Soviet TO&Es 1980-89 V.1.9 Soviet Tank Division/Guards Tank Division (A)

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Soviet TO&Es 1980-89 V.1.9 Soviet Tank Division/Guards Tank Division (A) BATTLEGROUP CWWP-01 Soviet TO&Es 1980-89 v.1.9 Soviet Tank Division/Guards Tank Division (a) ARMY ASSETS (c) BATTLEGROUP CWWP-05 BATTLEGROUP CWWP-08 x3 Tank Regiment Up to x1 Independent Tank Brigade BATTLEGROUP CWWP-06 FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT CWWP-14 x1 Motor Rifle Regiment (BMP) x1 Army Artillery Brigade FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT CWWP-10 x1 Divisional Artillery Regiment x1 Army Rocket Brigade (b) BATTLEGROUP CWWP-16 x1 Reconnaissance Battalion x1 Army SAM Brigade MANOEUVRE ELEMENT CWWP-23 x1 Engineer Battalion (f) x9 Army SAM Battery MANOEUVRE ELEMENT CWWP-22 x1 Army Engineer Brigade (d) x5 Divisional SAM Battery x2 Mi-2 ‘Hoplite’ Observation Helicopter CWWP-116 x1 Army Antitank Regiment x2 Mi-8 ‘Hip’ Utility Helicopter CWWP-119 BATTLEGROUP CWWP-21 x3 Antitank Battalion x2 Mi-24 ‘Hind’ Attack Helicopter CWWP-122 FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT CWWP-17 x1 Army MRL Regiment x1 Divisional Rocket Battalion (b) Up to x1 Attack Helicopter Regiment (a) A Guards Formation was organisationally identical to a non- Guards Formation. The term ‘Guards’ was simply an honorific title left over from WW2 and was only of historical interest. There was no x12 Mi-24 ‘Hind’ Attack Helicopter CWWP-122 qualitative edge, organisational difference or technological edge between Guards and non-Guards divisions. Indeed there were many x6 Mi-8 ‘Hip’ Assault Transport Helicopter CWWP-120 Guards divisions that were rated ‘Category C’, while equally there were many non-Guards ‘Category A’ divisions in the cutting edge of the Western Group of Forces. In East Germany. However, note that Up to x1 General Purpose Helicopter Regt all Air Assault Divisions were designated as Guards. (b) The Divisional Rocket Battalion and Army Rocket Brigade were x3 Mi-2 ‘Hoplite’ Observation Helicopter CWWP-116 armed with tactical nuclear missiles. Both these organisations fall outside the scope of wargames as practiced by normal people... x6 Mi-8 ‘Hip’ Utility Helicopter CWWP-119 (c) Front Assets follow a similar pattern to Army Assets, but are usually bigger and better: For example, each Front usually had an BATTLEGROUP CWWP-18 Independent Air Assault Brigade (BG CWWP-10), a Naval Infantry x1 Independent Air Assault Battalion Brigade (BG CWWP-09) if it was based in a coastal area, an Artillery Division with VERY BIG guns and the usual array of Engineers, BATTLEGROUP CWWP-16 SAMs, etc. Some Fronts might also possess 1-2 Guards Air Assault x1 Reconnaissance Battalion (e) Divisions (BG CWWP-03) in addition to their Air Assault Brigade. (d) More engineering assets than you can shake a stick at… (e) An Army Reconnaissance Battalion was generally organised exactly the same as a Divisional Reconnaissance Battalion, though there were many organisational differences in Soviet recce units at all levels and it remains a very complicated area of research. (f) The Divisional Engineer Battalion had a single Divisional Sapper Company that could be considered an ME for game purposes (ME CWWP-28), while the rest of the battalion consisted of road-building, bridging, amphibian, position preparation and demolition equipment, which is unlikely to feature very heavily in a game. BATTLEGROUP