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Home , Deconstruction, Marc Bloch University

Paola Marrati. Genesis and : Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. xiv + 258 pp. $57.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8047-3915-3.

Reviewed by Nicholas D. Liberto

Published on H-German (August, 2005)

Much of the recent scholarship on Jacques of the authors with whom Derrida has con‐ Derrida has moved away from according his char‐ cerned himself. Not even Heidegger" (p. 181). acteristic "deconstructive method" a narrow rele‐ Genesis and Trace was originally published in vance primarily to towards ap‐ French in 1998, when the author worked at the preciating its merits as a critical philosophical University in .[2] There the project unto itself. This interpretive trend sees de‐ book developed through her close collaboration construction as a constructive engagement with with the philosophers Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe the of Western in the twenti‐ and Jean-Luc Nancy. The original French edition eth century. One efort in this direction has been appeared through Kluwer Academic Publishers in to recapture Derrida's early reading of Edmund the Netherlands in its series on Husserl.[3] Husserl's phenomenology. Paola Marrati's work is Wolters Kluwer also publishes the journal Husserl an attempt to rethink this relation of infuence. Studies. Marrati's book carries the traces of these For Marrati, as early as his dissertation of 1953-54, elements of production and publication. The lan‐ the young Derrida produced a "singular interpre‐ guage and structure of the text be relatively tation" of Husserl's work that was to lead the lat‐ inaccessible for those unversed in the of ter to formulate the questions that would concern Husserl's phenomenology or unfamiliar with the him in his subsequent career.[1] Moreover, key terms of Derridian philosophy. This problem Husserl proves to be a more substantial and pro‐ is complicated further by the fact that the author ductive infuence for Derrida than any other employs this Derridian language and style seam‐ philosopher--even . The author lessly, with no interest in translating it for a non- explicitly concludes "Deconstruction ... is born in specialist audience. More importantly, for those Derrida's work on Husserl; more than this, how‐ unacquainted with the infuence of Husserl's phe‐ ever, it is born in the work that Derrida has done nomenology in French academic philosophy, with Husserl, thanks to him and, ultimately, which began in the early 1930s and continued against him, something that cannot be said of any H-Net Reviews into the postwar era, or with Derrida's own admit‐ coming. The discovery of this contamination leads tedly outsider status in the acadmie, I fear the Derrida to challenge the tenability of the phe‐ stakes of Marrati's work may be a mystery. This nomenological reduction. Husserl maintained situation is not helped by Marrati's reluctance to that the practiced phenomenologist could "brack‐ state these concerns explicitly at the outset or to et out" or "place in abeyance" (epoch;) the "natu‐ provide anything more than an internal exegesis ral attitude" or "prepredicative" way in which we of the philosophical texts. Although I certainly attend to objects in the intersubjective world of feel this book must be admired for its own merits, (Lebenswelt), thereby throwing into as a work of intense philosophical interpretation relief the transcendental acts of consciousness or and certainly an important contribution to our of a transcendental . Of course, the practice understanding of Derrida's development, I want of phenomenological reduction was always the re‐ to suggest that a broader consideration of the his‐ sult of an attempt to ground phenomenology's torical genesis--to use her key term--would both own refection: it was not only a method but also strengthen her argument and render it more ac‐ the result of its practice and the proof of the possi‐ cessible to a wider audience of philosophers and bility of phenomenology as theoretic refection.[4] intellectual historians. Similarly, Marrati suggests that Derrida discovers After exploring some of Marrati's main in investigating the problem of genesis the un‐ points, I would like to raise the issue of what is avoidable paradox in the reduction as method implicit in the authors attempt to locate the birth and result of phenomenological refection. De‐ of deconstruction in Derrida's early philosophical spite the phenomenologists efort to isolate the thought. Her insistence on the "singularity" and pure activity of consciousness, these acts always independence of the origin of deconstruction can refer back to or "intend" an that is al‐ be viewed as an act of legitimation of Derrida's ready in place, a genesis that is "" philosophical project, which leads her to elide the constituted by a passive temporal synthesis (p. historical and intellectual context of this recep‐ 15). Husserl holds onto the supposition that the tion in favor of a purely internal reading. What is separation of the phenomenological from the nat‐ more, this narrow focus on the internal connec‐ ural attitude as well as the separation of transcen‐ tions between philosophical texts would seem to dent and empirical life is possible in phenomeno‐ belie the fundamental Derridian point about the logical refection. Derrida introduces "contamina‐ ambivalence of any pure "birth" or origin. tion" as the inability to dissociate the world in its historical from the becoming of the Marrati makes the basic claim that the per‐ world in transcendental consciousness. We can sisting questions of Derridas deconstruction arise see incipient in this a critique of "meta‐ out of his criticism of Husserls phenomenology. physical presence" that was to be the mainstay of The most important of these questions is what Derrida's deconstruction. In Husserl's phe‐ Derrida calls the "contamination" of the empirical nomenological reduction, Derrida discovers the and the transcendental. For Marrati, Derrida ar‐ impossibility of a "pure presence" of thoughts for rives at this question through his thinking "with consciousness precisely by recovering the "trace" and against" the problem of genesis in Husserl's of its worldly genesis. task of transcendentally grounding philosophical refection. Contamination designates the continu‐ Derrida develops this point further through ing presence of the fnite in the infnite, of the criticism of the linguistic implications of the phe‐ temporal in the eternal, and the insurmountable nomenological way of thinking. Language serves paradox of worldly genesis as both origin and be‐ as "the fundamental condition of possibility of phenomenological diference" (p. 52). If transcen‐

