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COMMUNITARIAN LOYALTIES IN A BORDERLESS WORLD: GLOBALlZATlON AND POLITICAL ALLEGJANCES IN BELGIUM, CANADA AND ITALY
Livianna Stephanie Tossutti
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto
O Copyright by Livianna Stephanie Tossutti (1998) National Library Bibliothèque nationale of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. nie Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Onawa ON KI A ON4 Canada Canada
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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othecwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation, Communitarian Loyalties in a Borderless World: Globalization and Political Allegiances in Belgium, Canada and ltaly
Livianna Stephanie Tossutti Ph& 1998
Department of Political Science University of Toronto
Abstract: The persistenœ of ethnic andlor regional movements in advanced capitalist societies has defied the predictions of many integrationist theorists who have argued that modemization would eradicate sub-state loyalties. In much of the scholarly
literature, ethno-regional movements were held to be parochial reactions against modernity. The post-war resurgence of communitarian parties in the face of globalization processes suggests that sub-state identlies may be compatible with post- modemity. There is a growing body of literature which suggests that in a borderless world, citizens will use their increased individuation capacities to reassert ethnic, territorial and other sub-state identities in the face of centralization and cultural homogenization pressures. This shift in political allegiances to more immediate geographic areas and lower-order govemments - the so-called "new" localisrn - is held to be the product of rational evaluations that the central state can no longer fulfil the instrumental and psychological needs of citizens.
In order to detemine whether conternporary ethno-regionalism is parochial or post-modern, a survey and personal interviews exploring the ideological and issue orientations, lifestyles and sociodemographic backgrounds of party members in the iii
Bloc Québécois, Volksunie and Northem League were wnducted. In al1 three cases, the parties demonstrated an ability to appeal to both "traditional" and "post-modern" elements within their respective communities. This finding, in addition to evidence which points to a high level of intemal cohesion between party members, suggests that communitarian parties have the potential to persist in the face of transnational pressures. The study also shows that transnational trends, considered along with domesticdriented, exogenous, endogenous and intervening va riables, can help explain contemporary cornmunitarianism. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
During the course of my research, rny joumeys across Europe and my own country brought me into contact with many people who helped further my understanding of ethnic and regional identities. My sincere gratitude is extended to al1 those party officiais and members who participated in the survey and personal interviews. I appreciate the tirne you gave me, as well as your insightful comments in the interviews and questionnaires.
There were several party members who deserve special mention for the role they played in ensuring the successful completion of this project. They include Bert Anciaux and Els Van Weert of the Volksunie, Fabrizio Bruno of the Lega Nord, the riding presidents from the Bloc Québécois, and Daniel Germain, my interviewer in Quebec.
My parents, Victor and Therese Tossutti, have supported me throughout this joumey, and throughout the only other joumey that could possibly rival this one for the range of emotions which the traveller experiences - the one through life.
My supenhsor Lawrence LeDuc has provideci me with guidance since 1989, when I was still working in journalisrn and communications. Thank you for inspiring me to pursue a career in political science. Having the opportunity to learn from you has truly changed my life. Dr. Ronald Wagenberg and Professor Richard Price from the University of Windsor also deserve thanks for their continued faith in me.
Finally, the other members of my dissertation cornmittee, Doctors Richard Simeon and Joy Esberey, were brilliant critics of my work Dr. Liesbet Hooghe, Dr. Neil Nevitte and Dr. Roger 07001e al1 demonstrated why the University of Toronto is an internationally-renowned institution which attracts the finest academics. To Dr. Michael Keating, my external examiner, you have challenged me to think differently about my subject, which is al1 anyone who is seeking the truth can ask for. TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables
Chapter One Introduction
Chapter Two The Communitarian Universe
Chapter Three The Demographic Base of Cornmunitarianism
Chapter Four Issues, ldeology and Representation
Chapter Five Individuation, Mobility, and Culture
Chapter Six lntemal Diversity
Chapter Seven Territorial Loyalties and State Failure
Chapter Eight Post-modemity and Tradition
Notes
References and Interview List
Appendix 1 Post-war Communitarian Parties, By State Appendix 2 Questionnaires and Currency Coding LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 2.0 Post-war cornmunitarian parties: Relevance and Average Lifespan, by state 55 TABLE 2.1 Communitarian parties: Australia-Belgium Appendix 1 TABLE 2.2 Communitarian parties: Canada-Finland Appendix 1 TABLE 2.3 Communitarian parties: France-lreland Appendix 1 TABLE 2.4 Communitarian parties: lsrael Appendix 1 TABLE 2.5 Cornmunitarian parties: lsrael Appendix 1 TABLE 2.6 Cornmunitarian parties: ltaly Appendix 1 TABLE 2.7 Cornmunitarian parties: Netherlands-Portugal Appendix 1 TABLE 2.8 Communitarian parties: Spain Appendix 1 TABLE 2.9 Cornmunitarian parties: Spain-U.K. Appendix 1 TABLE 2.10 Communitarian parties: United Kingdom-United States Appendix 1 TABLE 2.11 Volksunie popular vote (W), House of Representatives elections: 1954-1995 TABLE 2.12 Lega Nord popular vote (%) in Chamber elections, by region: 1994-1996 TABLE 3.1 Socio-demographic background of party members TABLE 3.2 Workplace profile of autonomist party members TABLE 3.3 Household income of party members TABLE 4.1 Top three issue preferences of party mernbers TABLE 4.2 Attitudes about federalism and immigration TABLE 4.3 Most representative level of govemment TABLE 4.4 ldeological orientation of party members TABLE 4.5 Correlations between perceptions of issues, govemment and selected variables: VU TABLE 4.6 Correlations between perceptions of issues, govemment and selected variables: LN TABLE 4.7 Correlations between perceptions of issues, govemment, mobility and demogaphic variables: LN TABLE 4.8 Correlations between perceptions of issues, govemment and selected variables: BQ TABLE 4.9 Issue perceptions, mobility and demographic variables: BQ TABLE 5.1 Geographic identification of party members TABLE 5.2 Mobility 8 community involvement TABLE 5.3 Travel and language patterns TABLE 5.4 lnterest in culture and technology TABLE 5.5 Relationship between identity, issues, mobility cultural and demographic characteristics: VU TABLE 5.6 Relationship between cultural interests, mobility and demographic characteristics: VU TABLE 5.7 Identity, issues, mobility and cultural interests: LN TABLE 5.8 Correlations between mobility indicators: LN TABLE 5.9 Relationships between identity, mobility and demographic characteristics TABLE 5.10 Identity, ideology, mobility and cultural interests: BQ viii
TABLE 5.11 Cultural interests, mobility and demography: BQ FIGURE 5.12 Non-recursive causal model of factors infiuencing local and regional identification: VU FIGURE 5.1 3 Non-recursive causal model of factors influencing local and regional identification: LN TABLE 6.1 Intra-party differences on representation and immigration issues: VU TABLE 6.2 Intra-party ideological differences: VU TABLE 6.3 lntra-party differences on representation and immigration issues: LN TABLE 6.4 Inta-party incorne, ideological differences: LN TABLE 6.5 lntraparty differences on representation and immigration issues: BQ TABLE 6.6 lntraparty differences on identity issues: VU TABLE 6.7 Intra-party differences on identity issues: LN TABLE 6.8 Intra-party differences on identity issues: BQ TABLE 6.9 Intra-party differences in travel frequency and technology usage: VU TABLE 6.10 lntraparty differences in travel frequency and technology usage: VU TABLE 6.1 1 Intra-party differences on cultural, mobility patterns: VU TABLE 6.12 Intra-party differences in travel frequency and technology usage: LN TABLE 6.13 Inta-party differences in travel patterns and technology usage: LN TABLE 6.14 Intra-party differences on cultural and mobility issues: LN TABLE 6.15 Intra-party differences in travel patterns and technology usage: BQ TABLE 6.16 Intra-party differences in travel frequency, technology, mobility and cultural interests: BQ FIGURE 6.17 Typology of Volksunie supporters FIGURE 6.1 8 Typology of Lega Nord supporters FIGURE 6.19 Typology of Bloc Québtkois supporters TABLE 7.1 Factors influencing cornmunitarian party development TABLE 7.2 Perceptions of state faiiure The post-war ernergence of 162 territorial and ethnic-based political parties in Canada and 20 other industrialized states is symptomatic of the persistence of sub-state loyalties.' The enduring appeal of communitarian political parties in affluent western states challenges the convergence thesis about the capacity of modemization to erode citizen loyalties to ethnic, linguistic, religious or regional identities. "lntegrationist" theorists including Toqueville, Deutsch, Wagner, Peacock and Wiseman, have argued that the transition from traditional to modem society - involving increased economic concentration, mass enfranchisement, the growth of scientific and technical knowledge, mass communications, population mobility, the expansion of the welfare state, and the displacement effects of war - would produce an upward shift in power to the central state, and thus reduce the saliency of sub- state divisions. Marx, and later, Lipset, have argued that societal modemization would make the class struggle between capital and labour the principal political cleavage in affluent societies2
In the scholarly literature, the themes of state-building, modernization and the erosion of cultural nationalism have been linked as interdependent and simultaneous processes. Schafer has stressed that modem states attempt to enforce ethnic, religious, Iinguistic and cultural homogeneity in their efforts to promote uniformity and to create a sense of a shared mission or destiny amongst
l See Note #1. * See Seymour Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, (New York: Doubleday, 1960). diverse peop~es.~Pre-modem practises. on the other hand, were associated with the acceptance of differentiation and the tendency to "stick to one's kir^".^
Convergence theorists in the social sciences have associated pre-modem
''tradition" with the desire to retain difference, and "modemity" with cultural uniformity and shared values.
No attempt to assimilate linguistic, ethnic, religious and other diverse characteristics into a homogeneous state has been completely succe~sful.~
Territorial protest in the 1960s and 1970s in Canada, Belgium, Italy, the United
Kingdom and other countries prompted a re-examination of the convergence thesis of modemi~ation.~Sharpe and others have noted that modemization and state integrationist strategies have paradoxically generated decentralist demands for neighbourhood councils, more efficient local govemments, power devolution to sub- state governments and political independence.' The persistence of cultural
Boyd C. Schafer, Nationalism, Myth and Reality (London: Gollancz, 1955), 11 9- 121.
Zygmunt Bauman, "Modemity and Ambivalence," in Global Culture: nationalism, globalization and modemdy, ed. Mike Featherçtone (London: Sage Publications, 1990)' 156.
See Gordon Smith, Politics in Western Europe (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.. 1972); Nelson Polsby, Decentralist Trends N, Western Democracies, ed. L.J. Sharpe (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1979); Derek Univin, "Social Cleavages and Political Parties in Belgium: Problems of lnstitutionalization," in Political Studies 28(3) (1970).
L.J. Sharpe, "Decentraiist Trends in Westem Democracies: A First Appraisal," in Decentralist Trends in Westem Democracies (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1979). heterogeneity raises the question of wbether sub-state loyalties constitute remnants of a pre-modem past, or whether they represent a group's attempt to overcome its disempowement when the modem state assumed control over its territory. Thus, the persistence of ethnic. linguistic, territorial and similar loyalties may actually represent a "post-modem" desire to reassert one's lost identity. The convergence theorists fail to consider this possibility in their assessments of why sub-state loyalties persist. On the other hand, scholars drawn from international relations and sociology have explained this apparent paradox by arguing that the revival of local and regional identities is dialectically linked to the emergence of a post-modern,
"global" society. Thus, there are several plausible explanations of contemporary cornmunitarianism: it may be pre-modem and parochial, as the convergence theorists argue, or post-modem and cosmapolitan, as the proponents of the globalist-localist thesis have posited.
In order to determine which of these perspectives is the most accurate characterization of post-war communitarianism, one must first disentangle the meaning of the terms pre-modemity, modemity and post-modemity. Robertson argues that globalization is intimately related to modemity and moderni~ation.~The term globalization, as Robertson wnceptualizes it, refers to the "compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a who~e".~Giddens
Roland Robertson. Globalization: social theory and global culture (London: Sage Publications, 7992), 53. has referred to globalization, or globality, as a larger form of modernity (emphasis
mine). in which modemizing processes are transferred from society to the world.
For him, globalization is a fundamental consequence of modernity, where there is
the "intensification of worldwide social relations which link distinct localities in such
a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice
versa". 'O
Robertson acknowledges that processes of globalization are not new
developments, but have been occurring for centuries. He identifies five major
phases in globalization, the first of which begins in the early fifteenth century with the spread of the Gregorian calendar and the increasing scope of the Catholic
Church. Habermas has traced the emergence of modernity to the discovery of the
"new world", the Renaissance and the Refomation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries." Robertson traces the current "uncertainty phase" of globalization to the
1960s, which marked the beginning of a period of rapid acceleration in the number of global institutions and means of comrnuni~ation.'~Although the process of world compression has been unfolding for centuries, most authors agree that the rapid acceleration in global interdependence and awareness of the world as a whole is a wholly new phenornenon of the latter half of the twentieth century.
'O A Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 63, 177. " J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernw (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 5. '*Robertson, op.&, 58-59. Rosenau, Mlinar and Strassoldo have argued in separate works that globalism (world unity) and localisrn (local diversity) are compatible and not anti- thetical. In doing sol they reject the central premise of convergence theorists that ethnic, religious and linguistic identities are pre-modem. If, as Giddens and
Robertson argue, globalization is related to and is a consequence of modemization, then it follows that sub-state loyalties which currently co-exist with globalization, cannot be pre-modem. Strassoldo argues that contemporary expressions of localism constitute responses to globalization tendencies such as: the decreased salience of the nation-state and the emergence of supra-national institutions; the increased interdependence of nation-states; the internationalization of capital and the micro-electronic revolution.
Strassoldo contends that the "new" localism, which he operationalizes in several ways as: the spread of post-Fordist production structures, citizen demands for administrative decentralization, the revival of ethno-regional movements, local environrnental movements, and the renewed interest in small town life, has grown simultaneously with globalism, a term which he uses interchangeably with g~obalization.'~Like Robertson, Strassoldo notes that globalization is "old stuff', but the latter also finds new elements in the current phase of globalization which distinguish it from previous ones. These recent features include the spread of an ecological world-view in which environrnental protection has become a global
Raimondo Strassoldo, t'GlobaIism and localism: theoretical reflections and some evidence," in Globalization and Temtorial Identities. ed. 2. Mlinar (Hants, England: Avebury Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992)' 39-44. cause, and the aspiration for a pluralist non-hierarchical and de-centred world. He goes on to argue that what he calls the "new" lowlism is a feature of post-modern society, which he defines as being marked by the rejection of unifomity
(hornogeneity) and the elevation of the values of diversity.I4 With this, he completes the theoretical chain that links the "new" localism (which envelops the revival of ethno-regionalism), post-rnodemity and globalization. They are al1 processes which occur simultaneously and are closely related to each other.
The post-modern label that has been attached to contemporary technological and economic change requires clarification since there is debate as to whether it constitutes an historical epoch that is analytically distinct from the modem period.
In The Consequences of Modemity Giddens asserts that post-modemity does not represent a break with modemity, but is simply an extension of it. Lyotard has also talked of the postmodem as "undoubtedly a part of the rn~dern".'~Raulet has suggested that "post-modemity is not necessarily the impasse of a decomposition that abolishes reason... it could be a renewed modernity.... a new start. l6 The literature is replete with nebulous distinctions between modemity and post- modernity, and considerable debate over whether the two tens constitute distinct eras or aesthetic styles.
'' J.F. Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 79. '' G. Raulet, "Marxism and the Post-modern Condition," Telos 67 (1986), 162. In Toynbee's view, events such as the rise of an industrial working class and
the displacement of middle-class foms of life in the late nineteenth century rnarked
the end of the "modem" era and the beginning of a new post-modem age in westem
history. Two world wars, the accelerating pace of technological change, inventions
permitting instantaneous. global communication and the development of atornic
energy capable of destroying the human species, have al1 undermined westem
civilization. Toynbee argues that these socioeconomic and technological changes
have posed a predicarnent for westem civilisation because of the failure of the
spiritual, moral and political capacities of humanity to keep up with these
deve~oprnents.'~He laments these post-modem foms of change because of the
way in which they have undemined the hegemony of the north-western European
middle class by shifting power to industrial workers, to the growing public sphere,
and to Arnerica and Asia.
Bell was the next theorist to articulate a conservative response to post-
modemism. Writing in the 1960s, Bell associated post-modemism with the permissiveness of "pomo pop culture" and the absence or loss of spiritual values.18
Bath Bell and Toynbee argue that the crisis of post-modem western civilizations might be resolved throligh a retum to religion.
Strassoldo distinguishes the modem from the post-modem in the following
l7 See Bany Smart, Modem Conditions: Post-modern Controversies (London: New York: Routledge), 165.
Daniel Bel1, Sociological Journeys: Essays 1960-1980 (London: Heinemann. 1SSO), 288. ways. Modem society was based on: instrumental rationality; an emphasis on material values of production and consumption; the concentration of power in the hands of the nation state, and the centralization, hierarchization and cultural homogeneity that is required for state-building; strict control of boundaries, sovereignty and differentiation from other nation states. Meanwhile, post- modernism is marked by the rejection of uniforrnity which characterizes "modem" thinking, by the celebration of diversity, by the rejection of one religious or political
Centre, and by the revival of the new localism, as a spiritual search for meaning in a complex and rapidly changing world.lg
The operational definitions of post-modemity present two problems: first, the contentious issue of whether post-modernity is distinct from modernity remains unresolved in the literature; and second, the distinctions between the pre-modern ernphasis on retaining cultural differences and the post-modem emphasis on cultural pluralism are blurred. What is to distinguish pre-modernity from post- modemity, with respect to their assessments of the nation-state? It is this author's opinion that while post-modemity represents an extension of modernity, and not a distinct historiai epoch, the two terrns will be distinguished from each other due to the multiple ways in which they are interpreted by other analysts. The author also opines that if one chooses to make this distinction, then a radical re-thinking of the labels which have been attached to pre-modern, modem and post-modern periods needs to be undertaken by other analysts.
lgStrassoldo, op.cit., 45-46. This leads to the second problem that is posed by the operational definitions
of pre-modemity, rnodemity and post-modemity in the literature. Since the problem
of maintaining local differences in the face of the homogenizing effects of
modemization are of concem to both the so-called pre- and post-modemists, and
since the term post-rnodemity post-dates what is referred to as modemity, then the
"pre-modern" epoch should be re-labelled as the first stage of modemity. The rationale for this argument lies in the fact that the desire for cultural differentiation, which characterizes both pre- and post-rnodemity, means that these epochs are part of the same movement. In the authots view, pre- and post-modemity should be characterized as different stages of modemity, and that what is currently termed modernity, actually represents a counter-reaction to cultural pluralism.
This discussion of the various meanings attached to modernity, global ization and post-modemity illustrates the difficulty of detemining whether conternporary revivals of ethno-regional movements are modem or non-modern, pre-modern or post-modem. While pre-modemity is associated with parochialism, and modemity with standardization, post-modemity is synonymous with pluralism and cosmopolitanism. This study will test whether conternporary expressions of ethnic and territorial identities are modem or non-modem, and if they are non-modern, whether they are pre-modem and parochial or post-modem and intemationalist. If they are consistent with the globalist-localist theorists' contention that they are part of post-modem trends, then the convergence theorists' perception of ethno- regionalism must be rejected."
One way of assessing the nature of contemporary communitarianism can be
accomplished by examining the nature of ethno-regional political parties. Lawson and Merkl have developed a typology of alternative political parties which emerge when their established counterparts fail to provide linkage with sections of the elect~rate.~'They classiQ these alternatives as environmental, supplementary, communitarian or anti-authoritarian, based on their origins, structure, policy agendas, leadership, membership and tactics. Lawson identifies communitarian parties as those which aggregate interests along religious, ethnic or caste lines.
For this study, the definition of communitarian parties has been expanded to include territorially-based parties which advocate the common interests of citizens residing in a particular geographic area. The decision to include spatially-organized parties in this category is based on the fact that they often direct their appeals to citizens who share a common dialect, history, and political culture.
Through the examination of onginal survey data on rnembers of the Bloc
Québécois, the Volksunie in Belgium and the ltalian Lega Nord, this study will test
James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rosenau and DiMuccio, 'Turbulence and sovereignty in world politics: explaining the relocation of legitimacy in the 1990s and beyond," in Zdravko Mlinar (ed.), Globalization and Terdtonal Identities, (Hants, England: Avebury Publishing Company, 1992); Zdravko Mlinar, "Individuation and globalization: the transformation of territorial social organization," in Globalization and Territorial Identities; Raimondo Strassoldo, "Globalism and localism: theoretical reflections and some evidence, " in Globalization and Territorial Identifies.
" Kay Lawson and Peter MeM (eds.), When Padies Fail (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). the ability of the globalism-localisrn thesis in explaining the support base for contemporary wmmunitarian parties. The central question which this study will address is whether the localist sentiments of party members are associated with globalization trends. In other words, can what the convergence theorists describe as pre-modem or parochial sentiments really be, in fact, loyalties that are compatible with post-rnodernity?
These three cases were chosen based on their post-war origins and their proven capacity to achieve Sartori's criteria of political relevance, either through participation in coalition govemments, or in their blackmail potential." The
Volksunie was formed in 1954 to press the cause of Flemish nationalisrn. Its electoral support peaked in 1971 at 11.1 % nationwide, and the party has participated in the coalition govemments of the 1970s and 1980s which paved the way for federal reforms in Belgium. Since the devolution of more power to the regions, the party saw its support drop to just over 4% in the 1995 election.
The Lega Nord was formed in 1991 as a confederation of regional autonomy movements in northem and central Italy, to advocate the creation of a federal structure in Italy, and failing that, the secession of northern Italy. In the three elections it has contested thus far as a unit, its support has grown from 8.7% in
1992 to 10.1 % in 1996. For part of 1994, the party participated in a centre-right coalition government until the latter's collapse.
22 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1976). The Bloc Québécois was formed in 1990 by former Conservative and Liberal
MPs from Quebec who felt that Quebec wuld best protect its ewnomic and cultural
interests as a sovereign state. In the 1993 federal election. it won Official
Opposition status with 54 seats in the Canadian parliament. In late 1995, the
Quebec govemment held a referendum on independence. which the federalist "no" forces barely won with 50.6% of the popular vote. Following the referendum, Bloc
leader Lucien Bouchard stepped down and there were a series of leadership changes in the party. Neither of Bouchard's successors, including the current
leader, Gilles Duceppe. has proved to be as charismatic as Bouchard. In the 1997 federal elections, the Bloc saw its seat total drop to 44, thus losing Official
Opposition status to the western Canadian-based Refom Party.
Literature Review
Much of the literature on the growth of ethno-regional parties that was generated during the 1960s. 1970s and 1980s has focused on the role of domestic- oriented variables such as the state-building process, modemization and regional economic disparities. More recent accounts of communitarian parties have stressed the role of intervening variables such as major party or state failures to manage longstanding cleavages or to adapt to sociological changes.
Less attention has been given to individual-level value changes which may be associated with communitarian party loyalties, and even fewer acwunts have considered the role which trans-national trends rnay play in shaping citizens'
political orientations. This rnay be attributed to the difficulty of obtaining reliable
voting data on parties with small electoral bases andfor to the relative recency of globalization trends. In choosing to examine the potential links between globalization and the so-called "new localism," I am not denying the relevance of older approaches to understanding ethno-regionalisrn, but suggesting that the comrnunitarian question can be approached from a fresh angle. The availability of statistical data and survey techniques, as well as the electoral successes of some communitarian parties in the 1980s and 1990s provide further impetus to pursue this line of research.
Nationalism and reaionalism in Canada
The Canadian literature on the persistence of regionalism and ethno- nationalism mirrors the older European literature with respect to its emphasis on macro-level, cultural, structural or institutional variables operating within çtates as predictors of communitarian sentirnent~.~~Geographic barriers, uneven econornic development, ethnic distinctiveness, the absence of primaries which would channel regional protest into the major parties, a plurality electoral systern which rewards the geographic concentration of votes, and federal arrangements which reinforce sub-
*' Alain Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, eds., "Minor Parties of Protest in Canada: Origins, Impact and Prospects," in Gagnon and Tanguay (eds.), Canadian Padies in Transition: Discourse, Organization and Representation, (Scarborough, Ont. : Nelson Canada, 1989). state loyalties, have al1 been offered as reasons for the persistence of regionalism.
Radical scholars have emphasized structural conditions when arguing that regional economic disparities. exacerbated by a National Policy which unfairly transferred wealth from the periphery to central Canada, accounts for regional loyalties.
Contemporary staple theorists argue that federal economic developrnent policies have done little to narrow the per capita incorne gaps between the regions, and have thus exacerbated regional differen~es.~~
In popular accounts of cornmunitarian parties, the role of short-terni political catalysts or intervening variables in heightening longstanding regional or ethnic tensions is often emphasized. Several observers of the Reform party, which wins widespread support in western Canada, trace its rapid growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s to the western separatist movement of the 1970s (which itself was fuelled by Quebec separatism and the province-building strategies of western governments in their battles with Ottawa over fiscal and jurisdictional matters), and to federal policies such as OffÏcial Bilingualism. the National Energy Program, the
Goods and Services Tax and the Meech Lake constitutional accord guaranteeing
Quebec "distinct society" status."
24 Paul Phillips, Regional Dispanties (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1938).
zs Sydney Sharpe and Don Braid, Soming Babylon: Preston Manning and the Rise of the Reform Parfy (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1992) and George Melnyk, Beyond Alienation: polifical essays on the West (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises, 1993). Refom leader Preston Manning has linked the party's appeal to the same forces which ignited the pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe during the late i980s. He contends that Refom, which advocates the use of referenda and plebiscites. reflects the postmodem preoccupation with egalitarianism and democratic participation for the "ordinary" citizen. Sigurdson has argued that
Manning's movernent, bom in urbanized, secularized Albertan society, represents a type of postmodern conservatism which taps into citizen distrust of the traditional parties and ideologies, and which views itself as a corrective force to recover
Canada's "lost unity, identity and ~ornrnunity".~~The contributions of Manning and
Sigurdson to theories about the persistence of sub-state loyalties in Canada represent a minor shift in the literature, from its longstanding preoccupation with searching for domestic-oriented explanatory variables. to one which seeks to position Canadian political events within an international context. This observation is not intended to discredit the contributions of Lipset, Cairns, Macpherson and
Pinard to the literature on nationalism and regionalism. but to stress that global interdependence requires social scientists to consider the potential effects of supra- national variables on domestic politics
Like Manning, Bloc Québécois leader Lucien Bouchard has identified both domestic and international political catalysts in his account of the party's birth. On the domestic front, he has argued that the defeat of the Meech Lake constitutional
26 Richard Sigurdson, "Preston Manning and the politics of post-modemism in Canada." in Canadian Journal of Politcal Science 27:2, 1994. accord heightened longstanding Québécois grievances with Anglophone Canada.
Furthemore, he noted that the federal govemment's policy of Ofiicial Bilingualism
had failed to preserve francophone culture.27 Intemationally, Bouchard also pointed
to the resurgence of ethno-nationalism in Eastern Europe and to the devolution of
powers from the centre to the regions in western European states, as proof of the
universal desire for selfdetenination of peoples within contemporary societies.
Nevertheless, the bulk of the literature on the Bloc continues to stress
domestic variables, likely because of the comparative ease with which one cm
measure cultural, structural and institutional factors. One analysis of the Bloc's
support base in the 1993 election showed that charismatic leadership, the youth
vote, a deterioration in one's personal finances and a feeling that Quebec has
received less attention from the federal govemment than the other provinces, were factors influencing support for the Bloc.28 Gingras, Gauthier and Graves also found that Bloc support in 1993 tended to be higher amongst voters who feared losing their jobs and who lived in areas where local unemployment rates exceeded the
Canadian average? Thus far, Bloc support has been tied to economic and political variables operating within a domestic environment, although it should be noted that
27 Luciene Bouchard, Un nouveau parti pour lJétape décisive (Saint Laurent, Quebec: Fides, 1993).
28 André Blais, Neil Nevitte, Elisabeth Gidengil, Henry Brady, and Richard Johnston, "L'élection fédérale de 1993: le comportement électoral des québécois," in Revue Québécoise de science politique 27, 27, 29, 31.
'O François-Pierre Gingras, Benoît Gauthier and Frank Graves, "La question du chomage et le caractère distinctif de l'électorat québécois au scrutin fédéral de 1993," in Revue québécoise de science politique 27,1995,97. the questionnaires on which the analyses were based were not set up to measure the potential effects of transnational developments on Quebec politics
Ethno-reaionalism in Western Euro~e
The European Iiterature generally ernphasizes domestic-oriented variables in accounting for sub-national loyalties, although the works differ in the weight they assign to endogenous, exogenous and intewening factors. Endogenous variables include: the presence of cultural identity and linguistic character; the politico- institutional status of the region, and its economic development and potential.
Exogenous variables include: the nation-state formation process; the degree of unifonization and centralization; and the resistance of central powers to the recognition of diversity and decentrali~ation.~
Another approach to explaining ethno-regionalism attributes a greater role to intervening variables such as the attitudes and behaviour of people in the critical regions; agents of cultural mobilization (school, press, churches); the support granted to nationalistl regionalist demands by Iinkage agents such as the established parties, trade unions and employers' organizations; and the intemal contradictions of the dominant socioeconomic system. This second set of arguments posits that the rise of regional or ethnic-based parties is the resuit of voter pessimism about the capacity of traditional brokerage parties and/or central
Riccardo Petrella, "Nationalist and regionalist movements in western Europe," in Charles R. Foster (ed.) Nations without a state (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980). institutions to manage intemal clea~ages.~'
Some "disintegrationist" scholars have noted that centralizing socio- economic forces evoke decentralist readions in the electorate? Rokkan has posited that cornpetition between centres of political control, between capital and areas of growth in the provinces, and between the culturally and economically advanced core and backward periphery during the nation-building process can lead to ethnic or regional protesta
Hechter's intemal colanialism thesis has drawn on dependency theories to explain why nationalist movements increased in popularity in the United Kingdom after World War II. According to Hechter, the unequal distribution of resources between the core and periphery contributed to the development of a distinctive ethnic identification in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland." In his critique of
Hechter's thesis, Gellner argues that nationalism becomes powerful only under certain conditions, and that the increased emphasis placed upon egalitarianisrn in western societies may be one reason why the visibility of regional economic
a Vincent Wright, "Regionalization under the French Fifth Republic: The triumph of the functional approach," in L.J. Sharpe (ed.), Decentralist Trends in Western Democracies (London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).
33 Stein Rokkan , Citizens, Elections and Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development (Oslo: Universitetsforleget, 1970).
" Michael Hechter, lnternal Colonialism: The Celtic Fnnge in British National Development 7536-1966 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). disparities has increa~ed.~Page criticizes Hechter's fail ure to explain why
nationalism is converted from its raw fom into the "finished" product, arguing that
nationalism in Wales and Scotland must be viewed as an artifice, rather than as
something transferred frorn a longstanding, salient ethnic consciousness. Brand,
for instance, has argued that the eledoral successes of the Swttish National Party
in the 1970s were partially attributable to the ability of native elites to promote the
Scots language and to mobilize the population after the discovery of oil in the North
This political activist variable may explain why there is no viable ethno-
regional political party in southern Italy. On the face of it, southern ltaly would seem
to be the perfect candidate for Hechter's interna1 coloniaiism mode1 and a place that
is ripe for regional protest. ltaly is currently a divided country in material prosperity
between the affluent North and the less developed South; divisions which have
persisted since the fifteenth century. Before the Roman conquest, southern ltaly was the most prosperous part of the peninsula. Under Roman rule, it became an
expanse of farrning estates where a slave population worked the soil. The South was invaded by Germanic tribes and was for centuries dominated by Byzantines,
Arabs, Normans, German, French and Spanish rulers. Between the fifteenth
" Emest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964) and Nelson Polsby, "Preface," in Sharpe (ed.) Decentrakt Trends in Western Democracies.
Jack Brand, 'The rise and fall of Scottish nationalism," in Charles R. Foster (ed.) Nations without a state. century and ltalian unification, colonialism instituted a strong tradition of class
structure, reinforced by a feuaal organization that was abolished much later than
those in other European countriesf7
Following unification, the indifference of the state founders convinced
southemers that they were not citizens with the same rights as Northemers, but had
become subjects in a colony. A series of fiscal, trade and industrial policies that
threatened southern interests perpetuated the economic division between the two
Italies. Post-war initiatives to solve the "southern question", including land reform,
infrastructure development and industrialization, have failed to narrow the gap
between North and South. By the early 1990s, the South, with 40% of the country's
land areas and 30% of its population, acwunted for only 20% of its gross dornestic
product. Its official unemployment rate was nearly 20%. and the per capita income
barely reached 60% of the average in the rest of ltaly?
The interna1 colonialism model should have predicted that an ethno-regional
party would have developed in southern Italy. However, Brand's expianation of why
the Scottish National Party succeeded in cultivating local protest, explains the absence of a party of the ltalian "Mezzogiorno". The inability of southern elites to
channel economic and political grievances into a mass movement is the primary
reason why there is no viable "Lega Meridionale". Robert Putnam has
37 Mario Mignone, Italy Todayr a country in transition (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1995), 126-136. demonstrated that the absence of civic traditions and a political culture of patronage and clientelism in southem ltaly has retarded its economic and political development? It is this factor - the persistence of a clientelistic political culture that has been supported by local elites- which accounts for the failure of the south to develop its own strong regional party. In the 1990s, a regional party called the
Southern League was developed, but its electoral support is minimal.
Gurr's theory of relative deprivation, which posits that marginal increases in resources among deprived groups tend to increase the salience of the group's expectations, offers another explanation of how ethnic cleavages become politicalty salient." According to this theory, cornmunitarian loyalties persist despite industrialization and modernkation, if ethnically-defined regions bear the costs and benefits of mernbership in the state. Clark has employed the concepts of relative deprivation and state mismanagement in his explanation of Basque nationalism. In the 1950s, Spain's post-war strategy for redistributing wealth in a relatively backward national econorny was to increase industrial production in wealthier areas such as Basque, and to divert public funds to poor regions. The "globalista" and
"regionalista" approaches to economic development were disastrous for the
Basques and resulted in the radicalization of its working class and the formation in
Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 158-1 59.
40 See Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 3-1 2. 1952 of the revolutionary separatists, the ETA, and other ethnic parties4'
In a refinernent to the relative deprivation thesis. Mughan has argued that the politicization of ethnic cleavages in Belgium, Canada and Great Britain can be explained by regional-linguistic wntrasts in the timing and rates of modernization and in the distribution of political power resources amongst ethnic gro~ps.~~For example, while post-independence Belgium was dominated by a francophone bourgeoisie and a prosperous Walloon economy, post-war modemization rates favoured Dutch-speaking F landers. Flanders' growing economic weight accentuated awareness of its subordinate cultural status and encouraged nationalists to mobilize along latent linguistic c~eavages.~Modernisation and democratisation brought legal and socio-economic benefits to al1 Belgians,
Canadians and Britons, but this did not change the historical distribution of resources between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups. While the subordinate ethnic groups improved thcir ewnomic position, their gains weren't made at the expense of the dominant cultural group. Thus, Mughan traces the escalation of
41 Robert P. Clark, "Euzkadi: Basque nationalism in Spain since the Civil War," in Charles R. Foster (ed.) Nations without a state.
42 Anthony Mughan, "Modemization and ethnic confiict in Belgium." in Political Studies 27:1, 1 969. " Flemish nationalism first emerged as a reaction against Belgium's early linguistic policies. The first series of language laws effective1y made Flanders bilingual, while the rest of the country was uniiingual French. Language laws adopted in the 1930s made Flanders and Wallonia unilingual, and Brussels and areas with linguistic minorities. bilingual. By World War 1, Flemish nationalist parties advocated autonomy for the region. See Liesbet Hooghe, A Leap in the Dark: Nationalist Connict and Federal Reform in Belgium (Ithaca, N. Y.: Western Societies Program, 7 99 1). ethnic nationalism in these three countries to the breakdown of status deprivations and to the rise of "status in~unsistencies".~~
The ethnic competition model of nationalist conflict has been employed to explain FrenchlFlernish conflict in Belgium as well as French/English tensions in canada." Hooghe has identified four central tenets of the model: modernization tends to decrease value differences between ethnic groups; modemization and development spark ethnic movements; when resources become available to an ethnic periphery, these regions are likely to mobilize against the centre; and ethnic groups with higher rates of assimilation sometimes show greater levels of ethnic awareness and mobilization than less assimilated groups. She has also identified three conditions which can destabilize ethnic relations: an increase in the occupational differentiation between ethnic groups which impedes the mobilization of people dong class cleavages; increased competition between different ethnic groups for the same niche in the job market; and an increase in resources for the peripheral group."
Nielson's analysis of the Flemish rnovement's rise between 1954 and 1974 found tnat modemization increased the chances of ethnic conflict in Belgium
" Anthony Mughan, "Modernization, deprivation and the distribution of power resources: towards a theory of ethnic conflict," in New Community 5:4, 1977. " Susan Okzak and Joane Nagel (eds.), Cornpetitive Efhnic Relations (Orlando, Florida: Academic Press, Inc., 1986) and Olzak. "A competition model of ethnic collective action in American cities, 1877-1889," in Cornpetifive Efhnic Relafions.
a Liesbet Hooghe, A Leap in the Dark: Nationalist Conflicf and Federal Reform in Belgium (Ithaca, New York: Western Societies Program, 1991 ). because it made ethnic groups more alike and thus heightened cornpetition between thern." He found that the vote for the Flemish nationalist Volksunie was highest in cantons that had a greater proportion of people working in the tertiary sector and in upper incorne occupations. As well, the absence of class voting in cantons with a low level of political diversity tended to correspond with an increase in voting for ethnic parties such as the Volksunie.
The first school of disintegrationist scholars stresses the importance of grievance in the economically or culturally subordinate ethno-regional community.
Refinements to intemal wlonialism and relative deprivation theories have stressed that opportunity, which may corne in the way of an increase in de facto power resources to the subordinate community, is a crucial determinant of the rise of ethno-regional movements. Ail of these theories stress endogenous and exogenous variables operating within the territorial confines of the nation-state.
Another approach to post-war ethno-regionalism stresses the role of intervening variables such as the failure of established parties or the central state to manage longstanding cleavages or to adapt to contemporary sociological changes.
March and Olsen have argued that institutions can activate ethnic conflict through their ability to shape preferences, distribute resources and define rules. Their model argues that when there is a lag between institutional rules and societal changes, conflict among actors within institutional settings will occur and this will
47 Francois Nielsen, "Stnidural conduciveness and ethnic mobilization: the Flemish movement in Belgium," in Competitiwe Ethnic Relations. increase the political opportunities for political actors outside these settings to mobili~e.~~
Several observers of linguistic tensions in Belgium have argued that historically fragile citizen loyalties to the state and to the established parties were eroded by party miscues and by ill-conceived state responses to ethnic conflict during the 1960~.~~Hooghe has argued that Belgium's consociational approach to conflict management has affected the country's social structure, political culture and the behaviour of its political elites in several ways. First. she says it has institutionalized what Lowin defined as Belgium's segmented, plural society; it has encouraged elite cooperation to counteract disintegrative tendencies in the systern;= and it has created a culture of consensual democra~y.~'Hooghe proposes that the political-activist perspective. which suggests that the strategic behaviour of political actors shapes nationalist conflict and decides how it will be managed, best explains Belgium's post-war linguistic tensions."
" J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, Rediscovenng Institutions: the organizational basis of politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989).
49 Anthony Mughan, l'Accommodation or defusion in the management of linguistic conflict in Belgium," in Political Studies 31, 1983 and Val R. Lorwin, "Linguistic pluralism and political tension in modem Belgium," in Canadian Journal of History 5, 1970.
Arend Lijphart, "Consociational democracy," in World Polifics 21, 1969.
51 Stephen Hellemans, "Verzuiling, een historische en vergelijkende analyse," (Leuven, Belgium: Departement Sociologie, KU Leuven, 1990).
