The Decline of American Power and the End of the World System
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Immanuel Wallerstein. Alternatives: The United States Confronts the World. Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2004. v + 173 pp. $28.95, paper, ISBN 978-1-59451-067-0. Reviewed by Roger Chapman Published on H-US-Japan (November, 2005) In Alternatives: The United States Confronts tingly accelerated the process of America's decline the World, Immanuel Wallerstein argues that the of power. This is the thesis of the book and conse‐ United States is a superpower in decline, dating quently there is a great deal of focus on Bush's at‐ the beginning of this trend back to the 1970s. The tack on Iraq. dominance the United States enjoyed immediately Wallerstein writes, "September 11 simply following World War II was not to last as other crystallized a vague sentiment into a pressing countries began to catch up economically and concern." That vague sentiment was essentially a technologically. Now what is new, Wallerstein ex‐ nation's fear of losing international standing. plains, is the response coming out of Washington. Hence, there is the fear of Other and the fear that From Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton the ap‐ Other is scornful and no longer in awe of the Unit‐ proach to foreign policy was basically the same, ed States. "The American people are afraid of ter‐ one of "soft" multilateralism. In other words, rorists; they are afraid of Moslems; they are afraid Washington always did what it wanted to do on of strangers," the author continues. "It is the fear the world stage but usually after frst obtaining that the U.S. is no longer strong as it once was, is agreement from other nations: "The U.S. is multi‐ no longer as respected as it once was, is no longer lateral to the degree that others adopt the U.S. uni‐ appreciated as it once was" (p. 78). lateral position" (p. 90). Such orchestrating of Significantly, such fear is interconnected with coalitions and the development of consensus actu‐ domestic worries. "It is the fear that the American ally helped maintain American dominance in for‐ standard of living is in danger--a fear of inflation eign affairs and it helped maintain what the au‐ and of deflation, a fear of losing employment, a thor has for years referred to as the "world sys‐ fear that, as they live longer, they no longer live tem."[1] With George W. Bush's response to Sep‐ as well, because the health care for the older part tember 11 traditional multilateralism has been re‐ of the population is far weaker than people expect placed by "raw" unilateralism, which has unwit‐ and want." As if fear is the only thing to fear, H-Net Reviews Washington has responded with a course of ac‐ would explain in part why political conservatives tion that largely ignores the underlying problems. have resorted to Cold War rhetoric when address‐ "Bush responds to that fear not by saying there is ing the problem of global terrorism. Although the no problem, but by saying that there is a problem policy of containment has been relegated to the to which he has a remedy--tough, determined ac‐ dustbin of history and replaced by the Bush Doc‐ tion. The Bush administration exudes confidence trine of preemption (which is quite in keeping in itself and this attracts fearful people, enough at with these postmodern times characterized by a least who give their vote to toughness" (p. 78). vagueness of boundaries and a vagueness of ene‐ And such toughness, the implementation of shock, my identification), it has little to do with an aban‐ is directed at scapegoats, such as Saddam Hussein, donment of the Cold War mindset. while the decline of the United States accelerates Then and now, the thinking out of Washing‐ to terminal velocity. ton has been one of American exceptionalism, the Wallerstein sees Bush's invasion of Iraq as United States as savior of the free world. If it less about carrying out regime change and more could be shown that Washington possesses the ca‐ to do with intimidating the allies of the United pability of containing terrorism the way it had States, "so that they stop their carping, their criti‐ once contained the Soviet Union (contained in cisms, and fall back into line, as the schoolchild‐ that the Kremlin never bombed the United States ren they are considered to be" (pp. 89-90). In other or Western Europe), probably there could be words, "What Bush sought to demonstrate was greater unity between America and its allies. that the United States could and would assert its What is new is that there is no equivalent of nu‐ power unilaterally in the world, succeed militarily clear deterrence to keep the enemy at bay. Other in doing so, and thereby strengthen its political than waging world war and carrying out a policy and economic position in the world" (p. 135). of extermination, there