Weinstein 1

Carter Weinstein

Thesis

04/10/19

Rousseau and Virtue

In Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s moral philosophy there is no explicit mention of where the traditional virtues fall into play if they do at all. The purpose of my thesis is to argue that virtue has its source in Rousseau’s moral sentiments and, in support of this claim, to present a virtue-based interpretation of Rousseau’s moral philosophy as depicted in his work of Emile and ​ ​ with some supplementary support from the Second Discourse. This thesis has three primary objectives. The first is to understand what Rousseau means when he refers to virtues and what it is to be virtuous for Rousseau. This conception will be significantly different than a typically reason-based conception of virtues as abstract concepts, for I will argue that Rousseau takes virtue to have its foundation in the complex sentiment of conscience. The second is to explain the connection between amour-propre and virtue, specifically with regard to the possibility that ​ ​ amour-propre can be used to properly habituate one towards virtue. Rousseau takes ​ amour-propre to be the source of virtue and vice, and as such it is very important to explore this ​ relationship in this thesis. The third is to help illustrate the previous two goals through investigating Rousseau’s moral philosophy in terms of virtue ethics i.e. making a comparison between Rousseau and a standard Aristotelian understanding of virtue ethics. By claiming conscience as the foundation of virtue for Rousseau, I intend to illustrate how sentiment guides right action and habituation towards virtue, and contrast this with the common Aristotelian rationalistic model. At the end of each section I will address some possible concerns scholars of Weinstein 2

Rousseau may have about the work I am putting forward relative to each section. In conclusion, I will give a brief summary of Rousseauian virtue and also note some useful consequences of my view.

I will begin by providing some definitions of commonly used terms in Rousseau’s philosophy. Some of the most important terms in Rousseau’s work are amour de soi, pity, ​ ​ ​ amour-propre, and conscience. ​ Amour de soi is a natural sentiment that is the inward directed love of one’s self. ​ Rousseau describes amour de soi as “a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to attend ​ ​ to its self-preservation and which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue.”1 It is the source of the “gentle and affectionate passions”2 and is “the sentiment of existence.”3 In his developed moral philosophy, Rousseau takes amour de soi as the ​ ​ basis of sentiments of care for self.

Pity is a natural sentiment that gives one an innate repugnance to see other beings suffer which extends to other people and, to a lesser degree, non-human animals. Rousseau describes pity as “a disposition suited to beings as weak and as subject to so many ills as we are; a virtue all the more universal and useful to man as it precedes the exercise of all reflection in him, and so Natural that even the beasts sometimes show evident signs of it.”4 Pity is a powerful sentiment that is often acted upon without any reflection, “is prior to all reflection,”5 and allows for a kind of transportation from the self into the other, for “how do we let ourselves be moved by pity if

1 The Discourses note XV 218 ​ ​ 2 Emile 214 ​ ​ 3 By sentiment of existence, Rousseau means it is the source of the feeling of existence, which is a kind of feeling of peace and contentment. See Reveries 89. ​ ​ 4 The Discourses 152 ​ ​ 5 The Discourses 152-4 ​ ​ Weinstein 3 not by transporting ourselves outside of ourselves and identifying with the suffering animal, by leaving, as it were, our own being to take on its being.”6 Thus, pity serves as a basis of moral sentiments of care for others in Rousseau’s robust moral philosophy.

Amour-propre is also a kind of self love, but one that is “born in society, which inclines ​ every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else, inspires men with all the evils they do one another, and is the genuine source of honor.”7 It is important to note that “the immediate and primary end that amour-propre seeks is not self-esteem [...] but eseem (or ​ ​ recognition) in the eyes of others.”8 Amour-propre is also a relative sentiment where that means ​ ​ “relative to other subjects and [...] that the good sought by amour-propre is defined by, even ​ ​ ​ ​ partially constituted by, certain relations one has to subjects other than oneself.”9 Amour-propre ​ is different from amour de soi in that “it [amour de soi] does not directly and necessarily tie us to ​ ​ ​ ​ other subjects, as does amour-propre.”10 It is important to note that Rousseau claims ​ ​ amour-propre can be utilized for good purposes, as he states that one can “transform it into a ​ virtue.”11

Conscience, also known as the inner sentiment, is a rather complex sentiment born from amour de soi, pity, and reason. Conscience is described by Rousseau as a “[d]ivine instinct, ​ immortal and celestial voice, certain guide [...] infallible judge of good and bad which makes man like unto God; it is you who make the excellence of his nature and the morality of his actions” 12 and “an innate principle of justice and virtue according to which, in spite of our own

6 Emile 223 ​ ​ 7 The Discourses note XV 218 ​ ​ 8 Neuhouser 34 9 Neuhouser 32 10 Neuhouser 33 11 Emile 252 ​ ​ 12 Emile 290 ​ ​ Weinstein 4 maxims, we judge our actions and those of others as good or bad.”13 Conscience mediates between amour de soi and pity i.e. between self-love and the love of others. Among Rousseau ​ ​ scholars conscience is divisive, as some scholars ignore it completely14 while others attempt to make it rational or dependent on reason.15 Regardless of these disagreements in the literature, because the concept of conscience appears explicitly and does important work in Rousseau’s discussion of virtues, I will make use of it liberally. I will also take a moment to define a less important term that is related to conscience, namely heart, because Rousseau claims that conscience relies on the heart for its proper functioning, as I will discuss in more detail below.

The heart for Rousseau is a container for the sentiments, and in support of this he states that “we fill up his young heart at the outset with the passions which later we impute to nature”16 and “the sentiment of the just and the unjust [are] innate in the heart of man.”17

Conscience will play an important part in Rousseau conception of virtue, which may seem strange because virtue is traditionally understood as rational. However, sentiment plays an ​ incredibly important role in his conception of virtue. For Rousseau, virtue is neither an abstract medial concept that one uses to evaluate actions or dispositions nor is it a kind of understanding or knowledge. He goes so far as to say that “[g]eneral and abstract ideas are the source of men’s greatest errors.”18 Rousseau does not define virtue explicitly, but in the background of his works there exists a unique conception of virtue. In order to fully understand what Rousseau means by virtue it is important to look at Emile, for he develops his conception of virtue most in this piece ​ ​

13 Emile 289 ​ ​ 14 See Neuhouser’s Rousseau’s Theodicy 247 wherein he omits passages where conscience plays an important role. ​ ​ 15 See Resiert, A Friend of Virtue, 118-21 ​ ​ 16 Emile 48 ​ ​ 17 Emile 66 ​ ​ 18 Emile 274 ​ ​ Weinstein 5 on virtuous education. In my investigation of virtue, I will first investigate Rousseau’s understanding of how to teach virtue, and how this illustrates what virtue is for Rousseau.

Second, I will consider specific virtues that Rousseau discusses. Third, I will consider the relationship between virtue and sentiment. Fourth, I will consider the relationship between gender and virtue for Rousseau, and whether or not it is a problem for his conception of virtue.

Last, I will put forward some concerns scholars of Rousseau may have about the content of this section.

The development of virtue in an individual is a major portion of the project of Emile. ​ ​ This is to say that a good education is an education of virtue. As such, I will be enumerating a few examples from Emile to begun fleshing out Rousseau’s conception of virtue. Near the ​ ​ beginning of Emile, Rousseau asks “How is it possible that a child be well raised by one who ​ ​ was not well raised himself?”19 I see this as a question of virtue, for it may seem impossible for one who is not virtuous attempt to teach virtue to another, which may be why, in the end, Emile tells the tutor that “[A]s long as I live, I shall need you.”20 In any case, the first step in a virtuous education is not what one might expect, for Rousseau states that “the first education ought to be purely negative. It consists not at all in teaching virtue or truth but in securing the heart from vice and the mind from error. If you could do nothing and let nothing be done, [...] soon he would become in your hands the wisest of men; and in the beginning by doing nothing, you would have worked an educational marvel.”21 This looks like either wisdom is freedom from bad habit, or more interestingly that wisdom is brought about naturally so long as bad habits and vices do not get in the way. The latter is more likely to be what Rousseau is claiming, for elsewhere he states

19 Emile 50 ​ ​ 20 Emile 480 ​ ​ 21 Emile 93 ​ ​ Weinstein 6

“[d]o you wish to put order and regularity in the nascent passions? Extend the period during which they develop in order that they have the time to be arranged as they are born. Then it is not man who orders them; it is nature itself. Your care is only to let it arrange its work.”22 This first education is described further on in a virtuous manner with Rousseau stating “the only lesson of morality appropriate to childhood, and the most important for every age, is never to harm anyone. The very precept of doing good, if it is not subordinated to this one, is dangerous, false and contradictory [...] The most sublime virtues are negative. They are also the most difficult.”23

This passage gives some credence to the idea that the first education is virtuous in a way different to what one might expect of virtue,which is why Rousseau didn’t deign to call it a virtuous education. It is because of this talk of negative virtue that it is strange, and negative virtue seems to mean the kind of virtues that inform one of what one should not do. This appears to be a kind of habituation from vice, but not yet towards virtue.

