DOCSLIB.ORG

HSDRRS Hurricane Storm Damage Risk Reduction System

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
HSDRRS Hurricane Storm Damage Risk Reduction System HSDRRS Hurricane Storm Damage Risk Reduction System Times-Picayune / NOLA.com Times-Picayune / NOLA.com Industrial Canal Orleans Intracoastal Avenue London Canal Avenue Canal 17th Street Canal Industrial Canal Orleans Intracoastal Avenue London Canal Avenue Canal 17th Street Canal BAYOU ST. JOHN Industrial Canal Orleans Intracoastal Avenue London Canal Avenue Canal 17th Street Canal BAYOU ST. JOHN Industrial Canal Orleans Intracoastal Avenue London Canal Avenue Canal 17th Street Canal 10+ feet 8-10 feet 6-8 feet 4-6 feet Times-Picayune 2-4 feet NOLA.com 0-2 feet Graphic New Orleans Topography LAKE PONCHARTRAIN B City of New Orleans From Canal St. at Ground Elevations Mississippi River A to the FLOODWALL ALONG NEW MISSISSIPPI RIVER ORLEANS Lakefront at U.N.O. A 30 30 23 FT B 20 MR&T 20 PROJECT DESIGN LONDON AVENUE CANAL FLOODWALL FLOWLINE (18 FEET) HURRICANE LEVEE / FLOODWALL (14.0 FEET) 10 10 0 0 ELEVATIONS IN FEET NGVD -10 -10 10 - -20 -20 CANAL ST CANAL AT RIVER GENTILLY BLVD GENTILLY AT ALLEN ESPLANADE AT ESPLANADE ST. CLAUDE DERBIGNY AT I ST AT ANTHONY FILMORE AVE ST LOUIS CATHEDRAL WAINRIGHT DR L.AT C. SIMON DILLARD UNIV CAMPUS UNO SIDE OF WAINWRIGHT DR BAYOU ST. JOHN Industrial Canal Orleans Intracoastal Avenue London Canal Avenue Canal 17th Street Canal BAYOU ST. JOHN Industrial Canal Orleans Intracoastal Avenue London Canal Avenue Canal 17th Street Canal Times-Picayune NOLA.com Graphic 10+ feet 8-10 feet 6-8 feet 4-6 feet 2-4 feet Lesson Learned: 0-2 feet PROTECT THE PERIMETER Times-PicayuneNOLA.com 17th Street Canal LONDON ORLEANS BAYOU ST. JOHN 17th 17th Street Canal INTERIM PUMPS: 9,200 cfs PERMANENT PUMPS: 12,600 cfs 37% Orleans Avenue Canal LONDON ORLEANS BAYOU ST. JOHN 17th INTERIM PUMPS: 2,200 cfs PERMANENT PUMPS: 2,700 cfs 23% London Avenue Canal LONDON ORLEANS BAYOU ST. JOHN 17th INTERIM PUMPS: 5,200 cfs PERMANENT PUMPS: 9,000 cfs 73% SEABROOK LONDON ORLEANS BAYOU ST. JOHN 17th Navigable Width: 95’ Height: 16’ above sea level 2 Lift Gates: 50’ wide each Sill Depth: 18’ below sea level 24,300 cfs 16,000 cfs LONDON ORLEANS BAYOU ST. JOHN 17th I- Wall Canal (normal water level) Levee Steel Sheet Pile 26 miles L P V LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND VICINITY Includes 77 risk reduction features in St. Charles, Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Bernard parishes. L P V LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND VICINITY Includes 77 risk reduction features in St. Charles, Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Bernard parishes. W B V WESTBANK AND VICINITY Includes 98 risk reduction features in St. Charles, Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines parishes. PERIMETER: 133 Miles TOTAL: 350 miles with interior levees/floodwalls 75 Pump Stations Total Pumping Capacity: 8 Million cfs TOTAL COST: $14+ Billion IHNC SURGE BARRIER WEST CLOSURE COMPLEX SECTOR GATE BARGE GATE Each 150’ wide LIFT GATE 56’ wide COST: ~$1.1 Billion Largest continuous surge barrier in the world: 1.8 miles 26’ ABOVE Sea Level 26’ ABOVE Sea Level Sea Level 647 Steel Batter Piles 3’ diameter 129’ below waterline 190’ below waterline VIDEO OF SURGE BARRIER https://www.floodauthority.org/videos/ WBV WBV 6 PUMPS 15,623 cfs 3 PUMPS 8,991 cfs Removed more than 25 miles of levees and floodwalls from direct surge impact WCC COST: ~ $1 Billion Largest Pump Station in the World 19,426 cfS 1,165,560 cf /minute 356 Projects NOV Armoring PCCP 32 20 OFC 3 7 Mitigation 21 IHNC 12 Stormproofing 31 SELA 46 LPV 77 WBV 98 .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • JEFFERSON PARISH COUNCIL MEETING Wednesday, May 16, 2018 1221 ELMWOOD PARK BOULEVARD JEFFERSON, LOUISIANA
