Christian Wicke Catching God‘S Coattail

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WORKING PAPERS IN NATIONALISM STUDIES

No. 4, 2011

Christian Wicke Catching God‘s Coattail:

Comparing Bismarck‘s and Kohl‘s Profile in Nationalism

ISBN: 1 900522 88 8 Our Working Papers in Nationalism Studies present the finest dissertation work from students on the MSc Nationalism Studies programme at the University of Edinburgh.

Christian Wicke graduated with distinction from the programme in November 2007.

Abstract

It has been assumed that the first German unification was driven from above, whereas the second unification was driven from below and that Bismarck played a greater role in the respective process than Kohl. This comparative study rethinks the interaction between nationalisms from ”above‘ and ”below‘ and shows that contextualising individuals can be a fruitful method to overcome mistaken theoretical assumptions. Considering nationalism from below before the unifications, in combination with an analysis of the actions, socialisations, political philosophies and nationalist ideas of Bismarck and Kohl, leads to the conclusion that both unification processes were too dialectical to accept the abovementioned dichotomy. A national movement had existed in Germany for decades, while Bismarck continued to believe in his duty to protect the Prussian state. Yet, he eventually realised for pragmatic reasons that a ”golden bridge‘ between nationalism and Prussian expansionism in form of kleindeutsch policies was the only way to ensure the persistence of Prussia as a great power. While unification had been almost taboo since the FRG‘s entry in NATO, Kohl maintained his vision of German unity. He promoted his belief in the interdependency of liberty and unity and when the democratic movement in the GDR set in motion a peaceful revolution, Kohl immediately realised the opportunity to become the decisive actor for reunification.

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Catching God‘s Coattail

INTRODUCTION

This comparative study focuses on two important leaders in the history of nationalism. It shall contribute to a better conception, not only of the ideas and actions of Bismarck and Kohl regarding the two German unifications, but also of the interaction between nationalism from ”above‘ and ”below‘ in the (re)making of nation-states. This dissertation will show that investigating structural reasons for the will of well chosen individuals can be a very successful way of embracing diverse theoretical approaches in Nationalism Studies. Exposing similarities and differences between the motivations and actions of individuals leads to an enhanced understanding of important dynamics of historical events that are likely to be overlooked if nationalism is only grasped either as a force from above or from below.

Since the unification in 1871, Otto von Bismarck has been regarded as the founder of the German nation-state (Machtan 1994). Similarly, since 1990, Helmut Kohl became acknowledged as the ”chancellor of unity‘ (Bickerich 1996). In their collection of essays on the two unifications, Breuilly and Speirs (2005: 12) represent the often held view that Bismarck had a much more leading function than Kohl. Yet, without taking the effort to include a comparative essay that deals with these two individuals, the editors defend the general claim that the first unification was driven from above (ibid: 4), i.e. by the Bismarck government of Prussia, whereas the second unification was the result of a bottom-up process, i.e. driven by popular demand (ibid: 11).

This dissertation will argue that such a contrast is too crude and show that top-level initiatives toward the (re)uniting of Germany undertaken by both, Bismarck and Kohl, were essentially context-dependent, including public demands for social and political changes. Bismarck and Kohl both indeed took idiosyncratic decisions to realise their interests in form of German unity. Yet, before a top-bottom dichotomy concerning the two unifications can be established in a trustworthy manner, one should analyse the structural reasons for each of their individual will for unification.

The first part of this dissertation provides a background of the relevant theory, which paves the way to a conceptual understanding of these two cases. It deals with typologies of nationalism by taking particular reference to unification nationalism to

underpin the notional comparability of these two cases. It will moreover discuss the usefulness of a theoretical dichotomy between ”nationalism from above‘ and ”nationalism from below‘ and subsequently highlight the effectiveness of the study of individuals as a method in Nationalism Studies. The second and third parts each deal with one of the two unifications and respectively with Bismarck‘s and Kohl‘s profiles. Each chapter will introduce the development of German nationalism before the events of unification, the relevant actions toward unity undertaken by Bismarck and Kohl and furthermore analyse each of their socialisations, their political philosophies and ideas of the German nation in order to find out the motivations for their actions. The last part consists of a concluding comparative analysis.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

Nationalism is the most dominant global ideology, which has a great variety of facets, and its causes and effects are infinite. Discussions about the hierarchy of academic disciplines that may be most adequate to understand this subject are caused by conceitedness and should not have an impact on the study of nationalism, which is interdisciplinary in nature (Deutsch 1953: 162). Instead, receptiveness to all kinds of methods, their further development and the creation of new methods is crucial for grasping the multi-causality of the why of our world of nation-states. At this point, it makes sense however to assign a lowest common denominator to nationalisms: I suggest that nationalism is (1) the idea that one people, one nation and one state should coincide (Hobsbawm 1990) and (2) all efforts to realise or maintain this ideal, reflexively or purposively (Billig 1995). Nationalism can thus be studied as both a mindset as well as a set of actions.

The equation ”state = nation‘ has become a dominant mode to structure human relations vertically and horizontally, i.e. nationally and internationally (Hall 2003: 16-17). Because nationalism implies the imagination of individual membership of (or exclusion from) a greater whole of the nation (Anderson 1991), this equation has become increasingly essential for people‘s consciousness, identity, desires and actions. That is why some believe that nationalism is more than just a political

ideology (as e.g. Breuilly 1993, Hechter 2000, McCrone 2007 suggest) arguing that it is first of all a state of mind, a consciousness and feeling (e.g. Billig 1995, Greenfeld 2005, Kohn 1967).

Yet, the gestalt of nationalism is highly variable, depending on time, place and person - which is not only an inspiring fact for theorists engaged in this topic - but also leads to the scholarly obligation to become more occupied with case-studies to fully grasp the particular dynamics within the becoming and functioning of this assumed normality. Before coming to the two cases of Bismarck and Kohl it makes however much sense to pick up some theoretical baggage that will accompany us through the rest of this study.

Typologies of nationalism

Theorists have exerted themselves in establishing typologies of nationalism based on the comparison of specific aspects of specific cases. Mentioning all typologies would go far beyond the scope here, but it is noteworthy that some scholars paid more attention to ideological distinctions than others.

Ideological distinctions

Most prominent are polarisations like ”civic vs. ethnic‘ (Brubaker 1992), ”individualistic-libertarian vs. collective-authoritarian‘ (Greenfeld 1992), ”cultural vs. political‘ (Mann 1992: 137) or ”western vs. eastern‘ (Plamenatz 1975). These typologies are under attack as they tend to be too normative while neither their associated cases nor their geographical divide are de facto as pure as they suggest (see Anderson 2001, Brown 1999, Yack 1999).

Another famous ideological and certainly normative typology is launched by Alter (1985), who can, to a certain extent, be identified as a very influential author for this dissertation. He differentiates, apart from what he calls reform nationalism (in this case a nation, like Turkey under Kemal Atatürk, seeking to catch up with ”superior‘ nations), between two core types of nationalism. On the one hand, he depicts a more liberal Risorgimento nationalism, i.e. a protest movement against oppression, and, on the other hand, a more aggressive integral nationalism. Risorgimento (i.e. resurrection) is of emancipatory character, based on the spirit of the French and

American Revolutions. The anti-dynastic and anti-feudalist ideas of citizenship and public sovereignty stand in the centre of this development.

Alter thus implies that the original nationalism must first be grasped as a liberation force from below (this type will be further discussed in the next section). Here he conflicts with Greenfeld (1992), who clearly assigns, like many others do, German nationalism to the collectivistic-authoritarian, that is, the ethnic cultural type of nationalism. Nevertheless, Alter finds that cultural nationalisms can be analogous to Risorgimento nationalism, as art, language and education can be pre-political expressions of public emancipation. He takes the German Nationalbewegung as a prime example for Risorgimento nationalism.

Alter‘s concept of integral nationalism stands in sharp contrast to this. It has Darwinist attributes, is extreme and reactionary. In integral nationalism the individual and morality, i.e. the question of right or wrong, are subordinated to the national quest. It is worthwhile to note, however, that assumed liberal nations clearly show characteristics of Alter‘s integral nationalism. Thus when an American veteran at the Memorial Day faced the question of whether he would feel betrayed because the US government sends its citizens into false wars, he asserted vigorously: —right or wrong, it is my country“ ( Weltspiegel 2007).

After 1945, Alter goes on, nationalism was in a crisis. It was perceived as something evil that had nothing to do with ”healthy‘ national consciousness or patriotism. But, per definition, such a relativisation does not mean that nationalism was over. He thus acknowledges the remaining conceptual gap in his typology that cannot characterise the more benign type of nationalism which took place in the second half of the 20 th century.

Interesting in this regard is what Billig (1995) coins banal nationalism, which is seemingly the most widely distributed kind of nationalism. This type has been established to fill an often invisible blank left over in established typologies. Billig protests against the fact that nationalism has been portrayed as something occurring merely at the periphery of time or space, i.e. in the past or beyond the established western nation-state. By stressing the social psychological component of nationalism, he asserts that nationalism —is a way of thinking or ideological consciousness. In this consciousness, nations, national identities and national ”homelands appear as

”natural‘ (ibid: 10). Dismissing the normative character of Nationalism Studies, Billig thus brings the object of nationalism back into the centre of our daily life by showing that nationalism is steadily and reflexively happening in the form of ”banal‘ actions that reaffirm the existence of our nation-states. He points out that banal nationalism can easily turn ”hot‘; —the crisis occurs; the president calls; bells ring; the citizens answer; and the patriotic identity is connected [sic]“ (ibid: 7).

A non-ideological distinction: unification nationalism

Other typologies focus more on the territorial aspect of nationalism, i.e. in how far the shape of the state is potentially subject to change. Such typologies, which are obviously not based on ideological contrasts, should find broader acceptance. Hechter (2000: 15) distinguishes between state-building nationalism that —is embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state“, peripheral nationalism, which —occurs when a culturally distinctive territory resists incorporation into an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own government“, irredentist nationalism that —occurs with the attempt to extend the existing boundaries of a state by incorporating territories of an adjacent state occupied principally by co-nationals“ (ibid: 17) and unification nationalism, which is of particular concern for this study (see also Breuilly 1993: 9).

