in worse would erupt. ing nature of war and the General’s the fi rst place and subsequently failing years of experience leading forces in to prevent a stop once we were deep Throughout this dynamic time, the combat: inside the city. It was a tough time General travelled constantly through- The need for lethality must be the for me, because higher-level decisions out the region employing three lines measuring stick against which we had cost us lives, but now was not the of effort: evaluate the effi cacy of our military. By time to go inward. You must always aligning the entire military enterprise

100 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 BOOKS

… to the goal of compounding lethal- The second theme is, of course, the manner, the book is crafted to add ity, we best deter adversaries, or … win importance of reading history and as much value for sergeants and cap- at the lowest cost to our troops’ lives. “studying one’s craft.” His advice here tains and it does for colonels, senior S- is clear, if aspirational, for many: “If NCOs, and generals as well as elected Refl ections’ second part is “The Art you haven’t read hundreds of books, and appointed policy makers. Credit of Leading,” which, as the title sug- learning from others who went before must also go to co-author “Bing” West gests, provides a fi rst person descrip- you, you are functionally illiterate— and editor Will Murphy. This writ- tion of the General’s personal leader- you can’t coach, and you can’t lead.” ing team has produced a thoroughly ship and how he drew upon the Ma- The fi nal part of “Refl ections” and useful handbook for leaders housed rine Corps way of war in his own au- the last paragraphs of the book is “The inside an engaging and uniquely au- thentic warfi ghting style. This section Need for Allies.” Perhaps added here, thentic memoir. expands upon two recurring themes for those readers who “skip to the from throughout the book. First, is the end,” these paragraphs are the closest gratitude for the Vietnam veteran Ma- to discussing the General’s service as Notes rines who trained and mentored the the Secretary of Defense. The advice 1. Arturo Perez-Riverte, El Club Dumas, trans- General in his formative years in the here is broad and addressed to those lated by Sonia Soto, (New York, NY: Houghton Service. This debt is expressed repeat- who make national policy: “History is Miffl in Harcourt, 1996). edly in the book and is best stated here: compelling. Nations with allies thrive and those without wither.” 2. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Man Who Couldn’t I had been shaped and sharpened by Call Sign Chaos is an important Take It Anymore,” The Atlantic, (Online: Octo- the rough whetstone of those veterans, addition to any professional military ber 2019), available at https://www.theatlantic. mentored by sergeants and captains com. who had slogged through rice paddies reading list. Each section of the book and jungles fi ghting a tough enemy will resonate more with different read- every foot of the way. ers based on their own level of lead- ership and years of service. In this

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Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 101 BOOKS The Pentagon’s Wars

reviewed by Greg McCarthy

he Pentagon’s Wars: The Military’s Undeclared War >Mr. McCarthy is an Instructor, against America’s Presidents Defense Security Cooperation wrestles with the unsatisfy- Agency, Defense Institute of Secu- rity Cooperation, National Capital Ting strategic environment that char- THE PENTAGON’S WARS: The Region. acterizes the post-Cold War era. The Military’s Undeclared War author, Mark Perry, argues that—with Against America’s Presidents. the exception of Chairman of the Joint and Gen Richard Myers, USAF, was By Mark Perry. New York, NY: Chiefs of Staff GEN Colin Powell, weak. The author has favorites: ADM Basic Books, 2017. USA—the (JCS) Crowe as well as Army generals Hugh ISBN: 978-0465079711, 368 pp. failed to provide forceful, candid ad- Shelton, John Shalikashvilli, Eric vice to senior civilian leaders in the Shinseki, and Dempsey. LtGen Paul first year of the Clinton Administra- Van Riper, USMC(Ret), is the only tion, primarily on the subject of “don’t Marine who gets the author’s unquali- ask, don’t tell.” The book contains ten fied favor because he creatively upend- chapters, each discussing key lead- ed a pre- exercise before being with three possible approaches: with- ers and controversies chronologically, sidelined. draw, surge, or enhance locals. To his covering 1985 to 2015. The book be- Otherwise, Marines are not spared credit, the author explores how Marine gins with ADM William J. Crowe and from his indictment, receiving mostly units contributed to what became the ends with GEN Martin Dempsey. unflattering assessments. Marine gen- Anbar Awakening as early as 2005. A The Powell Doctrine, nation build- erals Carl Mundy and Peter Pace are footnote admits the Marine narrative ing, and “leading from behind” are all scored for resisting homosexuals in the is challenged by the Army. aspects examined within the central military and malfeasance in Iraq, re- GEN Jack Keane, former Army argument. Most of the controversies spectively. Even Gen James N. Mattis Vice Chief of Staff, emerges as an and personalities will be familiar to is subject to some grumbling, notably original thinker in retirement, cor- Gazette readers. for his mid-battle relief of a regimen- rectly concluding the Army had the Perry describes his prodigious re- tal commander in 2003. These idio- manpower to support the surge and search of more than 80 interviews syncratic indictments vary in strength the situation required it. Against the with 50-plus principals spread over and depend on one’s acceptance of the objections of Army Chief of Staff, two years. He relies on numerous author’s assumptions. GEN Peter Schoomaker, and Iraq anonymous sources, Bob Woodward- Perry remains incredulous regard- commander GEN George Casey, the style, despite the limitations this ing how the widely publicized Gener- author calls Keane’s success a “coup.” method imposes. He cites what ap- als Revolt of 2006 (when retired flag Perry also highlights the role of for- pears to be one senior Marine repeat- officers harshly criticized the Iraq War mer Senator Chuck Robb (D-VA), a edly as an authority on various inner and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld) Marine Vietnam veteran and member workings. Views of various personali- barely made a dent in JCS delibera- of the Iraq Study Group. The group ties echo conventional wisdom: GEN tions or options presented to national recommended a virtual withdrawal, Wes Clark, USA, was greatly disliked; leaders. He retells the familiar story but through his own initiative, tenac- Secretary of Defense Donald Rums- of the stalemated Iraq War before the ity and research (deviating from group feld did little right; GEN Tommy surge in early 2007. He finds that one briefs and insisting to go to the the- Franks, USA, was a poor commander; task force came away evenly divided ater), Robb adamantly dissented.