    JEFFERSON PARISH COUNCIL MEETING Wednesday, May 16, 2018 1221 ELMWOOD PARK BOULEVARD JEFFERSON, LOUISIANA SPECIAL PRESENTATIONS BY: BUSINESS MEETING BEGINS AT 10:00 AM MEETING CALLED TO ORDER INVOCATION AND/OR PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE ROLL CALL - COUNCIL MEMBERS ROLL CALL - PARISH PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF DEPARTMENTS PARISH PRESIDENT TO ADDRESS COUNCIL PERSONS WISHING TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COUNCIL REGARDING A RESOLUTION(S) ON AGENDA/ADDENDUM AGENDA ORDINANCES TO BE DEFERRED 1. SUMMARY NO. 24759 - repealing Chapter 2, Article VI, Sections 2-811 through 2-818 of the Code and enacting Chapter 2, Article VI, Sections 2-811 through 2-818 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances relative to the Transportation Advisory Board. (Parishwide) (Deferred from 4/25/18)(Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec.2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) 2. SUMMARY NO. 24799 - amending Chapter 2, Article II, Division 2 of the Code relative to the recording and broadcast of meetings of the Jefferson Parish Council. (Parishwide) (Deferred from 4/25/18) (Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec. 2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) 3. SUMMARY NO. 24894 - amending the Code to reduce and/or eliminate redundancies and fees with respect to requirements for emergency medical technicians. (Parishwide) (Deferred from 4/25/18) (Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec.2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) 4. SUMMARY NO. 24961 - amending Ordinance No. 18226, as amended, to amend Rule V Pay Plan of the Personnel Rules of the East Bank Consolidated Fire Protection District to add the position of Deputy Fire Chief.
    [Show full text]
  • Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005
    Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 by R.B. Seed, P.G. Nicholson, R.A. Dalrymple, J. Battjes, R.G. Bea, G. Boutwell, J.D. Bray, B. D. Collins, L.F. Harder, J.R. Headland, M. Inamine, R.E. Kayen, R. Kuhr, J. M. Pestana, R. Sanders, F. Silva-Tulla, R. Storesund, S. Tanaka, J. Wartman, T. F. Wolff, L. Wooten and T. Zimmie Preliminary findings from field investigations and associated studies performed by teams from the University of California at Berkeley and the American Society of Civil Engineers, as well as a number of cooperating engineers and scientists, shortly after the hurricane. Report No. UCB/CITRIS – 05/01 November 2, 2005 New Orleans Levee Systems Hurricane Katrina August 29, 2005 This project was supported, in part, by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CMS-0413327. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation. This report contains the observations and findings of a joint investigation between independent teams of professional engineers with a wide array of expertise. The materials contained herein are the observations and professional opinions of these individuals, and does not necessarily reflect the opinions or endorsement of ASCE or any other group or agency, Table of Contents i November 2, 2005 New Orleans Levee Systems Hurricane Katrina August 29, 2005 Table of Contents Executive Summary ...……………………………………………………………… iv Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 1.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………... 1-1 1.2 Hurricane Katrina ………………………………………………………….