Even though the number of divided nations remains high, successful unification nationalism is comparably rare in history. That is why the fact that Germany experienced two unifications astonishes even more. Unification, according to Hechter (2000: 16), —involves the merger of politically divided but culturally homogenous territory into one state (…). In this case, the effort to render cultural and governance boundaries congruent requires the establishment of a new state encompassing the members of the nation“. (Yet, one may argue, the level of a pre- existing cultural homogeneity is fairly relative.) Breuilly and Speirs (2005: 2) define —[n]ational unification [as] a process by which a plurality of sovereign states is rapidly reduced to a single state, an outcome legitimated, either in advance or in retrospect, by the argument that this process brings together a divided nation“. They explain that unification implies the downfall of some previously existing sovereignty, yet, unlike the rhetoric of annexation, conquest or expansion, it is —the word ”national‘ that gives meaning to the idea of ”unification“ (ibid). One should be aware,

however, that a situation, in which national rhetoric gives meaning to a political development, is not a particularity of unification nationalism but rather perceivable in any type of nationalism.

Despite this emphasis on the ”national‘, Breuilly (1993), in his chapter on 19 th century German, Italian and Polish unification nationalism, claims that it was not nationalism that served as a main driving force toward unification because it found relatively little appeal among the masses. A similar claim is made by Fulbrook (2005) in her essay on the second German unification. These assertions, it can be argued, suffer from problems of the research focus, and eventually of the conceptual frame. It is a fallacy to argue that nationalism was not a crucial force in the unification processes, no matter how many minds had internalised the idea of unification before it became politically relevant. Nationalism is an idea, which does not automatically involve either an immediate internalisation by all prospective members of a nation, nor a direct territorial materialisation. The event of unification requires a previous imagination of national unity at least by some (e.g. Kohl); and even if the idea of the nation is meaningless to one member of a society, he will notice that it is not meaningless to another member and might thus act differently (e.g. Bismarck) (see Anderson 1991, Greenfeld 1992).

Nationalism from above and below: an instructive dichotomy?

Underlying most approaches within the study of nationalism is the assumption that historical mechanisms of cultural (Anderson 1992), ideological (Greenfeld 1992), economic (Gellner 1983), or (geo)political (Mann 1993) nature are the preconditions for the expansion of nationalism. Nationalism is thus often described as a heavy side- effect of modernisation as well as a main driving force for change. More relevant for this dissertation is the fact that some of them hold that nationalism occurs from above, realised by institutional structures (e.g. Breuilly 1993) or power-holding elites (e.g. Snyder 2000), whereas others maintain that nationalism occurs as a public demand for power from below (e.g. Alter 1985, Hroch 2000).

Nationalism and the state

Breuilly (1993), who follows Skocpol‘s (1979) assumption of the ”autonomy of the state‘, i.e. that state structures should be grasped as the ”macro-structure‘ for revolutionary social transformations and not as an ”arena‘ of the public, places the analysis of the existent state in the centre. He distinguishes between nationalism carried out by governments and nationalism as a force of opposition against the state, which is essentially an object from which power derives. To explain the becoming of the first German unification, Breuilly parallels Moore‘s (1966) conception of ”revolution from above‘, in which Japan‘s entry into modernity is portrayed as a non-revolutionary modernisation enforced by state elites.

This notion of ”revolution from above‘, which was already used in the 1860s to describe Bismarckian politics (Gall 2002: 434-526) and still prevails today (Engelbert 1987), is problematic in its conception, though it only requires a re- interpretation as it is figuratively appropriate. Hall (1995: 15), who takes Breuilly‘s claim for granted, makes an interesting statement in this context: —[T]he old regime œ scared of the popular mobilization that the call to the nation entailed œ won, in the long run, Germany was created as the result of revolution from above.“ Of what were they scared, and who won? The proposition of this statement is obvious: State elites anticipated upheavals and decided to give in by carrying out reforms, which means that they lost some of their reactionary character. As the positive impact of the activity of movements on state elites seems to be beyond dispute when they are forced to adapt to public demands, this, though of course not in absolute terms, could be judged as a movement success.

It is interesting to note how Alter (1985) views such developments. He identifies certain cultural developments that emerged in the course of Risorgimento nationalism and refers to nationalist authors, poets, historians and philologists, the relevance of language and education, monuments as well as political and cultural civil society groups that were vital for the revolutionary Risorgimento nationalism in Europe (1985: 64-72). This reminds us of Mann (1993), who highlights the importance of discursive literacy. It also reminds us of Anderson (1991), who admits the existence of ”official nationalism‘, in which states pursue nationalist reform to cope with the pressure of the zeitgeist, but strongly emphasises cultural

developments when he assigns the emergence of print-capitalism to the origin of nationalism and mentions sites like museums or tombs of the unknown soldier that foster a national imagining. Similarly, Mosse‘s (1975) work on Germany portrays the significance of national symbolism, often in the form of monuments that contributed to a nationalisation of the masses, something further theorised in Hobsbawm & Ranger‘s (1992) famous concept of ”the invention of tradition‘, which cannot be ignored in this context. It shows that the demand for the employment of old cultural material transformed to fit new purposes underwent great increases in the course of national agitation and that the supply cannot be fully realised by the state. The disagreement Alter (1985: 72) maintains toward Breuilly is striking at this point: He finds that it does not contradict to the ideal of Risorgimento nationalism, if a particular state steps on the stage as the main driving force in the national agitation by openly implementing abovementioned methods, as it was the case in Italy (Piedmont) and Germany (Prussia).

Nationalism and elites

Also Snyder‘s (2000) nationalism comes from above. He believes that nationalism in democratising states occurs through elite-persuasion of the masses by means of unifying ideas and effective institutions. Such views have been taken further to explain certain case studies. Nationalist violence in Sri Lanka, for instance, has been widely explained on the grounds of institutional struggles by political elites, who recklessly employ nationalist rhetoric to gain public support (see e.g. De Votta 2005). Such disquisitions are morally highly estimable, but what such analyses tend to overlook is the effect on the public, that is, at the level of the individual. —Persuasion requires not merely facilities to spread information, and to influence its composition œ such facilities, such as the media of mass communication are quite unevenly distributed - but it requires most of all a susceptible public“ (Deutsch 1953: 51). Therefore, not only the reasons why elites seek to persuade others need to be established but also the susceptibility of the potential recipients. And, although reality is likely to be more dialectic, one can also argue in a different direction. Instead of holding that elites hijack the masses, one may argue that the public hijacks elites, no matter whether a system calls itself democratic or not.

In contrast to Snyder, Hroch (2000) considers nationalism as an upheaval of the suppressed. An important implication of Hroch‘s findings is that nationalisation of the masses can indeed derive from a great variety of lower social strands and that nationalism from below is a crucial aspect when a fully fledged picture is drawn. He however depicts great variations among the nations and time periods (phases of mobilisation) by analysing the role of classes or sub-groups in the national agitations of 19 th and early 20 th century Central and Eastern Europe. Hroch does not downplay the initial importance of the intelligentsia, 1 who provide some sort of discursive kick- start before it comes to greater political agitation. But what really emerges out of his studies is that it is hard to establish an overall statement on certain classes as social carriers for making nationalism a mass ideology when we want to explain nationalism as an international phenomenon. Depending on the specific context of period and place, certain groups may be more influential in the course of national agitation than others.

In this respect it is noteworthy that already Max Weber (1985: 527-530) pointed out that feelings of national solidarity are differently pronounced from class to class and time to time. The notion of ”class-interest‘ is not univocal and empirical. —Every class may be the carrier of some, innumerable forms of possible class-actions, but they do not have to. A class itself is not a community“ (1985: 533). The adequacy of class analysis for understanding nationalism should consequently be subject to further debate.

Nationalism and power

As insinuated in this section, an involvement of the concept of power to explain the establishment of nationalism seems to be pivotal in academic debates. Nationalism- from-above theorists claim that the power of elites (Snyder 2000) or states (Breuilly 1993) makes nations. Yet, power is not of static, that is, of organisational character. It can well be situational. Power, according to Max Weber, means —every chance within a social relationship to impose one‘s own will, even against resistance, regardless of the basis on which this chance rests“ (1985: 28). He continues —the concept of ”power‘ is sociologically amorphous. All thinkable qualities of a human being and all thinkable constellations can place somebody in the position to achieve his will in a

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given situation“ (ibid). Mann (1986: 1), moreover, points out that —societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks“. Therefore, any organisational sphere, which, of course, essentially consists of individuals, is steadily intruded upon by further power relations that may not only be of an official nature, but also of a public or of a private nature. What follows is that states or elites cannot be conceptualised as autonomous. What Weber calls ”will‘ is something that is formed by a multitude of influences uncontrollable by the assumed power-holder, who himself underlies a great array of power relations. The execution of power at the elite or state level requires certain propensities on other levels, which implies somewhat of a relativisation of power (Mann 1986: 6).

This multi-dimensionality and interdependency can make it hard to depict fixed points at the top or bottom of power. The realisation of the nation-state consists of more than top-level initiatives and the silver bullet seems to be an amalgamation of political, public and private nationalism. Starting from this premise, it is doubtful whether we should fully separate the concept of ”nationalism from above‘ from ”nationalism from below‘ (Hall 1995: 13). What should be studied is not only the ”chance‘ to implement the ”will‘ for a nation-state, but rather the construction of the ”will‘ for a nation-state as such, no matter which individual, social strata or institution is subject to analysis.

A capacious approach: individuals in nationalism

Against the backdrop of the abovementioned methodological problems, it makes much sense to take van den Bossche‘s (2003) suggestion of focussing on individuals into account. He accuses Gellner‘s (1983) theory of nationalism of being too reductionist as it limits —particular behaviours of any (group of) individual(s), local contents of ideology and a myriad of local circumstances to their structural characteristics so that the external logic of modernity could be exposed“ (ibid: 494). He also warns us not to —fall into the elite manipulation view“ (ibid: 499). Instead he proposes ”contextualism‘ of individuals as a fruitful way to study nationalism. —Only through the study of ”real‘ people, local circumstances will we come to understand the ”choice‘ for a nation [sic]“.

Van den Bossche maintains that —an intense focus on moments or periods of crisis in which normative values are more readily questioned and changed“ should be taken, in order to explain the —convergence of interest and identity, which lie at the heart of the appeal of the nation“. Nationalism should be studied by means of a —reconstruction of the social and political contexts“ in order to —account for the reasons, the timing and the manner in which they adopt a particular option out of the available alternatives (…)“ (ibid: 506). This is as true for people and movements of the lower social strata, as it is for individuals belonging to cultural and political elites, and as it is for key leaders in nationalism. To attain a better understanding of nationalism, both are required, micro-perspective descriptive analyses hand in hand with macro-perspective prescriptive theories.