2 H-Net Reviews dental reduction is the means to arriving at the tion (Destruktion) of the history of ontology (pp. theoretical attitude in acts consciousness, then the 114-116). The notion of contamination with which possibility for thematizing this content requires a Derrida confronts Husserl's transcendental refec‐ phenomenological language. But, for Derrida, the tions can be mapped onto Heidegger's point of de‐ possibility of such a language rests on the split parture for the existential analytic of . Hei‐ that is made in the between its pure expres‐ degger denies Husserl's focus on transcendental sion and its indicative . Phenomenology, in consciousness and the "bracketing" of the world it other words, requires "a purely expressive lan‐ requires; for Heidegger, self and world are con‐ guage" (p. 64). This state is achieved by viewing tained in Dasein. This state of afairs means that language as pure ideality, as in the example of what can be discovered in phenomenological in‐ imagination or fantasy. In Derrida's view, this ac‐ terpretation "already belongs to Dasein" even if it tivity amounts to the positing of a "solitary mental has the tendency in its everyday mode of to life" of interiority over against an "other" exterior "cover up" these ontological issues. Marrati re‐ world--the intersubjectively constituted world--to veals how Derrida concludes that Heidegger's ex‐ which it need not refer, but which will always re‐ istential analytic requires the "epoch of all meta‐ main as a "trace" or contamination of its worldly physical interpretation" and the naming of Dasein origin. This is in part the problem and paradox of (p. 146). On this basis, Derrida claims that Heideg‐ the phenomenological reduction being both pro‐ ger ultimately fails to throw of the traditional op‐ ductive of theoretical and the result of and ordering of metaphysics. its own practice: any supposedly pure theoretical Marrati follows this claim in an interesting presence must retain its "non-present" origin in discussion of the Heideggerian notion of "being time. As Marrati writes, "The possibility of a pure‐ towards death" as that which discloses to Dasein ly phenomenological language, of a language that its "ownmost" possibility. Many will be familiar can submit the world to epoch, is the very possi‐ with Heidegger's notion of being-towards-death bility of distinguishing body from soul within lan‐ developed in division 2 of . This is guage itself. There is no absolute life, no absolute the notion that only when confronted with the po‐ living life unless the soul does not need the body" tentiality of death does Dasein fnd disclosed its (p. 62). On this basis, Derrida claims that Husserl "uttermost possibility" of authentically taking a fails to free transcendental refection from the tra‐ stand in . Death is a perfect point of en‐ ditional oppositions of metaphysics and the privi‐ try for a Derridian deconstruction because it is, leging of interiority (p. 52). We must recognize, for like writing, at once the site of a possibility and Derrida, the "difrance" or limitation of a purely impossibility for being. Death is a universal expe‐ expressive language in a solitary mental dis‐ rience. Yet my death cannot be experienced by course that would maintain an ideality of anyone else; that is to say, I cannot experience it and a complete "othering" of an exterior world of as "one" (das Man) does. Moreover, Dasein cannot intentional signifcations. By speaking in properly experience death as a temporal being be‐ terms of asymmetrical oppositions, by privileging cause it is not characterized by a succession in the consciousness-side of experience, Husserl ulti‐ time. Death is fnal and thus defes the temporal mately falls prey to .[5] structure of experience in which Dasein is, as Hei‐ The second part of Marratis work focuses on degger puts it, "always ahead of itself" in its Derrida's confrontation with Heidegger's thinking projects. It is only through "being with" the death of an "originary temporality" under which the of others that we recognize this possibility. It is two related projects of Being and Time are placed: here that Derrida fnds the inevitable fall-back po‐ the existential analytic of Dasein and the destruc‐ sition whereby Heidegger attempts to support the