Hooghe, op.&. Lawson has attributed the emergence of cornmunitarian parties to the simultaneous influence of two variables: increased international economic instability and the declining relevance of sociological cleavages in voting behaviour? For
Berger, the failure of brokerage parties to respond to societal value changes, the failed transfomation of the Left and the displacement of parliamentary with bureaucratie power instigated the rise of the "new" politics articulated by ecologists, regional ethnic movements, anti-nuclear power protestors, and other movements in western Europe during the 1970~.~Her explanation of the "new" politics is rooted in the public's loss of confidence in state capacity - a pessimism which she traces to the perception that the centralized state could not prornote ethnic self- detemination, democratic participation and environmental protection.
Lopez' writings on the growth of regional parties in Spain of the 1960s and
1970s reflects Berger's approach. He contends that ethno-regionalism reflected grievances with the authoritarianism and intolerance of the Franco regime. In this case, ethno-nationalism became synonymous with the transition from Franco to democracy, student protests and Third World revolutionary mo~ements.~
Kay Lawson and Peter MeM (eds.), When Parties Fail (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1988).
Suzanne Berger, "Politics and anti-politics in western Europe," in Dedelus 108, 1979. " Cesar Diaz Lopez, "Centre-periphery structures in Spain: from historical conflict to territorialconsociational accommodation?," in Yves Meny and Vincent Wright (eds.), Centre-Penphery Relations in Western Europe (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985). In separate accounts of the growth in popularity of regional parties in
northem ltaly during the 1980s, Diarnanti and Mannheimer cite relative deprivation sentiments and major party failure as the key variables which stimulated the Lega's growth in the Veneto and Lombardy regions. Over the decade, an increasing number of residents in small and mid-sized cornrnunities in the affluent North perceived that their tax dollars were funding dubious economic development projects in southern ltaly and that their regions were not receiving a "fair" share of public sector jobs and services."
According to Diamanti and Mannheimer. party failure also played a part in the rise of the Lega Nord. While urbanization and secularization had been eroding
Christian Democrat support in northern areas since the 1960s, Italy's secular parties on the right and left failed to adapt their programmes to the changing electorate.
Moreover, the credibility of the main partners in Italy's post-war ruling coalitions was severly darnaged by revelations in 1992 that their funding derived from a nationwide system of kickbacks linking business, organized crime and the political and bureaucratic elites.
The literature's emphasis on the role of endogenous, exogenous and intervening variables in strengthening the viability of ethno-regional tensions in contemporary societies fails to explain why cornmunitarian options have emerged during the same historical era in states with often dissimilar institutional and non-
56 llvo Diamanti, La Lega: geografia, stona e sociologia di un nuovo soggetfo politico (Roma: Donzelli editore, 1993) and Renato Mannheimer, "Chi vota Lega e perché?," in Mannheimer (ed.) La Lega Lombards, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1991). institutional arrangements. Surely, there must be some commonality between these
movements that has not been accounted for in the literature.
The growth of the Lega Nord during the 1980s has not only been attributed to
exogenous. endogenous and intervening variables operating within Italy's borders,
but also to transnational developments such as the formation of the European
Union, the long-tem decline of ideology wnfirmed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, and
the increased influence of the mass media?
Several observers of the Lega's growth have noted that East-West detente
provided the catalyst for ideological depolarization in ltalian politics, thus eroding
the support bases of the Christian centre-right and secular Left, and opening up a
vacuum for new political cornpetitors. Mannheimer has discussed the declining
relevance of the left-right axis and the rise of new territorial or post-materialist
parties such as the Lega, the Greens and Radi~als.'~He partially attributes these
tendencies to mass communication and to an increased degree of personal and
social mobility which introduced ltalians to other cultures and lifestyles. It has also
been held that the increased strength of sub-national identities is a consequence of
Italyls membership in the European Union and its resulting loss of policy
57 Vittorio Moioli, I Nuovi Ranismi (Roma: Edizioni Associate, 1990); Renato Mannheimer, "La crisi del consenso per i partiti tradizionali," in Mannheimer (ed.) La Lega Lombarda; llvo Diamanti, La Lega: geografia, storia e sociologia, 7 993; G ianfranco Pasquino, La Nuova Politca (Roma-Bari; Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 1992). " Renato Mannheimer, "La crisi del consenso per i partiti tradizionali," in Mannheimer (ed.) La Lega Lombarda (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1991). a~tonomy.~
Ecological and individual-level analyses of Lega voters and sympathizers lend some support to contentions that relative deprivation sentiments, institutional failure, and transnational developments largely accounted for the party's success in the 1980s. Moioli's ecological analysis of Lega support between 1985 and 1989 found that the party did best in small and mid-sized towns where local politics had been dominated by the Christian Democrats or members of Italy's post-war ruling coalition. The party also drew better-than-average regional support in Lombard provinces characterized by higher levels of disposable income and home ownership, and by relatively fewer opportunities for public sector emp~oyment.~
Mannheimer's 1989/90analysis of Lega voters and sympathizers in
Lombardy found that they tended to be middle-aged males who had not cornpleted high school and who were ernployed in the tertiary sector. More recently, the Lega has diversified its electoral consensus to include university-educated supporters working in managerial positions or as independent business pe~ple.~'In a 1990 survey of Lombard residents, Mannheimer found that anti-traditional party attitudes and intolerance towards southemers and immigrants were strong predictors of neo- regional sentiments and syrnpathy for the Lega Lombarda. Al1 these characteristics point to a post-modern clientele that is dissatisfied with the operation of the central
59 Diamanti, op.&., 1993 and Strassoldo, op.cit. " Moioli, op.&. '' Mannheimer, op-cit., 1991 and Diamanti, op.cit., 1993. 29 state and which is seeking to reestablish its own identity.
In 1991, Diamanti developed a five-fold typology of Lega sympathizers based
on responses to surveys conducted in Lombardia. The five types include: the
disenchanted, the particularists, the intolerant, the localists and those favouring a
more efficient fonof govemment. Diamanti placed 42% of Lega sympathizers in
the first category of protest voters. This group was composed of people who
identified with their local environment and who exhibited materiaiist values. While
they expressed hostility towards southem Italians, they were more tolerant of foreign immigrants and less suspicious of the traditional parties than other Lega
sy mpathi~ers.~
Lega syrnpathizers in the particularist category made up 13% of the sample and expressed localist sentiments, a total mistrust of the traditional parties, and
hostility towards immigrants and southerners. They tended to be male seniors drawn from the urban working class and agriculture. They had low levels of education and strong ties to Catholicism and materialistic values. They feared social changes which threatened their environment and culture, and identified with right-wing politics. The third type of Lega supporter (16% of the sample) displayed high levels of ethnic intolerance towards immigrants and territorial intolerance towards southerners. These syrnpathizers were generally middle-aged members of the working class with low levels of education. They tended to be "extreme" leftists
62 llvo Diamanti, "Una tiplogia dei simpatiuanti della Lega," in Mannheimer (ed.), La Lega Lombarda. in their political orientations.
The localists constituted the 15% of Lega sympathizers who identified closely
with their municipalities, who held materialist values, and who expressed little faith
in public intervention and low levels of ethnic intolerance. This group was drawn
from the industrial and tertiary middle classes living in medium-sized cities. While
they advocated less state intervention in economic and social affairs, they
demanded higher levels of state efficiency and redistributive equity. The
"efficientisti" constituted the smallest group at 10% of the Lombard sample of Lega
sympathizers. They tended to be neo-liberal. post-materialists who valued the
private sector and who expressed the greatest degree of mistrust in the public
sector. They demonstrated more intolerance towards southem Italians than towards
immigrants. This sector was composed of the young, urban and industrial rniddle
class, and included many students whose interest level in politics was high, but who
distrusted existing public institutions and the traditional parties.
While most of these writers contend that the "new" localism is not parochial
or reactionary, there have been few empirical studies which have exarnined the
attitudes and demographic backgrounds of contemporary cornmunitarian party
members. This study will probe which description of the "new" localism - post-
modern, as many socialogists would suggest, or parochial, as the convergence
theorists would argue - is applicable to the three cases, so that a more refined typology of conternporary communitarianism can be developed. The alobalism-localism thesis and the "new" localism
Proponents of the globalism-localism thesis focus on the role which globalization plays in encouraging citizen loyalties to sub-state organizations or identities. The thesis states that the nation state's decline as the main level of social organization is both cause and effect of the crisis of modem society, which is in tum. correlated with technological advancements and the increased mobility of capital. These scholars also contend that the micro-electronic revolution has contributed to the analytic skills of individuals who are increasingly questioning authority and who are directing their loyalties to a variety of sources. States are experiencing crises of authority and legitimacy, and this has encouraged demands for the devolution of powers."
Rosenau's "turbulence theory" argues that simultaneous processes of integration and disintegration, fragmentation and aggregation, centralkation and decentralization are not paradoxes. but the expected products of change. He has posited that the simultaneous development of supranationalism and sub-groupisrn can be attributed to increased public pessimism about the efficacy of national govemments which can no longer provide basic services, guarantee national defence, control their economies or manipulate the flow of information.
Strassoldo has argued that the contemporary globalism which has evolved in the transition frorn a modern to a post-modern society has prompted individuals to seek out the familiarity and intimacy of local identities. The "new" localism represents
-- " Rosenau, Mlinar, Strassoldo, op.cit 32 one way out of the "anomie, alienation and identity loss" that is typical of modemity.
He suggests that post-war communitarianism differs from the pre-modern orientations of older ethno-regional movements in that it is cosmopolitan
(sophisticated, free from national prejudice) and internati~nalist.~"Mlinar also interprets the renewed interest in territorial identification as the product of increased global interconnectedness and possibilities for individual autonomy and group distinct iveness?'
Mlinar argues that along with the growth of globalization tendencies such as the increased use of technology and increased capacity to move freely across borders, citizens' individuation capabilities increase. Mlinar operationalizes individuation as: the ability to escape from pre-determined lifestyles and class status; a cultural group's ability to preserve its interna1 homogeneity through spatial segregation; and the group's ability to assert collective identities as conflicts with the external world grow."
The dialectic link that has been made between globalization and the "new" iocalisrn suggests seven guiding hypotheses about the nature of the contemporary supporter of ethnic or regional parties. By testing these hypotheses, one will be able to determine whether the thesis has merit in characterizing contemporary communitarian parties. The first potential portrait of a contemporary communitarian
84 Strassoldo, op.cit.
65 Mlinar, op-cit.
Md., 19-22. supporter that is suggested by the thesis challenges the centralist hypothesis about the parochial nature of sub-state identities. While pre-war cultural nationaliçm was held to be anti-modem, the "new" localism is held to reflect changes in the social and econornic framework of society; namely, the transition from modemity to post- modemity. and from industrialism to post-industrialism. Daniel Bell, who introduced the concept of post-industrial society, identified five main changes in the axis of production arising from advancements in science and technology. They include the shift in emphasis from the provision of goods to services, an increase in health, education and research and development, the growth of government agencies, the growth in the professional and technical class, and a knowledge-based ~ociety.~'
If the globalism-localism thesis on the resurgence of ethno-nationalism is correct, then the socio-dernographic characteristics, opinions and lifestyles of cornmunitarian party members should exhibit post-modern, and its econornic correlate - post-industrial - tendencies. With respect to their socio-dernographic background, it would be expected that the party members would be younger, urban residents who are highly-educated, well-paid and employed in the smaller-scale, tertiary sector organizations that are characteristic of post-Fordist econornies.
An alternative profile of the cornmunitarian supporter is also possible. In this case, sub-state identities could be formed in reaction to globalization, rather than as a reflection of globalization. Thus, if communitarianism is a reaction against global
67 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-lndustnai Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973),? 15. tendencies rather than a refiection of them, then the party members would be older,
less highly-educated citizens who are not the financial beneficiaries of globalization
processes. They would also tend to work in larger fims and live in srnail
cornmunities. It is the goal of this study to discover which of these portraits best
describes the members of the three parties.
The globalism-localism theorists also argue that global tendencies have
brought new issues to the forefront. As Strassoldo argues. the twb new elements of
the contemporary globalization process are the ecological world-view and
aspirations for a "pluralist, non-hierarchical, de-centred world-society".' If global
tendencies influence the issue orientations of the respondents, then one would
expect transnational concems such as the environment and immigration, and
individuation concerns about the protection of culture and local diversity, to rank
highly on the respondents' identification of important political subjects. If global
issues play a minor role in shaping their priorities, then domestic-oriented subjects
such as unernployment, debt and deficit reduction, and social programs, would factor into the respondents' top three choices. In order to determine whether the
issue preferences of communitarian supporters reflect these preferences,
communitarian supporters were asked in the survey to rank the three most important
political issuesm
" Strassoldo, op-cit, 35-36.
69 The issue list was based on a similar question in the World Values Study. 35 The globalism-localism thesis also argues that nation-states are losing their
policy-making autonomy as a result of their integration into supranational
organizations such as the European Community and their commitments to the North
Arnerican Free Trade Agreement.'' If this is sol then one would expect respondents
to express a lack of confidence in central goveming institutions, and a preference
for more immediate levels of govemment. Interestingly, this preference for lower
orders of government would also be associated with pre-modemity, indicating that
"post-modemity" and "pre-modemity" share several characteristics. However. this
preference for more immediate levels of government should not be interpreted as a
sign of parochialism, as so many convergence theorists have argued. Conversely,
those who refect "modern" orientations rather than "post-modern" characteristics,
would be more likely to express faith in national governments.
There are different interpretations of the potential ideological orientation of
citizens who have been exposed to globalization forces and who may have been
consciously or unconsciously affected by them. Evidence from a 1988 survey that was administered to samples in Friuli Venezia-Giulia, a region located in noNi-
eastem ltaly that has special autonomy status7'. found that
globalism/cosrnopolitanism is associated with leftist political orientations ("left"
" Mlinar, op&, 23. ' The region is divided into two parts; Venezia-Giulia is the Trieste metropolitan area, characterized by a substantial Slovene minority, while Friuli daims a distinct cultural-historical identity. The region was granted special autonomy status in 1963. refers to the classic predisposition for state intervention in the econ~rny).~It should be noted that while Strassoldo acknowledges that globalism and wsmopolitanism do not measure exadly the same concepts, the ternis are close enough in meaning to be employed interchangeably. It is true that globalism has a comparatively neutral, spatial dimension attached to its meaning, while cosmopolitanism invokes a more normative characterization of human predispositions. Nevertheless, they both measure a propensity towards looking outwards, beyond state borders, and thus, are rneasuring the opposite of parochialism. With respect to the association between globalism and ideological orientations, Bell and Fukuyama have also argued that individuation processes would produce a pluralist, non-ideological political culture? As a result of individualism and pragmatism. political orientations do not reflect a coherent ideological pattern, but transitory attitudes about current issues.74 Therefore, social research has thus far unwvered at least two contradictory paths which post-modem ideologies can take: the non-ideological route in which individuals join "catch-all" parties, or the "leftist" trajectory in which post-materialist values concerned with environmental protection and equality are paramount. If the respondent does not match the "post-modern" profile, then rightist
" Strassoldo, opcit., 55.
73 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology. On the exhaustion of politcal ideas in the Mies, (Illinois: Free Press, 1960) and Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?." in The National Interest, iSummer:3-18).
74 Peter Ester et.al., lndividualiiyng Society: Value Change in Europe and North America (Netherlands: Tilburg University Press, 1993), 10. tendencies might predominate, although there is no theory which explicitly links
either pre-modemity or modemity with these tendencies. The failure of
convergence theorists to analyze the ideological characteristics of these two epochs
leaves the researcher in the unenviable position of having to conclude that if the
responses are neither leftist nor non-ideological, then they must reflect either pre-
modernity or modernity.
The study also examines issues of territorial identity, cultural interests and
spatial and socioeconomic rnobility, as they relate to rnembers of cornmunitarian
parties. According to the globalist-localist thesis, citizens aspire to a pluralist, de- centered world-society, where local attachments are primary and nation-state and
international attachments are weak. Contemporary globalisrn rejects a conception
of world unity based on the spread of a single set of values and the dnrninance of a core area. It stresses the equality of a plurality of cultures and the desirability of cultural diversity." Empirical studies such as those carried out in Friuli, ltaly between 1972 and 1988 show that people identify with smaller-scale locales such as city neighbourhoods or communes. The second focus of attachment, much weaker than the first, is the nation-state, with intermediate levels (province, region) and the supra-national levels attracting the weakest feelings." In this paper's survey, party members were asked to identify the geographic area with which they identified. If the globalism theory is valid, one would expect that the majority of
75 Strassoldo, opcit., 37-39.
76 Ibid., 51-52. survey respondents would feel most attached to their communes, towns or cities,
least attached to intemediate and international geographic areas, and express
medium-intensity attachments to the states in which they live. Again, this portrait
mirron what one would expect of a pre-modem member who is most attached to
immediate geographic areas and least attached to areas that are distant from home.
This underlies the previous observation that pre-rnodemity and post-rnodernity have much in common, although it is important to stress that within the context of post- modernity, an attachment to local areas does not necessarily denote parochialism.
Increased world unity (globalkation) and increased individuation (individual and group autonomy and distinctiveness) are interdependent processes, according to the globalist-localist thesis of socio-spatial development. More global interdependence increases the possibilities for increased autonomy and vice versa.
As Mlinar writes, the results of these processes "undermine traditional territorial organization of society. Territorial communities lose their traditional identity due to the growing individuation of the groups and individuals within them, as well as to an increase of mutual interdependence îcross borders.""
Mlinar's conceptualization of individuation is linked to a person's ability to escape a lifestyle predetermined by geography and social class; thus, the more variation that exists in inter-generational, spatial and social mobility, the higher the degree of persona1 indi~iduation.'~Mlinar also conceptualizes individuation as
" Mlinar, op-cit.,25.
" Ibid., 16. increased individual control over extemal cultural intrusions. As urbanization and technological change lead to greater spatial mobility of people and goods and to more frequent global communication, Mlinar argues that the identities of individuals and groups become more dependent on protedive mechanisrns to defend them from these "intrusions". One of these rnechanisms for protecting the identity of the collective is spatial segregatiod9
Mlinar conceptualizes the dimensions of the process of globalization in several ways." First it can manifest itself as the increasing interdependence of events and people in different localities. As McLuhan has noted in his works on the media's role in shaping and reflecting society throughout world history, the electronic age has made the world a village where people are increasingly involved in each others' li~es.~'Since electronic speed allows people to be nomadic gatherers of knowledge who are more able to pursue independent thought, increased participation, individuation and decentralization bewme possible in the patterning of human relationship~.~~
Mlinar notes that globalization can be a means of surmounting temporal discontinuities with the new information and telecommunications technology.
79 Ibid., 17-18.
Ibid., 20-22. '' Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company, 1964), 5, 248. " lbid., 7-8. Computer, faxes etc., link people in different time zones and allow them to work
"around the clo~k".~~It is a theme of McLuhan's work that new communities fom
when more rapid flows of communication are developed. Faster speeds of
communication give political and economic centres control over more extensive
territories. However, McLuhan argues that this eventually leads to disintegration
when the centre-margin structure becomes too extensive for the dominant centre to
control. When this occurs, the peripheries may detach and create new center-
margin systems of their own."
Can Mlinar's broad theoretical conceptualization of globalization and
individuation be applied to explain mernbership in autonomist parties? What type of
lifestyle and life patterns would one expect from citizens who reflect globalization
and individuation tendencies? To answer these questions, the researcher
hypothesizes that people with a capacity for individuation would have lived or attended school in areas other than their birthplaces, and would belong to a different socio-economic class than their parents. A highly-individuated respondent could not be characterized as parochial, resistent to cosmopolitanism, and thus, pre-modern. This portrait clearly distinguishes pre-modemity frorn post-modernity, since a pre-modern individual would not be as mobile as this profile suggests.
Another operationalization of the individuation concept would be the individual's choice to protect hisBer collective identity from random and external
83 Mlinar, op.cit., 20-22.
84 Ibid., 90-91. intrusions through some fom of spatial segregation. such as residence in ethnicaily
homogeneous neighbourhoods or through membership in local clubs which promote
community interests. The author wntends that while the decision to segregate
oneself from other cultural groups can be interpreted as pre-modem, parochial and
anti-cosmopolitan, under the globalism-localism thesis, these actions are viewed as
the natural response of an individual who has been socialized in a post-modem era,
and who has both the desire and ability to choose to resist homogenization and to
embrace the protection of diversity. When these proclivities exist alongside other
indicators of individuation, the case for characterizing the respondents as post-
modem, rather than pre-modem, is strengthened.
The application of Mlinar's conceptualization of globalization would lead one to expect that "post-modern" individuals would be connected to people and events
in different locales. Based on these criteria, one would expect that "post-modern" respondents would travel frequently, use technology. speak or understand several languages. and express an interest in international news and foreign cultures.
Again, this profile sets apart the post-modern from the pre-modern individual, as
"parochial" respondents would not maintain these connnections to the outside world.
Methodoloqy
This study adopts a variety of methodological techniques to test the central hypothesis: a comparable-cases strategy, original qualitative (personal interviews) and quantitative (survey) research, and a sewndary analysis of party voter data drawn from the 1993 Canadian National Election Studies and 1993 Eurobarometer
40.0. The comparable-cases strategy permits cross-national wmparisons about the nature of cornmunitarian sentiments in North Arnerica and Europe, and the opportunity to place the Quebec case within a global context.
The research design is based on a self-administered survey (See Appendix for Dutch, ltalian and French versions) which pemitted the collection of directly comparable, original data in three stated5 The questionnaire was divided into three sections, al1 designed to test the applicability of the globalism-localism thesis to explaining cornmunitarianism. Pre-tests of the suwey were conducted after the
17-item questionnaire was translated by professional firms or by native speakers into Dutch, ltalian and French (See Appendix). In Belgium, the Volksunie party furnished a sampling frame of 500 addresses of part-time municipal councillors and party activists. The surveys were mailed to the entire population along with two letters of explanation from the party president and myself, and a self-addressed envelope. A follow-up, thank youheminder letter was mailed to these addressees 2-
3 weeks following the first mailing. In all, 265 responses were received for a response rate of 53%. The survey is representative of mid-level and senior party
The survey of Volksunie local councillors and party officiais was conducted between 27 November 1995 and 21 December 1995. The survey of Lega Nord members was distributed in five provinces of the Piemonte region between 27 November and 2 Febmary 1996. The survey of BQ members was mailed to 50 riding presidents across Quebec on 8 March 1996. A second set of surveys was mailed to an additional 23 riding presidents on 15 April 1996. officials and not necessarily of its general membership.
Research on the Lega Nord was conducted in the Piemonte region in northwestem ltaly for political and structural reasons. First, it is a region where the party had consistently registered its third highest levels of support amongst northem ltalian regions, behind Lombardy and Veneto. Piernonte was also an attractive choice from a structural perspective since it is a highly industrialized region which borders two states, and is host to a multicultural society that has been a destination for southern Italians in search of employment, and for non-white immigrants from north Africa and the middle East.
In Piemonte, a non-random snowball sarnpling technique was employed in order to distribute the survey to party members. Five Provincial Secretaries were asked to distribute the survey to party members at their next meeting. This choice of sampling technique was motivated by previous knowledge, and through confirmation of the party offcials, that the members are unaccustomed to receiving mail surveys with sensitive questions. While this sampling method could have produced a biased sample, this did not tum out to be a problem. As the data will demonstrate, the supporters represent a broad range of ideological positions and are drawn from diverse socio-economic backgrounds. A total of 181 surveys were received in Piemonte. A response rate cannot be calculated since the total number of surveys actually distributed is unknown.
Cornparisons between the Belgian and ltalian data must be tempered by the knowledge that the mailing in Belgium was directed to senior-level officials and part- time politicians, while the ltalian sample includes. but was not restricted to, that group. Therefore, the ltalian data is likely more indicative of the party's general mernbership, than the Belgian data.
In Quebec. provincial privacy laws prevented the BQ from releasing a list of party members. However, the party furnished a sampling frame of riding presidents whom 1 could ask for their help in distributing the surveys. Before mailing letters requesting their assistance, a Francophone assistant phoned each of the presidents to ask for their cooperation. The first mailing was sent to 50 riding presidents. In each of the envelopes, ten surveys were included with the request that the president complete one and distribute the remaining questionnaires, letters of explanation and self-addressed envelopes to executive members or other party sympathizers in the riding. The second mailing reached the remaining 23 riding presidents. For the second mailing, about four or five surveys were included in each envelope, with the same request that the riding president cornplete one and distribute the others to interested BQ respondents. In all, a total of 604 surveys were mailed. One hundred and seventy-five surveys were returned for a response rate of 28.9%. This figure likely underestimates the response rate as it is not known how many surveys were actually distributed. It is possible that surveys may have been discarded and that every questionnaire which was distributed, was wmpleted.
While this is wnsidered low, it is in keeping with traditionally lower response rates for surveys conducted in Quebec. After the analysis was completed, an additional
20 surveys arrived several months later, but they are not included In the results. Cornmunitarian parties from macro and micro perspectives
This study adopts both macro and micro approaches towards understanding
the nature of post-war communitarianism. Chapter 2 assesses the phenornenon's
breadth and relevance by identifying the universe of cornmunitarian parties which
have been founded in 21 industrialized western states since 1945. Each party is
then classified along three dimensions: policy orientation (religious, ethnic,
regional, occupational, dernographic, or any combination of these categories);
relevance, as rneasured by its strategic position in the party system, and life~pan.~~
The specific research questions that will be addressed in the second chapter
include: how many of these parties have been created since 1945? Which countries have been particularly hospitable to cornmunitarian alternatives? How many and which of these parties can be classified as relevant, using Sartori's measure of their coalition or blackmail potential? What is their average lifespan?
Which dimension of communitarianism has had the greatest life expectancy?
Which dimension of communitarianism has had the greatest success in achieving political relevancy?
In Chapters 3 to 7, quantitative and qualitative data on the membership of each of the three parties are analyzed in order to make intra-party and inter-party comparisons about whether the globalism-localism thesis adequately characterizes post-war communitarianism. The eighth and final chapter assesses whether
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and pady systems: a fkamework Tor analysis (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1976). comrnunitarianism is indeed associated with globlization, as well as the implications of the study's findings for the future of cornmunitarian parties and current territorial arrangements.
The findings shed light on whether contemporary wmmunitarian parties are compatible with post-modemism or parochialism, or whether they reflect a combination of both forces. A portrait of contemporary supporters of communitarianism will reveal whether they are reflective of the past or present. In furthering an understanding of why these parties persist and thrive in societies where they were supposed to become extinct, this study will discuss their potential to persist into the twenty-first century. If they are reflections of the transformation to a global, post-industrial society, then they will likely persist in some fom. If they are reactions to change, then their growth and impact will likely diminish over time, as the inevitability of change and socio-economic transformation on a global scale proceeds.
An analysis of the nature of contemporary sub-state loyalties will also lead to a better understanding of why states succeed or fail in cultivating citizen loyalties, and how globalization forces are affecting the legitimacy of the central state.
Implicitly, an explanation of whether globalization diminishes allegiances to the central state, will also help predict its potential impact on current territorial arrangements. If it plays a part in enwuraging sub-state loyalties, then one can expect that over time, the combined forces of globalization and localism will place tremendous pressures on the central state to either devolve authority to sub-state units, or to negotiate secession agreements with the concerned wmmunities. CHAPTER MO:THE COMMUNITARIAN UNIVERSE
Since 1945, 162 cornmunitarian parties contesting national elections have been formed in 21 industrialized western states (See Appendix 1). The universe of communitarian parties that is presented in the appendix situates the three case studies within the broader phenomenon of sub-state loyalties. It illustrates that the persistence of communitarianism is not isolated to a few countries, but is truly a global trend. Thus, the mere existence of these parties in countries with different institutional and non-institutional features reinforces the arguments of the globalist- localist theorists.
As has been noted earlier, Lawson's definition of communitarianism has been extended to include parties which aggregate territorial interests. This choice does not pervert the original meaning of communitarianism, which refers ta alternative parties that represent sub-state interests. The exclusion of territory from Lawson's list constitutes a shortcoming in the definition of wmmunitarian parties. For this study, the sub-categories of communitarian sentiments were cornbined when allegiances reinforced each other. For example, both the Volksunie and BQ represent the interests of distinct cultural groups, as well as separate territorial areas. Since both ethnic and territorial allegiances are equally important in their party programs, they were categorized as ethno-territorial parties. As will become evident, hyphenated communitarian movements, such as ethno-territorial or ethno- religious ones, have a demonstrated ability to achieve political relevance.
Candidates for inclusion on the list include only those communitarian parties which contest national elections, as well as the various cornmunitarian formations that
emerged from the niins of Italy's former ruling party. the Christian Democrats. With
the demise of the ltalian Christian Democrats, parties such as the Christian
Democratic Center have lost their status as major players in the political system,
and thus meet Lawson's criteria that cornmunitarian parties represent alternatives to
the major parties. Likewise, the list includes the communitarian successors of formerly, noncommunitarian major parties. This would include the language-based
parties representing the liberal, christian. socialist and ecological traditions in
Belgian politics While it could be argued that these parties are not communitarian
since their roots are ideological, rather than ethnic, religious or territorial, the break-
up of these parties in the 1960s and 1970s into separate language-based formations signified their re-birth as alternatives to "traditional" non-cornmunitarian choices.
Having specified the criteria for inclusion on the list, grounds must also be laid out to justiw why some parties have been excluded. In addition to the Christian
Democratic parties which no longer qualify as political alternatives because they have evolved into major parties, anti-immigrant parties were excluded since they represent an analytically distinct forrn of cornmunitarianism. Finally, the list does not include parties competing in overseas dependencies."
The countries which host the greatest number of communitarian parties
include: lsrael (38); Spain (23); ltaly (21); Belgium (21); the United Kingdom (12)
and the Netherlands (7). Together, these six wuntries acwunt for 122 or 75.3% of
al1 the communitarian parties created in the post-war period. Canada has produced
7 communitarian parties since 1945, with only 1 of them, the BQ, achieving political relevance through its ability to bring Quebec to the brink of secession from Canada.
The designation of the BQ as a relevant party stretches Sartori's rigid criteria of political significance. However, it is justified in that Sartori does not allow for altemate ways in which parties competing in first-past-the-post electoral systems where coalition governments are rare, can influence the national political agenda. If one extends this argument for definitional flexibility to the United Kingdom, where the same electoral formula is used, one might also designate al1 the sectarian parties in Northern lreland as relevant, since their continued existence and sometimes-affiliation with terrorist wings has prompted the British govemment to initiate historical peace talks behnreen the warring sides in this ancient conflict.
"The information on party formation is based on the following sources: Thomas T. Madue and Richard Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1991); Giovanni Sartori, Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1976); Europa Publications, Western Europe, 1993, (London: Europa Publications, 1992); Europa Publications, The Far East and Australasia, 20th ed., (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1994); Europa Publications Ltd., The Middle East and North Afka, 4 1st ed., (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1994); Alan J. Day, ed., Political Parties of the Wodd, (Chicago; London: St. James Press, 1988); Councii on Foreign Relations, Political Atlas and Handbook of the World, (New York: Harper, 19451987). Nevertheless, pending the outcome of ongoing talks it is unclear whether their
activities will lead to a permanent change in the status of Ulster. Thus, they have
been designated as politically irrelevant.
What the "host" countries with the largest numben of communitarian parties share is the presence of longstanding ethnic, religious or regional cleavages, and with the exception of the United Kingdorn, their use of proportional representation electoral systems which facilitate the parliamentary representation of smaller parties, however, moderated by a threshold. Thirty-eight of the 39 relevant parties are based in countries which adopt some form of the proportional system of electoral representation. Unitary systems also seem to encourage the fiourishing of nationalist sentiments, athough it should be noted that devolutionary regimes such as Spain and Belgium do not seem to be able to contain these movements either.
Thirty-nine, or 24% of the total, have fulfilled Sartori's criteria of political relevance, which requires that parties either participate in governing coalitions, or demonstrate an ability to extract important concessions from the governrnent (what he calls "blackrnail" potential). lsrael and Belgium have respectively produced 13 and 10 of the parties which have fulfilled these criteria.
Other post-war communitarian parties which have achieved relevance include the Christian Democrat parties of Belgium. Denmark, Sweden, Finland,
Spain and Italy, which have either led or participated in governing coalitions. Their endurance is rooted in the historic social and political roles which the Catholic or
Protestant churches have played in their countries, and to their ability to adapt to twentieth century secularism by transforrning themselves into "catch-all" parties. underpinned by appeals to western Christian values. In Spain, the Catalan
Convergence and Union, which is a moderate defender of Catalan interests, has been successful at the regional and local level, and supported the Spanish socialist minority govemment from 1993 to 1995.
A breakdown of the political orientations of the 162 parties reveals there are:
44 territorial; 35 ethno-territorial; 32 religious; 31 ethno-religious; 15 ethnic and 5 unknown parties. An analysis of the political orientations of these parties confined some expectations based on macro-social trends, but also produced some surprises. The list is indicative of the enduring strength of religion in the secular
West; 63 religious or ethno-religious parties have been created since 1945.
Religious orientations, whether based on the ancient faiths (Islam, Jewish,
Christian) or the newer denominations (Reforrnational Protestants, Evangelical
Christians etc.), constitute 38.8% of al1 post-war cornmunitarian parties. This is an interesting development in light of the declining number of people who attend religious services or who profess religious affiliation in western democracies. It could point to the public's desire to find meaning in politics, to a disillusionment with religious institutions as sources of spirituality, or to profound alienation from the material values that are expounded in wealthy societies. Any of these theories would confirrn the globalism-localism thesis on post-war communitarianism, but it would be premature at this point to draw any conclusions from these data.
Equally noteworthy is the importance of territory as a source of meaning for citizens. The territorial or ethno-territorial parties accounted for almost half of al1 the cornmunitarian parties formed. There were far fewer parties based solely on ethnicity, suggesting that when people who share common ethnic bonds are dispersed and do not govem their own administrative units, they are less likely to mobilize along communitarian cleavages. These findings point to the inability of federal structures to accommodate cornmunitarian demands within a state structure, and quite likely, to federalism's institutionalization of sub-state grievances.
A party's political orientation may also influence its success. Of the 39 relevant parties, 13 are religious, 10 are ethno-religious, 11 are ethno-territorial; 4 are territorial and 1 is ethnic. In terrns of political success, movements with a religious appeal have the most resonance, although it should be noted that one country, Israel, accounts for many of the politically relevant religious or ethno- religious parties. When ethnicity and territory overlap each other, movements based on these Win cleavages can also achieve electoral success. Again, these data testify to the longlasting and emotional pull which religion and ethnicity continue to exert on people.
The average lifespan of communitarian parties was calculated as the period from their foundation, to their dissolution or merger with another party. If they are still in existence, 1997 was used as the date of temination in order to provide a rough benchmark of their staying power. It should be noted that this figure vastly underestimates their lifespan, since rnost of the parties were still in operation as of
1997. Amongst the countries with 10 or more cornmunitarian parties, the sectarian parties of Northern lreland in the United Kingdom register the longest average lifespan at 18.7 years, with the ltalian parties registering the second-highest endurance levels at 14.6 years, closely followed by the Belgian communitarian parties with an average lifespan of 14.5 years. In the first case. the longevity and violence associated with the Catholic-Protestant conflict in Ulster likely explains the parties' durability, as does the longstanding intransigence of their wmmunity leaders. In the ltalian and Belgian cases, the persistence of territorial cleavages could be attributed to the unitary character of these states for most of their history, as well as to their electoral systems which feature relatively low thresholds for parliarnentary representation. It is interesting to note that the three countries which host the most endurable communitarian parties are either unitary or quasi-federal states. This suggests that centralization does not succeed in suppressing deep cornmunitarian divisions over the long-term. While three cases do not wnstitute the basis for a theory about institutions and communitarian conflict management, they do point to the dilemma facing governments dealing with serious secessionist movernents. If federalism, as has been noted earlier, tends to increase the likelihood of communitarian formations gaining political relevance, then the centralization of govemment powers does not seem to be the solution for building a consensus about the legitimacy of the state.
In countries which have produced more than one, but fewer than 10 communitarian parties, organizations in Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands registered average lifespans ranging between 21 and 40 years. Their endurance has been reinforced by historical religious conflict between
Catholics and Protestants, andlor by proportional representation.
TABLE 2.0 - POST-WAR COMMUNITARAN PARTtES COUNTRY # PARTIES # RELEVANT MEAN LIFESPAN (N=d 62) (N=39) (in years)
Australia 1 O 4.0
Belgium 21 10 14.5 Canada 7 1 8.9
Finland 2 2 40.0 France 4 4 9.5 Gerrnany (ex. former GDR) Greece Ireland lsrael My Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden
Switzerland 6 O 24.6 United Kingdom 12 O 18.7 United States 5 O 11.5 These data testify to the persistence and relevance of communitarianism in a global world. They also demonstrate that ethnic and religious loyalties are resilient in modem industrial societies, and that groups which live in separate administrative units are the most prolific advocates of cornmunitarian identities. From an examination of the universe of cornmunitarian parties, this study will proceed to a detailed analysis of three wmmunitarian parties which have achieved political relevance in their national party systems. The following section will examine the policies, structure and electoral history of the Volksunie, Lega Nord and Bloc
Québécois, with an eye to assessing their ideological orientations, degree of organizational decentrakation and political success.
The Volksunie's Policv Evolution:
Post-war Flemish nationalisrn can trace its roots to the nineteenth century struggles of their forerunners to strengthen the position of the Dutch language in
Belgium. Following Belgium's secession from Holland in 1830, French was made the official language of the country even though Flemish was spoken by a 57% majority. Although the constitution of 1831 guaranteed linguistic liberty, francophone elites dominated govemment administration, the courts, the anyand society. Soon after independence, there were some Flemish protests against language laws, discrimination in the courts, in education and in the workp~ace.~It
88 Liesbet Hooghe, A Leap in the Dark: Nationalist Conflict and Federal Reform in Belgium, (Comell: Western Societies Papers, 1991 ), 11-1 2. was not until 1898 that Dutch and French became equal before the law, making
Belgiurn became a de jure bilingual country.
After the First World War, Flemish resentment against Francophone political
and economic domination in the 19th and early 20th centuries generated nationalist
parties which sought either some form of autonomy for Flanders or a reunification
with the Netherlands. These parties had gained representation in parliament,
winning as much as 13% of the vote in Flanders in 1936. A second series of
language laws adopted in the 1930s moved towards instituting the principle of
territorial unilingualism in Wallonia and Flanders. Under these laws, the language
of government. the courts and education would be French in the south and Flemish
in the north. Brussels and other areas near the linguistic border between the two groups were designated as bilingual. These laws transfoned Flanders into a community with its own Dutch-speaking elite?
World War Two generated new tensions between the two linguistic groups after it was discovered that a small section of the Flemish nationalist movement had collaborated with the Germans. Although a virtually equal proportion of the French population was convicted of cooperating with the Nazis, the Walloon regional movement was not connected with wartime collaboration. and thus, did not pose as much of a threat to the integrity of the Belgian state. Other issues which dominated post-war relations between the two linguistic groups included the Royal Question as to whether King Leopold 111 should be permitted to return to the throne. A
-- * See Hooghe, A Leap in the Dark: Nationalist Conflict in Belgiurn. 57 consultative referendum on the proposal illustrated that the Flemish were in favour
of his resuming his duties following the war, while a majority of Walloons were not.
In 1954, a second generation of more confident and active Flemish nationalists
emerged, including the direct predecessor of the Volksunie, the Christian Flemish
People's Union. The latest Flemish nationalist Party was concerned with obtaining
linguistic parity in central administration, the decentralisation of cultural affairs and
preventing language borders from being further shifted to the north. This party was
later to become the Volksunie, and by 1989, had attracted 49,336 members to its
f~ld.~'
The 1960s saw the creation of four language areas with fixed borders, and
an upsurge in Flemish, Walloon and Bruxellois regionalism. Support for the
Volksunie began to increase dramatically from the mid-1960s onwards, and this
electoral swing away from the traditional parties led to a series of federal reforms in
1970, 1980,1988 and 1993, which the Volksunie played an important part in
bringing about. In addition to its involvement in decentralization, the party
participated in coalition govemments between April 1977 and December 1978, and
again from 1988 to 1991.