The availability of sources on individuals in nationalism is of course limited, as most people leave hardly any marks for the historian. Yet, there is a great array of examples, which prove that it would be ignorant to dismiss this method. In Kohn‘s The Mind of Germany (1961), one can find noteworthy examples of individuals and their stance on German nationalism. Chapter‘s on Goethe, Schlegel, Father Jahn and Heinrich Heine represent an interesting collection of mentalities in modern German history. Similarly, Schwedhelm (1969) edited an extensive collection of essays in his Propheten des Nationalismus. The main weakness of these books is the lack of contextualism, i.e. that they tend to be too prescriptive regarding the particular ideologies without following van den Bossche‘s advice to analyse the social psychological dimensions and the interdependency between individual mindsets and the given social and political structures. A truly fascinating book, however, which is of particular relevance for this dissertation, is Franz‘s (1926) book on Bismarck‘s national sentiment. Franz carefully analyses Bismarck‘s changing rhetoric on the German question by making direct reference to his individual biography and the broader social and political circumstances in the course of his life.

Furthermore, several comparative works demonstrate the helpfulness of putting individuals at the centre of analysis in order to present their choices for nationalism or other ideologies, and to analyse the construction, distribution and quality of these convictions. In The artist as nation-builder: William Butler Yeats and Chaim Nachman Bialik , Hutchinson and Aberbach (1999) show how private circumstances encouraged these two poets to promote nationalism, before they themselves became

lieux de mémoire of their Irish and Jewish nations. Szporluk‘s (1991) pretension in Communism and Nationalism to compare Karl Marx and Friedrich List instead only deals with the theoretical writings of her protagonists and hardly with their personal motivations so that the student gets the feeling he is not reading a comparative study of individuals, but rather of two ideologies, based on the personal assumptions of the author. Riga (2006), in its place, goes much further comparing the biographies of the Polish Bolshevik internationalists Karl Radek and Feliks Dzierzinski to provide a better understanding of the Bolshevik revolution and its tension between nationalism and socialist internationalism in a particular historical moment. She can thus show why multiethnic borderlands of the Russian Empire, in which nation-building was still in its embryonic stadium, were more likely to turn towards universalistic ideologies. Riga successfully contrasts and explains the different sources of the social identities of her two protagonists and places them in the structural context of the empire, which affected their appreciation of universalism instead of nationalism and triggered their individual actions.

Conclusion

When trying to treat nationalism as a theoretical object one comes across a startling variety of typologies and explanations. As was shown, these may be based either on normative ideological assumptions or on obvious territorial challenges, such as unification nationalism. In the latter type, the imagination of the unity of the nation validates a pooling of sovereignty as unification of a divided people, in contrast to supposedly more coercive border changing processes. This nationalist justification is the outcome of a dynamic process that involves forces from above and below, although perhaps to varying degrees.

It has been argued here that studying individuals allows entry into historical events and provides an effective focal point within the theoretical melange of Nationalism Studies. Understanding nationalism is still a highly complex undertaking and placing individuals in context can help to grasp the reasons for their ideological determinations and their choices of actions. It can moreover help to refine theoretical suppositions, such as taking a more or less relativist position toward the concept of power in the theory of nationalism. Due to their biographical

circumstances and the broader social and political constraints individuals executing power are themselves influenced by various forces of power. That is why nationalism from above and below tends to overlap and the dichotomy crumbles.

Having established this general groundwork, we can now depart toward the following chapters that will provide insights regarding the nature of Bismarck‘s and Kohl‘s profiles in two unification nationalisms and expose a comparative conception of these two politicians and their particular periods of time.

THE FIRST UNIFICATION AND BISMARCK

Introduction

Bismarck is frequently thought of as the ”white revolutionary‘ who installed a ”revolution from above‘ (Gall 2002). However, an arguably less reductionist picture emerges if one analyses the relationship between broader ideological, social and political developments that surrounded Bismarck, on the one hand, and the nature of his particular identity and reasons for action, on the other.

This chapter will illustrate the nature of German nationalism from below before the first unification and briefly explain Bismarck‘s actions in bringing about the unification. Moreover, it describes the motivations for his actions, i.e. the development of his personality, his political philosophy as well as his nationalism. The reader should be aware that the structure of this chapter parallels the one of the next chapter on Kohl, which allows for cross-reading and a better conception of the comparative composition of this dissertation.

Drawing on the expertise of researchers engaged in this topic limits the danger of misinterpretation of primary sources, as especially autobiographical data is likely to be biased. Memoirs, letters and speeches of individuals can however serve as valuable empirical data to reveal their mindsets and to supplement and rethink secondary literature.

Nationalism from below: the long cry for unity

Greenfeld (1992) shows that German nationalism began to spread with the Napoleonic invasions. The then emerging ideology found its foremost expression in romantic discourses that reacted to the German Enlightenment ( Aufklärung ), circulating throughout the then 38 Germanies in the form of nationalist poetry, German history, sagas and the heroisation of the war against France. Particularist identities or Landespatriotismus remained strong throughout the 19 th century and even during the following decades (see e.g. Bertram 2003). Yet, a general trend is obvious, as parts of all social strata evidently participated in movement events for unification already in the early 1830s (Gall 1988: 65). Nationalism had become a potent ideology across society already half a century before Germany became a nation-state (Greenfeld 1992: 371-377).

”Liberty and unity‘ became a twin-concept (Bethmann 2000), while social, economic and ideological transformations in Western Europe were leading to revolutionary upheavals that spilled all over Germany. By the 1840s, larger circles of society were politicised and their susceptibility to radical political changes packaged in nationalist rhetoric became accelerated by changing modes of production (also the rural areas), urbanisation and poverty. The period of 1849-48 was the heyday of political organisation in Germany; all classes expressed demands for change (Dann 1996: 128- 129). Liberals, Catholicists, democrats, women‘s rights activists as well as workers were aiming at the creation of a unified German nation-state (ibid: 128-129). Until 1871, two main groups stood politically in competition to each other and to the ruling nobility: the democratic movement and the national-liberals (ibid: 139-140).

Socially and politically, liberals and democrats were of common origin (Eyck 1986: 35, 391/2). Nonetheless, the liberal approach had only limited capacity for parliamentary powers and was often inclined to stay behind monarchical institutions. The liberals also had a more decentralised approach regarding the question of federalism and were less preoccupied with historical notions of the territorial layout of a German state (ibid: 393). The democratic approach was much more republican demanding the full abandonment of the ancient regimes (ibid: 390). It was, a more centralised approach regarding the question of state power, more romantic in employing historical concepts of the German nation, and, like

Catholicism, drew on the notion of the Holy Roman Empire (ibid: 392). However, both camps were internally strongly divided along political, religious, regional and economic lines (ibid: 394).

In 1848, the revolutionaries set up the National Assembly to draft a great-German constitution. Yet, while the debates about the formulation did not come to an end, a deep crisis was aroused when the real power of the assembly was revealed and the liberal parliamentarians affirmed its military dependence on the princes. Revolts against the National Assembly itself followed (Eyck 1986: 106, 134). The assembly became eventually itself reactionary turning into an ally of the ancient dynasties (Gall 1988: 138-140). Already then, the assembly decided to plead for a small-German solution and elected the Prussian King as German Emperor, an offer that the King rejected (ibid: 106/7, 148; Eyck 1986: 393). In 1849, new rebellions in all German states were eventually suppressed and the old Confederation restored (ibid: 151, 153). Nonetheless, it would be too simple to disregard the impacts of the revolution on the time after. The twin-development of nationalism and capitalism moved on (Pflanze 1963: 114) and so did the process of democratisation (Dann 1996: 141).

Tucker (1989: 44) provides us with some interesting theoretical insights, as he holds: —Social movements (…) may be able to provide another option to the usual understanding of [them] as reformist (…) or revolutionary“. One may also understand them as a —vehicle by which non-instrumental rationality can be brought into public life“. We must acknowledge that 1848 transformed the German nation to the core and was followed by an inexorable process of modernisation. The open discussion of new ideas, constitutional experiments and the degree of voluntaristic organisation left fundamental imprints on the orientations of individuals of all social strata (Barclay 2004: 68, Dann 1996: 145). That is why it is false to understand the revolution as fully abortive: A common nation-state remained a central objective and it was just a matter of time before political action would revive (Dann 1996: 148, 149, Siemann 1997: 123). Even during the subsequent period of repressive tranquillisation, nationalist campaigning did not come to a halt. When the temporary retreat of the nationalist agitation of the 1850s came to an end, organisations demanding unification were again in vogue and this time provided a less radical, more realpolitisch agenda that made their success increasingly plausible. A tremendous amount of police records suggests that organisational support for

unification was again omnipresent. 2 A much more unified organisation of the Nationalbewegung came back on the stage (Dann 1996: 151/2). Symptomatic of this development was the most influential nationalist association, i.e. the Nationalverein (est. 1859), which stood for the small-German solution and included a great number of the wealthy ( Besitz -) and educated ( Bildungs -) Bürgertum across Germany and which kept close contact with a variety of non-bourgeois and non-political associations, such as the gymnasts, singers and shooting associations (Biefang 1995, Carr 1992, Dann 1996: 149-155).

Bismarck‘s action toward unification: the three Wars of Unification

In 1847, i.e. one year before the revolutionary upheavals, Prussia had become a constitutional state. Without these liberal changes, Bismarck would not have had a political career as this offered him the first opportunity to become a representative in the Prussian Landtag . Fifteen years later the constitutional struggles in Prussia between the monarch/ists and the liberal majority in the Landtag offered him another, much greater opportunity: The appointment as prime-minister and foreign minister. The main reason for this was that when the Prussian king was unable to implement a military reform against the representatives, Bismarck could raise hope to implement this reform, as, despite of his conservative views, he felt politically relatively independent and was prepared to come to terms with the liberals (Lerman 2004: 51/52). In his eyes, domestic unity on ideological questions was essential for a successful foreign policy 3 and out of his relatively isolated position Bismarck was able to flirt with liberal nationalism, capitalism and Prussian expansionism - which eventually allowed for a strong alliance favouring small-German unification (Pflanze 1963: 111).

In real terms, the power of the Prussian prime-minister is not analogous to the head of governments in today‘s democracies. He had no power over his ministers and was entirely dependent on the grace of his monarch. Yet, in terms of foreign policy,

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Bismarck had much more room to pursue his interests (Lerman 2004: 74). In this regard it is important to acknowledge that, for Bismarck, the German question was indeed an international one. Apart from his principles of Prussian leadership and Austrian exclusion, he had no clear picture of the territorial shape of a potentially unified German nation-state, which allowed him to act flexibly in his foreign/German policies (ibid: 43). However, as above mentioned, the small-German solution under Prussian leadership was not Bismarck‘s brainchild. Not only did the larger chunk of the national movement feel increasingly inclined towards this option, also the Prussian government had forestalled a course later pursued by Bismarck (ibid: 44). Bismarck‘s essential contribution to the German question thus only occurred during the period of the three Einigungskriege from 1864 to 1871. It was Bismarck who then decided on the timing of war and peace and it was essentially his diplomacy that could rule out interference by potential enemies (Breuilly 1993: 310). These measures eventually accelerated the process of unification and determined the shape of the German-nation state.