CWWP-02 Soviet Motor Rifle Division/Guards Motor Rifle Division (a) ARMY ASSETS (c) BATTLEGROUP CWWP-06 BATTLEGROUP CWWP-08 x1 Motor Rifle Regiment (BMP) Up to x1 Independent Tank Brigade BATTLEGROUP CWWP-07 FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT CWWP-14 x2 Motor Rifle Regiment (BTR) x1 Army Artillery Brigade BATTLEGROUP CWWP-05 x1 Tank Regiment x1 Army Rocket Brigade (b) FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT CWWP-10 x1 Divisional Artillery Regiment x1 Army SAM Brigade BATTLEGROUP CWWP-16 MANOEUVRE ELEMENT CWWP-23 x1 Reconnaissance Battalion x9 Army SAM Battery x1 Army Engineer Brigade (d) x1 Engineer Battalion (e) BATTLEGROUP CWWP-21 x1 Army Antitank Regiment x1 Antitank Battalion BATTLEGROUP CWWP-21 MANOEUVRE ELEMENT CWWP-03 x3 Antitank Battalion x1 Independent Tank Battalion FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT CWWP-17 MANOEUVRE ELEMENT CWWP-22 x1 Army MRL Regiment x5 Divisional SAM Battery Up to x1 Attack Helicopter Regiment x2 Mi-2 ‘Hoplite’ Observation Helicopter CWWP-116 x12 Mi-24 ‘Hind’ Attack Helicopter CWWP-122 x2 Mi-8 ‘Hip’ Utility Helicopter CWWP-119 x6 Mi-8 ‘Hip’ Assault Transport Helicopter CWWP-120 x2 Mi-24 ‘Hind’ Attack Helicopter CWWP-122 (a) A Guards Formation was organisationally identical to a non- Up to x1 General Purpose Helicopter Regt Guards Formation. The term ‘Guards’ was simply an honorific title left over from WW2 and was only of historical interest. x3 Mi-2 ‘Hoplite’ Observation Helicopter CWWP-116 (b) The Army Rocket Brigade was armed with tactical nuclear missiles. These organisations fall outside the scope of wargames as x6 Mi-8 ‘Hip’ Utility Helicopter CWWP-119 practiced by normal people... (c) Front Assets follow a similar pattern to Army Assets, but are BATTLEGROUP CWWP-18 usually bigger and better: For example, each Front usually had an x1 Independent Air Assault Battalion Independent Air Assault Brigade (BG CWWP-10), a Naval Infantry Brigade (BG CWWP-09) if it was based in a coastal area, an Artillery BATTLEGROUP CWWP-16 Division with VERY BIG guns and the usual array of Engineers, x1 Reconnaissance Battalion SAMs, etc. Some Fronts might also possess 1-2 Guards Air Assault Divisions (BG CWWP-03) in addition to their Air Assault Brigade. (d) More engineering assets than you can shake a stick at… (e) The Divisional Engineer Battalion had a single Divisional Sapper Company that could be considered an ME for game purposes (ME CWWP-28), while the rest of the battalion consisted of road-building, bridging, amphibian, position preparation and demolition equipment, which is unlikely to feature very heavily in a game. BATTLEGROUP CWWP-03 Soviet Guards Air Assault Division (a) BATTLEGROUP CWWP-12 x3 Guards Air Assault Regiment FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT CWWP-07 (a) There were no Guards Air Assault Divisions permanently x3 Airborne Artillery Battalion stationed in Central Europe. However, there were several such divisions close at hand, with two being stationed in the Baltic Military District and one each in the Leningrad, Moscow, MANOEUVRE ELEMENT CWWP-11 Belorussian and Odessa Military Districts. Note that each of these x1 Airborne Assault Gun Battalion Military Districts (which would form a ‘Front’ in wartime) also had their usual Independent Front Air Assault Brigade. MANOEUVRE ELEMENT CWWP-19 x3 Airborne Antiaircraft Company MANOEUVRE ELEMENT CWWP-21 x1 Airborne Reconnaissance Company MANOEUVRE