The Volksunie is both a nationalist and a federalist movement, representing the Flemish people in a federal Europe. Its ultimate goal is to achieve
independence for Flanders. Until this has been achieved, its policy states that more
Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, eds., Party Organization: A Data Handbook, (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 133. powers should be devolved to the regional and community govemments. The
party's policy states that the Flemish Council and Executive, would be the main
legislative institution in an independent Flanders and would have the same powers
as the Belgian govemment. Brussels would remain the Flemish capital and retain
certain powers. Vlaams Brabant, the province in which Brussels is situated. would
remain biling~ai.~'
As will become clear, the Volksunie's position on social and economic issues reflect a blend of social democratic and liberal values, making it difficult to place the
party on the traditional ideological spectrum. The Volksunie currently seeks to federalize and reforrn the social security and health care systems which are administered by the central Belgian govemment. It argues that social programs should not be financed through direct contributions from wages, but through the regular tax system. Its policy calls for the development of a national approach to health care that emphasizes affordability, accessibility and qua~ity.~~Universal, basic pensions with a 10 percent increase should also be guaranteed to al1 seniors.
In addition, the basic pension should be cornplemented with a career allowance relative to the years of work.= A reformed social security system would also ensure a basic incorne for every individual.
'' Vol ksunie, Met hart en Uel voor vlaanderen, Verkieungs-programma, (Bnissels: 21 mei 1995), 1ô.
92 Ibid., 17- 18.
93 Ibid. With respect to economic policy. although Flanders is one of the most prosperous regions in the world, more than 1 million people are unemployed. The party favours redistributing job opportunities through shorter work hours and a reduction of Belgium's taxation rates. The party argues that more money should be spent on research and development and that more head offices should be located in
Flanders, especially in the insurance, banking and utility sect~rs.~The VU also argues that Flanders needs more fiscal autonomy so that it can finance new investment strategies for Flanders. impose budgetary restraint and reduce taxation to European levels.
The party program encourages cultural, economic and political cooperation with the Netherlands. An independent Flanders and Netherlands would together formulate an international cultural policy and the Benelux wuncil would be refomed to encourage economic cooperation between Flanders, Wallonia, Netherlands and
~uxernbourg.~~The VU'S European policy argues that the European Union (EU) must be transparent and democratic. It advocates a directly-elected EU president and ~ommission."
94 lbid., 9-1 3.
95 lbki., 41 -47.
9s lbid.. 65-67. Volksunie Oraanizational Stmcture:
The party hierarchy is organized into the community, district and national
levels. The smallest entities at the wmmunity level are the Branches and C~res.'~
More than one branch can be established in a community and cores can
amalgamate as long as they are in the same county. The District Level is
responsible for outlining the powers of the branches, and it is the District which
creates and dissolves the Branches. Each Branch has an executive which is
elected by its members. The directlyelected executive members choose the
president and secretary.
The councils and executives listed here generally serve three-year tens.
The Political Councileaexists in communities with more than one branch. It is the
highest level within the pariy at the community level. It is chosen after every
election and makes decisions on important community matters. It also decides on
administrative and coalition agreements with other parties at the community level.
This includes the contents of the agreement, the negotiating team, the delegation of
mayoralty and aldermanic positions, and rnembership in the OCMW (the Public
Welfare Organization).
The Political Council is wmposed of: the branch executive members within the community; the national and provincial candidates who live in the community; 2
97 Volksunie Vlaamse Vrije Demokraten, Statuten van de Volksunie, (12 februari, 1994), 1-2. " lbid., 2-3. deputies per core and 2 representatives from the party's youth organization. Every branch in the Political Council has 5 votes, a number which increases by 1 vote for each additional 50 voters who are over 25. Each core in the Political Council has 2 votes. Every Political Council decision has to be submitted to the District before it can be executed. The Iists of al1 elected members of the community are also submitted to the District Executive.
The Political CollegeS9is chosen from the Political Council's own mernbers.
The Coliege has a minimum of five members and each branch must be represented.
The Political Council chooses the College's president and secretary. The community deputies who are not members of the College can give advice at the meetings. The Political College executes the decisions of the Political Council and devises the model list for the Flemish Community Council elections, which must then be approved by the Political Council.
At the District Level, there is a District Council and ~xecutive.'~There are
18 districts in the 5 Dutch-speaking provinces and Brussels Brabant. The District
Council meets 5 times per year. Every member living within the district is part of the
District Council and can present written questions to it. If 10% of the members request it, the president of the District Executive can cal1 an extraordinary meeting of the District Council. At each meeting the decisions of the Party Council are presented and discussed. The District Councils within the same vote district meet
99 Ibid., 3-4.
'Oo Ibid., 4-5. at least twice a year to discuss woperative initiatives. The District Executives meet four times a year to discuss Parliamentary rnatters.
The District Executive consists of voting and non-voting rnember~.'~'Voting members include the president and secretary, seven members elected every 3 years by the District Council, and one youth representative. Non-voting members include national and provincial reprssentatives from the district; representatives from the cantons (election districts); cauncil members from the district; the party's provincial president (chosen by the party executive on the advice of the executives of the District executives) and the fomer district president and secretary.
The party's national structure consists of the Party Congress, Party Council and Party ~xecutive.'~The Congress is the party's supreme organ and decides on the Volksunie's orientation. Every two years, the Party Council sets the Congress agenda and chooses the Congress president and members of the Congress commission. Every Branch is informed about and discusses Congress decisions.
Every party member can introduce changes to these decisions. The Commission discusses these changes and if the members agree, they are published in an internai magazine. The final vote on the decisions and any amendments are held at a plenary meeting. Special Congresses are held every tirne the govemment asks the party to join the coalition.
loilbid., 5.
'02 lbid., 5-1 2. The Party Council is the second highest entity of the Party? Ifs composed of the presidents and secretaries of the districts and horepresentatives from the district council; district representatives; members of Parliament, the Flernish
Council, the Brussels Regional Govemment. Secretaries of State and Ministers; mernbers of the Party Executive and others.
The Party Executive consists of voting and non-voting rnembers. lM Those who can vote include: the president-founder; the general president and secretary; hnro vice-presidents; 8 Party Council members; 3 mernbers of the Flemish Council; the VU'S presidents in the House of Representatives, Senate and European
Parliament; one youth representative and the party treasurer. Those Party
Executive members who can only give advice are the outgoing president and secretary, the president of the Party Council; the general director and ministers and secretaries of state for the duration of their terms. The following Executive members are chosen by the Party Council: a general president and secretary, 2 vice-presidents and other members. It is the Executive's task to execute the
Council's decisions and to conduct the daily activities of the party.
The draft candidate lists for elections are drawn up in different ways. For elections to Parliament and the Provincial Councils, the lists are compiled by the
District Election cornmittee and voted upon by members of the appropriate election
Ibid., 7.
lbid., 8-9. district.'05 A two-thirds majority is needed for acceptance for the draft lists. The
approved lists are sent to the General Secretary, who presents the listings from al1
the Oistricts to the Party Executive. They must be ratified by the Party Council by
an ordinary majority.
The candidates for provincial or coopted Senators (coopted Senators are
elected by the directiy-elected Senators and the elected Community Senators of
each linguistic group) are chosen on a motion of the members of the Party
Executive, or on a proposal by ten members of the Party Council. The motion must
be accepted by the Party Council by a two-thirds majority.
The draft candidate lists for the Flemish Community Council e~ections'~are
drawn up by the Party Executive and submitted to the Party Council for approval.
The draft for the Community Council elections must be approved by the VU
members of the concemed comrnunity. If there is only one branch in a
commmunity, the draft list is made and approved by the branch executive. The list
must be ratified by the District Executive.
For elections to the European Parliament and Senate, the Party Council sets
up a National Election Cornmittee (NEC). The NEC consists of voting members of the Party Executive from each district, and one member of the Party Council selected by the District Executive. A draft candidates' list must get a two-thirds
majority from the voten in the NEC. The draft listing has to be submitted to the
'" Ibid., 12-13.
'O6 lbid., 12-1 3. Party Council for approval. All decisions frorn any council or executive below the
Party level can be appealed to a board at the next level and its decisions must be approved by a two-thirds majority.
The Volksunie's intemal voting structure is characterized by extensive consultation between lower and higher-level organizational units on candidate lists and coalition agreements with other parties, and by special majority requirements for decisions about candidates. Yet powers to create and dissolve the branches and cores, and powers to draft and ratify candidate lists for provincial, Comrnunity, parliamentary and European elections are centralized at the district or national levels. The party's organizational structure would seem to feature both centralist and decentralist elements.
Volksunie Electoral Histow:
The Volksunie contests communal, provincial, regional, Belgian (in Flanders and Brussels) and European elections. For the purpose of this study, only its results in elections to Belgium's Chamber of Representative will be presented.'07
The party contested its first election in 1954 and has participated in several coalition governments between 1977 and 1979, and from 1988 to 1991.
Throughout the 1970s, the Volksunie gained up to a fifth of the popular vote and seats in Flanders. Its parliamentary representation peaked at 22 seats in 1974,
'O7 ian Gorvin, ed., Elections Since 7945: A worldwide reference compendium, (Hariow: Longman, 1989). held steady until the late 1970s. and then began to drop in the mid-1980s during the
country's federalization. After the 1995 elections, its seat total droped in half to 5
seats in the Chamber, although the more radical nationalist party, the Vlaams Bloc, won 11 seats and now appears poised to take up the cause of Flemish nationalism.
TABLE 2.1 1 - VOLKSUNIE POPULAR VOTE (%) IN FLANDERS AND BRUSSELS FOR ELECTIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1954-1995'08 Year Flanders Brussels
1954 3.9 0.9 1958 3.4 1.O 1961 6.0 f -6 1965 11.6 2.4 1968 16.9 4.3 1971 18.8 5.6 1974 16.8 5.9 1977 16.3 6.2 1978 11-5 3.6 1981 16.0 4.4 1985 12.7 3.4 1987 12.9 3.7 1991 9.3 2.8 1995 7.3 4.3
'O8 Martijn Roessingh, Belgiurn: The dynamics of linguistic confiict," in Et hnona tionalism and Political Systems in Europe: A State of Tension (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996), 172-173. Leaa Nord Poiicv Evolution:
The Lega Nord was fonned in 1991 as a confederation of regional autonomy movements in Veneto, Lombardia, Piemonte, Liguria, Emilia Rornagna and
Toscana. Its name was inspired by the medieval Lombard League fonned by major cities in northwestem ltaly in 1167 as a defensive alliance against invading
Germanic tribes. In 1176, the Lombard League defeated the forces of the Holy
Roman Empire and forced it to recagnize the free cities of the north in 1183. Family rivalries and wars between the city-states accelerated the rise of Milan and the loss of territories to Venice and other powers in the 15th and 16th cent~ries.'~~
The idea of forming a northern ltalian political alliance did not resurface until the 1980s. If one is to understand how globalization forces may have contributed to the growth of the Lega, it is essential to understand how ltaly's post-war political history laid the groundwork for the crumbling of the old party system and the rise of ethno-regionalism. After the establishment of the First Republic, the Christian
Democrat Party won the first parliamentary elections in Italy's history in 1948 and about 40% of the popular vote until early 1990s. During this period, the Communist and Socialist vote remained at between 35% and 40%, while the right-wing vote ranged between 12% and 15%. A combination of a pure proportional representation system (which applied to the distribution of cabinet posts, as well as parliamentary seats) and the preference vote (voters could favour 3 or more
'" James Minahan, Nations Wdhouf States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements, (Westport, USA: Greenwood Press, 1996)' 332333. candidates, depending on the size of the district) enabled electoral winners to hold power and to maintain it through the use of patronage in their districts. The combination of these factors produced immobiljsmo, where the political system attained a high degree of stability. Although the electoral system produced unstable goveming coalitions, and thus, apparent instability, the personalities dominating govemrnent remained the same. The lack of meaningful change prevented needed refoms which would have implemented the liberal-dernouatic principles articulated in Italy's post-war constitution.
One prominent feature of the party systern which needed reform was the partitocrazia, where the parochial interests of the parties often led to the frequent collapse of goveming coalitions. The fonal democratic institutions of govemment and elections played only a secondary role in post-war politics. Parties with even a minimal percentage of the popular vote often shaped govemment coalitions and headed ministries.''O
A third feature of the ltalian post-war system was the exclusion of the
Communist Party from participation in government, despite widespread public support for this anti-system party. Until the 1950s, the left-wing parties had been shut out of participation in goveming coalitions. The gradua1 "opening to the Left" - or trasformismo - occurred between 1959 and 1963, when the Christian Democrats adopted centre-left policies in exchange for Socialist abstention from voting in parliament on certain issues. The Communist Party, though it regularly won
"O lbid., 30. between 25% and 33% of the ltalian popular vote and controlle many local govemments in central Italy, was never able to attain national power. Without the opportunity to participate in govemment, it was cut off from other left-wing parties, and the Socialists and Social-Democrats allied with the Christian Democrats to fonn most coalitions until the 1990s.
Between 1977 and 1978. the Communists and Socialists bewme part of a majority supporting the "historic compromise" govemment, although less than a year later, the PCI withdrew from the coalition and went back into opposition. In 1979, a new four-party centre-left coalition which mostly ruled during the 1980s was formed.
The fall of Communism in eastem Europe in 1989 contributed towards an identity crisis amongst the ltalian Communists in the early 1990s. After a long period of losing its popular support and membership base, in 1992 it changed its name to the
PDS (Partifo Democratico della Sinistra) or Party of the Left, and reemerged as a social-democratic entity.
The 1992 election marked the end of the old party system and the beginning of what some have called the Second ltalian Republic. In that election, the 4-party ruling coalition composed of Christian Dernocrats, Socialists, Social Democrats and
Republicans saw its support reduced to a 16 seat majority. The Christian
Dernocrats had their worst showing since the war, winning about 30% of vote. The
PDS and the Marxist Rifondazione Communista also lost strength when compared to prior elections. Meanwhile, the Lombard League won 55 seats in the Chamber, compared to the one member it elected in 1987. In 1993, "Operation Clean Hands," a judicial investigation into the links
between the ruling parties, business and the Mafia, uncovered a vast,
institutionalized network of kickbacks and bribes between state officials and the
private sector. These revelations rocked the party system and helped pave the way
for newer parties such as the Lega, Forza ltalia and the Alleanza Nazionale (the
democratic successor to the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano) to fiIl the moral
vacuum in ltalian politics.
Further changes were in store for the political system in 1993. In that year,
more than 82% of ltalian voters endorsed a shift frorn the proportional
representation system to a mixed majoritarianlp.r. system for electing Senators in a
national referendum. The referendum also abolished some govemment
departments and state financing of parties. With the backing of ltalian President
Oscar Scalfaro. the new govemment fomed after the referendum was headed by
the Govemor of the Bank of Italy, an official who was well-respected at home and
abroad. Upon taking office, Carlo Ciampi told parliament to enact the new electoral
reforms, which were extended to elections to the Chamber.
In the 1994 national elections, a right-wing alliance led by media mogul Silvio
Berlusconi won a majority in the lower house and a plurality in Senate. The junior
partners in this fractious coalition were the Lega and the Alleanza Nazionale.
Barely a year later, Bossi tabled a motion of non-confidence in the govemment, and
once again, ltaly was facing a constitutional crisis. A technocrat, Lamberto Dini, was selected by Scalfaro to lead the govemrnent, until he too was defeated in a vote of nonconfidence. The 1996 national election saw for the first time in history, a clear victory in both houses for a coalition of centre-left parties. Aithough the
Lega increased its popular vote, its choice to nin independent of any election partners effectively shut it out of power.
The institutionai backdrop to the Lega's birth and growth must be suppiemented by the particulars of its origins. The Lega Nord's roots can be traced to the emergence of the Liga Veneta which had been campaigning for political and economic autonomy for Veneto since the 1980 regional elections, when it obtained
5% of the vote. The Liga's rhetoric was directed against several targets: Southem- based crime organizations; the alleged over-representation of southem ltalians in the public service and an inefficient state which redistributed tax revenue generated by northerners to the S~uth.~''In the 1983 elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the Liga received 4.2% of the vote in Veneto. By 1987, the Liga vote in elections to the lower house had stagnated to 3.1 1 of regional vote and -8% nationwide.
Consequently, the leadership base of regional autonomist movements shifted to the
Lega Autonomista Lombarda and its charismatic leader. Founded in the early
1980s by the current leader of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, the Lega Lombarda's policy emphasized questions of ethnicity and federalism. Its manifestos called for: regional control over finance, social programs and education; the increased use of direct democracÿ mechanisms such as citizen initiatives and referenda; the
"' llvo Diamanti, La Lega: Geografia, stona e sociologia di un nuovo soggetto politico, (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 1993), 53. decentralization of powers to the provinces and communes; the priority allocation of public housing and employment to native Lombards and the promotion of the
Lombard culture in schools.' l2
The Lega Lombarda contested its first communal and provincial elections in the province of Varese in 1985, when it won 2.5% of al1 valid votes. In the 1987 national elections, it competed in 7 Lombard provinces, where it won 3% of al1 valid votes in elections to the Chamber. Over the next three years, its popularity grew sharply, as it won 8.1% of valid ballots in the 1989 European elections and 19% in the 1990 regional elections.
Many of the forces which fuelled the Lega Lombardats popularity were also occurring in the neighbouring region of Piemonte, which had its own regional autonomy party. Residents were becoming increasingly frustrated with the inefficient ltalian state, the squandering of northern taxes in the south, and the decreased use of the regional dialect which native Piemontesi consider their national language. Rapid industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s saw the migration of southem ltalian workers to the prosperous region. The growth of the rnass media and the use of standardized ltalian in communications led to the decreased use of Piemontese in the workplace and in social settings. Between
'12 Umberto Bossi and Daniele Vimercati, La rivoluzione (Milano: Sperling 8 Kupfer Editori, 1993), 87-89.
Paolo Natale, "Lega Lombarda e insediamento territoriale: un'analasi ecologica," in Renato Mannheimer, ed., La Lega Lombanla (Milano: Feltrinelli editore, 1991), 85- 90. 1950 and 1990, the daily use of the Piemontese dialed dropped from 60% to 17% amongst the region's residents.' l4 In the 1980s, the second Piemontese nationalist rnovement to emerge since World War Two began agitating for increased autonomy. In 1991, this movement joined with other autonomist and separatist groups in northem Italy, including the Liga Veneta and Lega Lombarda, to fom the confederal Lega Nord.
Like the Volksunie, the Lega has called for an independent northem Italy, failing the implementation of federal reforms in the unitary ltalian state. While it has been difficult at times to assess whether the party is federalist or secessionist, as both these tendencies coexist in the Lega, it is more probable that federalization is the preferred option over outright independence. In the early 1990s, the Lega Nord was advocating the creation of three socio-economic regions in a federal Italy:
North, Centre and South. More recently, it set up a separate northern ltalian parliament in the city of Mantova to shadow the activities of the Chamber of
Deputies in Rome, and in the fa11 of 1996, began calling for the independence of
Padania, essentially the territory encompassing northern and central Italy.
Despite the often inflammatory rhetoric used by the Lega leader in his calls for northem Italians to rebel against the central state, the party has developed detailed proposais for constitutional reforrns which have been rejected by ruling coalitions of both the centre-right and centre-left.
According to the Lega, the powers of the centralized welfare-state must be
Minahan, Nations without a State, 446.
74 diminished through constitutional and institutional refom before economic reforms such as reducing Italy's sizeable debt, can be a~complished.'~~
The Lega has proposed that ltaly evolve into a federal state composed of nine states and 21 regions (currently there are 20 regions and no state structures).'16 The ltalian Parliament would be composed of a directly elected
Federal Assernbly and an Assembly of States and Regions, which would be cornposed of members nominated by state and regional governments.'17 The president of the ltalian republic, who promulgates al1 federal laws, would be elected by Parliament and by 10 citizen delegates from each region.
The federal government would be cornposed of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet. The President of the Republic would nominate the Prime Minister, and upon the prime minister's advice, the cabinet ministers.ll* The federal government would have responsibility over extemal affairs, defence, the federal budget and finances, federal energy policy, navigation, postal and communications services, criminal law, civil liberties and the protection of linguistic minorities etc.
The composition of each directlyelected state parliament would be set by each state's constitution. Noone can be elected to more than one state parliament
'15 Lega Nord ltalia Federale, "Nord, Lotta di liberazione: Liberta dei popoli," in Lega Nord ltalia Federale, 22 gennaio 1996, 1. Gruppo Lega Nord - Senato della Repubblica, Revisione della Cosfituzione in senso Federale (Roma: Senato della Repubblica, 18 gennaio, 1995), 21 -22.
ll7 Ibid.. 32-33.
'18 Ibid., 44. or simultaneously hold seats in the state parliament and federal assembly. State powers are those which don't belong to other territorial govemments. The state may delegate legislative functions to the regions. provinces and communes within its borders.'lg Each region detemines the composition of its organs, including the directly-elected, unicameral assembly. The regions would have the administrative functions for carrying out the state cornpeten~ies.'~~Regional powers are those set by the region's constitution and state laws. The regional assembly elects its president and executive.
The communes and provinces would be self-goveming entities with administrative and fiscal autonomy. Each territorial entity would be responsible for raising the necessary funds to sustain its public spending, except where othe~lise stated in the Constitution. '"
The Lega proposes two constitutional amending formulas. The general procedure requires that revisions be twice approved by an absolute majority of the
Federal Assembly, and then, by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly of States and
Regions. The special amending formula conceming the revision of the division of powers or the modification of intemationallEuropean Union cornpetencies, requires more rigorous thresholds of approval. '*
'19 Ibid., 50-51.
'*O lbid., 51.
12' lbid.. 53. '" lbid., 58. At its 5th assembly in October 1995, the delegates unanimously approved legislative amendments urginglu: the complete privatization of Consob; an end to the practise of public administrators, politicians and union leaders renting apartments owned by state enterprises; limiiing the wages of public employees to less than those of parliamentarians; the regionalization of ANAS (the social assistance organization); the transfer of public properties from the ltalian state to the communes; the elimination of the ministries of agriculture, public education and heritage; increased measures to combat tax evasion; the certification of recipients of disability pensions; a reduction in wage increases for state employees and the equalization of the wages of state employees on a regional basis. The delegates also unanimously approved a motion to support the Quebec sovereignist movement that is fighting for its "liberty and national independence and for its ethno-linguistic identity and culture".124 On the question of immigration, the Lega accepts non-
European Community immigration, but is in favour of deporting individuals convicted of prostitution and drug trafficking.12'
'~3Lega Nord ltalia Federale, "Autodeteminazione per la liberta dei popoli," in Lega Nord Italia Federale, 7 novembre 1995, 2-3.
''' Lega Nord ltalia Fedemle, '"Giro di vite' per gli immigrati che violano le leggi," 14 november 1995,Z. Leaa Nord Orcranizational Structure:
An analysis of the Lega Nord ltalia Federale's structure demonstrates that it is the most decentralized of the three parties. The Lega Nord - Piernonte is a component of the confederal Lega Nord ltalia. The Lega Nord's constitution organizes the party into the communal. circumscription, provincial, national, and federal levels. 126
The sectional level generally covers small city and tom Iimits. Larger cities such as Turin are composed of 8 sections. Each communal section must have a minimum of 5 militants. The circumscription level coincides with the territorial limits of the single-mernber electoral districts for elections to the Chamber of Deputies.
While there are 36 electorai circumscriptions in Piemonte, the party has created 38 in order to account for local differences. The provincial level coincides with provincial boundaries. There are 8 institutional provinces in Piemonte, but the party has created 9 in order to accomrnodate the needs of one area. There are 14 national sections in the party. Each "national" section coincides with an ltalian region or culturally distinct part of a region. For example, the party's structure divides the ltalian region of Emilia-Romagna into 2 national sections of Emilia and
Romagna. Finally, the federal level oversees the activities of the "national" components. The national and federal levels are headed by a secretary, president and council, while the sectional, circumscription and provincial levels are headed by
lm Gruppo Lega Nord - Senato della Repubblica, Lo Statuto della Lega Nord ltalia Federale, (Verona: 5 marzo, 1995),5-23. a secretary and executive wuncil.
The party membership is divided into two types: militants and supporters.
The militants are obligated to participate in political life, cannot belong to another party and have the right to speak and vote at assemblies. Lega supporters have no political duties, but also no right to vote at assernblies.
There are various organs at the federal level including: the Federal
Congress, which elects the Federal Secretary (Bossi), the Federal President and
100 mernbers of the Federal As~embly.'~~The Federal Congress also develops policy and oversees the activities of the national sections. It is held every three years and its delegates are elected by the National Congresses of the member national sections. The Federal Assembly is a permanent organ with a three-year rnandate.12' It cansists of the Federal Secretary and President, National
Secretaries. the 100 members elected by the Federal Congress, parliamentarians and regional councillors. It evaluates the Federal Council and ensures that initiatives are in line with the policy set by the most recent Federal Congress. The
Federal Co~ncil'~~is composed of the Federal Secretary, President, Federal
Administrative Secretary, National Secretaries and "national" representatives elected by the Federal Congress. Its duties include fonulating general policy, especially with respect to organizational, financial and budgetary matters, and
12' lbid., 6-7. '*' Ibid., 7-8.
12' lbid., 8-9. verifying the adoption and implernentation of the deliberations of the National
Sections. It has the power to dissolve a National Council if it acts against the policy, administrative and moral stability of the Federal Congress. The Federal Council serves a three-year tem.
The Federal Secretary is the legal and political representative of the Lega
~0rd.l~'Helshe serves a three-year terni and is charged with the coordination of al1 the Lega organs. The Secretary presides over the Federal Congress and the
Federal Political Secretariat, nominates the Federal Organizer and the Head of the
Federal Legislative Office. The Federal Political Secretariat provides policy support to the Secretary and is composed of nine members, six of which are nominated by the Federal Assembly. The Federal President is elected by the Federal Congress for a three-year term, is a member of the Federal Council and mediates between different components of the movement.
There are several organs which provide support at the federal level, including the Federal Secretariat, the Federal Legislative OfFïce and the Federal
Administrative Committee.13' The Eledoral Commission is nominated by the
Federal Council and it devises candidate lists for the European and ltalian elections. The lists are drawn up by each National Council, deliberated upon by the
Electoral Commission and are forwarded as proposais to the Federal Council. Each communal section holds an assembly once a year, where it elects a
Secretary and executive c~uncil.'~Communal Sections can also create circumscription sections.'" For the ltalian elections, circumscriptions must form an electoral cornmittee. The duties of the circumscription sections include wordinating the communal sections with respect to electoral goals and to rationalize and uniw communal section actions.
The Provincial Congressl" is held every three years, where it elects the
Provincial Secretary, Executive Council, Provincial College of Accountants and delegates to the National Congress. It also deliberates on the adrninisrative projects of the provincial organization. The Provincial Secretary oversees membership lists and the nomination of new mernbers to the National Secretariat, and is a member of the National Council. The Provincial Executive Council, of which the Provincial Secretary is a part, oversees the application of Lega poli~y.'~~
The National congres^'^ is held every three years and establishes policy at the National level, in confomity with the Federal Congress. It also elects the
National Secretary and President, the National Colleges of Adjudicators and
Accountants, the elected components of the National Council and delegates to the
lbid., 17-18.
lbid. , 18-19.
Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 19-20.
136 Ibid., 20-21 . Federal Congress. Those with a right to vote at the National Congress include the
National Secretary and President, the Provincial Secretaries, parliamentarians and regional councillors from the "national" tenitory and delegates elected by the
Prov-incial Congresses. The delegates are elected on a provincial basis, from amongst the militants. The Federal Secretary has a right to speak at the National
Congress.
The National Co~ncil'~~is composed of the National Secretary and President, the National Administrative Secretary, the Provincial Secretaries and members elected by the National Congress. It serves a three-year terni and its duties are to approve budgets, deliberate on issues, and oversee membership Iists. The
National Secretary1= is the political and legal representative of the National
Section. Helshe serves a three-year terrn and is responsible for directing and coordinating the directives of the National Congress, convoking the National
Council and nominating the National Organizer and chief of the National Legislative
Office.
The National Organizer collaborates with hislher Federal counterpart and hisher duties are set by the National Council. The National Legislative Office13g works out the concrete application of Lega policy, provides technical, legal and legislative support to translate the initiatives of the regional assessors and
'j7Ibid., 21-22.
138 lbid., 22. '= lbid., 22-23. councillors into bills, provides research support to the communal and provincial assessors and councillors, follows the development of laws in Commissions and analyzes other parties' bills.
In the Lega, more power is given to the local organizational units than in the
Volksunie. For instance, Communal Sections can create circumscription sections and draft and approve their own candidate lists for communal elections. However, there is also evidence of powerful centralizing tendencies within the Party. For instance the Federal Council has the power to dissolve an elected National Council if it does not conform to the policy set by the Federal Congress, and the Federal
Council is responsible for approving candidate lists for the European and National elections. In short, the Lega is democratic and not authoritarian, as some of critics claim. However, it is not as confederal as its leader has portrayed it.
Electoral Historv of the Leahe:
The Lega Nord fields candidates in communal, provincial, regional, national and European elections. Presented in Table 2.12 are the Lega Nord's popular vote in elections it has contested as a unified body of regional movements in 1994 and in
1996 (popular vote in proportional representation elections to the Chamber of
Deputies).
The electoral origins of the northem ltalian Leghe movements date to 1983, where the Liga Veneta obtained more than 4% of the vote in elections to the
Chamber of Deputies. In the 1987 Chamber elections, the Lega Lombarda received 3 percent of the regional vote.'" During the 1992 elections to the Chamber, the
Lega Nord won 8.7% of the national vote in the Chamber. On a regional basis in
1992. the Leghe movements received 23% of the popular vote in Lombardia (almost al1 of which went to the Lega Lornbarda), 25.5% in Veneto (18% of the vote went to the Lega Nord); about 15% in Piemonte, Liguria and Friuli and about 10% in Emilia and in Trentino Alto Adige (the Lega Nord was the recipient of almost al1 of the votes in these last five regions).14' The 1994 national elections saw the Lega enter into a coalition governrnent with Forza Italia and the Alleanza Nazionale. It maintained its national popular vote at 8.4%. The electoral districts where it received its highest levels of support (more than 25.5%) were situated in the provinces of Belluno in Trentino; Treviso, Vicenza and Verona in Veneto; Brescia,
Como, Bergamo, Varese and Milan suburbs (in Lombardia) and in Cuneo
(piemonte).'"
In the 1995 regional elections, the Lega Nord Piemonte won 9.87% of the regional popular vote for seats distributed on a proportional basis, making it the fourth strongest party in the region behind Forza Italia-Partito Popolare (PP), the
Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) and the Alleanza Nazionaie? For seats
la Diamanti, La Lega:, (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 1995),21.
14' Ibid., 23. '" llvo Diamanti, "La Lega," in llvo Diamanti and Renato Mannheimer, eds., Milano a Roma: Guida all'ltalia eiefforale del 7 994 (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 1994). 53-67.
Consiglio Regionale del Piemonte. Eiezioni Regionali in Piemonte: Osservafoflo elefforale (Torino: maggio, 1 993, 2. distributed through the single-member, first-past-post system, the Lega was the third strongest party with 11.1 % of the regional popular vote.'* In this study, Lega members in five provinces were surveyed. The 1996 results of the regional elections. by province are1": Cuneo (17.8% of the vote rnaking it the second strongest party in the province behind Forza Italia-PP); Tonno (7.4% of the vote. making it the fifth strongest party in the province); Verbania (12.6% of the vote, ranking it as the third strongest party in the province behind FI-PP and the PDS) and Vercelli (9.3% of the vote, placing it in fifth position).
In April 1996, the Lega increased its popular support over the previous two ltalian elections, but failed to gain a pivota1 role in retaining the balance of power in
Parliament between the left and right. Campaigning on its own,the party won
10.1% of the popular vote in the Chamber and 10.4% of the vote in the Senate.
These totals gave the party 59 and 27 seats in the Chamber and Senate, respectively.'" On a regional basis, Table 2.1 0 below shows that the party made its most irnproved showings in the northeast between 1994 and 1996, even though it won fewer seats because of its decision not to align itself with other parties for electoral purposes. From 1994 to 1996, the Lega's popular vote in the proportional representation elections to the Chamber increased in bath electoral
'46 Corriere Della Sera, "Prodi: 'Un governo per cinque anni,' (Milano: 23 Aprile 1996), 1. circumscriptions in Pien10nte.l~~
TABLE 2.12 - LEGA NORD POPULAR (%) VOTE: 1994-1996 (Chamber of Deputies - seats allocated on P.R basis) Electoral circumscri~tion 1994 1996
------Piemonte 1 11.9 13.8 Piemonte 2 19.8 23 Lombardia 1 17.4 16.8 Lombardia 2 28.3 35.8 Lornbardia 3 18.7 21.l Trentino Alto Adige 7.5 13.2 Veneto 1 20.8 26.9 Veneto 2 22.9 32.8 Friuli Venezia Giufia 16.9 23.2 Liguria 11.4 10.2 Emilia Romagna 6.4 7.2 Toscana 2.2 1.8
Bloc Québecois Policv Evolution:
The Bloc is the latest expression of Quebec nationalism which dates to the
British conquest of the French in 1759. Since then, initiatives such as the
Constitutional Act of 1791, the Act of Union of 1840, Confederation, or 130 years of a shared past, including participation in two World Wars and repeated attempts at revising the constitution to devolve more power to provincial governments, have failed to quell the nationalist aspirations of francophone Québécois. ln May 1990, Lucien Bouchard, a former minister of the environment in the
Conservative govemment, had resigned from the federal cabinet over proposed changes to the Meech Lake accord, which was designed to secure Quebec's agreement to the Constitution Act, 1982. Two months later, Bouchard announced that a group of Quebec-based Conservative and Liberal MPs would sit as an informa1 group called the Bloc, and that these independents would defend the province's interests at the federal level, and "ensure that the Quebec people were able to freely exercise their right to self-determination".'" In August of 1990, the first Bloc candidate, Gilles Duceppe, was elected to the House in a federal by- election held in Laurier-Sainte-Marie. The Bloc did not become an officiai party until its founding assembly in 1991. At the assembly, the newly-elected party president.
Bouchard, announced that the formation of the Bloc, whose parliamentary delegation consisted of 8 MPs at the time, wouid give Quebecers the opportunity ta vote for separatists in federal elections.
The Bloc is a secessionist and social democratic party, although its rhetorical focus on constitutional change has overshadowed the attention it has devoted to safeguarding Canada's social security system. The Bloc has argued that Canada cannot financial ly sustain its social programs, and that the interna1 contradictions in federalism have damaged its competitiveness, productivity and the quality of its
'" Manon Cornellier, The Bloc (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company Publishers), 1995, 31. '" Bloc Québécois, "Le Bloc Québécois pour un Québec ouvert sur le monde," (Montréal: 16 octobre 1993), 1. training and resear~h.'~~The BQ promises to defend Quebec's interests in the
transition period between a referendum and sovereignty and the proclamation of
independence. Bouchard has defined those interests as: deficit reduction,
protecting Quebecers affected by the recession; blocking federal intrusions into
fields related to Quebec; ensuring that the province get its fair share of equalization
payrnents and federal funds for empl~yrnent.~~'In the event of separation, it would
be the Bloc's role to articulate policy on a division of the federal debt, assets,
monetary arrangements and territorial arrangements.
In his speech at the founding assembly, Bouchard noted that Quebeckers are
different from other Canadians because of their distinctive language, interpretation
of history, perceptions of the present and aspirations for the future. He said that
although Canadians realize this, many of them do not want to recognize Quebec's
distincti~eness.'~~In his autobiographical account of the BQ'S foundation,
Bouchard refers to other historical events which have helped solidify Quebec
nationalism: the duty of Quebecers to protect their language and culture after the
Conquest of New France by the British; the historical abrogation of French
language rights in Manitoba etc.; the expansion of federal fiscal powers during the
15' Lucien Bouchard, Un nouveau parti pour I'gtape décisive (Montréal: Fides, 1991), 105.
IP Lucien Bouchard, "II manque un pays dan ce pays: notes pour une allocution de monsieur Lucien Bouchard devant l'Assemblée de lancement du Bloc Québécois," (Sorel-Tracy: 15 juin 1991), 5. Second World War; federally instituted bilingualism and Quebec's economic and
cultural achievements in the 1960s.lS3
He also noted that any attempts to modify federalism have failed to protect
Quebec's interests. For exarnple. Quebec never signed the Canadian constitution
which was unilaterally patriated in 1980.'" Another attempt at constitutional
renewal, the Meech Lake Accord with its guarantee of Quebec's distinctiveness,
failed to pass in 2 Canadian provinces in 1990. Bouchard writes that the demise of
Meech wnvinced him that federalism could not be renewed and that English
Canada did not understand Quebec's aspirations. As a direct consequence. he
resigned as a cabinet minister in the Conservative govemment and went on to fom
the Bloc Québécois. The rejection of the Charlottetown constitutional accord (which
included a "distinct" society clause and guarantees of a perpetual25% threshold of
Quebec representation in parliament) in a national referendum held in 1992, further
reinforced his belief that Canadian federalisrn had nothing to offer Quebec and that
sovereignty was Quebec's only solution for self-preservation.
In his book, Bouchard argues that an independent Quebec would better
manage its finances. avoid service duplication, and would support trade
liberalization, flexibility and concertation.'" A sovereign Quebec would need to be
lU Bouchard, Un nouveau parti pour l'étape décisive, 78.
Lucien Bouchard, 'L'indépendencedu Québec estelle possible et souhaitable?: notes pour une alfocution de Lucien Bouchard devant le Cercle canadien de la Harvard Business School," (Boston: 10 mars 7993), 4. part of a cornmon association with Canada in order to harmonize rnacro-econornic, political, defence. minority rignts and environmental issues."
The Bloc Québécois is the federal counterpart to the provincial Parti
Québécois (PQ), the separatist administration which was first elected in 1976, then alternated in power with the provincial Liberals until it regained power in the 1994 elections. The similarities between the federal and provincial separatists extend to the types of supporters which they attract. It has been noted that both parties appeal to younger, welleducated supporters, and that many of them are employed in the public sector and cooperative movement.'" Furthemore, the PQ has given the Bloc organizational and fundraising support during federal elections, and many
Bloc candidates have been former PQ Members of the Quebec National Assembly.
In 1992, the two parties cooperated with each other to help defeat the referendum on the Charlottetown accord in Quebec. During the 1995 provincial referendum on sovereignty, the parties worked together for the "yes" forces, while former PQ
Premier, Jacques Parizeau, appointed Bouchard as chief negotiator with Canada in the event of a win for the sovereignty forces.
After the referendurn loss, Bouchard resigned as Bloc leader to become the leader of the Parti Québécois, and is currently serving as the Premier of Quebec.
His less charismatic successor, Michel Gauthier stepped down after less than a year as the leader of the Bloc. Gauthief s successor, Glles Duceppe, was selected
lS6Ibid.. 115.
Is7Cornellier, The Bloc, 77. as the new party leader at a party convention held in 1996. In the June 1997 federal election, the Bloc ran a lacklustre campaign. winning 44 seats, 10 fewer than its 1993 totals.
Bloc Québécois Oraanizational Structure:
The BQ'Sstructure is the least centralized of the three parties due to the control it gives over its riding associations to elect candidates to represent them in federal elections and to elect delegates to the Plenary Congress. The Plenary
congres^'^^ is the party's supreme organ and meets every two years.
Representation at the Congress is deterrnined by the General Council and it is composed of members of the General Council and delegates elected by the general assemblies of the riding associations. Only the resolutions adopted by a riding general assembly or by the executive office can be considered by the Plenary
Congress. The General Council can also convocate a Plenary Congress. Only the riding delegates and members of the regional councils have the right to vote and speak at the Plenary Congress. Congress delegates discuss the resolutions before them, adopt general party policy, verify the party's financial state and receive reports of the Executive Office and of the commissions formed by the Party
President.
Bloc Québécois, Les Statuts du Bloc Québécois (Sorel-Tracy: 15 juin 1991 ), 2-4.
91 The General C~uncil'~is the highest organ of the party between Plenary
Congresses. General Council members include: the presidents elected by each regional council or their substitutes; the presidents of the party commissions; the presidents of the riding associations or their proxies and the MPs or official party candidates. The Council meets at least once a year and is responsible for directing initiatives and party policy; overseeing the execution of Plenary Congress decisions; and accepting the party budget.
Members of the Executive Offi~e'~include the party leader; the caucus president; 2 MPs, three regional presidents and four commission presidents. The
Executive Office, supported by a national secretariat. directs the current affairs of the party and it ensures that the pariy program is applied. The caucus president and the 2 MPs are elected by the BQ caucus and report to the Plenary Congress or
General Council. The three regional presidents are elected by the regional presidents. The four commission presidents are elected by the commission presidents, party leader, caucus president. 2 MPs and 3 regional presidents who are members of the Executive Office.
