Electoral Institutions and Authoritarian Resilience in the Middle East
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University of Denver Digital Commons @ DU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 1-1-2010 Ruling with Rules: Electoral Institutions and Authoritarian Resilience in the Middle East Andrew Barwig University of Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd Part of the Islamic World and Near East History Commons, and the Political History Commons Recommended Citation Barwig, Andrew, "Ruling with Rules: Electoral Institutions and Authoritarian Resilience in the Middle East" (2010). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 758. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/758 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. RULING WITH RULES: ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST __________________ A Dissertation Presented to The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver __________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy __________________ by Andrew Barwig November 2010 Advisor: Martin Rhodes Author: Andrew Barwig Title: RULING WITH RULES: ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST Advisor: Martin Rhodes Degree Date: November 2010 ABSTRACT What explains the resilience of authoritarian regimes in the face of regular competitive elections that ostensibly should promote democratic transitions? This dissertation examines both why and how parliamentary elections in Jordan and Morocco have served to reinforce these two Arab monarchies. In doing so, it develops a framework in which the degree of cohesion among incumbent and opposition elites shape electoral system design and, in turn, particular electoral rules structure mass political attitudes and elite configurations. The main argument is that lower electoral thresholds generate unique electoral environments in which patronage politics thrive and opposition-based politics falter, thus producing a decidedly uneven playing field. In the end, this study examines four additional case studies from the Arab world in order to construct a typological theory about the conditions under which elections reinforce or undermine regime stability and then discusses the policy implications for democracy assistance programs. This project is grounded within the classic and contemporary literature on the role of elites in democratic transitions, the design and functioning of electoral systems and the relationship between elections and authoritarianism. The research design is based on a comparison of “most similar” cases and utilizes a “mixed method” approach that draws from qualitative and quantitative data. The empirical analysis, which focuses on the 2007 parliamentary elections in Jordan and Morocco, is derived from intensive fieldwork in both countries. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………..iv LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………v LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………..vi INTRODUCTION: WHY AND HOW ARAB REGIMES WIN ELECTIONS………..7 I. EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK: REGIME CONTINUITY THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE…………………………………………………….29 1) Theoretical Framework 2) Theoretical Model II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN MOROCCO AND JORDAN……………………………………..60 1) Colonial and Post-Independence Elections (1920s-1960s) 2) Elections of Regime Consolidation (1960s-1970s) 3) Elections Under Regime Duress (1980s) 4) Elections Under New Rules (1990s) 5) Elections Under New Kings (2000s) III. MOROCCO’S 2007 ELECTIONS: HOW THE PJD LOST…………………….109 1) Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 2) Background/Overview 3) Application 4) Discussion IV. JORDAN’S 2007 ELECTIONS: HOW THE “NEW CAPITALISTS” WON…..153 1) Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 2) Background/Overview 3) Application 4) Discussion V. A TYPOLOGICAL THEORY: ELECTORAL RULES AS REINFORCEMENT MECHANISMS…………………………………………...195 1) Historical Background of Secondary Cases 2) Developing a Typological Theory CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS…………………………………………………………………………...233 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………247 iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During my five years in the Ph.D. program at the Korbel School of International Studies, I enjoyed the support of a wide network of family members, colleagues and close friends, of whom not all can be recognized here. My wife Jill deserves my deepest gratitude for her unconditional love and support during this endeavor. I also realize how important this project was for keeping me grounded while raising my two young sons, Ben and Alex. I hope they read these words one day and feel their