After the first education, Rousseau discusses how virtue can be taught, and it is not in a ​ traditional teaching style. Rousseau states that “it is not by teaching the names of these virtues that one teaches them to children. It is by making the children taste them without knowing what they are.”24 ‘These virtues’ he specifically describes are the virtues of ‘constancy and firmness’ but he mentions that it applies to other virtues as well, and this ‘tasting’ means that one teaches virtue through virtuous action. One teaches through tasting either through providing the opportunity to perform virtuous action to another, or by performing virtuous action oneself as a demonstration to another. In order to learn properly one must learn through action, for he also states that one ought to “put all the lessons of young people in actions rather than in speeches.

22 Emile 219 ​ ​ 23 Emile 104-5 ​ ​ 24 Emile 131 ​ ​ Weinstein 7

Let them learn nothing in books which experience can teach them.”25 This ties in well with

Rousseau’s belief that the wellspring of authority is through virtue. Rousseau says that “authority will never be sufficient if it is not founded on the esteem for virtue.”26 I take this to mean that a governor should act as he teaches his charge to act, rather than the old adage of ‘do as I say not as I do.’ This way the student will both learn virtue and grant authority27 to the governor which enables better learning. However, Rousseau does think that it is best for one to learn virtue through performing virtuous actions oneself. However, he states that “virtues by imitation are the virtues of apes, and that no good action is morally good except when it is done because it is good and not because others do it,” but he does suggest that there is some value in this kind of virtue, for “at an age when the heart feels nothing yet, children just have to be made to imitate the acts whose habit one wants to give them, until the time when they can do them out of discernment and love of the good.”28 It seems that virtue by imitation is excellent for children who have yet to develop the sentimental capacity needed for virtue, and these children need to simply know virtue through habit until they are developed enough to understand to love virtue. Rousseau also states that “[i]t is in doing good that one becomes good” and this is works well with how ​ Rousseau has described teaching virtue so far.29 Rousseau also describes education in a farming metaphor, stating that “[b]efore sowing, the earth must be plowed; the seed of virtue sprouts with difficulty, long preparation is required to make it take root.”30 I take this to mean that the first non-virtuous, or negatively virtuous, education that was set up to prevent the development of bad

25 Emile 251 ​ ​ 26 Emile 95 ​ ​ 27 For those who may seen a conflict with this and Rousseau’s concepts of authority/autonomy, see Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens, Cambridge University Press, 1969 ​ 28 Emile 104 ​ ​ 29 Emile 250 ​ ​ 30 Emile 319 ​ ​ Weinstein 8 habit is the plowing of the earth, while the demonstration and ‘tasting’ of virtue that the child is taught is the seed of virtue. After the seed has been planted and taken root, it seems that it is up to the student to habituate themselves, so this metaphor is for the entirety of education. Once achieved, virtue is among the few things one can be assuredly proud of accomplishing, for those with virtue know “[t]he more they have, the more they know all that they lack [...] they are too sensible to be vain about a gift they did not give themselves. The good man can be proud of his virtue because it is his. But of what is the intelligent man proud?”31 Virtue is a steep cliff one must climb through the will of the person rather than the natural gifts or assistance that will make it easier, and that is why one ought to be proud of it.

The point of the first education comes through towards the end of Emile, when Emile is ​ ​ finally ready to practice virtue on his own. Rousseau states that “[t]he word virtue comes from ​ ​ strength. Strength is the foundation of all virtue. Virtue belongs only to a being that is weak by ​ nature and strong by will. It is in this that the merit of the just man consists; and although we call

God good, we do not call Him virtuous, because it requires no effort for Him to do good. [...] I have made you good rather than virtuous. [...] [The virtuous man] is he who knows how to conquer his affections; for then he follows his reason and his conscience; he does his duty [...]

Command your heart, Emile, and you will be virtuous.”32 This founding of virtue on strength means that only by overcoming weakness and temptation is virtue realized; Emile has been shielded from vice to such an extent that he will not be virtuous until he has overcome weakness and temptation by his own will. It is only once Emile commands his own heart, which is to say once he becomes his own master, faces temptation, and prevails over it that he may be called

31 Emile 245 ​ ​ 32 Emile 444-5 ​ ​ Weinstein 9 virtuous. I take the kind of strength Rousseau is describing to be a kind of strength of will demonstrated through resisting vice. This is a very interesting passage, for virtue is contrasted with goodness. Rousseau describes God as good but not virtuous because God’s goodness requires no effort. Virtue is the attainment of true goodness through great effort and the overcoming of temptation rather than just being truly good. In order for one to be virtuous, one must be good and have attained that goodness through one’s own effort and hardships rather than through any other fashion, if it is such that there is any other way of attaining goodness. So, this interesting divide between virtue and goodness appears to be a division wherein one who comes to possess goodness and triumphs over vice and temptation becomes virtuous, but one who is simply good who has not been tempted, or cannot be tempted in the case of God, is not virtuous.

The reason why Emile is told to become virtuous is because he can not forever be shielded from vice, so he can not be good forever without becoming virtuous, unlike God. Virtue is goodness that is secured from vice through strength and effort. This idea that virtue is not just goodness is very different from traditional accounts of virtue.

In summation, this account of teaching and attaining virtue has exposed that virtue can be taught as a kind of tasting, virtue is difficult, virtue is a special kind of goodness, and it is only attainable through strength over temptation. There are also different kinds of virtue, as Rousseau describes negative virtues which alludes to a classification of negative vs positive virtues. Virtue can be taught, but only insofar as the earth can be plowed and planted with a seed. It is up to the

seed to grow, and no amount of imitation or shielding from vice can guarantee that end.

Rousseau alludes to a classification or division of virtue, but does not specifically enumerate one. Understanding specific virtues discussed by Rousseau and attempting to build a Weinstein 10 classification of them may aid in understanding the broader sense of the term. Instead of attempting to compile a list of all of Rousseau’s specific virtues, which would be another project entirely, I will illustrate a classification that Rousseau seems to utilise when discussing virtues.

In book one of Emile, Rousseau describes hygiene, “the only useful part of medicine”, as “less of ​ ​ a science than a virtue” and goes on to talk about how “[t]emperance and work are the true doctors of man.”33 Virtue is used in conjunction with simple and straightforward speech, which is associated with the pure folk of the countryside instead of the corrupted denizens of the cities.34

So, from these first few examples we see Rousseau to be describing specific virtues like ‘being hygienic’ or ‘being honest and speaking simply.’ This also seems to indicate a division of virtue into bodily virtues and social virtues. At the end of book 3, he describes Emile as “laborious, temperate, patient, firm, and full of courage” while saying he “lacks only the knowledge of the relations which demand [the social virtues].”35 This passage seems straightforwardly a mention of the distinction between virtues of a healthy body and mind, and virtues of social interaction like charity or benevolence. So, it seems that for Rousseau there are virtues of a sound body and mind, and there are virtues of social life. There are also negative virtues, and positive virtues.

Negative virtues are broadly concerned with refraining from actions, while positive virtues are action demanding. I understand this classification as there being virtues like courage, which is a positive social virtue.36 Another example would be temperance which would be a negative bodily or mental virtue. It may also be possible for a virtue to possess negative and positive qualities, depending on the case it may demand action or demand a refrain from action, such as justice.

33 Emile 55 ​ ​ 34 Emile 264 ​ ​ 35 Emile 208 ​ ​ 36 Here I am being a little loose and painting in broad strokes, for one might argue that the courageous thing to do in a certain scenario may be to refrain from acting, but for my purposes I am being very general. Weinstein 11

As previously stated, Virtue is not an abstract concept that one ought to keep in mind when performing action. Instead, virtues are character traits or dispositions from which one acts that arise from conscience, other sentiments, and reason. The voice of conscience is the voice of virtue, for Rousseau states that “[t]here is in the depths of souls [...] an innate principle of justice and virtue according to which [...] we judge our actions and those of others as good or bad. [i]t is to this principle that I give the name conscience.”37 To be virtuous for Rousseau is to be able to hear the voice of conscience and to act as that voice dictates, for Rousseau states that the virtuous man “follows his reason and his conscience.”38 Pity helps reinforce the voice of conscience, for pity “[took] the place of Laws, morals, and virtue,” before conscience arose.39 Virtue has an interesting relationship with the more primitive sentiments of amour de soi and pity, for “the first ​ ​ voices of conscience arise out of the first movements of the heart, and [...] justice and goodness ​ ​ ​ [...] are true affections of the soul enlightened by reason, are hence only an ordered development of our primitive affections.”40 Given that virtue is a kind of goodness, and justice itself is a virtue, virtue is a development, enlightened by reason, of the more primitive, or natural, sentiments, or affections, of amour de soi and pity. Directly after this previous quote, Rousseau ​ ​ makes the claim “that by reason alone, independent of conscience, no natural law can be established.”41 This is evidence that Rousseau is founding virtue in sentiment rather than reason.