ELEMENT CWWP-26 x3 Airborne Engineer Company BATTLEGROUP CWWP-04 Soviet Unified Corps (‘Operational Manoeuvre Group’ in NATO parlance) (a) BATTLEGROUP CWWP-08 x3 Independent Tank Brigade (a) There were two ‘Unified Corps’; 1st Unified Corps formed part of BATTLEGROUP CWWP-06 the Belorussian Military District and 2nd Unified Corps belonged to x1 Motor Rifle Regiment (BMP) the Carpathian Military District. These were formed as heavy armoured groups, designed to be pushed into and through a FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT CWWP-12 penetration in NATO’s defences at the operational level. x1 Unified Corps Artillery Brigade (b) The Corps Engineer Battalion had a single Sapper Company that could be considered an ME for game purposes (ME CWWP-28), BATTLEGROUP CWWP-16 while the rest of the battalion consisted of road-building, bridging, x1 Reconnaissance Battalion amphibian, position preparation and demolition equipment, which is unlikely to feature very heavily in a game x1 Engineer Battalion (b) x1 Attack Helicopter Regiment x12 Mi-24 ‘Hind’ Attack Helicopter CWWP-122 x6 Mi-8 ‘Hip’ Assault Transport Helicopter CWWP-120 BATTLEGROUP CWWP-05 (d) BATTLEGROUP CWWP-06 Soviet Tank Regiment Soviet Motor Rifle Regiment (BMP) (ac) Command Command x1 T-64 AK 125mm Command MBT (ae) CWWP-06 HQ x1 Commander CWWP-103 Forward Air Controller Transport x1 Forward Observer CWWP-115 x1 BMP-KSh Command Vehicle CWWP-65 Transport/Recce Forward Air Controller x1 BTR-60 TACP CWWP-64 x1 Forward Observer CWWP-115 BATTLEGROUPS Transport/Recce x1 BTR-60 TACP CWWP-64 BG CWWP-14 x1 Motor Rifle Battalion (BMP) (f) BATTLEGROUPS BG CWWP-14 MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS x3 Motor Rifle Battalion (BMP) ME CWWP-01 x3 Tank Battalion (Tank Regiment) (b) MANOEUVRE ELEMENTS ME CWWP-02 ME CWWP-15 x1 Reconnaissance Company x1 Tank Battalion (Motor Rifle Regt) ME CWWP-15 ME-CWWP-13 x1 Reconnaissance Company x1 Antiaircraft Company ME-CWWP-13 ME CWWP-24 x1 Antiaircraft Company x1 Engineer Company (Tank Regiment) FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENTS ME CWWP-25 x1 Engineer Company (Motor Rifle Regiment) FSE CWWP-01 x1 Self-Propelled Field Artillery Battalion (g) ME CWWP-12 x1 Antitank Company (a) May replace command tank with: T-64 BK 125mm Command MBT (c) CWWP-07 Or in the mid 1980s in some Tank Divisions with: FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENTS T-80 BK 125mm Command MBT (c) CWWP-12 Or in some divisions outside Germany: FSE CWWP-01 T-72 K 125mm Command MBT CWWP-09 x1 Self-Propelled Field Artillery Battalion (b) T-72 AK/BK 125mm Command MBT (c) CWWP-10 T-54/55 K 100mm Command MBT CWWP-03 T-62 K 115mm Command MBT CWWP-05 (a) Some divisions, particularly in the early 1980s, had not received BMPs for their senior Motor Rifle Regiment. This was due mainly to a (b) As in WW2, tactical subtlety was not in the Soviet training lack of APC production capacity and partly to economics. These manual when it came to tank tactics – they were a very large, regiments were organised as per BG CWWP-03, though with tracked very powerful blunt instrument. Soviet Tank Battalions therefore BTR-50 APC variants, rather than wheeled BTR-60/70/80. A few operate as single MEs. However, one company may be detached regiments were equipped with MTLB carriers. However, all divisions in from each Tank Battalion as a separate ME (see ME-01).
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