parents enabled them to fulfill their dreams, just as mine did for me. Next, I want to thank the three members of my dissertation committee: Martin Rhodes, Tim Sisk and Nathan Brown. Their attention and diligence during every stage of my doctoral studies was exemplary. The in-country field work I conducted was made possible in part by grants from the American Institute for Maghrib Studies (AIMS) and the University of Denver. Several individuals also deserve mention for this part of my project. To begin, I would like to thank Peter van Arsdale for his guidance and encouragement with my field research plan. In Morocco, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Gerard Latulippe for inviting me to be a part of the National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) international observer mission and to Driss Choukri for answering so many of my questions about Moroccan politics. In Jordan, my former colleagues and dear friends Roula Attar and Abdallah Al-Zuabi provided invaluable wasta. I also benefited immensely from my affiliation with the Legislative Strengthening Program in Amman and am grateful to Dr. Mohammad Momani, Yara Sharif and Sawsan Hijazin for their assistance. Finally, I thank Terry Dalton and Keith Saito for their help with the statistical analysis. , iv LIST OF TABLES Table A: Summary of Main Similarities Between Case Studies……………..21 Table B: FH “Political Rights” Scores (Averages in Time Periods)…………23 Table C: Summary of Main Differences Between Case Studies……………..24 Table 1.1: Hypothesized Effects of Electoral Rules on Political Actors……..53 Table 2.1: Summary of Results from Comparative Historical Analysis…….102 Table 3.1: Analysis of Rabat’s electoral district (2002)………………...…..120 Table 3.2: Partial Results of Morocco’s 2007 Elections……………………..124 Table 3.3: Variables and Hypothesized Effects on Electoral Coordination….132 Table 3.4: Minimum/Maximum Population by District Magnitude (2007)…137 Table 3.5: Changes in District Magnitude Between Elections……………….138 Table 3.6: OLS Regression of ENP in 2007…………………………………141 Table 3.7: OLS Regression of SF-Ratio in 2007…………………………….142 Table 4.1: Demographic Profile of 15th Lower House………………………172 Table 4.2: Summary of Results……………………………………………...177 Table 4.3: Vote Totals in Amman Districts (1st and 3rd)…………………….178 Table 4.4: Professional Backgrounds of Jordanian MPs…………………….180 Table 4.5: Percentage of Votes/Margin of Victory by District Magnitude….182 Table 4.6: Threshold of Votes in 1989 and 1993 Elections by District……...183 Table 5.1: Placement of Primary Cases in the Typological Space…………...223 Table 5.2: Placement of Secondary Cases in the Typological Space………...223 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure A: Basic causal diagram of research design……………………………17 Figure B: Basic causal diagram of consequences of electoral rules…………...19 Figure C: World Bank “Stability” Score………………………………………26 Figure D: Polity “Autocracy” Scale……………………………………………27 Figure 1.1: Explanatory Framework of Electoral System Design………..........49 Figure 2.1: Summary of Electoral System Design (1920s-1960s)…………….67 Figure 2.2: Summary of Electoral System Design (1956 and 1963)…………..73 Figure 2.3: Summary of Electoral System Design (1980s)……………………84 Figure 2.4: Summary of Electoral System Design (1990s)……………………92 Figure 2.5: Summary of Electoral System Design (2000s)…………………...102 Figure 3.1: Scatter plot of ENP and SF-ratios of district-level results………..134 Figure 3.2: Histogram of District Magnitudes and SF-Ratios………………...135 Figure 3.3: Scatter plots of ‘Youth’ and ‘No Education’ variables……………147 vi INTRODUCTION: WHY AND HOW ARAB REGIMES CONSISTENTLY WIN ELECTIONS The past decade has presented a decidedly mixed record on elections in the Arab world. At the dawn of the new millennium, initial signs pointed towards a continuation of competitive elections as part of a gradual liberalization in the region. While the liberation of Iraq in 2003 failed to unleash a democratic “tsunami” and even gave fodder to some anti-democratic sentiments, a “new reform ferment” had taken hold in the region (Hawthorne 2005). During the first half of 2005, elections in Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon provided further impetus for political change. Buoyed by scenes of purple ink-stained fingers in Baghdad and popular protests in the streets of Cairo and Beirut, some media commentators and democracy enthusiasts quickly labeled this period as the “Arab Spring” that would mark the downfall of authoritarian regimes across the region.1 Just few years later, however, a number of countervailing forces seemed to augur the return of a long, cold winter under authoritarianism. Elections in Iraq hardened sectarian divisions as politicians struggled with the practicalities