Further, Rousseau states that “[r]eason alone teaches us to know good and bad. Conscience, ​ which makes us love the former and hate the latter, although independent of reason, cannot

37 Emile 289 ​ ​ 38 Emile 444 ​ ​ 39 The Discourses 154 ​ ​ 40 Emile 235 ​ ​ 41 Emile 235 ​ ​ Weinstein 12 therefore be developed without it.”42 Obviously, given the quote, Rousseau thinks that reason is necessary for the development of conscience, but he also seems to be saying something like this thought that conscience operates independent of reason. Also, Rousseau states that “[t]oo often reason deceives us. [...] But conscience never deceives; it is man’s true guide. It is to the soul what instinct is to the body; he who follows conscience obeys nature and does not fear being led astray.”43 If one follows conscience, a sentiment one feels, instead of reason, then one is

‘obeying nature’ and following ‘man’s true guide.’ This is not a warning against reason, but rather a warning against reason alone. Conscience is needed in conjunction with reason to guide the virtuous person. Conscience also occupies the same place as virtue, which is the heart, for

“the first voices of conscience arise out of the first movements of the heart,”44 and “having thus deduced the principal truths that it mattered for me to know [...] from the inner sentiment [...] I do not draw from these rules from the principles of a high philosophy, but find them written by nature with ineffaceable characters in the depth of my heart.”45 Virtue is also found in the heart, a container for sentiments, for Rousseau states that “[i]t is only then that he [Emile] finds his true interest in being good, [...] and in carrying virtue in his heart.”46 So, because virtue is a kind of goodness and is placed in the heart, it is dependent on sentiment. Also, virtue is concerned with reason because it teaches good and bad, and is a guide for the virtuous person in conjunction with conscience. Virtue is also concerned with conscience because conscience is man’s true guide, and the innate principle of justice and virtue. Thus, one can see virtue arises from sentiment, reason, and conscience.

42 Emile 67 ​ ​ 43 Emile 286-7 ​ ​ 44 Emile 235 ​ ​ 45 Emile 286 ​ ​ 46 Emile 314 ​ ​ Weinstein 13

The biggest difference between most conceptions of virtue and Rousseau’s conception is this foundation of sentiment rather than reason because Rousseau understands conscience to be the foundation of virtue. This is somewhat peculiar to Rousseau, as most consider conscience to be a guiding voice rather than the foundation of virtue. Virtue is, like conscience, a way of understanding reason and sentiment as working in unison rather than at odds. Virtue cannot be founded upon reason alone, but is instead the perfect state of peace and harmony between reason and sentiment where both are working in unison towards right action, and this is illustrated through how Rousseau describes being “[c]onstantly caught up in the combat between my natural sentiments [...] and my reason, which related everything to me, I would have drifted all my life in this continual alternation -doing the bad, loving the good, always in contradiction with myself- if new lights had not illuminated my heart, and if the truth, which settled my opinions, had not also made my conduct certain and put me in agreement with myself.”47 This agreement with himself is the unison of his reason and sentiment under the guide of conscience. This view that virtue is founded through conscience and is harmony between reason and sentiment is further supported by Rousseau placing virtue in the heart rather than in the mind or simply as a manifestation of a person’s good character.48 Another example of Rousseau describing reason and sentiment working in unison is when he states that “the precept of doing unto others as we would have them do unto us has no true foundation other than conscience and sentiment; for where is the precise reason for me, being myself, to act as if I were another, especially when I am morally certain of never finding myself in the same situation? [...] But when the strength of an expansive soul makes me identify myself with my fellow, and I feel that I am, so to speak, in

47 Emile 291 ​ ​ 48 Emile 314 ​ ​ Weinstein 14 him, it is in order not to suffer that I do not want him to suffer. I am interested in him for love of myself.”49 Reason may give one this maxim and sets the framework, but sentiment moves the pieces and inspires one to do it. Virtue is founded on conscience, and through conscience reason and sentiment work in concert to bring about right action.

There is a problem that one may run into with regard to how Rousseau understands virtue as being different between men and women. It is important to note he views men and women as structurally the same in terms of morals and conscience, for “[i]n everything not connected to sex, woman is man. She has the same organs, the same needs, and the same faculties.”50

However, women run into more trouble attaining virtue than men in his picture. Given how amour-propre operates and Rousseau’s idea that, in society, men “ought to be active and strong,” ​ 51 this leads women into the role of the “passive and weak”52 causing them to rely on their charms to constrain men. From these unequal societal roles comes about most of his sexism.

However, because men and women are structured in the same way morally, most of his sexism is not problematic for virtue. This is important to consider when investigating virtue, because if men and women were morally different, it may well be difficult to extricate Rousseau’s sexism from his conception of virtue. If Rousseau had a terribly sexist conception of virtue, then it would not be particularly useful or interesting to examine. This slight aside is by no means a full account of Rousseau’s sexism and there are far better accounts already in the secondary literature.53

49 Emile 235 ​ ​ 50 Emile 357 ​ ​ 51 Emile 358 ​ ​ 52 Emile 358 ​ ​ 53 See Lange, Lynda. Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Larrère, Catherine. “Jean-Jacques ​ ​ Rousseau on Women and Citizenship”, Schmidt, Claudia M., and John H. Zammito. “Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology”, and Thomas, Paul. “Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Sexist?” Weinstein 15

Now, one can see a thick conception of virtue forming for Rousseau. First, one can obviously tell that virtue is not some kind of abstract notion found only through reason, or a kind of understanding. It is taught not by name, but by taste, which is importantly sentimental.

Conscience plays an important role and appears foundational. Virtue is not simply goodness, but goodness that is proven through a strength of will over the temptation of vice. Virtue is placed in the heart, and as such is placed with sentiment. So, because virtue is a kind of goodness and is ​ placed within the heart, it is dependent on sentiment, and virtue is concerned with reason because reason is a guide alongside conscience for the virtuous person, and reason teaches one the notions of good and bad. Virtue is also concerned with conscience because conscience is man’s true guide, and the innate principle of justice and virtue. Conscience directs sentiment and reason to work in harmony to produce right action. Thus, one can again see virtue arises from sentiment, reason, and conscience. From all this, one can say that virtue is a harmonic disposition based in conscience that is developed through acting correctly with strength over temptation. By

‘harmonic disposition’ I simply mean that it is a kind of state that one acts from in a harmonious way, specifically denoting the harmony of reason and sentiment through conscience.

Some scholars of Rousseau may take issue with my putting forward of a sentimentally grounded conception of virtue with conscience at its heart. This is because there is a mistake in their interpretation, and this mistake is that they either ignore conscience, take conscience to be a rational thing, to be dependent on reason, or both. Neuhouser, for example, ignores Rousseau’s mentions of conscience and instead uses a kind of Freudian version of it.54 Dent even denies conscience’s place in formulating natural law and suggests reason does this, while Rousseau

54 Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy 247 ​ ​ Weinstein 16 specifically states reason cannot formulate natural law independent of conscience which I indicate above.55 Cassirer takes conscience as a kind of rational intuition instead of a sentiment developed with reason.56 However, I agree with most that reason is necessary to the development of conscience, but I think that, once developed, conscience is independent of reason in an important way. I take conscience to be independent of reason because Rousseau describes it being developed with reason, but afterwards operating independent of reason.57 One might think that conscience is rationally grounded, for, when Rousseau is describing the virtuous person, he states that “he follows his reason and his conscience.”58 One could take Rousseau to be repetitive and presume he is talking about the same thing in a roundabout way. However, I think Rousseau is instead differentiating conscience and reason further, for this is not the only time he does this.

