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Jefferson Journal of Psychiatry Volume 6 Issue 2 Article 3 January 1988 Some Comments on the Concept of the Ego-Ideal Gurmeet Kanwal, MD Brookdale Hospital (SUNY Downstate) Brooklyn, New York Follow this and additional works at: https://jdc.jefferson.edu/jeffjpsychiatry Part of the Psychiatry Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ouy Recommended Citation Kanwal, MD, Gurmeet (1988) "Some Comments on the Concept of the Ego-Ideal," Jefferson Journal of Psychiatry: Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 , Article 3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.29046/JJP.006.2.001 Available at: https://jdc.jefferson.edu/jeffjpsychiatry/vol6/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Jefferson Digital Commons. The Jefferson Digital Commons is a service of Thomas Jefferson University's Center for Teaching and Learning (CTL). The Commons is a showcase for Jefferson books and journals, peer-reviewed scholarly publications, unique historical collections from the University archives, and teaching tools. The Jefferson Digital Commons allows researchers and interested readers anywhere in the world to learn about and keep up to date with Jefferson scholarship. This article has been accepted for inclusion in Jefferson Journal of Psychiatry by an authorized administrator of the Jefferson Digital Commons. For more information, please contact: [email protected]. Some Comments on the Concept of the Ego-Ideal Gurmeet Kanwal, M.D. In a review of th e literature on th e ego-ideal my impression has been th at this co ncept has been placed in th e positio n ofa stepchi ld ofthe structural model of th e mind, falling somewhere between the ego and the super-ego, and yet rema ining loo sely linked to both.Authors suc h as J acobson (1954), Hartmann and Low enstein (1962), Sandler (1963), and Schafer (196 7), have regarded th e ego-ideal as a substructure of the super-ego. Others like Annie Reich (1953, 1954), Lampl de-Groot (1947), Peter Bios (1972), and Chasseguet-Smirgel (1975), have tended to view th e two as being sepa rate structures. T he purpose of this paper is, first, to point to the valu e of viewing th e ego-ideal from a metapsych ological stand po int as a d istinct entity, separa te in more than one way fr om th e super-ego. Secondly, the literature shows that many analysts tend to reduce th e ego-ideal to a 'model' that th e person is trying to emulate . T his is not so.If we follow th e developmen t ofthe ego-ideal we begin to see how it is a more complex co ncept than what is casua lly referred to as an 'ideal', and can be useful in th e understanding of a broader range of psychic phenomena. Finally, I will present some evidence as to how the ego-ideal can be perceived as being 'the heir to primary narcissism '. This paper is di vided into three parts. In th e first part I review Freud, so that we ca n see what ha s been th e metapsych ological origin of th is concept, and how it changed wit h th e evo lution of his theories. In the second part, I fo llow th e vicissitudes of the ego-ideal from infancy into adu lthood . In th e third part I will present some clinical material tha t will help to identify some ofth e characteristic features ofego -ideal pathology, or as Chassegu et-Smirgel ca lls it, " the mal ady of th e ideal" . T his malad y it will be seen is always closely relate d to variations of narcissistic states, wh ich is why it is importan t to stic k fir m ly to Freud's original co nception of th e ego-ideal. FRE UD 'S CONC EPTIO N Fr eud first used th e term ego-ideal in 191 4, in his paper On Narcissi sm. It developed as a co ntinuation of hi s co ncept of primary na rcissism, and the need to put th e economics of libidi nal flow into a logical framework. Freud described primary narcissism as, " the libid inal complement to the egoism of th e instinct of self-preservation" .In other words it is a reservoir of libidinal energy that has not yet been invested in anything outside th e self. T his "original libidi nal cathexis of 4 SOME COMMENTS ON THE CONCEPT OF THE EGO-IDEAL 5 the ego", is also referred to as "Ego-Libido". Yet presence of th is infantile narcissism was not readily visible in normal adults. The question then was, " W hat has become of their ego-libido?" Freud postulated two pathways: One part of it is cathected onto objects, starting with the primary caretak er. This Freud called "Object Libido". The remaining part is inv ested in th e