The first war was fought against Denmark. In 1846, the establishment of the Danish constitution was intended to include Schleswig. The German public and princes opposed this decision and called for a German prince to head the duchy. Bismarck then took a very unpopular decision to ensure that no additional pro-Austrian voice would enter the Confederation: He demanded an amendment of the Danish constitution instead of supporting the idea of an independent German duchy. When Denmark however refused this option, Bismarck initiated cooperation among the dualist powers against Denmark to bring Schleswig under Prussian - and the northern duchy of Holstein in return under Austrian control (Lerman 2004: 98-100).

The second war was the Bruderkrieg between the German states. When Austria did not stick to the agreed terms to keep Holstein under full control and allowed for an own government, Bismarck saw the decisive moment in which the dualist dilemma of the German Confederation would finally be solved and responded with a drastic proposal: Prussia should be the leading power north of the Main, Austria in the south. The Habsburgs, of course, rejected this idea. Bismarck‘s tactical proposal to establish a great-German parliament with direct voting was, needless to say, also refused by Austria and most other German states because Prussia‘s population was much weightier. Bismarck had beforehand prepared the neutrality of Russia and

France, in case it came to a German war. In 1866, Prussian troops invaded Holstein. Austria and the German Confederation consequently declared war on Prussia, a war that Prussia won. The multiethnic Habsburg was under great pressure to contain its south-eastern territories while suffering an economic crisis. As Bismarck feared a French intervention he persuaded the monarch to make a moderate peace with Austria, asking for no Austrian territory to be annexed. Austrian weaknesses were thus exposed to the public and Prussia could annex some North German states. The Confederation became dissolved and replaced by the North German Confederation, which was a pre-stage of the small-German nation-state. Bismarck moreover contracted individual treaties with the southern states to secure Prussian domination over the rest of (non-Austrian) Germany. He had to recognise that Prussian hegemony over German can only be achieved by making liberal and nationalist concessions. As a result, the conservative and liberal camps in Prussia broke apart, and the Bismarckian-liberal alliance for small-Germany was forged. Bismarck became Federal Chancellor and not only his prestige, but also the public and the German states‘ acceptance of a small-German solution was greater than ever before (Breuilly 1992: 309, Lerman 2004: 114, Mann 1969: 351-360).

The final war was the one against France, a rather popular war on all sides. Bismarck saw a victory over France as the inevitable prerequisite for German unification/Prussian expansion. 4 A war against the arch enemy promised great public support for Prussia, even in the south and he thus inflamed Germans with anti-French rhetoric in the press (Lerman 2004: 139, 145). One should however acknowledge that, in the case of the Franco-German War, Bismarck had no great influence on the war as such; it was, despite of its popularity, a purely dynastic issue (ibid: 148): When a German prince of the family of Hohenzollern was chosen as heir to the Spanish throne, the French public felt threatened and France demanded his resignation from the candidacy, a demand which the Hohenzollern indeed met. France, however, demanded moreover that Prussia must abandon any future claims to the Spanish crown. The Prussian King did not accept this demand for reasons of prestige with the result that France declared war and lost against the united German armies.

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This was the moment when Bismarck re-entered the stage and implemented the unification. —[T]hrough a potent cocktail of diplomatic intrigue, superficial concessions and corruption (…)“ he persuaded the south German states to join the Reich (Lerman 2004: 153). German particularism was finally overcome and although Prussia had been envisaged by Bismarck to dominate the small German nation-state, he could not prevent that it lost its particular character and became itself entirely German (Mann 1969: 385).

Bismarck‘s socialisation: the Junker‘s diremption

We will now turn to the question of Bismarck‘s motivations for the abovementioned actions by looking at some of Bismarck‘s biographical circumstances. Bismarck was born on his father‘s Junker estate in Pomerania in 1815, i.e. the end of the Napoleonic Wars. He lived in the rural areas of Kniephof and Schönhausen for few years only before being sent to a boarding school in Berlin. Within his early childhood, as Gall (2002) argues, Bismarck was to experience a certain ideological cleavage between the —bourgeois-bureaucratic-urban“ and the —traditional- aristocratic-rural“, which also found its expression in the different backgrounds and attitudes of his parents. His mother came from an educated family of academics and civil servants. Embodying enlightenment principles she was keen to impart an education that stood in sharp contrast to his father‘s attitudes, which were synonymous with the conservative passivity of the Old Prussian aristocracy (ibid: 29- 33). Indeed, the whole social setting in which Bismarck grew up, as Lerman (2004: 3-5) argues, was characteristic of this ideological cleavage. Lerman therefore rightfully warns us not to regard Bismarck as a typical representative of the old Junker-class: their status was changing and material needs drove the landowning nobility increasingly out of their previous way of life in the rural areas.

The Plamannsche Lehranstalt , a primary school, where Bismarck went at the age of six to twelve, was mainly attended by prospective civil servants, mostly of noble origin, and taught by anti-aristocratic ”gymnasts‘ following the tradition of ”Turnvater Jahn‘, one of the earliest German nationalists (see e.g. Kohn 1961). Bismarck was thus already from his very early age onwards confronted with nationalist ideas. After having completed school in Berlin, he entered the University of Göttingen to study

law. Acknowledging that he was out of place at his father‘s estate, he accepted his fate to become a civil servant, as it was then usual for someone of his kind of social origin (Gall 2002: 31-34). In this respect it is worthy of note that universities were the strongholds of nationalist agitation in Germany and the student associations, the Deutsche Burschenschaft (see e.g. Heer 1927), were a cornerstone of the national movement all over the 38 German states. In particular Göttingen played a major role in this respect.

It may be the antagonism between these different worlds, embodied by his parents and teachers, the countryside and the city, as well as the zeitgeist of ominous social change and the remembrance of a rising Prussia under Frederick the Great that triggered what Franz (1926: 13) calls his ”overreaching individualism‘. This individualism became clearly visible in his eccentric student life, but is symptomatic of his entire political life, which was never dominated by partisanship, a fact that eventually enabled him to make common cause with the liberals and to break with the ultra-conservative camp. Yet, these influences, indeed quite obviously, were not of a voluntaristic nature, but rather structural circumstances that contextualise Bismarck‘s political will.

His German national feelings had remained strong enough, as Bismarck later maintained, to look for relations with the Burschenschaft . He then still believed that German unity would succeed within the next twenty years, yet the awareness of being German remained an important jigsaw piece in Bismarck‘s identity. The adolescent however disliked the students‘ forms of behaviour and political understanding, which he described as utopian. 5 During this stage of orientation, he joined the Hanovera , a heavy drinking duelling corps that stood, in contrast to the Burschenschaft , for conservative-compatriotic views, a decision that Franz depicts as the —consummation of the breach with the political ideals of his schooldays“ (1926: 10-11).

In 1833, Bismarck, continued his studies in Berlin and began a career at the county court. Having initially striven for a career as a diplomat, Bismarck was unhappy with his placements as a lower civil servant. The triviality of his occupations undermined his self-esteem and caused his hatred of bureaucracy, local institutions and officials. 6 In 1839, being highly indebted because of gambling, Bismarck resigned from the

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state service and moved back to Pomerania, wanting to remain a Landjunker for the rest of his life.

In Pomerania, Bismarck became increasingly polarised between city and countryside and defended the ”manor-class‘ against urban-capitalist developments. 7 Gall (2002: 50) interprets the decision to return to Pomerania as ”romantic escapism‘ believing —that a ”homecoming to his paternal world was not possible and the diremption of his hitherto existence formed a part of himself.“ Although he never challenged his identity as a Junker (see Lerman 2004: 13-14), he could not find the right place for himself within the ancient rural order, in which he felt unfulfilled. And also when he later pursued his political career, away from his estates, he stressed —I will never get rid of the yearning to return; only half-heartedly I am in politics.“ 8

In any case, one should not ignore the political implications of his consciousness to be a Junker: —In controversial matters (…) I see through the eyes of my class-fellows, the knighthood (…)“ 9 and —for the true freedom, for political independence, without which Prussia cannot exist, the merits of the Prussian nobility are substantial.“ 10 Bismarck thus saw interdependency between the existence of the Old Prussian state order and the persistence of his class, i.e. his personal survival, a viewpoint where Bismarck‘s interest and identity fuse.

Bismarck‘s political philosophy: preserving the ancient order

While Bismarck lived his Junker-life, he kept close company with very pietistic circles of landed gentry (Lerman 2004: 9). Bismarck‘s religious understanding then merged with his political virtue. As God‘s servant he saw himself as an individual duty-bound to preserve the sacred course of history, and therefore to protect the determined order of state and society, while individual principles had to be

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suspended from this duty (Gall 2002: 65, Kühn 2001). He later wrote to his wife: —Peoples and humans, (…) war and peace, are coming and going like billows, and the sea remains. How are our states and their power and honour before God different to ant hills and beehives that the hoof of the ox crushes or the beekeeper‘s fortune appropriates.“ 11

It is hard to understand Bismarck‘s individualism against this background and one may argue that this, if at all, is a very twisted portrayal of personal sovereignty. But Greenfeld (1992) throws some light on this dilemma by drawing a broader picture of the nature of this romantic conception of political engagement. She shows that pietism in Germany, as a spiritual revolt against Aufklärung , transformed the image of the state —into an ideal entity, the instrument with which God raised and formed men in conformity with his supreme designs“ (ibid: 320). The state did not exist for the sake of human well-being but had a much higher meaning and its very existence was God‘s will (ibid: 347). It was believed that the totality of the individual could only be achieved by total dissolution of the self into the state. Individuality and universality were thus merged concepts: The state meant freedom that was worth being defended and simultaneously it was worthwhile to renounce all personal freedom (ibid: 350). It is crucial to understand that this larger ideological development, deriving from Protestant doctrines, which Greenfeld depicts as an integral precondition of German nationalism was the keynote in Bismarck‘s political philosophy and unification nationalism (Kühn: 2001).