The party leader is also the party president. elected by the delegates from the riding organizations who participate in the Plenary congres^.'^' The party leader nominates and oversees the creation of al1 the party commissions which
'SJlbid., 4-5.
'60 Ibid., 5-6.
16' Ibid., 6. helshe judges to be necessary and nominates their presidents. The party president is its spokesperson and representative, helshe presides over the General Council and Executive Office. The party leader may, after consultation with the Electoral
Commission president and the riding association, designate a candidate.'"
Each party commission is composed of a president, vice-president and a secretary. These individuals can include any penon they judge is necessary to accomplish their mandate. The composition of these organs must be ratified by the
General Council. The Commissions which were created inchde'? the policy, organizational, finance, communications, electoral, juridical, youth, seniors and cultural wmmunities commissions.
The Executive OffÏce determines which ridings are part of a region. The
Regional Council'~meets at least twice a year and is wmposed of the presidents of the riding organizations and of MPs or officia1 candidates. The Regional Council coordinates the ridings within its territory. Regional coordinators are designated by the caucus as presidents of their respective regional councils when al1 the riding presidents have been elected. The Regional Council elects a Regional President from among the riding presidents. The Executive Office recognizes a riding association where there are at least 50 rnember~.'~Each associaiion is directed
'" ibid., 1O. '" lbid-, 11-13. '" Md., 6-7.
Issibid., 7-1 O. by an executive with a minimum of five memben, including a president, vice-
president. secretary-treasurer and 2 directors. The Riding Executive is elected by a
general assembly once a year. The mernbers of each riding association have the
following rights and privileges: to elect the riding executive; to prepare written
questions during a general assembly; to adopt party policy within the riding; to elect
delegates to represent them at the Plenary Congress; and to elect the official BQ
candidate for federal elections and by-elections. Only the riding rnembers have the
right to vote and speak during a general or special assembly. Candidates must be
party members and have the signatures of at least 25 mernbers of the riding where
helshe intends to fun.
Bloc Québ6cois Electoral Histo~:
The Bloc runs candidates only at the federai level. In its first electoral outing in 1993, it elected 54 members from Quebec. Due to deaths and retirements, this total decreased to 52, until six federal by-elections were held in March 1996. An additional BQ member was elected to Bouchard's riding after his resignation as party leader, which brought the total number of Bloc MPs in Ottawa to 53. After the
1993 election, the party became the OffÏcial Opposition in the Canadian Parliament.
In October 1995, the Quebec provincial govemment held a popular referendurn on independence. While the pro-sovereignist movement was norninally led by Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau, Parizeau appointed Bouchard as the chief negotiator of independence should the Quebec nationalists win the referendum. In the eyes of sovereignists, Bouchard was considered to be the tme leader and syrnbol of the movement. In the end, the sovereignty proposal was narrowly defeated. with the
"yes" forces receiving 49.4% of the vote and the "no" forces winning 50.6% of
provincial support. Postelection exit polls revealed that about 60°h of francophone
voters favoured separation from Canada, and that it waç the allophone and
anglophone minorities within the province who gave the "no" forces their narrow
victory. In the 1997 federal election. its seat total dropped to 44.
This chapter has illustrated that communitarian parties have not disappeared
as a result of globalization forces. It has also demonstrated that these parties have
staying power and can achieve political relevance within their own countries. As the
description of their policies demonstrates, the three parties under scrutiny here
advocate the decentralization of powers from the centre to sub-state institutions and
the imrnediate or eventual secession of the territories in which they compete. They
are also ideologically amorphous, as witnessed by their combining social
democratic and economic liberal orientations, or in the little emphasis they place
upon ideology in party rhetoric.
While their organizational structures are al1 democratic, and their supreme
governing organs include officiais who have been elected by the party membership.
the extent of their decentralization differs. None of these parties could be described
as being centrally-directed. Provisions for consultation on party decisions and input
into which candidates will represent the parties in elections is available in some form to al1 party members at the local level. Thus. the parties fulfil certain
predictions of the globalism-localism thesis in that modem communitarian parties
are democratic, non-ideological and provide their members with opportunities for
input. CHAPTER 3: THE DEMOGRAPHIC BASE OF COMMUNITARIANISM
It was proposed in the first chapter that if cornmunitarian supporters are compatible with post-rnodernity, then their socio-demographic background should refiect those elements. Alternatively, if the movements are parochial and reactionary, then their supporters should exhibit more traditional tendencies. As this analysis will show, the Volksunie respondents can be painted as both "post- modem" (new localist) and "traditional" (old localist) citizens. The data presented in
Table 3.1 reveals that Volksunie party members are older, but that they report educational and income achievements that are consistent with post-modernity.
While most of the respondents are ernployed in the tertiary sector - many of them in the public service - neither the post-modern nor traditional portraits were helpful in pinpointing which types of communities would be the most fertile breeding ground for autonomist support. As the data show, it is the mid-sized community in Belgium which is home to the highest percentage of Volksunie supporters. Furthemore, while the largeer workplaces are fertile ground for Volksunie support, party supporters also tend to work in very small organizations with 10 or fewer employees.
Table 3.1 demonstrates that the party is male-dorninated (80%), and that nearly half of the respondents are aged 50 and over. The educational level of the members is also high; nearly 30% of the respondents are universityeducated, while another 33.5% have completed some form of higher education. A large majority of the membership (60.8%) is drawn from mid-sized communities of between 10,000 and 30,000 people.
96 TABLE 3.1 - SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF PARTY MEMBERS VAWABLES VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS GENOER Male Female AGE 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ EDUCATION Primary Middle School Secondary College University *Post- secondary **M.A.,Ph.D. COMMUNITY SiïE ('000s) < 1 1-10 10-30 30-1O0 100-500 500 + Table 3.2 reveals that party supporters are employed in tertiary sector occupations; very few are employed in manual labour or agricultural positions. Just over 14% of the Volksunie members are professionals, nearly 17% are employed in sales and office positions, and 11.5% are educators, namely. teachers or university professors. As for workplace size, there is virtually an even split between those employed in very srnall enterprises and those employed in large organizations.
Approximately 28% work in businesses which employ between 1 and 10 people, mile nearly 30% (29.4%) work in organizations which employee more than one thousand.
Table 3.3 shows the respondents report average to above-average household incomes in ~elgiurn.'" Just over 27% report monthly household incomes of more than 120,000 Belgian francs, the equivalent of more than $6,000
CANImonth. About 65% have household incomes of 80,000 Francs ($4,000 CAN) or more.
The analysis of the sociodemographic characteristics of Volksunie supporters illustrates that its clientele is both ''traditional" and "post-modem". While its members tend to be middle-aged or seniors. they are well-educated, upper- incarne professionals and administrators. They are also just as likely to be ernployed in small-scale organizations as large ones. With respect to community size, neither profile seems to fit. The members reside in neither large metropolitan
'= International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 7995, 54th ed. (Geneva: International Labour Office),629. The average monthly wages of employees in non-agricultural activities was 98,362 Belgian Francs according to statistics for 1993. centres that host culturally diverse populations, nor in small, culturally homogenous towns, but in mid-sized Belgian centres.
TABLE 3.2 - WORKPLACE PROFILE OF AUTONOMIST PARTY MEMBERS PARTY VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS OCCUPATION Proprietor with > 10 employees Proprietor with < 1O employees SupervisorlDirec. Professional Info. Technology Specialist ClericaUsa les Tradesperson Agricultural worker (farrner) Military member Homemaker Student Pensioner Civil Servant Educator Unempioyed Other WORKPUCE SlZE 1-10 11 -25 26-1 00 1O1 JO0 501-1,000 1,ooo+ 1,001-5,000 TABLE 3.3 - HOUSEHOLD INCOME OF PARTY MEMBERS PARTY VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BLOC auÉ~Écois
MONTHLY N % INCOME
Belgian Francs
ANNUAL INCOME N %
ANNUAL INCOME N % (CAN $) The socio-demographic data on the Lega supporters also features elements
of both potential profiles of communitarian supporters in the 1990s. However, there
are inter-party differences in the way these pattern manifest themselves. Unlike the
Volksunie members, the Lega supporters tend to be younger and more evenly
distributed between males and females. However, the low to average income and
education levels of the respondents more closely fit the 'traditional" pattern. These
latter findings may be attributed to the more diverse nature of the Lega sample, or to real differences between the parties.
As with the Flemish case, Lega members are drawn from service-sector occupations. They do not work in the modem, large-scale warkplaces that provided the thrust behind Italy's transition from a poor, rural society into a prosperous, industrial one, but in small-scale firms employing fewer than 26 employees; a trend which would confirm the "post-modern" portrait. Most of the respondents also live in small and medium-sized communities, as the traditional profile would suggest.
Table 3.1 demonstrates that the gender composition of the Lega Nord, unlike that of the Flemish party, more closely mirrors the general population with a 60:40 male-female ratio. The Lega also has a youthful demographic in comparison with the Volksunie, with 50.6% of the Lega supporters under the age of 40. With respect to education, about 18% of the respondents have a university degree. In comparison, the Volksunie's clientele is more highly educated, with 33.5% of them having completed a university degree. Just over 68% of the Lega respondents reside in small and medium-sized centres of between 1,000 and 30,000 people. However, a significant proportion of the respondents (10.6%) live in large cities with
more than half a million residents, suggesting that the party has some appeal to
those living in culturally diverse environments-
Table 3.2 illustrates some similarities and differences between the
occupational backgrounds of Belgian and ltalian autonomists. While the Lega Nord
also attracts large percentages of tertiary sector workers such as professionais
(21%) and sales/clerical personnel (22.2%),the party appeals to business owners
(10.2%). Unlike the Volksunie, the Lega does not attract educators or public
servants to its fold, with only 1.7% of the Lega respondents drawing from these
categories. In cornparison, just under 20% of the Volksunie respondents work in the public service or teach in schools and universities. The difference in the extent to which the European parties attract public service employees might be explained by Bossi's frequent use of populist rhetoric aimed against ineficiency and corruption in the ltalian bureaucracy. However, while the Lega has been a severe critic of the apparatus of the central state, it cannot be characterized as anti-statist, since it does not support the wholesale privatization of state enterprises or drastic reductions in taxations levels, but a redirection of state powen to regional governments.
Table 3.2 also reveals that a large majority (75.6%) of Lega respondents work in small to medium-sized firms or organizations employing between 1 and 25 people. There is no split tendency, as in Belgium, for party supporters to work in either very small or very large environments. In the Piernonte region, large workplaces have not proved to be fertile recniiting ground for the Lega. Table 3.3 demonstrates that Lega support is drawn from households with incomes below or at the ltalian average. Just under 48% of the respondents report annual family incomes of up to 36 million lire (up to CAN $32,727). Just over 22%, however, fall into very high-income categories (CAN $69,090 and up), making this a party which appeals mainly to average wage eamers, but also to a wealthy business and professional class.
The profile of Lega supporters equally fits both the 'traditional" and "post- modern" profiles. The respondents are generally younger than their Flemish counterparts, work in small firrns and tend to be drawn from the business, professional and service classes. However, a large majority of Lega members live in small and medium-sized comrnunities in Piemonte, demonstrating that the autonomist political message has widespread appeal in communities which are not as vulnerable to extemal cultural intrusions. With respect to the socioeconomic variables of education and income, the Lega supporters clearly mirror the characteristics of the traditional scenario. They tend to be less well-educated or well-paid than their Flemish counterparts.
As with the demographic portraits of communitarian supporters in Europe, the
Bloc members reflect elements of both the "post-modern" and 'traditional" portraits of communitarian supporters. An analysis of the gender, age, income and workplace size patterns reveals that its members tend to be middle-aged or older men with household incomes at or below the Canadian average. The occupational and community size patterns reveal elements of both scenarios: the highest percentage of respondents are retirees, followed by a large professional class.
While the highest proportion of the members live in large urban centres of more than half a million residents, almost equal proportions corne from srnall and mid- sized towns and cities. With respect to education and the size of their workplaces, the BQ respondents neatly fit the "post-modem" scenario as they are the most highly educated of al1 the respondents in the study, and almost half of them work in places with 10 or fewer employees.
Table 3.1 shows that the BQ and the Volksunie appeal to similar gender, age, and educational groups. The BQ, Iike the Volksunie, is male-dominated. Its age profile is also similar to that of the Flemish nationalists; the Bloc respondents are middle-aged, with just over 53% of them between aged between 40 and 59.
The party also has the highest proportion of seniors aged between 60 and 69
(18.9%).'~'The data show that the BQ respondents report the highest levels of education amongst the three parties: 34.1 % of them have eamed a Bachelor's university degree, while another 27.6% have a graduate degree.
As with the European parties, a high percentage of the BQ'S support is from small and intemediate-sized communities of between 30,000 and 100.000 people
(25.1%), and another 20.5% corne frorn srnall towns with between 10,000 and
30,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, a plurality of Bloc members reside in large cities
''' The relatively older age demographic could be attributed to the nature of the sample, which consists of many mid-level par@ officiais. (25.7%).
Table 3.2 shows that the occupational make-up of the party differs
completely from that of the European parties. While the Lega attracts a high
number of clerical and sales personnel, and the Volksunie appeals to many
teachers and public servants, no such patterns exist in the Quebec data. The most-
cited occupational category is that of retirees (25.9%). The second-most popular
category is the professional category, with 17.6% of the members belonging to it.
With respect to this last finding, the Bloc is similiar to the Lega in its propensity to
attract professionals. As with their ltalian counterparts, the Bloc members often
work in places employing between 1 and 10 people (46.2%), although just over 31 %
of them work in medium-sized and large workplaces employing between 26 and 500
employees. Table 3.3 shows that the income patterns of the Bloc members are at
or below the Canadian average.'" Just over 30% of the BQ members report
average household incomes of between $40,000 and $60,000 per year. About 70%
of the members report household incomes of less than $60,000.
Thus, the data on the Bloc confirm the findings drawn from an analysis of the
European parties' demographic make-up. Generally. neither the "post-modern" nor
''traditional" profiles describe the BQ'S clientele: they can both be applied to
describe the party, depending upon which variable is being analyzed. The Bloc,
like the Lega and Volksunie, contain both post-modem and traditional elements.
International Labour OfFice, Yearbook of Labour Sfafisfics7995, 54th ed., 626. The average annual income of Canadians employed in non-agricultural activities in 1993 was CAN $29,080.48. The demographic patterns in the original data were cross-checked against survey data drawn frorn the Canadian National Election Studies of 1992-93.'" A secondary analysis of the CNES data shows that Bloc voters are generally younger and less well-educated than respondents in the membership survey, although these results are not unexpected since mid-level party elites were being surveyed. The
CNES data reveals that 61-8% of al1 Bloc voters in the 1993 federal election were
40 and under, compared to just 25.5% who are under 40 in this study's survey. The educational accomplishments of Bloc voters are also more modest than those of the rnid-level party elites. The CNES survey found that 24.7% of Bloc voters had university degrees and that 3.8% of them had graduate degrees; far less than the more than 61% of the members who have completed post-sewndary education, but still a fairly high percentage of welleducated people.
However, other patterns do hold when non-dite data are examined. The gender gap narrows considerably, but remains, as 52.9% of al1 Bloc voters are males and 47.1 % are females. However, the household incorne distribution pattern of Bloc voters also mirrors the results of the membership survey. In the CNES data,
46.8% of the party's supporters report an annual household income of $40,000 or less, compared with 40% in the membership survey.
In addition to an examination of the CNES data on Bloc voters, data from the
Eurobarometer 1993 study was also analyzed for comparative purposes. While the
The Canadian National Election Studies campaign period survey of 3775 Canadian citizens aged 18 and over was conducted between September and October 1993 by the lnstitute for Social Research, York University. sample sizes for the Volksunie (N=31) and Lega (N=43)are small, some general conclusions about the nature of their electorates, and their similiarities to the mid-
level elites examined here, can be dra~n."~First, the Volksunie voters are more
'Yemale" than this study's data reveals, and the initial gender gap between males and females in the party reverses itself. Just under 55% of those who voted for the
Flemish nationalists in the previous national election in Belgium were females.
They are also less highly educated than my survey data, although this is not unusual Mentaking into account the party positions of the respondents. Still, even the voter data paint a picture of a well-educated electorate, of which 25.8% were 22 years and older when they had finished their studies. The voter data also shows that the age profile of VU voters is older, with 38.7% of them 55 and over. The community size categories in the Eurobaromater series are set up differently than this study's categories, but those data show that Flemish nationalists reside in mid- sized communities (42%). smaller "other locales" (32.3%) and big cities (25.8%).
There are many similarities between the occupational and income data collected in the membership and voter surveys. About 25.8% of the respondents are retirees (compared with 21% in the survey), 16.1% are homemakers and 12.9% are in middle management. These totals correspond very closely with the elite data.
The one difference between the two datasets came with respect to the very low
''O The Euro-Barorneter 40.0 Poverty and Social Exclusion survey was conducted by INRA (Europe) between October 18 and November 5 1993. Persons aged 15 and over residing in 12 member nations of the European Community, and in Nonnray and Finland were contacted. The sample size in Belgiurn was 1,003 and in Italy, it was 1,012. levels of professionals in the voter data (3.2%). As expected, the income levels of the voters are lower than those of elites, but 112 of the Eurobarometer respondents report rnonthly household incomes of between 100 and 120 thousand francs, while
16.5% of the members fall into the same category.
Amongst Lega voters, the Eurobarometer data also show that the gender gap closes when examining voter data, although 53% of the parîy's vote still cornes from males. The elite data does hold up well when examining the age, education and comrnunity size variables. Almost 40% of the Lega voters were 34 and under, while their educational profile is more traditional, as the membership survey shows, with
37.2% of them having completed their education at age 14. While the membership suwey reports that just over 38% live in communities of 10,000 and less, the voter data canfirm that 39.5% of the Lega voters live in these smaller communities.
Interestingl y, the membership survey underestimates the Lega's support in larger urban centres. While only 10.7% of the members live in cornmunities of 100,000 or more, 34.9% of the voters come from these areas.
The occupational data on the Lega voters reveals a clientele that is, not surprisingly, more traditional than those in more senior party positions. Just over
25% of the voters are retired and 14% of them are homemakers. The voting data, however, also confinn that the party has little appeal for manual workers, with only
4.7% of them reporting that they are occupied in this sector. The Eurobarometer data also confirm the below-average to average household incornes of the Lega supporters with 18.8% of them making between 30 and 36 million LIT per year and 35% of them eaming between 36 and 42 million.
With some exceptions, the membership survey seems to have produced a
fair portrait of the nature of contemporary cornmunitarianism, based on a
comparison of the original data with the secondary analysis of electoral data. in the
European cases, the membership survey "Ns" actually exceed the "Ns" in the
Eurobarometer data, and thus could be said to paint a more accurate picture of the
nature of ethno-regiona~isrn.'~'While wmparisons must be tempered with the
knowledge that party activists are generally drawn from upper socioeconomic
classes, the sirnilarity of patterns in the membership and voter data suggest that this
study's findings are not exceptional, but quite typical.
17' The number of Volksunie supporters in the Eurobarometer data total only 31, while the Lega voters total 43. CHAPTER FOUR: ISSUES, IDEOLOGY AND REPRESENTATION
In a post-modem era, concerns about ecology and the preservation of local diversity are supposed to take precedence over materialist concems with econornic and social benefits issues. Nevertheless, the data on issue preferences reveal that issues such as unemployment and the debt are the most-cited first priorities of the respondents in al1 three jurisdictions, although transnational issues such as ecology and immigration are popular second and third choices in the European parties
(Table 4.1 ). In Quebec, the second and third choices are dominated by economic and social issues, and not transnational ones. Issues pertaining to the preservation of local diversity, such as cultural policy, did not weigh very heavily in the first two choices of the respondents in the European parties, although cultural concerns did factor into the third choice of the Volksunie members.
In Belgium, 55.2% cite unernployment as the most important issue, followed by less than 14% who pinpoint social programs such as health and old age security as the most important political concem (Table 4). Immigration and ecology did not rank highly as the first choices of the respondents, as the globalism-localism thesis would have predicted. In Italy, economic concerns also topped the issue preference list, although most respondents cited the public debt (53.1%) as Italy's most pressing issue. This was followed by 28.4% who identified unemployment as the most important political issue.
Where transnational issues such as ecology and immigration, and local diversity issues such as the decentralization of state powers did make an impact was in the second and third choices of the European respondents. Amongst
Volksunie supporters, ecology ranked second behind social programs as the
second-most important political issue (22.1 %). Ecology was also the top-ranked third choice amongst the Volksunie respondents. Very few cited decentralization or autonomy concerns, although this option was not provided on the list and was written in by respondents in the "othef' category. In Piemonte, ecology was the most-cited, second-ranked issue (24.1 %), while 27% of the respondents cited national unity (which they interpreted as Piemontese solidarity) as the third most important subject followed by immigration at 20.4%.
In Quebec, unemployment and debt issues lead the respondents' identification of the most important political problems, with 32.3% and 25.2%. respectively, citing these areas as the most pressing. A concern for the preservation of social programs also ranks highly on the respondents' priority list
(15.5%). These three areas also place highly in the members' selection of second and third choices, testifying to the little weight which transnational issues play in shaping issue orientations. However, the strength of the economic and social preoccupations tends to overlook the fact that 7.7% of the BQ members cite cultural policy as the most important issue, moreso than their counterparts in the European parties. Therefore, while the wncerns of the BQ mernbers are rooted in traditional economic and social issues, local diversity plays a comparatively more important role in the BQ than in the Volksunie or Lega Nord. Another policy area which testifies to the BQ supporters' relatively stronger desire to preserve local diversity, is institutional refom. The BQ supporters register the comparatively highest percentage of support for independence, with 9% of thern citing it as their first choice.
TABLE 4.1 - TOP THREE ISSUE PREFERENCES OF PARN MEMBERS
VOLKSUNIE (N=265) LN (N=162) BQ (N=171) ISSUE RANK 1 2 3 - Unemp8ment Debt lnflation National unity Labour relations Ecology Immigration Culturel Language Social programs Moral questions Crime Defence Internat. relations *Decentral./ Sovereignty Other -- option was written respondents When the identification of important issues was cross-checked against voter
data drawn from the CNES, unemployment was also cited as the number one
concem of 30.3% of Bloc voters. Only 12.1 % of them cited that recognition of
Quebec was the most important issue. Thus. the membership survey seerns to
portray Bloc syrnpathizer concems fairly acwrately.
When Volksunie voters were asked to identify the issue that would most
influence their vote in the subsequent European elections, concerns about
unemployment and social benefits ranked very highly on their list of priorities at
52.9% and 17.6%, respectively. While the environment was not listed as an issue that would influence their vote, 71% of the Voiksunie voters did cite that environmental protection is very important on another question. The responses of the Lega voters reveals, as this study has noted, a dual concern with unemployment and the size of the welfare state. Forty-one percent of those who had voted for the
Lega said that unemployment would be the issue which would most influence their vote in the next European elections. while 17.9% cited taxes. As before, concerns such as the environment did not emerge here, although on another question, 95.4% expressed the view that environmental protection was either very important or important.
The globalist thesis posits that one of the consequences of modernization is a lack of faith in the autonomy of governing institutions in a world where many actors (economic, political, social etc.) are interdependent. If the thesis has merit, one would expect that party supporters would exhibit little confidence in government faimess or autonomy. In order to determine the level of confidence in central goveming institutions, the Flemish and Québécois respondents were asked to indicate their views on the faimess and autonomy of the federal govemment. Due to errors in the translation of the ltalian questionnaire, the responses to the question about central government capabilities were not usable.
The respondents were also asked about their views on immigrant assimilation and reducing immigration quotas (the latter question was asked on the ltalian and Quebec questionnaires only, since there are no immigration quotas in
Belgium). Since immigration could be perceived as a threat to maintaining the cultural integrity of a host group, then one might expect that respondents with highly developed capacities for individuation (which Mlinar defines as the capacity of a group to spatially segregate itself) would favour both a reduction in immigration rates, and would oppose proposals to assimilate immigrants.
The hypothesis that has been set forth requires some elaboration. First, the association between individuation and approval for lower immigration rates would seem to contradict the central thesis that the "new" localisrn is not parochial, but postmodern. After all, the terni "wsmopolitan" refers to an individual who is sophisticated and without prejudice. Therefore, someone who opposed the introduction of diverse elements into hislher home environment would be
"parochial". This contradiction, however, illustrates a weakness in the globalism- localisrn thesis, and not in the hypothesis presented here. Since Mlinar argues that increased individuation capacities and globalization trends are complementary processes which characterize post-modem societies, then the choices made by individuals to heighten their capacity for differentiation from the "other" are not parochial, but representative of the post-modem quest for one's lost identity.
The second problem which arises with respect to the hypothesis Iinking opposition to immigrant assimilation and post-modemism. is in how the tem
"assimilation" is interpreted in different settings. Assimilationist strategies were practised by modem state builders seeking to establish a hornogeneous national culture that would override ethnic, religious, linguistic and other sub-state loyalties.
These strategies are rejected in post-modern societies where they are viewed as a form of cultural irnperialism. Instead, multiculturalism has becorne the favoured strategy for integrating individuals from the non-dominant culture into plural societies such as Canada, Australia and to a lesser extent, Great Britain and the
United States. Multicultural policies do not encourage cultural homogenization, but promote the expression of cultural diversity within the state. Thus, assimilation is associated with the modern state and multiculturalism with the post-modern state.
The potential for confusion lies not with these posited associations between historical periods and immigration policies, but within how the term "assimilation" is interpreted in different contexts. In Quebec, the terni is viewed with distaste by the sovereignists, who repeatedly stress their preference for the "integration" of immigrants into Quebec society, rather than for the assimilation of minority cultures.
During the ltalian interviews, the sarne distinction between assimilation and integration was also made. None of the interviewees indicated that non-European immigrants should adopt "Piemontese" values and customs; they expressed the
view that newcomers to ltaly should appreciate the values of the host society, while
retaining their own traditions. The Dutch translation of "assimilation" was more
problematic, as it suggested the concept of integration, rather than assimilation.
Clearly, this last interpretation is more positive from a multiculturalist point of view.
An analysis of the data shows that the globalist-localist thesis fits the three
cases quite well. Table 4.2 shows that large majorities of the Flemish respondents
agreed or strongly agreed that the federal govemrnent has treated some regions
better than others, that their region (namely Flanders) has not been fairly treated by the federal govemment, and that this institution is not free to make decisions
independently of other actors. The results are surprising in light of the fact that the
Volksunie played an instrumental role in bringing about the four stages of federal
reforms implemented between 1970 and 1993. This disenchantment with federalism may be attributed to the recency of the institutional changes and the respondents' inability to evaluate their impact, or it rnay be due to dissatisfaction with the limitations of the refoms. The latter explanation is possible since the personal interviews which were conducted as part of a broader study on cornmunitarian parties revealed that some members feel that Flanders had not achieved enough fiscal and cultural autonomy.
The question of immigrant assimilation drew more equivocal responses, likely due to the manner in which different respondents interpreted the proposal as meaning either "assimilation", as North Americans would understand it, or as "integration", as many Europeans would understand it. Table 4.2 reveals that there was no consensus on this issue. More than 45% of Volksunie supporters agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition, while 40% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.
Opinions about immigration are less equivocal in Piemonte than in Belgiurn as nearly 80% of the respondents felt that immigration rates should be reduced.
However, the same pattern of ambivalence about assimilation was evident in the ltalian survey; a plurality, but not a majority of the Leghisti rejected the immigrant assimilation proposai. Nevertheless the data suggest that the respondents feel that the protection of local culture is best achieved through the maintenance of cultural d ifferences. TABLE 4.2 - ATTITUDES ABOUT FEDERALISM AND IMMIGRATION PARTY VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BLOC
172 in Federal programs favour sorne 67.6 8.3 97.6 2.4 regions over others (232) (22) (165) (4) 174 175 My region (or province) has been 80.3 9.5 97.6 2.4 treated unfairiy by the federal (212) (25) (162) (4) govemment 176 in The federal govemment cannot 72.1 15.2 59.0 41 .O make decisions independently (191) (45) (95) (66) Immigrants should be assimilated 45.8 40.0 38.3 48.9 83.3 16.7 into mainstream society (119) (104) (69) (84) (135) (27) Immigration quotaslrates should NA NA 80 t 1.7 60.4 39.6 be reduced (144) (21) (93) (61) SAIA=Strongly Agree or Agree SDlD=Strongly Disagree or Disagree NA=Option not available on questionnaire
The data also show that the BQ supporters overwhelmingly feel that federalism is unfair both in its treatment of different geographic regions and of
Quebec itself. In both cases, nearly al1 of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that federalism has been unfair, testifying to a cornpiete lack of confidence
ln Due to translation problems on the ltalian questionnaire, the responses to this question are not usable.
See footnote #172. '" See footnote # 172.
17' See footnote # 172.
17%ee footnote #172.
ln See footnote # 172. in Canada's central governing institution. Their views on the autonomy of the federal govemment are less cohesive, yet almost 60% of them express a lack of faith in this institution to act independently. These findings are not unexpected, given the territorial loyalties of the respondents, but they do confinn the main tenets of the globalist-localist thesis on the decline in institutional confidence as a by- product of globalization.
The globalism-localisrn thesis is only partly applicable with respect to the BQ supporters' views on immigration. They favour both assimilation (83.3%) and a reduction in immigration rates. It should be noted that on several surveys, the BQ respondents crossed out the term "assimilation" and replaced it with "integrationt'.
Obviously, this difference in terminology is important to the supporters and perhaps reflects their desire not to subsume foreign cultures within the Québécois collectivity, but to prevent the formation of separate cultural communities with no knowledge of, or contact with, Quebec society. This position may support the BQ daim that its nationalism is civic and inclusive of other cultures, rather than ethnic and exclusive. The CNES data on Bloc voters' perceptions about immigrant integration reveal that 64.2% of them agree or strongly agree that immigrants do not attempt to fit into society. This position does not necessarily indicate intolerance; when their responses are compared with those of Quebec residents who voted for other parties, the correlation between the Bloc vote and agreement with the statement that immigrants have not attempted to fit into the mainstream is a modest
.12 (p=.05). The CNES data on Bloc voters' feelings about racial minorities also suggests that Quebec nationalism is not necessarily xenophobic. When respondents were asked to locate their feelings about racial minorities on a 0-1 00 therrnometer scale, with "100" signifying wam feelings and "0"indicating negative ones, 53.5% of the
Bloc voters scored above the Quebec mean of 66.06.
The Eurobarometer survey also picked up on the ambivalence toward immigration that was expressed by Volksunie voters in the mernbership questionnaire. Over 55% of thern did not feel that fitting immigrants into Belgian society was an important issue, so one could sunise that these nationalists are not insistent about subsuming other cultures to their own. A similiar trend amongst
Lega voters is evident, with 51-3% of them indicating that immigrant assimilation is not important. It is interesting to note that a similiar percentage of Lega rnembers in this study's survey (48.9%) disagreed with the prospect of assimilating immigrants into society, so an antipathy towards the levelling of cultural differences is shared by members and elites alike.
The data presented in Table 4.3 summarize the respondents' opinions about the level of governrnent which they feel best represents their interests. It has been argued that globalization tendencies have contributed towards the loss of national sovereignty and towards a desire for self-government of local communities and decentra~ization."~
Strassoldo, op-cit., 41 42. Not surprisingly, in both European cases, most members cited the region as
the governmental level which was most responsive to their interests, followed by the
commune, city or tom. Only 1.5% and 4.6% of the respondents in Belgium and
Italy, respectively, felt that their national governments were responsive to them.
While this finding is entirely consistent with what one would expect from members of
ethno-regional parties, the data also show that there is no simultaneous
identification with international organizations, as Rosenau would argue in his contention that supranationalism and sub-state loyalties are simultaneous
processes. The representativeness of international institutions such as the
European Community and the United Nations failed to register with the party
members, as less than 1% of the Flemish respondents and only 4% of their ltalian counterparts felt that supranational institutions reflected their interests. In Quebec, disillusionment with the federal government is confirmed by the overwhelming support for the province. Unlike the European cases, there is very little faith in the municipal level of government. Only one individual cited the Canadian government as the most representative, while international institutions did not even register. TABLE 4.3 - MOST REPRESENTATIVE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT PARTY VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BLOC QUEBÉCOIS (N=261) (N=174) (N=165)
LEVEL % N % N % N
Province NA NA NA NA 94.2 161 Region 51.7 135 44.3 77 NA NA Belgianlltatianl 1.5 4 4.6 8 .6 1 Canadian Parliament International Institutions
None of the above 8.3 22 14.4 25 3.5 6 *This option wriiten in by respondent
These results show that disillusionment with power centralization is universal, but adopts different forms in different jurisdictions. In Europe, there is a regionalkation and localization of loyalties to sub-state goveming institutions. In
Quebec, the loyalties are almost unanimously directed towards the province. What is common amongst al1 the jurisdictions is the relative lack of impression which international institutions have made on the respondents. These findings illustrate that globalization and the simultaneous expression of outward and inward allegiances, do not necessarily coexist. as the g lobalist-local ist thesis would suggest.
The survey's fifth question containeci six parts in which respondents were asked to place themselves on a left-right scale, with "1" indicating a far left orientation and "10" indicating a far right orientation. They were then asked to place their party, most residents of their country, most residents of their region or province, the federal govemment, and the regional or provincial govemment, on the same scale. The European questionnaires asked for the respondents' views about their regions. while the Bloc members were asked to locate their provincial govemment and the majority of Quebec residents on the scale.
An analysis of the ideological perceptions of the party rnembers, as reported in Table 4.4, shows that supporters in both European parties tend to be centrist, and not leftist, in their orientations. For the purposes of this discussion, "centre" refers to the ideological position at the centre of a fixed, universai ideological left-right continuum. Centrist parties are considered moderate by objective international standards.179Castles and Mair have specified that moderate parties lie between 3.75 and 6.72 on a 140 continuum. TABLE 4.4 - IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS OF PARN MEMBERS PARN VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS PEOPLE AND MEAN MlNIMAX MEAN MIWMAX MEAN MINIMAX INSTITUTIONS (NI VALUES (N) VALUES (N) VALUES Yourself
Your party
Most residents in 6.0 1-10 4.7 1-9 6.8 1-10 your country (253) (169) (165) Most residents in 6.2 3-1 O 6.3 1-1 0 4.9 2-10 your tegionl (254) (175) (165) province The federal 5.5 2-1 0 N.A. MA. 7.2 1-1O government (254) (165) The provinciail 5.6 2-1 O 7. i 1-10 4.7 1-1 O regional govemment (253) (169) (166) N.A. = not available
''' Reuven Y. Hazen, "Does Centre Equal Middle?," in Party Politcs, V01.2(2) (London: Sage Publications), 212. The wide range between the minimum and maximum values of self-described ideological orientation suggest that al1 these parties have broad ideological appeal.
It would be more accurate to describe them as pragmatic parties with territorial appeal, a hypothesis which would support the "end of ideology" argument posited by Bell and Fukuyama.
Nevertheless, there is a tendency for Volksunie supporters to perceive themselves as having leftist orientations, since they place themselves and their party to the left of most residents in Belgium and in Flanders and to the left of both levels of government. The Eurobarometer voting data wnfirm that Volksunie voters are centrist in their orientations, with a mean self-described ideological rating of 5.4.
In Piemonte, the respondents placed most Italians to the left of themselves, and rnost of the region's residents to the right. Thus, the Lega members perceive themselves to be centrist in their orientations. The Eurobarometer data reinforce this assessment, with Lega voters averaging a dead-centre "5" on the continuum.
There are no strong ideological patterns which mark membership in the European parties. The respondents are drawn from a diversity of ideological backgrounds and the parties themselves are not described in any coherent ideological manner, as the range of values demonstrates. For the party mernbers, ideology does not seem to be a pre-eminent concern, since those who position themselves on the far left and far right of the spectnim are equally at home in these parties.
The theory that globalization tendencies would be associated with leftist political movements is most clearly confirmed in Quebec. The respondents place themselves, their party and the separatist provincial govemment ta the left with
respect to the ideological centre on the continuum and with respect to their
European counterparts. They also place most Canadians and the federal
govemment at the centre-right of the spectnim, much more so than the Volksunie
and Lega respondents. As with the European parties, the BQ respondents are
drawn from al1 points on the ideological spectnim. There is also a lack of
consensus on which ideology their party represents. Therefore, like the European
parties, the data suggest that communitarian parties are not ideological, thus providing some support to the "end of ideology" argument. It is evident that the party attracts a wide variety of individuals who are not whesive in describing their party's ideological orientation. Frorn a comparative perspective, the BQ is more firmly located to the centre-left of the political spectrum than the other European parties.
In order to detect how opinions on government representation. federalism and immigration are associated with "post-modern" or "traditional" lifestyle patterns and socio-demographic characteristics, al1 the variables were recoded and set up as dichotomous, dummy variables, with a "1 " representing traditional, local-oriented characteristics and a "2" representing post-modern or intemationalist tendencies.
For the questions on government representativeness and identity, the local and regional areas and institutions were coded "Z", and the national and international areas and institutions were wded "1", since the globalisrn-localism thesis associates sub-national identities with "cosmopolitan" tendencies (see Notes 2 and 3 for coding information). Only the statistically significant findings are reported.
As Table 4.5 demonstrates, attitudes on federalism, immigration and
govemment representation are not associated with many variables, and those
relationships which are statistically significant display moderate intensity levels.
Amongst the Volksunie supporters, there is a moderate relationship between
unfavourable opinions about the federal govemment's equitable treatment of
different regions and respondents who have completed their post-secondary
education. Those who agree that their region has been treated unfairly by the
federal govemment also tend to be individuals who have completed higher
education and who have travelled outside the country at least once in the previous
six months.
Yet agreement with the immigrant assimilation proposal is also associated
with "post-modern" indicators of exposure to globalization and mobility, such as the
frequent usage of information technology (at least once a week) and higher
education. These data indicate that it is the "post-modern" individual who is most
disillusioned with federalism, but who wants to strengthen the Flernish culture by
levelling, and not preserving the differences between natives and immigrants.
Another correlation which does not support the thesis is the positive association
between local and regional identities and disagreement that the federal government
is not autonomous. In Belgiurn, local and regional identifiers rnay not feel their region has been treated fairly, but they do believe that central institutions still have governing capacities. The relationships between a preference for immigrant assimilation, higher education and computer usage might be explained by the fact that exposure to cultural diversity through institutions of higher education, and through access to a global information network, may heighten the individual's consciousness of one's difference from others. This may in turn be transformed, as the globalism-localism thesis would predict, into the desire to protect differences from extemal intrusions.
However, for these "post-modern" Flemish nationalists, the protection of local culture is best achieved through assimilationist strategies rather than through spatial segregation.
The respondents who prefer the local and regional government levels tend to travel frequently outside Belgium (at least once in the previous six months), but report low levels of computer usage (never in a typical week) and employment in non-tertiary sector activities. Generally, these data paint a more ambivalent picture about cornmunitarian supporters. While they travel, they are not exposed to other globalization forces. TABLE 4.5 - CORREMIONS BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF ISSUES, GOVERNMENT AND SELECTED VARIABLES: the VU
ISSUES AND SDm Local/ I.T. Foreign Post- Terti- GOVERNMENT Region region usage Travel sec. ary Job treated Ident. Educ. unhirly SDID Federal govY .42* -.1 3" programs favour certain reg ions SDm Region has been -.IF -.1 4" treated unfairly by the federal govenment SDID Federal gov't does .1P -not have pawer to act independentiy SDID Immigrants -.1 6- -.17" should be assimilated LocaVregional govt's -.1 6" .IF 0.11'- best represent my interests **p=.Oi ; *p=.05
Table 4.6 confirms that the "new" localism is associated with a Iack of faith in central governing institutions and a conesponding faith in lower order governments.
There is a moderate association between those believing that their local or regional govemments are the most representative institutions, and a territorial identification with communes or regions (.14). Those who feel that the locallregional govemments are the most representative aiso tend to disagree with proposais to assirnilate immigrants (.28),and to support proposals to reduce immigration rates (-
.18). Thus, preferences for lower-level or intermediate governments are associated with the desire for cultural pluralism and segregation. These associations suggest that the globalism-localism thesis is correct in linking the desire for decentralization to higher capacities for individuation.