is no military solution for The author thinks the "shock and awe" plan stopping terrorism in the way that nuclear has failed miserably, putting the nation's decline brinkmanship worked against the Soviet Union. of power in an unstoppable fast-forward mode. [2] Since the United States has few answers and He believes that now more nations than ever will little power in dealing with terrorism, Washing‐ try to develop weapons of mass destruction, in‐ ton as command center is devalued by its tradi‐ cluding nuclear arms. Moreover, new alliances tional allies. are being fashioned to serve as a counterweight Alternatives is divided into three sections: against the United States' unilateralism: France, part 1, "Terrorism: The Bush Fiasco" (pp. 1-16); Germany, and Russia; China and Russia; China, part 2, "Bush Encounters the World: Commen‐ Korea, and Japan; and Latin America. The United taries, 2001-2004" (pp. 17-142); and part 3, "The States is challenged by a populist resurgence in Possible and the Desirable" (pp. 143-162). The bulk Latin America, a stronger China, and an unwill‐ of this work is comprised of the author's reconsti‐ ingness of Japan, South Korea, and China to take a tuted Web blogs (p. vii) that offer a diary-like com‐ hard stance against North Korea (pp. 83-84). mentary on the events leading up to Gulf War II Actually, the end of the Cold War began this and the subsequent quagmire/insurgency. The au‐ unraveling of American hegemony. "The collapse thor is a senior research scholar at Yale University of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991 represented a and editor of the Fernand Braudel Center Series. disaster, from the standpoint of U.S. control over There is probably an unwritten rule that a series its allies," Wallerstein explains. "It undid the ma‐ editor never publishes his own book in order to jor justification for U.S. Leadership" (p. 104). This avoid the problem of embarrassment afterwards. 2 H-Net Reviews This work is a fascinating and brisk read, on par As for the "political chaos" of the Middle East, with a rousing op-ed piece, but it would hardly is there any not directly or indirectly related to have passed muster through the usual vetting the legacies of imperialism? The terrorism that process. Web blogs on current events, it seems, has emerged from that part of the world is very are less than ideal material for constructing an much a negative reaction to the imperialistic mis‐ academic work because the reflection of events in sions of Great Britain and France and later, fol‐ real time, no matter how insightful the commen‐ lowing World War II, the United States. For exam‐ tator, is inevitably shortsighted. ple, what is the origin of the dislike Iran has for The strength of this book is that it attempts to the United States if it is not the 1953 CIA coup to explain American post-September 11 foreign poli‐ reinstall the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi to the cy developments and show the rational, if not nec‐ throne, an action Dwight Eisenhower ordered on essarily wise, thinking behind the decisions made behalf of British oil interests?[4] by Bush and his advisers. On the other hand, a What exactly are the "alternatives" being dis‐ weakness of the overall analysis is the presuppo‐ cussed in Alternatives? The author maintains that sition that the hawks of the Bush administration the Bush foreign policy has made things where are always behaving as rational actors. It could be the United States will not be able to return to argued, seemingly without much difficulty, that "soft" multilateralism because the world commu‐ the hawks have been deluded by an ideology that nity is no longer the same. The alternative to has made them less than rational. An ideology can American hegemony is multipolarity. This will re‐ be based on rational thought, but its adherents quire the United States to jettison American ex‐ can turn that rationality into a faith system that ceptionalism and "start thinking of itself as one calcifies into a rejection of the world of facts. Un‐ mature country among many, one that has had like Abraham Lincoln who maintained a war cabi‐ both greatness and things to repent in its past, as net comprised of individuals with diverse view‐ have most others" (p. 148). This approach would points,[3] George W. Bush seems happily predis‐ require Washington to engage in genuine dia‐ posed to seclude himself with people who practice logue with the rest of the world and quit talking groupthink and have zero tolerance for dissent. down to its allies. Perhaps only a psychoanalyst would be able to "Multipolarity is a great virtue, not a danger uncover the source of why Bush wanted to go to for the United States," Wallerstein insists, adding war against Iraq, but Wallerstein probably offers that a new era of dialogue among the nations (in‐ at least a partial reason.