Rousseau mentions conscience and reason together in his discussion of the right of slavery where he states “in spite of his conscience and his reason, which prescribe to him what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from doing” and in book IV of Emile he states “let us recall for the ​ ​ examination of conscience and reason all that they have taught us from our youth.”59 The virtuous person follows not only their conscience, but also their reason. This would further my view that conscience operates independently from reason. Another claim seems to fall out of these quotes, and that claim is that conscience and reason must be taken together to guide one to right action. I agree with this claim. However, there is one passage where one might think

Rousseau is describing that one can get virtue from reason, for he states that “[w]hile Socrates and minds of his stamp may be able to acquire virtue through reason, mankind would long ago

55 Dent, Rousseau 235 ​ ​ 56 Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 99 ​ ​ 57 See quote at footnote 42 where Rousseau states conscience is independent of reason 58 Emile 445 ​ ​ 59 Emile 304 ​ ​ Weinstein 17 have ceased to be if its preservation had depended solely on the reasonings of those who make it up.”60 I understand Rousseau to be describing a kind of genius, that very few people possess, which enables Socrates and those like him to obtain virtue in this way. So, maybe one can base virtue on reason if one is a genius, but I am not concerned with geniuses and how they obtain virtue. There is another mistaken idea in Rousseau scholarship, specifically that conscience can either be ‘well-formed’ or ‘malformed’ instead of simply being itself. Reisert, who takes conscience to be dependent on moral judgements and practical reasoning, puts forward a view such as this by giving a quote from Rousseau about a young man from the country who begins to live in the city.61 The mistake that Reisert makes is when Rousseau is describing the slow moral degradation of the young man where “his heart is still the same, but his opinions have changed.

His sentiments, slower to alter will eventually be spoiled by these opinions, and it is only then that he will be truly corrupted.”62 I take Reisert to mean that eventually even the young man’s conscience will change and remain silent when vice is embraced, but this is incorrect, for

Rousseau states “[c]onscience is timid; it likes refuge and peace. [...] the prejudices from which they claim it is born are its cruelest enemies. [...] Their noisy voices stifle its voice and prevent it from making itself heard. [...] It no longer speaks to us. It no longer responds to us.”63 It is not conscience that has changed, for conscience is the voice of nature,64 and what is natural is good for Rousseau. One may think just because conscience is natural does not mean that it is immutable, but Rousseau does state that he finds what I understand to be principles derived from

60 The Discourses 154 ​ ​ 61 Reisert, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Friend of Virtue 118-121 ​ ​ 62 Emile 330 ​ ​ 63 Emile 291 ​ ​ 64 The voice of nature is mentioned directly before conscience is introduced as the innate principle of justice in Emile 288-89 ​ Weinstein 18 conscience “written by nature with ineffaceable characters in the depth of my heart.”65 Since this young man’s conscience has not changed, because conscience cannot change, what has changed is the young man’s amour-propre. His amour-propre has become habituated with the bad ​ ​ ​ ​ opinions and prejudices of the city, causing conscience to show its timidity and becoming overwhelmed by his amour-propre. ​ ​ The relationship between amour-propre and virtue is a complicated one that will not be ​ ​ easy to illustrate. First, I will give a more in-depth explanation of what amour-propre is and how ​ ​ it functions. Second, I will attempt to illustrate in what way amour-propre is a source of virtue, ​ ​ or at least how the development of it gives rise to virtue. Third, I will consider the role amour-propre will play in the habituation of virtue. Last, I will judge whether or not properly ​ habituated amour-propre is necessary for the attainment of virtue. ​ ​ Amour-propre is the feeling of self-worth one has based on what one thinks others think ​ about oneself. In contrast to amour de soi, amour-propre is directed outside oneself and is “an ​ ​ ​ ​ inherently social passion.”66 It is also, similar to amour de soi and pity, a force of motivation, as ​ ​ ​ ​ Neuhouser describes “amour-propre forms part of his [Rousseau’s] psychological theory of the ​ ​ fundamental motivators of human action.”67 It can take three different forms, negative, neutral, and virtuous. Negative amour-propre leads one to dominate the other for one’s happiness, or as ​ ​ Rousseau says “which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else” 68 and early on in Emile he links amour-propre with “pride, the spirit of domination, [...] ​ ​ ​ ​ [and] the wickedness of man.”69 Negative amour-propre, Neuhouser describes it as “inflamed ​ ​

65 Emile 286 ​ ​ 66 Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy 38 ​ ​ 67 Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy 45 ​ ​ 68 The Discourses 218 note XV ​ ​ 69 Emile 67 ​ ​ Weinstein 19 amour-propre,” is the species of amour-propre that Rousseau has in mind when he describes ​ ​ ​ amour-propre as a thing that “inspires men with all the evils they do one another.”70 Neuhouser ​ describes at least five types of inflamed amour-propre that “tends to produce one or more of the ​ ​ human evils thematized in the Second Discourse,”71 but for my purposes I will simply describe all of these forms under the name ‘negative amour-propre.’ I’m not particularly concerned with ​ ​ the manifestations of negative amour-propre, for I only need to understand it as an obstacle to ​ ​ virtue or a pitfall leading to vice. Negative amour-propre inures one against the voice of ​ ​ ​ conscience making one unable to heed the guidance of conscience through producing prejudices and opinions, for “[c]onscience is timid; it likes refuge and peace. The world and noise scare it; the prejudices from which they claim it is born are its cruelest enemies. It flees or keeps quiet before them. Their noisy voices stifle its voice and prevent it from making itself heard.”72

However, there are other sentiments that aid one in heeding the voice of conscience such as pity, and it is with the aid of these other sentiments that virtuous amour-propre is produced. An ​ ​ ​ example of a negative amour-propre relation would be when Emile is understanding his ​ ​ self-worth as relative to that of others, and having pride in being superior to them, as when

Rousseau describes Emile saying “[h]e will say to himself, ‘I am wise, and men are mad.’ [...]

[I]n congratulating himself, he will esteem himself more, and in feeling himself to be happier than them, he will believe himself worthier to be so. This is the error most to be feared, because it is the most difficult to destroy.”73 As in this passage, negative amour-propre is incredibly ​ ​

70 The Discourses 218 note XV ​ ​ ​ ​ 71 Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy 90 ​ ​ 72 Emile 291 ​ ​ 73 Emile 245 ​ ​ Weinstein 20 difficult to change because one who has it thinks themselves above others and beyond reproach, but in reality they rely on the opinions of others more so than any other.

Neutral amour-propre is where one simply does not use it to one’s benefit or one’s ​ ​ detriment and one does not obtain one’s happiness from it, as that would be a detrimental use of it. This neutrality seems like the kind of neutrality of a tool, for Rousseau says that “since

[amour-propre] has no necessary relation to others, it is in this respect naturally neutral. It ​ ​ becomes good or bad only by the application made of it and the relations given to it.”74 Given that right before this quote Rousseau also states that “[t]he sole passion natural to man is amour ​ de soi or amour-propre taken in an extended sense,” I take this neutral amour-propre to be very ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ closely tied to amour de soi as “the guide of amour-propre, which is reason,” has yet to have ​ ​ ​ ​ been born, so it is still underdeveloped, and lacking an object, in an interesting way.75 Even though amour de soi is naturally good, this neutral amour propre remains neutral until it gains an ​ ​ ​ ​ object due to its nature as an extended sentiment. This neutral amour-propre is a kind of natal ​ ​ state that will quickly, in any sociable environment, become either negative or virtuous amour-propre, so it is, to some extent, the prepubescent state of this social sentiment that will ​ change once reason is properly developed enough to guide it. However, I do take it to be possible that, in incredible asocial situations, neutral amour-propre can remain as it is. This neutral ​ ​ amour-propre is as close as a civilized person can get to Rousseau’s natural man who lacks any ​ amour-propre. ​ Virtuous amour-propre is when amour-propre is aiding amour de soi to pursue one’s ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ happiness through a generalized love of others, for Rousseau states “[l]et us extend

74 Emile 92 ​ ​ 75 Emile 92 ​ ​ Weinstein 21 amour-propre to other beings. We shall transform it into a virtue, and there is no man’s heart in ​ which this virtue does not have its root. The less the object of our care is immediately involved with us, the less the illusion of particular interest is to be feared. The more one generalizes this interest, the more it becomes equitable, and the love of mankind is nothing other than the love of justice.”76 Another discussion of this virtuous amour-propre states that “[t]his spirit of peace is ​ ​ an effect of his education which, not having fomented amour-propre and a high opinion of ​ ​ himself, has diverted him from seeking his pleasures in domination and in another’s unhappiness. He suffers when he sees suffering. It is a natural sentiment.”77 This is a kind of comparison between virtuous amour-propre and its negative form. Negative amour-propre has ​ ​ ​ ​ one seek to dominate the other into unhappiness and gain one’s happiness in that manner, while virtuous amour-propre is peaceful and harmonious, and is more concerned with sentiment. The ​ ​ one who possesses virtuous amour-propre sees those who are unhappy not “[having] that only ​ ​ that sterile and cruel pity for them which is satisfied with pitying ills it can cure” instead “if he sees discord reigning among his comrades, he seeks to reconcile them; if he sees men afflicted, he informs himself as to the subject of their suffering; if he sees two men who hate each other, he wants to know the cause of their enmity [...] and, with the interest he takes in all men who are miserable, the means of ending their ills are never indifferent to him.”78 Here virtuous amour-propre is a motivating power for virtuous actions and motivates one to care for all those ​ who suffer. Unlike amour de soi and pity, “Amour propre is only a relative sentiment” and “in ​ ​ the genuine state of nature, Amour propre does not exist.”79 Though amour-propre is not a ​ ​