TABLE 4.6 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF ISSUES, GOVERNMENT AND SELECTED VAWABLES: the LN - - - - . -- -. - ISSUES AND SDID SDID LocaVregional GOVERNMENT Immigrant Cut immigration identities Assimilation quotas LocaVregional .28* -.1 8" .14** govt's most representative SDID .23* Immigrant assimilation h "p=.OI ; *p=.05
Table 4.7 shows that amongst Lega supporters, there are moderate to strong associations between opposition to assimilating immigrants into mainstream society and two indicators of "post-modemity": bilingualism (-25)and residential mobility
(15) These findings support this study's thesis that globalization tendencies such as mobility and individuation capabilities can be linked to citizen desires to maintain cultural differences. Interestingly, it is males, moreso than fernales, who are rnost opposed to immigrant assimilation, suggesting that men have a higher tolerance level for diversity. However, the data also reveal that bilingual respondents are more likely to reject the lower order institutions as being representative (-.28)'", and that those respondents who live in rnulticultural neighbourhoods are more tolerant of immigration (-24). These findings suggest that the more "post-modem" Piemontesi are less dissatisfied with central institutions and immigration, which runs contrary to
Only 15 individuals cited the ltalian and international institutions as the most representative and only 25 cited the "none of the above" category. the thesis.
One finding which confimis the argument that individuation tendencies (such as whether one chooses to reside in culturally homogenous neighbourhoods) are associated with the "new" localism is evidenced by the fact that those respondents who live in culturally homogeneous neighbourhoods are more likely to cite the local and regional govemments as the most representative (-A 5).
TABLE 4.7 - CORRELATlONS BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF ISSUES, GOVERNMENT, MOBlUTY AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES: the LN
Issues and government Ethnic Bilingual Residence Females neighbors mobility SD/D .25* .15* -.21* Assimilate immigrants SD/D .24* Reduce immigration rates LocaWregional govt's best -.15- -.28** represent my interests "p=.Ol ;*p=.OS
As expected, the correlations reported in Table 4.8 for BQ supporters demonstrate that perceptions that the federal government has been unfair are associated with favourable evaluations of the representativeness of the local and provincial governments. Since there is a positive association between disagreement that immigration should be cut and disagreement with immigrant assimilation (.23),one can infer that the respondents' views of assimilation are not based on a desire to subsume other cultures into their own, but on the "post- modem" tendency to preserve cultural differences. TABLE 4.8 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF ISSUES, GOVERNMENT AND SELECTED VARIABLES: the BQ It 1 ISSUES SDID Federal SDID Quebec SDD Immigrant gov't unfair treated unfairly Assimilation SDm The federal gov't favours some regions over others SDID The federal gov't -23"'' has treated Quebec unfairly ldeological self- placement SDID Reduce immigration rates Local and provincial -.1 6" govt's most rep'ive ==p=.Oi; *p=.OS
Table 4.9 shows that the more frequently one has travelled abroad, the more likely one will disagree that the federal government has treated Quebec unfairly. In this case, globalization encourages a tolerance for central institutions, which is not what the g lobalism-localism thesis would predict. Other globalization indicators such as frequent usage of the new information technology and inter-provincial travel are both moderately associated with disagreement that immigrants should be assimilated. These findings point to the power of technology and travel in encouraging the desire to maintain cultural differences, which is what the globalism- localism theory would predict. TABLE 4.9 - ISSUE PERCEPTIONS, MOBIUTY AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES: BQ
ISSUE I.T. usage Foreign Inter- lnt'st in City size: > Travel prov. Foreign 30,000 Trave1 cultures SDlD The federal govY has treated Quebec unfairîy SDID Immigrants should be assimilated SDm Federal gov't treats some regions better than others Local and provincial gov't most rep'ive ldeological self- placement II ISSUES Mobile resident mobility years education ernployees SDID Federal govY is -not autonomous SDID Immigrant assimilation
The data in Table 4.9 also show that higher intensity levels of interest in non-
Québécois cultural events are moderately and positively associated with the perception that the local or provincial govemment is the most representative. Thus, one's loyalty to the provincial government does not preclude an interest in foreign traditions. These results seem to canfirm the paradoxical nature of modern auionomist movements. One can be both intensely loyal to the sub-state unit, yet open to other traditions. The strong negative relationship between ideological self-
132 placement and interest in foreign cultures supports one of the predictions of the
globalist-localist thesis that wmmunitarian supporters might by "lsftist" in their
ideological orientations: the more one professes leftist orientations, the more likely
one is to express medium to high levels of interest in non-Québécois traditions (- .22).
The relationships between issue perceptions and various mobility and
demographic variables demonstrate that those who have been educated outside of
their birth province and who have a post-secondary degree are more likely to
disagree with proposals to assimilate immigrants and to reduce immigration. Those who have lived in communities other than their birthplaces also tend to oppose the
reduction of immigration rates (-25).Thus, exposure to globalization forces is
associated with the acceptance of diversity. t Workplace size is also associated with evaluations of federalism and
immigration. Those respondents working in smaller-scale environments with fewer than 26 employees, are likely to agree or strongly agree that the federal government is autonomous (-22).Thus, the globalist-localist theory fails to account for why those who are most exposed to post-modern forces would express greater faith in central governing institutions. Those who work in smaller firms feel that the federal govemment can adindependently of other institutions. Ernployees in the smaller organizations are also more likely to opposed reduced immigration rates (.20). The dissatisfaction with immigration may be due to the fact that employment in larger econornic organizations tends to intensify interactions between native and non- native Quebecers, and that those who are most exposed to these globalization
forces are opposed to further interaction.
Finally, residence in urban centres with more than 30,000 inhabitants is
associated with agreement that the federal govemment has treated some regions
better than others. These individuals are also more likely to express leftist political
orientations. This portrait of a lefiofcentre, urban resident who expresses little faith in central goveming institutions is consistent with the predictions of the globalist-localist thesis of autonomist party support in the 1990s. CHAPTER 5: INDIVIDUATION, MOBlLlfY AND CULTURE
In a global world where the traditional capacities of nation-states are on the
decline, and there is an increasing demand for autonorny and recognition of
diversity. citizens' psychological attachments to their environments are supposed to
change. Some empirical studies have found that people in certain communities are
professing a greater degree of identification with their towns or cities, than with
other geographic areas. This study has found that cornmunitarian party supporters
profess strong attachments to more immediate geographic areas, and weaker
identities with more distant ones. Table 5.1 shows that between 35% and 39% of the respondents in both European countries feel most attached to their city, town or
commune. However, un1ike the Friuli study, regional attachrnents were very strong , especially in Belgium where more than half of the party rnembers identified most
strongly with Flanders, and with Brussels to a lesser extent. In Piemonte, a third of the sample identified most closely with the region, thus placing the region a close second behind local attachrnents.
In both cases, the respondents did not express high levels of attachment to either Belgium or Italy. In both wuntries, a European identity is stronger than the nation-state identity. In Italy, the European identity rivals the strength of regional attachments, a finding which the globalist thesis would Say is an example of a simultaneous inward and outward direction of loyalties that is the expected product of supranational trends.
The Quebec case once again diverges from its European counterparts. Unlike the Volksunie and Lega cases, where identities are divided between local and regional areas, in Quebec loyalties are direded towards the province. Very few of them cite their cityltown or continent as the areas to which they feel most attached. The party data show that geographic loyalties amongst cornmunitarian supporters are only being directed inward.
The Eurobarometer survey asked respondents three questions which are linked to the question of identity. More specifically, they tap into respondents interest in, support for, and attachment ta, Europe. Arnongst Volksunie voters, 42% of them express a great deal or some interest in European politics, 80.6% favour
European integration, and 64.6% indicate they will feel at least partly European in the near future. Amongst Lega voters, 60.4% are interested in European politics,
88.1 % support European unification and 72.5% Say that they will feel at least partly
European in the immediate future. It is clear that there is a resounding acceptance of the process of building supranational institutions and identities. While the primary area of geographic identification may still be the local and intermediate units, there is no voter rejection of globalization trends. TABLE 5.1 - GEOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION OF PARTY MEMBERS
PARTY VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS
TERRITORIAL % N Y0 N % N IDENTITY CiiKowni Commune 38.4 1O1 35.8 64 2.3 4
Country .8 2 6.1 11 O O 'EuropelNorth 2.7 7 25.1 4!5 1.2 2 America
"Other -8 2 O O O O 'European questionnaires referred to the region and Europe; Quebec questionnaire refened to the province and North America ""Other" category was written in by respondent
While the CNES questionnaire did not contain a question about geographic identification, it did ask voters how they felt about Canada and Quebec by locating their feelings on the 1-100 thermometer, with "100" indicating the warmest feelings.
The mean ratings of al1 Quebec voters were 68.3 and 82.4, for Canada and the province, respectively. Amongst Bloc voters, 62.8% of them indicated that their feelings for Canada fell below the provincial mean, while 62.7% of them indicated above average feelings for Quebec. While these results are not directly comparable with the geographic identification question asked on the membership survey, they do indicate that the party elite is considerably cooler towards Canada than Bloc voters.
In the survey, respondents were also asked several questions designed to evaluate their socio-spatial mobility, that is, their exposure to globalization and their ability to achieve a high degree of individuation. Respondents were asked whether they had lived in wmmunities or a region other than their birthplace or had been educated outside their region or province of birth. They were also asked whether they belong to a local club or association which promotes their community's interests. and to describe the ethnic composition of their neighbourhoods in order to detenine whether they were culturally homogeneous (an indicator of individuation capacities) or multicultural. The results are reported in Table 5.2.
The data show that a two-thirds majority in both European cases have not lived in a region outside of their birthplace. In Piemonte, 66.1 % have attended school in the same region where they were barn, although a slight majority of their
Flemish counterparts have been educated in regions outside their birthplace. This difference is likely explained by the fact that more Flemish respondents are university or college-educated, and attendance at post-secondary institutions in small countries often involves leaving one's community. Approximately two-thirds in both European countries belong to the same socio-economic class as their parents.
One might interpret the data to signify a relatively low level of socio-spatial mobility, and thus, a low degree of individuation. However, the fact that nearly a third of the sample in both countries had lived outside the region of their birth and do not share the same class identification as their parents, could be interpreted as a sign of a relatively high degree of mobility and individuation. Similarly high percentages of the respondents had also left their home communities to pursue educational opportunities. In Quebec, the highest percentage of respondents amongst al1 three parties have Iived in a cornmunity other than their birthplaœ (50.3%) and belong to a different socioeconornic class than their parents (42.7%). However, fewer of them have attended school outside Quebec, which can partially be attributed to language barriers. These data paint a picture of a relatively mobile population which has been socialized inside the province. Another indicator of individualizing tendencies is the desire and capability to protect the integrity of one's culture. This can be accomplished by choosing to live in a culturally homogenous neighborhood, or by joining clubs and associations which promote the interests the local community. The data in Table 14 show that there is an extrernely high level of club mernbership amongst supporters in al1 three parties, but only the Lega members report high levels of individuation capabilities in ternis of their capacity to live in culturally homogeneous neighbourhoods. TABLE 5.2 - MOBILITY AND COMMUNITV INVOLVEMENT IN 3 PARTlES PARTY VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS
*Have you tived outside your regionlcommunity of birth? *Haveyouattended school outside your regionlprovince of birth? Do you belong to the same socio~conornicclass as your parents? LOCAL ATTACHMENTS Do you belong to a club which promotes your community's interests? Is your neighbourhood multicultural?PDo your neighbors belong to the same ethnic aroup?- 'Community and Province were substituted for region on Questions 9B and 9C on the BQ questionnaire. "Wording on BQ questionnaire,
Respondents were also asked to indicate their travel patterns and level of language proficiency, as indicators of their inter-connectedness with people in other areas. Table 5.3 shows that Volksunie supporters are frequent international and inter-regional travellers. This tendency to travel could be explained by many factors, such as high degrees of globalkation, high inwme levels, the country's small scale, the timing of the distribution of the survey (the six-month period would have included the traditional August vacation period in Europe) or by a combination d al1 four factors. The Volksunie supporters are highly proficient at languages, which demonstrates a high degree of exposure to globalization forces.
TABLE 5.3 - TRAML AND LANGUAGE PATTERNS IN THE PARTIES (% s 3 TIMES) TRAVEL VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BQ
How often have you travelled out of 24 6.3 5.3 the country in the last six months? (63) (11) (9) How often have you travelled 55.9 32.4 outside your regionlprovince in the (147) (58) last six months? k you speaWunderstand more 95.4% YES 65% YES 84.8% YES than one language? (250) (11 7) (145)
The data in Table 5.3 show that the Lega supporters do not travel outside
their region as often as their F lemish counterparts, which could indicate a relatively
low degree of exposure to globalization trends, or mask other factors which may
have prevented international travel, such as lower income levels. Two-thirds of the
sub-sarnple also report knowledge of a second language, a lower percentage than
the Volksunie supporters, but still quite high.
The Quebec respondents do not travel as much as their European
counterparts, but like the Flemish respondents, they report very high levels of
language mobility; nearly 85% of the BQ members are bilingual. The lower frequencies of travel can be partially explained by lower levels of exposure to
globalization forces, by the timing of the distribution of the survey (which did not
include the summer vacation period), or by the time-consuming and costly nature of
long distance travel in North Arnerica.
In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate their level of interest in people and events outside their locales, and their interest in, and usage of, new technologies. These questions are designed to measure their exposure to globalkation tendencies. Table 5.4 demonstrates that amongst Volksunie supporters, there is a lot of interest in local (81-8%) and regional news (78.4%).
Comparatively, only 40.5% and 25.5% of them express alot of interest in international news and in the new technology. There is less enthusiasm for artistic and sports events which highlight the traditions of non-Flemish cultures.
TABLE 5.4 - PERCENTAGE OF PARTY MEMBERS EXPRESSING ALOT OF INTEREST IN FOREIGN CULTURES, TECHNOLOGY
NEWS AND EVENTS VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BQ (N) (N) (N)
Local news 81.8 62.4 70 (216) (113) (120) RegionaUProvincial news
National news
International News
Cultural events which promote foreign 20.2 16.2 40.9 traditions (53) (29) (70) Sports events transrnitted from other 7.6 7.3 11.2 nations (20) (13) (19) New technologies
TECHNOLOGY USAGE (% using a % % % computer or fax > 3 timeslweek) (NI (N) (N) How often do you use a computer or fax 62.8 61.1 59.6 in a typical week? (164) (11 O) (102)
Approximately 63% of the sample, however, does use a computer or fax machine more than three times in a typical week. These results paint a picture of individuals who are very much attached to local events and Flernish culture, although there is an openness to new technology. Therefore, the globalization
levels with respect to an interest in foreign news and events are relatively low, but
are of medium-intensity with respect to the usage of new technology.
Table 5.4 reveals that there is less enthusiasrn amongst Lega supporters
than the Flemish for local and regional news. As with the Volksunie supporters,
there is no strong interest in the cultures or sports events transmitted from foreign
locales, although a large proportion (46.3) of Lega respondents express a lot of
interest in the new technologies, nearly double that of the Flemish sarnple. The
respondents in Piemonte are also very likely (61-1 %) to use new information technology more than 3 times a week.
Arnongst the three parties, the BQ respondents report the most interest in provincial and international news, as well as for foreign cultural and sports events.
Comparatively, the members also express the least interest in national news, so there is a bifurcation between immediate and supranational interests. Expressions of interest in the new information technology amongst the BQ respondents also register the highest levels amongst the three parties.
The relationships between identity, the various indicators of mobility, cultural interests and the socio-demographic variables in the questionnaire were then examined in order to detemine whether there are significant associations between the profession of local or regional identities and "post-modern" lifestyles and characteristics The strength and direction of the Pearson-R correlations will test the hypothesis that "post-modern" cornmunitarian supporters would choose to live in ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods, would be exposed to globalization influences through travel, cultural interests and the use of technology, and would display a high level of individuation through spatial and class mobility. Only the statistically significant relationships are reported.
Amongst the Flemish nationalists. local and regional identities are only significantly associated with two variables. As Table 5.5 shows. those respondents who never use wmputers and faxes in a typical week and those with no interest in technology, are the local and regional identitifiers. This draws a picture of a
"traditional" supporter. rather than a "post-modem" one.
Not surprisingly, mobility in one area - such as language proficiency or schooling - is associated with mobility in related areas. As Table 5.5 demonstrates, bilingualism is positively and rnoderately associated with both a mobile residential and schooling history, and a mobile lifestyle is associated with a mobile education history.
The opposite holds true for those whose life histories have been pre- determined by their origins. The statistical relationship between those individuals whose socioeconomic class differs from their parents and who express some or alot of interest in new technologies is moderately negative (Table 5.5). Under the globalist theory, one might have expected that members with a high degree of individuation would be interested in the new technology, but this is not the case.
The relationship between those supporters expressing some or alot of interest in foreign cultural events and non-rnembership in local clubs is moderately negative (47); that is, members of local clubs are more likely to be interested in multicultural
events. This supports the globalist-localist thesis that local attachments do not necessarily preclude an openness to globalization.
TABLE 5.5 - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDENTITY, ISSUES, MOBILITY, CULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPH - - - JDENTITY New Int'st in Inter- Int'st in Bilingual Mobile AND I.T. technology Residence MOBlLlTY usage LocalJReg. -.1 6* dentity Corn puter
Education Mobilitv Socio- economic mobilitv Residence mobility Non-club member < 40 Females Higher > 50,000 Workplace years educ. francs < 26 emp toyees Ethnic neig hbors Corn puter use Foreign travel The relationship of residential and mobility factors with demographic characteristics paints a dichotomous portrait of two types of Volksunies supporters.
There are individuals who may feel that the integrity of their identity is being threatened by the global diversification of territorial cornmunities. As Table 5.5 shows, there is a moderately strong relationship between residence in culturally heterogenous neighbourhoods and respondents who are male, aged 40 and over, and residents of srnaller communities (< 30,000).
There are others who could be described as mobile. Frequent use of computers and faxes is moderately and positively associated with male members under the age of 40 who have completed their post-secondary education and who report monthly incomes of more than 50,000 francs. Frequent travel abroad and out of the region are also moderately associated with higher education.
The relationships between demographic characteristics and an interest in international news, technology, non-Flemish cultural and sporting events and other socio-spatial mobility factors are examined in Table 5.6. As before, only the statistically significant relationships are reported. Interestingly, the older males express the most interest in technology, and the older females express the most interest in non-Flemish cultural events. Where one might have expected younger respondents to be more open to globalization, the opposite is tnie. In both cases, youth (under 40) is negatively associated with the expression of mid to high degrees of interest in new technology and cultural events. This contradicts the globalist- localist expectation that the young would be most receptive to gIo balization. The only area where the under-40 party members fulfilled the predictions of the globalist mode1 was with respect to socio-economic mobility. There is a moderately positive relationship between youth and the ability to transcend one's class origins
(.14), although it does not necessarily mean that they are upwardly mobile. What's important to the thesis is that their self-described class status differed from their parents, a trend which confins individuation tendencies. Along the gender dimension, males are more receptive than females to new technologies and foreign sports. The females also exhibit fewer "post-modem" characteristics, as there are moderate, negative relationships between "femaleness", bilingualism (-. 12) and residential mobility (-. 15).
Community size also plays a role in shaping cultural interests; residence in communities exceeding 30,000 people is associated with the expression of mid-to- high levels of interest in multicultural events. This suggests that residence in larger communities promotes an interest in global forces. This challenges the globalist- localist thesis, which predicts that those who live in culturally permeable areas would feel vulnerable to extemal "intrusions". TABLE 5.6 - RELATIONSHIP BEMENCULTURAL INTERESTS, MOBILIPI AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: the VU
CULTURE& c 40 years Females Post-sec. Tertiary City: MOBlLlN Educ. Occup, > 30,000 lnterest in -.lF -.17 technology 1 lnterest in foreign cultures Int'st in 1 1 -1 1 1 1 foreign sports Bilingual -.IF .31* .If* Residential -.15" .15* mobility Education .13" mobility Class mobility .14** *p=.Ol ; *p=.05
Arnongst Lega supporters, Table 5.7 demonstrates that identification with local or regional geographic areas is strongly associated with residence in a multicultural neighbourhood (-20).Bilingualism, an indicator of cultural mobility, is strongly associated with local and regional identities (-27).These findings show that exposure to globalization is strongly linked to the transfer of identities to srnaller geographic areas. TABLE 5.7 - IDENTIN, ISSUES, MOBlLlTY AND CULTURAL INTERESTS: LN Ethnic I.T. Foreign Inter- neighbor usage t ravel regional t ravel LocaVreg. -.2T -.1 8- II identities
l I.T. usage Travel abroad Travel out of region IDENTITY, No int'st Int'st Int'st Int'st Biling. Non MOBILITY, region foreign foreign foreign club INTERESTS news news mernber
Int'st in foreign II cultures No int'st in local II news No int'st in regional news Int'st in foreign news Int's in technology **p=.OI ; *p=.05
On the other hand, local and regional attachments display moderate-to- strong negative associations with other globalist tendencies such as foreign travel (-
22)and inter-regional travel (-. 18). These attachments are also strongly and negatively associated with expressions of mid-high interest levels: in international news (-.20),in foreign cultural events (-.24) and in foreign sports (-.39).These
149 findings contradict the globalist thesis, which predicts that local and internationalist outlooks are not mutually exclusive. These data seern to suggest that local and intermediate attachments are most strongly held by people who don't travel and take relatively little interest in foreign events. Thus, the Lega supporter who values local and intermediate attachrnents is a bilingual individual who rejects globalist intrusions in the realm of foreign news, culture and sport, and who expresses more faith in govemrnental institutions which are close to home.
Table 5.7 also outlines the relationships between cultural interests and it shows that local and intemationally-oriented interests are not always mutually exclusive. Sometimes intemationally-oriented interests reinforce each other, such as the evidence which shows that a lack of interest in local news is associated with an interest in foreign sports (. 17). Or the data which show that an interest in foreign news is positively associated with an interest in foreign cultures (.15) and in foreign sports (.16), and that an interest in foreign cultures is associated with an interest in foreign sports (. 19).
However, a lack of interest in events occurring within the immediate geographic area doesn't always mean that the members are interested in more global concerns. For example, expressions of no interest in regional news are associated with a lack of interest in: foreign news (-. 14); foreign cultures (-.23);and the new technologies (-.15). Yet local attachments such as membership in a local club don't necessessarily preclude an interest in foreign traditions. Table 5.7 shows that there is an association between club membership and mid-high interest levels in foreign cultures (-A 7). Table 5.8 shows that club membership is associated with residence in ethnic neighbourhoods (-.35),thus suggesting that exposure to diversity can persuade individuals to seek out the familiarity of local associations, as the globalist-localiçt thesis would predict.
Table 5.8 demonstrates that there are strong, positive relationships between the indicators of spatial mobility. Language proficiency is strongly related to mobile residential (.l8) and schooling (25)patterns. A mobile education history, whether one has studied in a region outside of one's birthplace, is also associated with individuals who have lived outside of their birth region. Socioeconomic mobility is also positively associated with frequent foreign travel (. 17). There appear to be some Lega supporters who are mobile and others who lead relatively stable lifestyles.
TABLE 5.8 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MOBlLlTY INDICATORS IN THE LN MOBILITY Ethnic Foreign Bilingual Mobile Educ. INDICATORS neighbors 1 Tnvcl 1 1 Reridence Mobile patterns I Bilingual .18* .25* Residence .18" .3Sn Mobility Education .25" .35* Mobility
Class mobility 1 .IF 1 1 1 The relationships between the demographic variables and the identity,
rnobility, and cultural interest indicators are explored in Table 5.9. Amongst Lega
supporters, local or regional attachments are associated with ernployment in non-
tertiary and non-entrepreneurial occupational activities (-. 16), an annual household
inwme of 36 million lire or less (--33)and residence in srnaller communities with
less than 30,000 residents (-22).These findings dispute the "post-modem"
hypothesis that the communitarian supporter would be upper-income, urban
residents employed in the tertiary sector.
lnterest in foreign sports is moderately to strongly associated with age,
education, income, workplace and community size. Table 5.9 shows that those
Lega members who express mid to high levels of interest in those sports are
younger, university-educated individuals with higher household incornes who work
in large-scale organizations and who reside in communities of 30,000 or more
inhabitants. With the exception of the workplace size variable, these results point to
the existence of some "post-modem" elements within the party.
Table 5.9 shows that there is a moderate association between female
members and static lifestyle patterns (-.17), and that the members who belong to a
different socio-economic class than their parents are younger, lower-income
individuals with prirnary, middle school or secondary education, thus suggesting that
socio-economic mobility in the Lega is downward. Since the youngest proponents
of communitarianisrn are not the beneficiaries of globalization, this suggests that they may be tuming to this party in reaction to changes which have not left them better off than their parents.
TABLE 5.9 - RELATlONSHlPS BETWEEN IDENTITY, MOBlLlN AND DEMOGRAPHIC
Post- Tertiary Job: < 26 City: sec. Occup. workers Educ.
use I Travel out of country I Travel out ,IF of region Int'st in technology Int'st in foreign
Residence
Education mobility Non-club .29* member Class .16" mobility *p=.Ol; *p=.05
Those individuals with a mobile educational history tend to be employed in
tertiary and entrepreneurial activities (. 14), have higher annual household income
levels (. 17) and live in larger communities (. 19). These results support the globalist contention that high degrees of individuation (as exhibited by the mobility indicators) are associated with post-modem features such as prosperity, urbanization and the growth of the tertiary sector. However, this is true with respect to educational
mobility and not socio-economic mobility. Those individuals who do report class
mobility, report lower education and income levels.
Table 5.10 reveals the association between leftist ideology and regional or
local identities amongst the Bloc supporters (--24). Expressions of some or a lot of
interest in foreign cultural events are also moderately associated with local or
regional identities. These data paint a portrait of a "post-modern" individual with the
ideological orientations of the "new left" which lnglehart has argued distinguish
post-modem societies from materialist ones. 18'
Arnongst the BQ respondents, mobility indicators tend to reinforce each
other. For example. frequent usage of the new infonation technology (at least one
day a week) is strongly associated with frequent inter-provincial travel (at least once
in the previous six months). Inter-provincial and foreign travel (at least once in the
previous six months) are also strongly related to each other at .61. There is a strong association between an interest in foreign cultural events and enthusiasm for international news (-27)and new technologies (.31).
However, the data also show that those who live in Québécois neighbourhoods are not as likely to travel abroad (--25).This last finding does not support the globalist contention that members exhibiting a high degree of individuation (decision to live in a culturally homogenous neighborhood), would
Ron Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977),69- il. exhibit other "post-modem" characteristics.
TABLE 5.10 - IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY, MOBILITY AND CULTURAL INTERESTS: BQ I ISSUES & ldeology I.T. usage Foreign Inter- No local 1 Int'st MOBILIN Tmvel prov. news 1 Foreign Travel interest culture Local and -.24"* Regional I.D. Qubbécois -.25" neighbours I.T. usage .34*" Foreign Travel .61- Inter-provincial .W .61** travel Int'st in Canadian news
Table 5.1 1 confirms the propensity of BQ supporters who are mobile in one aspect of their lives, to demonstrate similar globalization and mobility patterns in other areas of their lives. For example, bilingualism (85% of al1 rnembers report bilingualism) is moderately associated with frequent computer usage (.20),inter- provincial travel (. 14), an interest in international news (. 18), residential mobility
(-23)and educational mobility (-20).Frequent inter-provincial travel is also moderately associated with residential mobility and educational mobility. An interest in foreign cultural events is associated with educational mobility and middling to high levels of interest in international news. These data paint a portrait of a clientele that exhibits moderately "global" lifestyles.
,TURA1 INT RESTS, MOBlLlN AND DEMOGRAPHY IN THE E
Foreign lnt'st in Biling. Class news -7I.T. 7Mobile I.T. usage Inter-prov. travel -. Bilingual Residential Mobility Education mobility Non-member local club Int'st foreign II cultures MOBlLlTY & Age: < 40 Post-sec > $40K CULTURE Educ. per yr. I.T. usage .19" Foreign Travel Inter-prov. Travel
Residential IImobility
Class Non-membership in local clubs is moderately-to-strong ly associated with socio-economic mobility (-20)and higher incomes (-24). Yet it is also negatively associated with an interest in new technologies (-. 14) and in international news
-4)This means that the Bloc Québécois members who are most closely tied to their communities via club membership express the most interest in global forces, but like the younger Lega supporters, are not the beneficiaries of globalization. The data support the thesis that individuation can coexist with globalization, but not necessarily that the citizens with the most highly developed capacities for individuation have prospered in the material sense.
What are the factors which are most associated with an individual's attachment to local and regional identities? What causes these citizens to reject allegiances to current state boundaries, and to identify with their towns, cities or regions? This question will be answered through a stepwise multiple regression analysis of the independent variables which affect the dependent variable, geographic identification (Q4). This was selected as the dependent variable because it is the question most closely linked to the goal of this study: to explain why some individuals reject current nation-state boundaries and choose local, regional or provincial identities.
Stepwise multiple regression analyses were also performed on the independent variables which are directly and indirectly associated with local and regional identification (the dependent variable), in order to develop a non-recursive causal model of al1 the direct and indirect relationships which influence local and regional identification.
In the Flemish case, regional and local identification were considered separately as dependent variables because, as has been previously demonstrated, there is a bifurcation of territorial loyalties in the Volksunie. Figure 5.1 2 (page 160) shows that 25 percent of the variance in explaining regional identification amongst
Volksunie supporters can be attributed to two variables: evaluations of the most representative govemment and workplace size. The strongest predictor variable was the selection of the regional govemment as the preferred institution (.47), while a moderately positive relationship (. 17) was associated between small workplaces and regional identities. This means that those supporters who work in environments with fewer than 26 employees are more likely to hold regional loyalties than those who work in large-scale environrnents. These results support the globalist thesis which suggests that lower and intermediate-level territorial identities are associated with post-modemism.
As one can observe in Figure 5.12, there is a relationship of mutual causality between identity and govemment evaluation. ldentity was the only, albeit powerful, independent variable which influences a favourable performance evaluation of the regional govemment, when the latter was set up as the dependent variable (.47). ldentity alone explains 22 percent of the variance on whether individuals felt the regional institution was the most representative of their interests. While this finding is not directly related to an examination of the central thesis, it does demonstrate the power of identity in shaping performance evaluations, and the power of those evaluations to influence territorial identities. This suggests that evaluations of institutional performance exert a comparatively more powerful influence on the existence of cornmunitarian sentiments, than post-modern forces such as post-
Fordist workplace structures.
Figure 5.12 also shows which factors help predict the development of local identities amongst Flemish supporters. Twenty-one percent of the variance on the dependent variable is explained by a parsimonious two-variable model. The use of the new information technology and one's evaluation of local govemment performance are the only variables in the equation which significantly influence local identities. Of these two independent variables, a favourable evaluation of the local government is the most powerful (.42). Interestingly, there is a moderately negative relationship between frequent usage of the new information technology and local identities (-37). Those who never use the technology in a typical week are more likely to express local identities than those who use it at least once a week. Figure 5.12: Non-Recursive Causal Model of Factors lnfluencing Local and Regional Identification Arnongst Volksunie Respondents
Workplace Size: Frequent amputer use (< 26 employees)
Regional ldentity Local Identification R2 = -25 R2 = -21
1 1s most representative is most representative R2 = .22 R2 = -18
This finding suggests that local identities are insulated against post- modernity, a~dthat technology has a role in shaping identities. If infrequent use of the new technology influences the development of local identities, then frequent usage may encourage identification with current state boundaries. If this is true, then McLuhan's contention that the development of new media forms leads to the fragmentation of old political communities and the formation of new ones, must be
reexamined.'" While the globalist thesis posits that technology, and the mobility
that is guaranteed by its use, encourages individuation and decentralkation, the
Volksunie data suggest that technology cannot be equated with these trends, and
that the Volksunie supporters who are most insulated from technology are those
who are most attached to their local identities.
Figure 5.1 3 (page 162) shows the relationship between local and regional
identities and the forces of globalization in Piedmont. The data reveal that 23
percent of the variance on local and regional identities can be explained by income,
opinions on immigrant assimilation and interest in foreign cultural events. The most
powerful predictor variable, income, exerts a strong, negative influence on local and
regional identities (--31). That is, if one's household income falls below 36 million
lire per year, helshe is more likely to identify most closely with the region or
commune (--31).The second most powerful factor influencing local and
intermediate-level territorial identities is one's opinion about immigrant assimilation.
The more one disagrees with the statement that immigrants should be assimilated. the more likely it is that helshe is attached to the region or commune (-27).lnterest
in non-national cultural events is also negatively and strongly related to these territorial identities. Those supporters expressing no interest in these events are
more likely to be attached to their tom, city or region (-.21). Thus far, the data
reveal that more local identities1 are strongly held by a "traditional" clientele.
'* McLuhan, Understanding Media, 7-8. 161 Figure 5.13: Non-Recursive Causal Model of Factors lnfiuencing LocallRegional Identification Amongst Lega Nord - Piemonte Respondents
Se lf-described ldeology
lncome > 36 million Local and Regional SDlD Immigrant ltalian Lire Identification Assimilation R2 = -26 R2 = -23 R2 = -23
Post-secondary MidfHigh Interest Non-Club Education Levels in Foreign Member Cultural Events R2 = .Il
A regression analysis was also performed on the three independent variables which appeared in the initial regression equation. using them as dependent variables. The result shows that territorial identities share a mutually causal relationship with income, opinions on immigration assimilation and interest in non- national cultural events. Higher income levels above 36 million lire per year and expressions of some or a lot of interest in foreign cultural events are both negatively and strongly influenced by local and regional identities, at -.27 and -.30, respectively. While it is not surprising that more immediate territorial attachments would diminish an interest in other cultures, it is surprising to find that identity influences income. At least one explanation for this finding is possible; attachments to the city or region may dissuade the supporter from pursuing higher- paying occupations in larger urban centres.
As Figure 5.13 shows, local and regional identities have a strong and positive influence on disagreement with the proposition that immigrants should be assimilated (.22).This finding suggests that Lega supporters want to maintain the integrity of the Piemontese identity, but do not want or expect foreigners to conform to their traditions. Again. this can be interpreted as either a desire to exclude non- nationals or as an appreciation for cultural diversity. This depends on one's opinion of assimilationist strategies. If the central thesis examined here is used as a benchmark for evaluating assimilation, then the desire to uphold differences is a sign of individualization tendencies which are consistent with globalization trends.
ldentity can also be influenced indirectly through the variables which help predict the three main independent variables in the model (income, cultural interests and immigrant assimilation). Higher incorne, for example, is strongly affected by post-secondary educational levels (.28)and by disagreement with the proposition that a federal govemment has limited autonomy (-23).Thus, it is the more highly educated individual who expresses the most faith in the autonomy of goveming institutions, who is more likely to identify with wider identities. Meanwhile, those who don't belong to a local club tend to express no interest in foreign cultural events (--24). Where one might have expected local club involvement to reinforce a lack of interest in non-Piemontese events, the opposite was true- Those who are most involved in their local communities are the same people who express some or a lot of interest in other cultures. This finding partially challenges the image of cornmunitarian supporters as parochial citizens who are not open to globalization. They seem to be interested in other traditions, but not in assimilating those traditions into Piemontese society.
The immigrant assimilation question was influenced by three factors. Thus far, this paper has discussed the influence of local and regional identities on this issue, but not the influence of personal ideology and local club membership. As
Figure 5.1 3 shows, those Leghisti who are involved with local clubs disagree that immigrants should be assimilated (--23).This finding provides additional weight to the argument that those who are most committed to their communities tend to value the retention of cultural differences between groups. While the ideological spectrum was not recoded, this variable did have a strong and positive influence on disagreement with immigrant assimilation (-25).The farther to the right one places oneself, the more likely it is that helshe would oppose cultural homogenization. In the Lega, those individuals who value difference and individuation are not leftist, as some post-modern theorists have argued.
These data point to both the globalist and individualist aspects of contemporary autonomist sentiments. These individuals acknowledge both the constraints on political actors, and are thus sensitive to the impact of globalization on the sovereignty of the state. Yet, they also exhibit individuation tendencies in their support for the retention of cultural differences. mese two processes, as the globalist thesis posits, are paradoxical but can co-exist.
With respect to the Quebec data, the geographic identification variable was regressed on al1 other variables in the survey, and no significant predictors were found. The same procedure was performed using issue and govemment representation variables as the dependent variables in the equation. Again, no statistically significant results were produced. ldeological self-placement explained just 3% of the variation on the geographic identification variable. This suggests again, as with the European cases, that communitarianisrn is not rooted in ideology.
The BQ has a cross class appeal, as much as any "catch-allu party. The poor predictive power of the remaining variables in the survey also demonstrates that the party appeals to both young and old, to the traditional and post-modern elements in
Quebec society, to those who have been exposed to globalization trends, and to those who have been insulated from them. In short, there are no distinguishing characteristics of BQ supporters, as there are in Europe.
The relative weakness of the globalism-iocalism mode1 in predicting Quebec nationalism could be attributed to the high profile of transnational trends in Europe.
The development of the European Union, the close proximity of European states, the multitude of distinct cultures and languages which wexist with each other, the possibly stronger cornmunitarian feelings which exist in Europe as a result of their historical longevity, are al1 likely factors explaining why being exposed to global tendencies seems to invoke more fear in Europe.
In Quebec, the absence of a comparable supranational political institution which would threaten the province's sovereignty in its areas of jurisdiction, a greater tolerance of immigrants, the relative youth of Quebec nationalism and the francophones' majority position in their own province, have perhaps contributed to a lower level of awareness with respect to the effects of globalization on their culture.
The apparent absence of globalization effects on French nationalism is likely attributed to Quebec's preoccupation with its ongoing disputes with Ottawa. There is another possibility that there is a false sense of security within the population, and that in being consumed by intemal affairs, they have not yet begun to consider that global trade dynamics, cornputer technology and the alienation of Quebec's allophone population from Quebec, constitute serious threats to the formation of a separate state. In an inflamrnatory statement following the 1995 referendum on independence, former Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau spoke of the irreconcilable, profound differences which exist between "old stock" Quebeckers and the "ethnic vote", which he blamed for the "yes" side's loss. While the sentiments are reprehensible, they speak of an awareness and demographic truth that non-francophones have not accepted the Québécois' vision of the province's future, and thus do constitute a threat to the aspirations of a nation. CHAPTER 6: INTERNAL DlVERSlTY
The data presented thus far point to the existence of both "post-modern" and
''traditional" elements in al1 three parties. In order to further probe the parties' internal diversity, the oneway analysis of variance procedure will be employed to explore how age, income and ideological orientations divide members with respect to their issue orientations, identities, Iifestyles and interests. Finally, this chapter will develop a typology of each party's support base that will illustrate what proportion of the membership cmbe described as post-modem, traditional or mixed post-modern-traditionalists.
One benefit of looking into the internal divisions is to detenine the extent of their party's cohesiveness or disunity. Evidence of a high level of cohesiveness is a sign that these parties have the potential to persist, long after questions of decentralization and sovereignty no longer top political agendas. If there are many significant factors which separate party members, then it is likely that the party's success would be vulnerable to the effects of transitory issue cycles. In being able to appeal to a broader electorate, this may increase their chances of electoral success by siphoning votes from other parties' electoral coalitions; however, it also increases the fragility of their support and its susceptibility to erosion by short-term political factors. ldeoloaical and demoaraohic differences in the VU
In order to determine whether there are statistically significant philosophical,
generational and socio-ewnornic difTerences amongst rnembers of the Volksunie,
the means for self-described ideological placement, age and income were
calculated for each of the responses to the questions on issues and govemment
representation Table 6.1 demonstrates that those who express less faith in the
faimess and equitability of the federal govemment are younger and wealthier than
those supporters who have more faith in the institution. On the other hand, it is the
younger and less well-off members who feel that the federal government does not
have decision-making autonomy. Ideologically, the members are virtually
indistinguishable on the federalism question. On the immigration question, the
younger, wealthier and more leftist respondents tend to agree with the assimilation
proposition.