102 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 BOOKS

The author makes numerous pro- The author rightly notes that the tions for presidential decision making vocative brief statements. He specu- Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 great- should have been presented perhaps, lates that President George H.W. Bush’s ly strengthened an ambitious Chair- but imperfection and misjudgments refusal to support the Shia uprising in man (Powell), but it is hard to see plagued all parties. What is expected the immediate aftermath of DESERT how “war” is regularly waged against of fl ag offi cers? To what extent do mil- STORM in 1991 may be the pivotal presidents of the United States. Presi- itary leaders bear blame for setbacks event of our entire Middle East in- dent William J. Clinton ultimately and shortcomings of the last genera- volvement, as it required a continued got his Balkan deployments, President tion? These questions remain. presence and interest. He also over- George W. Bush had his Iraq war, and Perry has produced a controversial states the success of post-2011 Af- President Obama obtained his Iraq and interesting book. He adds addi- ghanistan. He similarly mentions in withdrawal. If anything, the author tional detail and background to re- passing that Gen Ulysses Grant is the seems to wish the JCS had waged more cent controversies and tells a sad tale best battlefi eld commander in Ameri- war. Yet, it is unclear what path not of strategic drift. His conclusions are can history. taken would have greatly improved unclear if not unconvincing. matters. A more robust series of op- For Further Reading

by LCpl Hunter D. Fives

Life after the Prophet is a book about the controversial history of the Arab World and after Prophet Muhammad’s death. Muhammad’s unwillingness to designate an heir to his position as leader of the Islamic World prompted generations of confl ict over who had the rightful claim as the subsequent leader of the faith. This confl ict is what divided the once unifi ed Muslim people into the two major sects: Sunni and Shi’a. Before becoming a prophet, Muhammad was nothing more than a common laborer and merchant in the tribal city of Mecca. This all changed when Muhammad received revelations delivered by angel Gabriel. These revelations inspired Muhammad to spread God’s word, and he built a small group of devoted followers. The ruling tribe of Mecca, the Ahhmayads, saw this as a threat and attempted to murder him. However, their attempt failed, allowing Muhammad to escape into the night. AFTER THE PROPHET: The Epic Sto- After years of struggle and confl ict, Muhammad was successful in uniting the Arab World ry of the Shia-Sunni Split in Islam. through Islam. Islam rid the region of the existing form of tribalism and aspired to make every- By Lesley Hazleton. New York, NY: one equal. While a great thing at the time, this all changed upon his death. Muhammad never Anchor, 2010. ISBN: 978-0385523943, 256 pp. designated an heir to his throne and left the choice to the Islamic community. This is where all the turmoil began as some believed his successor should be through the bloodline, whereas others believed that successors should be elected; eventually, those supporting a bloodline succession became known as Shiites and those in favor of elections became Sunnis. The issue of succession is the principle difference between the Sunni and the Shia and is the catalyst for the division in Islam. This division destroyed the great Arab nation and was the beginning of major confl icts that continue into the present day. The consequences of the division resulted in an innumerable amount of deaths starting in the Battle of Karbala and continuing to the modern day terrorist attacks by the Islamic State. This novel demonstrates how deeply rooted today’s modern confl icts are. They are more than just random groups of extremists or random acts of violence against other Muslims; rather, they are fueled by deep beliefs that have been present for thousands of years. It is important for modern Americans to understand this history as the United States gets increasingly involved with confl icts in the Middle East. With our recent intervention in Syria battling the Islamic State, Islam remains a hot topic of conversation as Americans debate whether or not we should be involved. We need to understand this confl ict goes back thousands of years and is unlike any previous wars. The beliefs held by these Middle Eastern people are deeply rooted and they profoundly infl uence their perspective and opinions. These beliefs affect us both overseas and at home. The United States, being a multicultural melting pot, is full of different people and religions. It is naive to as- sume these views did not come over with the people who immigrated here. Therefore, we need to comprehend these differences to further understand the world in which we live.

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2019 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 103 Editorial Policy and Writers’ Guidelines Index to Advertisers

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