    [Show full text]
  • Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost Volume I Options 1, 2, and 2A Report
    May 2010 Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost Volume I Options 1, 2, and 2a Report Prepared for Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans in partnership with the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority- East, Jefferson Parish Department of Public Works, and the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority Photo courtesy of USACE Graphics Water Prepared for: Sewerage & Water Board Prepared by: of New Orleans AECOM New Orleans, LA New Orleans, Louisiana Color 60149879.0005 May 7, 2010 Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost Options 1, 2, and 2a AECOM Water i Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. ES-1 1.0 Option 1 – Construction of New Permanent Gated Pump Stations at the Mouths of the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue Canals ................................. 1-1 1.1 Option 1 - Basis of Opinion of Probable Cost ..................................................................... 1-3 1.2 Summary of Findings for 17th Street Canal – Option 1...................................................... 1-4 1.2.1 Mechanical and Electrical .....................................................................................1-6 1.2.2 Geotechnical ......................................................................................................... 1-9 1.2.3 Real Estate ..........................................................................................................1-10
    [Show full text]
  • New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: the 17Th Street Drainage Canal
    New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: The 17th Street Drainage Canal R. B. Seed, M.ASCE1; R. G. Bea, F.ASCE2; A. Athanasopoulos-Zekkos, S.M.ASCE3; G. P. Boutwell, F.ASCE4; J. D. Bray, F.ASCE5; C. Cheung, M.ASCE6; D. Cobos-Roa7; L. F. Harder Jr., M.ASCE8; R. E. S. Moss, M.ASCE9; J. M. Pestana, M.ASCE10; M. F. Riemer, M.ASCE11; J. D. Rogers, M.ASCE12; R. Storesund, M.ASCE13; X. Vera-Grunauer, M.ASCE14; and J. Wartman, M.ASCE15 Abstract: The failure of the levee and floodwall section on the east bank of the 17th Street drainage canal was one of the most catastrophic breaches that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. It produced a breach that rapidly scoured a flow pathway below sea level, so that after the storm surge had largely subsided, floodwaters still continued to stream in through this breach for the next two and a half days. This particular failure contributed massively to the overall flooding of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin. Slightly more than half of the loss of life, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical and geoforensic lessons associated with this failure. Accordingly, this paper is dedicated solely to investigating this single failure. Geological and geotechnical details, such as a thin layer of sensitive clay that was laid down by a previous hurricane, proper strength characterization of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee, and recognition of a water-filled gap on the inboard side of the sheet pile cutoff wall are judged to be among the most critical factors in understanding this failure.
    [Show full text]
  • Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel Christine F
    THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong and Why A Report by the American Society of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel Christine F. Andersen, P.E., M.ASCE Jurjen A. Battjes, Ph.D. David E. Daniel, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE (Chair) Billy Edge, Ph.D., P.E., F.ASCE William Espey, Jr., Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE, D.WRE Robert B. Gilbert , Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE Thomas L. Jackson, P.E., F.ASCE, D.WRE David Kennedy, P.E., F.ASCE Dennis S. Mileti, Ph.D. James K. Mitchell, Sc.D., P.E., Hon.M.ASCE Peter Nicholson, Ph.D., P.E., F.ASCE Clifford A. Pugh, P.E., M.ASCE George Tamaro, Jr., P.E., Hon.M.ASCE Robert Traver, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE, D.WRE ASCE Staff: Joan Buhrman Charles V. Dinges IV, Aff.M.ASCE John E. Durrant, P.E., M.ASCE Jane Howell Lawrence H. Roth, P.E., G.E., F.ASCE Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The New Orleans hurricane protection system : what went wrong and why : a report / by the American Society of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. p. cm. ISBN-13: 978-0-7844-0893-3 ISBN-10: 0-7844-0893-9 1. Hurricane Katrina, 2005. 2. Building, Stormproof. 3. Hurricane protection. I. American Society of Civil Engineers. Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. TH1096.N49 2007 627’.40976335--dc22 2006031634 Published by American Society of Civil Engineers 1801 Alexander Bell Drive Reston, Virginia 20191 www.pubs.asce.org Any statements expressed in these materials are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of ASCE, which takes no responsibility for any statement made herein.
    [Show full text]
  • Decision-Making Chronology for the Lake Pontchartrain & Vicinity
    DECISION-MAKING CHRONOLOGY FOR THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN & VICINITY HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT FINAL REPORT FOR THE HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS SUBMITTED TO THE INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS Douglas Woolley Leonard Shabman March 2008 ii Forward The one-two punch of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September of 2005 proved calamitous to a vast swath of the U.S. Gulf Coast across the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas. While still offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina’s 175 mph winds created the highest storm surge yet recorded at landfall in North America. Katrina’s storm surge overwhelmed many of the levees and floodwalls for greater New Orleans designed and constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, collectively known as the Lake Pontchartrain & Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LP&VHPP). The result was a human tragedy—more than 1,600 people killed or missing and presumed dead, with over 1,250 confirmed deaths in Louisiana alone. In economic terms, the flooding from Katrina represents the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history. Direct flood damages to residential, non-residential, and public properties and infrastructure in greater New Orleans approached $28 billion, with further indirect economic effects and long- lasting socio-economic disruption to the region. In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, the Secretary of Defense directed that that Army enlist the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a thorough review of the engineering aspects of the performance of the levees and floodwalls in place in New Orleans on August 29, 2005.