As for the respondents' choice of the best governing institutions, the younger members chose the lower-order levels of governrnents, or none at all, while the older members were more inclined to choose the national govemment. Those choosing the local government as the most representative of their interests also seem to be distinguished from their colleagues. On the whole, they tend to be much more rightist in their orientations and less well-off. TABLE 6.1 - INTRA-PARN DIFFERENCES ON REPRESENTATION AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES: VU
FEDERALISM, IMMIGRATION AND GOVERNMENT MEAN MEAN 'MEAN IDEOL. AGE INCOME
SA or A: The federal govemment's programs favour certain regions SD or D: The federal govemment8sprograrns favour certian regions SA or A: My region has been treated unfairly by the federal govemment SD or D: My region has been treated unfairly by the federal govemment SA or A: The federal govY does not have the power to make decisions independently SD or D: The federal govY does not have the power to make decisions independently SA or A: Immigrants should be assimilated into mainstream society SD or D: Immigrants should be assimilated into rnainstream society. LOCAL GOVT best represents my interests REGIONAL GOV'T best represents my interests NATIONAL GOV'T best represents my interests INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS best represent my interests NONE OF THE ABOVE gov't institutions best represent my interests
SAMPLE MEAN ------9.3 'Sec Appendix 2 for income categories SA or A = strongly agree or agree SD or D = strongly disagree or disagree
Within the Volksunie, respondents who fit the post-modern portrait are disillusioned with central goveming institutions and favour cultural homogenization, rather than differentiation. It is also interesting that the younger members are most attached to local goveming institutions. a fact which would confinn the argument that autonomist movements have appeal that extends beyond older segments of the population, although it should be noted that they are not the financial beneficiaries of globalization. These intraparty differences suggest that localist orientations are not the preserve of older generations; an observation which suggests that communitarianism has the potential to persist. They also suggest that the new localism appeals most to those who have had trouble adapting to post-industrial economies.
In order to test for significant differences of age, income and ideological rneans, a oneway analysis of variance procedure was performed on al1 the value groups for the questions probing issue priorities, and opinions on federalism, immigration and govemment representation. First, those differences in means which did not prove to be statistically significant include the age and income differences between Volksunie supporters who indicate preferences for different government levels. There are also no significant differences in the age and income means for al1 values of the questions pertaining to the top priority issue and to opinions about federalism and immigration. On the whole, the party is a fairly whesive unit. Table 6.2 shows that very few issue areas provoke significant differences between party members, and that the F-scores are generally small.
What divides party members are not generational or socio-economic differences, but ideological divisions on the immigration and institutional performance questions. Table 6.2 shows that the average ideoiogical self-placement of those who
agree that immigrants should be assirnilated, is to the left of those who disagree and
strongly disagree with the statement Respondents prefem'ng the retention of
differences (non-assimilation) are found on the centre-right of the ideological
spectrum. There are also significant differences in the mean ideological self-
placement of those who indicate that the region and commune are the most
representative levels of govemment. Those who identify the commune tend to be
found on the centre-right of the spectrum, while those who identify the regional
govemment as the most representative govemment institution are located in the
centre. In short, those respondents expressing the most tolerance for cultural
diversity and esteem for local govemment are located to the centre-right, and not to
the left, as some post-modern theorists would have predicted.
TABLE 6.2 - INTRA-PARTY IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES: VU 1 -- ISSUE GROUPS F - SCORE Immigrants should be assirnilated 4.3** AGREE STRONGLY AGREE DISAGREE - STRONGLY DISAGREE Most representative level of govemment REGION, NATIONAL GOV'T, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNE NONE OF THE ABOVE **p=.Ol ;*p=.05 ldeoloaical and demoaraphic differences in the LN
An examination of the data presented in Table 6.3 shows that the mean age and income of those expressing the most faith in local govemment coincides with older, relatively lower income individuals. Thus, it would seem that the principle of decentralization is most favoured amongst the more "traditional" respondents.
Interestingly, the wealthier, more leftist, segment expresses the most confidence in international institutions, as the globalist-localist thesis would predict.
As for opinions on whether immigrants should be assimilated into mainstream society, older respondents favoured higher degrees of cultural homogeneity through their expression of support for assimilation and for reduced immigration quotas.
Again, the older and not the younger members seem to be more protective of the
Piemontese identity. With respect to incorne patterns on the immigration questions, those who are the least well-off are the most protective of keeping the Piemontese identity separate from those of newcomers. The lower income respondents favour both reduced immigration levels and oppose assimilation. Opinions on immigration cut across most intra-party ideological divisions. The only distinguishable mean cornes with respect to the rightist orientation of those who oppose immigrant assimilation, indicating that those on the right are most protective of their identities, rather than leftist or centrist adherents.
ln contrast with the Flemish case, in Piemonte the more traditional respondents express the least faith in central goveming institutions and the most loyalty to the local government. The "traditional" portrait is also suggested by the fact that those respondents who are less financially sewre are more predisposed to maintaining cultural separation.
TABLE 6.3 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES ON REPRESENTATION AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES: LN
IMMIGRATION AND GOVERNMENT MEAN MEAN 'MEAN IDEOL AGE INCOME
SA or A: Immigrants should be assimilated into 5.5 40.4 8.1 mainstfeam society SD or D: Immigrants should be assimilated into mainstream society. SA or A: Immigrant quotas should be reduced 5.7 40.0 7.3 SD or D: Immigrant quotas should be reduced 5.6 39.5 9.4 LOCAL GOVT best represents my interests 5.4 41 .O 7.0 REGIONAL GOWT best represents my interests 5.6 38.7 7.7 The ITALIAN GOWT best represents my interests 5.7 39.3 7. O lNTERNATlONAL INSTlTUTlONS best represent my 5.1 41.5 10.8 interests NONE OF THE ABOVE INSTITUTIONS best represent 6.1 40. O 6.9 my interests SAMPLE MEAN 5.9 40.0 7.6 *See Appendix 2 for income categories SA or A = strongly agree or agree SD or D = strongly disagtee or disagree
A oneway ANOVA procedure was perfomed to detect significant differences in the age. income and ideological means of different govemment representation and immigration issue groups within the Lega. Table 6.4 shows that it is the traditional. lower income segment of the party which favours reduced immigration. This finding is not in keeping with the expectation of the globalist- localist thesis, which would have predicted that the upper income members would be more predisposed to favouring lower immigration levels because of their higher individuation capacities. It also suggests that those individuais who feel most
threatened by the "other" are economically insecure.
TABLE 6.4 - INTRA-PARTY INCOME AND IOEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES: LN It I 1, ISSUE GROUPS INCOME AVG. F-SCORE Immigration rates should be reduced. Ag- Strongly Agree Disagree Strongl y Disagree
ISSUE GROUPS IDEOL MEAN 1 F-SCORE l Immigrants should be assimilated: Strongly Agme Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
Immigration quotas should be reduced: Disagree Agree Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
The data show that those who strongly disagree that immigrants should be
assimilated and who strongly agree that immigration quotas should be reduced, are
located on the centre-right of the political spectnim. Thus, individuation tendencies to preserve cultural differences in Piemonte are associated with rightist orientations.
Those who most strongly support the assimilation of immigrants and who disagree with the proposition of reducing immigrants quotas, are leftist or centrist in their orientations. While Lega supporters with leftist orientations accept the influx of culturally diverse populations into their territories. they desire their homogenization into mainstream society, rather than the retention of their differences. Where the globalist-localist thesis would have predicted leftist or centrist orientations. individualizing tendencies adopt a right-ofcentre bias in the Lega Nord. ldeoloaical and demoaraphic differences in the BQ
Table 6.5 demonstrates that the mean ideological self-placement of BQ members who agree with the proposition that federalism is unfair. express centre- left orientations, and are located much farther to the left than their four colleagues who disagreed with the statement. Those disagreeing with the proposition to assirnilate immigrants and to reduce immigration quotas are leftist in their orientations. The groups located farthest to the left also express the most support for the provincial govemment or the opinion that none of the goveming institutions represent their interests (this last fact must be interpreted with caution, as only 6 people responded this way). TABLE 6.5 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES ON REPRESENTATION AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES: BQ FEDERALISM, IMMIGRATION AND GOVERNMENT MEAN MEAN *MEAN IDEOL, AGE INCOME
SA or A: The federal govemment's programs favour cettain regions SD or D: The federal govemment's programs favour certain regions SA or A: My province has been treated unfairiy by the federal government SD or D: My province has been treated unfairiy by the federal government SA or A: The federal gov't does not have the power to make decisions independently SD or D: The federal gov't does not have the power to make decisions independently SA or A: Immigrants should be assimilated into mainstream society SD or D: Immigrants should be assimilated into mainstream society. SA or A: Immigration rates should be reduced SD or D: Immigration rates should be reduced The LOCAL GOVT best represents my interests. The PROVINCIAL GOVT best represents my interests. The CANADfAN PARLIAMENT best represents my interests. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS best represent my interests. NONE OF THE ABOVE institutions best represent my interests. SAMPLE MEAN 'See Appendix 2 for income categories SA or A = Strongly agree or agree SD or D = Strongly disagree or disagree The average age of those who feel that Quebec has been treated unfairly by
the federal govemment is much younger than those who disagree with the
proposition. However, menasked the more general question as to whether they
feel federalism has treated al1 regions unfairly, it is the older group which agreed
with this staternent. This demonstrates that younger individuals within the BQ are
more concemed with the treatment of Quebec, rather than the more theoretical
judgements of federalism itself. These results suggest that perhaps it is not the
federal system of govemment with which the younger members are dissatisfied, but
with how the federal govemment has treated their province. Younger mernbers also
identify the provincial govemment as more representative than the local
govemment. The number of cases in the other govemment representation
categories is too small to make any meaningful comparisons. As with the ltalian
case, the older members express the most support for the proposition of immigrant
assimilation and reduction of quotas, suggesting that it is the more "traditional"
subsst which wants to preserve cultural homogeneity.
The income patterns with respect to the questions on federalism and
immigration suggest that those who are most disillusioned with central goveming
institutions and with immigration fit the "traditional" portrait more closely. The
relatively less well-off members tend to agree that Quebec has been unfairly treated
by the federal government, and that the federal govemment does not have decision-
making autonomy. These findings do not support the globalist contention that wealthier individuals would express the most dissatisfaction with the institutional status quo, and the most disillusionment in institutional capacity. As for opinions on
immigration, the lower income members also desire immigrant assimilation and
lower immigration rates, thus indicating their more developed individuation
capacities.
Yet, the wealthier members cite the local government as the most
representative, thus indicating that decentralist orientations have a market amongst
the more "modem" clientele. A solid interpretation of the income patterns in the
Quebec case is marred by the fact that there are a srnall nurnber of cases in the
categories expressing disagreement with the first two propositions on federalisrn
and indicating support for non-provincial governments, but the differences in means
do point to some tentative conclusions.
The results presented in Table 6.5 show that younger members are more
disillusioned with Quebec's treatment in the federation, but desire the preservation
of cultural diversity through their greater acceptance of non-Québécois citizens.
Meanwhile, older, financially insecure members express less tolerance of
immigrants, but also cornparatively less dissatisfaction with how Quebec has been
treated by the federal govemment. The data suggest that individual members are
intemally beset by competing post-modem and traditional predispositions.
A oneway ANOVA procedure was performed on the BQ sample to detect
significant differences in the age, income and selfdecribed ideological means of
members expressing different opinions on issues and government representation.
The BQ sample proved to be highly cohesive with the onlv statistically significant difference emerging with respect to age and one's perception of the most important
issue (F-swre=2.2, p=.01). On this point. the mean age of those citing social
programs as the most important issue was 38.8 years. This differs significantly from
the average age of those citing the debt (50.7 years) or unemployment (50.6 years)
as the most important issues. These results point to a bifurcation within the party of
older members who cite the more traditional economic issues as the rnost pressing,
and younger ones who feel that the maintenance of social programs, a product of the modem welfare state, is the most important issue. This is likely reflective of the different life experiences of these generations. The middle-aged rnembers were socialized during an era of prosperity and growth, while the younger members have been socialized during an era of economic restraint, high unemployrnent and mounting govemment deficits which are threatening the maintenance of universal social programs.
Ideoloaical and demoaraphic differences in the VU
The data presented in Table 6.6 show that those who tend ta identify with their towns or cities are younger, their orientations are centre-right and their incorne levels fall below the levels of their older, wealthier counterparts who identify more with Belgium. While the average incomes of both local and regional identifiers is high by national standards, they are Iower than those supporters who most identify with Belgium. Thus, while identification with more immediate geographic areas is more pronounced amongst the "post-modem" Volksunie supporters, their ideological predispositions are not leftist. but skewed to the centre, which is what some post-industrial theorists would have predicted. What should also be noted is that respondents with the most pronounced leftist orientations are those who identify with Europe, which is consistent with Inglehart's contention that values in post-industrial societies are Iinked to leftist predispositions.'"
TABLE 6.6 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES ON IDENTIN ISSUES: VU TERRlTORlAL IDENTITY MEAN MEAN AGE MEAN INCOME IDEOLOGY
- - CityITown 5.8 47.8 8.9 Region 5.0 48.6 9.5 Belgium 6.0 59.0 11.5 Europe 4.1 48.4 9.5 Other 5.5 63.0 9.0
A oneway ANOVA procedure was perfomed to test the significance of these differences, but the only statistically significant difference was found with respect to the ideological differences between those identifying with the region and city (F- score= 4.6*). This shows that while age and incorne do not differentiate party members with respect to their psychological identification with geographic areas, local and regional identifiers are two different types of people with separate orientations towards social and economic issues.
183 Ron Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: changes in values and political styles among western publics (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1977). ldeoloaical and demoara~hicdifferences in the LN
Table 6.7 demonstrates that younger, centrist Lega supporters report
relatively high household income levels which are above the national average, are
more likely to identify with their city or town. Meanwhile, the marginally older and
least well-off supporters identify most closely with Piemonte. The oldest and
wealthiest members with the most pronounced centre-right orientations identify
themselves as Europeans.
In the Lega case. those who exhibit "post-modem" characteristics are local or
European identifiers, but not regional ones. As with the Belgian case this suggests
that there may be meaningful differences between local and regional attachrnents.
TABLE 6.7 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES ON IDENTITY ISSUES: LN TERRITORIAL MEAN MEAN AGE MEAN INCOME IDENTITY IDEOLOGY
Cityltown 5.3 39.1 7.1 Region 5.6 40.8 5.8 ltaly 6.0 39.2 6.9 Europe 6.0 41 -7 9.9
A oneway ANOVA procedure was perfoned to detect significant age,
income and ideological differences between geographic identifiers within the Lega.
The first significant difference cornes with respect to income, producing an F -score
of 10.9 (p=.UI). More specifically, the average incomes of European identifiers
differ significantly frorn the average household incomes of the local, regional and
ltalian identifiers. This indicates that financial prosperity, one indicator of post- modemity, is associated with international attachments, suggesting that autonomist sentiments may be more traditional than modem. Generally, the fact that only one demographic difference between the identity groups proved to be significant, demonstrates that the party is as cohesive as its Belgian counterpart.
Table 6.8 shows that the BQ supporters who identify with Quebec are older, left-of-centre individuals with relatively higher incomes that approximate the national average. Except for the age profile. these results confin the "post-modern" portrait of autonomist supporters. In this respect, the BQ supporters with intemediate-level geographic attachments mirror the regional identifiers in the Flemish sample. Both the Flanders and Quebec identifiers are slightly older and better-off than local identifiers in their respective jurisdictions, while the regional identifiers in the Lega are less well-off than their wlleagues expressing local attachments.
TABLE 6.8 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES ON IDENTllY ISSUES: BQ TERRiTORlAL MEAN MEAN AGE MEAN INCOME IDENTITY IDEOLOGY
Cityltown 4.7 44.5 7.5 Province 4.1 47.7 .8.9 Canada - - - North America 8.0 45 13.5
A oneway ANOVA procedure was perforrned to detect significant differences in the average age, income and ideological orientations of people who responded differently to the geographic identity question. Given the nearly unanimous proclivity of respondents to identify with Quebec, it is not surprising that very few intra-party differences were detected. However, there are significant differences in the ideological orientations between those who profess continental attachments, and those who express attachments to the city and province (F-score=5.4, p=.01).
These data mirror the results in the ltalian case, which show that those expressing continental attachments fall to the right-of-centre in their political orientations, but are the reverse of the Flemish data. Therefore, mixed evidence about the ideological implications of globalization emerges; supranational identities can be associated with both leftist or rightist orientations.
Generally, the examination of intra-party differences between identity members in al1 three parties show evidence of extremely high levels of intemal cohesiveness. Very few demographic or ideological differences separate party members, even when their psychological attachments to geographic areas differ.
These data suggest that there are no potential cleavages based on identity which could divide these parties.
ldeoloaical and demoaraphic differences in the VU
As Table 6.9 demonstrates, the younger, wealthier, centrist VU supporters tend to use the new information technology and travel outside the region more frequently than their older. less well-off, right-of-centre party colleagues. Frequent travel outside Belgium is associated with wealthier and older respondents with ideological leanings that fall to the left of their younger, less well-off counterparts.
Therefore, there appears to exist with the party, both "post-modem" younger members who have adopted the new information technology, but are less able to afford trips abroad, and older mernbers who resist computer technology, but whose higher incomes permit them a greater degree of mobility.
TABLE 6.9 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES IN TRAVEL FREQUENCY AND TECHNOLOGY USAGE: VU
TRAVEL AND TECHNOLOGY MEAN MEAN AGE MEAN INCOME iDEGLOGY
Respondent uses a computer,fax 3 5.2 46.1 9.7 or more times during a typical week Respondent uses a computer, fax 4.9 47.7 9.3 between 1-3 times dun'ng a typical wee k. Respondent never uses a computer, fax during a typical week. Respondent has travelled out of the 4.9 country more than 3 times over the past six months Respondent has travelled out of the 5.4 country between 13times over the past six months Respondent has never travelled out 5.4 of the country over the past six months Respondent has travelled out of the 5.2 region more than 3 times over the past 6 months Respondent has travelled out of the 5.4 48.2 9.0 region between 1-3 times over the past 6 months Respondent has never travelled out 5.2 50.7 8.1 of the region over the past 6 months
A oneway ANOVA procedure was performed to detemine whether the diferences between people who responded differently to the travel and technology questions are statistically significant. The results in Table 6.1 0 show that age and income differences separate the "post-modem" from the 'Yraditional" elements in the party. The members who use the new information technology more frequently are younger than their counterparts who don't use cornputers or faxes. There are also significant differences between the average age of those who never use these inventions, and respondents who use them at least once a week. The average income of those who never use a computer is significantly different than the average income of those individuals who use them at least once a week. Meanwhile, the average incomes of those who travel outside the country or region more than 3 times in the preceding six months is significantly different than both groups who travelled less frequently to those areas. These data indicate that younger, relatively wealthier rnembers within the Volksunie are most exposed to globalist tendencies.
TABLE 6.1 0 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES IN TRAVEL FREQUENCY AND TECHNOLOGY USAGE: VU MOBILITY GROUPS lpp~ëË~~~EGiË Frequency of fax, cornputer use in a typical week > 3 times 1-3 times never INCOME MEAN F-SCORE Frequency of fax, cornputer use in a typical week 8.3- never 8.2 1-3 times 9.3 > 3 times 9.7 Frequency of travel abroad in last 6 months 8.0** never 8.2 1-3 times 9.2 >3 tirnes 10.2 Frequency of travel outside region in last 6 months 5.9'- never 1-3 times 8.1 > 3 times 9.0 9.7 'p=.01; *p=.05 The F-scores for significant age and income differences between Flemish nationalists who express differing levels of interest in foreign cultures and different mobility patterns, are reported in Table 6.1 1. Interestingly, the older members expresses the highest degree of interest in non-national cultural events, which would not be expected of this more "traditional" element within the party. The data also reveal that the average age of those who are most attached to the local community through involvement in clubs is older. With respect to mobility, the younger members report higher levels of language proficiency, but do not exhibit as much class mobility as older memben. These data show that it is the older respondents who are most able to escape the pre-detemination of their class origins, and thus, possess more capacity for individuation than their younger colleagues.
The average household income of those who indicate a higher level of language proficiency and who have attended schools outside their birth region, is, as expected, higher than those with less mobility. Those Volksunie respondents who are able to transcend their class origins also report significantly higher household incornes, signifying that class mobility is upward and not downward in this party. These data on cultural interests and mobility paint a portrait of members who individually combine "post-modem" and 'Yraditional' characteristics. The younger members may exhibit more spatial mobility and language proficiency, but they do not report as much openness to globalization or capacities for individuation which characterize the older members. TABLE 6.1 1 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES ON CULTURAL AND MOBIUTY PATTERNS:
1 CULTURAL INTERESTS AND MOBlLlTY 1 AGE MEAN F-SCORE Interest in non-national culiural events not much 43.0 some 48.2 alot 51.O Are you a member of a club which promotes the interests of your community? No 45.4 Yes 48.9 Do you speaWunderstand at least two languages? Yes No
Do you fselong to the same socio~conomicclass as your parents? Yes No MOBILITY GROUPS INCOME MEAN F-SCORE Do you speaWunderstand at least two languages? 9.5** No Yes 7.2 9.4 Have you attended a school outside the region where you were boni? No Yes Do you belong to the same socio~conomicclass as your parents? Yes No ldeoloaical and demoara~hicdifferences in the LN
The typical frequent user of the new infonation technology in the Lega Nord
is a younger, centre-right adherent with a relatively higher household income than
hisher wunterparts who use cornputers and faxes 3 or fewer times in a typical week Lega supporters with the same demographic and ideological characteristics also report the most frequent levels of inter-regional travel. Frequent travel abroad
is more often completed by older, rightist individuals who report incornes that fall between the above and below-average income groups. With respect to foreign travel, the youngest members with the lowest income levels generally have never travelled abroad within the preceding six months. Table 6.1 2 presents a picture of two types of Lega supporters: technology-oriented young adults who travel frequently within, but not outside Italy, and older individuals who aren't as receptive to the new infonation technology, but who have the income and desire to travel abroad. TABLE 6.12 - INTRA-PARW DlFFERENCES IN TRAVEL FREQUENCY AND TECHNOLOGY USAGE: LN
TRAVEL AND TECHNOLOGY MEAN MEAN AGE MEAN INCOME IDEOLOGY
Respondent uses a computer,fax 3 5.7 37.8 8.3 or more times during a typical week Respondent uses a computer, fax 5.3 41 -4 between 1-3 times during a typical week. Respondent never uses a computer, fax during a typical week. Respondent has travelled out of the 6.6 country more than 3 times over the past six months Respondent has travelfed out of the 5.3 country between 1-3 times over the past six months Respondent has never travelled out 6.0 of the country over the past six months Respondent has travelled out of the 5.7 region more than 3 times over the past 6 months Respondent has travelled out of the 5.6 39.2 7.3 region between 13times over the past 6 months Respondent has never travelled out 5.3 of the region over the past 6
Table 6.1 3 shows that incorne is the only significant dividing factor with respect to the usage of cornputer technology and travel patterns amongst Lega supporters. Age does not play a significant role in separating technology users and travellers from other members. Generally, the wealthier supporters are more exposed to the new information technology, inter-regional and foreign travel. The income differences between frequent technology users (> 3 days in a typical week) and the remainder of members who use that technology less frequently, are statistically significant, as is the income gap between those who have never travelled outside the region and those who have travelled out of the region more frequently. Finally, the income differences between those who had never travelled abroad and those who had made between 1 and 3 trips in the previous six months also proved to be significant.
These results mirror the Flemish data in that it is generally the wealthier members who are most exposed to globalization tendencies, thus suggesting that if there are cleavages in these parties, they are based on lifestyle patterns that need to be supported by higher incomes. The data point to the existence of "post- modem", prosperous members who have been exposed to globalization tendencies, and those who are less well-off who lack the financial capacity - or interest -to expose itself to foreign environments.
TABLE 6.13 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES IN TRAVEL PAlTERNS AND TECHNOLOGY USAGE: LN MOBlLlTY GROUPS INCOME MEAN FSCORE Frequency of fax, cornputer use in a typical week 10.5" never 5.1 1-3 tirnes 6.0 > 3 times 8.3 Frequency of travel abroad in last 6 months never > 3 times 13times Frequency of travel outside region in last 6 months never > 1-3 tirnes > 3 times Table 6.14 reveals signifiant differences in the average ages of those Lega supporters who express different levels of interest in technology, language proficiency and class mobility patterns. The data show that individuals expressing a lot of interest in new technology and bilingual abilities are generally younger than those indicating the opposite. While the "post-modem" portrait of the autonomist supporter would have predicted that younger members would be more open to globalization trends, it would not have predicted that they would report less class and spatial mobility. The data show that it is the older members who have ived outside Piemonte and who have transcended their class origins.
The average income of the cultural interest groups follows the same pattern in Belgium. The relatively wealthier respondents indicate higher levels of interest in international news, new technologies, and non-national sports events. These data confinn that prosperity is associated with exposure to globaiization. The average income of those who belong to a different class than their parents is also higher than those who belong to the same class, as the thesis would have predicted.
However, the thesis would not have expected that the higher average income group would be unilingual, non-members of local clubs. Those who are bilingual and local club members (the supporters with the most individuation tendencies) are more likely to report lower incornes. TABLE 6.14 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES ON CULTURAL AND MOBlUPl ISSUES: LN Ii 1 CULTURAL INTERESTS AND MOBlLlTY AGE MEAN F-SCORE lnterest in new technology. Alot Some Not much Do you speaWunderstand two languages? Yes No Have you lived in a region outside your birthplace? No Yes Do you belong to the same socio~conomicclass as your parents? Yes No
II CULTURAL INTEREÇTS AND MOBlLlTY F-SCORE
lnterest in international news. Not much Some Alot lnterest in new technology. Not much Some Alot lnterest in non-national sports. Not much Alot Some Do you speaWunderstand two languages? Yes No Do you belong to the same socio-economic class as your parents? Yes No Do you belong to a club which prornotes your community's interests? Yes Table 6.15 shows that the BQ respondents who use the new information technology most often are younger and wealthier individuals than their colleagues who are less frequent users. While they are leftist in their orientations, they do fall slightly to the right of their colleagues who use cornputers and faxes less frequently.
In this respect, these patterns mirror those found in the European parties of younger, wealthier members who are more exposed tu globalization.
These relatively younger, wealthier individuals with political orientations that fall to the right of their colleagues in the BQ, tends to travel more frequently out of the country and province. This pattern differs slightly from that found in the
European parties, where the older members travelled abroad most frequently.
These results support the contention that within the BQ, as with the other parties, there seems to be a bifurcation between the old and the Young, and between the wealthy and less well-off, with respect to their exposure to globalization. TABLE 6.15 - INTRALPARN DlFFERENCES IN fRAVEL PATTERNS AND TECHNOLOGY USAGE: BQ
TRAVEL AND TECHNOLOGY MEAN MEAN AGE MEAN INCOME IDEOLOGY
------Respondent uses a computer,fax 3 4.2 44.8 9.6 or more times during a typical week. Respondent uses a computer, fax 4.0 between 1-3 times during a typical week, Respondent never uses a computer, fax during a typical week. Respondent has travelled out of the 5.7 46.4 11.2 country more than 3 times over the past six months Respondent has travelled out of the 4.0 48.2 9.7 country between 1-3 times over the past six months Respondent has never travelled out 4.2 47.3 of the country over the past six months Respondent has tmvelled outside 4.6 42 Quebec more than 3 tirnes over the past 6 months Respondent has travelled outside 4.2 47.5 9.6 Quebec between 1-3 times over the past 6 months Respondent has never travelled 4.0 49.4 8.0 outside Quebec over the past 6 months
Table 6.16 below shows that there are significant differences between members reporting varying socio-spatial mobility patterns. Generally, the wealthier the party member, the more likely it is that helshe will use the new information technology more often, engage in foreign and inter-provincial travel and express alot of interest in international news. More specifically, there are significant differenœs in the income means between those who use computers and faxes more than three days a week and those who never use it in a given week. Those who have never travelled abroad in the period under study also report household incomes whose means differ significantly from those who have made between one and three trips outside Canada. Those individuals who have never travelled to other provinces in the previous six months also report significantly different income averages than those who've made between 1-3 trips, and more than three trips in the previous six months. Finally, there are significant differences in the mean incomes between those rnembers expressing alot or some interest in international news.
With respect to age differences between members, the younger Bloquistes tend to make the most use of the new information technology, and the differences between the age means of those who never use it and those who use it more than three days a week are statistically significant. However, they also exhibit less class mobility than older members, which is one indicator of a low level of individuation.
The results presented in Table 6.1 6 provide further evidence that there are relatively wealthy members who have adopted the tools of globalization, and less well-off, sometimes older respondents who are not as exposed to globalization tendencies, but who exhibit a higher degree of individuation. TABLE 6.9 6 - INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES IN TRAVEL FREQUENCY, TECHNOLOGY USAGE, MOBlLlTY PATTERNS AND CULTURAL INTERESTS: BQ Ir TRAVEL, TECHNOLOGY AND CULTüRE How often do you use a computer, fax in a typical week? never 1-3 days a week more than 3 days a week How often have you travelled outside the country in the last six months? never 13times more than 3 times How often have you travelled outside Quebec in the last six months? never 1-3 times more than 3 times How much intemst do you have in international news? not much some alot MOBlLlTY GROUPS AGE MEAN F-SCORE Hsw often do you use a computer, fax etc. in a typical week? never 1-3 days a week more than 3 days a week Do you belong to the same socio-economic class as your parents? Yes No -
Several observations can be made about the data on interna1 party divisions presented in Chapter 6. First, what is remarkable about the data as a whole are the relatively few differences which prove to be statistically significant, and the low F- scores that are associated with them. This indicates a high level of interna1 party cohesion, and the ability of these parties to attract people with similar geographic loyalties, cultural interests and lifestyle patterns. However, when significant differences do emerge, they are based on age and income differences which divide members with varying rates of exposure to globalization and individuation capacities. In ail three parties, there seems to be a split between younger anaor wealthier members who are more exposed to globalization forces, and those who are older andior less wellsff, who aren't frequent travellers or technology users.
There is also an interesting pattern in the European parties where the younger respondents report no class mobility and lower income levels than those who have transcended their class origins. This suggests that the young "post-modem" elements who are attracted to these parties have not been the beneficiaries of globalization trends. While al1 these differences considered together rnay not provoke serious splits in the parties, they do point to their intemal diversity and complex nature. These parties are neither 'traditional" nor "post-modern", but embrace both tendencies.
ly~oloovof ~arhrsupporters
The examination of intra-party differences between supporten can be further refined by determining what proportion of each party's membership base can be described as "post-modem", "traditional", or a blend of the two primary characteristics In order to do this, a two-item index based on identity and community size was developed in order to distinguish the respondents from each
other. Larger indices would have produced so many intra-party types that the
analysis would have become inwherent. The strategy was to develop a limited
number of membership categories based on the members' geographic allegiances
and place of residence, and then conduct a more detailed analysis of differences in
their Iifestyles and interests.
Figure 6.1 7: Typology of Volksunie Supporters
Figure 6.17 illustrates that a plurality of Volksunie supporters can be described as "post-modem regionalists", indicating that communitarianism is compatible with post-modemity, and thus, confinning the globalist-localist thesis with respect to Flemish nationalism. However, there is no evidence to confirm that an identification with one's tom or city is associated with modemity. In this case, intemediate-level identities directed towards regional geographic areas are held by memben who exhibit higher levels of openness towards globalization. The following paragraphs outline the breakdown of party types in the Volksunie.
The "traditional localists" are local identifien living in communities with fewer than 30,000 residents (mean age=48 years). This group largely consists of males (74.7%), who are welleducated (26.4% of them have completed university), but less well-off (16.1 1 of them report monthly househoid incomes of more than
120,000 francs) than the other groups. The "traditional localists" tend to work as office employees or as supervisors in large workplaces employing more than one thousand people. A majority (56.3%) of the traditional localists also favour assimilationist, rather than multicultural, immigrant settlement policies.
The "traditional localists" tend to use wmputers and travel abroad less frequently than the other types, they express the most interest in local news and the least interest in international news. However, they tend to have led more mobile lifestyles than the other groups, an observation that could be attributed to the small size of their communities and the necessity of travelling out of their region for work and educational opportunities. Surprisingly, higher levels of local club membership were reported amongst the "post-modern regionalists" and "mixed post-modern- traditionalists", suggesting that those who are exposed to more globalization forces feel a greater need to re-connect with local attachments. Generally, the "traditional localists" are the least exposed to globalization forces within the party. The "post-modem regionalists" are regional identifiers living in communities with fewer than 30,000 residents. This is the largest group wnstituting
41 -5% of the Volksunie sample. It includes a higher proportion of both males and older members than the Iltraditional localists" (mean age=48.4 years). A slightly higher proportion of them have completed university (30.9%) and free professionals
(17.3%) seem to dominate their ranks. More than 20% of the "post-modern regionalists" work in large organizations employing between one thousand and five thousand people, and nearly 30% of them report househoid incomes of more than
120,000 francs per month. Their occupational make-up and higher incomes distinguish them from their "traditional localist" counterparts. The "post-modern- regionalists" are also express the most opposition to immigrant assimilation
(50.9%),and thus, accept the principle of a plural, decentered world.
They are the most frequent users of the new information technology of al1 three party types, but travel abroad less frequently than the residents of larger communities. About 65% of them have not lived in other regions, but half of them have attended school outside their home region. In comparison with their party coileagues, a larger proportion of them belong to a different socio-economic class than their parents. This group is made up of upwardly mobile professionals who are generally open to globalkation, and thus can be characterized as post-modern.
The "mixed post-modern-traditionalists" are regional and local identifiers living in cornmunities with 30,000 or more residents. This is the oldest group (mean age=49.5 years) which is the most concemed with unemployment (almost 60% of thern rank it as the most important issue) and the most predisposed towards immigrant assimilation. They are less male-oriented than the "post-modem regionalists" and are the best-educated and wealthiest of the three groups. They are made up of office employees (18.9%) and educators (16.2%) who work in small and medium-sized workplaces employing between 1-1 0 people or between 26 and
100. They are more likely to live in ethnically heterogeneous neighbourhoods, to express the least interest in local news and the most in international current events, and to engage in the most frequent foreign travel. All of them are bilingual, but a majority report that they have not lived or attended school outside their region. The socio-demographic characteristics of this group are generally post-modern, but their lifestyles and issue orientations reflect a mix of tradition and post-modemity.
Just over 72% of the Lega respondents fit into 5 categories based on divisions about identity, community and opinions about immigration (Figure 6.18).
What unites al1 the groups is their preference for reduced immigration rates, and thus, for a clear differentiation between the Piemontese and other cultural identities.
This finding reaffirms the globalism-localism's thesis that comrnunitarianism is a reflection of the post-modem desire to reafFirm individual or group identities.
Another fact which unites al1 the groups is their perception that Italy's debt is the most important political issue in the country. As with the Volksunie sample, economic and materialist subjects factor into their issue priorities, a finding which does not confirm the predictions of the globalist-localist thesis. However, it should be noted that environmental issues do figure prominently into the Volksunie and Lega supporters' identification of second and third choice issue priorities, as stated in an earlier chapter.
Figure 6.18: Typology of Lega Nord Supporters
Mixed pu&-modern tradiüonalists Traditional regionalçts 1220% 17.20%
Young wnünentaliî 10.60% le continentalists 10.60% 21 -70%
The "traditional localists" are local identifiers living in communities with fewer than 30,000 residents, and who favour lower immigration rates. This group is the oldest (mean age=40.5 years) and least welleducated of al1 the Lega groups, with 48.7% of thern having completed high school education. They tend to work in clerical positions in small fims employing between 1 and 10 people and are the least well-off, with 41 % of them reporting annual household incarnes of between 25 and 36 million LIT. Unlike the "mixed post-modern-traditionalists", "young cosmopolitans," and "female cosmopolitans", they tend to oppose immigrant assimilation and use cornputers much less frequently than their party colleagues.
More than half of them have never travelled outside the country in the previous six months and a relatively lower proportion of them express an interest in international news or in foreign cultural events. They also tend to have lived and studied within
Piemonte's borders. Clearly, the socio-demographic and lifestyle characteristics of this group point to a traditional membenhip.
The "traditional regionalists" are regional identifiers living in communities with fewer than 30,000 residents, who favour reduced immigration rates. This is the only group where unemployment was ranked as highly as the debt in ternis of issue priorities. The 'traditional regionalists" are the most maleariented of al1 the groups and represent the oldest segment of the party (mean age=42 years). A majority of thern have completed high school, and their occupational make-up includes retirees, students and professionals in almost equal proportions. As with the
"traditional localists", they tend to work in the smallest fims, but they report slightly higher inwmes than the "traditional localists". Like them, a plurality of the
"traditional regionalists" oppose immigrant assimilation and live in ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods.
The "traditional regionalists" use cornputers even less frequently than the
"traditional localists", but travel more frequently abroad than the latter. They are not as interested in local news as the 'traditional localists", but express even less interest in international news than the local identifiers in smaller comrnunities. The
"traditional regionalists" tend to have Iived outside the region moreso than the
"traditional localists" and to report higher levels of class rnobility (71% of them belong to a different socioeconomic class than their parents). Their traditional socio-demographic rnake-up and issue preferences suggest that this group may feel vulnerable to the cultural and economic threats which globalization forces pose to their lifestyles.
The "mixed post-modem-traditionalists"are local or regional identifiers who favour reduced immigration rates and who live in cornmunities with 30,000 or more residents. This is the youngest group of the five types (mean age=37 years), and they strongly oppose immigrant assimilation proposals (81.8%), suggesting that youth is associated with a preference for the maintenance of cultural distinctions.
They report educational achievements that are simi lar to the "traditional regionalists" and include the highest proportions of office employees (45.5%) working in small workplaces (59.1 1)amongst the five groups. Mernbers are evenly split between those living in ethnically homogeneous and heterogeneous neighbourhoods.
The "mixed post-modern-traditionalists" report high levels of computer use
(86.4%), less frequent foreign travel than the "young cosmopolitans" or "female cosmopolitans", and middling levels of interest in international news and foreign cultural events. Interestingly, while they report the highest frequency of bilingualism in the party, they are less likely to have attended school outside Piemonte, and are more likely to belong to local clubs. They can best be described as mixed, post- modern-traditionalists.
The "young continentalists" and "female continentalists" are two distinct groups who identify themselves as Europeans, and who favour lower immigration rates. Both types together represent 21.2% of the Lega sample. Half of them live in communities with fewer than 30,000 people and the other half in areas with
30.000 or more residents. The average age of the European identifiers tends to be younger than local and regional identifiers, with the "young continentalists" averaging 37.75 years and the 'Yemale continentalists" 39.75 years. Interestingly, the fornier group contains more males than al1 other categories (78.9%),while
84.2% of the latter group of supporters are females; the only party type in which females constitute a majority.
The 'Yemale continentalists" are distinguished by their high level of education, with 47.4% of them having completed university. While just under half of the "young continentalists" are professionals. about the same percentage of the
'Yemale continentalists" work as office employees. The "female continentalists" are part of the wealthiest group in the Lega. with over 52% of them reporting annual household incornes of between 76 and 100 million lire. Just over 21 % of the "young continentalists" fall into this same range.
Between 80% and 90% of both types consider the debt as the most important issue. far more than the 38%-43% of the traditionalists and mixed post-modern- traditionalists who identify this as the most pressing issue. What is also noteworthy is that these groups tend to favour the assimilation of immigrants to a much greater degree than the first three types. While one might have expected younger post- modernists to be more tolerant of cultural differences, this is not the case here.
Both groups tend to live in Piemontese neighbourhoods and report the highest frequency of cornputer usage and foreign travel, much lower levels of interest in local news and some of the highest reported interest levels in foreign affairs.
Interestingly, both types report the lowest levels of bilingualisrn in the party.
When it cornes to assessing their socio-spatial mobility, the "young continentalists" and "female continentalists" begin to diverge. Whereas a majority of "young continentalists" report that they have lived and studied outside their region, the "female continentalists" report the opposite on both wunts. In fact, this latter group reports the most static lifestyle patterns of al1 the groups, a fact which may be attributed to the historically conservative role and orientations of females in ltalian society. Furthemore, while nearly 85% of the "young continentalists" report that they belong to a different socio-economic class than their parents, similar percentages of the Yemale continentalists" do not. Both types can be described as the party's modern elements because of their high educational and income achievements, and their openness to globalkation trends. Of the two types, the
"young continentalists" exhibit more post-modern characteristics due to their higher level of spatial mobility.