76 Emile 252 ​ ​ 77 Emile 251 ​ ​ 78 Emile 251 ​ ​ 79 The Discourses 218 note XV ​ Weinstein 22 natural sentiment, it is very important to understand the role amour-propre plays in Rousseau’s ​ ​ moral philosophy, as the main concerns of moral education are to stave off the development of negative amour-propre and habituate virtuous amour-propre. ​ ​ ​ ​ Amour-propre is the source of both virtue and vice, which may seem strange, as one may ​ expect amour de soi to be the source of virtue. Amour-propre is the source of vice because it is ​ ​ ​ ​ “born in society and [...] inspires men with all the evils they do one another.”80 Rousseau’s story of societal corruption is primarily concerned with the corrupting influence of amour-propre upon ​ ​ individuals in society which leads them to dominate one another in pursuit of their happiness.

The relationship one has with the other through amour-propre is a reciprocal relation wherein the ​ ​ amour-propre of both parties is dependent upon both parties’ opinions of one another which gets ​ complicated very quickly.81 An example of this is the scene of the birth of amour-propre in the ​ ​ Second Discourse when “[e]veryone began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a price.”82 In an important, and previously quoted, note to the Second Discourse Rousseau describes virtue as produced by amour de soi.83 This may seem ​ ​ ​ ​ contradictory because amour-propre is supposed to be the source of both virtue and vice, but ​ ​ amour de soi certainly plays an important role in the development of virtue, and as such does ​ produce virtue, but it does not produce virtue through itself alone. The reason why one shouldn’t take amour de soi as the sole source of virtue for Rousseau is because Rousseau states that ​ ​ “[v]irtue belongs only to a being that is weak by nature and strong by will.”84 In this quote,

80 The Discourses 218 note XV ​ ​ ​ ​ 81 This reciprocal relation is most easy to understand when considering two persons and their respective amour-propre intermingling as they interact with one another. ​ 82 The Discourses 166 ​ ​ 83 The Discourses 218 note XV ​ ​ ​ ​ 84 Emile 444 ​ ​ Weinstein 23

Rousseau means that being exposed to and conquering vice is an important part of being virtuous, for without vice one is simply good. Amour de soi is a part of humanity’s nature, and so ​ ​ virtue would not come about solely through humanity’s nature given that it is only through weakness of nature and strength of will that virtue is produced. If it were the case that nature solely brought about virtue, humanity would be good rather than virtuous, because being virtuous requires struggle. Given that amour-propre is the source of vice, and vice is necessary ​ ​ to produce virtue, then amour-propre is necessary for the production of virtue. ​ ​ It is important to understand the problem of amour-propre before one gets to how it can ​ ​ produce, or aid in the production of, virtue. Amour-propre, often translated as vanity, is the ​ ​ reason societies are terrible places of social domination for Rousseau.85 This vanity or pride is the reason why people compete and attempt to outdo their peers, so as to appear greater in the eyes of their peers, or amour-propre can also be described “as a yearning to be recognized as ​ ​ better than others.”86 This negative comparison is best understood through Rousseau’s discussion ​ of benevolence in Emile. Rousseau describes a child whose amour-propre has just awakened, ​ ​ ​ ​ and “the child becomes imperious, jealous, deceitful and vindictive. If he [the child] is bent to obedience, he does not see the utility of what he is ordered, and he attributes it to caprice, to the intention of tormenting him; and he revolts. If he is obeyed, as soon as something resists him, he sees in it a rebellion, an intention to resist him. [...] Self-love [amour de soi], which regards only ​ ​ ourselves, is contented when our true needs are satisfied. But amour-propre, which makes ​ ​ comparisons, is never content and never could be, because this sentiment, preferring ourselves to others, also demands others to prefer us to themselves, which is impossible.”87 This ​

85 The Discourses 218 note XV ​ ​ ​ ​ 86 Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy 58 ​ ​ 87 Emile 213-4 ​ ​ Weinstein 24 characterization of amour-propre is of the kind I describe as negative, is the source of “hateful ​ ​ and irascible passions” and further described as “what makes [one] essentially wicked is to have many needs and to depend very much on opinion.”88 This discussion is just before Rousseau describes the virtue of benevolence which one is “naturally inclined to” and which comes up as

“he extends his relations, his needs, and his active or passive dependencies” which in turn causes

“the sentiment of his connections with others [to become] awakened.”89 There is thus a tension between benevolence and amour-propre because amour-propre is this sentiment of connection. ​ ​ ​ ​ This is because amour-propre is often domineering and causes one to desire to dominant others, ​ ​ but benevolence is directed at the aiding and flourishing of others. Amour-propre was developed ​ ​ alongside human society, and outside of human society there is no vice, so there is no virtue.

This is the simple way amour-propre is the source of virtue and vice. There is a more ​ ​ complicated way that amour-propre gives rise to virtue, and that is through proper habituation of ​ ​ amour-propre to help resist vice and promote virtue in an individual. ​ Amour-propre does not only provide hurdles over which one must jump to become ​ virtuous. Amour-propre can be used to become virtuous as well. Rousseau states that “we shall ​ ​ transform [amour-propre] into a virtue, and there is no man’s heart in which this virtue does not ​ ​ have its root.”90 What this ‘root’ is is left uncertain, and I take it to either be amour-propre itself ​ ​ or conscience. This transformation of amour-propre into a virtue is a generalization of it to the ​ ​ entirety of humanity as Rousseau describes. Through this generalization it becomes a love of humanity, and “the love of mankind is nothing other than the love of justice.”91 Rousseau then

88 Emile 214 ​ ​ 89 Emile 213 ​ ​ 90 Emile 252 ​ ​ 91 Emile 252 ​ ​ Weinstein 25 goes on to hook pity into his conception of justice, stating that “to prevent pity from degenerating into weakness, it must, therefore be generalized and extended to the whole of mankind. Then one yields to it only insofar as it accords with justice” and incorporating amour-propre and sentiment together through justice.92 This acts as justice through separating ​ oneself from particular interest, and having the highest interest in the general happiness of all rather than in individual happiness. This virtuous amour-propre is then a force that, through a ​ ​ concern for others or justice, aids in reinforcing conscience’s voice rather than drowning it out like negative amour-propre. Also, I take this virtuous amour-propre to be the resolution of the ​ ​ ​ ​ tension between benevolence and amour-propre mentioned previously. In a true paradoxical ​ ​ Rousseau fashion, the source of all vice can be turned into a force for the attainment and maintenance of virtue.

A question that is worth considering is whether or not virtuous amour-propre is ​ ​ necessary for the attainment of virtue. Due to the necessary part that the voice of conscience plays in attainment of virtue, I take it to be the case that one cannot be both virtuous and beset by a negative amour-propre, for negative amour-propre would make it impossible to properly allow ​ ​ ​ ​ conscience to be a guide and reason would lead one astray without conscience. The more likely candidate is neutral amour-propre. However, as described above, neutral amour-propre will ​ ​ ​ ​ become either virtuous or negative in any social context93 if reason is developed enough to guide it. This leaves virtuous amour-propre. Virtuous amour-propre is necessary for the attainment of ​ ​ ​ ​ virtue, for the virtuous person will, in virtue of being the virtuous person, be better than those who have yet to attain virtue, and virtuous amour-propre is necessary in order for one to be able ​ ​

92 Emile 253 ​ ​ 93 Whether neutral amour-propre becomes virtuous or negative depends importantly on the raising of the person. ​ ​ Weinstein 26 to lower oneself to others and see their perspectives to treat them justly. Rousseau describes this by stating that “a man who is superior to others and, unable to raise them to his level, is capable of lowering himself to theirs! The true principles of the just, the true models of the beautiful, all the moral relations of beings, all the ideas of order are imprinted on his understanding. He sees the place of each thing and the cause which removes it from its place; he sees what can do good and what stands in its way.”94 Here virtuous amour-propre is a power for understanding things in ​ ​ relation to oneself, and being able to identify the correct place for each thing, what be used for good, and what needs to be avoided in the pursuit of goodness. This leads some credence to the idea that the ‘root’ of virtuous amour-propre is conscience, for it appears that the things one does ​ ​ with virtuous amour-propre are similar to the powers of conscience, or at the very least both ​ ​ conscience and virtuous amour-propre are rooted in the moral sentiments of amour de soi and ​ ​ ​ ​ pity. Virtuous amour-propre also is a power for motivation that is necessary for promoting the ​ ​ doing of virtuous action.

