Weinstein 1 Carter Weinstein Thesis 04/10/19 Rousseau and Virtue In Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s moral philosophy there is no explicit mention of where the traditional virtues fall into play if they do at all. The purpose of my thesis is to argue that virtue has its source in Rousseau’s moral sentiments and, in support of this claim, to present a virtue-based interpretation of Rousseau’s moral philosophy as depicted in his work of Emile and ​ ​ with some supplementary support from the Second Discourse. This thesis has three primary objectives. The first is to understand what Rousseau means when he refers to virtues and what it is to be virtuous for Rousseau. This conception will be significantly different than a typically reason-based conception of virtues as abstract concepts, for I will argue that Rousseau takes virtue to have its foundation in the complex sentiment of conscience. The second is to explain the connection between amour-propre and virtue, specifically with regard to the possibility that ​ ​ amour-propre can be used to properly habituate one towards virtue. Rousseau takes ​ amour-propre to be the source of virtue and vice, and as such it is very important to explore this ​ relationship in this thesis. The third is to help illustrate the previous two goals through investigating Rousseau’s moral philosophy in terms of virtue ethics i.e. making a comparison between Rousseau and a standard Aristotelian understanding of virtue ethics. By claiming conscience as the foundation of virtue for Rousseau, I intend to illustrate how sentiment guides right action and habituation towards virtue, and contrast this with the common Aristotelian rationalistic model. At the end of each section I will address some possible concerns scholars of Weinstein 2 Rousseau may have about the work I am putting forward relative to each section. In conclusion, I will give a brief summary of Rousseauian virtue and also note some useful consequences of my view. I will begin by providing some definitions of commonly used terms in Rousseau’s philosophy. Some of the most important terms in Rousseau’s work are amour de soi, pity, ​ ​ ​ amour-propre, and conscience. ​ Amour de soi is a natural sentiment that is the inward directed love of one’s self. ​ Rousseau describes amour de soi as “a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to attend ​ ​ to its self-preservation and which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue.”1 It is the source of the “gentle and affectionate passions”2 and is “the sentiment of existence.”3 In his developed moral philosophy, Rousseau takes amour de soi as the ​ ​ basis of sentiments of care for self. Pity is a natural sentiment that gives one an innate repugnance to see other beings suffer which extends to other people and, to a lesser degree, non-human animals. Rousseau describes pity as “a disposition suited to beings as weak and as subject to so many ills as we are; a virtue all the more universal and useful to man as it precedes the exercise of all reflection in him, and so Natural that even the beasts sometimes show evident signs of it.”4 Pity is a powerful sentiment that is often acted upon without any reflection, “is prior to all reflection,”5 and allows for a kind of transportation from the self into the other, for “how do we let ourselves be moved by pity if 1 The Discourses note XV 218 ​ ​ 2 Emile 214 ​ ​ 3 By sentiment of existence, Rousseau means it is the source of the feeling of existence, which is a kind of feeling of peace and contentment. See Reveries 89. ​ ​ 4 The Discourses 152 ​ ​ 5 The Discourses 152-4 ​ ​ Weinstein 3 not by transporting ourselves outside of ourselves and identifying with the suffering animal, by leaving, as it were, our own being to take on its being.”6 Thus, pity serves as a basis of moral sentiments of care for others in Rousseau’s robust moral philosophy. Amour-propre is also a kind of self love, but one that is “born in society, which inclines ​ every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else, inspires men with all the evils they do one another, and is the genuine source of honor.”7 It is important to note that “the immediate and primary end that amour-propre seeks is not self-esteem [...] but eseem (or ​ ​ recognition) in the eyes of others.”8 Amour-propre is also a relative sentiment where that means ​ ​ “relative to other subjects and [...] that the good sought by amour-propre is defined by, even ​ ​ ​ ​ partially constituted by, certain relations one has to subjects other than oneself.”9 Amour-propre ​ is different from amour de soi in that “it [amour de soi] does not directly and necessarily tie us to ​ ​ ​ ​ other subjects, as does amour-propre.”10 It is important to note that Rousseau claims ​ ​ amour-propre can be utilized for good purposes, as he states that one can “transform it into a ​ virtue.”11 Conscience, also known as the inner sentiment, is a rather complex sentiment born from amour de soi, pity, and reason. Conscience is described by Rousseau as a “[d]ivine instinct, ​ immortal and celestial voice, certain guide [...] infallible judge of good and bad which makes man like unto God; it is you who make the excellence of his nature and the morality of his actions” 12 and “an innate principle of justice and virtue according to which, in spite of our own 6 Emile 223 ​ ​ 7 The Discourses note XV 218 ​ ​ 8 Neuhouser 34 9 Neuhouser 32 10 Neuhouser 33 11 Emile 252 ​ ​ 12 Emile 290 ​ ​ Weinstein 4 maxims, we judge our actions and those of others as good or bad.”13 Conscience mediates between amour de soi and pity i.e. between self-love and the love of others. Among Rousseau ​ ​ scholars conscience is divisive, as some scholars ignore it completely14 while others attempt to make it rational or dependent on reason.15 Regardless of these disagreements in the literature, because the concept of conscience appears explicitly and does important work in Rousseau’s discussion of virtues, I will make use of it liberally. I will also take a moment to define a less important term that is related to conscience, namely heart, because Rousseau claims that conscience relies on the heart for its proper functioning, as I will discuss in more detail below. The heart for Rousseau is a container for the sentiments, and in support of this he states that “we fill up his young heart at the outset with the passions which later we impute to nature”16 and “the sentiment of the just and the unjust [are] innate in the heart of man.”17 Conscience will play an important part in Rousseau conception of virtue, which may seem strange because virtue is traditionally understood as rational. However, sentiment plays an ​ incredibly important role in his conception of virtue. For Rousseau, virtue is neither an abstract medial concept that one uses to evaluate actions or dispositions nor is it a kind of understanding or knowledge. He goes so far as to say that “[g]eneral and abstract ideas are the source of men’s greatest errors.”18 Rousseau does not define virtue explicitly, but in the background of his works there exists a unique conception of virtue. In order to fully understand what Rousseau means by virtue it is important to look at Emile, for he develops his conception of virtue most in this piece ​ ​ 13 Emile 289 ​ ​ 14 See Neuhouser’s Rousseau’s Theodicy 247 wherein he omits passages where conscience plays an important role. ​ ​ 15 See Resiert, A Friend of Virtue, 118-21 ​ ​ 16 Emile 48 ​ ​ 17 Emile 66 ​ ​ 18 Emile 274 ​ ​ Weinstein 5 on virtuous education. In my investigation of virtue, I will first investigate Rousseau’s understanding of how to teach virtue, and how this illustrates what virtue is for Rousseau. Second, I will consider specific virtues that Rousseau discusses. Third, I will consider the relationship between virtue and sentiment. Fourth, I will consider the relationship between gender and virtue for Rousseau, and whether or not it is a problem for his conception of virtue. Last, I will put forward some concerns scholars of Rousseau may have about the content of this section. The development of virtue in an individual is a major portion of the project of Emile. ​ ​ This is to say that a good education is an education of virtue. As such, I will be enumerating a few examples from Emile to begun fleshing out Rousseau’s conception of virtue. Near the ​ ​ beginning of Emile, Rousseau asks “How is it possible that a child be well raised by one who ​ ​ was not well raised himself?”19 I see this as a question of virtue, for it may seem impossible for one who is not virtuous attempt to teach virtue to another, which may be why, in the end, Emile tells the tutor that “[A]s long as I live, I shall need you.”20 In any case, the first step in a virtuous education is not what one might expect, for Rousseau states that “the first education ought to be purely negative. It consists not at all in teaching virtue or truth but in securing the heart from vice and the mind from error. If you could do nothing and let nothing be done, [...] soon he would become in your hands the wisest of men; and in the beginning by doing nothing, you would have worked an educational marvel.”21 This looks like either wisdom is freedom from bad habit, or more interestingly that wisdom is brought about naturally so long as bad habits and vices do not get in the way.