The Bloc members fit into three categories representing about 97% of the respondents from Quebec (Figure 6.19). Almost half of them report residence in
Québécois neighbourhoods located in cornrnunities with 30,000 or more residents.
The second largest group, comprising 39.8% of the sample, wnsists of those living in ethnically hornogeneous neighbourhoods with fewer than 30,000. Finally, the smallest group lives in ethnically heterogeneous neighbourhoods located in comrnunities with 30.000 or more people. This breakdown of the party types illustrates that communitarianism is not confined to smaller communities, but that living in a Québécois neighbourhood does reinforce ethnic identities.
Figure 6.1 9: Typology of Bloc Québécois Supporters
The "cultural protectionists" live in ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods in communities with fewer than 30,000 people. This group is the oldest of the three types (mean age=48.25 years), the most male-oriented (72.1%) and the wealthiest (32.4% report annual household incomes ranging between
CAN$40,000 and $60,000). The "cultural protectionists" are as welleducated as the "mixed post-modem-traditionalists", with about a third of them having eamed a university degree. This group is largely made up of retirees and professionals who are employed in small workplaces with between 1 and 10 members. They are slightly more in favour of immigrant assimilation than those living in ethnically heterogeneous neighbourhoods, but are least in favour of lower immigration rates.
They are not as likely to use wmputers as the other paFty types, or to have travelled
outside Canada in the previous 6 months. They express the lowest levels of
interest in international news, the least proclivity to have studied outside Quebec
and the most frequent instances of membership in local clubs. This group can be
described as economically and culturally secure, but not very receptive to
globalization forces.
The "mixed post-modem-traditionalists" live in Québécois
neighbourhoods in communities with 30,000 or more residents. Just 60% of this
group is male and it is slightly younger than the "cultural protectionists" (47.9
years). However, the "mixed modem-traditionalists" do share many characteristics
with the first party type: about a third of them are university educated, they tend to
be either retirees or professionals, and they are employed in small workplaces.
Fewer of them report annual household incomes of between $40,000 and $60,000
(28.7%),but they are wealthier than the "post-modern urbanites".
The "mixed post-modem-traditionalists" are the most frequent computer
users, express the most interest in international news and foreign cultural events,
and are also notable for their very high rates of bitingualism (91.3%) compared to
77.8% amongst the "post-modem urbanites" and 77.9% amongst the "cultural
protectionists". They are the least likely to belong to a difierent class than their
parents, and the least likely to have lived in a cornmunity outside their birthplace.
This group of mixed post-modemists-traditionalists is highly exposed to and appreciative of global tendencies. although it has essentially led a static lifestyle.
The "post-modern urbanites" reside in multicultural neighbourhoods located in toms or cities with 30,000 or more people. This is both the youngest
(mean age=44.4 years) and most highly educated group within the Party, with
66.6% of them having eamed a Bachelor or graduate university degrees. They are the least wealthy of the three types, with a third of them eaming between $20,000 and $40,000 per year. They are ove~lhelminglyin favour of lower immigration rates
(72.2%) in comparison with the other supporters, a fact which may partly be attributed to their heightened exposure to extemal cultural intrusions and insecure financial situation. What is also noteworthy about this group is that a plurality cite the debt as the most important issue, rather than the unemployment issue which is prioritized by the other two types.
The "post-modern urbanites" exhibit an openness towards other cultures and experiences. More than 72% of them have travelled outside Canada in the six months prior to the distribution of the survey. They also express the least interest in local news, the lowest levels of membership in local clubs, and the highest propensity to have lived in comrnunities outside their birthplace. Just over two thirds of them report class mobility, aithough their lower incorne levels suggest that it may be of the downwards variety. This is the rnost contemporary portion of the
BQ mernbership, reporting the highest level of exposure to globalization. The alobalisrn-localism thesis and the mernbershi~tvwloay
The party typologies have shown that contemporary communitarians cannot
be considered parochial rernnants of the past, although only a minority in the Lega
and Bloc cmtnily be described as "post-modem" by the criteria of the globalism-
localisrn thesis. The Volksunie is the only party where a plurality of supporters
could be characterized as "post-modem", although this conclusion must be
ternpered by the fact that the composition of the Belgian data is probably less
representative of the general party membership than the other samples.
The typologies illustrate that these parties largely appeal to people living in
srnaller comrnunities and in ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods, although
residence in multicultural, urban areas does not preclude adherence to ethnic and
territorial allegiances, and perhaps encourages it in some instances. The parties'
advocacy of territorial and linguistic issues does not seem as appealing to
European women, who traditionaily support Christian Democratic or Socialist
parties, or to Québécois females, who consistently report less support for sovereignty than their male counterparts. With the exception of the strong gender bias in cornmunitarian parties, their membership bases are inclusive and plural istic with respect to other demographic indicators.
This analysis provides strong confirmation of the globalist-localist thesis and the links that it claims exist between modemity and the persistence of sub-state
identities. It further suggests that these parties can withstand and thrive in the face of globalization pressures. Discussion of intra-party membership patterns
It is apparent that the parties attract people from al1 cross-sections of society, but that in the end, any intemal ciifferences between party members are small and insignificant. The analysis has also made it clear that these parties cannot be considered wholiy traditional, although only a minority in the Lega and Bloc can truly be described as fulfilling most of the prerequisites of modernity. The findings in this chapter have provided a fairly strong confirmation of the globalist-localist thesis and the links it makes with the transition to a post-modern, post-industrial society, and citizens' adaptations to it. It also points to the likelihood that these parties will continue to persist, in spite of, and aided by, globalization trends. CHAPTER SEVEN: TERRITORIAL LOYALTIES AND STATE FAlLURE
By probing the personal beliefs and motivations of party members, one can pinpoint which factors cause people to reject current definitions of state boundaries and institutional arrangements, and to embrace the idea of local or regionalfprovincial selfdetermination. Personal interviews were conducted with party officials in order to detect whether there are links between globalization and the demands of some citizens for political independence or for the decentraiization of govemment powers. Seven riding presidents from the Bloc Québécois, 11 Lega
Nord members and five Volksunie members or party officials were interviewed. The
Bloc respondents were selected from a list of riding presidents to represent different regions and genders. The Lega Nord respondents consisted of provincial secretaries as well as members referred by the provincial secretaries.
In Belgium, Piemonte and Quebec, intermediate-level party officials were asked to state the three most important reasons which persuaded them to join the
Volksunie, Lega Nord or the Bloc Québécois. They were then asked to explain the three most important reasons which would explain the existence or resurgence of sovereignist or decentralist movements in the 1990s, and to list the three chief failures of the Belgian, ltalian or Canadian states. The data presented in Table 6.1 do not always add up to multiples of three, since some questions were not answered with three responses per individual. They were asked whether they felt that globalist tendencies wtiich make borders more porous (ie: free trade, immigration, telecommunications) have helped boost their parties' popularity by appealing to those individuals who want to protect the integrity of their terrïtories.
They were then asked whether these developrnents reinforce or dilute the appeal of
autonomist movements.
Belaium:
There are two overwhelming factors which attract the Volksunie officiais to join the party: its moderate, socialdemocratic platform and its defence of the
Flemish identity. Jan Rogiers, a party secretary in the Gent-Eekls arrondissement
says that he was attracted to the party because of its independence from unions
and interest groups, its socialist policies and its Flemish rights platform. For Jan
Puypé, assistant ta the party president, the VU is a moderate party that represents
the Flemish identity, but is not as extreme as the right-wing. nationalist Vlaams Bloc.
Lucie De Munck, a municipal wuncillor from Gillis-Waas, also identified the
Volksunie as the only party which defends the rights of the Flemish people. De
Munck said that although the Flemish are the numerical majority in Belgium, they
are oppressed culturally and economically by the Francophone minority. She also
recalls historical grievances and Belgium's treatment of Flemish collaborators after
the Second World War.
When asked to explain the rise and endurance of the 42-year-old party,
cultural variables again dominate the discourse, although there are some
references to political factors. Marc Hendrickx, Vice-President of the Mechelen
Arrondissement in the province of Antwerp, says that more people in Europe are becoming interested in their national identity, just as they are in Canada. Both
Roegiers and De Munck referred to the post-war treatment of Flemish collaborators as initial reasons why the party was created. Younger rnembers such as Sigurd
Vangermeersch, president of the Youth Federation, also note the post-war treatment of the Flemish as a factor explaining the Volksunie's existendU
Jan Pupye offers some conternporary. political reasons which help explain the party's endurance. He says the party encourages ideological diversity and pragmatism, while the traditional parties have more narrow, philosophical horizons.
Thus, the interviewees' explanations of the Volksunie's endurance tend to wnfirm the globalist-localist thesis about the ideologically pluralist content of autonomist parties, and about the importance of cultural identity to citizens who feel they have been unfairly treated by the central state.
Piemonte:
In this region, institutional and political factors were the most influential in encouraging Lega Nord loyalties amongst members, Provincial Secretaries and a parliamentarian. Alberto Sciandra, provincial secretary of the province of Cuneo,
Paolo Bini, the cornmissioner of Cirié, and Mario Di Primio, the coordinator of the commission on local agencies, agree that their desire for the decentralization of
'" During the war, a small group in Flanders collaborated with the German army by providing them with contingents on the Russian front in exchange for the future establishment of a Greater Netherlands of Flanders, Holland and northern France. After the war, 58,000 people in Wallonia and Flanders were found guilty of having collaborated with the Germans duririg the war. Of these, 241 were executed. power and regional control of financial resources motivated their political choiœs.
Alberto Sciandra feels that decentralization would help simplify problems in a complex world, mile Mario DiPrimio feels that centralism consists of laws decreed by Rome which don? take into account the special needs of each region.
Others were motivated by political factors, namely, the failure of traditional parties to solve Italy's economic problems. Mario DiPrimio felt that state attempts to help develop the southem ltalian economy have failed because the political class didn't direct resources to aid the underdeveloped South, but to the privileged few.
Gianfranco Novero, a municipal assessor in Cirié on the outskirts of Turin, was looking for more honesty in a morally banknipt political system, as was his colleague Paolo Bini. Alberto Sciandra also referred to the compt political class which ruled ltaly between 1945 and 1991. Erwle Fossale, the provincial secretary of the Vercelli province, was attracted to the party's policy. Before he joined the party, Fossale had never been involved in politics because of his disillusionment with traditional political choices. He recalls that when he read about the new party, he was attracted by its simple, direct language and relevance. Roberto Rosso, provincial secretary of the province of Turin, was attracted to the Lega after it became a wnfederation of different regional parties in 1991.
CulturalBistorical reasons play a srnall part in motivating political choices.
While Gianfranw Novero said the protection of local cultures should be a priority.
Fossale also said that he wanted to assert his ethnic identity and emphasize the cultural aspects of his region. Personal reasons tended to motivate the younger interviewees. 60th Alberto Sciandra and Roberto Rosso indicated that the desire to serve their communities or to participate in politics, influenced their decision to join the Lega.
When asked to explain the resurgence of autonomist movements in northem ltaly in the 1980s and 1990s, institutional factors, including a critique of centralism and fiscal unfaimess/rnismanagement, dominated the responses of the interviewees. Roberto Cerese, a Lega deputy and head of the Parliamentary
Commission on Health, says that the distribution of fiscal resources under the current system is unfair. According to Roberto Cerese, the redistribution of local taxes from Rome does not unifomly benefit the regions, and favours the South to the detriment of the North. Ercole Fossale noted that 90% of personal taxes are funnelled to Rome so that people don't see the concrete results of their work. If local mayors want to raise money for projects, they need to implernent additional taxation measures. Mario DiPrimio referred to the intense fiscal pressure on citizens and the feeling that the state misrnanages the money it does collect.
Giovanni Baudin said the fiscal system is unfair because the North doesn't administer its own money. He also referred to the overrepresentation of southerners in the public service.
The political factors include a belief that ideologies are dead and that the traditional political parties are inept. Roberto Cerese said that ideals and individuality have filled the void left after the decline of ideologies. Sciandra referred to Italy's experience with bad govemment, while Roberto Rosso attributed the Lega's popularity to Bossi's political intuition in pursuing the federalism route.
Culturalhistorical factors played as strong a role as the political variables, in
explaining the existence of the Lega Nord. Alberto Sciandra noted that people
increasingly sense the need for points of reference in a cultural void, while Rosso
noted that the ltalian state's atternpts to homogenize the different regional cultures,
through the creation of RAI, the state-owned telecommunications network in the
1950s, is one of the reasons why there is a new interest in recapturing local
differences. Mario DiPrirnio noted that the absence of a strong sense of nationality
is due to the passionless nature of the ltalian Risorgimento. He feels that strong
national identities are only developed when citizens must sacrifice themselves in wars of liberation.
Quebec:
As the table below demonstrates, political variables, working in both positive and negative directions, play an important role in influencing the political choices of the interviewees. All of the riding presidents interviewed were attracted to the Bloc because of its sovereignist platform. Nicole Boulet, president of the Montreal riding of Louis-Hébert, notes that the second-most important reason which influenced her
BQ loyalties was the feeling that the traditional Ottawa parties are too closely-linked to the financial establishment. For her, these parties did not ad in the citizens' best interests. The Beauce riding president, Jean-Guy Breton feels that the federal
Liberal Party has been forced to make compromises to satisfy the rest of Canadians, and that these compromises do not fulfil Quebec's interests.
Jean-Guy Breton and Ginette Beaudry, president of Mercier riding, note that
they would probably not vote in federal elections if the BQ did not exist. Thus, the
party attracts sovereignists, but also those disillusioned with the big business links
of the traditional parties and their consociational style of policy-making. Louis-
Philippe Lemire, head of the Hochelaga-Maisonneuve riding in Montreal and at 21
years, the youngest BQ riding president in the province, says that he was attracted
to the party by its moderate ideological character and by the fact that it is composed
of non-career politicians. Since Quebec separation would lead to the dissolution of
the BQ, Lemire feels the Bloc MPs are politicians of conviction, rather than
careerists. Lemire's observations provide sorne support to the thesis that the "new"
politics is about ideological moderation and non-material considerations.
Culturallhistorical and personal factors played a comparatively less important role in encouraging BQ loyalties, although Christian Pilote, president of the west
Montreal Island riding of Saint-Laurentlcartierville, said that he became a BQ militant in order to "allow old stock Quebecers to occupy their tnie place," emphasizing the historical colonializing tendencies of the Anglophones in the province. Christian Pilote also notes that he wanted to establish a country for future generations of Quebecers.
Where the cultural/historical factors played a more important role was in the interviewees' perceptions of the factors explaining the resurgence of nationalism in the 1990s, after it lay dormant in the 1980s. Jean-Guy Breton says the BQ exists because Quebecers have becorne more conscious that they wnstitute a distinct people. Christian Pilote feels that more Quebecers are realizing that self- govemance has its advantages. He also notes that in the past years, Quebecers feel they have been "put to the wall," and that the sovereignty movement is an
"instinctual act of self-preservation". Jean-Guy Breton also observes that
Quebecers now feel that sovereignty is inevitable, partly due to the entrance of younger voters in the electorate and the disappearance of older voters who had been opposed to the sovereigniy option.
Luc Landreville, president of the LaurierISainte-Marie riding, notes that immigration has exacerbated Quebec nationalisrn because new citizens adopt a
Canadian identity rather than Québécois allegiances when they settle in the province. According to Luc Landreville, this dilutes Quebec's uniqueness. If
Quebec were independent, it would be clear to newcomers that their land of choice is Quebec. Under those conditions, it would be easier to integrate immigrants who would understand that their adopted language is French.
Institutional critiques play an important role in the interviewees' explanation of 1990s-style nationalism. While Christian Pilote refers to 'Yederal govemment oppression," Ginette Beaudry refen to the federal govemment's distribution of public finances, a system which favours the large corporations to the detriment of less affluent citizens. For her, the fiscal pressure exerted by two govemments has become intolerable for many citizens. By far the most often cited institutional reason why the BQ exists was the respondents' perception that Canadian federalism has either centralized too much power in Ottawa's hands, that it has imposed too much unifonity on diverse provinces or that it has favoured Ontario.
Linked to this dissatisfaction with the current division of powers between the federal govemment and the provinces is pessimism about reœnt failures to refonn the constitution (wtiose patriation in 1982 was opposed by Quebec), due to the defeat of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. Louis-Philippe Lemire says that Quebecers have become more conscious that further attempts at constitutional renewal are a waste of time, energy and money. Political variables play a cornparatively minor role in the respondents' explanations of Quebec nationalisrn in the 1990s. Chambly riding preçident Gilles Beaudoin and Louis-Phillipe Lemire both note that the charismatic leadership of Bouchard galvanized the sovereignist movement, but it is the institutional critique which plays the most important role in reinvigorating Quebec nationalism. TABLE 7.1 - FACTORS INFLUENCING DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITARIAN PARTIES (# mentions) EXPLANATORY VARIABLES Volksunie Lega Nord
. -- -- Why did you join the party?: POUTICAL: - Traditional party fiilure - Party policylstructure - - Past political affiliation - Charismatic leadership - "Polïticians of conviction" INSTITUTIONAL: - Desire for institutional change - Institutional corru~tiodcrirne CULTURAUHtSTORICAL: - Majority oppression of minority - Protect local culture - Nationalisf identity PERSONAL: - Give children a country - Experience with bureaucracy - Public service - Social benefe Explain nationalismlautonomist movements in the 1990s: POLITICAL: - Party re-orgainkation (PQ) - Charismatic leadership , Traditional party failure - * ' - Ideological moderation INSTlTUTlONAUSTRUCTURAL: - Centralist tendencies of state - Fiscal mismanagernentlunfaimess - Constitutional refonn fiilures - Unfair Public Service employment practices - Economic insecurity CULTURAUHISTORICAL: - Languagefculture threatened n - lncreased consciousness that *1i group is a separate "nation" - New generation of voters - Absence of strong state identitY J3elgium:
As with the other jurisdictions, institutional critiques top the list of state failures, although the cultural variables weigh more heavily here than in either
Quebec or Piemonte. One of the main criticisms lies in what the respondents perceive as the centralized organization of the Belgian state, and its failure to distribute fiscal resources evenly across the country. First Marc Hendrickx argues that although the Flemish constitute 60% of the country's population, they are entitled to only 50% of Cabinet representation. Second, he feels that the region is entitled to 60% of al1 tax revenues, instead of 50%. Third, he says Belgium's social security system directs too much money to Wallonia: 'We feel as if they can't exist without ouf support."
Jan Rogiers wants to see the decentralization of the social sewrity and transportation competencies that now lie in the federal govemment's hands, while
Sigurd Vangermeersch and Jan Puypé referred to the duplication of services that results through the "pillarkation" of the social service system. This means that each ideological family - the Christians, Socialists and Liberals - receive funds from the central state to support their own social service organizations, which the interviewees argue wastes tax revenues and increases Belgium's debt.
The cultural variables which the respondents argue marked the failure of the
Belgian state include historical grievances such as discrimination against Dutch speakers following Belgium's independence frorn the Netherlands in 1830. Lucie
De Munck refers to the laissez-faire language policies of the nineteenth century which resulted in French becoming the language of govemment and education, while Flemish was considered a dialect of the poor. She adds that historically, the important jobs in the public service and private sector were given to the French.
She also referred to the Flemish character of Brussels, and its transformation into a largely French-speaking city after its boundaries were changed in the early twentieth century.
Piemonte:
When asked to identify the three chief failures of the ltalian state, institutional factors topped the list. The chief criticisms include the centralization of powers, the uneven distribution of fiscal resources across the country to the detriment of northern Italy, Italy's debt, the inability of the state to ameliorate conditions in southem ltaly despite the system of equalization payments that was designed to bring the economy in line with the northem ltalian standard of living, the failure of the welfare state to provide efficient social services, and the proliferation of organized crime in the south. Political and cultural factors were less &en cited and included Alberto Sciandra's observation that the errors and corruption which characterized the tenure of the post-war political class have distanced Italians from politics so much that there is a risk that they will seek out authoritarian solutions to
Italy's problems (ex. growth in popularity of the Alleanza Nazionale). Quebec:
When asked to identify the three chief failures of the Canadian state, the
Quebec respondents cited institutional variables, followed by cultural ones. The
centralizing tendencies of Canadian federalism and the failure of constitutional
refom packages topped this list. Canada's debt was also cited by Gilles Beaudoin,
Beaudry, Breton, Landreville and Lemire as state failures. Jean-Guy Breton attributes this debt to the duplication of federal services in areas of provincial powers.
Cultural/historical variables played a secondary role here, with some riding presidents referring to the Canadian govemment's abrogation of what they perceive as the original intentions of the framers of the 1867 constitution to create a decentralized state. Others referred to the introduction of Official Bilingualism in the
1960s by the Liberal government. Boulet considered this law aggressive and ruinous, because it was denounced by both the English and French for imposing second language usage in areas where it was not needed or wanted. Christian
Pilote echoes the same sentiments, but in more direct ternis. He views Trudeau's advocacy of official bilingualism as proof that the federal govemment wanted to assimilate francophones, much in the same way that the Durham report urged the assimilation of Francophones into the dominant English culture during the nineteenth century.
Luc Landreville also refers to what he perceives as a misguided federal strategy to standardize diverse provinces through its programs. He says that when the federal govemment began to substitute itself for the provincial govemments by
intervening more often in social and ewnomic affairs, it killed provincial initiative.
He cites as an exarnple the federally-subsidized wheat producers in western
Canada who have become dependent on public revenues for their welfare. For him, intewentionism is synonymous with standardization and homogenization - the worst outcornes for a diverse country such as Canada.
TABLE 7.2 - PERCEPTIONS OF STATE FAILURE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES VOLKSUNIE LEGA NORD BLOC QUEBECOIS What are the three chief failures of the central state? POLITICAL: - lnept governing class - Leftist ideology of post-war goveming parties INSTITUTIONAUSTRUCTURAL: - Constitutional failure - Centralization of powers - Fiscal unfaimessldebt - Economic mismanagement - Failute of welfare state - Corruptionlorganixed crime - Undemocratic parliamentary representation CULTURAUHISTOFUCAL: - Abrogation of constitution - Language legislation - Homogenization of diverse cultures - Discrimination Belaium:
A sense of optimism prevailed amongst the Volksunie members who were
asked whether they felt globalist tendencies have strengthened or weakened the
Flemish identity and their demands for power decentralization. Marc Hendrickx
confins the central point of the theory when he says that "people feel anonymous
(in a global environment). therefore, they go back to their roots". Vangermeersch
also feels that globalism won't weaken the Flemish identity, noting the European
Union's interest in Belgian-Flemish politics. Although he says that people are
increasingly open to more cultures as a result of immigration and mass media
influences, those developments won? necessarily lead to a decline in cultural
nationalism. Jan Pupye says that there is a need for economic globalization with a
place for culture and identity in it: "People aren't against globalism, but it must have
a human face ...that's why there's still a future to make a Europe with a more human
face".
However, there was some recognition that the macro-trends could pose a threat to the image of nationalist parties. Jan Roegiers echoed the concerns of the
Lega Nord's Paolo Bini, who argued that the mass media often cast nationalism in a
negative light. Jan Roegiers points out that journalists often fail to distinguish
between hard-line and moderate nationalists: "The media calls the (anti-immigrant)
Vlaams Bloc nationalists, but they're different." Piemonte:
The Lega officiais felt that globaIization/modemization trends did have an
impact on the federalistlautonomist movements of the 1980s and 1990s. and that
their influence on the Lega's growth or growth potential has been both positive and
negative. Giovanni Baudin, the provincial secretary of the province of Verbania,
said that the urbanization and industrialization of Italian society in the 1950s and
1960s strengthened attachments to local territories. He draws on his own personal
history to illustrate the effect which this transition frorn a rural to urban society had
on his political orientations. During the 1%Os, Italy's industrialization forced himself
and many Piemontesi from agricultural toms to emigrate to the large cities in
search of work. He says that this rapid displacement of people caused them to [ose
their identities and eradicated thousands of years of rural traditions. The
experience of adapting to urban society was traumatic, as he underlines the
importance that maintaining an identity has for one's self-confidence and security.
Alberto Sciandra. who is also a provincial councillor in Cuneo, feels that
globalist forces and the transfer of state powers to Brussels and Strasbourg have
sparked the renewed calls for power decentralkation. Firstly, he argues that the
macro institutions which are the products of modemization and nation-building, must delegate power because they are distant from the citizens they serve. He adds that most powers should be delegated according to the principle of subsidiarity
- to the govemment level which can most effectively perform the service. Only the classical federal powers - defence, foreign affairs, currency, civil rights - should be delegated to the ltalian state. Social services should belong to the region (health
care, social assistance, post-secondary education), the coordination of ewnomic
policy should rest at the macro-regional (state) level and al1 residual powers should
rest with the commune.
Alberto Sciandra adds that trade liberalization has meant that Piemonte
conducts more trade with southem France than with southem Italy: 'The Mure of
Cuneo is allied more with southern France... we are on an east-west axis in Europe,
not a north-south axis." This indicates that globalization forces such as the
elimination of trade barriers have changed the conceptions of some Piemontesi about the psychological and physical links they share with other Italians. This idea of transnational linkages is a clear product of global trade agreements and of the
European Union.
The transnational idea was echoed by Roberto Cerese, who insists that the
Lega is a European, transnational party, and not an ethno-regional or localist movement. Those present at the Cirié meeting agree that rnodemization has both diluted and reinforced the party's strength. One aspect of post-rnodemization, the growth of the mass media, has been a thorn in the Lega's side due to its consistently negative or dismissive coverage of the party, says Paolo Bini.
Gianfranco Novero and Roberto Cerese both said that immigration has strengthened the movement by highlighting the need to safeguard the Piemontese identity: "We live in a multi-ethnic world, but we must know ourselves, guard our identity, in order to converse with others.. .the Lega project departs from cultural ideas, but follows an institutional road. The ethnic road leads to violence, not reforrn..- .the secession rhetoric demonstrates what could be the extreme consequences of an insensitive central state. Paolo Bini adds that immigrants to the region must be taught to love Piemonte and to live by its traditions.
Roberto Rosso. who Iives in multiwltural Turin, also agrees that immigration has highlighted the Lega's popularity: 'We must give those who corne here the possibility to integrate. They must understand our culture. As things are now, our culture is threatened. They are ahead of us in ternis of identity... we must reestablish ourselves." With respect to technological developments, Rosso agrees that they have the potential to threaten the Piemontese culture and that the homogenization of cultures could lead to the establishment of dictatorships. The centralkation of economic activities, mass immigration and the opening of trade barriers have had a perverse effect on Piemonte, argues Roberto Rosso. "FIAT contracted work out to other nations for financial reasons...( a move) which resulted in higher unernployment in Piemonte". This situation could have been avoided, he argues, if Rome had encouraged the diversification of the Piemontese economy rather than the creation of large-scale, uncompetitive industries. He points to the example of northeastem Italy, whose prosperous economy is based on small and mid-sized companies operating in diversified fields, as an example of what Rome should have been promoting in Italy's northwestem industrial triangle. ''The immigration of southem ltalians to FIAT created ghettos in Torino ...the multinational has ruined us." Ercole Fossale believes that the centralist policies which are the result of the process of modem state building have resulted in the weakening of
federalism and have distanced people from the govemments which rule them.
Nevertheless he believes the future of Europe will lie in the break-up of larger states
into smaller units.
Mario Di Pmio feels that globalism can coexist with federalism, although he
describes ltaly as a country that has not been in the forefront of globalist trends. He
argues that until recently, there has been no desire on the part of politicians to leam from other nations and that only the younger generations (under 40) who have travelled and who have leamed about other institutional arrangements, are those who most value cultural autonomy. Thus, globalism in the way of increased
international travel, warks indirectly to socialize a new generation to doing politics differently.
Quebec:
When the Bloc riding presidents were asked whether they felt globalization tendencies had influenced the resurgence of Quebec nationalism in the 1990s, few of them saw any link between the two developments, and attributed greater importance to interna1 forces peculiar to the domestic environment. Only Luc
Landreville referred to immigration as an important variable to consider when explaining modem Quebec nationalism. However, he noted that the phenornenon cannot be interpreted as a rejection of globalization forces, but as an affirmation of identity based on an historical accumulation of grievances. Breton characterizes the Bloc's existence as a response to the Canadian govemment's actions, and that the party's role is not so much to protect Quebec against extemal intrusions, but to defend the province's specific interests and the interests of those Canadians who share the same problems. Christian Pilote also felt that nationalism has an energy which nurtures itself, and that it is not affected by globalization/modernization tendencies. Many of the interviewees tumed the question around to speculate on the place of nationalism in a global environment.
Nicole Boulet said that sovereignty would permit Quebec to demonstrate its uniqueness in a world with increasingly porous borders. Christian Pilote felt that independence would protect Quebecers against an eventual cultural menace that is posed by g lobalization.
When asked whether globalization reinforces or hinders nationalism in
Quebec, Jean-Guy Breton felt that it could cool nationalist passions because many economic actors (banks, Canadian and Quebec entrepreneurs) would encourage fear about the potential economic fall-out if Quebec were to becorne independent.
In other words, globalization would have an effect on the confidence of some
Quebecers in the sovereignty project. Nicole Boulet also felt that if globalization dilutes or reinforces Quebec nationalisrn, it would infuence Quebecers' confidence in the sovereignty project. However, she feels these reactions would influence the intensity of nationalism in a superficial, not fundamental, manner. Gilles Beaudoin also felt that globalization could have a potentially negative effect on nationalism by altering the Quebec culture and by enwuraging the decline in usage of the French language. Because of this, independence would give Quebec the necessary tools to safeguard its culture. Only Ginette Beaudry felt more positive about the potential effects of globalization on culture, suggesting that these forces will contribute towards promoting the Quebec culture abroad.
Discussion of autonomist movements in the 1990s
In Piernonte and Quebec, the failure of the traditional parties to enact major institutional changes, and the attractive platforms of the autonomist alternatives, were critical factors in canvincing the intewiewees to join the parties in this study.
In Belgium, cultural variables were much stronger in motivating personal choices, in addition to the Volksunie's appeal as a moderate, ideologically diverse movement.
Institutional and structural explanations also dominated the interviewees' perceptions of the resurgence of nationalism in Piemonte and Quebec. While cultural/historical memories are stronger in the latter jurisdiction than in Piemonte, the results of the interviews suggest that autonomist sentiments in both territories are the direct products of an institutional critique, and disillusionment with the traditional parties and govemments, rather than the result of an emotional appeal to identity. ldentity may be the common bond of those who are dissatisfied with current instititutions. Cultural mernories play a stronger role in the Volksunie's members' perceptions of why their party was created and has endured. These intewiewees drew more often on the historical experiences of the Flemish with unfavourable language legislation and the post-war treatment of some collaborators. These memories are still very vivid, especially for the older party
members,
The chief failures of the Canadian and ltalian states were identified as failure to decentralize power and to manage their finances in a fair or efficient manner. In
al1 three states, political variables such as the failures of individual politicians
played a minor role in their critique. Although the Lega Nord respondents'
identification of political corruption as a state failure is a political variable, the institutionalized character of corruption in Italy's executive, legislative and administrative branches of govemment, makes it a structural problem rather than the mark of a few individuals lacking integrity. The interview results from both
Piemonte and Quebec suggest that short-ten strategies on the part of traditional parties, such as attractive policies and charismatic leaders, would not be enough to dilute the support for wmmunitarian parties, and that only fundamental institutional changes cari address these memben' grievances.
Thus far, it is too early for the Volksunie respondents to launch an intensive institutional critique of the federal refoms in Belgium. However, there are signs of dissatisfaction with the changes that have been implemented. This may lead to speculation about whether institutional tinkering can quel1 nationalist sentiments in the long-run. Although the Volksunie's share of the popular vote has decreased since the federalization of Belgium's institutions took place, the popular vote for the
Vlaams Bloc, whose nationalism is much more strident than the moderate
Volksunie's, has increased as much as the VU'S has decreased. The globalization question and its relationship to the strength or weakness of nationalism in the 1990s drew diverse responses in the airee jurisdictions. In
Belgium, the respondents saw these tendencies as largely positive forces which would strengthen their popularity as more Flemings would feel the need to centre thernselves in their cultural identities. In Italy, globalism, particularly immigration, was seen as a threat to the protection of Piemontese identity, but also as a valuable
"wake-up call" that this identity must be reestablished. The mass media was criticized as a threat to the Lega movernent because of its hostile or indifferent coverage of the party, while cnimbling trade barriers and the creation of the
European Union were seen as factors which strengthen the Iiberal and federalist character of the Lega.
In Quebec, the majority of the respondents do not link globalization and the resurgence of the nationalist movement in the 1990s. Instead, they attribute the
Bloc's popularity to intemal forces working within Quebec and Canada. When there was an admission that these forces might have an effect on the intensity of Quebec nationalism, they were seen as potentially negative developments which would threaten the protection of the Québécois culture and language. Only one interviewee saw them as oppcrtunities to introduce Quebec culture to the world.
Thus, in the eyes of party members, the globalism-localism thesis seems to be more applicable in Europe than in North Arnerica.
This difference in the geographic relevance of the thesis to explaining ethno- regional movements could be attributed to the process of European integration. which heightens citizen awareness of eaemal challenges to the preservation of local diversity. In Quebec, none of the respondents attributed the growth of Quebec nationalism to the increased awareness of international economic agreements such as the North Arnerican Free Trade Agreement, and the threat it may pose to francophone institutions. The thesis' comparative relevance in Europe could also be attributed to the high profile of immigration issues in Europe. For ancient
European cultures, the influx of new groups might be perceived as more of a threat than the influx of immigrants to the younger and multicultural Quebec society.
There is another possibility as to why the thesis seems to be less applicable to the Quebec case. During the personal interviews, several BQ ofiicials indicated that modem Quebec nationalism has developed within the container of the dynamics of provincial and federal politics. Only a few of the respondents cited immigration pressures, a manifestation of globalization trends, as possible contributors to the formation of the BQ.
The findings from the personal interviews suggest that globalization forces, along with the other traditional explanations of ethno-regional movements, have contributed towards the persistence of cornmunitarian movernents. The globalization influence mentioned most oflen was disillusionment with the central state. This disillusionment is traced either to perceptions that the state has mismanaged important short-term issues, or has failed to recognize its interna1 diversity through policies which seek to level inter-regional differences. What is striking is that prominent endogenous variables such as regional economic disparities. relative economic deprivation, job market competition, and regional economic development and potential were not mentioned in the interviews. lntervening variables such as traditional party failure or the amergence of capable nationalist elites. and endogenous variables such as a distinctive cultural identity were mentioned in the interviews, but not with the frequency which one might have expected.
Similarly, globalization forces were infrequently mentioned by the respondents as explanatory factors for ethno-regionalism: the growth of micro- electronic communications and international travel, immigration, increased levels of state dependence on foreign acton, and increased capacities for individual self- determination of lifestyles. Nevertheless, the statistical data illustrate that globalization forces can influence people at the subconscious level. While the respondents may not directly link these macro trends to their political choices, the correlation and regression analyses demonstrate that lifestyle choices and one's exposure to globalization do matter. The quantitative and qualitative data presented here show that globalization forces, along with domestic-oriented explanations of ethno-regionalisrn, both account for the persistence of contemporary cornmunitarianism. CHAPTER EIGHT: POST-MODERNITY AND TRADITION IN A BORDERLESS WORLD
This study has demonstrated that predictions about the power of nation-state
building, modemization and globalization to erode sub-state loyalties have
underestimated the enduring appeal of communitarian loyalties, and especially
those based on regional and religious cleavages. Of the 162 communitarian parties
which have been founded in 21 industrialized states since the end of World War 11,
nearly a quarter of them have achieved Sartori's criteria for political relevance.
Furthemore, not only have they demonstrated a capacity to influence the agenda of
current states, but they persist even when their popular support falls to negligible
levels.
The analysis of the parties' supporters was undertaken with the intent of discovering whether they reflect or reject the twin forces of globalization and
individuation which are said to characterize post-modem, post-industrial societies.
It should be noted that the case studies are not intended to be representative of the universe of communitarian parties, merely indicative of where these specific parties are located on the traditional-post-modem continuum. According to the globalization hypothesis, turbulent change and the increased porousness of current territorial arrangements are supposed to induce a desire on the part of citizens to seek lost identities that are threatened by decreased state capacities, the growth of microelectronic communication and increased population mobility. The hypothesis suggests two possible profiles of contemporary communitarian supporters. The first profile paints a picture of the "post-modem" communitarian who is Young, well- educated, mobile, knowledgeable about international events and trends, and who posesses highlydeveloped mpacities for individuation. If the globalist-localist thesis makes erroneous links between transnational trends and the resurgence of wmmunitarian loyalties, then party rnembers will fit the second "traditional" profile of relatively immobile people who corne from Iess advantageous socio-demographic backgrounds, and who are insulated from the forces of globalization. This second type tends to react against globalization tendencies, rather than ernbrace them.
This study has looked closely at how three communitarian parties bear out these predictions. A recurn'ng theme in this analysis is that the party members exhibit both traditional and post-modem characteristics in the demographic composition of their memberships. After considering both the quantitative and qualitative data which have been presented here, it appears that the globalist- localist thesis is most applicable in Italy, less relevant in Quebec, and exerts some influence in Belgium.
The policy priorities of the cornmunitarians reveal that traditional materialist issues are still valued, although ewlogical wncems have made an impact with the
European respondents. The ideological orientations of the party rnembers are as diverse as their demographic backgrounds. In al1 three cases, contemporary communitarianism is not doctrinaire, but pragmatic, flexible and pluralistic.
Globalist-localist theorists posit that an expected product of globalization and the wrresponding decrease in nation-state sovereignty, is the citizen's loss of confidence in central goveming institutions. Not surprisingly, the survey results
confin this view most strongly in Quebec, where Viere is much disillusionment with
Canada's wellestablished federal system. but also in Belgium, where its reœntly
developed federal system does not seern to have gained the support of the Flemish
respondents.
In a world where state sovereignty is being threatened by supranational
instiiutions, citizens are supposed to be losing faith in central institutions and
seeking out more immediate levels of govemment to represent them. These trends
are confinned by the respondents' identification of the most representative level of
govemment. In none of the jurisdictions did more than 5% of the respondents
identify the national govemment as the most representative. International
institutions also failed to make an impression on the respondents, and in Europe,
loyalties were split between local and regional levels of govemrnent.
An interesting difference between the Canadian and European cases
emerges with respect to the expression of territorial loyalties. In Europe they are
split between the city and region, while in Quebec they are directed only to the
province. Perhaps more importantly for the thesis under examination here, no
evidence was found that these autonomist movements represent a simultaneous
inward and outward direction of loyalty to supranational geographic areas. Here, the globalist-localist thesis is weakened by evidence pointing to a propensity to value the familiar, rather than to embrace the distant and unknown. Spatial and class mobility are a few indicators of the modem capacity for
individuation. While many cornmunitarian supporters have led mobile lifestyles,
they are less flexible with respect to social mobility. About one-third of the members
in the European parties have lived outside their regions of birth. Arnongst BQ
supporters, there is considerable evidence of movement as more than half of them
have lived in a community outside their bitthplace, and a quarter of them have
attended school outside Quebec. In al1 three parties, close to two-thirds of the
respondents belong to the same socioeconomic class as their parents. However,
even when there is evidence of class mobility, it is often of the downwards variety for the younger cohorts. This suggests that the motivation for younger voters joining the party may be based more on an econornic protest, rather than a territorial
protest against centralization and homogeneity. However, lacking the appropriate
survey instrument to test this proposition, it would be premature to make any
assumptions about the psychological dispositions of the younger members.
Individuation can also be measured by the capacity to protect one's wmmunity from extemal intrusions. On this count, the party members have only
been partially successful. While a majority of them belong to local clubs, only the
Leghisti have been able to spatially segregate themselves by living in ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods. This demonstrates a wholly post-modern desire to value and retain difference, rather than to accept the pressures of homogenization
in modem societies. While this fact may be interpreted by some as indicative of racist or separatist proclivities, most of the comments from the persona1 intewiews indicate that there exists less of an antagonism towards "others", than a desire to reassert oneself in a rapidly changing social environment.