Rousseau scholars like Neuhouser would take issue with a few of my claims in this section. First, they would argue that my dismissal of inflamed amour-propre into a single kind is ​ ​ an oversimplification, and to some extent I agree. However, it is not within the scope of this paper to go into the tragic depths of inflamed amour-propre. Second, these scholars would take ​ ​ issue of my concern with conscience and how it interacts with amour-propre in all of its forms. ​ ​ When Neuhouser discusses the correct form of amour-propre, which I call virtuous, he discusses ​ ​ “the standpoint of reason” and “what role amour-propre might play in making it possible for ​ ​ human beings to adopt such a standpoint”95 rather than talking about conscience. Neuhouser does

94 Emile 253 ​ ​ 95 Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy 218 ​ ​ Weinstein 27 not bother with conscience because he is concerned with how “sentiments must be guided by reason if they are to be reliable producers of right actions”96 and how pity must be “subordinated to abstract ideas, which only reason can supply,”97 instead of how conscience is a guide to right action. I have already described Rousseau’s concern with abstract ideas,98 but I think it is a mistake to ignore conscience and instead focus on reason as both conscience and reason ought to be considered together as working in concert to guide one to right action. Rousseau also thinks this, for he states that “his conscience and his reason [...] prescribe to him what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from doing.”99 My analysis works with Rousseau’s conception of conscience and draws interesting conclusions that fit well with the textual evidence, while

Neuhouser’s account must abandon Rousseau’s conception of conscience and adopt a more

Freudian approach to conscience for it to make sense. This seems to clearly be an advantage of my view. Another scholar, Melzer, claims that conscience is a kind of falsehood intended only as an aid to the audience, or Emile, in grasping morality.100 If this is the case, conscience becomes useless and my understanding would be in serious trouble, but I consider this kind of hardline suspicion of Rousseau to be not only useless, but also harmful for proper scholarship of

Rousseau. Some suspicious can be considered as fine or even warranted, but conscience is so thoroughly enmeshed in his theory of morality that its useless without it.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle lays out an understanding of how to live well ​ ​ through the cultivation of virtue, and throughout this paper, I have attempted to illustrate what virtue is for Rousseau, and what the cultivation of virtue is for him. In this last section, I will

96 Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy 222 ​ ​ 97 Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy 222 ​ ​ 98 See footnote 14 99 Emile 460 ​ ​ 100 Melzer, “The Origin of Counter-Enlightenment: Rousseau and the New Religion of Sincerity” Weinstein 28 show the similarities between the two, their common goal, the differences between them. First, I will compare their notions of virtue and the virtuous person. Second, I will compare their methods of virtue cultivation, Third, I will compare their respective foundations of virtue.

Fourth, I will discuss why these two philosophers might have similar ideas, and what this might say about virtue. Last, I will offer some criticisms from scholars of Rousseau who may take issue with my conception of virtue and habituation. It is important to note I am using a basic conception of Aristotle here only as a foil for Rousseau’s conception. I am seeking a better understanding of Rousseau through this comparison, not a full account of each theory and what the similarities and differences entail.

For Rousseau, based on all the discussion so far, a virtue is a harmonic disposition based in conscience that is developed through acting correctly with strength over temptation or vice. I say based in conscience again because conscience is the “innate principle of justice and virtue”101 and Rousseau specifically states that “we are tempted by the passions and restrained by conscience.”102 The harmonic disposition part is meant to evoke the relationship between reason and sentiment which gives rise to virtue. It is only when there is peace and harmony between reason and sentiment that virtue may arise. For Aristotle, we get something similar as he states that “[v]irtue, then, is a deliberately choosing state, which is in a medial condition in relation to us, one defined by a reason and the one by which a practically-wise person would define it.”103

Another way to put this ‘medial condition in relation to us’ phrase is that virtue is the, not necessarily arithmetical, mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency, and the virtue must be specific to a person, as the appropriate consumption of food differs on the

101 Emile 289 ​ ​ 102 Emile 281 103 ​ ​ b Nicomachean Ethics 28 (1106 3​ 5) ​ ​ ​ Weinstein 29 constitution of the person. Though Rousseau may disagree with the idea that virtues are relative in this specifically personal manner, instead the virtues would most likely take different roles and forms given different contexts. Rousseau certainly does not think that one could listen to conscience too much, so there is a kind of difference with regard to the medial condition of virtue. Unless this appears as being too sentimental and ignoring reason, but conscience is not purely sentimental in this way because it is developed from reason. This example may work with pity or amour de soi, but not conscience. Both Rousseau and Aristotle consider virtue to be a ​ ​ kind of disposition or state that one acts from, but there is a difference in that Rousseau bases his on conscience whereas Aristotle bases his on a specific reason chosen by the practically-wise person, i.e. the virtuous person, and adds in the relational medial condition bit. However,

Aristotle does recognize the importance of emotion in becoming virtuous, for he states that

“virtue of character seems in many ways to be intimately attached to feelings.”104 Although

Aristotle also describes the soul as having “something besides reason, countering it and going against it” which may appear to be the emotions when improperly habituated.105 This latter sentiment that counters reason would go well with Rousseau’s understanding of amour-propre ​ and its typical role in leading one astray from the voice of conscience. One could also see the tension between amour-propre and benevolence as an example of this, for one is naturally ​ ​ inclined towards benevolence, but amour-propre causes one to desire to dominate others which ​ ​ seems counter to benevolence. One can also see this with conscience and amour-propre when ​ ​ conscience shows its timidity and the prejudices of amour-propre cause it to go unheard. What I ​ ​ want to stress here is that while their accounts certainly differ, both Rousseau and Aristotle have

104 a Nicomachean Ethics 188 (1178 1​ 5) 105 ​ ​ b ​ Nicomachean Ethics 20 (1102 2​ 0) ​ ​ ​ Weinstein 30 strong similarities that resonate together to reinforce the idea that they have the same project, or that they are describing the same phenomena. I will further this claim throughout my comparison

Rousseau defined his conception of the virtuous person as “he who knows how to ​ conquer his affections; for then he follows his reason and his conscience; he does his duty; he keeps himself in order, and nothing can make him deviate from it.”106 One ought to consider that ​ Rousseau takes conscience not only to be a guide to right action, but to be an unerring guide as well. Aristotle takes the virtuous person to be the practically-wise person, for a practically-wise ​ person is “able to deliberate correctly about what is good and advantageous for himself, not partially [...] but about what sorts of things further living well as a whole.”107 Not only this, but

Aristotle also states that “they [the virtues] [do] not exist without practical wisdom.”108 This ​ virtuous person possesses all the virtues and has this excellence of deliberation, which is a kind of thinking concerned with action. Deliberation for Aristotle is a kind of action-oriented decision-making involving “reason and thought.”109 Being able to deliberate well and stably is what practical wisdom is, and this is pretty different from Rousseau. Rousseau doesn’t discuss deliberation, and instead he discusses how conscience is always right and one simply needs to listen to it. For Rousseau, people already have a stably correct guide to action, but the difficult is not drowning out its voice through negative amour-propre. Aristotle and Rousseau both consider ​ ​ the virtues to be importantly connected, for Aristotle it is practical wisdom that connects the virtues, and Rousseau, at one point, states that “[v]irtue is one, as one of my adversaries has very well said. One cannot split virtue up to accept one part and reject another.”110 Both conceptions

106 Emile 445 107 ​ ​ a Nicomachean Ethics 101 (1140 2​ 5) 108 ​ ​ b​ Nicomachean Ethics 111 (1144 2​ 0) 109 ​ ​ a ​ Nicomachean Ethics 40 (1112 1​ 5) ​ ​ ​ 110 Emile 385 ​ ​ Weinstein 31 of the virtuous person have reason has a guide, though Rousseau adds his sentiment of conscience as a guide in addition to reason. This addition of conscience is a great aid for

Rousseau because when reason errs conscience can pick up the slack, but one may ask what happens if they are in conflict. Given that Rousseau describes conscience as “man’s true guide” it seems straightforward that if there is ever a conflict of reason and conscience, conscience wins.

