Presidential Decision-Making and the Emergence of Foreign Policy Crises
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Durham E-Theses RISK VS. RISK TRADE-OFFS: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING AND THE EMERGENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY CRISES TRENTA, LUCA How to cite: TRENTA, LUCA (2014) RISK VS. RISK TRADE-OFFS: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING AND THE EMERGENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY CRISES, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10551/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 RISK VS. RISK TRADE-OFFS: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING AND THE EMERGENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY CRISES LUCA TRENTA Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations School of Government & International Affairs University of Durham 2013 1 2 Abstract. With the radicalisation of the ‘War on Terror’ and the chaos following the 2003 Iraq War, the concept of ‘risk’ emerged as central to a wide-ranging set of claims about the extent and significance of the changed post-Cold War strategic environment and its impact on policy-making. International Relations (IR) scholars argued that ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ defined foreign policy-making, with the US as the principal exemplar of such a change. The thesis explores the two, sociologically rooted, accounts of risk that underpin this literature – indebted to Ulrich Beck and Michel Foucault respectively – to identify the deeply contrasting and contradictory conceptualisations of risk they produce. Returning to some classic, and badly neglected, writing on risk and highlighting an alternative account originally developed by John Graham and Jonathan Wiener, the thesis establishes Presidential decision-making in foreign policy as a series of ‘risk versus risk trade-offs.’ This framework focuses on the ways in which risk operates simultaneously in different environments via concepts of ‘political risks’ focusing on the domestic environment and ‘strategic risks’ focusing on the international dimension. The concept of trade-off elucidates the ways in which actions aimed at countering a ‘target risk’ frequently produce ‘countervailing risks’ of their own. Using this approach, the thesis assesses the build-up to three crises in US foreign policy; two from the Cold War (the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Iran hostage crisis) and one from the post-Cold War period (the road to Srebrenica). The case studies, based on archival research and interviews, effectively challenge the claim that the end of the Cold War represented the onset of an era of foreign policy-making as risk management, by showing how the Kennedy and Carter administrations engaged in policy-making practices and processes that are not markedly dissimilar from Clinton’s. In addition, the case studies enrich the ‘risk literature’ and demonstrate how the analysis of crises can be advanced by understanding the moment of crisis as the culmination of a series of neglected ‘countervailing risks.’ More generally, the thesis points to the initial validity of an approach that can be applied to diverse issues in foreign policy-making. 3 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................. 14 1.1 MAIN ARGUMENT OF THE THESIS ...................................................................... 14 1.2 PLAN OF THE THESIS ........................................................................................... 16 CHAPTER 2: RISK IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ........ 21 2.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 21 2.2 RISK IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: FROM SOCIOLOGY TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS .................................................................................... 22 2.2.1 The Power of Risk ............................................................................................................. 25 2.2.1.1 From Foucault’s ‘notion of risk’ to governmentality studies ........... 25 2.2.1.2 A ‘dispositif’ of precaution: risk and the War on Terror ................... 29 2.2.2 Welcome to the risk society: reflexive modernity and uncontrollable risks .................................................................................................................................................... 35 2.2.2.1 Beck’s Risk Society: the ageing of modernity ......................................... 35 2.2.2.2 The Risk Society goes to War ........................................................................ 39 2.2.3 The two scholarships reconsidered ........................................................................... 43 2.3 DECISION THEORY: RISK AND RISK-TAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY ................... 47 2.3.1 From Bernoulli to VertzberGer ................................................................................... 48 2.3.1.1 Bernoulli meets Allison’s Rational Actor Model .................................... 48 2.3.2.2 Prospect Theory’s reality check ................................................................... 50 2.3.2.3 Vertzberger’s ‘convergent synergism’ ....................................................... 54 2.4 AN INTERIM REPORT CARD ................................................................................ 56 CHAPTER 3: RE-CONCEPTUALISING RISK IN FOREIGN POLICY ........................................................................................... 58 3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 58 3.2 RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND RISK MANAGEMENT: A FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................................................... 59 3.2.1 SchellinG’s uncertain competition in risk-takinG ................................................ 59 3.2.2 Neustadt’s ‘fire-fighter’ behaviour: risk manaGement and Presidential decision-makinG ................................................................................................. 62 3.2.3 Lamborn and GeorGe: risks and trade-offs ............................................................ 65 3.3 UNCERTAINTY, RISK, AND RISK MANAGEMENT: A NEW PERSPECTIVE .......... 68 3.3.1 Towards operational definitions ............................................................................... 68 5 3.3.1.1 Knight and Keynes: risk, uncertainty, and that ‘awkward fact’ ...... 69 3.3.1.2 Uncertainty, risk, and risk management: the risk management perspective ........................................................................................................................... 71 3.4 ESTABLISHING THE CONNECTION ..................................................................... 77 3.4.1 Presidential decision-makinG and ‘risk vs. risk trade-offs’ ............................. 77 3.5 COUNTERVAILING RISKS, UNCERTAINTY AND FOREIGN POLICY CRISES ........ 80 3.5.1 The crisis literature ......................................................................................................... 81 3.5.1.1 The heated debate: lost in definitions ....................................................... 81 3.5.1.2 The ‘explosion thesis’ and the origins of crisis ...................................... 85 3.5.2 The nature of crisis: enter risk and uncertainty ................................................. 87 3.6 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES ALONG THE COLD WAR/POST-COLD WAR DIVIDE .......................................................................................................................... 90 3.6.1 Towards the case studies ............................................................................................... 93 CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND METHODS .................. 95 4.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 95 4.2 THE ‘WHY’ QUESTION ......................................................................................... 95 4.3 THE ‘WHAT’ QUESTION ....................................................................................... 97 4.3.1 Interpretation: a Game of Scrabble .......................................................................... 97 4.3.2 From interpretation to foreign policy decision-makinG ............................... 101 4.3.3 Interpretation, foreign policy decision-makinG and risk ............................. 104 4.3.4 Case studies: case studies as cases of somethinG ............................................. 107 4.3.5 Which case studies? And why? ................................................................................. 109 4.4 THE HOW QUESTION: INTERROGATING THE HISTORICAL RECORD. ........... 110 4.5 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 114 CHAPTER 5: ‘I SHOULD HAVE SAID THAT WE DON’T CARE:’ THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND CUBA, 1961-1962 ................................................................................