    [Show full text]
  • Wednesday, April 6, 2016 1221 ELMWOOD PARK BOULEVARD JEFFERSON, LOUISIANA JEFFERSON PARISH COUNCIL MEETING SPECIAL PRESENTATIONS
    JEFFERSON PARISH COUNCIL MEETING Wednesday, April 6, 2016 1221 ELMWOOD PARK BOULEVARD JEFFERSON, LOUISIANA SPECIAL PRESENTATIONS BY: BUSINESS MEETING BEGINS AT 10:00 AM MEETING CALLED TO ORDER INVOCATION AND/OR PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE ROLL CALL - COUNCIL MEMBERS ROLL CALL - PARISH PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF DEPARTMENTS PARISH PRESIDENT TO ADDRESS COUNCIL READING OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE CONTRIBUTIONS PERSONS WISHING TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COUNCIL REGARDING A RESOLUTION(S) ON AGENDA/ADDENDUM AGENDA ORDINANCES TO BE DEFERRED 1. SUMMARY NO. 24373 - amending Section 17-20 of the Code regarding support of the prison medical unit. (Parishwide) (Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec. 2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) (Deferred from 3/2/16) 2. SUMMARY NO. 24447 - amending the Code to establish requirements with regard to the submission of invoices from sub-consultants to the Parish and the timely payment of sub-consultants by primary consultants under contract with the Parish or with any of the Parish’s departments, agencies or districts. (Parishwide) (Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec.2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) 3. SUMMARY NO. 24473 - amending 2016 Operating Budget. (Parishwide) (Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec. 2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) 4. SUMMARY NO. 24474 - amending 2016 Capital Budget. (Parishwide) (Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec. 2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) 5. SUMMARY NO. 24475 - amending 2016 Operating Budget. (Parishwide) (Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec.
    [Show full text]
  • Interaction Between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board Preceding the Drainage Canal Wall Failures and Ca
    Water Policy 17 (2015) 707–723 Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of New Orleans in 2005 J. David Rogersa, G. Paul Kempb, H. J. Bosworth Jrc and Raymond B. Seedd a157 McNutt Hall, Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, MO 65409, USA b633 Magnolia Wood Avenue, Baton Rouge, LA 70808, USA cCorresponding author. 1527 S. Carrollton Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA. E-mail: [email protected] d760 Davis Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA Abstract The authors hope to correct any premature conclusions about the role of the pre-Katrina Orleans Levee Board (OLB) in the failure of the outfall drainage canals in New Orleans during the 2005 hurricane – conclusions that appear to have been based on inaccurate information and/or assumptions. With regard to the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals, the authors have not uncovered any information that would suggest that the OLB behaved irresponsibly in its duties. What is evident from the project record is that the Army Corps of Engineers rec- ommended raising the canal floodwalls for the 17th Street Canal, but recommended gated structures at the mouths of the Orleans and London Avenue Canals because the latter plan was less expensive. The OLB convinced Congress to pass legislation that required the Corps to raise the floodwalls for all three canals. Furthermore, the Corps, in a separate attempt to limit project costs, initiated a sheet pile load test (E-99 Study), but misinterpreted the results and wrongly concluded that sheet piles needed to be driven to depths of only 17 feet (1 foot ¼ 0.3048 meters) instead of between 31 and 46 feet.
    [Show full text]
  • Jefferson Parish Library
    JEFFERSON PARISH 2015 MULTIJURISDICTIONAL HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN UPDATE MARCH 2015 Table of Contents Section 1 Executive Summary 6 1.1 Organization of the Plan 7 1.2 Background 7 1.3 Hazards and Risks 8 1.3.1 Hazards 8 1.3.2 Risks 9 1.4 Summary of Goals, Objectives, Strategies and Actions 9 1.4.1 Hazard Mitigation Goals 9 1.4.2 Hazard Mitigation Objectives 10 1.4.3 Hazard Mitigation Strategies 10 1.4.4 Action Items 11 1.5 The Planning Process 11 1.6 Approval and Adoption Process 12 1.7 Implementation Process 12 1.8 Monitoring and Updating Processes 12 Section 2 Background 13 2.1 Introduction 13 2.1.1 Scope of the Plan 13 2.2 Organization, Objectives and Mission 14 2.3 Background Information 15 2.3.1 Geography 15 2.3.2 Parish History 18 2.3.3 Climate 19 2.3.4 Transportation 19 2.3.5 Community Assets 19 2.3.6 Population and Growth 21 2.4 The Louisiana State Hazard Mitigation Plan 24 Section 3 Planning Process 25 3.1 Interim Final Rule Requirements 25 3.2 Federal Mitigation Planning Requirements 26 3.3 Description of the Planning Process 27 3.3.1 How the Plan was Prepared and Updated 27 3.3.2 Step 1 – Organize Resources 28 3.3.3 Step 2 – Assess Risks 31 3.3.4 Step 3 – Identify and Scope Potential Projects 31 3.3.5 Step 4 – Develop the Mitigation Plan 32 2 3.3.6 Step 5 – Implement Plan and Monitor Progress 32 3.4 How the Public and Jurisdictions were Involved 32 3.5 Other Local Planning Mechanisms 33 3.6 Review/Incorporation of Plans, Studies, Reports, and 34 other information Section 4 Hazard Identification, Ranking, and Risk Assessments