This does not mean reason is useless, for reason is very useful in determining how to go about enacting what the voice of conscience dictates. Both conceptions also consider virtue has a state of harmony with sentiment and reason, for Aristotle claims that in the virtuous person the non rational part of the soul “chimes with reason in everything.”111 Rousseau’s understanding of the harmony between reason and sentiment through virtue is discussed in the first section. Rousseau and Aristotle arrive at a similar conception of the virtuous person except Aristotle’s picture is a little more reason-based, while Rousseau’s picture has more emphasis on sentiment though reason is still importantly present. These accounts are similar in that they both conceive of a person possessing a kind of united disposition that enables harmonious right action in a stable fashion. Also, Rousseau’s virtuous person seems more human than Aristotle’s. Aristotle’s ​ virtuous person has an almost godlike understanding, but Rousseau’s virtuous person has a more human understanding. In order to never err, Aristotle needs his virtuous person to have this godlike understanding, but Rousseau only needs his virtuous person to heed the voice of conscience alongside the guidance of reason. This does not mean that Rousseau’s conception is somehow easier to achieve than Aristotle’s, only that is seems more human. One can question

Rousseau’s virtuous person about the reason for which they performed an action, and the answer

111 b Nicomachean Ethics 20 (1103 2​ 5) ​ ​ ​ Weinstein 32 can simply be ‘because it felt right’ or ‘because that is what conscience bade me to do.’ This sounds closer to what it is to be a normal person than Aristotle’s virtuous person who always understands their actions and can give very specific accounts of why they perform them. This more human consequence of Rousseau’s view seems to me to be an advantage, though some may claim it as the opposite. This seems like an advantage to me because the end result is recognizably human, with human faculties and a deep connection with human nature. Aristotle’s virtuous person seems to possess such an incredible understanding that it becomes almost godlike in knowledge.

The cultivation of virtue for both Rousseau and Aristotle is a story of habituation. This is not surprising, for both consider that, from human nature, people are naturally inclined towards virtue. For Rousseau, until amour-propre came into the picture, human nature was good and ​ ​ founded upon the sentiments of amour de soi and pity. Rousseau states this clearly when he ​ ​ describes pity by stating that “in this [n]atural sentiment [...] that one has to seek the cause of the repugnance to evil-doing”112 and when he describes amour de soi as “a natural sentiment which ​ ​ inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation and which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue.”113 Rousseau states that this goodness is “an incontestable maxim” and “that the first movements of nature are always right. There is no original perversity in the human heart.”114 Virtue is natural to humanity, for “[i]f he [humanity] were made to do harm to his kind, as a wolf is made to slaughter his prey, a humane man would be an animal as depraved as a pitying wolf, and only virtue would leave us with remorse.”115 I

112 The Discourses 154 ​ ​ 113 The Discourses 218 note XV ​ ​ ​ ​ 114 Emile 92 ​ ​ 115 Emile 287 ​ ​ Weinstein 33 take this natural inclination to be why Rousseau claims that “[n]othing is more lovable than virtue.”116 Conscience is also very important to Rousseau’s understanding of habituation because of its role as a guide to right action, for Rousseau states that “conscience never deceives; it is man’s true guide. It is to the soul what instinct is to the body; he who follows conscience obeys nature and does not fear being led astray.”117 Aristotle is a bit more straightforward, as he claims that “the virtues come about in us neither by nature nor against nature, rather we are naturally receptive of them and are brought to completion through habit.118 Aristotle also states that “we are in fact just, disposed to temperance, courageous, and the rest straight from birth.”119 So the story of habituation comes first from a place of natural inclination from both Aristotle and

Rousseau.

This may seem strange, as most people are not virtuous, some say no one is, and yet everyone is naturally inclined to be virtuous. To clear up this confusion, Rousseau tells his story of negative amour-propre that is described in the section above, and Aristotle blames bad ​ ​ upbringing and the general difficulty of achieving virtue, for “it makes no small difference whether people are habituated in one way or in another way straight from childhood; on the contrary, it makes a huge one– or rather, all the difference.”120 Aristotle also claims that “virtue ​ ​ [is] always concerned with what is more difficult, since to do well what is more difficult is in fact a better thing”121 and “it is possible to err in many ways [...] whereas there is only one way to be correct. That is why erring is easy and being correct difficult, since it is easy to miss the target

116 Emile 291 ​ ​ 117 Emile 286-7 118 ​ ​ a Nicomachean Ethics 21 (1103 2​ 0) 119 ​ ​ ​ b Nicomachean Ethics 111 (1144 5​ ) 120 ​ ​ a ​ Nicomachean Ethics 22 (1104 2​ 0) 121 ​ ​ b​ Nicomachean Ethics 25 (1105 5​ ) ​ ​ ​ Weinstein 34 but difficult to hit it.”122 Rousseau also considers bad upbringing as being incredibly bad for one’s chances of becoming virtuous as he states that “the first education ought to be purely negative. It consists not at all in teaching virtue or truth but in securing the heart from vice and the mind from error.”123 Since the first step of an education is that of protection from vice, if one is infected with vice early, it will be very bad for one’s chances in attaining virtue.

With these things in mind, Rousseau follows Aristotle in believing that only through performing virtuous action can one become virtuous. He states that “[i]t is in doing good that one becomes good; I know of no practice more certain.”124 This is very similar to Aristotle, for he states that “it is correct to say that a person comes to be just from doing just actions, and temperate from doing temperate ones, and that from not doing them no one could have even the prospect of becoming good.”125 Performing right action slowly habituates oneself into becoming virtuous, though it is not simply the action that is important for either Rousseau or Aristotle.

Both Rousseau and Aristotle require the action to be coming from the right intention. Rousseau states it quite simply by saying that “no good action is morally good except when it is done because it is good”126 and Aristotle states that “[t]he things that come about in accord with the virtues, by contrast, are done justly or temperately not simply if they are in a certain state but if the one who does them is also in a certain state. First, if he does them knowingly; second, if he deliberately chooses them and deliberately chooses them because of themselves; and third, if he does them from a stable and unchangeable state.”127 One only performs virtuous action if one

122 a Nicomachean Ethics 28 (1107 3​ 0) ​ ​ ​ 123 Emile 93 ​ ​ 124 Emile 250 125 ​ ​ a Nicomachean Ethics 26 (1106 1​ 0) ​ ​ ​ 126 Emile 104 127 ​ ​ b Nicomachean Ethics 25 (1105 3​ 0) ​ ​ ​ Weinstein 35 does it well with the right intentions on both accounts. However, there is an interesting difference between Aristotle and Rousseau with regard to the habituation of virtue, and that is how Rousseau describes it being taught. As described before, it is a matter of ‘tasting’ rather than

‘naming.’ I take Aristotle’s habituation to be building a kind of understanding that develops into the state of virtue, while Rousseau’s habituation builds up a kind of feeling, or the ability to recognize a feeling such as conscience, rather than an understanding.

Given that habituation trains one to be virtuous, it may not come as a surprise to find out that habituation is also how one becomes vicious. Aristotle’s account of this is straightforward,

“since some people become temperate and mild-mannered, whereas others become intemperate and irascible– the one group from conducting themselves in one wau in such circumstances, the other from doing so in another way. In a word, then, states come about from activities that are similar to them.”128 Rousseau’s account is a little more mysterious, as it relates to the growth of amour-propre and conscience, for “[c]onscience is timid; it likes refuge and peace. [...] the ​ prejudices from which they claim it is born are its cruelest enemies. [...] Their noisy voices stifle its voice and prevent it from making itself heard. [...] It no longer speaks to us. It no longer responds to us.”129 As opinion and prejudice take hold of a person, they drive away conscience, and it can no longer guide one to right action, and it is through the improper habituation of amour-propre that causes the opinions and prejudice to take hold. Going back to the first section ​ with its discussion of Rousseau and teaching virtue, one can seen that this kind of teaching is habituation under another name. An advantage that Rousseau’s account holds over Aristotle is that Rousseau develops a rich account of motivation through virtuous amour-propre while ​ ​

128 a Nicomachean Ethics 22 (1104 2​ 0) ​ ​ ​ 129 Emile 291 ​ ​ Weinstein 36

Aristotle does not have similar account of motivation. Virtuous amour-propre as a power to ​ ​ motivate is discussed in section two, and Aristotle’s conception of motivation seems to be mostly concerned with pleasure, pain, and the more abstract desire for happiness or the good. So both

Aristotle and Rousseau are concerned with habituation when it comes to the cultivation of virtue, and not only habituation through right action. They are both also concerned with the state of character from which one acts; Aristotle with his regard to virtue as a state and Rousseau with conscience. They both also agree that, due to human nature, one is naturally inclined to virtue.