Although Bismarck had managed his inherited estates economically well and even succeeded in becoming one of the greatest landowners in Germany (Lerman 2004: 11), the Junker-life could not save him from deep feelings of dissatisfaction. In 1947, Bismarck thus joined the newly established Prussian Parliament to look for new challenges. At the Landtag , he however expressed his criticism about parliamentarianism itself, the press and the unbalanced weight of the urban society on the representation of public opinion: —A people will pursue its course, whether supported by paragraphs or solely based on the eternal unalienable right (…). It is only the question, who has the right to make an authentic, binding declaration.“ In Bismarck‘s judgement this was —only the King, and (…) this is in accordance with the sense of justice of the people. (…) That is why I do not find the majority of the

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Prussian people represented in the assemblies.“ 12 Two crucial features in Bismarck‘s ideology surface within these statements:

Firstly, his belief in the divinity of the crown and his identification with the given order of the state , i.e. the monarchist Prussian state, which he sought to protect against the social and political pressures of his time. He explains that the —German- national impressions“, he had gained at school, —were not strong enough to root out inborn Prussian-monarchist feelings. My historical sympathies remained in line with the authorities.“ Bismarck thus internalised a disparity between justice and revolution: —Harmodius and Brutus were, for my sense of justice, criminals and Wilhelm Tell a rebel and murderer.“ 13 Regarding the two crucial events in the history of the national movement, i.e. the Hambacher Fest, in 1832, and the Frankfurter Putsch, in 1833, he wrote: —These appearances disgusted me, my Prussian instruction stood against riotous interferences into state order (…).“

Even though Bismarck had recognised that the option of a combination between German nationalism and Prussian imperialism had become increasingly popular with the success of the counterrevolutionary forces in 1848/49, he did not depart from his dynastic principle. When he began to adopt a more German-nationalist rhetoric, recognising that Prussia can only survive as a great power by using the showground of an omnipresent German nationalism to expand, he combined anti- particularism with dynasticism (Lerman 2004: 42). Albeit he believed in the —Prussian Crown‘s assignation by God to protect Prussia, against unjustness, from inside and outside“, he dismissed the —fully unhistorical God œ and lawless bogus sovereignty of the other German princes.“ 14

Regarding the German question he thus reduced the divine right to the Prussian crown. 15 Generally, he was certain about —the deep dynastic adherence of the German.“ In Bismarck‘s eyes —the German needs a dynasty“ on which he can base his patriotism. Yet, he eventually argued that —dynastic interests in Germany are only justified, as long as they fit to the common national Reich-interests (…).“ Bismarck obviously tried to give legitimacy to Prussian dominance over Germany, which

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became in reality his main ambition: —[T]he way in which the King exercises power over Germany, was never of particular importance for me; on the fact that he exercises it, I have given my full support (…); may they call the navy Prussian, German or North German, it is our King‘s navy.“ 16

The second crucial feature of his ideology is the belief in the impossibility of true democracy . Symptomatic of this anachronistic view was his use of the inopportune term ”subject‘ instead of ”citizen‘. 17 Bismarck believed, that —the good thing about pure absolutism is that [the monarch‘s] feeling of responsibility for his own actions remains. More dangerous is the one that that is supported by compliant parliaments that do not require any justification other than the approval of the majority.“ 18 He assumed that the common will of the (Prussian) Volk cannot be represented in the form of parliamentarianism; 19 the Frankfurt parliament sanctioned the principle of popular sovereignty 20 and was —caught in the double-fallacy of addressing the dynastic question as resolved.“ 21 He dismissed any theories of social contract claiming —a true representation“ and —an authorisation of the individual according to natural law“ was impossible. 22 Moreover, to him, public opinion was dominated by the press, who did not represent the undiscriminating people, who could easily be manipulated. 23 He also demanded a limitation of the freedom of assembly and association, as these —are the dangerous weapons of those minds that deny any authority.“ 24 In his view, the masses had a desideratum for order, —that is why the historical circle, within a comparably short time, returns to dictatorship, despotism, and absolutism.“ 25

It is yet decisive that Bismarck eventually realised that liberalism was a powerful tool for putting pressure on the princes to make concessions favourable to the Prussian cause. He began to find it important for the persistence and expansion of Prussia to guarantee inner concord with the rising liberals and to build, what he calls, a ”golden

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bridge‘ between the Prussian-conservatives and German-liberals to pursue the King‘s German politics. 26 Thus, also in this regard, Bismarck was himself forced to converge with zeitgeist challenges, which finally led to a dispute with his conservative fellows. In an undisclosed letter from 1861, he wrote:

I fail to see why we are shy at the idea of a people‘s assembly, be it in the confederation, or be it in the parliament of the Zollverein. An institution, that has legitimate power, which even we conservatives in Prussia do not want to miss, we cannot combat as revolutionary. On the national domain even very moderate concessions are regarded as valuable. One could create a quite conservative National Assembly, and then still raise a cheer from the liberals. 27

Bismarck‘s idea of Germany: —Prussian we want to remain“

Bismarck‘s concept of the nation was congruent with the state and was not a cultural phenomenon. It was the state that served as the basis for his national sentiment (Pflanze 1963: 72). Within the context of German particularism Bismarck could thus genuinely employ, what Anderson describes as ”official nationalism‘ (1963: 83-111): When Berlin came under attack by the revolutionaries in 1848, Bismarck appealed to —everyone, whose Prussian heart beats in his chest“28 to organise the reaction. Also after the revolutionary phase, Bismarck emphasised the —distinguished peculiarity of Prussian nationality“, which he saw endangered by constitutional experiments. 29 His commitment to Prussia was more than a matter of calculated Junker class-interest. To him it was something emotional, 30 inherent, and persisting: —I cannot take off my Prussianness like a skirt.“ 31 And still in 1864, he wrote: —God willing, He knows, for how long Prussia shall exist. I bear misery, if it ceases, God knows that! 32 The endurance of Prussia was for him indeed weightier than a German nation-state: —In the worst case (…) I want that Prussia remains Prussia. It will thus remain capable of imposing laws on Germany, instead to receive them from others.“ 33 Again, it is the pietistic adherence to the state - a state, which Prussia traditionally had, but

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Germany had not - which explains his preference of Prussia over Germany: —My parental house is Prussia, and I have never left my parental house and will not leave it (…). Germany, so I must tell him, he does not have a parental house (…) one is still yet to lay the foundation.“ 34

Below this staatsnationalistisch attitude, however, slumbered deutschnationalistisch sentiments that he had internalised during his childhood. These were originally great-German, later however they became small-German (Franz 1926: 23, 29). —What I thought about foreign policy (…) was viewed, in the sense of the Wars of Liberation, from the standpoint of a Prussian officer. Looking at the map, I was annoyed by the French possessions [which] made me feel vengeful and belligerent.“ 35 Within this anti-French context he felt German, yet, he felt German as a Prussian officer. The one did not exclude the other and the question of German autonomy was thus unintelligible to him; it was integrated into his notion of Prussianness. The rise of German national feelings, after Prussia‘s military successes in 1866, he later portrayed as —the trust in the Germanic power that has been developed by Prussia.“ 36

By gazing at some of Bismarck‘s comments, we can argue, not only that he had reservations about foreign, i.e. non-German, influences 37 , but also that he had cultural-nationalist ideas of what it was to be German. He found, for example, that Princess Augusta‘s behaviour was —of real German blood that had preserved our national character, which finds its most fierce expression in her idiom (…).“ Yet her supposed attitude —that the French and entirely the Englishman (…) would be a more noble being and that (…) the public opinion from Paris and London constitutes a more authentic testimony of the own value than our own consciousness (…)“, Bismarck regarded as —a burden on our national sentiment.“ 38

Bismarck did not exclude unification as such, yet the means of how unification would be achieved was more important than the end. When the revolutionary German constitution was drafted in 1848, he stated, before he began to cry: —I have to take this at least for an erroneous path. If it eventually leads us to achieve a unified German fatherland, a happy or at least lawful condition, then the moment may come,

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when I express my gratitude; now it is impossible.“39 One should be aware, that Bismarck wanted to be remembered by historians as being driven by the leitmotif of German unity (Pflanze 1955: 562), yet, despite all his tactical rhetoric, the main rationale for his actions remained Prussian dominance and, because of geopolitical, i.e. dualistic, and revitalising public pressures, Bismarck then saw only one way to preserve Prussia as a great power: unification (Lerman 2004: 42).

When he had realised that the unification of Germany and Prussian leadership should be the two top issues on the agenda, and that both aims coincided, 40 Bismarck was forced to package his Prussian ambitions into German-nationalist oratory. He thus changed his rhetoric in so far, as now not Prussia but German unity came to the fore in his agitation. In 1858, he wrote that —there is nothing more German than the development of Prussia‘s particularist interests, properly understood“ (cited in Lerman 2004: 42); in 1866, he claimed —my highest ambition is to make the Germans into one nation“; and by the end of the 1860s he asserted —I bear the adamant trust that Germany is strong enough to protect its independence with God‘s help against any violation.“ 41

Conclusion

The ambiguity between Bismarck‘s origin and education as well as the social upheavals that threatened the Junkers‘ existence were formative to his ideas and actions for German unification under Prussian leadership. Bismarck saw the existence of his Junker-class as dependent on the existence of Prussia as a great power and his political philosophy was strongly influenced by pietistic principles that legitimated his actions for the endurance of an archaic order of state and society. His political allegiance to no one but the King enabled him to build ”a golden bridge‘ between conservatism and liberalism.

While German unification nationalism had developed as a mass ideology within the first half of the 19 th century and had persisted after the success of the reactionary forces in 1849, Bismarck continuously defended the divine rights of the Prussian

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crown as a statesman, whose German sentiments were always secondary to Prussian utilitarianism. One must thus abstract nationalist ideas from other transforming ideas leading to unification and still bear in mind that there may be a strong correlation between both forces. After 1849, the option of a small-German solution found growing popularity within the dualist framework, an idea that eventually merged with Bismarck‘s Prussian ambitions. Once nationalism and liberalism became too strong to uphold the status quo, Bismarck came to the firm conviction that ”Germany‘ was the most effective domain of action for a struggling monarchist. He then formed an alliance with former revolutionary forces and was instrumental in the making of war and peace, which finally led to a widely accepted unification.

THE SECOND UNIFICATION AND KOHL

Introduction

Before one can claim that Kohl‘s role was less significant than the one of Bismarck in the unification process (see Breuilly & Speirs 2005), further analysis is required. This chapter corresponds to the previous one in its structure. It will describe the nationalism from below before the reunification, the actions of Kohl in bringing about this event and, once more, the individual motivations, i.e. the socialisation of Kohl, his political philosophy and his moralisations of the German question. Akin to chapter three, secondary literature and empirical data will serve as sources to establish Kohl‘s profile.