3 H-Net Reviews opposition of inauthentic, undiferentiated being In my view, the question remains why there and authentic "being-towards-death." The distinc‐ is a need for the author to defend deconstruction tion between the empirical death of man (veren‐ in this way, or at the very least to provide for it an den) and "authentic dying" (eigentlich sterben) of alternative, more "profound" lineage. Marrati Dasein, and of the "" and "ontological" levels never claims that this is an introduction to Derri‐ in general, is something achieved only through da's thought or a history of the reception of Ger‐ language. As Marrati puts it, "this distinction is man philosophy in postwar France. However, she only possible because Dasein is presupposed" as does tell us in a perfunctory footnote that in ex‐ that which "can itself testify to its being Dasein, planations of the role of phenomenology in that is, to its potential being for death" (p. 163). French philosophical debates, she fnds that "the Death, at once Dasein's "ownmost possibility," is opposition between 'historical' and 'internal' rea‐ also an impossibility in the that Dasein can‐ sons--in other words, between structure and gene‐ not die, nor truly experience the death of others. sis--is ultimately insufcient for reading a work There is again an issue of the "trace" as a contami‐ that, from The Problem of Genesis on, constitutes nation of the empirical and the transcendental, an attempt to reconsider all such categories" (p. which was frst constructively taken from a dia‐ 199 n2). While I certainly accept this point of logue with Husserl, and now deployed against the difrance, I fnd it surprising that she proceeds to Heideggerian hierarchy of asymmetrical opposi‐ fall back on a purely internal reading of Derrida's tions between authentic/inauthentic or ontic/onto‐ work. This decision generates the suspicion that logical. the concern for the status of deconstruction as "a This interpretation is a very specialized study theoretical thinking: a philosophy" has its own of Derrida's reading of Husserl that seeks to show historical grounds in the author's implicit agenda how the unique questions that emerge initially (p. xiii). from this reading predate Derrida's reception of The difculty of this book may be in part the Heidegger, and thus distinguish deconstruction result of bringing a work intended for a French from Heideggers philosophical project. If we do audience unchanged into an English edition.[6] not view the Husserl reception in this sense as the The French reader may better ascertain the value originary moment of Derrida's philosophical ap‐ of an attempt to locate the root of Derrida's prenticeship, Marrati emphasizes that we run thought in a philosophical questioning derived "the risk of turning deconstruction into a formal from the criticism of Husserl. For it was Husserl and empty structure, a method that one might in‐ who imparted to his French audience in 1929 the diferently apply to all sorts of texts in order to in‐ following insight: "Jeder, der ernstlich Philosoph vestigate their undecidability" (p. 181). This is as werden will, mu sich einmal im Leben auf sich close as Marrati comes to explicitly revealing selbst zurckziehen und in sich den Umsturz aller what is at stake in her reading of Derrida. Decon‐ vorgegebenen Wissenschaften und ihren Neubau struction is not frst "applied" but properly born versuchen. Philosophie ist eine ganz persnliche in Derrida's thinking of the problem of contami‐ Angelegenheit des Philosophierenden."[7] Derrida nation in Husserl's thought. Derrida would contin‐ had not been born when these words were ut‐ ue to repeat this thought of contamination, always tered; however, the conception of phenomenology altering it to be sure, but never reducing this "pro‐ as the most rigorous philosophical thinking of found lineage, as the never abandoned categories real existence would dominate the academic of ideality and the contamination of the empirical world in which the young Derrida was educated. I and the transcendental suggest" (p. 183). do not mean to reduce Derrida's thoughtful en‐ gagement with Husserl to the question of his aca‐