    [Show full text]
  • Tidally-Influenced New Orleans Canal Network Benefits from Accurate Water Level Data Aqua TROLL® 200 Instruments Dynamically Compensate for Changing Salinity Values
    Innovations in Water Monitoring Application Note Tidally-Influenced New Orleans Canal Network Benefits from Accurate Water Level Data Aqua TROLL® 200 Instruments dynamically compensate for changing salinity values Application The Southern Louisiana Hurricane Protection System includes a network of levees, floodwalls, floodgates, and pumping stations in New Orleans, Louisiana. This network includes monitoring equipment designed to improve management of water levels throughout the system. Water level monitoring helps synchronize pumping and assures that all elements of the water level control system are within proper ranges. Water level monitoring is also conducted around Lake Pontchartrain and at locations upstream and downstream of locks. In addition, groundwater levels are checked throughout the district to scrutinize levee integrity and condition. Both fresh water and saltwater influence water level changes in New Orleans. In areas where salinity values vary due to mixing, rainfall, or tides, water level measurements must be adjusted by compensating for changes in water density due to George Brown of the USACE New Orleans District changes in salinity. Water Management Office works with an In-Situ RuggedReader® Handheld PC and Aqua TROLL 200 Continuous monitoring improves canal Instrument at a pumping station on 17th Street Canal, management constructed after Hurricane Katrina. The gates behind him were included in the new structure to control water Since Hurricane Katrina pounded the Gulf Coast in surge into and out of the canal. The USACE has recently August 2005, the USACE has fortified New Orleans city deployed Aqua TROLL 200 units to profile key water canals with control gates and pumping stations—and parameters along waterways in the New Orleans District.
    [Show full text]
  • The Hurricane Katrina Litigation Against the Corps of Engineers: Is Denial of Geology and Climate Change the Way to Save New Orleans?
    University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review Volume 40 Issue 4 The Ben J. Altheimer Symposium: The Law and Unnatural Disasters: Legal Adaptations Article 8 to Climate Change 2018 The Hurricane Katrina Litigation Against the Corps of Engineers: Is Denial of Geology and Climate Change the Way to Save New Orleans? Edward P. Richards III Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview Part of the Environmental Law Commons Recommended Citation Edward P. Richards III, The Hurricane Katrina Litigation Against the Corps of Engineers: Is Denial of Geology and Climate Change the Way to Save New Orleans?, 40 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 695 (2018). Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss4/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE HURRICANE KATRINA LITIGATION AGAINST THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS: IS DENIAL OF GEOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE THE WAY TO SAVE NEW ORLEANS? Edward P. Richards, III* I. INTRODUCTION The movie Rashomon presents the story of an event from the perspective of four storytellers. Depending on the point of view, the event could be a murder and rape or a battle of honor over a woman.1 Legal scholars have made much of the Rashomon Effect as an example of the ambiguity of truth and the effect of a person’s involvement in an event on the person’s view of the event.2 The story of Hurricane Katrina echoes Rashomon but includes many more unreliable narrators.
    [Show full text]
  • Levees and Floodwalls
    Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System Final Report of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force Volume V – The Performance — Levees and Floodwalls June 2007 FINAL Volume I – Executive Summary and Overview Volume II – Geodetic Vertical and Water Level Datums Volume III – The Hurricane Protection System Volume IV – The Storm Volume V – The Performance – Levees and Floodwalls Volume VI – The Performance – Interior Drainage and Pumping Volume VII – The Consequences Volume VIII – Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis Volume IX – General Appendices DISCLAIMER: The contents of this report are not to be used for advertising, publication, or promotional purposes. Citation of trade names does not constitute an official endorsement or approval of the use of such commercial products. All product names and trademarks cited are the property of their respective owners. The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other authorized documents. Volume V The Performance — Levees and Floodwalls Contents Contents ........................................................................................................................................................ii Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Performance Analysis Team..................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]