Nationalism from below: the sudden call for liberty

German nationalism seemed over after having reached its most integral form under Hitler. The Nazi-regime had destroyed the Bismarckian Reich, what was left after 1945 were four zones of occupation on scaled down territory that had experienced a tremendous influx of millions of German refugees moving westwards. In the aftermath of WWII, most Germans were occupied with their bare survival in a fundamentally devastated country. Sovereignty remained with the victorious powers and efforts for new nation-building, in the ideological sense, remained quasi absent.

Within this atmosphere of insecurity, value breakdown, and international supervision, there was no room for nationalism, for moral as well as utilitarian reasons: a reconstruction of the country was only possible with international support. Nationalism turned into a faux-pas word, on a par with national-socialism, i.e. something that had happened and should never happen again. Debates for unification were ultimately taboo with the Federal Republic‘s entry into NATO in 1955. Consequently, the global bipolarity manifested itself within Germany as German unity became the widely accepted liability for historical guilt, economic ruin and strategic insecurity (see Alter 1992, Dann 1996, Fulbrook 1992).

Word War II and the Holocaust turned into the dominant lieux de memoir in German identity, yet they were reworked in different manners in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (both established in 1949) (Bialas 2002: 9). Banal nationalism persisted in both states; but reflexive confirmations of national belonging were much more ambiguous than Billig‘s (1995) theory suggests. Both national flags were of black-red-golden background, deriving from the 19 th century national movement, which suggests a common continuity of German history, yet each flag had a different symbol in the centre, which in turn suggests a different discontinuity. While the West-German population found its ideological canon in western democracy and anti-communism, hovering between remorseful historical rework and self-righteous amnesia, the East-Germans were encouraged with authoritarian courtesy to commit themselves proudly to the socialist project that would endow them with an alternative to nationalism and ideological compensation for the dark past (Alter 1992: 155, Fulbrook 2005: 246, 249).

The GDR employed a class theory to legitimise the existence of two separate nations (Fulbrook 1992:180). National symbols, such as the 7 th of October, for instance (cf. Lomnitz 2001: 338), or the GDR‘s anthem, were thus automatically symbols of anti- fascism and solidarity (cf. Billig 1995). Yet, against the backdrop of the watching of West-German broadcasts from the 1970s onwards (cf. Anderson 1991), which was illegal, as well as the increasing presence of the Deutschmark in the East, a great part of the GDR citizenry formed a —visual community of experience oriented to the West“ (Dann 1996: 340, 363, 365) that was often preoccupied with the allure of prosperity.

Dann (1996: 339) explains the occurrence of —a paradoxical situation: although the Federal Republic realpolitisch only projected its own statehood, it had resort in its political legitimacy to the lost Reich and excluded the GDR from it.“ This found expression at the legal level as the Basic Law of the FRG, which provided legitimacy for the continuation of the Reichsvolk (ibid: 362). Nevertheless, although the GDR became territorially recognised in the course of Bonn‘s Deutschlandpolitik (i.e. policy of peaceful co-existence and rapprochement from the 1970s onwards), GDR- citizenship remained unrecognised. The ethnic notion of the Volk remained thus legally existent in the form of ius sangius , allowing for all GDR citizens to attain an FRG passport.

The mental realities looked however fairly different. A notion of who is German and of what is German persisted œ yet, this notion was not homogenous. Bialas (2002: 10, 11) is right in maintaining that —at all times of national division the category of the Volk made its career as a symbolic promise for unity“ and could be successfully revived in 1989/1990. But what he misses is that —diverging imaginations of the nation were applied. Every one in three of the West-Germans, in 1986, assigned to the German nation either the population of the Federal Republic or the one of both German states or all German speakers, i.e. the Reich with the borders of 1937“ (Dann 1996: 364). In the West, the notion of Germany became increasingly reduced the Federal Republic (ibid: 323). The Wessis experienced a growing alienation from the East-German population that was associated with a foreign Communist country which threatened freedom and affluence (ibid: 338).

The German question remained at least as open as during the mid 19 th century with the crucial difference that there was no national movement and that the previous existence of a small-German nation-state could justify 3 October 1990 as the date of re -unification. A reunification was nevertheless not a necessary outcome of the Soviet breakdown: —As the cohabitation in one state did not constitute a value as such, an Austrian solution was imaginable and acceptable. After all had the Bismarck-Reich, to which the reunification had to tie up, only existed for 75 years“ (Gauland 1994: 71).

It is, moreover safe to say that the outset of the East-German revolution, in autumn 1989, was itself not driven by national imagination (Fulbrook 2005). While the

Communist bloc was economically crumbling and employed policies for liberalisation, the GDR experienced an increase of demands for social and political changes embodied in civil rights groups (such as the Initiative für Frieden und Menschenrechte , the Umweltbibliothek or the ”prayers for peace‘ at the Nicolaikirche ). Like 1848, the revolution was stimulated by an international development toward liberalisation, in this case symbolised by Glasnost, Perestroika and movements like Solidarnosc .

The ultimate stimulus was however provided by an enormous emigration movement in summer 1989, when Hungary opened its borders to Austria, which was seen as symptomatic of the repression of the people. In September 1989, the reform prayers in Leipzig turned into mass protests. Thousands demonstrated for freedom of movement and civil rights on the streets in Leipzig. The participants consisted of a vast plurality of characters. They had different political views, different personal, professional and civil aims and different moral concepts; they consisted of conscientious objectors, ecologists, human rights activists, women rights activists and ex-cons (Czok 1999: 9). The commotion quickly spread to other cities in the GDR œ but, one must be aware that none of the key groups that were formed in autumn 1989 (such as the Neues Forum , Demokratie Jetzt , Demokratischer Aufbruch and the Vereinigte Linke ) were calling for unification. The subject matter of the assemblies, discussions and petitions was foremost the democratisation of an authoritarian state, of which the particularistic legitimacy as such was not questioned (Dann 1996: 396).

One can however perceive a certain landslide toward unification nationalism within this short revolutionary period of 1989. The key event was the opening of the borders on 9 November, a point in time when also the Kohl-government‘s Deutschlandpolitik shifted (see next section). From then onwards a reunification became an issue among the protesters. While, at the greatest of all demonstrations, in Berlin, on 4 November, there were hardly any black-red-golden flags 42 (Dann 1996: 368, 369) - only nine days later, in Leipzig (ibid: 371), —the simple replacement of one word in the slogans of the autumn symbolised the deflection of the revolution: ” Wir sind das Volk ‘ became ” Wir sind ein Volk‘ “ (Fulbrook 1992: 193). Roughly two camps then crystallised out of the movement. While the one, unwilling to give up the socialist

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achievements of the GDR, continued to defend the third way of a reformed GDR against the prospect of a Kohlian Reich , the other viewed unification as the safest way for an enhancement of their living conditions (Fulbrook 2005), an idea that found increasing popularity and perfectly suited Kohl‘s vision.

Kohl‘s actions toward unification: the Ten Points for Germany

In 1982, the Christian Democratic Party won the federal election and Kohl became head of the West-German government. Generally, the chancellor‘s competences rank between the presidential and the prime-ministerial powers of other West European states. One should however not ignore Kohl‘s abilities to exploit the Kanzlerdemokratie in so far as he could conduct his Deutschlandpolitik on a very personal level, taking opinionated decisions and with informal consultations that were crucial for unification (Clemens 1998: 15, Paterson 1998: 20, 22, 25). Against the background of the short timespan, in which reunification occurred, the divide about the German question within the revolutionary movement and the still persisting global bipolarity, it is safe to argue that the Kohl government was the decisive actor within this process (Dann 1996: 374). While unification was inevitable in the 19 th century, in what contour so ever, the reunification in the 1980s was much less likely.

The chancellor‘s actions toward unification consisted of various small steps on the domestic and international level. His Deutschlandpolitik comprised successful campaigning for unity amongst the Eastern and Western publics, political management of economic and institutional assimilation of the GDR into the FRG as well as diplomatic measures for the closure of the four-power-status and Soviet permission for the GDR‘s exit from the Warsaw Pact (Breuilly 1992: 226-229, Clemens 1998, Junghans 1999).

Kohl initially continued Brandt‘s and Schmidt‘s policy of ”change through rapprochement‘ towards the GDR. Yet, he departed from the moral recognition of the division that had been practiced by the former governments. While unification was still appearing as illusionary and the public had abandoned the German question, he

was one of the very few politicians to whom German unity remained central, a standpoint which he often reaffirmed domestically and internationally. 43

Since he had assumed the office of the federal chancellor, Kohl had steadily appeared as a strong supporter of the Transatlantic Alliance as well as of the deepening of the European integration process. He could thus gain the trust that a German Sonderweg was impossible under his leadership, a precondition for the later support for unification from Bush Snr. and Mitterrand. Also during his meeting with Gorbachev, in June 1989 in Bonn, he was able to establish a personal relationship of trust that allowed for the broaching of the issue of self-determination of the German Volk, implying that this also concerned the freedom to choose the political and economic system, including the question of strategic alliances. The Soviet General Secretary signed an agreement that declared the overcoming of European division as a common goal and gave assurances that the SU would not intervene in the East- German developments of that time (Junghans 1999: 83, Dieckmann & Reuth 1996: 35-51).

When the revolutionary process in the GDR accelerated and the East Berlin government could eventually not stand the pressure from inside anymore and opened its western borders on 9 November 1989, German unification became Chefsache , i.e. top-priority of the person Helmut Kohl. He immediately dropped the FRG‘s policy of conciliation, put every effort into the total suspension of the SED- regime and began to speak directly to GDR protestors on several occasions in order to convince them of the genuineness of national unity. 44

The key event of the unification process occurred on 28 November with Kohl‘s presentation of his of his ten-point programme at the Bundestag. Unlike Kim Il Sung‘s ten points for the reunification of Korea, this roadmap set in motion a course of action that would eventually overcome the German division. It is noteworthy that this plan was a great surprise, not only among the Western allies, but also for foreign minister Genscher as well as for Kohl‘s own party. The programme declared the

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FRG‘s willingness to further ease travelling between both states, to support East- German refugees and it confirmed the readiness for greater economic, cultural, scientific and infra-structural cooperation with the GDR. Kohl‘s agenda however coupled any financial aid with an irreversible break with the planned economy and the one-party system as well as the liberation of political prisoners. Moreover, the plan highlighted the all-European dimension of the German unification process that it should be embedded into EC and OSCE frameworks together with efforts for military demobilisation. The final stage would be accomplished with the formation of a common nation-state (Junghans 1999: 84, Korte 1998: 82, DHM 2007).