4 H-Net Reviews demic pedigree and cultivation in the premiere "Derrida"? A Derrida whose absence we now institutions of French secondary education (the "mourn" and whose insights in life would seem to Louis-le-Grand to cole Normale Suprieure trajec‐ have defed the oppositions of reader/writer, tory, etc.). However, to fnd the origin of decon‐ philosopher/literary critic implicit in Marrati's struction here, as Marrati does, is to place Derri‐ representation. da's thought in a philosophical tradition unim‐ Notes peachable for its seriousness and rigor. [1]. First published in French as Jacques Der‐ The issues at stake are the French reception rida, Problme de la gense dans la philosophie de of Derrida himself and the related concern of his Husserl (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, reliance on Heidegger. Derrida's infuence in aca‐ 1990) and very recently in English as The Problem demic philosophy and the in France of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy, trans. by Mari‐ was much less signifcant in comparison to his in‐ an Hobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, fuence in the United States. The enfant perdu 2005). held a marginal position in the French academic [2]. Paola Marrati-Gunoun, La gense et la feld as matre-assistant at the cole normale trace. Derrida lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger (1964-84) and thereafter as director of the Collge (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998). Inernational de Philosophie. His works after the Husserl studies were not as well received by the [3]. The Netherlands and Belgium have a rich academic establishment. He was considered by tradition of Husserl reception, due in part to the many to be more of a literary critic than a serious location of the main Husserl archive at the philosopher. Marrati wants to turn our focus to Katholieke Universiteit in the Flemish town of the work on Husserl in part to recuperate Derrida Leuven. as a "serious" philosopher. While this shift in fo‐ [4]. This observation, that "the reduction is its cus may be helpful and justifed for our under‐ own ," was famously made by standing of Derrida, I also believe that this strate‐ Husserl's apprentice, Eugen Fink. For the best in‐ gy must be made explicit. Likewise, if we are to troduction to this problem and to Husserl's accept the independence of Derrida's questioning in general see Maurice Natanson, Edmund of traditional metaphysical from Hei‐ Husserl: Philosopher of Infnite Tasks (Evanston: degger's "," then it would have been Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 75-77. worthwhile for the author to link this localized [5]. Here Marrati might have compared Derri‐ concern with what intellectual historians of post‐ da's refections with those of Maurice Merleau- war France have come to regard as a general ten‐ Ponty in the preface to his Phenomenology of Per‐ dency to overestimate the Heideggerian infu‐ ception, where the latter introduces an infuential ences in .[8] criticism of Husserl's egological perspective. In Finally, one could argue that the author's fo‐ general, I fnd the absence of any reference to cus on the "internal" reasons for Derrida's work Merleau-Ponty in Marrati's text troubling, given with/against Husserl and the "confrontation" with that philosopher's enormous infuence on the re‐ Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein takes for ception of Husserl in postwar French academic granted a "Derrida" and his "reading-of" as un‐ philosophy. problematic origins or as pure presences. Mar‐ [6]. Yet this has nothing to do with the actual rati's internal reading of "structure" in this sense work of , which is extremely faithful to could be problematized by the "contamination" the French original. inherent in its own "worldly genesis." Who is this

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[7]. , "Die Cartesianischen Meditationen und ihre kritische Umbildung zur meditierenden Erschlieung des transzendentalen ego," lecture given on February 23, 1929 at the In‐ stitut d'tudes germaniques and the Socit franaise in Paris. [8]. This is one of the main conclusions of Alan D. Schrift's excellent essay "Is There Such a Thing as 'French Philosophy' Or Why Do We Read the French So Badly?" in Julian Bourg, ed., After the Deluge: New Perspectives on the Intellectual and Cultural History of Postwar France (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004).

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Citation: Nicholas D. Liberto. Review of Marrati, Paola. Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger. H-German, H-Net Reviews. August, 2005.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=10832

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