This thought that humanity has a natural inclination towards virtue, as previously discussed, is based upon Rousseau and Aristotle’s conceptions of human nature, and from this view of human nature one can find both Aristotle and Rousseau’s conceptions of the foundation of virtue. For Aristotle, it is often said that humans are rational, or political, animals, and for

Rousseau humans are a kind of feeling thing which possesses reason. Aristotle doesn’t see the emotions as being wholly nonrational, for they come from a part of the soul that is non rational but “also has a share of reason [...] because it is able to listen to reason and obey it. [...] If we should say that it too has reason, however, then the part that has reason will be double as well–one part having it fully and within itself, the other as something able to listen to it as to a father.”130 This reasonability of the emotions is further substantiated by Aristotle’s discussion of mild-mannerness, the virtue of feeling anger, where he states “being mild-mannered means being calm and not being led by feelings but displaying anger in the way, about the things, and for the length of time that the reason prescribes.”131 This seems to describe being angry in the right way as coming from a place of understanding, rather than a habituation of the feeling itself. Reason is

130 b a Nicomachean Ethics 20 (1102 -​ 3 )​ 131 ​ ​ b​ ​ Nicomachean Ethics 70 (1126 3​ 5) ​ ​ ​ Weinstein 37 dictating the virtuous circumstances and the emotion is listening to it as a child to a parent. This is to say that, given Aristotle’s view concerning the rationality of humanity, virtue is founded upon a proper understanding of action, circumstance, and deliberation, which is why the one who possesses virtue is also the one who possesses practical wisdom. Rousseau, on the other hand, has a different view of the foundation of virtue because of his view that humans are feeling beings more so than thinking beings. There is no grand unifying kind of wisdom, this role is instead taken up by the sentiment of conscience. In an important footnote describing the foundation of morality, Rousseau states that “when the strength of an expansive soul makes me identify myself with my fellow, and I feel that I am, so to speak, in him, it is in order not to suffer that I do not want him to suffer. I am interested in him for love of myself, and the reason for the precept is in nature itself, which inspires in me the desire of my well-being in whatever place I feel my existence.”132 From these quotes, one can tell that Rousseau is concerned with what one feels and its harmony with human nature rather than deliberating or having a proper understanding of actions or circumstances. This is the greatest difference between Aristotle and

Rousseau. Aristotle’s foundation of virtue on understanding and reason, and Rousseau’s foundation of virtue on feeling and nature could not be anymore different. However, from these two radically different starting points they both proceed in similar ways and arrive at similar conclusions, for the most part.

To explain this, one can easily appeal to the idea that Rousseau had read Aristotle, which

I am not arguing against, and took what he thought to be good out of Aristotle’s view and ran with it. However, this is uninteresting, and more importantly, I think this is wrong. Rousseau’s

132 Emile 235 ​ ​ Weinstein 38 take on habituation, for example, is similar to Aristotle’s take in how one must perform virtuous action with virtuous intent in order to become virtuous, but otherwise it is quite different. This habituation by tasting, as described with children, is better described as a habituation through feeling. It is listening to the voice of conscience and allowing that to guide one’s action with reason and understanding as conscience’s aides, rather than attempting to trust one’s reason alone. This difference in kinds of habituation naturally develops out of the differences in the foundation of virtue. It is because Rousseau founds virtue through conscience that conscience does the developing of virtue, and it is because Aristotle founds virtue through reason and understanding that habituation as a kind of understanding leads to the development of virtue.

Rousseau and Aristotle certainly have both their differences and similarities with regard to their theories of virtue. All of the important differences can be traced back to their different foundations of virtue. The important similarities speak to the nature of virtue as a carefully crafted disposition one acts from, always involving actions, intentions, and a slow continuous habituation to establish and maintain it.

Scholars of Rousseau, such as Neuhouser or Dent, may take issue with my definition of virtue, and how I understand habituation for Rousseau as a sentimental ‘tasting.’ Specifically, they might take issue with how I did not mention reason explicitly in the definition. Neuhouser comes at Rousseau from a kind of Kantian perspective, concerned with rational duties, and this idea of virtue would not be at all compatible with his account. Dent, with his founding of natural law through reason, would fall into similar compatibility problems that Neuhouser suffers, but to a lesser extent. Obviously reason has its place in my conception of virtue for Rousseau, and not only its role in the development of conscience. When I stated that one must perform action Weinstein 39 correctly I meant that one must perform action as reason and conscience prescribe one ought to. ​ This role of reason is as a guide to right action alongside conscience, for most of reason’s role is the formation of conscience and the notions of good and bad which are already accomplished in mature persons. Scholars such as Neuhouser may take issue with conscience being the foundation of virtue instead of some abstract rational principle such as the ‘standpoint of reason,’ but I already addressed such concerns about conscience in the first section. Scholars of

Rousseau, such as Neuhouser or Reisert, may understand this sentimental habituation of

Rousseau’s to be instead a kind of habituation not of sentiment but of reason because of their more rationally-oriented views on conscience and morality in Rousseau. Even though Rousseau states one ought not teach the names of virtues to children, but instead teach them virtue through having them observe and perform right action, this may still be seen as them developing an understanding in the same way Aristotle sees it. However, even if this is the case, it changes the story of habituation to be more reason-focused, but reason is a part of action-guidance and so this is not incredibly crippling for my conception. The one defense I will offer is at another point where Rousseau talks about taste and virtue. When discussing women’s responsibilities with regard to their sex, Rousseau states “[h]ow much tenderness and care is required to maintain the union of the whole family! And, finally, all this must come not from virtues but from tastes, or else the human species would soon be extinguished.”133 I take this mention of ‘tastes’ instead of virtue means that virtues are difficult to develop and not many have them and sentiments are

‘tastes’ so all women would have them and be able to perform their duties accordingly. This passage could be interpreted as Rousseau claiming women cannot attain virtue, so they must rely

133 Emile 361 ​ ​ Weinstein 40 on taste or sentiment instead, but I find this interpretation to be a stretch without a lot of other textual evidence pointing to the idea that women can’t be virtuous in Rousseau’s sense, which I don’t think is there because he understands men and women to be morally structured in the same way.

Rousseau never explicitly defines his conception of virtue even though it is present throughout his philosophy. The purpose of my thesis has been to develop the idea that, for

Rousseau, virtue has its source in moral sentiments like conscience. To accomplish this, I have attempted to lay out a virtue-centered understanding of Rousseau’s major moral ideas. In order to do this, I set out with three goals. The first was to understand what Rousseau means by the term virtue, and what it is to be virtuous. This conception differed significantly from a typical reason-based conception of virtues as abstract concepts, for Rousseau seems to identify a virtue as a disposition based in conscience that is developed through acting correctly with strength over temptation or vice. The second was to explain the connection between amour-propre and virtue, ​ ​ ​ specifically with regard to the possibility that amour-propre could be used to properly habituate ​ ​ one towards virtue.Through this I identified three different kinds of amour-propre: negative, ​ ​ neutral, and virtuous. The third was to help illustrate the previous two goals through understanding them and understanding Rousseau’s philosophy in terms of virtue ethics i.e. making a comparison between Rousseau and a standard Aristotelian understanding of virtue ethics. I took this Aristotelian conception and contrasted it with what virtue looks like when originating from conscience. An interesting consequence of this view for Rousseau is that it has not only a great deal of textual support, but it also does not fall prey to conflicts within

Rousseau’s writings. Some views held by scholars have to pick and choose between some of his Weinstein 41 writings because they contradict said views, which seem to have the bad consequence of seeing

Rousseau as a kind of distrustful figure whose writings must be regarded with suspicion if the truth of the matter is to be sussed out. Also, it is refreshing to consider a view where virtue is not wholly concerned with reason, for nearly all accounts of virtue are only concerned with the ability for reason to master the non rational, or to habituate the non rational into following reason’s lead. This view finds itself at an interesting crossing point of neither sentiment nor reason taking full precedence in the picture, for the guide to right action is both reason and a sentiment developed from reason. Given the importance of sentiment and, of course, reason in everyday life, I understand the truth of virtue to be closer to an account that puts emphasis on both the rational and the non rational in somewhat equal measures, which seems to me an advantage of this view. Overall, this is most assuredly not the last word with regard to

Rousseau’s conception of virtue. However, I do feel as if I have offered a compelling account for why one might think that Rousseau founds virtue in conscience and how that works with his greater moral theory.

Weinstein 42

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