When Kohl appeared for the next time on East-German streets, i.e. on 19 December in Dresden, he was celebrated as the liberator of the suppressed, who regarded unification as the only working remedy against the historical dysgenics of the nation‘s eastern appendix (Dann 1996: 373/4, Korte 1998: 64). From then onwards Kohl was untameable. Aware of the fact that the reunification was impossible without permissions from London, Moscow, Paris and Washington, the chancellor began to lobby internationally. Instead of finding a solution to the German question at OSCE summits, Kohl opted for Two-Plus-Four negotiations that involved no more than the two German states and the four victorious powers to discuss the dissolution of the four power status and a German unification within the NATO framework (Dann 1996: 376). He met the leaders of the four powers individually and already in December, Bush assented, provided that a unified Germany remained within the Transatlantic Alliance, something which perfectly matched the chancellor‘s ambitions. The rest turned out to be a hard nut to crack, but also Mitterrand was eventually d‘accord . After several meetings and phone calls between Kohl and Gorbachev, Moscow agreed on the deal that a reunified Germany could be part of NATO in return for several billion Deutschmarks (Gauland 1994: 79-80). Thatcher, still very worried about possible outcomes of Kohl‘s vision, had finally no other choice than to accept the historical course (Junghans 1999: 86).

Domestically, Kohl was successful in gaining increasing public support for his vision. Despite resistance from the Social Democrats, he won endorsements of German unification by promising affluence and freedom to East-Germans and by telling West Germans that there were no economic risks in integrating the East. He moreover pushed forward his idea of the rapid implementation of an economic and monetary

union that would harvest votes in the East and make the economic integration of the GDR irrevocable. In the GDR, he was instrumental in launching the Allianz für Deutschland , a coalition of East-German parties that followed his course toward unification. Kohl held several rallies and his partners won the first democratic elections in the GDR, which provided Kohl‘s actions with the necessary democratic legitimacy (Clemens 1998, Dann 1996: 376/7, Junghans 1999).

Kohl‘s socialisation: the man of the centre

We will now turn toward the question of Kohl‘s motivations for the abovementioned actions by looking at his biographical circumstances. Kohl was born in 1930, three years before Hitler came to power and he grew up in Ludwigshafen, a provincial town in the Palatinate, which he hardly left until he was drafted during the last two years of WWII. The experiences during and after the war were extremely formative for Kohl‘s character. In his memoirs, he writes about the dead bodies that he retrieved out of ruins after the bomber attacks on Ludwigshafen, about hunger and the angst that Soviet troops might reach his Heimatflak base. Also the trembling uncertainty when the war was over and the chaos on his way back home had left deep marks on his personality. The loss of his older brother he describes as a ”shock‘ 45 (see also: Dreher 1998: 21-24, Gauland 1994: 15).

Before he was drafted, Kohl lived in a petit-bourgeois and rural surrounding under rather simple, though never insufficient material conditions, that were dependent on the small salary of his father, who worked for the local finance office (Dreher 1998: 13-16). Protected by their Catholic worldview, his parents did not follow the ideological agitation of the Nazi movement. Kohl‘s pious mother and his national- liberal father, both voiced criticism against the power holders (ibid: 19-20). That is why Kohl did not experience a break between his religious and civil values and the Nazi doctrines; he did not suffer the generational conflict, which held sway over Germany in the aftermath of the war. Instead, he could follow up the moral instruction of his parents (Gauland 1994: 61). In this regard it is interesting that Kohl often spoke about, what he calls, the —grace of late birth“, denying any collective guilt

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and believing in the acquittal for the whole of his younger generation, a view that would become essential to his later responses the German question (Pruys 1995: 34).

In his memoirs, Kohl emphasises the importance of his geographical origin for the development of his identity. The Rhinish regions were traditionally threatened by German-French disputes and secessionist ambitions were not uncommon until the second half of the 20 th century. Yet, he imagines his beloved Heimat as a cultural landscape, as a —European heartland“ as well as a —primordial-land of German history“ 46 . Kohl thus fills his notion of Heimat with the triad of Palatinate, Germany and Europe, strongly opposing any revanchism against France. By portraying the people from this border-region as —European minded and German patriotic“, he generalises his self-perception in respect to others, 47 (see also Pruys 1995: 67/8). The authenticity of Kohl‘s European identity and his international orientation were however indeed decisive for his concept of German unity.

After the war, Kohl became highly interested in politics and joined the discussions at the parish house of Limburgerhof, where the local dean Finck invited youngsters to debate various political philosophies and to hold lectures. Kohl lectured about Catholic social teachings that were in keeping with the values of his parents and were in accordance with Finck‘s Weltanschauung . The dean pleaded for a societal renewal according to Christian principles, argued against Rhinish separatism as well as against German revanchism and was also cofounder of the Christian Democratic Party, in which Kohl became from the beginning onwards actively involved 48 (see also Dreher: 1998: 34).

Ludwigshafen was then governed by communists and social-democrats, whose parties he viewed as too doctrinaire. For Kohl, the CDU was —the only real people‘s party after the war to which I could not see any alternative. I had, so to speak, imbibed from my infancy that I cannot be and think as a socialist.“ 49 Yet, he did not become polarised in internal affairs; the SPD was never perceived an enemy and social democracy was an integral part in his politics Kohl was a ”man of the middle‘,

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which he tried hard to remain for the rest of his political career (Pruys 1995: 53, Herles 1990: 189).

After having finished high-school in his hometown, Kohl studied law at Frankfurt University, which he pursued only half-heartedly. He became more enthusiastic about his studies at Heidelberg, where he eventually earned a doctorate in history (Gauland 1994: 16) and his idea of German history remained undeniably central in his political thinking, which becomes even clearer in last section of this chapter.

Kohl‘s political philosophy: promoting western freedom

Aden (1990) depicts Kohl‘s chancellorship as a ”spiritual-moral turn‘ of the Federal Republic. Kohl believed that the political task of the Christian-Democrats was —the duty (…) not to accept the world as it is but (…) to improve it“ (cited in Pruys 1995: 107), and he had a clear conceptual framework of principles on which such actions must be based. Kohl sees the system of the FRG relying on ethical ideas that derive from Christianity and Aufklärung 50 and these values should be the final response to ideological debates and must thus be applied universally

His understanding of history and politics relied essentially on his notion of the individual. History is to him the catenation of human fates, and politics are made by individuals for individuals (Neander 1990, Gauland 1994: 60). In his Erinnerungen , Kohl explains that —[t]he core of the Christian idea of man is the belief in the imago dei of every human. The human is god‘s creature and as such has rights, which nobody may touch (…). Human dignity and human rights have therefore for the CDU absolute rank.“ 51 Kohl augments that —because the human is in his whole creation made by God, he has joint responsibility also for the environment.“ 52 In 1989 he praised Vaclav Havel for refusing —to imagine the individual only as ”screw in the gigantic machine-state‘.“ He reminded instead of —what everyone of us originally is, (…) that is a mature human being, responsible to the world and for the world.“ 53

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This notion of the individual did however not allow for any relativism. While he held the protection of the individual as the prime duty of the state, he believed that the state cannot be neutral with regard to values. Kohl was keen to forswear any ideology, anything doctrinaire, although his own political Weltanschaung followed ideological principles that so strongly relied on Western and Catholic principles. He took his own ideals and vision as universally right for the sake of all. Kohl‘s notion of democracy turns out therefore to be quite ambiguous, which becomes clear with his explanation of a ”value judgement‘:

—It is based on the insight that nobody in politics - not even the majority œ is in possession of the truth, as none of us can rid himself of his imperfection and defectiveness.“ Kohl declared that —[t]he Basic Law guarantees that the power of the majority finds its limits in this principle. And life experiences shows indeed that the minority from yesterday can be the majority of today, and conversely.“ 54

His universalistic worldview becomes even more peculiar when he brings the idea of falsification into play: —According to Karl Popper the human is characterised by the ability to drop false ideas and theories in place of others“, yet he believes that his —idea of freedom will one day prove stronger than any ideologies that treat the individual as a minor being.“ Within Kohl‘s ideology not his own values - but instead Popper‘s - falsification encounters a relativisation: —It is about the peaceful overcoming of untruth. There is no compromise with the lie: where it is about freedom, human rights and self-determination, there is not only the law, but especially the duty to interfere in internal affairs.“ 55 Kohl‘s falsification ends at the point that Kohl judges as right, i.e. at his final interpretation of Christian ethics and the Western model of society and economy, which becomes clear in his polarisations of the conflicting political ideologies during the epoch of global bi-polarity:

He applies his leitmotif of individual freedom in absolute terms to the rest of his geopolitical principles; i.e. transatlanticism, European integration and also the German question. All of them are underwritten by an important superior rationale:

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The individual who lives in democracy and market economy —lives on the sunny side of the history.“ 56

Kohl‘s idea of Germany: —We remain one nation“

Like the 19 th century national movement, Kohl twinned a concept of liberty with the one of unity. He did that in two ways: One the one hand, he contrasted oppressive communism with liberal western democracy, which symbolised the ideological divide of Germany, and, on the other hand, he found that the division was not in accordance with the principle of self-determination and the national will. 57 At the 25 th anniversary of the Berlin War in 1986, Kohl spoke in the Reichstag building to remind everybody that the memorial of this day —is the commitment to the unity of our nation, the commitment to Berlin and the Berliners: the divided city remains a symbol for the will to freedom of all Germans.“ He moreover maintained that —as long as the wall stands there is no normality“ and —as long as the Germans are deprived of liberty (…), as long the German question remains open.“

It is fundamental to see that Kohl believed that unification is —the goal of all Germans, as the German national anthem says: we want to strive together for unity and justice and freedom.“ 58 When Honecker came to Bonn in 1987, he affirmed that —the consciousness for the unity of the nation is awake as ever - and undaunted is the will to preserve it. This unity finds its expression in common language, in common cultural heritage and a long and continuing common history.“ 59 Also at the Kremlin in 1988, Kohl pointed out: —This division is unnatural. And the solidarity among the Germans is a historical, a human reality, which even politics cannot circumvent.“ 60

Kohl had however been keen to show that Germany‘s history was not following a Sonderweg , but that —there is only one place in the world for us: on the side of the free nations. Our goal: in a freely united Europe a free and united Germany.“ 61 He hence tried to initiate a certain ”normalisation‘ of German history. Kohl did not reject

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the fact that atrocious deeds were committed by Germans, but he saw the Nazi era as one terrible episode in a continuous German history that should neither be used to legitimise the division of a historically grown nation, nor for self-blame and sullying of national pride. Kohl‘s idea of the god-ordained duty of the human to interfere in worldly affairs went along with his rejection of collective guilt for the Holocaust and WWII, which had been routinely internalised by West German generations since 1945: —(….) because my generation, due to its youth could not become guilty itself; we are through our own experience and knowledge responsible to history to ensure that bondage and strife will never again be possible.“ 62

In his view, —in the Soviet-zone one dictatorship replaced the other.“ 63 Therefore, this responsibility should not stop at the Berlin Wall as —[t]he only theory that supports this structure consists of the conviction, which was deduced from Marxist literalism enforced through the power of guns, that the state owns the people as slaves (…)“. That was why —[t]he division of Germany (…) contravenes the right of the Germans to national self-determination (…).“ 64

He took the Franco-German friendship as —an example of new normality“ 65 and demanded this international normality for Germany in the form of several geopolitical decisions, such as the deepening of EC integration and the unpopular agreement with the NATO twin track strategy (1983). Noteworthy in this respect were also divisive symbolic actions for conciliation, such as the meeting with Mitterrand at the battlefield of Verdun (1984) and the visit with Reagan to the military cemetery in Bitburg (1985), which were intended to depart from victim- offender assessments of the two World Wars based on national differentiation to a more joint remembrance of soldiers killed on both sides (Clemens 1998: 12). Even in Israel Kohl pronounced his idea of —the grace of late birth“ (Pruys 1995: 34).