so ca lled "Ideal Ego", which is really an ideal image of the self, the possessor of every imagined perfection. As the child develops, " he is disturbed by th e admonitions of others and his own critical judgement is awakened, he seeks to recover the early perfection, thus wrested fr om him, in th e new form of an ego-ideal." (Freud 1914, pg. 51) This first usage of the term ego-ideal underwent cha nges between 191 4 and 1932. In Freud's paper Group Psychology (1921 ) the ego-ideal was invested with the functions of, " self-observation, the moral consc ience, the ce nsorship of dreams, and the chief influence in repression." Unlike in 1914 th erefore, the term now came to include what had been referred to as the "consc ience", a precursor of the super-ego. Then in 1923, in his paper, Th e Ego And Th e Id, and his formulation of the structural model, the ego-ideal became synonymous with the super-ego. Finally in 1932, in the New Introductory Lectures, the super-ego was described as " the veh icle of th e ego-ideal, by which the ego measures itself.... No doubt this ego-ideal is the precipitation of th e old ideas of th e parents." With the co ming of the structural model in 1923 the super-ego came much more into the foreground, while the ego-ideal lost some of its original identity and was subsumed as a substructure of th e super-ego. In an attempt to maintain some clarity around th e concept let me trace the development of the ego-ideal and its vicissitudes from infancy into adulthood . DEVELOPMENTAL VICISSITUD ES At the beginning there is simply th e in fantile narCI SSI stIC omnipotence, whi ch is libido cathect ed exclusively within self. With th e emergence ofsepara­ tion-individuation th e process of disillusionment starts. Part of the libido , nevertheless, remains cathected onto the ideal-ego, and this fo r ms the co re of the ego-ideal. Another part of the libido is ca thecte d onto objects, th e primary caretaker, the parents, leading to idealization of the love-objects, th e ideal parents. Meanwhile th e process of di sillusionment is still co ntinuing. T he pai n of this continuing narcissistic injury co inc ides with and stim ulates the development of identificatory abilities , to regain the lost omnipotence. So th e ch ild begins to incorporate and identify with th e ideal parental images, wh ich thus become another aspect of the ego ideal; the rind around th e core. T herefore mak ing up the ego-ideal we ha ve: 1. The image of the ideal self, whi ch is quite primitive and exists in an unmodified form, representing the 'core omn ipote nce' of each one of us, and, 6 JEFFERSO N JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY 2. The precipitate of the ideal parent, whi ch undergoes further phase­ appropriate modifications, most evident in th e period ofadolescence. To quote Peter BIos from his paper, Th e Function Of The Ego-Ideal In Adolescence, "The ego-ideal is subject to qualitative and quan titative changes during the course of development. .. The ego-ideal becomes en mes hed with new drive modalities as well as with new ego-competencies as both emerge at different developmental stages. By virtue of this fact , we ca n expect the ego-ideal to be drawn into the turmoil in which th e libidinal and aggressive drives partake during lat e adolescence." (1972, pg . 95). In this period which has been referred to as the second separation-individuation, th e reawakened id­ impulses must look for gratification through modes th at are congruent to the adolescent's reality concept. A need arises to reaffirm o ne's autonomy and identity, as well as to integrate oneself in some way into larger perspectives of society. This ma y occur through religion, politics, cult-worship, or any other group-oriented activit y. There is thus a re-enactment of the ambivalence and affective confusion ofa two-year-old. Thus we see that an upsurge of id-impulses in ad olescence raises the need for instinctual gratification, and reaffirmation of one's om nipotence.Parent s and society once again impose restrictions on this gratification, th e old narcissis­ tic wounds are re-opened, and once more a process of disillu sionment begins. Instead of identification with the ideal parents this time , th e group-ideal and the sexual-ideal become the targets of identification. The obj ect choice at this time will depend, among other things on the ego-ideal that th e adolescent has carried forward from his childhood.
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