When asked about immigration, the survey found that a majority of LN and
BQ respondents favour lower immigration rates, and thus, exhibit individuation tendencies towards spatial segregation from extemal cultural intrusions. The
Vol ksunie membership was split on the question of immigrant assimilation, while in
Quebec, the respondents were strongly in favour of it. In Italy, the respondents were lzrgely opposed to the proposai. Since assimilationist policies run counter to post-modem values. then only the Lega supporters fulfill the expectations of the globalist-localist thesis, while their Quebec counterparts are, comparatively, the least tolerant of diversity.
With respect to their exposure to globalization through knowledge of other languages or travel, al1 the members score well on the bilingualism indicator.
However, only the Flemish tend to travel frequently outside thier country. This may be attributed to the higher incomes of the Flemish respondents or to longer travelling distances in North America. Nevertheiess, wmmunitarians tend to stay close to home. Their interests in international curent affairs, trends and cultures were also adopted as indicators of an openness to globalization. Members in the three countries use the new information technology frequently, but only the BQ supporters indicate high levels of interest in international news and multicultural events. With the European cornmunitarians expressing high levels of concern with events and trends in their own countries, and their Quebec counterparts reporting the opposite proclivity, the validity of the globalism-localism thesis is limited in this case, to North American exceptionalism.
A correlation analysis of the relationships between the demographic, issue orientation, lifestyle and cultural interest variables shows that arnongst VU supporters, the perception that Flanders has been treated unfairly is associated with post-modern characteristics such as higher education and foreign travel. However, agreement with the proposal to assimilate immigrants is also associated with post- modem proclivities such as the frequent usage of the new technology and higher education. Therefore, whi le disillusionment with central goveming institutions and the desire for cultural homogenization are linked to post-modemity. While the former finding confirms the globalist-localist thesis, the latter one does not. Other data, such as the fact that local and regional identifiers tend to be employed in non- tertiary activities, and to express no interest in, or usage of, technology, further reduce the explanatory power of the globalism-localism thesis in Belgium.
Within the Lega, supporters expressing the most faith in the representativeness of lower and intemediate levels of govemment tend to live in
Piemontesi neighbourhoods, oppose immigrant assimilation and favour lower immigration rates. Here, the data confirm the central thesis that autonornists are highly individuated citizens. Members who oppose the assimilation of immigrants are not traditional and have been exposed to global forces such as knowledge of other languages and mobile lifestyles. Those who profess local and regional identities in the Lega have not been sheltered by transnational forces, as there is a strong and positive association between them and residence in multicultural neighbourhoods and bilingualism. However. on other wunts. local and regional identities are associated with indicators of tradition such as infrequent travel, negligible interest in foreign affairs, cultures and sports, employment in non-tertiary activities, lower household incomes and residence in smaller comrnunities.
Amongst BQ supporters, the frequent foreign travellers disagree that the federal govemment has treated Quebec unfairly, thus challenging the globalist- localist thesis that exposure to the world reduces citizen confidence in central goveming institutions. This point is interesting because it illustrates how exposure to other cultures can improve one's image of a Canadian institution that has been maligned in separatist circles. Furthemore, BQ members who are employed in workplaces with more than 25 employees tend to agree that the federal govemment is not autonomous and favour reduced immigration rates. These correlations also weaken the globalization-localism thesis, by indicating that employees in modern workplaces, rather than smaller-scale, post-modern fims, express less faith in federalism and a greater desire for spatial segregation from other cultures. The one finding which supports the central thesis is that residents in comrnunities with more than 30,000 people tend to agree that the federal govemment treats some regions better than others, indicating that disillusionment with federalism is not confined to the smaller, traditional communities.
There is a modest association between the BQ supporters and an interest in foreign cultures, suggesting that loyalty to lower orders of govemment does not necessarily lead to parochialism. The post-modem elements of the BQ tend to oppose immigrant assimilation. Frequent usage of cornputers, inter-provincial travel, education mobility, and higher education are al1 associated with opposition to the levelling of cultural differences. This supports the globalist-localist thesis that globalization is linked to a preference for cultural pluralism.
Finally, intemediate geographic identities in the BQ are associated with a leftist ideological predisposition, likely because of the strong associations between provincial support for the Parti Québécois and federal support for the Bloc. In
Europe, comrnunitarianism is non-ideological, and thus, post-modem and pragmatic. In Canada, the Bloc's more ideologically-oriented clientele wuld be interpreted as being responsive to the class voting trends that have long influenced
European voting patterns, or it could be the harbinger of the new value-oriented politics that lnglehart has written about, where leftist, post-rnaterial tendencies are said to shape post-industrial politics.
The regression analyses of local and regional attachments in Europe demonstrates that while globalization and wunterglobalization forces have exerted a strong impact on geographic Ioyalties, other explanations of ethno-regionalism help predict cornmunitarian loyalties. Evaluations of institutional performance, demographic and lifestyle variables exert direct and indirect influences on identities.
In the Volksunie case, the institutional variables outperfom the influence of the globalization variables, and in the Italian case they are equally predictive of cornmunitarian loyalties as the globalization variables. The Flemish data denote two interesting trends. While regional identities are
partially influenced by ernployment in post-modern, post-Fordist workplaces, local
identities are influenced by insulation against globalization forces. In Belgium, it appears that the "new" localism is not a homogeneous phenomenon. Regional loyalties are associated with post-modemity, hilecommunal ones are associated with pre-modernity. In Piemonte, there was no such bifurcation of the "new" localism, as regional and local identities could not be separated from each other to produce significant results. When they were considered together as one dependent variable, demographic characteristics and cultural interests were two of the three variables explaining most of the variance in respondents' territorial loyalties. One
"global" force which detemines localist identities is disagreement with the prospect of immigrant assimilation.
As previously stated, these parties contain elements of both tradition and post-modernity, although there is a high level of cohesiveness with respect to issue orientations, ideology and lifestyles. The general absence of high F-scores in the analysis points to the likelihood that these parties exist and persist precisely because they have incorporated and merged the interests of their traditional and post-modern elements. When there are differences, they are based on ideology in the Volksunie, on income and ideology in the Lega Nord, and on age in the Bloc
Québécois. Amongst Volksunie supporters, rnembers aged 40 and over who express the most support for local govemrnent and the highest levels of opposition to immigrant assimilation, were located to the centre-right of the ideological spectrum. In Italy, those who express centre-right political orientations also oppose immigrant assimilation. These data show that, contrary to the predictions of some post-industrial theorists, those who most value local differentiation in Europe are centrist in their orientations, and not leftist. In Quebec, significant differences were found between Bloquistes under 40 who rank social programs as the most important issue and their older counterparts who rank unemployment and debt as the most pressing issues. While there are more intra-party differences with respect to the mobility patterns of the respondents, few of them prove to be statistically significant cleavages. In Belgium, the younger Volksunie members (under 40) report higher levels of bilingualism and wmputer usage than their older wlleagues. The older members report more instances of local club involvement, class mobility and interest in foreign cultures. These data echo a recurring pattern in the survey data: while the under-40 group may be more open to the new technology, it does not necessarily mean that exposure to globalization leads to iricreased individuation capabilities, thus challenging the globalist thesis that these processes are interdependent.
The intra-party divisions in the Bloc are sirnilar to those in the Flemish sample. The older members report more class mobility, while the younger members are more frequent users of computen and faxes. In both Quebec and Piemonte, the wealthier respondents tend to use wmputers and travel more frequently, and to express more interest in international news. These data generally suggest that if there are divisions within these parties, they are between younger or wealthier members who have been exposed to globalization tendencies, and older supporters
with a greater capacity for individuation. Interestingly, the most relevant intemal
party cleavages are between different generations of post-rnodemists, rather than
between traditionalists and post-modemists. Again, this points to the parties' capacity to persist, once the older generations exit the party.
The typology of party supporters shows that only a minofity within the Lega and BQ can be characterized as post-modern, while a strong pluraiity in the VU can be described this way. What's important to note is that these parties have the potential to act as brokers between different interests within their own ethnic or regional containers. This capacity to appeal to groups which are subtly different from each other, as demonstrated by the ANOVA analysis, testifies to their potential to achieve electoral success, and thus, to persist. They do not appear to be beset by profound intemal divisions, yet what divisions do exist, are accommodated within. While this power to appeal to many may increase their likelihood of survival in the face of globalization pressures, it is also likely to make them as vulnerable to short-terrn political variables as any non-communitarian party. The emergence of new issues, the absence of charismatic leadership or the revitalization of the political competition, are al1 factors which could easily cut into the support base of these cornmunitarian catch-al1 parties.
Of course, the institutional setting in which these parties cornpete must also be favourable. The BQ, which fields candidates only in Quebec, under a single- member plurality, first-past-the-post electoral system, is the most at risk since it will never win a federal election on its own, and has a remote chance of ever gaining the balance of power in a Canadian parliament. Furthemore, since the provincial
PQ is wnsidered to be the standard bearer of the separatist cause in Quebec, the party may in the future become irrelevant in the eyes of Quebeckers. The European parties are under no such constraints, as they compete in electoral systems with a measure of proportional representation. They have in the past, and could be in the future. coalition govemment partners.
The personal interviews confimi that domestic-oriented, exogenous variables directly influence an individual's party affiliation and hislher analysis of the growth of cornmunitarianism. The respondents infrequently cited globalization and individuation forces as the explanation for the growth of cornmunitarian parties or their negative evaluations of state performance. However, citizens are not likely to be aware of the unconçcious influence which they can exert. For this reason, the statistical analysis of their backgrounds, issue orientations and lifestyles, must be considered along with the interview results.
The perceptions of globalization's influence on political identities differ between countries. In Belgium, the effects are viewed as positive; in Piemonte, they entail both positive and negative implications for the Lega's future, and in
Quebec, they are not perceived to play a critical role. In Europe, there is more sensitivity to globalization forces, perhaps because of the smaller size of the states or the existence of the European Union. Arnongst Lega supporters, the respondents saw industriakation, the growth of the mass media and immigration as challenges to the strength of its movement and to the protection of the Piemontese culture. The only globalization tendencies which were seen in a positive Iight were expressed by the younger interviewees Mofelt that the emergence of the
European Union and international travel had exposed them to other cultures and means of governance.
In Belgium, globalization was viewed as a positive force which will only highlight the increased need of people to retum to their cultural roots in an
"anonymous" global environment. One respondent also felt that immigration and the mass media have made the party's members more reœptive to foreign cultures.
This study has demonstrated that the globalism-localism thesis cannot replace the explanatory power of domestic, exogenous variables, but the impact of technology, immigration and the decentrakation of the workplace cannot be ignored in an analysis of these parties' growth patterns and their intemal cleavages.
Even a conservative estimate of the thesis' relative importance in explaining cuntemporary secessionist or autonomist movements would rank transnational variables at least as important as intervening (usually political or ideological) or endogenous (usually cultural) variables, but not as important as exogenous factors such as institutional performance and the distribution of powers within domestic settings.
As outlined in the summary of this study's major findings, the globalist-localist thesis is a "qualified" success as a theory accounting for the nature and persistence of cornmunitarianism. For every finding which challenges the central tenets of the theory, there are additional data which sustain its retevance in explaining why the integrationist scholars were misguided about the nature and fate of cultural nationalisrn. One of the key questions underlying this study was whether ethno- regional parties, as examples of cornmunitarian revivals, are modem or non- modem. The bulk of the evidence indicates that these parties are primarily non- modem in that they tend to exhibit either pre-modem or post-modern characteristics The difficulty in assessing whether these parties are pre-modem or post-modem lies in the globalist-localist theorists' amorphous or contradidory operationalization of key indicators. For example, globalization and individuation are posited to be compatible trends in post-modem societies. Yet the operationalization of globalization envisions an openness to the outside world, while the operationalization of individuation includes a proclivity to insulate oneself and one's group from the "othef '. This paradox makes it difficult to interpret whether the responses to questions on immigration and the cultural composition of one's neighbourhood are illustrative of the non-racist, post-modern quest for self- actualization, or the pre-modem and exclusionary tendency to "stick to one's kin".
The answer to this dilemma likely hinges on probing the respondents' psychological orientations through numerous, intensive personal interviews.
The typologies of the party supporters also highlight the difficulty of arriving at a definitive conclusion about the pre-modem, post-modem dilemma. Many of the members in al1 three parties were characterized as "mixed" traditionalists and post- rnodemists. Within the Lega, neither the convergence nor globalist-localist theories were able to describe nearly a third of the respondents. Since both pre-modem and
post-modern tendencies are prominent in each of the parties, they muid dilute each
other, although it appears that pre-modem tendencies have a slight edge over post-
modem ones in two of the parties.
These observations illustrate the weaknesses in the most prominent theories
of contemporary communitarianism. While the convergence theorists do not
consider that non-modem tendencies could be post-modem, the globalist-localist
theorists fail to adequately distinguish between pre- and post-rnodemity. This,
however, could be attributed to the challenging enterprise of operationalizing the
theory's central concepts.
The theory also does not resolve the relationship between gender and
contemporary communitarianism. The data show that males and females often
differ in their issue orientations, membership and lifestyle patterns. In addition to
higher male membership levels in these parties, the males report higher levels of
mobility and exposure to globalization forces than the females. The problem for the
researcher is how to interpret the lack of attraction which these parties have for females? Does it mean that the party is non-inclusionary, and thus, pre-modern?
Or does this mean that the parties are post-modem, and that females do not
generally fulfill the post-modem criteria set out by the theorists? Unfortunately, the
globalist-localist theorists do not provide any guidance on this point.
Finall y, the entire discussion surrounding the differences between pre-
modemity, modemity and post-modernity that was introduced in the first chapter, complicates the depiction of the party memberships. What has been characterized
as post-modernity, sometimes overlaps what has been referred to as pre-modernity.
For example, the artisan of the small, pre-modem workplace has been replaced by
the computer analyst or by the worker on the automated assembly line in the
smailer-scale, decentralised, post-Fordist workplaces. The result is that the distinction between the pre-modem and post-modem begins to blur. Fortunately, workplace size is but one variable of many that can be used to assess post- modemity; the operationakation of the key concepts of globalization and
individuation provide other opportunities for the researcher to test the respondents' exposure to genuinely "new" forces such as computer technology and increased spatial rnobility.
This leads to the argument which was set forth in the initial chapter: that what has been labelled "modemity" really constitutes a counter-reaction to what I would term the first stage of "modernity". Both pre-modemity and post-modemity share a concern for the protection of cultural pluralism in a de-centred world; thus, any policies which have sought to impose one culture over others are clearly antithetical to the acceptance of diversity.
Nevertheless, this study has demonstrated that globalization and communitarianism are not mutually exclusive, and that post-modem proclivities can find a home within parties that are largely traditional. The fact that tradition can accommodate post-modemity, suggests that communitarianism is flexible enough to adapt to transnational trends, and that it is likely to persist despite pressures against the retention of local allegiances. NOTES
1. The tally on cornmunitarian party formation was calculated frorn: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose, The International Almanac of electoral History, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1991); Europa Publications, Western Europe 1993, (London: Europa Publications, 1992); Europa Publications, The Far East and Australasia, 20th ed., (London: Europa publications Ltd., 1994); Europa Publications Ltd., The Middle East and North Af&a, 41st ed., (London: Europa Publications Ltd.. 1994); Alan Day, Political Paeies of the World, 3rd and 4th eds., (London: St. James Press, 1988, 1996); Council on Foreign Relations, Politcal Handbook of the World: pariiaments, parties and press, 1945-1 987, (Harper: New York, 1988).
2. Questions #1A-C (issues), #5A-F (ideology), #12 (sex) not recoded Question 6: "1" = does not live in multicultural neighbourhood; "2" = lives in multicultural neighbourhood. Question 8A-B: "1" = some or a lot of interest in local or regionaVprovincial news; "2" = not much interest in local or regionallprovincial news. Question 8C-G: "1" = not much interest in national news, international news, new technology, foreign sports and foreign cultural events; "2" = some or a lot of interest in above subject areas. Question 9A-E: "1" = respondent is not bilingual; "2" = respondent bilingual; "1" = respondent has not lived in a cornrnunity/region outside of birthplace; ''2" = respondent has lived in a community/region outside of birthplace; "1 " = respondent has not been educated outside region/province of birthplace; "2" = respondent has been educated outside regionlprovince of birthplace; "1" = respondent belongs to same socio-economic class as parents; "2" = respondent belongs to different socio- economic class as parents; "1" = local club member; "2"=nontlub member. Question 11: "1" = 40-80 years of age; "2= under 40 years of age. Question 15: "1" = > 25 employees in workplace; "2" = < 26 employees. Question 16: "1" = < 50,000 Belgian Francs or < 36 million ltalian Lire or c $40,000 Canadian dollars; "2" = annual household income levels above cited figures for each jurisdiction. Question 17: "1" = < 30,000 residents; "2" = > 30,000 residents.
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Wright, Vincent. 1979. Regionalkation under the French Fifth Republic: The Triumph of the Functional Approach. In Decentralist Trends in Western Democracies. Ed. L.J. Sharpe. London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. INTERVIEW LIST BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS
Gilles Beaudoin
Ginette Beaudry
Nicole Boulet
Jean-Guy Breton
Luc Landreville
Louis-Philippe Lemire
Christian Pilote
LEGA NORD - PIEMONTE
Giovanni Baudin
Paolo Bini
Roberto Cerese
Gianfranco Cerutti
Piero Colombatto
Sergio Colombatto
Mario Di Primio
Ercole Fossale
Gianfranco Novero
Roberto Rosso
Alberto Sciandra VOLKSUNIE
Lucie De Munck
Marc Hendrickx
Jan Pupyé
Jan Roegiers
Sigurd Vangemeersch iiii i iii iii i i i LLLL L b L L LLL L. L. L &iElikk aQ)Q)o Q) aaa aao Q>o a Q)Q)Q)Q)Q1 Y 7 Y Y Y TABLE- 2.2 - POST-WAR COMMUNITARIAN PARTIES: CANADA-FINLAND COUNTRY IRRELEVANT RELEVANT ORIENTATION L Social Credit Rally Ethno-terr Nationalist Party Ethno-terr. Nationalist Party Ethno-terr. Reform Party Territorial Popular National Party Ethno-terr. Party for an lndependent Nfld. Regional
Quebec Bloc Christian People's Religious Party Eskimo Brotherhood Finnish Rural Party Territorial
Finnish Christian Religious League
n.a.=information not available; *=party still in existence ABLE 2.3 - POST-WAR COMMUNITARIAN PARTIES: FRANCE-IRELAND COUNTRY IRRELEVANT RELEVANT ORIENTATION LIFESPAN France Democratic Centre Religious Democracy and Religious Progress Centre Centre of Social Religious Democrats Democratic Force Religious Germany Bavaria Party Territorial Bible-Believing Reliy ious Christians Greece Ind. Muslim Lists Ethno-religious 1985" Christian Democracy Religious 1985" lreland Independent Fianna Fail Ethno-religious 1970* Republican Sinn Fein Ethno-religious 1986" n.a.=information not available; * = party still in existence
TABLE 2.7 - POST-WAR COMMUNlTARlAN PARTIES: NETHERLANDS-PORTUGAL
COUNTRY IRRELEVANT RELEVANT ORIENTATION Netherlands Catholic National Party Religious Reformed Political Religious Association Farmers' Party Territorial Roman Catholic Party Religious Neth. People's Union Ethnic Evangelical Political Religious Federation Evangelical People's Religious Party
I New Zealand Mana Motuhake Ethnic Ethnic Minority Party Ethnic Norway Aunelista Territorial Lappish People's List Ethnic Christian People's Party Religious Portugal Popular Party Religious n.a.=infomation not available; *=party still in existence TABLE 2.8 - POST-WAR COMMUNITARIAN PARTIES: SPAIN
COUNTRY IRRELEVANT RELEVANT ORIENTATION Spain Demo. Convergence of Territorial Catalonla Socialist Party of Navarra Territorial Basque Socialist Party Territorial Andalusian Party Territorial United People Territorial Catalan Socialists Territorial Convergence and Union Territoriat Union of the Navarrese Territorial People Valencian Union Territorial Galician Centrists Territorial Party of Muslim Territorial Democrats lndependent Canary Territorial Groupings Asturian Party Territorial Basque Solidarity Territorial Basque Left Territorial Basque Socialist Party- Territorial Party of Left Aragonese Regional Party Territorial lndependent Aragonese Territorial Party Canarian Coalition Territorial n.a.=information not available; "=party still in existence TABLE 2.9 - POST-WAR COMMUNlTARlAN PARTIES: SPAIN-UNITED KINGDOM
- - IRRELEVANT RELEVANT ORIENTATION LIFESPAN Democratic Union of Territorial Catalonia Catalonia Regionalist Party Territorial Union of the Centre and Territorial Christian Democrats of Catalonia Socialist Party of Valencia Territorial Sweden Christian Democratic Religious 1964* Party
Switzerland Vaud League Territorial Federal Democratic Union Religious Jura Rally Ethno-terr. Ticino League Ethno-terr. Jura Unity Ethno-terr. Evangelical People's Party Religious United Sons of Cornwall Territorial Kingdom Social Democratic and Ethno-terr. Labour Party Democratic Unionist Party Vanguard Unionist Ulster Unionists and Loyalists Scottish Labour Party Ulster Popular Unionists Progressive Unionist Party lslamic Party of Britain n.a.=information not available; *=party still in existence TABLE 2.10 - POST-WAR COMMUNlTARlAN PARTIES: UNITED KINGDOM - UNITED STATES
COUNTRY IRRELEVANT RELEVANT ORIENTATION LIFESPAN United Kingdom Irish Nationalist Ethno-religious n.a. Ulster Independence Movement Ethno-religious ma. United Kingdom Ethno-religious 1995* Unionist Party United States Afro-American Party Ethnic 1964" Christian Nationalist Party Religious 1947-1956 Freedom Now Party Ethnie Freedom and Peace Party Ethnic
Peace and Freedom Party L Ethnic 1967-n,a. n.a.=information not available; *=party still in existence
Waarde Vumandataris,
Me1e wekai geleden ontving ik de vraag van mmLivia~a Tosuîtu, an Cadese docto- -dente, om onze medewerkhg te verlenen aan een onderzoek voor haar doaoraatsthe as,
In haar brief legt tezeff het opta van die thesis uit. De W beslwt om mee te wakm. Ilt 2ou LI dan ook denvragen om bijgevoegde mgenlijst in te vdim m terug te zenden naar het algemeai sekretariaat. De partij U Pch bewust van hct belang van wetaschppelijk ondenoek en wil haar medewerkùig hieman verlenen, op voorwaarde dat heî op een dgeen vcrant- woorde manier wordt opgevat.
Dit specineke onderzoek staat ondu begeleiding van Prof. Marc Swyngedouw van de Katho- iieke universiteit Brussel. Prof Swyngedouw kent u weilicht van zijn politiek opimesndenoek in Vlaanderen. Daarom hebben wij het volste vemouwen in de ernst van dit ondazoek
Uw medewerking is uiteraard voliedig vrijblijvend. Toch durfik er op te rekmen dat de meesten onder u bereid Pjn de vragedjst in te den.
Met oprechte achting, B
Bert Anciaux - Algerneen Voorzitt er ïk zou u. ais vertegenwootdiger van uw partij, wiiicn vngm bijgevoegde vngedijst in te denDit duurt ongeveer 15 minuta De anonimiteit nin de amwoordm is verzeicerd.
Bijgcvocgd vmdt u een gdhkeade b~ebmskgdie u terug kan sturen naar het Volkninia LEDEN VAN DE VOi.KSUNIE
DANK U VOOR HET iNWLLEN VAN DEZE VRAGENLUST. ALLE ANIWOORDEN BLIJVEN CONFIDENTIEEL
1) Wtlke van de ondcrstaande -tics ajn van het grootste belang voor u? (s.v.p. DRIE ond#wcrpen aaogtye~,in volgorde van btlang, 1= mmt btlangrijk en)
2) Wat is uw mtning ovcr de volgtnde zakcn? Omcirkcl -met gcbniik van de 5 puntcn schaal - bet
1 - Voikomen met cc= 2 - Mce cens 3 - Gecn mening trovcr 4-Nittmetttns 5 - Er heel erg tegcri
Het fcdcraic rc@n@cleid btptigt 1 2 3 4 5 hct cne gtwest mter dan het andere.
2 3 4 5
Dt ftdcralt rcgcring kan nict vrij handelen 1 2 3 4 5 bij het maken van reg&
Nxeuwe mmjpanîcn' bchorcn in de hecrstnde 1 2 3 4 5 stroming opgwomcn te worden. 4) Met wtlk geogra6sch gcbitd idr-nt;fic#rt u zich het meest? (S.V.P. siechts ecm aangcvm)
5) Wat politickt zakcn aangaat sprtekt men mr' W en 'recht5. Hoc plaatst u de volgtndc mmen/wttecn op cen schaal van IO? Gecf naast IEDERE vraag cen cijfcr aan.
6) Zijn de mensen in uw buurt hoofdzalcclijk van dezelfdc etnische afkomst? (S.V.P. dechts EEN aangcvcn)
7) Hoe veeiddig ntcmt u dtcl aan de volgcnde,activitcitcn? Gecf op icdcre vraag maar EEN antwoord.
mcw dan 3 k 1-3 kcer nooit
Hoc dilnivijls gebruikî u eerr cornputer of fax gedurcnde eea normale wcek?
Hoc dihvijk hctft u buitcn uw gmst gcreisd gdurcndc de iaatstc zcs maanden? - Niem technologie
9) Beantwoord de voigende vragen met JA of NEE NEE - Htbt u mit in ten piaats buiten uw gcboortestreek gewoond?
Hcbt u ooit op schooi gegaan buiten uw gebaortcstreek ?
Behoort U tot dezeifde sociaal aonomische stand als uw oudtrs?
Bent u iid va^ ecn dub of ytrcn- die uw buurt bevurdert zoats ecn buurtverm@g, cuiturtie grocp, Kamer van Koophandd eu)?
10) Wannecr ben< u iid van de piadj gewordcn? W& jaar ii) Wa~cwbcnt u geboen? Jaartal
î2) Benr u man of vrouw 13) Wat is het hoogste ahmu van ondcrwîjs dat u hebt ber&? Maar EEN mg-
14) Wat is uw bcroep? (s.v.~. dtchts EEN aangcvcn)
Eigtnrar wn cen bcdrijf mu 10 of meer wcrlwmar Eigcnaar van ten Mjfmet minder dan 10 wukntmcn Clhcf/btdrijWWdcr Vrij koq(advocaat, accountant, a) Idonnatic-ttchoologiscb bcroep (amputer programmeur enz) - Admhharief/verkoop Gcschoold arbeider/ambachtsman Boer - OngcschooId arbcider Militair Huisvrouw Studtit Gcpcdme~~d Anders (a.ubspdiaren)
101-5007- 501-laIo mttr dan 1OOO
16) Wat is ongevetr het masndeiijk hkomm van uw HUISHOUDEN? (sxp. sicchts EEJ aangevcn) DANg U VOOR UW TUD EN DEELNAME. SONDA3GIO DEI SOC1 DELLA LEGA NORD
LA RINGRAZIO DELLA SUA COLLABORAZIONE. TUTTE LE RISPOSTE RIMARRANNO ANON J ME,
1) 1 dentifichi soltanto TRE dei seguenti soggetti politici in or dine d'irnportanza: 1' 1 rappresenta molto importante il 2 rappresenta importante il 3 rappresenta meno importante la disoccu pazione il debk pubblico l'inflazione l'u nMnazionale le relazioni sindacali l'ecologia l'immigrazione la cultura i programmi sociali (la sanità, T'assistenza sociale ecc-) le questioni morali (1'aborto, l'eutanasia ecc. ) la criminal* la difesa le relazioni internazionali Altro (specifichi)
2) i ndichi la Sua opinione personale riguardo gli seguenti argomenti, accerchiando il numero appropriab:
1 = Completamente d'accor do 2 = D'accordo 3 = Nessuna opinione 4 = Non condivido 5 = Non condivido affatto i programmi del governo federale favoriscono 1234s alcune regioni. La mia regione é stata trattata ingiusbmente 12345 da1 governo federale- il governo federale non ha il potere di prendere decisioni indipendentemente. Gli immigranti dovrebbero essere assimilati 12345 nella società italiana. La quota d'immigrazione dovrebbe essere ridotta. 12345 3) Quale livello di governo rappresenta meglio i Suoi interessi?
il comune ' ta regione il Parlamenta nazionale le istituzioni inter nazionali (le Nazioni Unite, la Comunità Europea) nessuna delle sopranominate
4) Con quale delle seguenti aree si identifica meglio? Scelga UNA.
città/paese regione i talia Europa
5) Corne descriverebbe gli attegiamenti politici di queste persone/istituzioni, usando la sala destra-sinistra? Ogni domanda deve essere segnata con un numero.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IO Sinistra Centro Destra
Lei stessa? ta Lega Nord? Gli itaiiani? La popolaiione della Sua regione? 11 governo federale? il governo regionale?
6) € il Suo rione multiculturale? Scelga UNO.
Per la maggior parte Non molto
- 7) Con quale frequenza partecipa alle seguenti attività? Scelga UNA risposta pet- ogni domanda. Più di 1-3 Mai 3 volte volte Con quale frequenza usa il cornputsr o il fax in una settirnana?
Quante volte ha viaggiab all'estero negli ultimi sei mesi?
Quante volte ha viaggiab fuori della Sua regione negli ultimi sei mesi? 8) Qual'é il Suo interessamenb nei seguenti soggetti? Molb Abbastanza Non affatb le notizie locali
le notizie regionali
le notizie italiane
le notizie internazionali
nuove tecnologie
eventi culturali (mostre d'arte, concerti ecc.) che promuovono le culture straniere
Io sport trasmesso dalle attre nazioni (ilrugby americano, l'hockey ecc.)
9) Risponda con un "Si" O con un "No" alle seguenti domande.
Parla/capisce più di una lingua?
Ha vissuto fuori della regione di nascita?
Ha frequentato una scuola in una comuniti fuori della regione di nascita?
A p partiene alla stessa classe socio-economica dei Suoi genitori?
Lei é sxio dj un club/associazione che promuove gii interessi della Sua comunità?
10) I n quale anno si é associato/a al partita?
11) l ndichi I'anno di nascita
12) I ndichi il sesso. Maschile O Femminile .
13) Che livello di istruzione scolastica ha completato? scuola elemenme scuola media scuola secondaria superiore laurea universitaria dotbrato di ricerca 14) Qual'é la Sua profiessione? Scelga UNA.
proprietario/a con 10 O più dipendenti proprietario/a con meno di 10 dipendenti su pervisore/direbre(ice)_ libero professionista specialista su Il' informatica impiegato(a)/commesso(a) mestierante contadino/a manovale membro delle forze armate casalin ga studente/ssa pensionab/a Altro (specifichi)
15) Quanti dipendenti ci sono al Suo posb di lavoro? Scelga UNA.
16) Qual'é il reddito ANNUALE approssimativo neila Sua famiglia (in MlLlONl I LIRA)?
meno di 6 milioni da 6 a 12 milioni da 13 a 24 milioni da 25 a 36 milioni da 37 a 50 milioni da 51 a 75 milioni da 76 a 100 mifioni da 10 1 a 150 milioni da 151 a 300 milioni oltre 300 milioni
17) Quanti abitanti ci sono nella Sua città/paese? Scelga UNO.
meno di 1,000 da 1,OOO a 10,000 da 10,000 a 30,000 da 30,000 a 100,000 da 100,000 a 500,000 oltre 500,000
RlNGRAZlO LA SUA COLLABORAZIONE. Department of Political Science
?-+@ A- University of Toronto
Aux pdsidents de circonscriptions du Bkqu6becois.
Je suis candidate & un doctorat en philasophie B PUniversit6 de Toronto et mntreprends actuellement un sondage auprbs des membres du Bloc qu6becois et de deux partis pogtiques en Belgique el en Italie, dans le cadre de ma recherche de dissertetion. Mon étude examine les simifides el les diff6renœs entre les pas &paretistesi autonomistes qui ont 816 fornids depuis 1945.
Dans les documents que je vous ai faits parvenir, !lai indus environ dix exemplaires du questbnnaim. Ce dernier comprend 17 questions concernant i'attitude de vos membres sur les sujets politiques. les insotutions gowemementales, les tendances & la mondialisation el leurs collectMtBs. Étam donne que vos listes de membres sont confidenbjelles. j"appWerais beauooup si vous vouliez bien remplir ce questionnaire el distrtbuer ie reste aux autres membres de wtre bureau ou aux sympathisants du parti clans votre arcondption.
Dans chacune des enveloppes. rai indus une lettre d'explication, le sondage et une enveloppe affranchie et préaâress6e de manibre & ce que les r6pondants puissent rehyer le questionnaire B î'univerrit6. J'entrerai en cuntact avec VOUS SOUS peu pour rdpondre vos questions. et si possible pour organiser des inteMews penonnelleM6l6phoniques avec vous pour connaare les raisons qui vous ont incite a vous joindre à œ parti. et de quelie maniare vous concevez le rble du Bloc qu6bécois dans un monde en plein changement.
Nosvous remeteions de Pattention que vous avez bien voulu porter sur œ sujet.
Livianna S. Tom UniversitA de Toronto
100 St. George Street Toronto Canada M5S 1Al Telephme 4161978 3343 Fax 416/W8 5566 @ Department of Political Science University of Toronto 2T 2T *naon9
Cher membre du Bloc QudMmis,
Je suis une candidate au doctorat tt I'Université de Toronto, Canada effahuuit une enquete postale auprés des membres du Bloc QuCbCoois. Cette enquttc fait panie dune ttude des partis politiques du Qu~ba,de la Belgique, et de Iltalie, sur 1aquciiejWris ma dissertation de doctorat. Le sondage ci-joint conticnt des questions au sujet de vos mentalitCs envers le gawcrncmcnt, Les affaires murantes et votre communauté.
Je semis reconnaissante de votre coilaboration à remplir ce questiomaire. Toutes Ies repenses du sondage sont an6denticllu et seront analysées dans l'ensemble seulement Ces documents ne seront utilisés pour aucun autre but
J'indus une emrc1oppe-rtpoasc ahchie aiin que vous puissiez retourner le questionnaire à I'universite.
Vous remerciant de votre attention B cet 6gar4 je vous prie d'agréer I'cxprtssion de mes sentiments les meilleurs.
Livianna Stephanie tossutti Université de Toronto, Canada
i00 St. George Street Toronto Canada M5S 1A1 Telephone 4161978 3343 Fax 47 61978 5566 S'ii vous plait. veuillez répondre aux questions qui suivcnt en cochant la ou lu réponses appropnte~. Toutes vos r6poases deme~nroatconfidentielles et anonymts.
1) Parmi Iu questions suivantes, quelles sont les TROIS que VOUS muidérez pcf~~~el~erncnt mmme ies plus importantes? (Veuillez &crin'1," '"2. ou T &té de chacun de vos trois choix selon I'importanœ que vous leur accorda) Le diClmage La dette nationale L'inflation L'unit6 canadienne Les relations industn'ellc L'environnement L'immigration La politique ailtureUc/Iinguistique La politique socinle (santt. assistance rwale etc.) Les questions morales (avortement, euthanasie etc.) La criminalite La défense nationale La politique Ctran@re Autre. prkdsez SVP
2) Que pensez-vous des propositions qui suivent? Veuillez entourer le chifie correspondant à votre réponse:
1 2 3 4 5 Tout D'acmrd Sans Pas Pas à fait opinion d'accord du tout d'accord d'accord
Lu politiques ftdérales sont plus béntfiques à certaines rtgions qu'a d'autres.
Le Qutbec n'a pas et& bien par le gowcmement féderal.
Le puvernement canadien ne peut pas de son propre &cf Claboret lu politiques qu'il souhaite. Les nouveaux immigrants devraient ttrc assimilts a la population du pays.
Le taux d'immigration devrait ttre diminut. 3) D'après vous, quel palier de gouvernement defend le mieux vos intéré!ts? (Une seule
Le gouvernement local Le puvernement quéôémis Le gouvernement Edéral Les institutions internationales (Nations Unies, OTAN etc) Aucun
4) Parmi les lieux géographiques suivants, vous vous identifiez le plus (une seule rtponse SVP):
A votre ville Au Qu&cc Au Cana& A I'Amtrique du Nord
5) En politique, on parle génbralemcnt de "gauche* et de "droite." Où situez-VOUS les ~~~M~ et les iastitutions poiitiques suivantes? (Veuillez indiquer le chifne correspondant ik &té de chacune de vos rCponses)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Gauche Centre Droite Vous-même Le Bloc Qu6Mcois La rnajorite des Canadiens La majorité des residents du QuCbec Le gouveniment fCdtral Le gowemement qu6bécois
6) Les personnes qui vivent pr&sde chez vous appartiement-eUes au mCme groupe ethnique que vous?
La maiont6 appartient iî mon groupe ethnique Une minoritt appartient B mon groupe ethnique
7) Combien de fois vous arrive-t-il d'utiliser un ordinateur ou un tCltcopieur et de voyager? Plus Entre Jamais de 3 fois 1 et 3 bis Nombre de jours OS j'utifist un ordinateur ou un tCICcopieur au cours d'une semaine-type
Nombre de fois où rai voyage B l'&ranger au cours de ces six derniers mois
Nombre dc fois où j'ai voyage B l'&rieur du Quebec au cours des su demiers mois 3 8) Les questions Cnumtrécs ci-dcssous vous inttressent beaucoup, un peu ou pas du tout?
Beaucoup Un peu Pas du tout
Les nouvelles locales Les nouvelles qutbéwi~es
Les nowelles internationales Les innovations technologiques Les expositions, mncerts (ou tout autre spectacle ayant nait aux traditions adturelles d'un pays) Les 6vênemcnts ou &missions sportifs d'autres pays (football européen, football amCriCain)
9) Vedarépondre par OUI ou NON aux questions suivantes (une seule réponse SVP):
Oui Non
Pouvez-mus parler/comprendre au moins deux langues?
Avez-vous déja vécu dans une autre ammunaut6 que alic OB MUS etes nC(e)?
Avez-vous déjà CtudiC daris une autre province que alle où vous Ctes nt&)?
Appartenu-~usil la mCme daae socio-tconomiquc que vos parents?
Appanenez-~usB une association qui encourage I'tpiinouissemcnt & votre communautt (par exemple: dubs de loisir, groupes artistiqur$ Chambres de commerce)
10) En quelle mCe ava-mus adhCré au Bloc quéôécoû? Anntc
11) En quelle amte &es-VOUSnt@)? Annte
12) Quel est votre sexe? Masculin FCminin U) Quel est votre plus haut niveau â'~tudescomplété? (Une seule rtponse SVP) Primaire Seconciaire coiicpial Badaurt?at universitaire Univenitaire Ztme cycie/dipi&ne professiomel
14) Qudlc ut votre occupation professiomclle? (Une seule rCponsc SVP)
Pmpri6taire d'une entreprise de 10 ou dus employCs Proprietaire d'une entreprise de moins de 10 employCs Sumeillant(e)/Directeui(na) Profusion libérale (await(e). comptable etc) hformaticien(nc) EmployC(e) de bureau/Secrétaire TravailIeur(ew) manuelQe) quaiifi~(e)/Commerçant(e) Fermier(tre) Manoeuvre Militaire Menagère Étudiant (e) Retraite(e) Autre. prCcisez SVP
15) Combien de personnes travail1enttlles à votre lieu de travail?
16) Approximativement, quel est le revenu total de votre WAGE?
Moins de $20.000 $m,ooo-w,~
Sso,ooo-S100,ooO plus de S100.000
17) Approximativement. combien d'habitants votre ville comprend-tlle? moins de 1,000 30.~100,000 1,ooO-10,ooo lao.OOOI500,OoO 10,ooe30,ooo Plus de 500,000 Volksunie Survey - Belsian Francs:
Lecia Nord - Piemonte Survev: ltalian lire
1 = < 13 million 3 = 13-24 rnfltion 5 = 25-36 mi'llion 7 = 37-50 mii 1û= 51-75 rnfllion 13= 76-100 miin 14= 101-150 rni'llion 15= 151-300 mt't)ion 16= > 300 million
Exchange Rates at tirne of survey:
CAN$ = 20 8dgian Francs CA* = 1150 ItaWn Lire IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)
APPLIED 2 IMAGE. Inc 1653 East Main Street --A --A - Rochester, NY 14604 USA --= --= -- Phone: 716/482-0300 ------Fax: 716i288-5989
o 1993. Applii Image, tnc., All Rlghr, Reserved