This was accompanied with attempts to nationalise the Germans‘ consciousness, who in great parts still associated their history shamefully with the Nazi-era (Gauland 1994: 61-65). He tried to relativise German history in respect to other nation‘s histories and sought to relativise the Nazi-era in respect of other more positive

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aspects of German history: —Like any other people the German nation is also affected by its historical, cultural and social development (…). Our history can show its face, when it comes to great achievements and brilliant personages, who have served human progress (…).“ 66 Kohl saw it as his duty to promote a common national identity for all Germans. 67

He perceived Germany foremost as a unique Kulturnation , which would persist even if the state structures suggest something different, 68 yet he did not accept that German history has been —forced into unnatural channels“ 69 and thus sought to counter this development by demanding that history lessons and inter-German cultural exchange should —raise the awareness of the continuing unity of the nation, especially in the adolescent generation 70 (see also Korte 1998: 68). In this regard it is worth mentioning that Kohl was instrumental in the foundation of the Deutsches Historisches Museum and the Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland .

The chancellor was especially careful in this course of action to always portray the continuity of the democratic traditions of the German nation. —Few Germans today know that at the Hambach castle our black-red-golden flag waved for the first time as a symbol of democracy and fatherland“ 71 and —[b]lack-red-gold is the outer expression of the disposition, the history, the tradition of our republic“ (cited in Fuchs 1990: 147). Apart from the —responsibility that is imposed by our common history“ Kohl very often referred to the German Basic Law, which calls upon the Germans —to complete the unity and freedom in Germany in free self-determination“ (Art. 146 GG). In his universalising worldview —nobody can abscond from this duty.“ 72

In 1989, when Hungary opened its borders to Austria and thousands of East German refugees arrived in the FRG, Kohl addressed himself to the West Germans: —Nobody may be indifferent about those people (…)“and demanded that they should be

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welcomed as Germans who claim their rights and not be treated as foreigners. At the same time he saw this movement as evidence —that against all orations and auguries (…) we Germans belong together and that the will to unity of the nation is not just any will, but a deep, also morally moving force.“ 73

Conclusion

The 1989 revolution in the GDR was not predominantly a revolution for unification; it was a revolt for democratisation, where Kohl once more twinned the concept of liberty with the one of territorial unity. Ideas and actions for unification came only very abruptly into being to serve as legitimacy for the FRG government‘s plans for the annexation of the GDR, which were realised within a surprisingly short timespan.

Kohl could utilise the moral education he had enjoyed during his childhood and was thus unaffected by anti-German sentiments that were in vogue among the Germans themselves. His will for unification had been apparent throughout his career, which was untypical of politicians in the two German states. The chancellor‘s career was characterised by symbolic actions that were intended to promote a certain ”normality‘ of German history, nationally and internationally. His vision of German unity combined with his leitmotif of ”freedom‘ did not allow for a third way of a reformed GDR; there was only one way: one German state within the transatlantic framework.

A COMPARATIVE CONCLUSION

In order to justifiably conduct a comparison between the first and the second unification, and between Kohl and Bismarck, we need to allow for a certain theoretical universality. This comparative universality rests, first of all, on the concept of unification, which is a type of nationalism that has been used to describe the two events (see Breuilly 1993: 9, Hechter 2000: 16). Universality must moreover be acknowledged to follow the argument made here: In both cases leading individuals proved instrumental in the processes of unification. Yet, for the sake of

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Verstehen , i.e. for understanding the intention and the context of Bismarck and Kohl‘s actions, one must account for the multicausality, i.e. the structural reasons for their individual will, - a methodology which exposes that nationalism from above is always relative to socio-historical constraints, namely that ideas and actions ”from below‘ can be of great consequence for the ideas and actions of state leaders (see Hechter & Kiser 1991; Kalberg 1994).

The assumption, which is defended by Breuilly and Speirs (2005: 11, 12), i.e. that Bismarck had a greater impact on unification than Kohl seems to be a fallacy as an analysis that draws only on theories of nationalism from above (see Breuilly 1993, Snyder 2000) obscures the dialecticism of both unification processes and leads to false results. Instead, contextualising the motivations of these two leading individuals (see van den Bossche 2003), also in relation to nationalism from below (see Alter 1985, Hroch 2000) leads to very different outcomes.

Interestingly, Bismarck and Kohl both illustrate their own role within the respective processes by portraying themselves as individuals, who were just making use of a God-given opportunity in history: —You cannot create by yourself, you can only wait, and once you can hear God striding through history œ catching his coattail œ that is all“ (Kohl cites Bismarck, in Diekmann and Reuth 1996: 422). This quote implies Kohl‘s assumption of a certain equivalence regarding his influence on the historical development before 1990 compared to Bismarck‘s influence before 1871. Even this assumption does however not hold anymore when looking at the role of national agitations from below in relation to the national imaginations of our protagonists.

Before the first unification, nationalism from below had existed for decades in all German states. The abstract concepts of liberty and unity were common leitmotifs of a fragmented national movement, which interpreted these concepts in different ways. While more radical democrats demanded a total dissolution of the ancient order, the liberal part of the movement increasingly turned toward a Prussian solution when it became clear that they needed a strong ally from above to achieve unification, a need, which Bismarck could fulfil.

Before the second unification, there was no national movement anywhere in Germany. Action for social and political changes was only apparent in East Germany, whereas the West German population remained passive. The political groups in the

GDR who organised the protests did not question the existence of their state and the following protesters on East German streets were hardly making any claims for unification before the Berlin Wall fell. Within this fairly short timespan in autumn 1989, however, the GDR revolution changed its course and a growing section of the protestors felt inclined towards Kohl‘s vision of unification.

Due to their respective socialisations Kohl and Bismarck were equipped with different political philosophies and ideas of the German nation, which they never abandoned. Bismarck had learned liberal and nationalist thinking, yet, for him, his German identity was only secondary to his Prussianness and the freedom of the individual was secondary to the freedom of the Prussian crown. He believed that the majority of the people, who were in his eyes politically not able to judge, needed the divine crown as the leading institution of the state.

By contrast, Kohl had a vision of German unity and his German identity remained unchallenged within his notion of home, in which he also placed Europe and the Palatinate. He had internalised the idea of individual freedom and self-determination and was convinced of the historical continuity of the German will for liberty and unity, a point where he however equalled individual will with national will. One could therefore argue that Bismarck and Kohl both had certain authoritarian tendencies.

They both sought to encounter supposedly ”unnatural‘ developments and both were driven by religious convictions, which served as legitimisation for their ideas and actions for unification. Bismarck believed in his duty to protect the god-ordained existence of the Junker-class, and Prussia as a great power, and his notion of Germany was yet far from being dominated by a belief in the inviolability and wholeness of a German nation as a cultural community within a common state. Instead, he only employed the already existing kleindeutsch idea for the sake of the geopolitical ambitions of the Prussian state when he realised that this would be the only way to ensure Prussian hegemony in Germany.

Kohl, on the other hand, believed in his duty to promote the freedom of the people that could only be achieved when the Germans would be united in one state, which must be integrated into the transatlantic framework. He was, moreover, one of the few Germans, who were convinced by the inevitability of German unity. One may thus argue that Bismarck‘s actions during the period of the three Wars of Unification

only accelerated the process of unification, they were only crucial for the territorial and political shape of the German nation-state and not for unification as such, whereas it is more doubtful whether the reunification would have occurred at all without Kohl.

A combination of forces from above and below seems however essential for the (re)making of a nation-state. Studying nationalism, as a mindset, on the one hand, and as set of actions, on the other, allows for certain differentiation between ”idealist nationalism‘ (or ”liberal nationalism‘) and ”realist nationalism‘ that tend to correlate with each other. The inverse symmetry that emerges out of this comparative study is striking and underpins this suggestion:

In the first unification, the synthesis of Aufklärung -liberal and romantic-ethnic concepts of the nation had developed from below. Bismarck, who was a ”nationalist of means‘ or a ”nationalist for itself‘, opposed these concepts and used unification nationalism to encourage an extension of Prussian power as a solution to the Prussian question. Whilst carrying out nationalist policies, one can thus argue, he had internalised non-nationalist ideas to promote ”realist nationalism‘.

In the second unification, it was the democratic movement in the GDR that kick- started a revolution with non-nationalist motivations. Greater parts of the GDR citizenry turned eventually towards a realism, which did not allow any further ”experiment‘ of a reformed GDR, but only for the extension of the Federal Republic. Kohl was a ”nationalist of ends‘ or a ”nationalist in itself‘, who used unification nationalism to encourage the extension of the Federal Republic of Germany as a concluding solution to the German question. Drawing on the twin-concept of liberty and unity, which derived from the 19 th century national movement, he promoted the belief in the interdependency freedom and unification .

Kohl‘s liberal nationalism could thus be seen as the revival of classic nationalism (see Hroch 1996) and moreover be taken as another example for the weakness of too normative typologies of nationalism (see e.g. Greenfeld 1992), which confirms once more that the study of individuals can lead to fascinating findings to challenge established theories in Nationalism Studies.

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